Voluntary Research

Macapagal, Gladys, D.

Evidence

AMENDMENTS: [] – Revised Rules on Evidence; __ - Amended A.M. No. 19-08-15-SC

Rule 132

Section 5. Direct examination. — Direct examination is the examination-in-chief of a witness by the

party presenting him or her on the facts relevant to the issue.

Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. — Upon the termination of the direct
examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party [as to many matters stated in the
direct examination, or connected therewith] on any relevant matter, with sufficient fullness and
freedom to test his or her accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse,
and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue.

Section 11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness. — A witness may be impeached by the party
against whom he or she was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his or her general
reputation for truth, honestly, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he or she has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present, testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts,
except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he
or she has been convicted of an offense.

Section 12. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime. – For the purpose of impeaching a witness,
evidence that he or she has been convicted by final judgment of a crime shall be admitted if (a) the
crime was punishable by a penalty in excess of one year; or (b) the crime involved moral turpitude,
regardless of the penalty.

However, evidence of a conviction is not admissible if the conviction has been the subject of an
amnesty or annulment of the conviction.

Section 13 [Then Section 12]. Party may not impeach his own witness. — Except with respect to
witnesses referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 10 of this Rule, the party [producing]
presenting a witness is not allowed to impeach his or her credibility.

A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon adequate
showing of his or her adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his or her having misled the
party into calling him or her to the witness stand.

The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party, may be impeached
by the party presenting him or her in all respects as if he or she had been called by the adverse party,
except by evidence of his or her bad character. He or she may also be impeached and cross-examined by
the adverse party, but such cross-examination must only be on the subject matter of his or her
examination-in-chief.

Section 14 [Then Section 13]. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent

statements. — Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he or she has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his or her present testimony, the statements must be related to him or
her, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he or she must be
asked whether he or she made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be
in writing, they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him or her concerning them.

[Then Section 14. Evidence of good character of witness. — Evidence of the good character of a witness
is not admissible until such character has been impeached.] – Incorporated in Section 54, Rule 130

Rule 130, Section 54. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions. – Evidence of a person’s
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion; except:

(a) In Criminal cases:

(1) The character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree
the probability or improbability of the offense charged.

(2) The accused may prove his or her good moral character, pertinent to the moral trait involved in the
offense charged. However, the prosecution may not prove his or her bad moral character unless on
rebuttal.

(b) In Civil cases:

Evidence of moral character of a party in a civil case is admissible only when pertinent to the
issue of character involved in the case.

(c) In Criminal and Civil Cases:

Evidence of the good character of a witness is not admissible until such character has been
impeached.

In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof
may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-
examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.

In cases which character or trait of character of a person is an essential element of a crime,

claim or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of that person’s conduct.

Section 15. Exclusion and separation of witnesses. — [On any trial or hearing, the judge may exclude
from the court any witness not at the time under examination, so that he may not hear the testimony of
other witnesses.] The court, motu proprio or upon motion, shall order witnesses excluded so that they
cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses. This rule does not authorize exclusion of (a) a party who
is a natural person, (b) a duly designated representative of a juridical entity which is a party to the case,
(c) a person whose presence is essential to the presentation of the party’s cause, or (d) a person
authorized by a statute to be present.

The [judge] court may also cause witnesses to be kept separate and to be prevented from
conversing with one another, directly or through intermediaries, until all shall have been examined.

Section 19. Classes of Documents. — For the purpose of their presentation evidence, documents are
either public or private.
Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments;

(c) Documents that are considered public documents under treaties and conventions which are in force
between the Philippines and the country of sources; and

(d) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to the entered therein.

All other writings are private.

Section 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office
in which the record is kept is in foreign country, which is a contracting party to a treaty or convention to
which the Philippines is also a party, or considered a public document under such treaty or convention
pursuant to paragraph (c) of Section 19 hereof, the certificate or its equivalent shall be in the form
prescribed by such treaty or convention subject to reciprocity granted to public documents from the
Philippines.

For documents originating from a foreign country which is not a contracting party to a treaty or
convention referred in the preceding sentence, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.

A document that is accompanied by a certificate or its equivalent may be presented in evidence

without further proof, the certificate or its equivalent being prima facie evidence of the due execution
and genuineness of the document involved. The certificate shall not be required when a treaty or
convention between a foreign country and the Philippines has abolished the requirement, or has
exempted the document itself from this formality.
Cases:

Direct and Cross-examination

Patungan, Jr. V. People. G.R. No. 231827. January 20, 2020

Facts: In an information filed dated March 24, 2008, Edgardo Patungan Jr. was charged for the crime of
homicide for allegedly stabbing Venancio Furigay with a knife, thereby inflicting upon the latter wounds
which caused his death.

According to the prosecution, Kristine and Gladys Furigay, daughters of the deceased, went to
the store of a certain Viring near the accused-appellant’s house. While on their way back home, they
met Richard Ventura who shouted “pokpok” at Kristine and he proceeded to the accused-appellant’s
house. The women went to Patungan’s house to talk to Richard, wherein they saw that there was a
group of men having a drinking spree, including Patungan. Kristine, who was then crying, asked Richard
why he called her "pokpok," but Richard just kept quiet. Also, Patungan also tried to cover up for
Richard.

Later, Venancio arrived at the petitioner's house to fetch her daughters. He had a heated
argument with Richard. Gladys asked Kristine and their father to just go home instead.  However, after
Venancio and his daughters had left the place and were already on the road, petitioner, who was
running, suddenly stabbed Venancio on his stomach.  Venancio subsequently fell to the ground. One of
the men, Erwin Patungan, boxed Venancio and slapped Kristine. Their Uncle Lauro came to their rescue
and rushed Venancio to the hospital, but the latter died after the operation.

PO3 Bago and SPO4 Balagan went to the hospital and asked the victim, Venancio, if he could
identify his assailant to which the victim replied that it was petitioner. The same was reduced into
writing, however, the statement was not reflected in PO3 Bago's affidavit of arrest nor in the police
blotter because according to him, they were running out of time and had no pen and paper.

In his defense, petitioner denied the charge against him and testified that he was in his house
with one Venerando Danga practicing church songs when he heard Richard outside shouting. He then
saw Richard holding a knife while screaming that he was slapped by Kristine three times. He advised
Richard to hide his knife. Thereafter, he saw Kristine, who smelled intoxicated, asking him why he called
her “pokpok”; Kristine, who was crying, was with Gladys at that time. He asked Kristine why she was
blaming him when he never called her "pokpok." Kristine then admitted that she mistook him for
Richard and left. Few minutes after, Richard, with his companions arrived with a bottle of gin and invited
him to drink, to which he refused as he had LBM. He allowed them to drink at the veranda of his house
and went to the CR. While there, he heard a commotion outside and saw Venancio sprawled to the
ground.

The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. CA affirmed, finding that
Venancio's daughters, who were with him on his way home, both categorically and positively identified
petitioner, their neighbor, as the one who stabbed their father; that although the incident happened at
night, there were streetlights near the locus criminis.

Issue: Whether or not the testimonies of Kristine and Gladys on petitioner’s identity as the one who
stabbed their father is doubtful.
Ruling: No. A review of the records would show that the prosecution witnesses, Kristine and Gladys, had
sufficiently proven that petitioner was the one who stabbed their father, Venancio. In her
direct examination, Kristine testified that she personally saw the petitioner stabbed her father; that she
was slapped by Erwin Patungan and that her uncle came to their rescue. Gladys corroborated Kristine’s
testimony.

Kristine and Gladys positively identified petitioner as the one who stabbed their father. We have ruled
that the familiarity of the witness to the perpetrator of the crime erased any doubt that the witness
could have erred in identifying him; and that a witness related to the victim of a crime has a natural
tendency to remember the faces of the person involved in the attack on the victim, because relatives,
more than anybody else, would be concerned with seeking justice for the victim and bringing the
malefactor before the law.

Moreover, contrary to petitioner’s claim that the prosecution failed to show that there was sufficient
illumination on the night when the stabbing incident happened, Kristine's testimony proved otherwise.
She declared on cross-examination that there were two street lights. One in front of petitioner’s house
and one adjacent to Viring’s store. Thus, there were two streetlights near the area where the stabbing
incident happened which provided sufficient visibility for Kristine and Gladys to identify petitioner even
when the incident happened at night and coupled with the fact that petitioner is known to them for
being their neighbor.
Public Document

The Heirs of Lupena V. Medina. G.R. No. 231639. January 22, 2020

Facts: Marsella Lupena filed a complaint for recovery of possession of real property against respondents.
While the case was pending before the RTC, Lupena died and she was substituted by his heirs. It was
alleged that Lupena was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Taguig. In or about 1985-1986,
respondents entered the property and unlawfully withheld and deprived Lupena over a big portion
thereof. Repondents refused to vacate the premises despite demands, thus, Lupena hired a licensed
surveyor, Engr. Tenazas, to determine the extent and exact area of the portion of lot individually
encroached by each respondent. Engr. Tenazas prepared a Relocation Plan, which was duly approved by
the Land Management Bureau and DENR, and a Sketch Plan.

For their part, respondents alleged that they were the owners of the parcel of land on which their
houses were erected. They argued, assuming without admitting, that they had indeed encroached on
the property of Lupena, they ought to be considered as builders in good faith for way back in 1964, they
year in which they erected their family dwelling, Lupena had not informed them that they had
encroached on her property. The RTC dismissed the complaint because it found that the evidence
presented by the petitioners failed to sufficiently establish that the lots occupied by the respondents
were actually part of or overlapped the property registered in the name of Lupena. The RTC stressed
that while it is true that the Relocation Plan is deemed a public document as it had been approved by
the LMB, and hence entitled to be presumed correct as to its contents in accordance with Section 23,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the presumption under the cited Rule is not conclusive but merely
disputable.

The RTC did not uphold the presumption of correctness of the contents of the aforesaid Relocation
Plan and Sketch Plan in the light of the information given by Engr. Tenazas during his cross-examination.
The RTC noted that albeit Engr. Tenazas claimed to have verbally informed [respondent] Medina about
the survey, such claim was not proven by the evidence on hand since there was no written statement
from [respondent] Medina that she had been so informed. CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling because
Relocation Plan prepared by Engr. Tenazas did not indicate whatsoever that the subject property was
encroached by the respondents.

Issue: WON CA misappreciated the evidence on record when it found that the Relocation Plan approved
by the LMB failed to show that the respondents encroached on the subject property.

Ruling: No. The Relocation Plan does not indicate whatsoever that the subject property was encroached
upon by the respondents. In fact, the petitioners Heirs of Lupena themselves admit that while Section
643 (d) of the Revised Manual for Land Surveying Regulations in the Philippines requires geodetic
engineers to indicate in the relocation plan the positions of buildings, fences, walls, and other
permanent improvements adversely affected by the determination of the boundaries, in the Relocation
Plan they offered as evidence, it states therein that there are no such adverse buildings, fences, walls,
and other structures put up in the subject property. Curiously, the petitioners Heirs of Lupena even
unequivocally admitted that the respondents did not put up any structure on the subject property.

Hence, with the Relocation Plan submitted into evidence by the petitioners Heirs of Lupena
incontrovertibly showing that no buildings, enclosures, and other permanent structures were put up by
the respondents on the subject property, the CA did not commit any error in holding that the petitioners
Heirs of Lupena failed to sufficiently establish that the respondents encroached upon the subject
property.