Windows Server 2016 Security Guide en US
Windows Server 2016 Security Guide en US
August 2017
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Contents
Windows Server 2016 Security Guide ............................................................. 3
Why is Windows Server 2016 security important?............................................................................... 3
How does Windows Server 2016 help prevent and detect compromise? ........................................... 4
Additional resources ............................................................................................................................. 5
Build a secure foundation .............................................................................. 5
Stay current on Windows Server security updates ............................................................................... 5
Configure Windows Server security settings ........................................................................................ 6
The high-level process for obtaining and deploying the security baselines can be found in the
Microsoft Security Compliance Toolkit 1.0. You can find out more about current Microsoft security
guidance at Microsoft Security Guidance blog. .................................................................................... 7
Back up your information and systems ................................................................................................ 7
Management and monitoring using Operations Management Suite ................................................... 7
Protect privileged identities ............................................................................ 8
How do privileged identities get compromised? .................................................................................. 8
How to prevent attackers from gaining access to privileged identities ............................................... 9
Harden Windows Server .............................................................................. 12
Improve threat detection ............................................................................. 15
Harden Hyper-V environments ..................................................................... 15
Why harden a virtualization environment? ........................................................................................ 15
How to harden Hyper-V environments ............................................................................................... 15
Appendix ............................................................................................................................................. 18
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Windows Server 2016 Security Guide
Windows Server® 2016 is the most secure version of Windows Server developed to date. However, just
as with every previous version of Windows Server, Windows Server 2016 needs to be secured and
hardened to your specific apps and environment.
This guide will help you secure Windows Server 2016 and previous versions of Windows Server for your
environment. It provides additional resources that contain step-by-step instructions you can use to
implement the guide's security recommendations.
Note Although this guide focuses on Windows Server, you need to have a comprehensive
security plan that encompasses your clients and network infrastructure, which is beyond the
scope of this guide. For additional Microsoft® security resources, see
http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/default.aspx.
Much like any other crime, the sooner that you can detect a potential attack, the more that you can
mitigate any compromise in security. Typically, an attacker starts by researching an environment's weak
points and then proceeds to performing the attack. After an attacker breaches an environment (through
phishing or vulnerable entry points), they proceed to escalate their privileges through lateral movement
within the environment until they take control over the organization within a short period, typically 24
to 48 hours from the first compromise (as shown in the following figure). Your goal is to detect and
respond to such attacks as fast as possible.
To do that, you need to extend the time it takes an attacker to take control to weeks or even months by
blocking their lateral movements and hardening your systems. Then you can detect the attack by
improving the various warning signals and respond by removing compromised identities and systems.
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Figure 1. Timeline for typical attack scenario
1. The attacker does some research and preparation about an organization (such as by using Facebook,
Linked In, search engines, or other social networking services).
2. The attacker determines the best method for initiating an attack (such as a phishing email or
probing edge-of-network services).
3. The attacker initiates an attack to gain a foothold into the organization's network and services.
4. The attacker gains access and then, using one or more compromised identities, attempts to escalate
their privileges.
5. The attacker gains escalated privileges and continues to compromise services and servers within the
organization, compromising data and/or causing denial of service.
It is important to note that the longer the attacker goes undetected, the more damage they can do and
the harder it will be to expunge the attacker from the network. Again, your goal is to extend the time it
takes to escalate privilege to weeks and months so that you can detect an attack and respond to it
before the attacker can gain full control. The remainder of this guide focuses on how you can make it
harder for an attacker to escalate privilege and move freely in your network, and how to detect attacks
sooner.
How does Windows Server 2016 help prevent and detect compromise?
As the latest version of Windows Server, Windows Server 2016 has built-in security features to help
better harden the operating system and detect malicious activity. The following bullet points identify the
security features available in Windows Server, and they are discussed in more detail in the
corresponding sections later in this guide:
• Build a secure foundation. This section discusses how to help ensure Windows Server is a secure
foundation for running your apps and services by using Windows Server security updates, Group
Policy settings, Local Script tools, and Microsoft Operations Management Suite (OMS).
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• Protect privileged identities. This section discusses how to help protect your privileged identities
(accounts with elevated privileges, such as members of Domain Admins) from theft by using Just
Enough Administration (JEA), Just in Time Administration (JIT), Credential Guard, Remote Credential
Guard, and Advanced Threat Analytics. Additional protections include the usage of Privileged Access
Workstations, which is not covered in this document.
• Harden Windows Server. This section describes how to help protect the apps and services running
on Windows Server by using Control Flow Guard (similar to /GS, DEP, and ASLR), Windows Defender,
Device Guard, AppLocker®, and Microsoft OMS.
• Improve threat detection. This section describes how to help detect security threats faster by using
improvements in Windows event log entries, Windows Server auditing, and Microsoft OMS.
• Harden Hyper-V® environments. This section describes how to help protect sensitive workloads
running in Hyper-V environments by using Guarded fabric, TPM in Hyper-V, and the Datacenter
Firewall in Software Defined Networking (SDN).
Additional resources
In addition to the resources listed in this guide, you can use the following resources to help you secure
Windows Server 2016 in your environment:
You can deploy these updates to the servers in your organization by using one of the methods listed in
the following table.
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Table 1. Methods for Deploying Windows Updates to Servers
Note All the methods for deploying and monitoring updates in this section are applicable to Windows
Server 2008 R2 and later versions of Windows Server.
These security baselines include recommended settings for Windows Firewall, Windows Defender, and
other security settings. These security baselines are provided as Group Policy object (GPO) backups that
you can import into Active Directory® Domain Services (AD DS) and then deploy to domain-joined
servers. You can also use the Local Script tools to configure standalone (non domain-joined) servers.
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The high-level process for obtaining and deploying the security baselines can be found in the Microsoft
Security Compliance Toolkit 1.0. You can find out more about current Microsoft security guidance at
Microsoft Security Guidance blog.
You can perform backups on-premises by using solutions such as System Center Data Protection
Manager or cloud-based backups by using Microsoft Azure Backup Server. There are also a number of
backup solutions available from Microsoft partners.
In addition, OMS integrates with on-premises System Center components such as System Center
Operations Manager to extend your existing management investments into the cloud. System Center
and OMS work together to provide a full hybrid management experience.
• Insight and analytics. This feature can collect, correlate, search, and act on logs and performance
data generated by Windows operating systems and apps. It provides real-time operational insights
for all your workloads and servers, on-premises and in Azure®.
• Security and compliance. This feature identifies, assesses, and mitigates security risks. It uses the
Security and Audit solution (which collects and analyzes security events), the Antimalware solution
(which provides current malware protection status), and the System Updates solution (which
provides current software update status) to ensure the ongoing security of your on-premises and
cloud workloads and servers.
• Automation and control. This feature automates administrative processes with runbooks (similar to
runbooks in System Center) using Windows PowerShell®. Runbooks can access any apps, operating
systems, or services that can be managed by Windows PowerShell. It also provides configuration
management with Windows PowerShell Desired State Configuration(DSC), which can automatically
enforce your configuration settings on-premises and in Azure.
• Protection and recovery. This feature can back up recovery workloads and servers. Azure Backup
protects app data for on-premises and cloud-based servers. Azure Site Recovery helps provide
disaster recovery by orchestrating replication, failover, and recovery of on-premises Hyper-V virtual
machines.
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Protect privileged identities
Privileged identities are any accounts that have elevated privileges, such as user accounts that are
members of the Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, local Administrators, or even Power Users groups.
Such identities can also include accounts that have been granted privileges directly, such as performing
backups, shutting down the system, or other rights listed in the User Rights Assignment node in the
Local Security Policy console.
You need to protect these privileged identities from compromise by potential attackers. First, it's
important to understand how identities are compromised; then you can plan to prevent attackers from
gaining access to these privileged identities.
• More privileges than are necessary. One of the most common issues is that users have more
privileges than are necessary to perform their job function. For example, a user who manages DNS
might be an AD administrator. Most often, this is done to avoid the need to configure different
administration levels. However, if such an account is compromised, the attacker automatically has
elevated privileges.
• Signed in with elevated privileges all the time. Another common issue is that users with elevated
privileges can use it for an unlimited time. This is very common with IT pros who sign in to a desktop
computer using a privileged account, stay signed in, and use the privileged account to browse the
web and use email (typical IT work job functions). Unlimited duration of privileged accounts makes
the account more susceptible to attack and increases the odds that the account will be
compromised.
• Social engineering research. Most credential threats start out by researching the organization and
then conducted through social engineering. For example, an attacker may perform an email phishing
attack to compromise legitimate accounts (but not necessarily elevated accounts) that have access
to an organization's network. The attacker then uses these valid accounts to perform additional
research on your network and to identify privileged accounts that can perform administrative tasks.
• Leverage accounts with elevated privileges. Even with a normal, non-elevated user account in the
network, attackers can gain access to accounts with elevated permissions. One of the more
common methods of doing so is by using the Pass-the-Hash or Pass-the-Token attacks. For more
information on the Pass-the-Hash and other credential theft techniques, see the resources on the
Pass-the-Hash (PtH) page.
There are of course other methods that attackers can use to identify and compromise privileged
identities (with new methods being created every day). It is therefore important that you establish
practices for users to log on with least-privileged accounts to reduce the ability of attackers to gain
access to privileged identities.
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How to prevent attackers from gaining access to privileged identities
You can reduce the attack surface for privileged identities (discussed in the previous section) with each
of the mitigations described in the following table.
Table 2. Methods for Preventing Attackers from Gaining Access to Privileged Identities
You can configure JEA as a Windows PowerShell session endpoint on any computer to manage that
computer or remote computers. You can configure a PowerShell Session Configuration file (which
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specifies who can connect to the JEA endpoint) and one or more Role Capability files (which specifies
which actions a specific user can perform).
With JEA, you connect by using your regular, non-elevated user credentials. After JEA authorizes you,
JEA runs the Windows PowerShell commands you specify by using an elevated virtual account on the
targeted computer. This approach means that you never actually sign in by using elevated credentials.
JEA works using Windows PowerShell and is available on any Windows operating system that supports
Windows Management Framework 5.0 and later versions (such as Windows Server 2008 R2 and later
versions of Windows Server).
1. An IT administrator uses the JIT system to submit a request to get administrative access.
2. The request goes through a workflow such as two-factor authentication or manager approval and
audit logs are created.
3. Upon approval, the IT administrator will either get temporary local administrative credentials to the
system they need to manage or their administrative account will be put in the right group that is
allowed access.
4. The IT administrator uses his administrative account (or temporary credentials) to log on to the
remote system (such as Remote Desktop or Windows PowerShell) or uses a remote management
tool with Run As credentials.
5. After the designated time, the privilege gets revoked.
• Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS). LAPS is available as a free download to help manage
local administrator password on Windows operating systems in your organization.
• Microsoft Identity Manager 2016. Microsoft Identity Manager is an on-premises identity and access
management system that provides JIT administration.
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authentication, authorization, and information gathering protocols (such as Kerberos, DNS, RPC, NTLM,
and other protocols). ATA uses this data to build a behavioral profile about users and other entities on a
network so that it can detect anomalies and known attack patterns. The following table lists the attack
types detected by ATA.
You can use ATA to help detect attackers attempting to compromise privileged identities.
For more information on deploying ATA, see the Plan and Design and Deploy topics in Advanced Threat
Analytics documentation.
Credential Guard
Credential Guard uses virtualization-based security to encrypt secrets (such as NTLM password hashes,
Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets, and credentials stored by apps) so that only privileged system
processes can access them.
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• Virtualization-based security (required)
• Secure boot (required)
• TPM 2.0 either discrete or firmware (preferred - provides binding to hardware)
• 64-bit CPU
• CPU virtualization extensions plus extended page tables
• Windows hypervisor
You can use Credential Guard to help protect privileged identities by protecting the credentials and
credential derivatives on Windows Server 2016. For more information on Credential Guard
requirements, see Protect derived domain credentials with Credential Guard.
To use Remote Credential Guard, the Remote Desktop client and server must meet the following
requirements:
• Must be joined to an Active Directory domain and be in the same domain or a domain with a trust
relationship.
• Must use Kerberos authentication.
• Must be running at least Windows 10 version 1607 or Windows Server 2016.
• The Remote Desktop classic Windows app is required. The Remote Desktop Universal Windows
Platform app doesn't support Remote Credential Guard.
You can enable Remote Credential Guard by using a registry setting on the Remote Desktop server and
Group Policy or a Remote Desktop Connection parameter on the Remote Desktop client. For more
information on enabling Remote Credential Guard, see Protect Remote Desktop credentials with
Remote Credential Guard.
As with Credential Guard, you can use Remote Credential Guard to help protect privileged identities on
Windows Server 2016.
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Server, you can compile them with Control Flow Guard enabled to help make your applications less
susceptible to memory corruption attacks.
For more information about Control Flow Guard, see Control Flow Guard.
Windows Defender
Windows Defender has been included in Windows operating systems since Windows 8. It helps protect
Windows devices against viruses, malware, spyware, and other threats. Windows Defender has been
optimized for running on Windows Server and is enabled by default in Windows Server 2016. The
advanced security features it provides include:
You can configure Windows Defender by using Group Policy, Windows PowerShell, Windows
Management Instrumentation (WMI), or interactively through the Windows Defender user interface.
The Windows Server security baselines also include Microsoft recommended settings for Windows
Defender.
For more information about Windows Defender, see Windows Defender Overview for Windows Server.
Device Guard
Device Guard provides the ability to specify which binaries are authorized to run on your server,
including user mode and kernel mode binaries (enhancing the currently available AppLocker
functionality).
You can create a code integrity policy to define the set of specific kernel mode and user mode binaries
that can run on your system so that malicious code is blocked from running.
Device Guard code integrity policies can be run in audit mode or enforcement mode. In audit mode,
Device Guard will trigger an audit log event whenever a non-authorized binary is running but will not
block the binary from running. The Device Guard logs are available in the following event log:
Logs\Microsoft\Windows\CodeIntegrity\Operational
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Audit mode allows you to identify apps that you do want to allow in your organization. You can create a
code integrity policy file based on the captured audit information in the event log.
In enforcement mode, Device Guard will actually block any binary that should be denied. You would
configure Device Guard for enforcement mode after you have run a selected group of devices in audit
mode to identify the apps that you want to allow.
1. Create an initial version of the Device Guard code integrity policies on a clean server.
2. Deploy Device Guard on a selected group of devices (that provide a good cross section of your
devices) in audit mode.
3. Collect audit mode events for a period of time to get an accurate representation of the apps in used
within your organization.
4. Create an updated version of the Device Guard code integrity policies based on the event log entries
collected from the select group of devices.
5. Configure Device Guard to run in enforcement mode on a select group of devices.
6. After a period of time, broaden Device Guard deployment to larger and large groups of devices
(updating the code integrity policies as necessary)
For more information on Deploying Device Guard, see Device Guard deployment guide.
You can also use AppLocker with or without Device Guard. AppLocker complements Device Guard, as
Device Guard does not lock down Windows Store applications. You can use AppLocker for locking down
which Windows Store Apps you would like to authorize to run on your server..
For Windows Server operating systems prior to Windows Server 2016, you can use AppLocker to provide
similar functionality to Device Guard. On these versions of Windows Server, you can deploy AppLocker
to harden Windows Server. For more information on AppLocker, see AppLocker.
Secure Boot
Secure Boot is a PC industry standard that helps ensure your device boots only software that is trusted
by the device manufacturer. Secure Boot helps protect devices from rootkits and other low-level
malware attacks by blocking unauthorized (non-signed) software.
When a device starts, the device firmware checks the signature for each piece of boot software to
ensure they are trusted. If all boot software signatures can be confirmed, the firmware starts the
operating system.
You need to ensure that Secure Boot is enabled in the device's firmware.
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Improve threat detection
Threat detection is an essential part of Windows Server security. The faster you can detect threats, the
easier it is to respond before an attacker reaches full control. Microsoft provides threat detection for
servers using Windows Defender Advanced Thread Protection (ATP). In addition, Windows Server
includes security audit events that can be consumed by Security Information Event Management
systems (SIEM) for threat detection. OMS security is one such system that provides threat intelligence
and analysis.
Windows Server has always provided essential security information by recording this information in the
Windows event logs. Windows Server 2016 represents the latest in this effort by providing improved
auditing information that helps focus on suspicious activities that should not occur on servers, such as
the following:
Windows Server provides these and other events that helps you identify suspicious activity. For a
complete list of the new events, see the Security auditing section in What's new in Windows 10,
versions 1507 and 1511.
You can use OMS to collect these new events and help improve insights into threats that may be
occurring within your organization. For more information on OMS features, see Operations
Management Suite earlier in this guide.
The following are Windows Server 2016 features that you can use to help harden Hyper-V
environments:
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• Software Defined Networking – Micro-segmentation firewall
The following figure illustrates how the Host Guardian Service uses attestation to ensure that only
known, valid hosts can start the shielded virtual machines by using the Attestation Service. The Key
Protection Service determines whether to release a key that the guarded hosts need to start the
shielded virtual machine.
The high-level steps for deploying guarded fabric and shielded virtual machines are as follows:
1. Deploy new Windows Server 2016 Hyper-V hosts, or upgrade any existing Hyper-V hosts to Windows
Server 2016.
2. Deploy the Host Guardian Service on a three-node cluster.
3. Configure the attestation mode for the Host Guardian Service.
4. Configure Hyper-V hosts to attest against the Host Guardian Service.
5. Create a shielded virtual machine template.
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6. Create a shielding data file, which contains sensitive information about the shielded virtual machine
(such as Administrator password or RDP certificates).
7. Create your shielded virtual machines.
For more information on guarded fabric and shielded virtual machines, see Guarded fabric and shielded
VMs.
You can protect virtual TPM (vTPM) by using the local guardian or the Host Guarding Service. If you use
the local guardian, the keys are stored locally. So, if the local Hyper-V host is compromised, the virtual
machines running on that host can be compromised.
If you use the Host Guardian Service, the keys are stored in the Host Guardian Service. So while the Host
Guardian Service requires more infrastructure, it also provides more protection.
Datacenter Firewall is one of the technologies in SDN. Datacenter Firewall provides the ability to
centrally manage firewall policies that help protect virtual machines from undesired traffic originating
from the Internet and your intranet networks. Datacenter Firewall is a network layer, 5-tuple (protocol,
source and destination port numbers, source and destination IP addresses), stateful, multitenant
firewall.
You configure Datacenter Firewall by creating Datacenter Firewall Access Control Lists (ACLs). Each ACL
is very similar to the Windows Firewall inbound or outbound rules. You can create as many ACLs as are
needed for each virtual machine. Each virtual machine may have its own unique set of ACLs.
As shown in the following figure, the Distributed Firewall Manager manages the firewall policies for each
virtual machine. If you move a virtual machine from one Hyper-V host to another Hyper-V host, the
Distributed Firewall Manager ensures the firewall polices are still applied to the virtual machine.
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Figure 3. Datacenter Firewall
Appendix
Windows Server 2016 Security related videos:
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