[ G.R. No.

 202275, July 17, 2018 ]

THE PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (PBOAP), THE SOUTHERN LUZON BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC.
(SO-LUBOA), THE INTER CITY BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION (INTERBOA), AND THE CITY OF SAN JOSE DEL MONTE BUS OPERATORS
ASSOCIATION (CSJDMBOA), PETITIONERS, V. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE) AND LAND TRANSPORTATION
FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD (LTFRB), RESPONDENTS.

FACTS: Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 were issued "[to promote and protect] the welfare of the
public utility bus drivers and conductors" and "(to ensure] road safety"by imposing a wage system where public utility bus drivers do not have
to compete with one another and drive recklessly for additional income. Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-
001 are social legislations and police power measures to which petitioners' right against impairment of obligation of contracts must yield

In the present case, petitioners' sole claim on their equal protection argument is that the initial implementation of Department Order No. 118-
12 in Metro Manila "is not only discriminatory but is also prejudicial to petitioners." Petitioners add that the initial implementation of
Department Order No. 118-12 within Metro Manila allegedly creates an arbitrary distinction between bus operators operating in Metro Manila
and those operating outside of Metro Manila, in violation of petitioners' right to equal protection of the laws.

Respondents counter that petitioners have no legal standing to file the present Petition considering that Department Order No. 118-12 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 are directed against bus operators, not against associations of bus operators such as petitioners. They
add that petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy courts in directly filing their Petition before this Court. For these reasons, respondents
pray for the dismissal of the Petition.

On the constitutional issues raised by petitioners, respondents contend that Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No.
2012-001 are valid issuances promulgated by the DOLE and the LTFRB in the exercise of their quasi-legislative powers.

Department Order No. 118-12 does not violate Metro Manila public utility bus operators' right to equal protection of the laws since it applies
to all public utility bus operators in the country.

ISSUE: Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 and DEPARTMENT ORDER N0. 118-12 violate the equal protection clause

RULING: At any rate, the initial implementation of Department Order No. 118-12 is not violative of the equal protection clause. In  Taxicab
Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. v. The Board of Transportation,this Court upheld the initial implementation of the phase-out of old taxicab
units in Metro Manila because of the "heavier traffic pressure and more constant use" of the roads. The difference in the traffic conditions in
Metro Manila and in other parts of the country presented a substantial distinction.

The same substantial distinction can be inferred here. Department Order No. 118-12 has also been implemented in other parts of the country.
Petitioners' weak argument is now not only moot. It also deserves no merit.
 [ G.R. No. 228087, January 24, 2018 ]

H. VILLARICA PAWNSHOP, INC., HL VILLARICA PAWNSHOP, INC., HRV VILLARICA PAWNSHOP, INC. AND VILLARICA PAWNSHOP, INC.,
PETITIONERS, V. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, AMADOR M. MONTEIRO, SANTIAGO DIONISIO R. AGDEPPA,
MA. LUZ N. BARROS-MAGSINO, MILAGROS N. CASUGA AND JOCELYN Q. GARCIA, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS: In 2009, petitioners paid their delinquent contributions and accrued penalties with the different branches of the SSS. On January 7,
2010, Congress enacted R.A. No. 9903, otherwise known as the  Social Security Condonation Law of 2009, which took effect on February 1,
2010. The said law offered delinquent employers the opportunity to settle, without penalty, their accountabilities or overdue contributions
within six (6) months from the date of its effectivity.

Consequently, petitioners thru its President and General Manager Atty. Henry P. Villarica, sent separate Letters, all dated July 26, 2010, to the
different branches of the SSS seeking reimbursement of the accrued penalties, which they have paid in 2009. Petitioners argue that the
last proviso of Section 4 of R. A. No. 9903 "clearly extends the benefit of the waiver" to employers who have settled their arrears before the
effectivity of the law, hence, to allow the refund of the corresponding penalties paid;  that the "equity provision" in Section 4 of R.A. No. 9903
should be interpreted to include a refund of penalties already paid if such law is to be given any effect;  and that a refund should be allowed
because there is no substantial distinction between employers who paid their accrued penalties before and after the effectivity of the R.A. No.
9903.

In its Comment, the SSC counters that since petitioners have already paid their unremitted contributions and accrued penalties before the
effectivity of R.A. No. 9903, there is nothing left to be condoned or waived; that, at the time of their payment, there was no remission of
accrued penalty yet; that R.A. No. 9903 does not contain a provision allowing the reimbursement of accrued penalty which was paid prior to its
effectivity; that the CA correctly interpreted the term "accrued penalty" to mean "unpaid" by using the definition provided in Section 1 (d) of
the IRR.

ISSUE:
RULING: Condonation statutes—being an act of liberality on the part of the State—are strictly construed against the applicants unless the laws
themselves clearly state a contrary rule of interpretation. Under R.A. No. 9903 and its IRR, an employer who is delinquent or has not remitted
all contributions due and payable to the SSS may avail of the condonation program provided that the delinquent employer will remit the full
amount of the unpaid contributions or would submit a proposal to pay the delinquent contributions in installment within the six (6)-month
period set by law. Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 9903, once an employer pays all its delinquent contributions within the six month period, the
accrued penalties due thereon shall be deemed waived. In the last proviso thereof, those employers who have settled their delinquent
contributions before the effectivity of the law but still have existing accrued penalties shall also benefit from the condonation program. In that
situation, there is still something to condone because there are existing accrued penalties at the time of the effectivity of the law. Section 1 (d)
of the IRR defines accrued penalties as those that refer to the unpaid three percent (3%) penalty imposed upon any delayed remittance of
contribution.Accordingly, R.A. No. 9903 covers those employers who (1) have existing delinquent contributions and/or (2) have accrued
penalties at the time of its effectivity.

There is no violation of the equal protection clause

There is a substantial distinction between employers who paid prior and subsequent to R.A. No. 9903's effectivity. The equal protection clause
guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place and in like circumstances. [71] However, the concept of equal protection does not require a universal application of the
laws to all persons or things without distinction; what it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification.

In other words, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. It does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. Neither is it necessary that the classification be
made with mathematical nicety. Congress is given a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification; especially when social or economic
legislation is at issue. Hence, legislative classification may properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not
preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear.

Significantly, petitioners have already paid not only their delinquent contributions but also their corresponding penalties before the enactment
and effectivity of R.A. No. 9903. Because of this observation, petitioners cannot anymore be considered as "delinquent" under the purview
of R.A. No. 9903 and are not within the class of "delinquent employers." Simply put, they are not similarly situated with other employers who
are delinquent at the time of the law's effectivity. Accordingly, Congress may treat petitioners differently from all other employers who may
have been delinquent. Verily, this Court cannot—in the guise of interpretation—modify the explicit language of R.A. No. 9903 in waiving the
collection of accrued penalties to also include claims for refund. It obviously violates the  Trias Politica Principle entrenched in the very fabric of
democracy itself. While violation of the equal protection clause may be a compelling ground for this Court to nullify an arbitrary or
unreasonable legislative classification, it may not be used as a basis to extend the scope of a law to classes not intended to be
covered. Therefore, R.A. No. 9903, which waived outstanding penalties, cannot be expanded to allow a refund of those which were already
settled before the law's effectivity.
 [ G.R. No. 202408, June 27, 2018 ]

FAROUK B. ABUBAKAR, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

FACTS: The assailed judgments declared Farouk B. Abubakar (Abubakar) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 10 counts of violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and Ulama S. Baraguir (Baraguir) and Datukan M. Guiani (Guiani) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 17 counts of
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

Abubakar, Baraguir, and Guiani were public officials of the Department of Public Works and Highways in ARMM (DPWH-ARMM) when the
offenses were allegedly committed. Abubakar held the position of Director III, Administrative, Finance Management Service. Baraguir was the
Director of the Bureau of Construction, Materials and Equipment, and a member of the Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards Committee, while
Guiani was the DPWH-ARMM Regional Secretary. After the creation of ARMM, the national government earmarked P615,000,000.00 for the
implementation of regional and provincial infrastructure projects. In 1991, the funds were transferred to the Office of the ARMM Regional
Governor. Later, a portion of the funds was then transferred to DPWH-ARMM.

During the incumbency of then President Fidel V. Ramos (President Ramos), the Office of the President received reports of irregularities
attending the implementation of the DPWH-ARMM infrastructure projects. The Commission on Audit was directed to conduct an investigation.

Based on the report submitted by the Commission on Audit, the Office of the Ombudsman conducted a preliminary investigation and found
probable cause to indict the regional officials of DPWH-ARMM for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. On July 31, 1998, 21 separate Informations were filed against Abubakar, Baraguir, Guiani, and other officials of DPWH-
ARMM. The consolidated cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 24963-24983.

Charged in Criminal Case Nos. 24963 to 24969 were Guiani, Baraguir, and several other DPWH-ARMM officials for allegedly awarding projects
to contractors without the required public bidding. Abubakar, Guiani, Baraguir, and two (2) employees of DPWH-ARMM were charged in
Criminal Case No. 24970 for allegedly awarding excessive mobilization fees to Arce Engineering Services.

Petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir assert that their right to equal protection was violated due to "selective prosecution." Only a handful of
DPWH-ARMM officials were charged of violation of Republic Act No. 3019. Several employees who allegedly participated in the preparation of
project documents were not indicted.

ISSUE: Whether there was a violation of the petitioners’ right to equal protection

RULING: NO. The prosecution of offenses is generally addressed to the sound discretion of the fiscal. A claim of "selective prosecution"  may
only prosper if there is extrinsic evidence of "clear showing of intentional discrimination.
 The prosecution of one person to the exclusion of others who may be just as guilty does not automatically entail a violation of the equal
protection clause.

The discretion of who to prosecute depends on the prosecution's sound assessment whether the evidence before it can justify a reasonable
belief that a person has committed an offense. The presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly performed their duties, and this
presumption can be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation.

Petitioners failed to establish discriminatory intent on the part of the Ombudsman in choosing not to indict other alleged participants to the
anomalous transactions. Their contention that several other public officials were not criminally charged, by itself, does not amount to a
violation of petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir's right to equal protection of laws. The evidence against the others may have been insufficient
to establish probable cause. There may have been no evidence at all. At this point, all this Court could do is speculate. In the absence of
extrinsic evidence establishing discriminatory intent, a claim of selective prosecution cannot prosper.
 [ G.R. No. 201292, August 01, 2018 ]

PENSION AND GRATUITY MANAGEMENT CENTER (PGMC), GHQ, AFP, CAMP AGUINALDO, QUEZON CITY, REPRESENTED BY ITS CURRENT
CHIEF, PETITIONER, VS. AAA (CA-G.R. SP NO. 04359-MIN), *** RESPONDENT.

FACTS: Respondent AAA filed an action for support against her husband, BBB - a retired military person, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Isabela, Basilan.

On February 12, 2010, the trial court issued its Judgment, [5] the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondent by way of the following:

1) Ordering the issuance of a Permanent Protection Order decreeing the respondent to support the petitioner and the minor child CCC
consisting of 50% of his monthly pension to be withheld regularly by the Pension Gratuity Management Center of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, General Headquarters, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, to be remitted by the latter by check directly to the petitioner

ISSUE: The lone substantive issue for resolution in this suit - which would settle the case once and for all - is whether petitioner may be validly
ordered by the court to withhold half of BBB's pension for direct remittance to respondent. The Court declares that it can; the issue has
already been settled in a previous case - one involving the very same petitioner in this case.

RULING: YES. A protection order is an order issued by the court to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their
family or household members, and to grant other necessary relief Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize
any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. The protection orders issued by the
court may be a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) or a Permanent Protection Order (PPO), while a protection order that may be issued by the
barangay shall be known as a Barangay Protection Order (BPO).

It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more
recent expression of legislative will. Statutes must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. However, if several laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier statute must yield to the later enactment. The later law is the latest
expression of the legislative will.

We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be construed as laying down an exception to the general rule
above-stated that retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The law itself declares that the court shall order the withholding of a
percentage of the income or salary of the respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically remitted directly to the woman
"[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary."

This Court has already ruled that R.A. No. 9262 is constitutional and does not violate the equal protection clause. In Garcia v. Drilon the issue of
constitutionality was raised by a husband after the latter failed to obtain an injunction from the CA to enjoin the implementation of a
protection order issued against him by the RTC. We ruled that R.A. No. 9262 rests on real substantial distinctions which justify the classification
under the law: the unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of
violence; and the widespread bias and prejudice against women.
 [ G.R. No. 221103, October 16, 2018 ]

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, PETITIONER, VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, RESPONDENT.

FACTS: In this petition for certiorari filed before this Court, petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes challenges the constitutionality of several
provisions of the 2015 Revised Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). In particular, petitioner questions (1) the rule
which requires the presence of at least one Justice of the Supreme Court to constitute a quorum; (2) the rule on constitution of a quorum; and
(3) the requisites to be considered a member of the House of Representatives.

Petitioner alleges that Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules is unconstitutional as it gives the Justices, collectively, denial or veto powers over the
proceedings by simply absenting themselves from any hearing. Petitioner further alleges that the rule violates the equal protection clause of
the Constitution by conferring the privilege of being indispensable members upon the Justices. Petitioner alleges that the quorum requirement
under the 2015 HRET Rules is ambiguous because it requires only the presence of at least one Justice and four Members of the Tribunal.
According to petitioner, the four Members are not limited to legislators and may include the other two Justices. In case of inhibition, petitioner
alleges that a mere majority of the remaining Members shall be sufficient to render a decision, instead of the majority of all the Members.

The HRET maintains that it has the power to promulgate its own rules that would govern the proceedings before it. The HRET points out that
under Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules, a quorum requires the presence of at least one Justice-member and four members of the Tribunal. The
HRET argues that the requirement rests on substantial distinction because there are only three Justice-members of the Tribunal as against six
Legislator-members. The HRET further argues that the requirement of four members assures the presence of at least two Legislator-members
to constitute a quorum. The HRET adds that the requirement of the presence of at least one Justice was incorporated in the Rules to maintain
judicial equilibrium in deciding election contests and because the duty to decide election cases is a judicial function.

Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules does not grant additional powers to the Justices but rather maintains the balance of power between the
members from the Judicial and Legislative departments as envisioned by the framers of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions. The presence of the
three Justices is meant to tone down the political nature of the cases involved and do away with the impression that party interests play a part
in the decision-making process. Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules requires the presence of at least one Justice and four members of the
Tribunal to constitute a quorum. This means that even when all the Justices are present, at least two members of the House of Representatives
need to be present to constitute a quorum. Without this rule, it would be possible for five members of the House of Representatives to
convene and have a quorum even when no Justice is present.

ISSUE: Whether Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution

RULING: Contrary to petitioner's allegation, Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere
fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable,
which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This
Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not
palpably arbitrary.

In the case of the HRET, there is a substantial distinction between the Justices of the Supreme Court and the members of the House of
Representatives. There are only three Justice-members while there are six Legislator-members of the HRET. Hence, there is a valid
classification. The classification is justified because it was placed to ensure the presence of members from both the Judicial and Legislative
branches of the government to constitute a quorum. There is no violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
 [ G.R. No. 199515, June 25, 2018 ]

RHODORA ILUMIN RACHO, A.K.A. "RHODORA RACHO TANAKA," PETITIONER, VS. SEIICHI TANAKA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF LAS PIÑAS
CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS: Racho and Seiichi Tanaka (Tanaka) were married on April 20, 2001 in Las Piñas City, Metro Manila. They lived together for nine (9) years
in Saitama Prefecture, Japan and did not have any children. Racho alleged that on December 16, 2009, Tanaka filed for divorce and the divorce
was granted. She secured a Divorce Certificate issued by Consul Kenichiro Takayama (Consul Takayama) of the Japanese Consulate in the
Philippines and had it authenticated by an authentication officer of the Department of Foreign Affairs. She filed the Divorce Certificate with the
Philippine Consulate General in Tokyo, Japan, where she was informed that by reason of certain administrative changes, she was required to
return to the Philippines to report the documents for registration and to file the appropriate case for judicial recognition of divorce. She tried
to have the Divorce Certificate registered with the Civil Registry of Manila but was refused by the City Registrar since there was no court order
recognizing it.

Petitioner argues that under the Civil Code of Japan, a divorce by agreement becomes effective upon notification, whether oral or written, by
both parties and by two (2) or more witnesses. She contends that the Divorce Certificate stating "Acceptance Certification of Notification of
Divorce issued by the Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama Pref., Japan on December 16, 2009" is sufficient to prove that she and her husband have
divorced by agreement and have already effected notification of the divorce. [28]

She avers further that under Japanese law, the manner of proving a divorce by agreement is by record of its notification and by the fact of its
acceptance, both of which were stated in the Divorce Certificate. She maintains that the Divorce Certificate is signed by Consul Takayama,
whom the Department of Foreign Affairs certified as duly appointed and qualified to sign the document. She also states that the Divorce
Certificate has already been filed and recorded with the Civil Registry Office of Manila.
She insists that she is now legally capacitated to marry since Article 728 of the Civil Code of Japan states that a matrimonial relationship is
terminated by divorce.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General posits that the Certificate of Divorce has no probative value since it was not properly
authenticated under Rule 132, Section 24 [31] of the Rules of Court. However, it states that it has no objection to the admission of the Certificate
of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce submitted by petitioner in compliance with this Court's January 18, 2012 Resolution

RULING: Judicial recognition of a foreign divorce requires that the national law of the foreign spouse and the divorce decree be pleaded and
proved as a fact before the Regional Trial Court. The Filipino spouse may be granted the capacity to remarry once our courts find that the
foreign divorce was validly obtained by the foreign spouse according to his or her national law, and that the foreign spouse's national law
considers the dissolution of the marital relationship to be absolute.

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a  verba legis or
strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this
aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit
of the law controls its letter.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

The second paragraph was included to avoid an absurd situation where a Filipino spouse remains married to the foreign spouse even after a
validly obtained divorce abroad. The addition of the second paragraph gives the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have the marriage
considered as dissolved, and ultimately, to grant him or her the capacity to remarry.

To insist, as the Office of the Solicitor General does, that under our laws, petitioner is still married to respondent despite the latter's newfound
companionship with another cannot be just. Justice is better served if she is not discriminated against in her own country.  As much as
petitioner is free to seek fulfillment in the love and devotion of another, so should she be free to pledge her commitment within the institution
of marriage.

In 2009, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9710 or the Magna Carta for Women, which provides that the State "shall take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations." [63] This necessarily includes the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Thus, Article 26 should be interpreted to mean that it is irrelevant for courts to determine if
it is the foreign spouse that procures the divorce abroad. Once a divorce decree is issued, the divorce becomes "validly obtained" and
capacitates the foreign spouse to marry. The same status should be given to the Filipino spouse. The national law of Japan does not prohibit
the Filipino spouse from initiating or participating in the divorce proceedings. It would be inherently unjust for a Filipino woman to be
prohibited by her own national laws from something that a foreign law may allow. Parenthetically, the prohibition on Filipinos from
participating in divorce proceedings will not be protecting our own nationals
 [ G.R. No. 237987, March 19, 2019 ]

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, REGION IV-A AND GENEVIEVE E. CUARESMA, AS ONE OF THE CERTIFYING OFFICERS AT
THE TIME OF THE GRANT OF THE ASSAILED CNA INCENTIVE,* PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, RESPONDENT.

FACTS: On December 16, 2008, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Central Office, through then Secretary Hermogenes E.
Ebdane, Jr. (Secretaiy Ebdane), issued a memorandum [5] authorizing the grant of Collective Negotiation Agreement (CNA) Incentive to rank-
and-file employees in the DPWH for calendar year 2008. The memorandum provides, among others, that:

3. That the CNA Incentive shall be paid out of savings generated from the Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE), completed
projects and Engineering and Administrative Overhead (EAO) of each office (Central Office and Regional and District Offices), subject to the
usual accounting and auditing rules and regulations[.]

On January 6, 2010, DPWH IV-A received a copy of ND No. 09-01-101-(09) dated December 14, 2009, signed by the Regional Audit Team
Leader and Supervising Auditor, both of the COA IV-A. The COA auditors explained that the CNA Incentive in the amount of P3,915,000.00 was
disallowed because it was paid out of the Engineering and Administrative Overhead (EAO), in violation of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) Budget Circular No. 2006-1, issued on February 1, 2006, which states that CNA Incentive shall be sourced solely from the
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE).

Cuaresma insists that the subject CNA Incentive was validly paid out of the EAO. She argues that payment of the CNA Incentive out of the
savings from the EAO in lieu of the MOOE is allowed under the General Appropriations Act (GAA) because MOOE and EAO serve substantially
the same purpose.

Cuaresma also faults the COA for allegedly being selective when it disallowed the subject CNA Incentive. She claims that there were other
departments and regional offices which sourced their respective CNA Incentive from the EAO but the COA allowed their releases. Thus, she
alleges violation of the equal protection clause.

RULING: This argument is misplaced. In People v. Dela Piedra, the Court declared that an erroneous performance of statutory duty - such as an
apparent selective enforcement of the statute - could not be considered a violation of the equal protection clause, unless the element of
intentional or purposeful discrimination is shown. In that case, the Court ruled that there is no violation of the equal protection of the laws in
prosecuting only one of the many equally guilty persons. This lone circumstance would not be sufficient to uphold the claim of denial of the
equal protection clause. Absent a clear showing of intentional discrimination, the prosecuting officers shall be presumed to have regularly
performed their official duties. showing a discriminatory design over another not to be inferred from the action itself. But a discriminatory
purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of "clear and intentional discrimination."  Appellant has failed to show that, in charging
appellant in court, that there was a "clear and intentional discrimination" on the part of the prosecuting officials.

Like the prosecution which has been given the discretion to prosecute whoever it believes to have committed a crime, depending on its sound
assessment of the evidence, the COA has the authority to disallow disbursements of public funds if, in its judgment, they were utilized in
violation of its intended purpose. Consequently, it is up to the person who claims to have been the victim of selective enforcement to prove
that the same was made for a discriminatory purpose.

In this case, aside from her allegation that DPWH IV-A was among those singled out by the COA concerning the disallowance of the CNA
Incentive, Cuaresma failed to present even a single evidence to show that the disallowance of the subject CNA Incentive was made pursuant to
a discriminatory purpose. Clearly, no violation of equal protection clause for selective enforcement could be attributed to the COA as
Cuaresma failed to prove that there was intentional discrimination.
 [ A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC, December 04, 2018 ]

IN RE: SPECIAL REPORT ON THE ARREST OF ROGELIO M. SALAZAR, JR., SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT,
BOAC, MARINDUQUE, FOR VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

I concur. Respondent Rogelio M. Salazar, Jr. (respondent) should be held administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service in view of his admitted drug use, and thus, ought to be dismissed from service. I do, however, find it fitting to
expound on the parameters of the exclusionary rule under Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution in order to address respondent's
averments in his August 25, 2017 letter to this Court.

To recount, in said letter, respondent requested for the dismissal of the instant administrative cases due to the prior dismissal of Criminal Case
Nos. 62-15 (for violation of Section 15 in relation to Section 28 of Republic Act No. [RA] 9165) and 63-15 (for violation of Section 11 in relation
to Section 28 of RA 9165) after the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled that the drugs seized under the void search warrant, as well as the fruits
thereof (i.e., the results of the confirmatory drug test), were inadmissible in evidence by operation of the exclusionary rule.  Notably, the
documents relative to the foregoing criminal cases were forwarded to the Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator
and hence, spurred these administrative cases against respondent. Thus, as presented in the ponencia, "[i]t is respondent's position that since
the evidence obtained through such search warrant were declared illegal and inadmissible by the  RTC, the same cannot likewise be used in the
instant administrative cases [which hence] have no leg to stand on and must be dismissed."

It is well settled that "an administrative case is independent from the criminal action, although both arose from the same act or omission xxx.
Given the differences in the quantum of evidence required, the procedure observed, the sanctions imposed, as well as in the objective of the
two proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other.

As previously stated, the exclusionary rule applies to any evidence obtained in violation of Section 2, Article III,  i.e., the guarantee against the
right to unreasonable searches and seizures, and has the effect of rendering such evidence inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The phrase "for any purpose in any proceeding" in Section 3 (2), Article III correspondingly reflects - as it is made to implement - the equally
expansive "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose" under Section 2 as above-said.

Indeed, the phrase "for any purpose in any proceeding" in Section 3 (2), Article III means that the exclusionary rule should apply in all kinds of
cases, whether criminal, civil, or administrative. It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that where the words of a statute are clear, plain,
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. As for the present matter, it is my
humble view that the exclusionary rule finds application in both the criminal and the administrative cases against respondent. As mentioned,
the primary evidence against respondent is the subject drugs seized from him. However, these drugs were obtained by virtue of a void search
warrant and hence, fall within the ambit of the exclusionary rule, rendering them inadmissible in evidence.

Likewise, the exclusionary rule applies to render inadmissible the results of the confirmatory drug test because it is the direct fruit of the
unlawful search and seizure. In People v. Alicando, the Court explained that "once the primary source (the 'tree') is shown to have been
unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the 'fruit') derived from it is also inadmissible. xxx The rule is based on the principle
that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained
evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. In this case, respondent's apprehension was based on the drugs illegally seized from him.
Without said evidence, there would be no reasonable basis for the apprehending officers to subject respondent to a confirmatory drug test.
Thus, the results thereof should be deemed as fruits of the poisonous tree and perforce, should be excluded.

These notwithstanding, records disclose that respondent voluntarily admitted before the public prosecutor during the preliminary
investigation that he was a drug user. As aptly pointed out by the ponencia, "[t]he admission was made by respondent during the preliminary
investigation stage which is a source independent from the illegal search, seizure, and arrest, and is presumed to have been regularly
performed. xxx Notably, respondent never questioned the voluntariness of such admission[,] as well as the regularity of the preliminary
investigation." As I see it, there is no clear causal relation between the evidence which were illegally obtained and the admission made by
respondent. The latter is not a logical consequence of the former. As earlier stated, the admission was a voluntary act of respondent; he was
not put into such an inescapable situation wherein he would be forced to admit to his guilt, since nothing precluded him from contesting the
admissibility - as he did, in fact, contest the admissibility - of the evidence illegally obtained from him. Thus, as respondent had valid claims and
defenses, it would be a stretch to conclude that the admission made during the preliminary investigation was a direct result of the evidence
illegally seized from him. That being said, the admission is a distinct and separate piece of evidence that should not be tarnished by the illegal
search conducted and hence, cannot be deemed as a fruit of the poisonous tree.

Without a doubt, the admission of respondent constitutes substantial evidence to hold him administratively liable for grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. "Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The standard of substantial evidence is justified when there is reasonable ground to believe that
respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant."
 [ A.M. NO. P-08-2519 (FORMERLY A.M. OCA IPI NO. 05-2155-P), November 19, 2008 ]

ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT AGAINST ATTY. MIGUEL MORALES, CLERK OF COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF MANILA

FACTS: The two anonymous letters charge Atty. Morales with the following offenses: attending to personal cases while using official time,
office supplies, equipment and utilities, leaving the office after logging-in in the morning only to return in the afternoon, and playing computer
games whenever he was at the office.

It is undisputed that pleadings for private cases were found in Atty. Morales's personal computer in the MeTC-OCC and Atty. Morales could not
provide any satisfactory explanation therefor. Such fact, by itself, could already make Atty. Morales liable for simple misconduct for it hints of
impropriety on his part. The Court has always stressed that all members of the judiciary should be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only
with respect to their duties in the judicial branch but also to their behavior outside the court as private individuals, in order that the integrity
and good name of the courts of justice shall be preserved. [42]

Atty. Morales, in defense, argues that since the pleadings were acquired from his personal computer which DCA Dela Cruz confiscated without
any valid search and seizure order, such evidence should be considered as the fruits of a poisonous tree as it violated his right to privacy.

Both the Investigating Justice and the OCA failed to discuss this matter. The Court however finds it proper to squarely address such issue,
without prejudice to the outcome of the administrative case filed by Atty. Morales against DCA Dela Cruz regarding the same incident.

ISSUE: Are the pleadings found in Atty. Morales's personal computer admissible in the present administrative case against him?

RULING: NO. The charges against Atty. Miguel Morales, former Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 17, are DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.

There are exceptions to this rule one of which is consented warrantless search.

DCA Dela Cruz in his report claims that that they were able to obtain the subject pleadings with the consent of Atty. Morales.[47] The Court finds
however that such allegation on his part, even with a similar allegation from one of his staff, is not sufficient to make the present case fall
under the category of a valid warrantless search.

Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred and must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. It must be voluntary in order to validate
an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion. The burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and
voluntarily given lies with the State. Acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed and courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. To constitute a valid consent or waiver of the constitutional
guarantee against obtrusive searches, it must be shown that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

In this case, what is missing is a showing that Atty. Morales had an actual intention to relinquish his right. While he may have agreed to the
opening of his personal computer and the printing of files therefrom, in the presence of DCA Dela Cruz, his staff and some NBI agents during
the March 16, 2005 spot investigation, it is also of record that Atty. Morales immediately filed an administrative case against said persons
questioning the validity of the investigation, specifically invoking his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.

While Atty. Morales may have fallen short of the exacting standards required of every court employee, unfortunately, the Court cannot use the
evidence obtained from his personal computer against him for it violated his constitutional right.

Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to
search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the
constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government.

And as there is no other evidence, apart from the pleadings, retrieved from the unduly confiscated personal computer of Atty. Morales, to hold
him administratively liable, the Court has no choice but to dismiss the charges herein against him for insufficiency of evidence.
 [ G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011 ]

BRICCIO "RICKY" A. POLLO, PETITIONER, VS. CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID, DIRECTOR IV RACQUEL DE GUZMAN
BUENSALIDA, DIRECTOR IV LYDIA A. CASTILLO, DIRECTOR III ENGELBERT ANTHONY D. UNITE AND THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
RESPONDENTS.

FACTS: This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who was charged administratively and eventually
dismissed from the service. The employee's personal files stored in the computer were used by the government employer as evidence of
misconduct. On January 3, 2007 at around 2:30 p.m., an unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson Karina
Constantino-David which was marked "Confidential" and sent through a courier service (LBC) from a certain "Alan San Pascual" of Bagong
Silang, Caloocan City, was received by the Integrated Records Management Office (IRMO) at the CSC Central Office. Following office practice in
which documents marked "Confidential" are left unopened and instead sent to the addressee, the aforesaid letter was given directly to
Chairperson David. The letter-complaint reads: I would like to ask from you personally if it is just alright for an employee of your agency to be
a lawyer of an accused gov't employee having a pending case in the csc. I honestly think this is a violation of law and unfair to others and your
office.

Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in information technology (IT), and issued a memo directing
them to conduct an investigation and specifically "to back up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal
divisions." It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the
petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or letters in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other
tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order dated January 11, 2007, requiring the petitioner, who
had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice. As to the anonymous letter,
petitioner argued that it is not actionable as it failed to comply with the requirements of a formal complaint under the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACC). In view of the illegal search, the files/documents copied from his computer without his
consent is thus inadmissible as evidence, being "fruits of a poisonous tree.

ISSUE: : (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files?; and (2) Was the search authorized by the
CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner's computer reasonable in its inception and scope?

RULING: There is no violation to petitioner’s right to privacy. The employee's expectation of privacy must be assessed in the context of the
employment relation. An office is seldom a private enclave free from entry by supervisors, other employees, and business and personal
invitees. Instead, in many cases offices are continually entered by fellow employees and other visitors during the workday for conferences,
consultations, and other work-related visits. Simply put, it is the nature of government offices that others - such as fellow employees,
supervisors, consensual visitors, and the general public - may have frequent access to an individual's office.

In our view, requiring an employer to obtain a warrant whenever the employer wished to enter an employee's office, desk, or file cabinets for
a work-related purpose would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business and would be unduly burdensome. Imposing unwieldy warrant
procedures in such cases upon supervisors, who would otherwise have no reason to be familiar with such procedures, is simply unreasonable.

We answer the first in the negative. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or
government-issued computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did
not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used
passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the
public assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have visitors in his office like friends, associates and even unknown people, whom
he even allowed to use his computer which to him seemed a trivial request. He described his office as "full of people, his friends, unknown
people" and that in the past 22 years he had been discharging his functions at the PALD, he is "personally assisting incoming clients, receiving
documents, drafting cases on appeals, in charge of accomplishment report, Mamamayan Muna Program, Public Sector Unionism, Correction
of name, accreditation of service, and hardly had anytime for himself alone, that in fact he stays in the office as a paying customer." Under this
scenario, it can hardly be deduced that petitioner had such expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable. Moreover, even
assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or proof of the aforementioned factual circumstances, that petitioner had at least a subjective
expectation of privacy in his computer as he claims, such is negated by the presence of policy regulating the use of office computers, as
in Simons. The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy
in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using
both automated or human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used
only for such legitimate business purposes. The search of petitioner's computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of work-
related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where
the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is supposedly "lawyering" for individuals with pending cases in the CSC. A
search by a government employer of an employee's office is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will
turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct. The above case is to be distinguished from the case at bar because,
unlike the former which involved a personal  computer of a court employee, the computer from which the personal files of herein petitioner
were retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence government property the use of which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and
monitor.