[ G.R. No.

 203984, June 18, 2014 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MEDARIO CALANTIAO Y DIMALANTA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

FACTS: On November 13, 2003, Calantiao was charged before the RTC of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 in an
Information. n November 13, 2003[,] at around 5:30 x x x in the afternoon, while PO1 NELSON MARIANO and PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ were on
duty, a certain EDWIN LOJERA arrived at their office and asked for police assistance regarding a shooting incident.  Per report of the latter, it
appears that while driving a towing truck and traversing along EDSA, Balintawak, Quezon City, he had a traffic dispute (gitgitan) with a white
taxi cab prompting him to follow said vehicle until they reached along 8 th Avenue Street corner C-3 Road, Caloocan City.  Thereat, the
passengers of said taxi cab, one of them was accused Calantiao, alighted and fired their guns.  Surprised, Lojera could not do anything but
continued his driving until he reached a police station nearby where he reported the incident.

The police officers on duty then were PO1 NELSON MARIANO and PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ.  PO1 Mariano testified that they immediately
responded to said complaint by proceeding to 5th Avenue corner 8th Street, Caloocan City where they found the white taxi.  While
approaching said vehicle, two armed men alighted therefrom, fired their guns towards them (police officers) and ran away.  PO1 Mariano and
PO3 Ramirez chased them but they were subdued.  PO1 Mariano recovered from Calantiao a black bag containing two (2) bricks of dried
marijuana fruiting tops and a magazine of super 38 stainless with ammos, while PO3 Ramirez recovered from Calantiao’s companion [a] .38
revolver. The foregoing testimony of PO1 MARIANO was corroborated by PO3 RAMIREZ who testified that he personally saw those bricks of
marijuana confiscated from the accused.  He confirmed that he was with PO1 Mariano when they apprehended said accused and his
companion and testified that while PO1 Mariano recovered from the accused a black bag containing marijuana, on his part, he confiscated
from accused’s companion a .38 revolver.

The accused offered a different version of the story.  According to his testimony, this instant case originated from a traffic mishap where the
taxi he and his companion Rommel Reyes were riding almost collided with another car.  Reyes then opened the window and made a “fuck you”
sign against the persons on board of that car.  That prompted the latter to chase them and when they were caught in a traffic jam, PO1 Nelson
Mariano, one of the persons on board of that other car alighted and kicked their taxi.   Calantiao and Reyes alighted and PO1 Mariano slapped
the latter and uttered, “Putang ina mo bakit mo ako pinakyu hindi mo ba ako kilala?”  Said police officer poked his gun again[st] Reyes and
when Calantiao tried to grab it, the gun fired.  Calantiao and Reyes were then handcuffed and were brought to the police station.   Thereat,
they were subjected to body frisking and their wallets and money were taken.  PO1 Mariano then prepared some documents and informed
them that they will be charged for drugs.

ISSUE: Whether the search was valid

RULING: YES. This Court cannot subscribe to Calantiao’s contention that the marijuana in his possession cannot be admitted as evidence
against him because it was illegally discovered and seized, not having been within the apprehending officers’ “plain view.”

The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest
outside the suspect’s person and premises under his immediate control.   This is so because “[o]bjects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has
the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.”   “The doctrine is usually applied
where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object x x
x.  [It] serves to supplement the prior justification – whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or
some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused – and permits the warrantless
seizure.” The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in Calantiao’s situation because the police officers purposely searched him upon his
arrest.  The police officers did not inadvertently come across the black bag, which was in Calantiao’s possession; they deliberately opened it, as
part of the search incident to Calantiao’s lawful arrest.

The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is “to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by
the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach.”  It is
therefore a reasonable exercise of the State’s police power to protect (1) law enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted on them by a
person they have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from being destroyed by the arrestee.  It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting
officers and the integrity of the evidence under the control and within the reach of the arrestee.

Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on
the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter’s reach.  Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of
evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control.   The phrase “within the
area of his immediate control” means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.   A gun on a
table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person
arrested. 

In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiao’s possession and within his immediate control.  He could have easily
taken any weapon from the bag or dumped it to destroy the evidence inside it.  As the black bag containing the marijuana was in Calantiao’s
possession, it was within the permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly conduct a warrantless search.
 [ G.R. No. 205015, November 19, 2014 ]

MA. MIMIE CRESCENCIO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

FACTS: This case stemmed from Ma. Mimie Crescencio’s (petitioner) conviction for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (Forestry Code). Acting on an information that there was a stockpile of
lumber or forest products in the vicinity of the house of the petitioner, Eufemio Abaniel (Abaniel), the Chief of the Forest Protection Unit of
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) - Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, Talibon, Bohol, together
with Forest Rangers Urcino Butal (Butal), Alfredo Bastasa and Celso Ramos (Ramos) went to the petitioner’s house at Balico, Talibon, Bohol on
March 15, 1994 at 3:00 p.m. Upon arriving thereat, they saw forest products lying under the house of the petitioner and at the shoreline about
two meters away from the petitioner’s house. As the DENR personnel tried to investigate from the neighborhood as to who was the owner of
the lumber, the petitioner admitted its ownership. Thereafter, the DENR personnel entered the premises of the petitioner’s house without a
search warrant.

Upon inspection, 24 pieces of magsihagon lumber, which is equivalent to 452 board feet, were discovered. When the DENR personnel asked
for documents to support the petitioner’s claim of ownership, the latter showed to them Official Receipt No. 35053 issued by Pengavitor
Enterprises where she allegedly bought the said lumber. However, when the DENR personnel scaled the lumber, they found out that the
dimensions and the species of the lumber did not tally with the items mentioned in the receipt. The said receipt showed that the petitioner
bought 10 pieces of red lawaan lumber with sizes 2x6x18 and 5 pieces with sizes 2x8x16 on March 13, 1994. On the other hand, the lumber in
the petitioner’s house, on March 15, 1994, was 24 pieces of magsihagon lumber of three different sizes, to wit: 20 pieces 2x6x18; 3 pieces
2x8x18; and 1 piece 2x10x12. Since the petitioner could not present any other receipt, Abaniel ordered the confiscation of the lumber, asked
for police assistance, and told the petitioner that they were going to transport the confiscated lumber to the DENR office for safekeeping.

In attempting to escape liability, the petitioner contends that: (a) she had the supporting documents to show that she bought the questioned
lumber from legitimate sources; and (b) the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the DENR personnel was illegal and, thus, the items
seized should not have been admitted in evidence against her.

RULING: The Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Nonetheless, the constitutional prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions, one
of which is seizure of evidence in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the “plain view” of an officer, who has a right to
be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.

There is no question that the DENR personnel were not armed with a search warrant when they went to the house of the petitioner. When the
DENR personnel arrived at the petitioner’s house, the lumbers were lying under the latter’s house and at the shoreline about two meters away
from the house of the petitioner. It is clear, therefore, that the said lumber is plainly exposed to sight. Hence, the seizure of the lumber outside
the petitioner’s house falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine.

Besides, the DENR personnel had the authority to arrest the petitioner, even without a warrant. Section 80 of the Forestry Code authorizes the
forestry officer or employee of the DENR or any personnel of the Philippine National Police to arrest, even without a warrant, any person who
has committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined by the Forestry Code and to seize and confiscate the tools and
equipment used in committing the offense or the forest products gathered or taken by the offender. Clearly, in the course of such lawful
intrusion, the DENR personnel had inadvertently come across the lumber which evidently incriminated the petitioner.
 [ G.R. No. 234333, January 08, 2018 ]

MILKESEDEC SIOCO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: At around 7:00 p.m. of November 24, 2014, the Barangay Hall of Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City received a call from a concerned
citizen that there was a man along Kaibigan Street, Kalayaan B, Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City, carrying a gun. Three of the on-duty
Barangay Peace and Security Officers (BPSO), Antonio B. Gutierrez (Gutierrez), Jonathan Lising (Lising), and Gil Palma(Palma), went to the area
to investigate. When they arrived, a woman pointed to a man, whom she claimed had a gun tucked in his waist. When Gutierrez approached
the man, who later turned out to be Milkesedec Sioco (petitioner), he noticed something protruding from the latter's waistline and when he
checked, it turned out to be a .38 caliber "paltik." The three then arrested petitioner and brought him to the Barangay Hall. After which, they
went to the Quezon City General Hospital for medical examination, and then brought him to the Police Station for investigation. Hence, an
Information for illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions punishable under Section 28 (a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 10591, otherwise
known as the "Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act" against petitioner was filed.

Petitioner presented a different narrative of his arrest. He averred that on the night of the arrest, while he and other persons were playing
video karera near his house, barangay officials suddenly arrested them and brought them to the Barangay Hall, where they were told that
somebody called the Barangay Office and informed them that a certain male was carrying a gun. Petitioner was then brought to a small room
where he was forced to point to a gun and admit that it was his. Thereafter, he was brought to the Prosecutor's Office where he was again
forced to admit ownership of the gun allegedly recovered from his possession.

ISSUE: Whether the search was valid

RULING: YES. The factual circumstances of the present case fall squarely under the plain view doctrine. Based on the plain view doctrine,
warrantless search is valid if the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification
for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it
is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. In
the case at bar, the gun was in plain view and readily visible as it was protruding and not totally covered by petitioner's shirt.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the search and arrest were illegal, petitioner has waived to question the legality of his arrest. Basic is
the rule that an accused may be estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of the Information
against him before his arraignment. Any objection involving the arrest or the procedure in the court's acquisition of jurisdiction over the
person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise the objection is deemed waived. Here, the petitioner never raised the
illegality of his arrest before his arraignment and in fact, as the records reveal, even participated in the proceedings before the trial court.

Since petitioner's arrest is a sanctioned warrantless arrest pursuant to the plain view doctrine and since the gun seized from him was effected
from a valid warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, the objects seized from petitioner as a result of the warrantless search are
admissible in evidence.
 [ G.R. No. 238865, January 28, 2019 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. BILLY ACOSTA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

FACTS: This case stemmed from an Information [5] filed before the RTC accusing Acosta of the crime of Illegal Planting and Cultivation of
Marijuana Plant, defined and penalized under Section 16, Article II of RA 9165. The prosecution alleged that at around seven (7) o'clock in the
morning of September 10, 2015 in Purok 2, Barangay San Juan, Gingoog City, Alfredo Salucana (Salucana) went to the Gingoog City Police
Station to report a mauling incident where Acosta purportedly hit him with a piece of wood. He also reported that Acosta was illegally planting
marijuana. Salucana's foregoing reports prompted Police Inspector Ismael Virgil O. Gundaya (P/Insp. Gundaya), Senior Police Officer 4 Henry B.
Legaspi (SPO4 Legaspi), Senior Police Officer 2 Jan Jomen (SPO2 Jomen), and Police Officer 3 Leo Pontillas (PO3 Pontillas) to proceed to
Acosta's home in Purok 2, Barangay San Juan, Gingoog City. Thereat, Salucana positively identified Acosta who was then walking on the trail
leading towards his house. The police officers then rushed towards Acosta and arrested him before he entered his home. After the arrest,
SPO4 Legaspi found thirteen (13) hills of suspected marijuana plants planted beneath the "gabi" plants just outside Acosta's home, and around
a meter away from where he was arrested. Upon seeing the marijuana, SPO4 immediately called Barangay Captain Rodulfo Maturan (Brgy.
Captain Maturan), Barangay Kagawad Danilo Macaraig (Brgy. Kagawad Macaraig), and Mrs, Joyce Donguines (Mrs. Donguines) of the Farmer's
Association, to witness the uprooting of the suspected marijuana plants. Thereafter, they brought Acosta and the uprooted marijuana plants to
the police station for the marking and inventory of the seized items.

In defense, Acosta denied the charges against him and maintained that the accusations hurled against him were all fabricated. He likewise
argued that the seized marijuana plants are inadmissible in evidence as the "plain view" doctrine is not applicable. Acosta argued that the
discovery was not inadvertent because it was Salucana who pointed out the marijuana plants to the police.

ISSUE: Whether the search was valid

RULING: NO. One of the recognized exceptions to the need of a warrant before a search may be effected is when the "plain view" doctrine is
applicable. In People v. Lagman, this Court laid down the following parameters for its application":

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search
warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The 'plain view' doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the
discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a
position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.

In this case, the first and third requisites were not seriously contested by Acosta. Instead, he argues that the second requisite is absent since
the discovery of the police officers of the marijuana plants was not inadvertent as it was prompted by Salucana. After a careful review of the
records, this Court is inclined to agree. The testimonies of P/Insp. Gundaya, SPO4 Legaspi, and Salucana collectively paint the picture that the
police officers proceeded with the arrest of Acosta for the mauling incident armed with prior knowledge that he was also illegally planting
marijuana.

It is clear from Salucana's testimony that he knew of Acosta's illegal activities even prior to the mauling incident. In fact, it may be reasonably
inferred that the mauling incident had something to do with Acosta's planting of marijuana. It is also clear that Salucana apprised the police
officers of the illegal planting and cultivation of the marijuana plants when he reported the mauling incident. Thus, when the police officers
proceeded to Acosta's abode, they were already alerted to the fact that there could possibly be marijuana plants in the area. This belies the
argument that the discovery of the plants was inadvertent. In People v. Valdez, the Court held that the "plain view" doctrine cannot apply if
the officers are actually "searching" for evidence against the accused.

Verily, it could not be gainsaid that the discovery was inadvertent when the police officers already knew that there could be marijuana plants
in the area. Armed with such knowledge, they would naturally be more circumspect in their observations. In effect, they proceeded to Acosta's
abode, not only to arrest him for the mauling incident, but also to verify Salucana's report that Acosta was illegally planting marijuana. Thus,
the second requisite for the "plain view" doctrine is absent. Considering that the "plain view" doctrine is inapplicable to the present case, the
seized marijuana plants are inadmissible in evidence against Acosta for being fruits of the poisonous tree.
 [ G.R. No. 234155, March 25, 2019 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. EDUARDO CARIÑO Y LEYVA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

FACTS: Appellant was charged in three separate informations with illegal sale of dangerous drugs (0.08 gram of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu), maintenance of a drug den, and illegal possession of dangerous drugs (0.04 gram of shabu). During arraignment,
appellant pleaded "not guilty" to all charges. After consolidation, joint trial ensued. On July 24, 2009, SPO2 Navarro arrested a certain Dexter
Valencia (Valencia)  for possession of illegal drugs. Valencia admitted that appellant's house, located at Mac Arthur Highway, Block 3, San
Nicolas, Tarlac City, was purposely used for shabu sessions. On that same day, SPO2 Navarro went to appellant's house to warn him of his
illegal activities. On July 30, 2009, at around 8:30 a.m., SPO2 Navarro and his team, which included SPO2 Andasan and a certain Jay
Mallari (Mallari),  conducted a surveillance operation around the vicinity of appellant's house. SPO2 Navarro was stationed at the highway,
SPO2 Andasan along Block 3, and another team member at Block 4. According to SPO2 Navarro, he saw three persons inside appellant's house,
later identified as Noel Manianglung (Manianglung),  Alma Bucao (Bucao),  and Milagros Soliman (Soliman), who were also in the "drug list."

After a couple of minutes, SPO2 Navarro saw appellant come out of his house and head towards the house of a certain Tikong
Dulay (Dulay). SPO2 Navarro followed him and he saw appellant hand some money to Dulay in exchange for four sachets of shabu. Appellant
went back to his house, with SPO2 Navarro following and returning to his position at the highway. He signaled Mallari to move closer to
appellant's house. A few minutes later, Mallari gave a signal to SPO2 Navarro that a "pot session" was taking place inside appellant's house.
Appellant then came out of his house. At that point, SPO2 Navarro approached appellant and told him he was being arrested for delivering
shabu and maintaining a drug den. After the arrest, SPO2 Navarro stooped to look inside the house and confirmed that Noel Manianglung was
heating foil with a lighter and a woman was holding a rolled aluminum foil and using it as a "tooter."

ISSUE: Whether the search was valid

RULING: NO. Objects sighted in plain view by an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to seizure even without
a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular
area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or
properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he inadvertently comes across a
piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. Here, it was a certain
Mallari who saw that drugs were being used inside appellant's house during the surveillance operation. However, Mallari was never presented
as a witness. His rank as a police officer and his assigned role during the alleged surveillance operation were not provided by the prosecution.
Thus, it could not be determined from the records whether the requisites of the plain view search were complied with against appellant's
alleged crime of maintenance of a drug den. The validity of the plain view search is crucial since it will determine whether the police officers
conducted a valid warrantless search and arrest against appellant and his house. The prosecution did not give any justification for its failure to
present Mallari as a witness. Worse, SPO2 Navarro, who arrested appellant, testified that he first performed a warrantless arrest against
appellant before he allegedly saw people using drugs inside the house.

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113, two elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in
the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. To be sure, the term probable cause has been understood to mean a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is
guilty of the offense with which he is charged. In this case, appellant was not doing anything beforehand when he was arrested by SPO2
Navarro. Certainly, it does not satisfy the elements of a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(a) of Rule 113 because SPO2 Navarro had no
probable cause before the arrest that appellant was committing or had just committed the crime of maintenance of a drug den. It was only
after his arrest that SPO2 Navarro purportedly saw the drugs being used inside appellant's house. Again, the finding of probable cause cannot
apply after the warrantless arrest had been made. Notably, Mallari could have established the overt act that drugs were being used inside
appellant's house before the arrest. Lamentably, he was not presented as a witness by the prosecution, thus, the facts and circumstances that
would create probable cause to arrest appellant could not be determined. The Court cannot make guesswork whether Mallari truly had
probable cause to justify the warrantless arrest of appellant by SPO2 Navarro.

The questionable and invalid arrest thus makes the subsequent search in the house of appellant also invalid, the exclusionary rule or the
doctrine of the fruit of the poisonous tree applies. According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been
unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized
evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act; whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act.
The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on
the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained
evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. In this case, the primary source is appellant, who was arrested illegally without probable
cause. Thus, all secondary or derivative evidence drawn from the arrest of appellant is also inadmissible as evidence, including those seized
from the search inside his house
 [ G.R. No. 89139, August 02, 1990 ]

ROMEO POSADAS Y ZAMORA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS: On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both members of the Integrated
National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes
Street, Davao City. While they were within the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they
noticed him to be acting suspiciously.

They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away
was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance. They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .
38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196 [ two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade,[ and
two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In the course of the
same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he
failed to do so. Hence, the herein petition for review, the main thrust of which is that there being no lawful arrest or search and seizure, the
items which were confiscated from the possession of the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence against him.

The Solicitor General, in justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the petitioner, argues that under Section 12, Rule 136
of the Rules of Court a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of an
offense without a search warrant. It is further alleged that the arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the circumstances.

ISSUE: Whether the search was valid

RULING: YES. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside
the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle or flashes a light therein, these do not
constitute unreasonable search. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's
right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail .

Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure, conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at bar, there
is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable
cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause
that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. It is too much
indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant
for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.

"The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a "stop and frisk" situation whose object is either to determine the identity of a
suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information. The United States
Supreme Court held that "a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for the purpose
of investigating possible criminal behaviour even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." In such a situation, it is reasonable for
an officer rather than simply to shrug his shoulder and allow a crime to occur, to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his
identity or maintain the status quo while obtaining more information. Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the
exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated.

The Solicitor General argues that when the two policemen approached the petitioner, he was actually committing or had just committed the
offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the presence of the police officers and consequently the search and seizure of the
contraband was incidental to the lawful arrest in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. We disagree.

At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not know
that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he
was hiding something in the buri bag. They did now know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a
warrant.
 [ G.R. No. 87059, June 22, 1992 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROGELIO MENGOTE Y TEJAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

FACTS: Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on the strength mainly of the stolen pistol found on
his person at the moment of his warrantless arrest. In this appeal, he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him
because it had been illegally seized and was therefore the fruit of the poisonous tree. The Government disagrees. It insists that the revolver
was validly received in evidence by the trial judge because its seizure was incidental to an arrest that was doubtless lawful even if admittedly
without warrant.

The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after the Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that
there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of
plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. As later narrated at the trial by Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan, they
there saw two men "looking from side to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified
themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them.
The suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson
revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right
pants pocket. The weapons were taken from them. Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by
the Intelligence Division. Besides the police officers, one other witness presented by the prosecution was Rigoberto Danganan, who identified
the subject weapon as among the articles stolen from him during the robbery in his house in Malabon on June 13, 1987. He pointed to
Mengote as one of the robbers. He had duly reported the robbery to the police, indicating the articles stolen from him, including the
revolver.For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the firearm or that he was licensed to possess it and claimed instead
that the weapon had been "planted" on him at the time of his arrest.

It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence because of its illegal seizure, no warrant
therefor having been previously obtained. Neither could it have been seized as an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote
was itself unlawful, having been also effected without a warrant. The defense also contends that the testimony regarding the alleged robbery
in Danganan's house was irrelevant and should also have been disregarded by the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether the search was valid

RULING: NO. There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding for any
purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3(2), of the Constitution. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the
justification given by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution, which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot
profit by their wrong will the wrong be repressed."

Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit
an offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer. These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the
arrest in question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting officers
themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by
Mengote their presence. On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, why his eyes were darting from
side to side and he was holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has
nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was all about. In fact, the policemen themselves testified that they were dispatched to that
place only because of the telephone call from the informer that there were "suspicious-looking" persons in that vicinity who were about to
commit a robbery at North Bay Boulevard. The caller did not explain why he thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the
impending crime. Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied. The prosecution has not
shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and that the arresting officers had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a
crime that had yet to be committed. The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been committed and neither were they
aware of the participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had appeared at the police headquarters, that
they learned of the robbery in his house and of Mengote's supposed involvement therein. As for the illegal possession of the firearm found on
Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this only after he had been searched and the investigation conducted later revealed that he was
not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it. Before these events, the peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote’ identity, let alone
the fact (or suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of Danganan's house.

It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just because he is holding his abdomen, even if it be
possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have
committed a criminal act or is actually committing or attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a free society. This is not a police state where
order is exalted over liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part of the arresting officer may be justified in the name of security.
 [ G.R. No. 113447, October 09, 1997 ]

ALAIN MANALILI Y DIZON, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS: Petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon was charged by Assistant Caloocan City Fiscal E. Juan R. Bautista with violation of Section 8, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425. At about 2:10 o’clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City
Police Station were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. The policemen
were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas and a driver named Arnold Enriquez was driving a Tamaraw vehicle which was the official
car of the Police Station of Kalookan City. The surveillance was being made because of information that drug addicts were roaming the area in
front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.

Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their vehicle. They then chanced upon a male person in front of the
cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When this
male person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then asked
the male person what he was holding in his hands. The male person tried to resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could see
what said male person had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took
the wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents.

On rebuttal, Pat. Espiritu testified that appellant was not riding a tricycle but was walking in front of the cemetery when he was apprehended.
Loreto Medenilla, the tricycle driver who was allegedly with the accused when he and the accused were stopped by policemen and then bodily
searched on April 11, 1988, testified. He said that the policemen found nothing either on his person or on the person of the accused when
both were searched on April 11, 1988.

Petitioner protests the admission of the marijuana leaves found in his possession, contending that they were products of an illegal search. The
Solicitor General, in his Comment, dated July 5, 1994, which was adopted as memorandum for respondent, counters that the inadmissibility of
the marijuana leaves was waived because petitioner never raised this issue in the proceedings below nor did he object to their admissibility in
evidence. He adds that, even assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, the search was legal because it was incidental to a warrantless
arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether the search was valid

RULING: We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the landmark case of Terry vs.
Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him,
and pat him for weapon(s):

“x x x (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized may properly be introduced in evidence against
the person from whom they were taken.”

Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of
Appeals, the Court held that there are many instances where a search and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an
arrest, one of which is stop-and-frisk.

In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling
like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his
experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who
were “high.” The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such
investigation, they found marijuana in petitioner’s possession.

Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor General’s contention that petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of any evidence illegally
obtained when he failed to raise this issue or to object thereto during the trial. A valid waiver of a right, more particularly of the constitutional
right against unreasonable search, requires the concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the right to be waived existed; (2) the person
waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

In the present case, however, petitioner is deemed to have waived such right for his failure to raise its violation before the trial court. In
petitions under Rule 45, as distinguished from an ordinary appeal of criminal cases where the whole case is opened for review, the appeal is
generally limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal.
 [ G.R. No. 182010, August 25, 2010 ]

SUSAN ESQUILLO Y ROMINES, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

FACTS: Susan Esquillo y Romines (petitioner) challenges the decision convicting her for violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9165 (the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) - possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

On the basis of an informant's tip, PO1 Cruzin, together with PO2 Angel Aguas (PO2 Aguas), proceeded at around 4:00 p.m. on December 10,
2002 to Bayanihan St., Malibay, Pasay City to conduct surveillance on the activities of an alleged notorious snatcher operating in the area
known only as "Ryan." As PO1 Cruzin alighted from the private vehicle that brought him and PO2 Aguas to the target area, he glanced in the
direction of petitioner who was standing three meters away and seen placing inside a yellow cigarette case what appeared to be a small heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white substance.  While PO1 Cruz was not sure what the plastic sachet contained, he became
suspicious when petitioner started acting strangely as he began to approach her.  He then introduced himself as a police officer to petitioner
and inquired about the plastic sachet she was placing inside her cigarette case.  Instead of replying, however, petitioner attempted to flee to
her house nearby but was timely restrained by PO1 Cruzin who then requested her to take out the transparent plastic sachet from the
cigarette case.

In her present petition, petitioner assails the appellate court's application of the "stop-and-frisk" principle in light of PO1 Cruzin's failure to
justify his suspicion that a crime was being committed, he having merely noticed her placing something inside a cigarette case which could
hardly be deemed suspicious. To petitioner, such legal principle could only be invoked if there were overt acts constituting unusual conduct
that would arouse the suspicion.

ISSUE: Whether the search was valid

RULING: YES. Petitioner did not question early on her warrantless arrest - before her arraignment.  Neither did she take steps to quash the
Information on such ground.  Verily, she raised the issue of warrantless arrest - as well as the inadmissibility of evidence acquired on the
occasion thereof- for the first time only on appeal before the appellate court.  By such omissions, she is deemed to have waived any objections
on the legality of her arrest. Be that as it may, the circumstances under which petitioner was arrested indeed engender the belief that a search
on her was warranted. Recall that the police officers were on a surveillance operation as part of their law enforcement efforts. When PO1
Cruzin saw petitioner placing a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance into her cigarette case, it was in his plain view.  Given his
training as a law enforcement officer, it was instinctive on his part to be drawn to curiosity and to approach her. That petitioner reacted by
attempting to flee after he introduced himself as a police officer and inquired about the contents of the plastic sachet all the more pricked his
curiosity.

Elucidating on what includes "stop-and-frisk" operation and how it is to be carried out, the Court in People v. Chua held:

. . . the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The police officer
should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious
conduct, in order to check the latter's outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine
reason, in accordance with the police officer's experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held
has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for
this principle to apply.

This principle of "stop-and-frisk" search was invoked by the Court in Manalili v. Court of Appeals. In said case, the policemen chanced upon the
accused who had reddish eyes, walking in a swaying manner, and who appeared to be high on drugs.  Thus, we upheld the validity of the
search as akin to a "stop-and-frisk." In People v. Solayao, we also found justifiable reason to "stop-and-frisk" the accused after considering the
following circumstances: the drunken actuations of the accused and his companions, the fact that his companions fled when they saw the
policemen, and the fact that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons w[h]ere roaming
the vicinity.

What is, therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has weapons or contraband concealed about him. Such a "stop-
and-frisk" practice serves a dual purpose: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the
recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate  circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation
which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that
could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned act of the police
officers constituted a valid "stop-and-frisk" operation. The search/seizure of the suspected shabu initially noticed in petitioner's possession -
later voluntarily exhibited to the police operative - was undertaken after she was interrogated on what she placed inside a cigarette case, and
after PO1 Cruzin introduced himself to petitioner as a police officer.  And, at the time of her arrest, petitioner was exhibiting suspicious
behavior and in fact attempted to flee after the police officer had identified himself.
 [ G.R. No. 205926, July 22, 2015 ]

ALVIN COMERCIANTE Y GONZALES, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

FACTS: On July 31, 2003, an Information was filed before the RTC charging Comerciante ofviolation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.
According to the prosecution, at around 10 o'clock in the evening of July 30, 2003, Agent Eduardo Radan (Agent Radan) of the NARCOTICS
group and PO3 Bienvy Calag II (PO3 Calag) were aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the area while on their way to visit a friend at Private Road,
Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City. Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour along Private Road, they spotted, at a distance of about 10
meters, two (2) men - later identified as Comerciante and a certain Erick Dasilla (Dasilla) - standing and showing "improper and unpleasant
movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other. Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately stopped
and approached Comerciante and Dasilla. At a distance of around five (5) meters, PO3 Calag introduced himself as a police officer, arrested
Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from them. A laboratory examination
later confirmed that said sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

In his defense, Comerciante averred that PO3 Calag was looking for a certain "Barok", who was a notorious drug pusher in the area, when
suddenly, he and Dasilla, who were just standing in front of a jeepney along Private Road, were arrested and taken to a police station. There,
the police officers claimed to have confiscated illegal drugs from them and were asked money in exchange for their release. When they failed
to accede to the demand, they were brought to another police station to undergo inquest proceedings, and thereafter, were charged with
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. In his petition, Comerciante essentially contends that PO3 Carag did not effect a valid warrantless arrest
on him. Consequently, the evidence gathered as a result of such illegal warrantless arrest, i.e., the plastic sachets containing shabu should be
rendered inadmissible, necessarily resulting in his acquittal.

ISSUE: Whether the search was valid

RULING: A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant case reveals that there could have been no lawful warrantless arrest made on
Comerciante. PO3 Calag himself admitted that he was aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of around 30 kilometers per hour when he saw
Comerciante and Dasilla standing around and showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to
the other. On the basis of the foregoing, he decided to effect an arrest. On the basis of such testimony, the Court finds it highly implausible
that PO3 Calag, even assuming that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy especially from a distance of
around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour miniscule amounts of white crystalline
substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets held by Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other overt act could be properly
attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Calag that the former had just committed, was committing, or was about to
commit a crime. Verily, the acts of standing around with a companion and handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be
considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and his companion were showing "improper and unpleasant movements" as put by PO3
Calag, the same would not have been sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure.[31] That his reasonable suspicion bolstered by (a) the fact that he had seen his fellow officers arrest persons in
possession of shabu; and (b) his trainings and seminars on illegal drugs when he was still assigned in the province are insufficient to create a
conclusion that what he purportedly saw in Comerciante was indeed shabu.

"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given
the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in
accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present where the police officer
finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. Experienced police officers have personal
experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to discern - based on facts that they themselves
observe - whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her
personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.

Malacat v. Court of Appeals clarifies the requirement further. It does not have to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion. It has
to be a genuine reason to serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk" exception: Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause
is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A
genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him. In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers must not
rely on a single suspicious circumstance. There should be "presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together,
warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity." 

In this case, the Court reiterates that Comerciante's acts of standing around with a companion and handing over something to the latter do not
constitute criminal acts. These circumstances are not enough to create a reasonable inference of criminal activity which would constitute a
"genuine reason" for PO3 Calag to conduct a "stop and frisk" search on the former. In this light, the "stop and frisk" search made on
Comerciante should be deemed unlawful. In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid "stop and frisk" search made on
Comerciante. As such, the shabu purportedly seized from him is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the
poisonous tree. Since the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Comerciante must necessarily be acquitted and
exonerated from all criminal liability.
 [ G.R. No. 211214, March 20, 2019 ]

LARRY SABUCO MANIBOG, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

FACTS: During pre-trial, the parties stipulated that on March 17, 2010, police officers arrested Manibog and seized his firearm for not having a
permit from the Commission on Elections to carry it. The issue was later narrowed down to whether an illegal search and seizure attended
Manibog's apprehension and confiscation of his gun. In the morning of March 17, 2010, Police Chief Inspector Randolph Beniat (Chief Inspector
Beniat) received information from a police asset that Manibog was standing outside the Municipal Tourism Office of Dingras, Ilocos Norte with
a gun tucked in his waistband. To verify this information, Chief Inspector Beniat immediately organized a team. Together, they proceeded to
the Municipal Tourism Office located around 20 meters from the police station.

About five (5) to eight (8) meters away from the Municipal Tourism Office, Chief Inspector Beniat saw Manibog standing outside the building.
The team slowly approached him for fear that he might fight back. As he moved closer, Chief Inspector Beniat saw a bulge on Manibog's waist,
which the police officer deduced to be a gun due to its distinct contour. Chief Inspector Beniat went up to Manibog, patted the bulging object
on his waist, and confirmed that there was a gun tucked in Manibog's waistband. He disarmed Manibog of the .45 caliber handgun inside a
holster, after which he arrested him for violating the election gun ban and brought him to the police station for an inquest proceeding. Police
Officer Rodel 2 Caraballa (PO2 Caraballa) testified that he was part of the team organized by Chief Inspector Beniat to verify a tip they received
concerning Manibog. He narrated that as he walked up to Manibog with the team during their operation, he noticed what appeared to be a
gun-shaped bulge on Manibog's waist.

ISSUE: Whether the search was valid

RULING: YES. For a "stop and frisk" search to be valid, the totality of suspicious circumstances, as personally observed by the arresting officer,
must lead to a genuine reason to suspect that a person is committing an illicit act. Consequently, a warrantless arrest not based on this
constitutes an infringement of a person's basic right to privacy. On March 17, 2010, Manibog was charged with violation of Section 1 of
Commission on Elections Resolution No. 8714, in relation to Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166, and Sections 261(q) and 264 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code (Gun Ban).

Malacat instructed that for a stop and frisk search to be valid, mere suspicion is not enough; there should be a genuine reason, as determined
by the police officer, to warrant a belief that the person searched was carrying a weapon. In short, the totality of circumstances should result
in a genuine reason to justify a stop and frisk search. For purposes of a valid Terry stop-and-frisk search, the test for the existence of
reasonable suspicion that a person is engaged in criminal activity is the totality of the circumstances, viewed through the eyes of a reasonable,
prudent police officer. Accordingly, to sustain the validity of a stop and frisk search, the arresting officer should have personally observed two
(2) or more suspicious circumstances, the totality of which would then create a reasonable inference of criminal activity to compel the
arresting officer to investigate further. Here, while the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that a reasonable search was conducted on petitioner,
the facts on record do not point to a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. Rather, what transpired was a stop and frisk search. Chief
Inspector Beniat received information that petitioner, whom he knew as a kagawad and security aide of Mayor Gamboa, was carrying a gun
outside the Municipal Tourism Office during an election gun ban. With a few other police officers, he went there and spotted petitioner right in
front of the building with a suspicious-looking bulge protruding under his shirt, around his waist. The police officer deduced this to be a firearm
based on the object's size and contour. The tip on petitioner, coupled with the police officers' visual confirmation that petitioner had a gun-
shaped object tucked in his waistband, led to a reasonable suspicion that he was carrying a gun during an election gun ban. However, a
reasonable suspicion is not synonymous with the personal knowledge required under Section 5(a) and (b) to effect a valid warrantless arrest.
Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the search conducted on petitioner fell under the established exception of a warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest. Nonetheless, the combination of the police asset's tip and the arresting officers' observation of a gun-shaped
object under petitioner's shirt already suffices as a genuine reason for the arresting officers to conduct a stop and frisk search on petitioner.
Hence, the trial court correctly upheld the reasonableness of the warrantless search on petitioner. In the present case, the Dingras policemen
searched the accused not only because of a tip - a very specific one - that he was at that moment standing in front of the nearby Municipal
Tourism Office with a gun on his waist. More importantly, PCI Beniat testified that at a distance of about two to three meters from the
accused, he saw the latter's bulging waistline indicating the "distinct peculiar contour" of a firearm tucked on his waist. Citing his experience as
a police officer, PCI Beniat testified that he could distinguish a firearm from any other object tucked on the waist of a person. In the language
of Justice Panganiban's separate opinion in  People v. Montilla, the Court finds that the bulging waistline of herein accused constituted "an
outward indication" that clearly suggested he was then carrying a firearm. It should be noted that the firearm recovered from the accused was
an ARMSCOR full-size 1911 pistol (GI series) with an overall length of 8.5 inches and a barrel length of 5 inches. Not being a compact pistol, its
size made it difficult to conceal. Conceivably, it could be concealed under appropriate clothes like a jacket or an additional piece of clothing. In
this case, however, PO1 Caravalla (sic) testified that the accused was at the time of his apprehension merely wearing a white shirt depicted in
his photograph at the police station. In other words, the accused was not wearing a jacket or any additional garment that could have masked
the contour of a full-sized pistol. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that the size of the pistol and the absence of any other clothing
worn by the accused during his apprehension support the testimony of PCI Beniat that his (the accused Larry Manibog's) waistline was then
bulging in a manner suggestive of the presence of a firearm