US-Taliban ‘peace’ deal: Despite being a key stakeholder, India has painted itself into a

corner of irrelevance

Sreemoy Talukdar

India’s reaction to the deal signed between the United States and the Taliban for “peace” in Afghanistan
reveals more than is immediately apparent. For one, it indicates India’s discomfort with the
development, portrays New Delhi’s determination to remain a stakeholder in Afghanistan while
simultaneously exposing its lack of options in the wake of a regional development that holds crucial
security and strategic implications for India.

Speaking to reporters Saturday on the US-Taliban “peace” agreement signed in Doha, and issuing of a
parallel joint declaration between the US and Afghan governments in Kabul, MEA spokesperson Raveesh
Kumar stated: “India’s consistent policy is to support all opportunities that can bring peace, security and
stability in Afghanistan; end violence; cut ties with international terrorism; and lead to a lasting political
settlement through an Afghan led, Afghan owned and Afghan controlled process.

“We note that the entire political spectrum in Afghanistan, including the Government, the democratic
polity and civil society, has welcomed the opportunity and hope for peace and stability generated by
these agreements.

“As a contiguous neighbour, India will continue to extend all support to the Government and people of
Afghanistan in realising their aspirations for a peaceful, democratic and prosperous future where the
interest of all sections of Afghan society are protected.”

Two points here are worth noting.

One, in using the word “contiguous”, India is delineating clearly that it shares a border with Afghanistan.
This has several implications. India is reiterating its sovereign rights over Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir and
formalizing its role as a neighbor of Afghanistan, not just a close regional partner. In so doing, New Delhi
is contesting not only Pakistan’s claim over PoK but also Islamabad’s key contention that India is an
“outsider” in Afghanistan.

Simultaneously, the statement expresses India’s determination to remain a key stakeholder and an
integral partner in the war-ravaged country’s reconstruction, reconciliation and restructuring. The word
‘contiguous’ is pregnant with more meanings than just a desire to maintain strategic depth in
Afghanistan.

Second, India “notes” that various stakeholders in Afghanistan — its government, democratic polity and
civil society — have “welcomed” the initiative, but it refrained from greeting the development or
expressing any enthusiasm or hope.

India instead issued a careful, stoic statement underlining the factors of importance that the so-called
‘peace deal’ should uphold. These factors include not only India’s oft-stated policy of “lasting political
settlement through an Afghan led, Afghan owned and Afghan controlled process”, but also “end of
violence”, cutting of “ties with international terrorism” and protecting the interests of “all sections” of
Afghanistan society.

Contrast this cautious statement with India’s vociferous backing on 20 February of Afghanistan
president Ashraf Ghani on his re-election in Presidential polls. The ministry of external affairs, in an
official statement, had congratulated Ghani and reiterated its support for “democratic aspirations of the
people of Afghanistan” and commitment for “strengthening our bilateral strategic partnership in fighting
the scourge of externally sponsored terrorism and for an enduring and inclusive national peace and
reconciliation which is Afghan led, Afghan owned and Afghan controlled.”

It would seem that India is deeply skeptical of the outcome of the US-Taliban peace deal, despite the
fact that in sending Indian ambassador to Qatar P Kumaran to Doha as an “observer” to the US-Taliban
peace deal, New Delhi arranged for a serving Indian diplomat to be in the same room as Taliban
representatives for the first time since 2001.

To interpret this as India’s endorsement of the peace deal would be a mistake, however. It was more an
acceptance of inevitability and a realist interpretation of the course of history over which India has little
control. New Delhi’s skepticism over the “peace deal” stems from an apprehension that the agreements
— signed by US representative Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar at a
ceremony in Doha where US secretary of state Mike Pompeo was also present — are merely the first
step and not a culmination of events.

India reads the “agreement” not as a treatise of “peace” but the first step towards an US exit strategy. It
regards withdrawal of US troops — from nearly 13,000 now to 8,600 within 135 days — as the
statement of intent from Doland Trump administration that it is tired of fighting an 18-year-old war.

The point needs to be elaborated here. India is aware of the inevitability of the turn of events, but it
does not consider the inking of “peace deal” at Doha — accompanied by cries of Allahu Akbar from
Taliban side as a unitary moment that may lead to a lasting solution to Afghanistan conflict, bring peace
to Afghan people and secure the progress achieved over the last 18 years.

This lack of conviction is also apparent in the reaction of India’s foreign minister Subramanyam
Jaishankar who, during an event in New Delhi, said that “our message to the US is that the achievements
of the last 18 years should not be lost”. Speaking with former foreign secretary Shyam Saran, Jaishankar
also expressed India’s apprehension that “real negotiations” will begin only now and it remains to be
seen how “cohesive are the various players, does the Taliban join the democratic set-up, or will the
democratic set-up have to adjust to the Taliban...We are all watching this space,” according to a report
in The Hindu.

Yet India is not the only party skeptical of the “peace deal”. The Afghan government led by President
Ghani — that has been kept marginalized by the lead actors (the US and Taliban) — is even more
skeptical of the deal, and views the agreement as a hogwash that may eventually give Taliban the space
and ability to capture power by toppling the democratic government in Kabul.

The Taliban certainly hasn’t lost hopes of doing so even as it agreed to kickstart “intra-Afghan” dialogue
for a power-sharing arrangement with the administration in Kabul. The footsoldiers of Taliban believe it
is merely a matter of time before they take over Kabul and establish an Islamic government.
Ghani is restless, and he has already rejected a key component of the “peace agreement” — swapping
prisoners with the Taliban. Under the agreement, around 5000 Taliban prisoners will be released in
exchange for 1000 from Afghan side. Remaining prisoners will be released in three months.

A day after the deal, however, the Afghanistan president told reporters that “government of
Afghanistan has made no commitment to free 5,000 Taliban prisoners”.

This is just one of the many hurdles that the “peace deal” faces, and even takes for granted by way of
escalatory steps. India has little say in shaping the realities because it remains averse to proactively
interfering with the turn of events by sending boots on the ground in Afghanistan.

The Ghani government wants India to consider deploying troops in Afghanistan, as the country’s
National Security Advisor, Hamdullah Mohib, recently told the powers-that-be in New Delhi but India
has never considered sending forces — even in a peacekeeping role — seriously because there is a
consensus among policymakers, strategic thinkers and governments that taking such a step may trigger
an escalatory mechanism bound to go out of control.

That’s a strategic choice, and India must live with the consequences of that choice. It is one of the
biggest players in region, an emerging superpower and a key stakeholder in Afghanistan. What happens
in Afghanistan has a direct strategic bearing and holds security concerns for New Delhi, yet it remains
completely at the mercy of other actors and has no other option but to ask others to be mindful of its
concerns. The Taliban may have little patience with such a request.