Report 1 of the Forty-Third

Statewide Investigating Grand Jury

 Table of Contents

Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 1

The Realities of Shale Gas Operations .......................................................................................12

The Effects of Shale Gas Operations on Pennsylvania Families .............................................22

The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection ..................................................48

The Pennsylvania Department of Health ...................................................................................68

Recommendations of the Forty-Third Statewide Investigating Grand Jury .........................93

RESPONSES TO REPORT NO. 1:

Response of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection ………………...103

Response of the Pennsylvania Department of Health ………………………...…………….160

Response of Michael Krancer ………………………………………………………………..224

Response of Scott Perry ………………………………………………………………………228

 Introduction

The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of
the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the
common property of all the people, including generations yet to
come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.

Pennsylvania Constitution, Article 1, Section 27: the Environmental Rights Amendment

This Grand Jury Report assesses impacts on Pennsylvania of a new, lucrative but often

destructive enterprise – the unconventional oil and gas industry, commonly known as “fracking.”

Unconventional oil and gas drilling began its explosive growth in this state more than a decade

ago. We, the 43rd Pennsylvania Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, find by a preponderance of

the evidence and in many instances by clear and convincing evidence, and that after

comprehensive study in the course of our investigative duties, conclude that government

oversight of this activity was for many years poor, and has only more recently shown signs of

improvement. As a result, officials often did not do enough to properly protect the health, safety

and welfare of the thousands of Pennsylvania citizens who were affected by this industry.

The Grand Jury began this investigation based on evidence that private companies

engaged in unconventional oil and gas activities have committed criminal violations of

Pennsylvania’s environmental laws. We found such violations and we are issuing several

presentments recommending the filing of criminal charges. And we believe investigation of

additional crimes should, and will, continue beyond the term of this Grand Jury. In the course of

our work, we found something else as well. We saw evidence that government institutions often

failed in their constitutional duty to act as trustee and guardian “of all the people,” as Article 1,

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Section 27 provides. We issue this Grand Jury Report to document our findings, and to make

recommendations for improvements going forward.

We are not “anti”-fracking. The purpose of this Report is to present an account of the

impacts of an industry that will affect Pennsylvanians for decades to come. We are aware that

unconventional drilling brings significant economic benefits. But if the activity is to be

permitted, it still must be regulated appropriately, in ways that prevent reckless harms. Instead,

we believe that our government often ignored the costs to the environment and to the health and

safety of the citizens of the Commonwealth, in a rush to reap the benefits of this industry.

At the same time, we recognize that some progress has been made in recent years. Our

investigation engaged extensively with the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental

Protection (DEP) and the Pennsylvania Department of Health (DOH), the two agencies whose

responsibilities encompass oversight of unconventional oil and gas activity. We heard testimony

from dozens of current and former employees of these departments, and learned that at least

some of their failings are being somewhat addressed. But we strongly believe we have to

examine and expose those failings, past and present, in order to illustrate the need for further

improvement and to ensure that the mistakes of the past do not continue into the future.

We are also aware of continuing debate about the nature and degree of health impacts

related to unconventional drilling. We do not believe, however, that such uncertainty could ever

be an excuse for inaction. The risks of this new industry should fall on the industry and the

regulatory agencies, not on the public. As we see it, the purpose of government agencies like

DEP and DOH is to proactively prevent harm, not to wait and see if the worst really happens.

There has already been too much of that.

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 Human impact

We heard, from witness after witness, about what happens when you find yourself living

next to a fracking site. To understand, we had to spend a great deal of time over the last two

years hearing testimony from experts and learning about the process. Unconventional oil and

gas activity is heavy industry, requiring heavy construction, heavy trucks, and heavy traffic.

Wells are drilled thousands of feet down into the ground, through water tables, and then drilled

laterally for thousands more feet. The drills are lubricated with hazardous chemical compounds.

When the holes are drilled, gas doesn’t just flow up on its own. In order to release the gas, shale

rock has to be fractured – “fracked” – using explosives and even more chemicals. There are

thousands of wells around the state, and each one produces thousands of gallons of “flowback”

or “produced water” – chemical-filled water that comes back up out of the well along with the

gas. The fluid, as well as the drill cuttings, present unique issues for storage and disposal.

What is most concerning about this industry is that it doesn’t happen in out-of-the-way

industrial parks. It happens wherever there is a deep seam of shale rock – under houses, and

farms, and woodlands. It’s a geological crapshoot. Landowners who sell their mineral rights

often have no idea what it really involves, and people who buy property after rights have already

been sold, or who live next to someone else who sold, have no choice in the matter.

Wells can be drilled as close as 500 feet from your front door. Once construction of a

well pad begins, life changes. We heard about the clouds of dust, the grimy film, the booming

and the blinding lights, day and night. The construction phase of the process is still just the

beginning. Next comes the drilling and the hydraulic fracturing of the wells. These parts of the

process bring their own nuisances, some of which are similar to what homeowners experienced

during the construction phase. Oftentimes, the noise is far worse than it was during the

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construction phase and can occur 24 hours a day. Some people had to sleep in a corner of the

basement trying to get away from it. The vibrations from drilling and fracking were sometimes

so intense that all the worms were forced up out of the ground.

Aside from the nuisances of the process, some people, as we learned from testimony,

began to notice changes to their water. In many areas where unconventional oil and gas activity

is common, there is no public water line. People rely entirely on water wells drilled on their own

property. When the oil and gas operators spilled products used to fracture a well, or the storage

facilities that held the waste water leaked, the chemicals made their way into the aquifers that fed

those water wells. The water started smelling like sulfur, or tasting like formaldehyde. It burned

the skin. There was a black sludge in the toilet. Some people hauled in “water buffaloes” –

giant tanks of clean water – but the monthly cost could be more than a mortgage payment.

Then there was the air. The smell from putrefying waste water in open pits was

nauseating. Airborne chemicals burned the throat and irritated exposed skin. One witness had a

name for it: “frack rash.” It felt like having alligator skin. At night, children would get intense,

sudden nosebleeds; the blood would just pour out. But you can’t buy a water buffalo to replace

the air you breathe.

Many of those living in close proximity to a well pad began to become chronically, and

inexplicably, sick. Pets died; farm animals that lived outside started miscarrying, or giving birth

to deformed offspring. But the worst was the children, who were most susceptible to the effects.

Families went to their doctors for answers, but the doctors didn’t know what to do. The

unconventional oil and gas companies would not even identify the chemicals they were using, so

that they could be studied; the companies said the compounds were “trade secrets” and

“proprietary information.” The absence of information created roadblocks to effective medical

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treatment. One family was told that doctors would discuss their hypotheses, but only if the

information never left the room.

Regulatory reaction

Contamination of water and air is not supposed to happen, of course. Environmental

laws and regulations are supposed to prevent these very things. The agency responsible to

enforce those requirements is DEP. Our investigation, however, convinced us that DEP did not

take sufficient action in response to the fracking boom, and even now, more than a decade after it

began, must do more to fully address the special challenges posed by the industry.

Unconventional oil and gas activity uses completely different processes than classic oil

drilling, or any other industry that DEP had previously regulated. New rules were required to

cope with these issues. But it took the agency years to promulgate regulations specifically

targeting this industry, and some crucial areas still haven’t been covered. The Department says

formal regs are subject by law to an inherently slow review process beyond DEP’s control. But

we’ve seen the agency issue and enforce informal rules, when it elected to do so; and on many

occasions it hasn’t availed itself of that option either. As a consequence, companies were free to

continue environmentally hazardous activities that DEP had the power to stop.

DEP employees didn’t just need new rules; they needed new knowledge. The

Department was faced with novel extraction technologies that no one knew anything about. In

the early days of the industry, DEP endeavored to better understand aspects of the process by

performing its own study. And yet, the agency did not effectively share the information among

its own staff once it was acquired. We learned that expert training is available that could assist

DEP employees in their ability to effectively regulate this industry. In spite of its availability,

the agency hasn’t found a way to avail itself of many of these training opportunities.

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 More concerning, though, were the Department’s failures to enforce its existing powers.

DEP was charged with protecting water quality. One of the mechanisms to do so was to conduct

water testing when a homeowner complained of contamination. However, we learned that DEP

was relying on old, pre-fracking criteria – meaning DEP employees weren’t even looking for the

new compounds used in unconventional drilling, and therefore couldn’t accurately say whether it

was causing contamination. And the Department sometimes failed to take advantage of the

law’s most powerful feature: the “zone of presumption.” If water sources near a gas well

showed contamination in the period soon after drilling and hydraulic fracturing, the burden was

on the operator to disprove responsibility. But that presumption was not consistently enforced.

We were also troubled by other practices. We learned, for example, that DEP employees

often elected not to inspect reported violations; some employees would just call the well’s

operator, and rely on his version of events. And even in cases where investigation did show that

a violation had occurred, and that ground water had been tainted, DEP employees typically chose

not to notify neighboring landowners, who would have had no way to know there was a problem.

Even today, there is apparently no policy that requires DEP to notify unsuspecting neighbors that

a nearby resident’s water was found to be contaminated, and therefore that their water could be

contaminated as well.

The goal of regulatory oversight, moreover, is not only to discover past violations of

environmental requirements, but to deter new ones. And the way to do that is to punish violators

once they are identified. Administrative action begins with a Notice of Violation (NOV). But

especially in the early years, there just weren’t very many NOVs issued for fracking violations.

In fact, in 2011, the Department issued a directive prohibiting oil and gas NOVs unless they were

personally reviewed and approved by the Secretary himself, the top official in the Department.

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The message to employees, intended or otherwise, was to leave fracking alone. That message

was reinforced by the Department’s failure to use another powerful tool at its disposal: referral of

cases for possible criminal prosecution. Even in recent years, when things have gotten better in

some other respects, the number of criminal referrals for fracking infractions has been close to

zero.

We believe that some DEP employees saw the job more as serving the industry than the

public. We heard too many stories of complaints unanswered, or cavalierly dismissed. Some

employees refused to consider evidence of problems presented by citizens, while at the same

time readily accepting and believing information supplied by operators. Even when homeowners

went to the trouble and expense of hiring their own experts, some DEP employees did not listen.

We appreciate that not every complaint is founded. But, in areas of this Commonwealth where

fracking has taken a toll, many people do not believe that DEP is an honest broker. Work

remains to win back that trust.

Public health response

In some ways, the Department of Health should have had an easier time dealing with the

shale gas boom than DEP did. Unconventional oil and gas activity was a revolutionary

development. Public health crises, on the other hand, were nothing new for DOH. The

Department, like other public health agencies, had seen plenty of newly arising health conditions,

such as HIV, that demanded concerted action from health care officials: reaching out to doctors

and hospitals in the affected area to gather information, tracing pathways of transmission,

educating the public to recognize warning signs and prevent their spread.

Yet somehow it was different with fracking. When reports started coming in from

homeowners suffering the symptoms of exposure to frack-contaminated air and water, DOH was

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suddenly hands off. There was no special training for public health center staff in affected

communities; no public education alerting people to the potential problem; no centralized

collection of data that might help pin down what was making people feel sick.

Instead, staff were directed, in effect, to leave fracking-related complaints alone. The

agency actually constructed a list of approximately 20 words related to health complaints arising

from unconventional drilling activity. Staff were instructed that if anyone called in, and used

one of those words, the staff member should end the call and direct the caller to a central office

at headquarters. After that, nothing happened. Callers who had been transferred to the central

office never got anywhere. They would call back to their district office asking what happened.

Meanwhile, DOH employees who could see that something was going on in their communities,

and who were trying to educate themselves about it, were instructed that they could not attend

meetings or events related to fracking without applying for and receiving special permission that

was not required in other areas.

It didn’t have to be that way. We know, because we heard from other entities about how

they handled these health issues. We heard evidence about a non-profit health organization

active in southwestern Pennsylvania, and a federal agency working on this issue throughout

Pennsylvania. Professionals from these organizations actually investigated to try to find out

what was happening. They used tools to collect air specimens and to detect patterns. They

discovered that exposure levels varied considerably by various factors, such as distance from the

well, time of day or night, elevation, and weather conditions. DOH could, and should, have been

doing the same kind of work, but never did.

Now the agency tells us they are enhancing their response to fracking-related health

complaints. They have a new centralized database, although few people call to report

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information, because DOH has little to provide in return. The Department says it is changing

that; it is embarking on a new, three-year study, at a cost of one million dollars per year, to

examine possible links between health and unconventional oil and gas activity. We are pleased

to hear that. But the study is retrospective, meaning it will attempt to gather and analyze already

existing data from prior complaints. And because DOH effectively discouraged such complaints

in the past, there may be little data to review.

We believe the Department is still in a state of denial about the potential effects of

fracking-generated substances on human beings. We asked DOH to share with us its opinion on

whether fracking posed a risk to public health. The answer was that definitive causation “has not

been proven.” Well, yes; you can’t prove what you don’t examine, and DOH has gone out of its

way in the past not to look at connections between fracking and health effects. The

circumstantial evidence is compelling and we think it was the Department’s job to look at it. The

new study is a start, but is still far from the proper response of a public health agency.

Recommendations

We urge the executive and legislative branches of Pennsylvania’s government to

seriously consider the findings of this Report, and to act in favor of the common good of

Pennsylvania and its citizens. We think there is more that can and must be done to minimize the

hazards arising from unconventional drilling. Some of it is science; but it’s not rocket science.

These are practical and available responses to the problem.

1. Expand the no-drill zones

Everything we’ve seen confirms that all the impacts of fracking activity are magnified
by proximity. The closer you live to a gas well, compressor station or pipeline the
more likely you are to suffer ill effects. Yet the state law minimum “set-back” for
well construction is only 500 feet. That is dangerously close. An increase in the set-

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 back, to 2500 feet, is far from extreme, but would do a lot to protect residents from
risk.

2. Stop the chemical cover-up

Oil and gas companies use huge quantities of complex, man-made chemical
compounds, which then get released into the environment. Some of them are subject
to disclosure requirements, but only after they’ve been used. Some have no reporting
requirement at all. And some are kept hidden based on “trade secret” claims. Let’s
end this camouflage, provide transparency to the public, and mandate disclosure of all
chemicals used in any aspect of unconventional drilling, so their possible hazards can
be properly considered.

3. Regulate the pipelines

Fracking requires special pipelines that pose special environmental risks. When they
travel through less-populated areas, though, the network of smaller pipes, called
“gathering lines,” is almost completely unregulated. This is yet another undeserved
exemption for elements of the unconventional drilling system. Close that loophole.

4. Add up the air pollution sources

Fracking equipment regularly releases gasses into the atmosphere. One of the culprits
is the so-called “pigging station,” where pipeline valves are opened up for cleaning.
DEP generally considers individual pigging stations as too small to require attention.
But these stations are often located near each other, and so they have a cumulative
effect that is significant. Start adding together all the emissions producing sources in
a specific area and treat them as one pollution source, so that the true impact on local
residents can be properly addressed.

5. Transport the toxic waste more safely

The industry uses hazardous chemicals in drilling and hydraulically fracturing

unconventional wells. These chemicals return to the surface as waste. This waste is
transported around the Commonwealth in trucks labeled as non-hazardous “residual
waste.” That means when the public and first responders encounter this waste, they
do not know it could be highly dangerous. To mitigate this risk, Pennsylvania should
require trucks carrying waste containing chemicals used in the drilling and fracturing
process display signage specifically identifying the source of the waste they carry.

6. Deliver a real public health response

Let’s release DOH from its self-imposed constraints and require it to treat fracking
like any other public health crisis. Send out the nurses and doctors to interview health
care professionals. Advertise in affected areas. Collect sophisticated data and
conduct sophisticated analysis.

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 7. End the revolving door

DEP employees, once trained about fracking at government expense, are often
poached away to much higher-paying jobs in the oil and gas industry. That
creates a potential conflict of interest for government workers whose duty is to
regulate the people who may well be their future employers. A revolving door
rule would reduce that potential conflict by requiring a period of delay before
taking a new job in the regulated industry.

8. Use the criminal laws

DEP won’t use its most powerful weapon against frackers who break the rules:
criminal prosecution. But there’s no reason it should only be DEP’s call to make.
Extend jurisdiction to the Office of Attorney General, so that its environmental
crimes section can follow the evidence and make appropriate decisions about
criminal charges, without leaving it all up to DEP.

If we ignore history, we’re bound to repeat our mistakes. That is why we are issuing this

Report. We’ve been here before in Pennsylvania. First, we allowed the timber in our

Commonwealth to be plundered. Then it was our coal. Now it’s shale. Other industries will

certainly come our way, for some new natural resource to exploit. This is the time to learn our

lesson for the future: who will bear the inevitable risks? We say it should be those who exploit

the resources, not those who live among them. That means let industry pay the price of harm

reduction, and let government take the time to get it right before we hand over the keys. And for

the present, let us at least do all we can to catch up.

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 The Realities of Shale Gas Operations

Pennsylvania has experienced an extraordinary oil and gas boom since the first

unconventional well was drilled in Washington County in 2004. Today, approximately 12,500

unconventional oil and gas wells have been drilled in Pennsylvania, and around 10,500 are

actively producing natural gas. Hydraulically fracturing a well is a heavy industrial operation.

Even under ideal conditions, these operations significantly affect the environment and

communities where they occur.

Fracking technology has enabled the extraction of once unobtainable oil and gas deposits

in shale rock formations thousands of feet below the surface of Pennsylvania. In the

Commonwealth, unconventional drilling has targeted the Marcellus shale formation, a 575-mile

long deposit of flat lying shale rock running beneath West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and

New York. As shown in the depicted map, in Pennsylvania, the Marcellus runs from the

southwest of the Commonwealth in an arc toward the northeastern region of the state, with

drilling concentrated in the southwestern corner and northeast.

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 The ability to access gas deposits in shale formations through unconventional drilling has

revolutionized energy production in the United States, and Pennsylvania is at the center of this

revolution. While unconventional drilling and recovery involves impressive feats of

engineering, it is an industrial enterprise. It has in many cases been undertaken within a few

hundred feet of homes and water supplies. This close proximity between industry operations,

homeowners, and communities results in unavoidable risks and problems.

The fracking industry is still in its infancy. Experts anticipate that there will be another

30,000 to 40,000 unconventional wells drilled in the Marcellus shale in the coming years. These

estimates do not reflect the drilling potential of other shale formations lying beneath

Pennsylvania, such as the Utica shale, which also contain substantial gas deposits.

Understanding how fracking has developed in Pennsylvania up to the present day is important

because we are concerned about Pennsylvania’s future. We must act now, with a clear and

honest understanding of the reality of this industry, to avoid potentially devastating

consequences to our environment and the health and well-being of Pennsylvania residents.

The drilling process

The first stage requires clearing and leveling the drilling site and preparing the drilling

infrastructure, including a well pad, an access road to the well pad, and any other required

equipment. Once the necessary infrastructure and large machinery are in place, drilling begins.

The industry utilizes fluids and chemicals throughout the drilling process to manage friction,

allow drill cuttings to move vertically up and out of the well, and to cool and lubricate the drill

bit. Drill cuttings can be contaminated with hazardous chemicals used in the drilling process, as

well as naturally occurring metals previously trapped beneath the earth’s surface, which can be

harmful and even radioactive.

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 Drilling an unconventional well occurs in stages. As each section is drilled, a metal pipe

called a "casing" is inserted into the ground to stabilize the hole. Cement is then pumped under

pressure inside the casing and when it reaches the bottom of the drilled hole, is pushed up the

outside of the casing to fill the area between the casing and surrounding rock and soil. Once the

cement hardens, the intended result is a metal casing surrounded by cement that has completely

filled and sealed any space between the well and its surroundings. The process is repeated with

progressively narrower casings as the well is drilled.

The Marcellus formation lies from 7,000 to 9,000 feet underground and is around 100 to

350 feet thick. At around 1,000 feet of the targeted shale deposit, drilling goes from vertical to

horizontal at a slight curve. Once lateral, the well is drilled out through the shale rock for

upwards of 25,000 feet, or approximately five miles.

The hydraulic fracturing process

Once an unconventional well is drilled and casings are in place, "perforating guns" are

lowered into the horizontal extension of the well. Perforating guns allow explosives to be placed

and detonated in order to puncture hundreds of dime-size holes through the production casing

and cement and out into the rock formation. This is followed by hydraulic fracturing, which uses

a high-pressure injection of fluid (generally water), "proppant" (sand or silica), and chemicals to

fracture the shale and stimulate production. The fracturing process requires the use of

extraordinary amounts of fluid.

All of those fluids do not remain underground. A portion of the fluid used in the fracking

process returns to the surface as "flowback." Flowback consists of the chemical composition of

the fracking fluid plus naturally occurring substances it mixed with during the fracking process,

such as chloride and strontium.

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 Once the flowback has exited, natural gas begins flowing upward and out of the well. At

this point, the well is in production. In addition to gas, wells expel "produced water," which

consists of fracking fluid that did not initially exit the well as flowback, but steadily exits a well

during production. Because produced water has remained in the subsurface far longer than

flowback, it is more contaminated, and will typically contain high levels of sodium chloride

(salt), bromide, lithium, boron, iron, manganese, arsenic, and radioactive radium. An

unconventional well can produce from half a million to over three and a half million gallons of

flowback and produced water over the first five to ten years of production.

Pipelines

In Pennsylvania, natural gas is transported from well sites via a series of pipelines. From

the wellhead, gas first travels through "gathering lines," which are around four-to-six inches in

diameter and can be highly pressurized at around 1,000 psi. Gathering lines are not subject to

safety regulations in less populated areas. Despite the proliferation of gathering lines throughout

the Commonwealth and the fact that they commonly leak, in underpopulated areas (less than 10

residences within 1 linear mile of pipeline) they are not regulated or otherwise monitored by the

federal government or the Commonwealth for safety.

Gas transfers from gathering lines to "transmission lines," which are 36-to-42 inches in

diameter and travel for hundreds to thousands of miles. Transmission lines ultimately arrive at a

"city gate," where gas is decompressed, odorized, and distributed to end use consumers through

narrow, low-pressure "distribution lines."

"Compressor stations" are strategically placed along gathering and transmission lines to

add and maintain pressure in the pipeline, as well as to clean, cool, and otherwise facilitate

movement of natural gas through the pipeline network. It is necessary to release gas from

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compressor stations through "blowdowns," which are required to ensure the pipeline can be

depressurized in case of emergency. Transmission lines, as well as gathering lines, employ

"pigging stations," where devices called “PIGs” (pipeline inspection gadgets) are inserted and

removed from pipelines to clean out debris and gather data to ensure the pipeline is operating

properly. Each time a pig is inserted or removed from a pigging station, the pipeline has to be

depressurized and gas released through a blowdown. As with blowdowns at compressor stations,

release of gas from a pigging station can have an impact on the environment and those in the

vicinity of where the blowdown occurs.

Disclosure of chemicals used in drilling and hydraulic fracturing

Approximately 1,600 different chemicals have been detected in fracking wastewater. We

have high quality toxicity data on only about 10% of these, however. Among the most common

of these chemicals are petroleum distillates, which are like diesel fuel, and act as "friction

reducers" to sustain pressure in a pipe. Hydrochloric acid is frequently used to keep the holes in

a production casing clear and open to allow gas to flow into a well. Corrosion inhibitors protect

the inside of the casing from corroding. We were particularly concerned to learn that petroleum

distillates are commonly used in the fracking process because they contain "BTEX" chemicals

like benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylene. BTEX chemicals are extremely toxic and can

cause serious health effects in very small doses, including cancer, neurotoxicity, kidney damage,

liver toxicity, changes to blood chemistry, and harm to the immune system.

A sophisticated nationwide system, referred to as “SARA Title III,” governs the

treatment of hazardous industrial chemicals in the workplace. This system requires businesses to

directly report dangerous chemicals they store on site to “Local Area Emergency Planning

Committees,” local fire departments, and Hazmat teams. The information is also available to the

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public. Notifying first responders of dangerous chemicals in their communities allows them to

prepare for a fire or emergency at a facility where these chemicals are present. Businesses are

required to maintain “Safety Data Sheets” to identify the chemicals on site and allow first

responders to quickly determine the specific risks associated with them in emergencies. When

dealing with dangerous chemicals such knowledge is essential – firefighters and Hazmat teams

can only do their jobs if they know what they are dealing with.

Remarkably, the shale gas industry, despite using and transporting dangerous chemicals

in their everyday operations, is largely excused from SARA Title III’s oversight regime. No

other industry enjoys such comparable exemptions.

Because of these federal exemptions, the states almost exclusively govern the fracking

industry’s obligations to publicly disclose the dangerous chemicals it uses. In Pennsylvania, the

industry self-reports and publicly posts the chemicals used in hydraulically fracturing an

unconventional well on a website called "FracFocus." Via FracFocus, anyone can look up any

shale gas well in Pennsylvania and see what chemicals the operator reported using in fracturing

the well. Operators are required to provide this information only after completing a fracturing

job, however, with the DEP receiving notification 30 days after and a public posting occurring

within 60 days.

There is a significant gap in reporting, however, because the industry is not obligated to

identify or provide information about chemicals they classify as proprietary trade secrets. While

the industry must disclose trade secret chemicals to the DEP, the public and first responders

cannot access them. Keeping these proprietary chemicals secret leaves firefighters and Hazmat

teams incapable of effectively or safely responding to emergencies at unconventional gas sites.

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Communities, industry employees, and others who find themselves in close proximity are

likewise kept in the dark. This risk is unacceptable. Only full public disclosure is sufficient.

In addition, the industry is only required to disclose chemicals used in the hydraulic

fracturing process, but not the drilling process. This is a serious problem because chemicals used

in the drilling stage can come into direct contact with the water table. We have learned that

water contamination most frequently occurs when a well is drilled. Yet the drilling stage, when

water supplies are most at risk, is largely unregulated.

The industry argues that maintaining the confidentiality of trade secret chemicals is

necessary to protect their competitive advantages. We find any competitive interest of the

industry outweighed by the need for Pennsylvanians to know all chemicals used in fracking

operations. In addition, we have learned that full disclosure of trade secret chemicals can occur

without harming oil and gas operators' economic interests.

In 2014, a United States Department of Energy task force unanimously recommended full

disclosure of all constituents used in hydraulic fracturing, including those containing trade secret

information. The task force concluded that complete disclosure can occur with nominal risk of

revealing proprietary information if it is “organized by the chemicals rather than the additives of

products to the fluid." In the words of one witness, “it is like the back of the Kentucky Fried

Chicken box . . . . Ingredients do not make a recipe.”

Pennsylvania should require full public disclosure of all chemicals, including trade secret

chemicals, used in both drilling and hydraulically fracturing an unconventional well. These

disclosures should occur before drilling commences, and an operator should update its

disclosures if different chemicals are used during a fracking job. Anything other than complete

disclosure poses an unacceptable risk to communities and first responders.

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 Hauling fracking waste

The dangerous chemicals used to drill and hydraulically fracture unconventional wells

end up in drill cuttings and millions of gallons of wastewater produced by each individual well.

Managing the millions of gallons of wastewater generated by unconventional oil and gas

operations, in particular, presents an extremely challenging problem. The fracking industry has

never had a good solution for this problem, and it persists today.

For years following the fracking boom, the DEP permitted the industry to dispose of

flowback and production water at municipal wastewater facilities. However, these facilities

could not process the various metals, chemicals, radioactive materials, and extreme salinity of

these fluids. Therefore, in 2012, a voluntary ban on accepting fracking fluids at wastewater

facilities was instituted, and Pennsylvania later formally banned the practice.

Fracking wastewater can be permanently disposed of by pumping it into decommissioned

oil and gas wells called "deep injection wells," or “underground injection control wells.” There

are currently around a dozen permitted deep injection wells in Pennsylvania, and only a few of

these operate commercially; meaning they can accept wastewater from any operator. Rigorous

permitting requirements, local opposition and litigation, and the fact that Pennsylvania’s geology

is not conducive to these wells means they are not a viable local option to the fracking industry’s

wastewater problem.

There are over 200 deep injection wells in Ohio, however, so 90% to 95% of

Pennsylvania’s fracking wastewater disposed of in deep injection wells goes to Ohio. Given the

cost and logistical burden of shipping wastewater to these out-of-state injection wells, this is not

a viable solution to the industry’s wastewater problem.

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 The industry primarily employs on-site tanks to store flowback and produced water,

which is later "recycled" to frack other wells. In Pennsylvania, around 90% of flowback and

produced water is recycled, and 20% to 30% of fracturing fluids are composed of recycled

wastewater. This practice entails storing fluids in a series of interconnected "frac tanks," which

hold around 20,000 gallons and are roughly the size of a shipping container. More recently,

companies have begun using "modular aboveground storage structures," which are temporary

holding tanks that store massive amounts of wastewater.

Before flowback and produced water can be recycled, it has to be treated. Operators use

on-site mobile treatment units or ship their waste to the approximately 20 treatment plants

around the Commonwealth. Treating fracking wastewater is its own distinct industry, with costs

ranging from $2.00 to $10.00 a barrel (42 gallons) depending on the degree of treatment

performed.

Both “recycling” wastewater and disposing of it in deep injection wells requires hauling

it around the Commonwealth and neighboring states in tanker trucks. This wastewater may be

composed mostly of brine and relatively harmless constituents, or it may be full of extremely

dangerous chemicals or highly radioactive. There is no way to tell, however, because the

industry is not required to identify or manage its wastewater for what it actually contains. Due to

exemptions under federal law, trucks carrying fracking wastewater in Pennsylvania are not

placarded as hauling hazardous waste, even though they may be carrying hazardous waste.

Rather, they display signage indicating they are carrying “residual waste,” which fails to account

for the serious health and environmental risks posed by fracking wastewater.

Hauling fracking wastewater as “residual waste” poses a serious risk to the public and

first responders because if there is an accident and the driver of a truck hauling fracking waste is

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incapacitated, the public and first responders at the scene won’t know that whatever may have

spilled all over the roadway came from a fracking site. Pennsylvania should require that trucks

hauling solid and liquid waste containing chemicals from shale gas operations display signage

indicating the source of the waste in question. While this signage may not clearly state exactly

what is in the waste in question, the public will know it came from a fracking site and can handle

the matter appropriately given the risk that it may contain extremely dangerous chemicals.

Our government and the shale gas industry currently have no long-term sustainable

solution to managing the toxic waste generated by fracking operations. At the very least, the

industry should be required to more safely and responsibly transport this waste around the

Commonwealth.

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 The Effects of Shale Gas Operations on Pennsylvania Families

We heard testimony of the experiences of over 70 households with the shale gas industry.

This sampling represents the limited number of complaints we as a grand jury had jurisdiction to

investigate. While the number of homeowners we heard from is far less than the total number of

Pennsylvanians who have experienced harm from fracking operations, their stories provided us

with a sound and detailed understanding of the realities of this industry and the problems

associated with fracking in our Commonwealth.

We are deeply grateful to the homeowners who shared their stories with us. We were

moved by the profoundly emotional experiences many have endured. Often, their pain was still

raw, but they nevertheless testified and taught us about the sometimes harsh reality of shale gas

operations. While we cannot truly capture what it was like to witness their testimony, all those

reading this report should understand that we find the testimony of these homeowners credible

and compelling.

While each homeowner's experience was unique, they were in many ways similar,

regardless of whether they lived in the same township or hundreds of miles from one another.

Indeed, many of their accounts were remarkably consistent. Dozens of people experienced the

same medical symptoms in association with the same oil and gas activity. Parents invariably

feared what exposure to fracking operations posed to their children's health and future, as any

parent would. There are simply too many people who have suffered similar harms in

communities throughout Pennsylvania where fracking occurs to disregard the damage caused by

this industry's operations. This reality necessitates laws and regulations capable of protecting

those put at risk by fracking, and a government willing to enforce them. For too long,

Pennsylvania has failed to live up to its responsibility to its people in both respects.

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 Fracking is a heavy industrial operation. It requires hundreds or even thousands of trips

by heavy trucks, coming and going from a well pad, 24 hours a day, for months. Drilling and

fracturing requires the use of dangerous chemicals – some known and some unknown, because

the industry refuses to disclose them. The use of these chemicals produces contaminated solid

waste and hundreds of thousands of gallons of liquid waste. The industry is exempt from

treating the dangerous byproducts of its operations as hazardous. Spills and accidents happen.

Emissions are inevitable. We examined evidence and heard testimony showing that when all this

industrial activity occurs within a few hundred feet of someone's home, as our laws have

allowed, harm to public health and significant disruption to people’s lives result.

We do not claim to have an easy solution that would allow fracking operations and

residents to coexist in perfect harmony. However, the recommendations we do offer are

necessary and obvious. Extensive testimony, hundreds of exhibits containing records, and

technical data from leading experts and dozens of DEP and DOH employees support what we

propose. Ultimately, the recommendations in this Report are rooted in and validated by the

experiences of everyday Pennsylvanians who shared with us the real world effects

unconventional oil and gas operations can have on people’s lives. Confronting and fixing the

legal, regulatory, and executive-level norms that enabled the harms experienced by the

homeowners will go a long way toward restoring some balance between fracking operations,

public health, and the constitutional right to "clean air, pure water, and the preservation of the

natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment."

The vast majority of homeowners we heard from lived in rural, agricultural areas. Some

deliberately sought an escape from the noise of urban or suburban life when they bought

property and built their dream homes. They lived on small plots of land as well as on farms

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spanning hundreds of acres. Some entered into oil and gas leases, often under false pretenses or

lacking a full understanding of what fracking operations would entail. As one homeowner told

us,

The land manager told us that when they were finished, all that
would be in there were a few green tanks, but we had no idea that
it was going to be a three-year ordeal of 24-hour lights, back-up
beepers, digging, my wall vibrating in my house. Just had no idea.

Many did not sign leases, but that did not insulate them from the life-altering disruption

of industry activities. Extraction may occur on a neighboring property, or an oil and gas

company might have obtained the mineral rights to the land from a prior owner, allowing the

company to access the property to extract the oil and gas lying below. So long as the operation

was not within 500 feet of their home – the only limitation under Pennsylvania law – residents

had no control.

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 Families that once lived in peaceful agrarian communities suddenly found themselves

living in something resembling an oil refinery. As one witness described it,

It has made it an industrial zone. There is no country living out

there anymore. Getting out of our driveway alone is dicey at best.
We have a lot of fracking trucks. We have a lot of sand trucks.
We have a lot of construction vehicles . . . . And there is – you
know, when we first started building, there was one small
compressor station. There is two very large compressor stations.
There are two cryogenic plants. There are several wells, pigs, of
course, and that is all within less than a mile from our house. Most
is I would say less than three quarters of a mile. . . . So, yeah, it is
– it is worrisome.

For homeowners who did not own the mineral rights beneath their property, the

realization that an oil and gas operator had the right to come onto their land and set up operations

could be traumatic:

A: I just got a chill. You kind of forget some of those things. But
when it first happened, it was devastating to have somebody knock
on your door and tell you we're going to come on your land, we
have the right to do it, and we're going to use – I don't even know
how many acres they said. I don't even know if they knew at the
time. You know, beautiful wooded land, places I take trail horses
with old tree lines with trees covered and old fence lines. It was a
nightmare. I remember [my husband] and I both – I don't think I
slept through the night for a month. It was like a nightmare. You
just can't imagine somebody knocking on your door saying we
have the right to come on your land and do such and such to the
land. It was like a living nightmare really.
Q: Ultimately, did they come on the land to start constructing well
pads?
A: Ultimately, they did, yeah.

Once an operator has secured leases for mineral rights in and around the area of the

proposed well pad, their next step would be to acquire all necessary permits. Once the permits

are in hand, the operator would begin the actual construction of the well pad. The heavy

industrial nature of fracking becomes evident to property owners from the very outset of

constructing the well pad. Many homeowners described the extreme disruption this process

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caused to their lives. Heavy truck traffic caused clouds of dust to circulate around their

properties, blanketing their homes inside and out. They kept their windows shut. They stopped

spending time outdoors. Their children could not play in their yards. A grimy film would

accumulate on glass surfaces as dust and particulate matter invaded the interior of their homes.

These sort of problems were a direct result of our laws permitting shale gas sites in such close

proximity to people's homes.

The industrial nature of fracking operations is apparent from just looking at a typical well

pad.

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 Construction of the pad is only the beginning. Next comes the drilling of the gas wells.

This part of the process can continue for weeks on end, day and night, with the drilling pad lit up

with blinding lights, creating extraordinary noise and vibrating the Earth around it. The closer a

homeowner lived to these operations, the more traumatic they were to their previously peaceful

lives. Homeowners described sleeping in corners of their basements in an effort to escape the

bright lights and noise. They could not sleep. Their children could not sleep. They could not

escape the industrial activity happening so close to where they lived.

When they sought help from local authorities, their pleas often fell on deaf ears. For

example, we heard testimony that when residents complained that industry operations were in

violation of noise ordinances, local governments changed the ordinances to accommodate the

industry rather than responding to the needs of their citizens. In addition to finding no help from

the local authorities, we heard from homeowners who sought help elsewhere and were equally

frustrated. One witness recounted calling DEP to register her complaints and being told to call

9-1-1 instead. When she called 9-1-1 as instructed, they did not understand why she was calling

and were equally unhelpful. The lack of response from agency after agency led to feelings of

hopelessness, despair, and distrust toward the government.

Many homeowners reported that they first experienced contamination of their drinking

wells during the drilling process. Drilling through the water table would turn their well water

brown and rust-colored and fill it with sediment. Sometimes after drilling was complete, their

well water would eventually return to normal after constituents in the aquifer resettled or

contaminants introduced during the drilling process dissipated or moved along in the aquifer.

For others, contamination of their water supply was just beginning. In some cases, homeowners

experienced a complete loss of their water supply.

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 Below is a photo of contaminated tap water from a homeowner’s well:

For many Pennsylvanians living in rural areas, such as where shale gas drilling

proliferates, clean drinking water is available only from wells. Most of us take for granted the

safe, municipally supplied water we use every day. In rural parts of the Commonwealth, public

water is the exception to the rule, and well water is the only option. Thus, if industry operations

contaminate a family's water supply, they cannot simply hook up to a public system. When their

water suddenly changes in taste, smell, or appearance, they can either continue drinking it and

hope for the best or begin hauling clean water to their homes.

Many resort to using large water tanks called “water buffalos.” Sometimes an oil and gas

operator alleged to have contaminated a family’s well will supply them with a water buffalo, at

least temporarily, while other homeowners are left to cover the cost of an alternative water

source themselves. One homeowner testified that paying for an alternative water supply cost her

family $650 per week, which can easily exceed a family's monthly mortgage payment. We heard

testimony from some homeowners who felt that oil and gas operators would remove their water

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buffalo in direct response to additional or continuing complaints that they made. We find this

behavior, if true, unconscionable.

The next stage in the process of extracting natural gas is known as hydraulic fracturing.

During this stage of the process, many homeowners described over 200 trucks coming and going

from a well site in a single 24-hour cycle. This traffic goes on for weeks as a well is fracked.

These numbers are not exaggerated. They reflect the millions of gallons of fluids, sand, and

chemicals necessary to hydraulically fracture a well. We heard the following account of what

fracking-related truck traffic is like:

It was horrific. It was constant. The amount of trucks going in and

going out of there, I've never seen anything like it in my life. You
couldn't pull out without being behind, between or trying to
maneuver with the trucks. . . . [T]hey made the roads go like a
washboard. It was rough.

Below is a screenshot from a video of fracking-related truck traffic that captures to some

degree what such traffic looks like.

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 Hydraulic fracturing entails pumping millions of gallons of fluid into the earth under

enormous pressure. This causes powerful vibrations to resonate through the earth. These

vibrations shake homes and crack foundations. Several homeowners described how the earth

around their homes would vibrate so intensely that worms would crawl out from the ground in

their yards and basements. A fleet of heavy trucks coming and going, day and night, to provide

millions of gallons of fluid to the well pad, accompanies all of this fracturing activity. The noise

would be overwhelming.

Descriptions of the effects of fracking on peoples' well water were remarkably similar

across the Commonwealth. Many described a "black film" or "black sheen" appearing in their

water, particularly when it would sit idly in their toilets. Some would have "cloudy" water.

"Black sludge" or "black slime" would clog and damage the pumps and filters used to treat their

well water. They would find sandy, particulate matter in their water and filters. They described

a "sulfur" or "rotten eggs" smell. Homeowners detailed a variety of chemical smells, as "sweet,"

"like a chemical lab," "plastic," or "like formaldehyde." Those who ventured to taste their water

often described it as "foul" and "metallic." None of these conditions occurred prior to fracking

operations near their homes.

Homeowners' water became unusable for not only drinking and cooking, but bathing,

hand washing, and other basic household purposes. Some came to realize their water was

contaminated not because of perceptible changes such as smell or color, but through illnesses

and health effects. Accounts of red, itchy, burning rashes from exposure to contaminated water

were widespread. When people were away from their residence, their skin problems subsided.

They were unable to safely wash their hands or bathe in their own homes. Often these symptoms

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would manifest without their water exhibiting noticeable problems such as intense smells or

discoloration. As one homeowner described her family's experience,

We started getting sores all over us. And we were sick to our
stomachs and having problems with breathing whenever we were
in the shower. And it would burn our eyes, nose, and throat; and it
just -- it was putrid. It was embarrassing. If we had anyone
coming to our home, we would have to shower and air the house
out and then try to spray air fresheners to get rid of the smell. It
was bad.

We learned that part of what complicates well water testing and determinations of

contamination is that subsurface waters are dynamic, and chemicals in an aquifer may not appear

at detectable levels in a water supply at the same time. Nor do they necessarily remain

indefinitely. This means that contaminants may be in someone's water and affecting their health,

but they are initially unaware of it at the time, but when symptoms manifest those chemicals may

have washed out or dissipated in the water table and been replaced by some other contaminants.

Often a homeowner will take action to test their water only when it becomes highly salty, or

when some other noticeable problem manifests, without realizing they have been exposed to

contaminants over the prior months. When testing then occurs, it may not reflect the totality of

their exposure, and the links between their health condition and possible causes are more

difficult to determine.

Water analysis is an imperfect science that cannot always provide the answers

homeowners need. This complexity of water testing is compounded by the fact that operators are

not required to disclose all the chemicals used to fracture any particular well, or any chemicals

used in the drilling process. That makes it impossible to analyze a homeowner's water for

sources of contamination properly, because the tester does not know what to look for.

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 Homeowners frequently described a lingering fear that analysis of their water was not

showing a full and accurate picture of what was happening. When they turned to DEP for

answers, they were often left unsatisfied because DEP’s standard water analysis was too narrow

and would not account for the full range of potential contaminants in their water. When results

were provided they were difficult for the layman to understand. Turning to the industry operator

would bring equally unsatisfying answers. In the midst of this anxiety-inducing situation,

homeowners often concluded that no one was taking their concerns seriously. They were

ultimately left to decide whether to pay the hefty cost of an alternative water supply or complex

treatment systems to clean their water of unknown chemicals and fracking byproducts or

continue using their suspect well water.

Different homeowners described different ways in which the industry's operations

affected their lives. We heard many accounts of impoundments; man made ponds, several acres

in size, where oil and gas operators stored millions of gallons of fluids. In some instances the

DEP permitted the use of an impoundment to hold fresh water for use in fracturing wells in the

surrounding area. Over time, however, the industry sometimes would use these impoundments

to store contaminated wastewater, even though they were not designed to store toxic fluids.

Such impoundments lacked features like double liners and leak detection zones capable of

detecting leaks. As a result some of these ponds of liquid waste failed, with devastating

consequences. Dangerous chemicals and contaminants invaded the environment and affected

public health.

Families came to realize that wastewater impoundments not only contaminated their

water, but the air they breathed. As enormous open toxic pits, some of which were acres in size,

impoundments would release harmful chemicals into the air. The smell of sulfur and intense

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chemicals smells would inundate nearby homes. Property owners would sense a metallic taste in

their mouths. Contamination in the air would overwhelm homeowners with nausea, dizziness,

and a feeling that they would pass out. They would vomit. Their eyes, nose, skin, and throat

would burn.

These were not fleeting episodes. The air in their homes would cause persistent sores,

nosebleeds, mouth ulcers, unexplained bruises, and extreme fatigue. Visitors would grow ill.

Children would become frighteningly lethargic. Homeowners stopped going outside from fear

of exposure. Their children could no longer play in their yards or explore the previously bucolic

farmland where they lived. Nor did the inside of their homes offer an escape. We learned that

air quality testing inside residences confirmed the presence of dangerous chemicals that would

not normally be in people's homes, like benzene, toluene, methylbenzene, chlorobenzene,

xylenes, acrylonitrile, cyclohexane, and three different types of trimethylbenzene. One

homeowner described what it was like to live near a wastewater impoundment:

My property had a fence around it and they put the frack pit in 200
feet behind my property which was the size of a football field.
Then they started filling it with chemicals. It constantly smelled
like gasoline and kerosene, constantly.

Homeowners processed their experiences in different ways. In telling their stories, some

seemed haunted and freshly traumatized, while others were stoic. The common theme from

every homeowner who testified before us was an all-encompassing, debilitating anxiety that

comes from so many unknowns. This was especially the case in the early days of the fracking

boom, when there were more questions than answers. While this was partially due to the

newness of the activity, it was also a consequence of the industry having no obligation to provide

information to families living within a stone’s throw of a well pad. Homeowners were not

informed that toxic chemicals were used during the drilling or fracturing of a well. They were

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not told that toxic waste was stored in impoundments. They had no idea if these giant ponds of

wastewater were leaking. They smelled foul odors, but did not know the cause, or if the mere act

of inhaling could cause them to become ill. They did not know if their water was safe to drink or

bathe in. Almost every normal daily activity suddenly posed unknown risks. There was little to

no transparency.

When families would turn to the medical community their problems would often remain

unresolved. We heard from several homeowners who attempted to find answers to their ongoing

health concerns and received troubling responses from medical professionals. Too often, they

recounted their doctors expressing reluctance to overtly link their symptoms to fracking

operations, while also telling them it was not safe to stay in their homes. For instance, one

parent described receiving test results confirming that chemicals used in an adjacent fracking site

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were poisoning her family. When she visited a toxicologist with this information, the doctor told

her his office could not confirm the gas industry was responsible because his practice may lose

its government funding, but that if he were in her situation, he would leave the family home.

This type of account was not an anomaly. Another homeowner described a similar

experience with the medical community:

. . . [W]e've kind of hit a brick wall there as well trying to relate it.
We go to the doctor's with him and they're not allowed to talk
about anything. You mention one word, drilling or fracking or any
of the key words, then you're kind of shut down. At one point we
met with the doctors at UPMC and they took us into an emergency
room and brought a couple chairs in and shut the door and
whatever happens in this room has to stay in this room. What they
told us is they can't put a direct link to it. It's just that the only
thing they can do is process of elimination, take one thing out of
the mix at a time until they determine what's wrong. They sent us
to a specialist. Then it just kind of went nowhere either.

Another homeowner recounted the struggle faced when trying to find answers to what

was making her children so sick:

…our other doctors, like our family doctor and the pulmonologist
and the gastroenterologist that my son saw, I mean basically, they
were just trying to help us figure this out along with us. I mean, no
one had any experience or expertise in this area. . . . And so it just
– it was hard trying to put two and two together. And, you know,
[the operator] wouldn't tell us what they were using up there. You
know, they have their proprietary chemicals, which we fought hard
to try to get those, and so we didn't even know what else to test for.
I mean, it was – if they would have at least given us what they
were using, then we could have – you know, I could have had my
kids tested for other things. We were just trying to figure things
out on our own, find out information from the people in Texas,
who had already been through a lot of this. It was – it was just
hard, and there was no cooperation whatsoever.

For many, determining what industry operation was causing them to get sick was elusive.

The most obvious pathway of contamination seemed to be well water, so people initially focused

on their water. Many would obtain alternative water sources once the quality of their well water

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was ruined or they started getting sick. Even though they were no longer exposed to

contaminated water, their health would not improve, and many found themselves and their

children getting sicker.

Families would then turn to the next most likely pathway of contamination: air.

Wastewater impoundments would release repugnant airborne smells and toxins so intense

property owners would pass out, become sick or vomit, or so overwhelming that they would

have to be rushed to the hospital. Many other components of this industry’s operations release

airborne contaminants as well, which can be particularly harmful to those living close to sources

of these emissions. Emissions from well pads, pigging stations, compressor stations, and other

industry operations can all contaminate the surrounding air. Sometimes the way homeowners

experienced emissions from well sites would change over the course of a day, with the air

smelling “sweet and sulfur-like” at night, and like “burning hair” during the day. We heard of

smells like “hair dye at a salon” and “burnt electrical components.”

We heard of the industry performing "blowdowns" or wellhead "flaring"; or the rapid

release of gas due to maintenance, a malfunction, emergency, or as part of regularly mandated

safety testing. Many homeowners described these events as sounding like a "jet engine,"

vibrating nearby homes and windows, and releasing plumes of gas that would, in some instances,

settle like fog in the surrounding area. One homeowner described awakening at 4:00 in the

morning, without notification, to the "jet engine" sound of a wellhead flaring natural gas. The

industry employees overseeing these operations wore protective headgear, but she was not, and

was left with a loud hissing sound in her ears.

Various homeowners all described emissions from compressor stations smelling like

chlorine. Noxious gases generated from compressor stations would permeate the interior and

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exterior of peoples' homes, causing burning eyes, headaches, and sores in their mouths, and the

development of serious illnesses. Blood tests would confirm the presence of contaminants in

people who had been exposed to these gaseous emissions.

Health symptoms related to exposure to routine emissions were numerous and deeply

troubling. Respiratory problems, headaches, dizziness, and burning eyes were commonplace.

Children in particular experienced nosebleeds and extreme stomach pain. People told us that

after the industry came into their lives they experienced weight loss, neuropathy (nerve pain),

tremors and shaking, nose and throat pain.

Linking the wide variety of health issues homeowners have associated with air

contamination to specific industry operations can be difficult. The absence of testing and lack of

access to industry data substantially impede understanding. What we do know is that upon

installation of an industry operation close to a family’s home, they would begin to detect smells

associated with the gases and chemicals emitted from these operations. At the same time, they

started experiencing various symptoms indicative of airborne contamination and getting sick.

Environmental testing at their homes, when properly conducted, would confirm the presence of

airborne contaminants. Medical testing would likewise reveal that chemicals associated with

industry operations were inside of their bodies.

One homeowner eventually saw a specialist who told him his blood revealed “chronic

benzene exposure.” His wife also had benzene levels in her blood. But he was particularly

concerned for his children. As he told us,

Q. How does it make you feel that your children were being
exposed?

A. Well, the same thing. The worst thing about it is if you read the
toxicologist's report, one of the last statements he makes is now
you need to be concerned about cancer sometime in the future.

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 For many families, exposure to contaminated air results in health anxieties and requisite

medical monitoring becoming a routine part of their children’s lives:

A: So there was blood work, urinalysis; and it is hard to take kids

to have their blood taken all the time. It is pretty terrifying. How
much do you torture them through that; but yet, there were things
found in their blood.

Q: Okay. And do you have any recollection sitting here today

what those things were or would you have to look back at the
actual medical records?

A: They said it had something to do with the ethyl benzene.

We heard the same account from witness after witness about the rashes their families

would get from exposure to air contaminants. These rashes would appear on the frequently

exposed parts of their bodies – their hands and arms, necks and faces – and would go away when

they were away from home for a long enough period of time. While a rash may not seem like a

particularly distressing ailment, one parent’s description of a rash his son continually had

captures the disturbing nature of this condition:

Yes. We all call it a frack rash. He gets like an alligator skin after
that and becomes really sensitive after a while. He's moved out of
the house a couple times, moved back in. As he moves away, he's
gone for a month and it goes away. If he's back in, it acts up right
away.

Another near constant account was of children frequently waking at night with sudden,

severe nosebleeds. As one parent testified:

Both kids seemed to have [nosebleeds] a lot. My daughter seemed

to get them more at night so she would kind of just wake up and
panic, you know, something is on my face, screaming. She was,
like, four or five years old. So by the time you turn on the light,
you see – I know kids get bloody noses. We all do, but it was
becoming a chronic thing. And it was getting to the point where I
could trace them back to when they were doing maintenance at one
of the compressor stations or opened the lines because there was

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 too much pressure. But it was getting really bad like she had this
pretty little – her first princess bedspread and it was just ruined. It
was getting to the point where I was using hydrogen peroxide to
get the blood out of the carpet. That is not something normal. The
doctors couldn't find any reason for it.

Another mother recalled a similar experience:

We had – my daughter had a lot of nosebleeds. It seems like the

nosebleeds were worse with her. They would just be standing
there and then all of the sudden blood would start pouring out of
their noses. It wasn't anything like that they had done anything to
prompt it.

A constant theme in the stories we heard was that children suffered health effects from

nearby oil and gas operations more than adults. In addition to severe and chronic rashes,

headaches, and nosebleeds, we heard accounts of children experiencing lethargy, bruising,

intense cramping, difficulty sleeping, and painful stomach problems, including nausea and

vomiting. They had eye problems ranging from frequent burning sensations and conjunctivitis to

partial blindness. We heard of young people suffering symptoms associated with neurological

problems, like twitching and tremors, erratic and uncontrollable eye movements, and neuropathy,

which involves weakness, numbness, and stabbing or burning sensations throughout the body.

We heard clear and convincing evidence that leads us to conclude that industry

operations in Pennsylvania have made our children sick. That is not a reality we are willing to

accept, and the recommendations we propose will help to alleviate this problem.

We learned that kids get sick from airborne contamination not just because of some faulty

industry operation, such as a malfunctioning compressor station, or practices that are no longer

commonplace, like the use of wastewater impoundments. We know that air contamination is not

limited to anomalous, outdated, or unintended industry activities. Indeed, the exact opposite is

true. Standard operating procedure under Pennsylvania’s current legal and regulatory regime

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exposes those living in close proximity to fracking operations to possible exposure and health

risks. Pennsylvania needs to resolve this problem by requiring industry sites be far more distant

from where we live and work. The current 500 foot standard is woefully inadequate.

Pennsylvania's laws further aggravate the problem by not accounting for the aggregate

effects of fracking operations. When numerous gas sites exist in a relatively small area, their

collective effect is not measured or acknowledged in the governing regulatory scheme. Many

homeowners described living near a combination of well pads, pigging stations, gas processing

plants, compressor stations, and impoundments. The DEP regulates these sites only individually,

however, and by each individual company associated with them. Therefore, two oil and gas

companies may own and operate adjacent pigging stations, but so long as each is compliant with

emissions limits, Pennsylvania law is met. Meanwhile, a nearby homeowner is exposed to the

collective effect of the emissions from both pigging stations, in addition to other nearby well

pads and industry operations, but there is no recognition of the heightened risk posed by the

collective emissions from multiple sites.

When families would escape their homes, whether temporarily or permanently, many of

their symptoms would go away. For some the damage was permanent, however, and they

continue to struggle with long-term problems like reduced motor faculties and sensitivity to

chemicals. Many parents and medical professionals fear for the long-term health of children

who have suffered health problems related to industry activities, particularly their ability to have

children of their own and the risk of developing cancer. Doctors have advised that children who

have suffered persistent health problems related to nearby fracking sites participate in regular

cancer screening for decades to come.

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 Additionally, we find that while families may implement measures to remediate the risks

of living near an industry site inside their homes, such as with high-tech air filtration systems and

alternative sources of water, they cannot remedy conditions outside the home. As a result, pets

and livestock would continue to face exposure. Often, homeowners' animals first showed

symptoms of contamination from industry activity. Even if their owners arranged a safe water

supply for their animals, animals instinctively drink from seeps, streams, and ponds and their

caretakers can do little to stop this. Family dogs got violently ill and died. Horses were

poisoned and died. Many homeowners regularly bred livestock like goats, sheep, and cows.

Some animals would become infertile, miscarry, and produce deformed offspring. Postmortem

blood testing consistently showed the presence of fracking-related chemicals in animals’ bodies.

For many homeowners, the loss and harm to their animals was not strictly economic, but caused

great emotional anguish.

Industry operations would ruin families’ ability to enjoy other aspects of their country

homesteads. For many, fishing and swimming in a pond is part of the joy of living in the

countryside. Several homeowners described chemical spills, impoundment failure, or well bore

breakdowns ruining their once thriving freshwater ponds. We heard about fish kills, ponds

turning black, natural gas bubbling around the surface of the water, and plants and animals living

around ponds dying off. Trees and massive patches of grass would die on people’s land. While

these effects of fracking may not seem as profound or life altering as other events we have

learned about, such as someone's child becoming terribly ill, they nevertheless constitute a

serious impact on homeowners' lives and are indicative of the variety of ways industry

operations can harm the environment in which they occur.

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 Additionally, we heard testimony from individuals concerned about the possible effects

of producing food on their property in close proximity to shale gas operations. Well pads in rural

areas of Pennsylvania means there is a lot of industry activity near farming. We heard from a

homeowner whose property was surrounded by multiple well pads who grew tomatoes, grapes,

and apples. The owner watered the produce with potentially contaminated water and sold it to a

local grocery chain. We heard from another farmer with a well pad on their property who raised

and bred livestock that drank from suspected contaminated water. When the livestock failed to

breed as anticipated, possibly because of the tainted water they were exposed to, the farmer sold

them at auction to be butchered and sold to the public. We have learned that food, like water and

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air, is a possible pathway of contamination, and are concerned that contaminants from fracking

may be spreading into the broader community by entering our food supply.

Industry operations also had effects on interpersonal relationships and sense of

community. Once close-knit communities unraveled over whether they supported or opposed

fracking. The industry perpetuated this division by rallying public support for their work and

opposing those who spoke out against their business interests. Formerly cordial neighbors would

be openly hostile to one another. People told us they no longer felt comfortable shopping and

socializing in their own communities because of the animosity they felt. Friendships and

community bonds were broken. We heard testimony from a witness who spoke about how life in

her community changed:

…I got some incidents where I would go to a grocery store and one

time a guy came charging at me. The woman with him pulled him
back. Other times I would be pushed pretty close to the edge of
the road. I had a gas tanker beep loudly their air horn every time
they go by my house. I went up to the [supermarket] one day and
walked in and they had a table set up where you could get a
subscription to the [local newspaper]. I thought about it. I said
maybe I should. Then a guy came up behind me and said, you
should, you're in it all the time. People felt free just to say things
to me. Some of the neighbors that were talking to me just had to
tell me how badly I was being spoken of. It was very hostile. I
actually stopped shopping in my hometown. My family all lives a
short distance away in [a nearby town] and I do all my shopping
there or elsewhere. Once in a while, I have to run over to [the
supermarket]. I have a beautiful home in a community that is not
my home.

As these experiences compounded, some homeowners eventually reached a breaking

point and were left with no choice but to leave the homes they loved. Medical professionals and

others told them it was unsafe to stay; an obvious fact given what was happening to their family.

They could not sell their home, however, because it was unsafe, but also could not afford the cost

of maintaining their mortgage and paying to live somewhere else. Thus, they were stuck with

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the option of financial ruin or trying to carry on living in a home where they feared for their

health and the long-term wellbeing of themselves and their children. These were decisions born

from desperation, and several homeowners shared with us the heartbreaking moment they

realized they had no option but to leave:

One day I was unpacking the car from Costco, I realized I'm now
buying the double pack of hydrogen peroxide at Costco because
this is strictly just to clean the carpet. This is it for me. I am done.
This is not how kids live. So we left.

Protecting one’s children is fundamental to a parent, and the realization that your own

kids cannot experience a healthy, happy childhood is too much for anyone to bear. A parent

described learning from someone else that her own son would hide the fact that he was feeling

the effects of airborne contamination from his parents just so he could play outside:

…And she was sitting in the sandbox with him and she came back
down with tears in her eyes and literally said to me that he told her

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 that he doesn't always tell me when he is outside and gets
headaches and dizzy and can smell it because mommy won't let
him come out and play with his new trucks in the sand box.

Some homeowners were able to obtain financial relief by entering into settlement

agreements with industry operators. This, however, brought additional issues in the form of non-

disclosure agreements that prevented homeowners from discussing with their neighbors the fact

that their community had been contaminated by industry activity. One homeowner described the

way a non-disclosure agreement impacted her ability to answer her neighbors’ questions:

And the people that just purchased the [] house down below. . .
[S]he says tell me about your water situation and I said I'm not
allowed. And she says we just bought this place. I need to know
. . . . So I told them, I said you need to get in touch with the DEP
and EPA as well and that is all I can tell them.

Some homeowners found themselves with no choice other than to stay where they were.

We heard from one homeowner who testified as follows:

I took my son [] to the doctor and he referred me to Children’s

Hospital for his rash. . . . I went in there and after several times
of going to [the doctor’s] office, she said that there was nothing
she could do for me. Then she said her advice was to get an
attorney or move.
And then that’s when I thought, I can’t live – why is this
happening? And that’s when I thought, I can’t move. I’m going
to sell this house to somebody else and let this happen to
somebody else or somebody else’s kid? I couldn’t do it. So that’s
when we just decided we really have to, as a family, just watch
out for one another and my two neighbors and just not go outside.

*****

Knowing what we know, and having heard so many Pennsylvania families experiencing

terrifying health problems in relation to unconventional oil and gas operations, we cannot accept

the status quo in our Commonwealth that facilitates these harms. Every Pennsylvanian should

ask themselves how they would feel if a fracking operation suddenly commenced near their

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home. Imagine waking up in the morning and knowing that when you step into the shower, it

fills the house with a smell of rotten eggs and burns your skin. You try to shower as quickly as

possible with the windows open to mitigate the effects. You try to increase the number of days

between bathing your children to minimize their exposure to this harmful water.

To protect friends and family and out of embarrassment, you never allow visitors to come

over because of the way your water looks and smells when it comes out of the tap. You can’t

help but wash your clothes in your now contaminated water. You just hope you can air dry your

clothes long enough that the odor diminishes before you have to wear them, all the while hoping

that wearing clothes washed in unknown chemicals isn’t going to exacerbate any symptoms you

or your children have developed since your water changed.

And you do have symptoms that tell you that something is wrong: headaches and nose

bleeds and rashes that don’t go away. Your children are tired and nauseous all the time and

frequently sick. You fear that something isn’t right with your water, in spite of being told it is

safe and so you begin to spend money to buy bottled water. You have animals to care for, but

there is no way you can afford to give them bottled water to drink, so you continue to let them

drink the potentially contaminated water. You watch as some of your livestock and pets become

sick and die.

You become more and more concerned for your health and the health of your children.

You cannot get straight answers from the gas company about what chemicals might be in your

water because they’re not required to tell you, so you’re left to try to figure it out for yourself.

DEP tests your water but only for a handful of compounds – and not the ones you really want to

know about.

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 You worry that it’s not just the water that is to blame, but the air that your family is

breathing. You can’t buy clean air at the grocery store. You make more frequent trips to the

doctor. You scour the internet for information. You and your children do more blood tests. The

symptoms persist.

You try to spend more time away from your house than you do in it. But you cannot

leave permanently because your house is worthless without potable water, so you cannot sell it.

You cannot afford to keep paying a mortgage on a house that has no value and so you just wait

for the bank to foreclose or possibly declare bankruptcy. No matter what, your credit is ruined,

which makes it almost impossible to find another place to live. You struggle to work because

you’re feeling sick and you’re taking more time off to care for your sick children. And even if

you do finally manage to get away from the house and you find a new place to live, even when

you have the opportunity to breathe clean air and drink clean water again, you are left waiting for

a diagnosis that you hope never comes. Because you know that the impact of drinking

contaminated water or breathing contaminated air can show up slowly over time as a multitude

of diseases.

This reality is not something that should be tolerated. We find it unacceptable that, for

many living in close proximity to unconventional oil and gas operations, their health is

jeopardized and their constitutional right to “clean air” and “pure water” has been rendered a

fiction.

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 The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

DEP Mission Statement

The Department of Environmental Protections’s mission is to protect Pennsylvania’s
air, land and water from pollution and to provide for the health and safety of its citizens
through a cleaner environment. We will work as partners with individuals, organizations,
governments and businesses to prevent pollution and restore our natural resources.

The Grand Jury heard extensive evidence about the response of the Pennsylvania

Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) to the fracking boom. More than 30 witnesses

from the department testified. They included retired and current employees, ranging from the

ground-level inspectors up through various managers, to the people at the very top of the agency.

We heard from water quality specialists, water quality specialist supervisors, oil and gas

inspector supervisors, air quality specialists, air quality specialist supervisors, environmental

program managers, environmental protection specialists, geologists, engineers, bureau directors,

Deputy Secretaries and even former Secretaries – the top officials who ran the Department.

We conclude from this evidence that DEP was initially unprepared for and at times

overwhelmed by the challenges resulting from the new technologies of unconventional drilling –

or, as it is known in the general public, “fracking.” To some extent, this was not the fault of

Department employees. They were not the people who opened the Commonwealth’s shale

resources to industrial exploitation, or who permitted aggressive expansion before an appropriate

regulatory framework could be enacted. Nonetheless, we were disturbed by what we heard. We

believe that many DEP employees were doing the best job possible with the limited resources

they had. We also believe there were others who appeared to show undue deference to the

fracking industry, and undue indifference to citizens with serious complaints about appalling

effects they were suffering.

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 In more recent years, it appears progress has been made. The current administration has

responded to our requests for information, and has documented improvements. We believe,

however, that it remains important to highlight the past history of DEP’s management of this

new industry, both to explain the public distrust that has built up over time, and to ensure that the

Department’s actions going forward will fulfill its mission – to protect the environment, for all

the citizens of Pennsylvania.

At the outset, we feel obligated to note concern about the role that industry influence may

have played in DEP’s delayed reaction to the arrival of unconventional drilling. We realize, of

course, that government bureaucracy is inherently slow. But we heard enough testimony during

the course of our investigation to believe that more may have been at work. Two former DEP

Secretaries voiced similar opinions before the Grand Jury. Both felt an obligation under Article

1, Section 27 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, known as the

Environmental Rights Amendment. That provision, adopted by the voters in 1971, gives citizens

the right to clean water and air, and makes the Commonwealth the trustee of the environment for

present and future generations. Yet both Secretaries felt that the oil and gas industry had its own

pipeline to elected officials, and both felt pressure to permit production of shale gas.

As our investigation progressed, we learned of a joke circulated in Harrisburg that there

was an oil and gas industry lobbyist for every member of the General Assembly. We assume that

is hyperbole. But the concern would explain a lot of what we saw, and what we heard from DEP

employees at both high and low levels.

Failure to regulate

When the shale gas “boom” began in Pennsylvania, DEP was still working from

administrative regulations that were geared to a different era. The only regulations in place were

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those created to oversee conventional drilling – e.g., old-fashioned oil wells. When the U.S. oil

industry first began in the 1800s – ironically, in Pennsylvania – operators only had to dig down

100 feet or so in the right spot, and the oil spouted up by itself. Fracking requires an entirely

different and more complex approach. As one witness described it to the Grand Jury, the

comparison was like riding in a horse and buggy while the unconventional operators were flying

to the moon and back.

• Impoundments

A prime example of the outmoded regulatory approach was the use of “impoundments,”

or pits for storing liquids at the well site. While pits certainly existed at old-fashioned

conventional well sites, the impoundments that were springing up around fracking sites dwarfed

anything DEP had seen previously. These impoundments were now being used to store tens of

thousands of gallons of fracking fluid, which contained varieties of exotic, complex chemical

compounds, many of which may have serious health consequences.

The Grand Jury heard testimony about consideration of new rules for such impoundments

that would have required permits like those for landfills. In the end, DEP decided to let

operators build impoundments as part of the well pad, making them exempt from permit

requirements under the Solid Waste Management Act.

In the mid-2010s, DEP recognized that impoundments were not safe, and they were

phased out in favor of more secure storage methods. But by that time, DEP had years of

knowledge about impoundment failures. The Grand Jury heard extensive testimony about leaks

from impoundments that contaminated springs and wells which had served as the only source of

water for many Pennsylvania families. We also heard about the effects on neighbors’ living

standards caused by the intense, rancid odors generated by the impoundments. The consequences

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of these under-regulated impoundments ruined property values, family finances and water

supplies in many areas, and impacts on physical health are still being assessed. DEP’s new

regulatory approach is welcome, but for many Pennsylvanians it came too late.

We heard from current DEP Deputy Secretary Scott Perry, who was also with the agency

in those early fracking days. He testified that an initial decision made by DEP management to

exempt impoundments from regulation under the Solid Waste Management Act was “wrong,”

but that his position was rejected. A former DEP employee testified that, based on his

experience with the agency, the impoundment decision was likely made in deference to the oil

and gas industry: “if they had to go through waste management, they were concerned that there

were going to be delays in getting these permits issued…. [W]hat was consequential for [the

industry] was time, not so much money.… They had a lot of resources. They could spend the

money.”

• Pigging stations

We saw another example of failure to regulate in the case of pigging stations. At these

junctions along a gas pipeline where the gas is treated and the lines are cleaned, methane and

other pollutants are regularly released into the air. We know DEP knew about the issue, because

it sent out a preliminary notice to the industry in 2011. Yet it did not follow up for five more

years, until 2016, when it finally began to require emissions reporting for pigging stations. In the

meantime, the lack of regulatory oversight in this area made it possible for operators to build

multiple stations in close proximity, sometimes right next to a school or someone’s backyard.

The net result, for some unlucky homeowners, has been high exposure to the kind of

danger DEP is tasked to help protect us against. Health data presented to the Grand Jury have

made clear that, although fracking has caused severe water contamination in certain parts of the

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Commonwealth, we should be equally concerned about the contaminants the industry releases

into our air. DEP regulation concerning pigging stations has been, in our view, insufficient and

untimely.

Ask the family we heard from in Washington County. They built a home for their three

children, and refused to grant an easement for oil and gas development. But the company came

anyway, laid down a pipeline next to their property, and constructed a high pressure valve

system for “blow-downs” that showered chemical waste into the yard. After a gas release that

sounded “like a jet engine,” the family developed nosebleeds, dizziness, and a rash of eraser-

sized dots on exposed areas of their skin. The family called DEP, but were told no action could

be taken. “I assumed by the title of their name, department of environmental, I just thought they

were protecting the environment,” the mother told us. “Now I really don’t know what they do.”

• Comprehensive regulations

But the failure to regulate wasn’t just in one or two areas. Testimony showed that, early

on, people in the agency knew they needed a whole new set of regulations specific to

unconventional drilling, and there was much discussion of the issue. DEP helpfully prepared a

timeline for us, showing that the Department began “developing concepts” for a comprehensive

fracking regulation package as early as 2009-10. But the package wasn’t formally proposed until

2013, and it wasn’t until 2016 that full regulations were finally adopted. John Hanger, a former

DEP secretary, testified that in his view the delay was partly political: “the business community

has been very, very successful in making passing regulations or enacting regulations difficult

because they don't generally like regulations. So the rules about how you pass a regulation in

Pennsylvania are very, very difficult.” But another former Secretary, Michael Krancer, testified

that “the Department is able to move more nimbly by using policy documents and guidance

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documents, which are not regulation,” but still provide a basis for enforcement. Unfortunately,

DEP for a variety of reasons failed to create a comprehensive fracking policy, whether through

formal regulations or internal guidance documents, in a timely fashion.

Failure to train

As fracking ramped up in Pennsylvania, DEP was attempting to perform its regulatory

responsibilities with employees whose tenures largely predated unconventional drilling, and who

knew little about the highly complex methods used to extract natural gas from shale. One

employee, for example, told us he had never even seen an impoundment before. The testimony

we heard established that agency personnel knew they were playing catch-up; yet many were

unsatisfied by DEP’s efforts to train employees for the new challenges they would be facing.

Indeed, several employees testified that training opportunities that did arise seemed to be

discouraged, both in earlier and in more recent years. One DEP employee testified that he

traveled out of state for training on his own initiative, and met scientists (including one from

Penn State, which has a Center for Marcellus Shale Research) who offered to provide training

and assistance to DEP. The employee brought back the offer to supervisors, but nothing was

ever done. Other DEP employees testified that they were told not to participate in training

provided by outside entities because attendance would violate the administration’s “gift ban”

policy. Another employee testified that he tried to institute bi-monthly training sessions within

his district office, but that he was transferred after two or three sessions and the training stopped.

The result, once again, was the absence of any comprehensive response to the new

circumstances. One employee told us that, when fracking began, he felt his colleagues were

“thrown into the fire.” Another testified that agency staff received only “on-the-job training”

and “an occasional staff meeting.” As he pointed out, “[w]hen you learn from someone who

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learned from someone who learned from someone, you could have been doing it wrong the

whole time.”

DEP did provide us with a list of training sessions conducted by the agency over the

years. Many of these, however, do not appear to have focused on fracking, and in several years

it appears there was little or no training at all. We recognize that most government agencies lack

significant funding for training. Indeed, an official DEP representative acknowledged to the

Grand Jury that this remained an item of need for the Department. For us the point is that

fracking was the new challenge facing DEP, and that was the subject on which agency personnel

most required information. As we heard from the employees who testified before us, they didn’t

get it.

Failure to communicate

Testimony also established that, even when DEP employees did gain useful knowledge

about the new industry, they failed to communicate it to others within the agency. Some of this

was a structural problem; sections of the Department with overlapping responsibilities did not

talk to each other. We learned of one case, for example, in which one DEP section – the Bureau

of Waste Management – prepared a cease and desist order against a company that was illegally

operating a waste storage unit without the required permit. When inspectors arrived at the scene

to serve the order, however, the operator produced a document provided to him by a different

DEP section – Oil and Gas – which authorized him to use the waste storage unit without getting

a permit. The Oil and Gas employees had never bothered to check with Waste Management

about its interpretation of the law it oversaw. Oil and Gas issued similarly improper

authorizations throughout the Commonwealth.

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 In general, we learned, DEP showed little interest in cross-training employees with

overlapping responsibilities. Instead, the culture was described to us as “stay in your lane.” We

heard testimony about another very telling case, in which DEP actually did something

responsible early on, and yet wound up wasting the effort. In the first days of unconventional

drilling, starting in 2008, DEP undertook what should have been a crucial study to identify the

precise chemicals the industry was using in frack fluid to open up shale deposits. The

environmental engineer who led the investigation appeared before the Grand Jury. Several

employees were assigned to the project, as well as interns. They took dozens of samples around

the state, which were then analyzed by the Department’s Bureau of Labs.

But the results never really went anywhere. The engineer handed off the data, but the

study was never published within the agency, and no one received any training on it. We asked

other employees what they had learned from the study. It appeared that most had barely even

heard of it. This was information that should have advanced DEP’s regulation efforts by years.

But it didn’t.

DEP has assured us that its efforts from the beginning of the fracking boom included

internal collaboration, and no doubt there was at least some in some form. But the testimony of

the agency’s own employees persuaded us that, in the opening years of unconventional oil and

gas activity, when the need was greatest, the Department’s efforts to coordinate its widespread

staff were not sufficient.

Failure to test

We were also disturbed by testimony about how the Department failed to test, or

ineffectively tested, water samples to find contamination caused by fracking. The law requires

the Department to conduct water quality tests in response to citizen complaints. We learned that

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DEP performed that obligation by relying on a set list of known parameters to test for, such as

chloride and sediment levels. The list was called a “suite code”, and could be effective only to

the extent that it accurately identified the appropriate factors for which to test in particular

situations. One of these lists, suite code 942, had been developed by DEP before fracking, for

old-fashioned conventional drilling. Since conventional drilling did not use the same chemicals

or techniques as fracking, suite code 942 could not accurately indicate whether water was

contaminated; yet many DEP employees relied upon it to the exclusion of any additional

investigation. Eventually, a new list was developed, suite code 946, but many employees didn’t

know about it, and kept on using suite code 942.

Even the new suite code, moreover, was often too narrow to catch contaminants. And

once again, it was used without regard to individual circumstances. An operator might be using

a particular compound on a specific occasion that is not universally present at fracking sites. If

DEP did not check the operator’s records to see what he was using when a spill occurred (if the

chemicals were fully disclosed), the Department would never know what to test for. Reliance on

the standard suite code would actually be detrimental, because it would give a clean bill of health

to water that might in fact be dangerously contaminated. And the problem was compounded, we

learned, by the fact that DEP did not always fully report all the substances for which it did test.

So even those homeowners whose water was tested, and who did receive results, might never

know what they really meant.

We were also disturbed to learn about DEP practices concerning “pre-drill” sampling.

Experts in the field explained to us that impact assessment relies heavily on comparing the water

before and after a company starts drilling in a particular area. Some compounds occur naturally

in water, and vary from location to location. Pre-drill samples establish a baseline for a

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particular water supply; if the water changes significantly after fracking operations begin, the

reasonable conclusion is that the fracking caused the change. DEP often lacked pre-drill data in

the early years of fracking, but nevertheless purported to make determinations about whether a

well site had caused contamination. We heard testimony from one water quality specialist

supervisor who stated that without pre-drill testing a positive determination would not be

possible and that any additional investigation would not be helpful. We shared that assertion

with a higher ranking employee in the same section and the response was “that’s absurd.”

Moreover, even when proper samples did exist, we remained concerned about whether

DEP knew how to properly analyze them. We reviewed a DEP policy document from 2015

setting forth guidelines for assessing water quality samples. But the document makes no

reference to established federal standards for maximum safe concentrations of various

contaminants, nor does it identify the criteria that are most likely to indicate whether water has

been compromised by industrial activity. Surprisingly, this policy was adopted in 2015 – long

after unconventional drilling began. By that time, DEP’s water-testing policies should have been

far more advanced.

These concerns may sound technical; but they are not trivial. It is important to keep in

mind that, in most of the areas where unconventional drilling became prevalent, there are no

public water lines to supply water to landowners. These people rely entirely on wells that are

dug on their property to supply their water. So when there is a noticeable change to their water,

whether it is a smell or a change in appearance, it is devastating. We heard many accounts of

landowners who literally begged and pleaded with operators to provide a temporary water supply

so they wouldn’t have to drink, cook, clean, bathe or care for their animals using well water they

believed was contaminated

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 We heard much testimony, however, indicating that DEP employees often approached

these issues with less gravity than, in our view, they deserved. In many cases, DEP water quality

specialists, relying on outmoded or overly restrictive testing parameters, would declare water to

be clean and would “close” the investigation in the face of a homeowner’s knowledge that

something was wrong. We remember one employee in particular who admitted in his testimony

that, as he saw it, his duty prevented him from putting a “monetary hit” on an operator unless he

could “prove that this water is being impacted by this activity.”

As we learned, however, that is not at all how the applicable law works. The Oil and Gas

Act establishes a “zone of presumption.” Within the zone, contamination from oil and gas

activity is presumed. DEP need not “prove” that the activity caused the contamination; rather,

the operator must prove the opposite. Previously, the zone of presumption was 1,000 feet from

an oil or gas well, and applied to any contamination manifesting within six months after

completion of drilling or subsequent alterations. In 2012, the zone was enlarged – to 2,500 feet

and 12 months after drilling or alteration.

This is an absolutely essential aspect of Pennsylvania’s environmental protection system.

But testimony established that some DEP employees have simply disregarded this safeguard.

One, for example, stated that “I would use probably the same, you know, level of proof

regardless” of the zone of presumption. We find it troubling that any DEP employee was

unaware of crucial legal guidelines that govern the Department’s testing program.

Failure to inspect

We were additionally troubled by testimony concerning the conduct of inspections, such

as when a spill was reported. We learned that DEP regulations require well operators to report

spills of more than five gallons. Several employees testified that, in order to make

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determinations in such situations, they would simply take the operator’s word for it about the

existence or amount of a spill. These employees told us that they trusted the industry to follow

the rules and self-report accurately.

We are mindful of concerns that DEP is understaffed and employees cannot spend all

their time making inspections. At the same time, we are highly skeptical that operators can fairly

or effectively police themselves, given the powerful incentives not to expose their own

violations. Yet we learned that it was not uncommon for DEP employees to resolve some cases

through an “administrative file review,” meaning sitting at their desks, reviewing documentation

submitted by the industry, without ever seeing the spill for themselves.

On other occasions, we learned, DEP employees would investigate citizen complaints

simply by calling the operator and asking him what happened. “We had so many complaints,”

testified one employee. “It was impossible for us to respond to every one.” So, instead, the first

step was often to telephone the well site operator. If the operator sent in a photo purporting to

show that no spill had occurred, the matter could be closed without ever leaving the office.

Revolving door

The credence given to oil and gas operators by some DEP employees proved less

surprising to us after we learned this fact: that oil and gas operators often were DEP employees

who had recently left the public sphere for private industry. As is typical with government work,

they could make considerably more money by moving on. In fact we learned of an instance in

which an operator scooped up seven employees from the same DEP office all at one time. This

sort of hiring created an unfortunate talent drain for DEP – but more concerning to us was the

potential effect on the integrity of the Department’s investigations.

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 We heard testimony, for example, concerning the improper issuance of two “plugging”

certificates that allowed a company to shut down wells without first doing the necessary work to

make them safe. When we asked about the identity of the employee who had issued the

certificates, we learned he was no longer at DEP; he was hired by the company to whom the

certificates had been issued. Such career progression was not uncommon. Industry employees

were often former employees of DEP. In our view, this is not a recipe for restoring public

confidence in the DEP inspection process.

Failure to notify

We should emphasize that DEP did often perform proper testing and inspection, and in

many cases has identified contamination caused by shale gas activity. Yet we were surprised to

learn about what often happened, or more accurately didn’t happen, next. We would have

expected that DEP would have a clear practice, if not a rule, of notifying neighbors in the area

once a positive determination had been made that water sources had been tainted. That

apparently is not the case.

DEP employees testified repeatedly that notification to neighbors was not the norm, nor

required, as far as they were aware. As one put it, employees were reluctant to “poke a hornet’s

nest.” Another explained that, in his view, surrounding homeowners might not want to know,

“because they're afraid of what it will do to their property value.” A third simply said, “[w]e

generally do not do that. We address the complaint that's given to us.” These employees were

not against the idea that it made sense to notify neighbors if DEP determined someone’s water

supply had been contaminated, they just understood that wasn’t the policy. As to why – that was

“above [their] paygrade.”

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 We asked Deputy Secretary Perry about this issue. He stated DEP had an obligation to

notify neighbors when a contaminating event occurred close to their homes, but that this

obligation, and how it is carried out, depends on the circumstance of the particular event. For

example, when serious instances of well failure cause stray gas to migrate out of a well bore and

into the surrounding aquifer, according to Perry, DEP has a clear half-mile notification policy,

which can expand beyond this radius. DEP has also required operators to notify neighbors about

serious chemical spills in their area. Ultimately, however, DEP’s approach to this issue depends

on the “best judgment” of its employees in determining the need to notify nearby homeowners

about a contaminating event.

What we know from the DEP employees we asked about this issue – including water

quality supervisors and those supervisors’ supervisor – is that to the extent there is some policy

or practice about notifying homeowners in close proximity to a confirmed case of water

contamination from shale gas activity – DEP employees are largely unaware of it. Indeed, their

understanding was that the policy is not to notify those living nearby.

It is deeply troubling to us that this type of notification isn’t routinely happening at DEP.

The need is particularly great given that many homeowners enter into non-disclosure agreements

(NDA) with operators in order to settle water supply complaints. If DEP doesn’t tell neighbors

there is a potential problem and their neighbors can’t tell them because they entered into an

NDA, there may be no way for people to find out. We think that, whether or not DEP believes

adjacent landowners “want” to know, they have a right to know, so that they can make their own

decisions about how to proceed. We recommend DEP take measures to ensure this is

occurring—formalizing and standardizing policies and procedures to ensure consistent

application by all regions and levels of employees.

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 Failure to issue violations

Our investigation also revealed evidence of another manner in which DEP was not

vigorously enforcing Pennsylvania environmental laws. When the Department discovers that an

operator is not in compliance with a regulation, the Department is supposed to issue a Notice of

Violation, or “NOV.” DEP failed to do much of that in the formative years of fracking, which is

when oil and gas violations were much more likely to occur.

We saw this in particular in relation to odor complaints. In the early days of the industry,

when impoundments were commonly used to store noxious fluids in open air, neighbors lodged

repeated air quality complaints. We think they should not have been that difficult to substantiate;

the nose knows. The Department, however, imposed such stringent requirements that violations

could rarely be found. A DEP air quality specialist explained, for example, that, in order to

vindicate a complaint, the odor had to be smelled at the same time by three unrelated people in

three different households, plus an inspector on site. And if the operations around the

impoundment tended to produce the odor at a particular time of day that was outside of DEP

work hours, no violation could be brought. The inspector testified that, in ten years in his

position, he had never once been able to issue a “malodor” NOV.

We heard evidence indicating that in at least some cases DEP staff’s reluctance to issue

oil and gas NOVs may have been a consequence of policy decisions made at the top of the

Department. We reviewed an email from the then-Executive Deputy Secretary of DEP, dated

March 23, 2011. The email directed that every single NOV had to be personally approved by the

highest official in the agency, then-Secretary Michael Krancer. The email stated emphatically

that “I need to repeat no final actions are to be taken unless … with clearance from Mike. Any

waiver from this directive will not be acceptable.”

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 Mr. Krancer did come before this Grand Jury, and described the email as “a

misunderstanding” based on a miscommunication between the Deputy Secretary and himself.

Employees who learned of the email, understandably, did not take it that way. As one put it, he

thought the message was clear: “To leave the Marcellus alone…. Don't interfere with their

business.”

DEP has provided the Grand Jury with statistics showing that, in more recent years, the

number of NOVs has dramatically increased. In 2015, for example, the Department issued over

400 unconventional well NOVs, and the numbers have gone up since. We’re encouraged to see

that. We do note, however, that the Department has begun, in effect, double-counting NOVs in

some cases. If the violation is not corrected within the year, it is carried over to the following

year but is registered as if it were a new violation. In addition, the Department can’t tell us what

we would most like to know: how many NOVs have risen to the level of enforcement action?

DEP now publishes online the status of each NOV that occurred after 2017, and whether the

violation has been corrected or noted on a subsequent report. DEP does not track all

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enforcement actions and litigation that may result from an NOV. We also find it concerning that

the Department says that while it tracks complaints generally, it is unable to parse out which

complaints relate solely to oil and gas activities, so we cannot tell how many citizen complaints

in this area have been investigated and acted upon. Still, the situation seems to be improving.

Failure to refer

In a related area, however, we think enforcement is still lagging, and has even been

getting worse. The ultimate sanction for an environmental law violation is criminal prosecution.

The Pennsylvania Legislature has created several criminal offenses in the environmental field.

The Office of Attorney General has a special section dedicated to environmental crimes. But the

office does not have the power to initiate such prosecutions on its own. The Attorney General

can act only if an outside agency – primarily DEP – refers the case for investigation.

Evidence presented to the Grand Jury, however, established that, in contrast to NOVs, the

number of criminal referrals by DEP in fracking-related cases has been declining in recent years,

to the point where they rarely occur at all. A number of DEP employees testified that they didn’t

even know about the referral process. Others, who did know, justified the absence of criminal

referrals mostly on the grounds that such referrals simply aren’t necessary. They testified to their

belief that the oil and gas industry wants to do the right thing, and that the threat of civil penalties

is sufficient to achieve compliance with the law. As one supervisor put it, “[t]he industry is

pretty scared of us.”

We don’t agree. We did not see anything in this investigation to convince us that oil and

gas operators are running scared. The advantages of money and power are on their side. Given

that reality, there will be cases on occasion in which appropriate enforcement includes

prosecution. DEP witnesses themselves acknowledged that guns, badges, and subpoenas can get

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the attention of people on a drilling site. Decisions about invoking these criminal sanctions

should ultimately be made by experienced prosecutors, not oil and gas administrators.

DEP has recently given us new statistics, claiming that it actually has referred hundreds

of cases for prosecution, with yearly levels in the double digits. We find those numbers to be

irrelevant to the present inquiry. What we are talking about are fracking-related referrals, for

violations related to unconventional drilling and pipelines. From 2008 to 2018 there were a total

of only 17 such referrals. From 2015 to 2018, the grand total was two. If DEP is dedicated to

effective use of the tools at its disposal, it should start referring appropriate cases for criminal

prosecution. Given what we’ve seen, we feel confident there are more cases out there that

deserve prosecutorial review.

Failure to listen

We end with one overriding concern. Our investigation persuaded us that DEP’s actions

in the past, during the years that defined its reaction to the fracking phenomenon, created

significant distrust of the agency among many members of the public. We know that there are

and have always been exemplary DEP employees. But we heard of too many times when

Department representatives, all too willing to believe operators, dismissed the concerns of

citizens who had turned to government for assistance. We hope that is changing, and that this

Report, by exposing the behavior, may advance the change.

We heard, for example, from a homeowner who personally observed a spill occurring

into the creek near his property. He saw the creek change color. He took video. He called DEP

and described what was happening in real time. But nothing he said would convince the

employee to come and look for himself. The employee said he had already talked to the

operators of the well, that they had assured him there was no danger to the creek, and that he

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therefore had no need of the homeowner’s evidence. He threatened to have the homeowner

prosecuted for filing a false report.

We heard testimony from other citizens who could get nowhere even when they went to

the expense of hiring their own consultants to offer scientific analyses to DEP. The Department

declined to review third party data from citizens, although we know that employees often

accepted evidence from oil and gas operators. We heard from a DEP water quality specialist that

he could not consider lab results provided by a homeowner, even when they came from the same

lab regularly used by the industry. We heard from another homeowner that DEP not only

refused to review her lab report, but also refused to do its own analysis to look for the

compounds her report had revealed.

We also heard from a hydrologist at Penn State who had been called in to investigate well

water that was milk-colored and frothing. The scientist performed extensive forensic lab testing

to confirm that the foam had the same chemical signature as a drilling foam that was then being

used at a nearby well site. But even this expert made no progress with DEP.

Ironically, forensic analysis is what one DEP employee expressly disavowed. “[T]hey

expect my guys to be NCIS,” he testified, referring to a popular crime lab television series.

“That’s not going to happen in reality.”

We don’t think the public really expects DEP to be NCIS. We think citizens just want to

be listened to, to be taken seriously, and to be informed. We understand that complaints about

fracking-related contamination are not always correct. Sometimes the operator is not to blame.

But unconventional drilling is different from almost all other heavy duty industrial operations in

that it can happen virtually in people’s backyards or the playgrounds where they take their

children. Fracking can threaten the only water available to them to drink and the only air

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available to them to breathe. DEP must respond to these concerns with neutrality and

professionalism.

*****

We recognize that certain actions taken by DEP as described in this report were based on

legitimate policy decisions. A deliberate policy decision was made to support the fracking

industry in Pennsylvania as an important economic driver. However, policy decisions also have

consequences, and in this case, one consequence of the decisions made by multiple

administrations and DEP was inadequate supervision of an industry which had – and continues to

have – significant impacts on the Commonwealth’s citizens. While it may not have been

intentional or malicious, ultimately, DEP failed to meet its mission “to protect Pennsylvania’s

air, land and water from pollution and to provide for the health and safety of its citizens.”

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 The Pennsylvania Department of Health

DOH Mission Statement

The mission of the Pennsylvania Department of Health is
to promote healthy behaviors, prevent injury and disease, and to
assure the safe delivery of quality health care for all people in Pennsylvania.

For years following the outset of the fracking boom, Pennsylvania failed to sufficiently

recognize or respond to the public health consequences of fracking. We failed to train or

empower our public servants to educate and help those reaching out to their government when

they believed their health was suffering because of industry operations. Our government devoted

woefully insufficient resources toward gathering public health data associated with industry

activities. It failed to implement executive-level policies that could have improved public health

data collection. This absence of data crippled potential regulatory, legal, and enforcement

actions aimed at addressing industry practices harmful to public health.

Things have improved under the current gubernatorial administration. Inheriting a legacy

of inaction, the administration made a deliberate effort to gather health data associated with

fracking operations more effectively, but the inadequate resources put toward this effort doomed

it to failure. Just recently, the administration has directed greater effort and resources toward the

problem, but in our view, more should be done. Most significantly, our government -- including

its Department of Health (DOH) -- does not recognize that fracking operations harm public

health, citing insufficient research on the issue. However, the absence of such research, at least

in part, is due to DOH's own failure to inquire into the matter over the past decade. This "wait

and see" approach facilitates placing the health risks of the shale gas industry's operations on

everyday Pennsylvanians. We find this status quo unacceptable. The recommendations we

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propose are in recognition of the public health risks posed by the fracking industry and seek to

strike the right balance going forward.

DOH at the beginning of the fracking boom

We heard from a public health nurse who worked for the Pennsylvania Department of

Health in Fayette County, in southwest Pennsylvania, for 36 years. In 2011 and 2012, State

Health Centers in southwest Pennsylvania began receiving complaints from people in the

community who believed they were experiencing health problems due to shale gas activity.

Fracking was a new phenomenon, however, and DOH employees had not received training on

how to respond to these complaints. As a result, they were unequipped to help members of the

community reaching out to DOH for help.

This was not the first time the Department of Health was confronted with an emergent

public health event. In such instances when communities were experiencing a broad public

health phenomenon, such as the HIV crisis or hepatitis outbreaks, DOH responded by educating

its staff through in-service and out-service programs. DOH staff would then implement a

Department-directed public education, outreach, and treatment program. DOH would refer the

public to resources and medical professionals for treatment and testing. As we were told, one of

the “ten essential services of public health” is “informing and educating and empowering people

regarding health issues.”

When DOH began receiving health complaints linked to fracking activity, however, no

such collective public outreach and education response occurred. Rather, the Department of

Health strictly limited its employees' activities in relation to fracking. For instance, the public

health nurse we heard from explained that she and her colleagues received a list of 15 to 20

words related to the fracking industry they were to keep next to their telephones. If someone

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called with a health complaint and referenced these terms, they could not answer any of the

caller’s questions. Rather, they were to take the caller's name and information and pass it on to a

supervisor. While they were under the impression that someone higher up in DOH would

respond, she and her colleagues frequently received calls from frustrated citizens who never

received a follow-up response from DOH to their fracking-related health complaints. The

witness we heard from testified that in her 36 years as a public health nurse, the Department had

never handled any other public health complaints in this manner.

At the same time DOH employees received instructions on how to process fracking-

related health complaints, the Department imposed other limitations on their freedom to engage

with the public. DOH employees were instructed that in order to participate in conferences,

boards, task forces, or public meetings, they first had to channel a request through their

supervisor, which would ultimately require approval from the DOH Bureau of Community

Health in Harrisburg. These requests entailed filling out a form specifying the date of the event,

who would be attending, the agenda and what would be discussed, and if they would be taking

an active or speaking role. Staff was obligated to sign a document confirming they understood

the limitations DOH had placed on public engagements. Thus, although a public-facing office,

DOH policies restrained public health employees from engaging with the public or from

participating in events where they could learn about fracking, health concerns related to industry

operations, or otherwise carry out the Department's public health mission.

The Department’s blanket muzzling of its employees at the outset of the fracking boom

and general failure to meaningfully address the public health consequences of fracking

operations was unprecedented. As the witness before us confirmed, the Department had never

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before imposed comparable restrictions on its employees in response to any other public health

issue during her 36-year career.

DOH continued to ignore the public health effects of fracking

The absence of any meaningful public health response from our government to the

fracking phenomenon continued for years. We heard testimony from a witness who served as

the District Executive Director for the Southwest District of DOH’s Bureau of Community

Health Services from January 2012 through April 2014 (District Director). This District Director

oversaw the State Health Centers in ten southwest Pennsylvania counties at the center of the

fracking boom.

DOH provides public health services to local communities through its State Health

Centers, such as those the District Director oversaw. During his tenure with DOH, all phone

calls or complaints involving unconventional oil and gas activity were forwarded to the Bureau

of Epidemiology in Harrisburg. The District Director confirmed these referrals did not go to

some team of public health professionals specially equipped to respond to fracking-related

issues. Rather, they went into a proverbial “black hole.” There was no protocol, there was no

plan, and there was no meaningful response from DOH. The practice implemented at the

beginning of the fracking boom continued for years thereafter.

DOH’s approach to fracking-related health issues stood in stark contrast to the usual way

State Health Centers respond to health outbreaks. The District Director described how DOH

carries out its mission when communities experience a public health event. For instance, when

he worked at DOH there were 74 diseases, conditions, and infections the Department was

required to monitor and address as part of the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System,

or “PA-NEDSS.” The PA-NEDSS is integrated with local health providers and the federal

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Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and is part of a nation-wide system for monitoring

outbreaks and risks to public health. When a public health issue included in the PA-NEDSS

arises, DOH takes action to address the problem.

The Department’s public health nurses, who work out of DOH State Health Centers, are

its “boots on the ground” points of contact with the community. DOH nurses carry out their

duties according to training and protocols developed by the Department for a wide variety of

health issues, including those in the PA-NEDSS. These protocols include providing public

health nurses with questionnaires to gather pertinent information from the community in

response to an emergent health problem. When such a problem arises, DOH does not sit idly by,

but goes out into the community to directly figure out what is happening. Once DOH acquires

an understanding of the problem, it equips its staff with direction on how to advise the public

accordingly, with the ultimate goal to figure out the source of the health issue in question and

then execute a plan to stop the problem from continuing or spreading.

Despite DOH’s capacity to address a wide variety of public health problems, nothing was

developed to address the health effects of fracking. There were simply no resources or policies

implemented to do so. Early versions of Act 13 included $2 million to address the public health

risks of fracking. When the Act ultimately passed, however, it allocated no money for public

health. The District Director testified that he attended quarterly meetings in Harrisburg with the

DOH Secretary and Department of Epidemiology leadership. A response to fracking was never

discussed at these meetings. Thus, DOH’s failure to take meaningful action in response to

fracking was established as policy from the outset of the unconventional oil and gas boom and

continued for years, despite persistent and widespread reports and public outcry about the harms

to health industry operations were causing to so many Pennsylvanians.

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 Throughout our investigation, we heard Pennsylvanians express a sense that their

government failed to acknowledge what they were experiencing because of shale gas operations

occurring near their homes and in their communities. Accompanying this lack of

acknowledgment was a lack of action, which fostered a feeling of hopelessness and distrust in

their government. We find that DOH’s response – or rather lack of response – during the rapid

expansion of the fracking industry contributed significantly to the pervasive sense of despair felt

by so many people whose lives were upended, and health damaged, as a result of industry

activities. While better efforts by DOH are now underway, this legacy continues to pose

substantial obstacles to mounting an adequate response to the public health implications of

fracking.

The current administration's approach

• The "enhanced" oil and gas health registry

Our government’s first deliberate response to the public health harms caused by

unconventional oil and gas operations was the development of a so-called “enhanced” oil and

natural gas public health registry. The development of this registry began in 2015 with the

current administration devoting $100,000 to address the public health effects of fracking, which

ultimately went to the enhanced registry. “Enhancing” DOH’s fracking-related health registry

did not mean much, however, since from 2011 on, the Department logged citizen complaints

involving shale gas activity on a Microsoft Word document. When the current administration

assumed office in 2015, this Word document log was the totality of what DOH received in terms

of fracking-related data or programs from prior administrations.

During our investigation, the Office of Attorney General shared evidence with DOH and

the administration and welcomed feedback on this evidence. DOH accepted this opportunity by

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submitting written submissions and live testimony for our consideration. The Office of Attorney

General "ceded the floor" to the administration and allowed it to present its own evidence

directly to us. With respect to the administration's public health approach to the shale gas

industry, we heard from Dr. Rachel Levine, the current DOH Secretary.

Dr. Levine explained the circumstances surrounding the creation of the enhanced

registry. Dr. Levine, who previously served as Pennsylvania’s Physician General, testified she

was tasked by her predecessor as DOH Secretary with developing a proposal for how to most

effectively use the $100,000 budgeted toward the administration’s public health response to

fracking. DOH developed two proposals. The money could be used for an enhanced oil and gas

health registry, which was ultimately selected, or as “seed money” toward a more comprehensive

health study, which would be done in partnership with a research university. Such a

comprehensive study, if ultimately funded, would cost millions, however. Because there was no

certainty more money would be budgeted toward this public health issue in the future, the

administration opted to spend the $100,000 toward the enhanced registry.

Virtually all of the $100,000 in funding for the enhanced registry went toward paying the

contract employee who administered it. This contractor initially worked with others in the DOH

toward developing a more detailed questionnaire for collecting health complaint data involving

shale gas operations. Once collected, the data is entered into a free software program provided

by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC).

The CDC software used for the enhanced registry is an information repository capable of

generating reports, which DOH issues quarterly. The software does not analyze data. The

dataset in the registry includes only that self-reported by a citizen complainant. The program

does not incorporate medical data and DOH does not engage with health providers in developing

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the registry. While a letter sent in response to oil and gas complaints welcomes the recipient to

have their doctor contact DOH, the contractor stated that had never occurred. In addition, Dr.

Levine stated, "data reported by a doctor would be anecdotal and therefore not really useful."

Assuming contaminants are found in the complainant's water at elevated levels indicative of a

health risk, the contractor informs the complainant accordingly and describes the risks associated

with the chemicals in question. A toxicologist is available to assist the contractor in that regard.

Otherwise, the Department does not follow-up with complainants or doctors.

DOH has received an average of one complaint per month since establishing the

enhanced registry in 2017. As of DOH's last report issued for 2019, the registry includes 164

inquiries related to fracking since March 2011. Of these 164 inquiries, only around 120

constitute specific complaints of fracking activity affecting someone’s health. Most of these

registered complaints carried over from the Word document dataset maintained by prior

administrations, which gathered less data than the current registry. So, over three years the

enhanced registry gathered around three dozen complaints.

The amount of complaints received by the enhanced registry fell far below the

Department's expectations, which was partly a consequence of DOH failing to meet community

expectations. As Dr. Levine acknowledged, despite DOH's concerted efforts to encourage those

with fracking-related health complaints to participate in the enhanced registry, it was difficult to

convince people to do so because the Department was not offering answers or solutions to their

problems. People were not eager to spend upwards of an hour completing a detailed health

survey when DOH had little assistance to provide them in return. We find that DOH’s response,

or in reality lack of response, contributed to citizens’ feelings of hopelessness and created a lack

of trust in the government that should have been interested in protecting them.

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 When Governor Wolf commenced his first term in 2015, he selected John Quigley to

serve as DEP Secretary. The Senate confirmed Quigley as Secretary in June 2015 and he

remained in that position until May 2016. Quigley testified that he also participated in the

administration’s discussions on developing a fracking-related public health registry.

Quigley had significant concerns about the harm to public health posed by shale gas

operations. However, he understood that without data substantiating the connections between

fracking and public health, DEP, the administration, and other actors were hamstrung in asserting

the need for regulatory or government action to address this problem. In Quigley’s view, the

$100,000 a year budgeted for such a registry was inadequate, and it would cost millions of

dollars to build a sufficient registry. We find it self-evident that this level of funding was

inadequate and did not rise to the level of importance of the problem at hand.

• Failure to work together

The administration’s failure to gather public health data effectively in relation to industry

activities was further undermined by its own agencies’ inability to work effectively together

toward that end. DOH relies primarily on DEP referrals for oil and gas related health

complaints. As the contractor who administers the enhanced registry testified, it was

“perplex[ing]” how DEP had received thousands of complaints in relation to fracking activity,

while DOH had registered only around 120 total health complaints. While under the current

administration DOH and DEP have made some effort to collaborate and address this data gap,

these efforts have fallen short.

At the outset of the current administration, DEP and DOH initiated monthly meetings

aimed at getting DEP and DOH to work together to gather better public health data. The general

approach developed during these meetings was to include health-related questions among those

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asked when DEP takes an environmental complaint. If someone contacted DEP to report their

belief that fracking operations were contaminating their water, air, soil, etc., they would also be

asked whether they were experiencing any health problems. If so, that information could be

shared and registered with DOH, and DOH could follow-up accordingly.

Efforts at incorporating health questions into DEP’s environmental complaints

culminated in a November 7, 2018 meeting between high-ranking DOH and DEP officials and

policy experts. DOH had proposed adding an “active” box to DEP’s water quality complaint

form, which would require a DEP employee registering a complaint to ask the complainant

whether they had any health concerns. DEP, principally through Scott Perry, the Deputy

Secretary of the Oil and Gas Management Program, opposed this request because it would

constitute a “leading question” and was outside the area of DEP’s expertise. Ultimately, DEP

agreed to a “passive” box on the complaint form; meaning if the complainant mentioned a health

issue, unprompted, a notation to that effect would occur and be passed to DOH.

Additionally, DOH and DEP were only discussing adding a health question to water

quality complaints, but health complaints regularly pertained to air quality, truck traffic, and

other effects of unconventional oil and gas operations. DOH was interested in developing ways

they could gather information about these health issues as well. So, while DEP was somewhat

receptive to incorporating public health issues into its complaint processes, in DOH’s view, there

was a lot more it could do. DOH representatives continued to push DEP to take further action

aimed at gathering public health information, including adding an “active” question on health.

Ultimately, however, Scott Perry refused to agree to more than adding the passive box to the

water quality complaint form, and the meeting, which was contentious at times, ended.

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 After the November 2018 meeting, DEP cancelled all future regularly scheduled

meetings with DOH. There was no discussion about this; DEP simply deleted the meetings from

a shared Outlook calendar.

When Dr. Levine testified before us in January 2020, she informed us that DEP and DOH

had recently begun meeting again. That was not the case when Scott Perry testified in November

2019, however. Mr. Perry shared his view on the above-described meetings with DOH.

According to Perry, it was important that DEP only provide information to DOH with the

consent of the complainant because not all homeowners trusted the government or would

welcome another agency reaching out to them following their interaction with DEP. Perry

believed DEP’s engagement with DOH accomplished that end because DEP now refers health

complaints to DOH. Otherwise, at the time of his testimony, Perry was open to meeting with

DOH again, but said he would want to see what agenda they had because he saw nothing more

on the policy development side for them to discuss.

DOH saw a slight increase in complaint referrals from regional DEP field staff following

the November 2018 meeting. While the creation of the enhanced registry and DEP agreeing to

transmit some information to DOH was an improvement over nothing, the financial resources

devoted to this enhanced registry and collaborative effort between DEP and DOH were grossly

inadequate and did not constitute a legitimate public health response to the realities of fracking.

We learned that the current administration recently budgeted $1 million a year to fund a

study, in collaboration with a research university, of trends and clusters of acute health harms

and cancer rates in southwest Pennsylvania. The administration anticipates dedicating $1 million

each year for three years. Once gathered, this data can be analyzed to determine whether public

health trends correlate to unconventional oil and gas activity. While the administration has

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finally budgeted funds sufficient to gathering and studying public health data associated with

fracking, we are disturbed by the long-standing approach by our government to ignore or reject

information that substantiates the health and environmental harms of shale gas operations.

Further, we understand that developing sound data on the health consequences of the

unconventional oil and gas industry is important to implementing polices aimed at addressing

this issue. The current $1 million in funding to engage in a study of this issue may finally bring

about some meaningful results. We fear that the unwillingness to gather data over the past

decade, and years it will take to develop data under the currently-envisioned plan, have and will

continue to allow further harm to Pennsylvanians.

We asked DOH its position on whether unconventional oil and gas operations harm

public health. As the question was phrased, "Is it the DOH and administration's view that there

is insufficient evidence proving that unconventional oil and gas operations, whether in the past or

as they currently exist under the governing legal and regulatory scheme, harm public health?"

DOH responded by stating, "[T]he science in this area is developing, and it is fair to say that it

has not been proven that fracking harms public health." The Department further noted that

"'association' is not the equivalent to 'causation,'" and that further research was required to

substantiate a causal connection between fracking and harms to public health.

We do not contend that we are qualified to dispute medical professionals over whether

there is a sufficient body of epidemiological research establishing a connection between fracking

and public health. Indeed, officials at DOH co-authored a study in 2019 in which they reviewed

the prevailing scientific literature on the issue and found it lacking. However, we also learned

about studies concluding that health harms increase based on how close one lives to a fracking

operation, and that the only dispute was over how far away from the site was far enough.

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Regardless of which view is the correct one, we reject DOH and the administration's view on this

issue for two primary reasons.

First, DOH, prior gubernatorial administrations, and our government as a whole failed to

acknowledge or inquire into the public health effects of fracking since shale gas operations

commenced in the Commonwealth years ago. No resources were put toward addressing this

issue and executive level polices were implemented that prevented data gathering or a legitimate

public health response. Recently, the current Administration made some effort, but the $100,000

per year put toward the enhanced registry was inadequate and that endeavor was destined to fail,

despite efforts by those at DOH to make the most with what they were given.

Only now, after a decade of fracking and the drilling of over 12,000 unconventional

wells, has our government devoted resources to study the issue that may actually bring about

some meaningful results. These results, assuming they do come about, are still years away.

Thus, the absence of data and research DOH points to in saying there is insufficient evidence to

find a connection between fracking operations and harms to public health is, in part, a

consequence of DOH and our government's failure to look into this issue in the first place. In

other words, our government made no effort to gather the data and points to the lack of data as a

reason for not concluding there is a problem.

Meanwhile, we know that Pennsylvania families have been crying out to their

government, and anyone who will listen, that fracking operations have made them sick. We

heard many of their stories, and we find them credible.

Second, we do not accept that perceived inadequacies in available scientific research on

the risks to public health posed by industry operations should result in placing those risks on

Pennsylvania families. Under the status quo, the industry operates in close proximity to family

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homes without those families knowing what is happening at the industrial site next door. They

are exposed to harmful emissions and chemicals while we wait and see if research will

definitively prove, and in what way, the harms to their health that may be occurring. We are not

guinea pigs in an epidemiological study. If further research is necessary to understand this issue

fully, so be it. In the meantime, our laws should protect Pennsylvania families. The

recommendations we propose seek to impose some sanity and safety to how this industry

operates in Pennsylvania.

Others actors fill the void

Given our government's failure to mount a meaningful public health response to the

fracking phenomenon in Pennsylvania, concerned organizations have tried to fill this void. We

heard testimony from Dr. David Brown, a public health toxicologist with the Southwest

Pennsylvania Environmental Health Project (EHP), a nonprofit public health organization that

offers services to southwestern Pennsylvanians who believe their health has, or could be,

affected by unconventional oil and gas development. We learned from Dr. Brown's testimony

what a typical, on-the-ground public health response looks like.

In approximately 2010, a philanthropic organization voicing community concerns about

the health impacts of fracking contacted Dr. Brown. They flew him in to meet with physicians

and residents in Greene and Washington Counties who believed they were experiencing health

problems because of shale and gas operations. Dr. Brown met with multiple people living near

unconventional gas sites who described illnesses befalling their animals and similar health

problems they were experiencing personally; most notably headache symptoms associated with

methane exposure. He saw no indication these people were colluding in describing their similar

ailments and experiences. Dr. Brown was particularly concerned upon seeing reports signed by

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DEP employees informing people their water was safe, rather than such assurance coming from a

public health or medical professional, which he described as a "sin." In the doctor's view, the

scenario looked like "a public health outbreak," and he put together a plan to mount a public

health response, received immediate funding from a philanthropic organization, and the project

commenced.

Dr. Brown had overseen responses to public health outbreaks before, for instance while

working at the Centers for Disease Control and as the Director of Epidemiology for the

Connecticut Department of Health. He educated us on how a public health response is carried

out. The first step is to perform a "needs assessment," which entails finding out what is going on

in the local population and whether the population has the resources to deal with the problem.

That means gathering as much information as possible from local medical professionals, the

Department of Health, and the community. To achieve that end, Dr. Brown hired a nurse

practitioner and a professional to do environmental assessments at peoples' homes. They used a

standardized questionnaire in an effort to develop a sound dataset to understand what was going

on and develop possible solutions to the problem.

The chief obstacle at the outset of this public outreach effort was the sense of

hopelessness felt by many suffering the health effects of oil and gas activities. Their government

was not recognizing what they were experiencing or trying to offer some meaningful help, the

industry continued to operate unabated, and they felt let down and abandoned as a result. For

these and other reasons, there was significant distrust of anyone from outside of Washington

County. To overcome this barrier, Dr. Brown's team brought on Raina Rippel, a local

environmentalist and health organizer, who helped build trust with the community. Ms. Rippel

insisted a social worker accompany medical and technical experts on home visits because the

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focus of the organization was to help people. That is and remains the mission of EHP: to "do

what public health organizations do," which is to look at health data, come up with solutions to

the problem at hand, and educate the public on ways they can protect themselves.

Informing people on how to protect themselves from contaminants harmful to health

requires determining the pathways of exposure. Cutting off these pathways is how a public

health outbreak is stopped. In this instance, there were three possible pathways: (1)

groundwater, which was the most frequent mechanism; (2) air; and (3) contamination through

plants and food. What EHP learned about how oil and gas activity results in contamination via

air pathways was of particular interest to us.

Consistent with the evidence we heard from homeowners living in close proximity to

industry operations, people living near oil and gas operations regularly complained to EHP of

repeated nosebleeds. These nosebleeds most often occurred at night. Children were affected

most frequently. While kids getting nosebleeds is not unusual, they would also develop stomach

distress and frequent headaches. Local doctors could not explain what was going on. People

were traveling as far as the Cleveland Clinic for help. These complaints came from those with

both well and public water supplies, so EHP looked to air emissions as a source.

EHP used meters to measure air quality in affected areas and determined that while

emissions from unconventional gas sites may have been relatively constant, at night

contamination levels would "peak," resulting in increased exposure. This was explained by

"vertical mixing," which refers to the upward or downward movement of air because of

temperature differences between the surface of the Earth and overlying air. At night, when there

is no sunlight hitting the ground, there is less vertical mixing and air is stagnant and low-lying.

On cloudy nights without wind, air was even more likely to stagnate and settle on the ground.

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Under this combination of circumstances exposure levels would peak, contaminated air would

enter homes, and symptoms like nosebleeds, stomach problems, and headaches would result.

EHP confirmed this was occurring by monitoring air quality meters placed inside and outside of

peoples' homes along with the health complaints experienced by those living in monitored

homes.

Meanwhile, DEP's air monitoring program, which conformed to EPA's, was concerned

with overall air emissions compliance over 24-hour periods. While overall emission reduction

targets were reached under this program, it did not account for how peak contamination levels

affected health in localized instances. As a result, when people complained to DEP about health

problems – headaches, nosebleeds, burning eyes, etc. – they believed were caused by emissions

from a nearby compressor station or impoundment, DEP would conclude there was no problem

based on testing focused on emissions over 24-hour periods. DEP would deny the claim, but the

health problems would persist.

Over the decade or so EHP has operated, it has identified 77 compounds emitted from the

approximately 350 compressor stations, gas processing plants, and well pads operating in

Washington County. Of these 77 compounds, five made up 90% of emissions. The most

frequent was nitrogen oxide, which is an eye irritant that also causes cardiovascular problems

and damage deep in the lungs and upper respiratory system. Carbon monoxide, which causes

"anoxia," or reduced oxygen to the brain, headaches, and brain pain, is also common. In Dr.

Brown's opinion, however, detected carbon monoxide levels – which were comparable to

smoking three cigarettes a day – were not high enough to cause the reported health problems.

The most frequent compounds also include microscopic particulate matter, which moves

like a gas, releases proteins in the blood called "kinins" that cause inflammation and affect blood

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pressure, damage the lungs, and cause heart conditions. Particulate matter is also problematic

because water-soluble compounds in the air can attach to it, causing it to act as a vector by which

other toxins can travel deep into the lungs where they are far more damaging. Among the

compounds that can attach to particulate matter are volatile organic compounds (VOC), like

toluene, benzene, and xylene, which are also frequently found in gas emissions. These cause

neurological and cardiovascular effects and intense fatigue. Also, when VOCs like iodine,

chlorine, and bromine attach to a chemical like methane, they become even more toxic. Finally,

formaldehyde, a carcinogen and irritant that results from methane as it breaks down, is also

among the top five contaminants in oil and gas emissions.

The potential health risks of the remaining 72 compounds identified by EHP emitted by

oil and gas operations are, in many cases, unknown.

Factors determinative of exposure risks to people living near oil and gas operations are

necessarily nuanced and site-specific. For instance, EHP found that in Washington County, the

particular chemicals emitted from any one oil and gas site would vary by a factor of 10; meaning

chemicals from one well could be 10 times greater than that emitted by another. Whether

someone lives uphill or downhill from oil and gas operations affects exposure. The number of

peak exposures experienced within a short time-period is significant because if the body has not

processed contaminants from one exposure before another occurs, the health effects can

compound.

Health impacts also increase the closer someone lives to an oil and gas operation and as

the density of pads around their property increases. The general range where exposure can be

problematic is within two kilometers, or a mile-and-a-quarter, of a gas site. And the rates of

emissions from well pads are not the same. Well pads emit contaminants from degassing tanks,

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condensate tanks, and dehydrating tanks, which can emit periodically. These inconsistent

emission events, both in frequency and volume, add additional unpredictability. Meanwhile,

weather can be varied, with cloud cover, temperature, wind, and vertical mixing all having a

significant influence on exposure risk. All these factors make reaching some comprehensive,

uniform approach to understanding airborne exposure risks from oil and gas operations difficult,

if not impossible, to determine. Risk is determined by location and constantly changing

interactive factors.

Once EHP developed an understanding of the paths of airborne exposure from oil and gas

operations and the factors influencing risk, they implemented means of educating the public on

how to avoid these risks. EHP can identify a Washington County homeowner’s exact latitude

and longitude and determine their grams per hour exposure risk depending on their distance from

the source and weather patterns. EHP developed an informational magnet people keep on their

refrigerators that help them predict risk levels based on weather patterns. These are particularly

useful to asthmatics because of their sensitivity to airborne contaminants and those with young

children who need to avoid playing outside when the air is compromised.

Air quality monitoring techniques employed by EHP include providing homeowners with

“SUMMA” canisters, which collect air over 24-hour periods for testing inside and outside of

peoples’ homes. Testing from SUMMA canisters has confirmed high levels of contamination

inside residences. EHP recommends such minor approaches as not wearing shoes in the house to

prevent dust from oil and gas activity tracking inside to recommending installation of advanced

home filtration systems. Children are a particular concern with respect to airborne contamination

because chemicals associated with oil and gas emissions can block development in their rapidly

growing bodies, causing permanent damage. However, health data on the long-term effects of

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oil and gas operations to children’s health are incomplete, and likely will not be clear for years to

come. In instances where air contamination levels are particularly high in a home, EHP has

recommended that families with young children move. Dr. Brown confirmed it would be

unethical for a public health organization, like EHP, to advise families that consistently exposing

their children to airborne fracking contaminants is acceptable.

We find that EHP’s actions stand in stark contrast to DOH’s: the government agency

charged with protecting public health. We further find it remarkable that a newly created

organization like EHP swiftly gathered data and provided guidance to Pennsylvanians on how

they could protect themselves from the effects of industry operations, while a long-established

government entity, DOH, did not.

In addition to Dr. Brown's testimony on the work of EHP, we learned of efforts by the

federal government to provide public health services to Pennsylvanians who suffered adverse

health effects from fracking operations. We heard testimony from Dr. Karl Markiewicz, a Senior

Toxicologist from the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), which is a

federal public health agency within the Centers for Disease Control. ATSDR partners with EPA

and other agencies to provide public health oversight and responses to significant instances of

environmental pollution or contamination.

As a public health agency, ATSDR works much like EHP. When assigned to look at a

particular incident, usually via a referral from EPA, they first perform a public health

assessment. In understanding the situation at hand, ATSDR most often gets data from states in

which they work, medical records from patients, and other sources, although they gather their

own data as well. Dr. Markiewicz repeatedly emphasized how critically important access to

comprehensive, quality data is to understanding the possible health risks to a community in

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relation to an incident of contamination. Like EHP, ATSDR tries to determine exposure

pathways, with groundwater being the most likely path of exposure, but air as well, and then a

means of interrupting that pathway to prevent ongoing harm from the given source of

contamination.

ATSDR’s first contact with the fracking phenomenon in Pennsylvania was in response to

a stray gas migration incident that resulted in the contamination of numerous drinking water

wells. DEP investigated the incident and determined the problem was resolved and drilling

operations could continue. Meanwhile, EPA and ATSDR were brought in out of concern over

possible ongoing health risks. ATSDR did its own independent water testing and recommended

people not drink local groundwater pending further testing. They were the only agency advising

the public as such.

According to Dr. Markiewicz, the divergence between ATSDR’s recommendation and

DEP’s reflected, at least in part, the agencies’ respective missions. DEP is a regulatory agency

that performed testing according to the governing protocols of DEP. DEP is not specifically

tasked with protecting public health or addressing public concerns outside its perceived

regulatory mission. ATSDR is a public health agency with a different perspective, and their

focus on public health led them to view the same phenomenon in a different light. There were

apparent, serious risks to public health present, and ATSDR could not accept or disregard these

risks without further understanding what was going on. These differences in perspective

illustrate how the absence of any meaningful involvement by the Pennsylvania Department of

Health in the fracking phenomenon has resulted in an ineffective response by our government to

the realities of unconventional oil and gas operations experienced by many of its citizens.

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 ATSDR’s inability to get data from DEP and industry operators frustrated efforts at

mounting a public health response to the stray gas migration incident in question. ATSDR works

most frequently with Superfund sites, where the norm is an open door policy with private

companies and the government in sharing all available data and information. The fracking

industry is different, however. The fracking industry resisted sharing information about its

practices with ATSDR and legal mechanisms obstruct the sort of routine oversight other

industries are subject to. Meanwhile, DEP’s failure to collect data, and resistance to sharing

what data they have, coupled with their narrow approach to testing when determining whether

contamination has occurred, enables the industry to ignore residents’ claims that oil and gas

activity has contaminated their environment, air, or water supply. DEP’s failure to adequately

respond to homeowners’ concerns builds distrust between the community and the government.

That distrust has become entrenched in Pennsylvania, which further impedes a meaningful

response to the problem.

With respect to the Pennsylvania Department of Health, ATSDR experienced the same

disengaged, hands-off response consistently shown by DOH in relation to the fracking

phenomenon. Pennsylvania has professionals capable of doing the same work ATSDR does and

Dr. Markiewicz was in contact with DOH employees during their work involving fracking

operations. While DOH employees wanted to know what was going on, “they were not allowed

to work on it,” and did not engage in an on-the-ground response to what was happening, despite

being welcome to participate. Dr. Markiewicz could not verify whether there was any specific

directive within DOH preventing its employees from working with ATSDR on a public health

response to fracking-related contamination, but he frequently heard complaints from residents

about DOH’s absence from their community.

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 Like EHP, ATSDR also worked on air quality contamination from fracking operations.

They used SUMMA canisters to collect data, but emphasized a significant lack of air quality data

in Pennsylvania on oil and gas activity. They investigated emissions from a pigging station in

collaboration with the criminal division of EPA, and found that when a pigging station releases

rapidly at around 1000 psi, as opposed to gradually at 100 psi, there are significantly higher

methane and benzene emissions. Using high-tech cameras, they observed the massive amount of

emissions from when a PIG was removed at the station, and the plume of gas that would waft

over nearby residents’ homes.

Dr. Markiewicz expressed concerns that DEP was not looking into the combined impact

of pigging stations, gas condensing units, and the combined effect of transporting gas from well

pads through pipelines. Again, more data is needed to understand the reality of how fracking

operations affect air quality and public health.

Testing must reflect how oil and gas operations impact air quality and the pathways of

contamination that can result in harm to public health. Similar to the testimony we heard from

Dr. Brown, Dr. Markiewicz recognized how air contamination occurs in “peaks” through a

combination of factors, and that testing needs to reflect that reality. ATSDR was asked to review

data gathered by DEP pursuant to a long-term air-monitoring project conducted at four locations

in Washington County in 2012 and 2013. They found that because of where DEP placed air-

monitoring devices in relation to wind and weather, the devices collected pertinent data only

20% of the time. Again, more data is essential, and testing must account for the inherently

localized nature of air contamination from oil and gas operations.

Dr. Markiewicz's testimony also reflected Dr. Brown's concern over DEP informing

people that based on its test results, it was safe to drink their well water. In his view, by

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providing such assurances without consulting with medical or public health experts, they are

putting peoples’ health at risk. Moreover, you do not need to be an expert to see the wisdom of

this view. As Dr. Markiewicz described an interaction he had with a homeowner who was told

by DEP that his water supply was safe to drink:

He kind of looked at me and he stood up and his kids are sitting

around. And he went over to the kitchen sink and he took a glass
tumbler and filled it up and I mean, it looked like swamp water.
And he said, you are telling me that I can drink this? And he didn't
say, go ahead and drink it but he was holding it in front of me. And
I said, [], I agree with what you are saying but based on the data --
and that is how I started the conversation. I said, based on the data,
there wouldn't be any restrictions on this. It would be okay. He
said would you drink this or give it to your kids? I said, no, I
wouldn't.

*****

We appreciate DOH engaging with us in this investigation. We found their input

extremely helpful, and the Department deserves credit for the efforts it has made in recent years

given its available funding. For instance, in addition to the initiatives discussed above, in 2015

DOH hired an expert with a background in environmental health to head its Bureau of

Epidemiology. It brought on additional staff over the past few years, most of whom were

responsible for overseeing the enhanced registry. The Department also indicated it received

funding in 2019-2020 for ten new positions dedicated to environmental health. It has engaged in

direct outreach to communities and stakeholder organizations in an effort to encourage

participation in the health registry. It provides useful information to the public via a website

devoted to oil and gas activities. When DOH comes in direct contact with people who believe

fracking operations have affected their health, it offers to review any available sampling results

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to identify potential health risks, and provides referral information for environmental health

physicians.

In our view, however, more can be done. We would like to see DOH not only fund

research and provide feedback and referrals to those who reach out to the Department, but

actively go out into communities and try to find solutions to the problems people are

experiencing right now – not wait on the research. We learned that public health work is all

about identifying pathways of contamination and cutting off these pathways so that people stop

getting sick. This is what EHP has endeavored to do in Washington County, and they have had

some success. We know DOH does this with other public health issues, and we would like to see

DOH put forth the type of on-the-ground effort others are making in response to the public health

consequences of fracking. Such an approach would provide Pennsylvanians with the kind of

help they are looking for from their government.

We also understand DOH may not have the resources to do the sort of work we would

like to see. Perhaps the increased staffing it expects will enable it to do more. Regardless, we

remain troubled by the Department's belief "that it has engaged in an appropriate response to the

potential health effects associated with fracking." Again, DOH's perspective appears rooted in

its view that a connection between shale gas operations and public health remains "unknown,"

and "that it has not been proven that fracking harms public health." We know from our

investigation what too many Pennsylvanians know from personal experience: that industry

operations have made Pennsylvanians sick, and that the legal and regulatory regime governing

shale gas extraction in the Commonwealth puts people's health at risk. Our proposed

recommendations account for this risk as we develop a better understanding and approach to

managing the relationship between public health and fracking.

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 Recommendations of the
Forty-Third Statewide Investigating Grand Jury

We, the 43rd Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, based on a preponderance of the

evidence before us and in some cases clear and convincing evidence, make the following

recommendations. Our recommendations, though relevant to all living in the Commonwealth,

are focused on the oil and gas industry, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Department of

Environmental Protection, the Department of Health, and the General Assembly.

One: Expand the No-Drill Zones

For all the arguments about the effects of fracking, we believe, and the evidence we

gathered confirms, that there is one point that is impossible to deny. The closer people happen to

live to a massive, industrial drilling complex, the worse it is likely to be for them. The more of a

chance that their drinking, cooking, and bath water will be contaminated. The more harmful

emissions they will breathe into their lungs. The more truck traffic and machinery they will have

to hear, at all hours of the day and night. The more the effect on the health, safety, and welfare

of their family and children.

And yet, under current law, an unconventional oil and gas company can drill a well as

close as 500 feet from a person’s home. That’s only about 200 steps away. That means the well

itself can be that close; the well pad and its accompanying equipment can come even closer. No

one expects, when they find a place to settle, raise a family, live a life, that a steel mill might be

constructed right next door, or a power plant. And local zoning laws will normally make sure

that doesn’t happen. When it comes to unconventional drilling, though, people have seen rigs

sprout up almost in their backyard, along with all the equipment necessary to service them. In

many parts of the state, local zoning practices have simply been inadequate to prevent such

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development. There has to be a statewide minimum “set-back” – and the current minimum, 500

feet, just isn’t high enough.

We therefore recommend that the set-back statute be changed. Considering the size and

scale of a fracking site, the no-drill zone should be at least 2,500 feet, not 500. Even that

distance is still only a short stroll, within sight and sound of residences. We do not believe such

a modest buffer zone is too much to ask when it comes to people’s health and homes.

But our concern is not just for residential settings. We were astonished to learn that the

drilling set-back is no different even when it comes to sensitive sites, like a hospital, or an

elementary school playground. It is the same 500 feet. We think the no-drill zone for schools

and hospitals should be even bigger – 5,000 feet. We understand that fracking has its benefits.

We just want to give it some separation from the places we eat and sleep, treat the sick, and

educate our children.

Two: Stop the Chemical Cover-up

We heard repeatedly during this investigation the claims that there is no real danger from

the use of complex chemical compounds manufactured for the fracking process – or at least that

the risk is “unproven.” The time has come to provide for proof, one way or another; and the only

way that can happen is to require disclosure.

We learned that under existing law, the oil and gas companies don’t have to say what

chemicals they are using until after they have already used them. And even that disclosure rule

only applies to chemicals used in the fracturing phase of the process – the stage after the well has

been drilled, when the companies use high-pressure water and chemicals to break up

underground rock formations in order to extract the gas. What goes down the hole, though, must

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come up – much of the chemical-filled fluid that is used for fracturing makes its way, sooner or

later, back to the surface.

But the companies also use potentially dangerous chemicals during the drilling process

itself, before they even start the fracturing. And those chemicals don’t have to be publicly

disclosed at all – even though they often drill directly through water tables, where the chemicals

may mix with water that someone is using and drinking.

In addition, every time these fracking chemicals are moved there is a risk of leaks or

spills or escape onto the ground, into the water, and into the air. And if there is any kind of

accident, the first people at risk are the first responders, followed by everyone else in the

vicinity.

But in addition to these lax rules about disclosure, there is another problem. Companies

also get an exception to the disclosure requirements for “trade secrets.” So if they say they have

created some special chemical compound that gives them a competitive advantage over other gas

companies, they don’t have to reveal publicly what it is.

We find that unacceptable. The corporate bottom line does not outweigh the lives and

health that may be at stake. We want the public to know the identity of all these chemicals being

released into the environment, so their effects can be studied, and so government or individual

citizens can choose to protect against them if they deem it necessary. We recommend that all

chemicals employed in any stage of the unconventional oil and gas process must be publicly

disclosed before they can be used.

Three: Regulate All Pipelines

With all the attention on pipeline problems in different parts of Pennsylvania, one would

expect that government must have some role in how the system is operated. And it does – up to

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a point. We were surprised to learn, however, that as of now regulations focus primarily on the

big pipelines, the major “highways” that transport gas over long distances.

As with the road system, though, those gas highways are not the only pipelines. The gas

has to have some way to get to the pipeline highways from the well. They don’t use tank trucks.

They use a system of smaller pipelines, called “gathering lines.”

And those gathering lines are hardly regulated at all in the rural and semi-populated areas

where most fracking takes place. In effect, it is a remnant of history: they didn’t need regulation

for gathering lines in conventional drilling days, because those lines were low pressure, low

volume, and no real hazard. Modern gathering lines are very different. Yet only the gas

highways get full government oversight.

This deficiency is not defensible. These gathering lines operate under high pressure and

can span hundreds of miles. They are subject to leaks, erosion, and even explosion, much like

the bigger lines. And yet, outside of higher-population areas of the state, the companies are

largely free to lay down whatever gathering lines they want.

We say the Commonwealth must start regulating gathering lines from unconventional

drilling wells. All pipelines in all parts of Pennsylvania.

Four: Add Up the Air Pollution Sources

Fracking does not entail big belching smokestacks, like some factories. So we don’t

think of it as a source for air pollution.

But it is. Fracking operations mean frequent releases of gas, not just accidental but

intentional. The pipes must be cleaned out regularly, and every time that is done, billowing but

invisible clouds of gas escape into the atmosphere. That gas can be hazardous in itself, and in

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addition can be tainted with the man-made chemicals used to extract it from the ground, and with

naturally occurring chemicals released from deep in the earth.

The problem is that most of the fracking industry air pollution comes from smaller clean-

out stations, known as "pigging stations," and other sources that, individually, slip under the air

pollution thresholds at which regulation would kick in. And that is true even though these oil-

and-gas industry pollution sources are often clustered together; if aggregated, they would trigger

requirements for pollution control. But they are not aggregated, and so they are frequently not

regulated.

The solution is to stop looking in isolation at air pollution caused by unconventional

drilling sources. The state has to begin using more common sense and logical standards for

evaluating these sources. If air-polluting fracking facilities are stationed in close proximity, treat

them as one source, and regulate accordingly. After all, if people live anywhere nearby, their

lungs aren’t going to care whether the chemicals in the air came from one large source or from

many smaller sources all next to each other. It is reasonable to expect our regulatory agencies to

take that into account.

Five: Transport the Toxic Waste More Safely

Among the many troubling aspects of unconventional oil and gas drilling is this one: its

waste. Simply put, the fracking industry generates enormous quantities of noxious by-products.

We learned that unconventional drilling creates two categories of waste requiring special

disposal. The first is a significant problem; the second is an even more significant problem.

First, there are the drill cuttings – the rock and mud that is ground up and brought out to

create the well. The drill cuttings are mixed in with the sludge of industrial chemicals used for

the drilling processes. This is not just normal rubbish that can be tossed onto a regular garbage

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dump. The chemicals in drill cuttings are potentially hazardous even beyond the standards of

landfill sites used for municipal trash.

Second, there is the wastewater – which is not just water at all. The fluid injected into a

fracking well cannot perform its function with mere H20. Frack fluid is an elaborate and, as we

mentioned, secret chemical cocktail of lubricants, biocides, solvents, and other agents. And the

issue isn’t just the composition, but the quantity. A single well may create millions of gallons of

contaminated water over its lifetime.

Yet this hazardous material is not treated as such. We learned of a striking example of

the problem. When toxic chemicals are initially transported to a well, the tanker trucks are

labeled as carrying hazardous material. But after these chemicals are injected into the ground,

and then return to the surface in wastewater, the contaminated water is transported from the well

as if any danger had ceased to exist. The very same chemicals that were identified as hazardous

before they were used are now identified as non-hazardous “residual waste,” although their

composition has not changed. Thus, the transportation of fracking-generated wastewater in

Pennsylvania does not account for the toxic nature of this waste being hauled all over the

Commonwealth.

This creates a serious problem. Fracking wastewater can be a relatively harmless briny

concoction, an extremely dangerous combination of chemicals, or highly radioactive. Because it

is labeled as “residual waste” – a classification that includes many sources of waste other than

from fracking – there is no way to know whether a tanker came from a shale gas site or carries

something that does not carry the same potential risk. If one of these trucks overturns and spills

all over a roadway, the signage on the truck will not provide adequate notice to those at the scene

about what they are dealing with. This system puts the public and first responders at risk.

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 Presently, there is no easy long-term solution for permanently disposing of waste

generated from shale gas operations. And operators perform an elaborate shell game, moving

fluid from one well to the next to fracture more shale. The movement of this waste presents a

risk to the public. While regulators sort that out, at a bare minimum, Pennsylvania should

require that trucks carrying waste from fracking sites display signage specifically identifying that

which they are hauling as unconventional oil and gas waste.

Six: Deliver a Real Public Health Response

Our investigation showed that, for the better part of a decade, there were Pennsylvania

citizens who suffered ill effects after fracking moved into their neighborhoods, and who basically

received a cold shoulder from their government’s official medical establishment. Now we have

learned that in recent years the Department of Health has made more of an effort to address the

problem, and has allocated a million dollars a year for a three-year study. That is encouraging.

But it is not enough.

We understand the nature of the challenge. There are many potential health issues that

fall under the “fracking” label, and many conflicting claims about what is or is not dangerous.

That, however, is usually the case with public health issues. It is not always obvious up front, in

any health crisis, what the real causes are, or what the consequences will be. But lack of

knowledge should be a reason to do more, not less.

Consider the attention being paid to vaping, which the Pennsylvania Secretary of Health

wants declared as a public health emergency. Consider the resources marshaled to study the

spread and effects of a group of harmful substances known as PFAS from the former Willow

Grove air base outside of Philadelphia. Consider the state government’s call to arms over

spotted lanternflies.

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 These are all significant issues, and we have no intention of minimizing them. But

fracking has been going on for over a decade in Pennsylvania now. It has potentially affected the

short- and long-term health of tens of thousands of people. By this point, we should know more

than we do. It was as if our government didn’t want to know.

Several other of our recommendations will serve to address the public health

consequences of fracking, such as expanding the no-drill zone and requiring full disclosure of

chemicals used in industry operations. We also call on DOH to unleash the full force of the

public health apparatus in order to gather all the data and figure out the best medical responses.

Don’t just wait for people to report; they might not, or they might have tried repeatedly and

given up because no one listened. Put boots on the ground and go out into the community.

Mobilize health centers. Make public service announcements. Build a better website, and

advertise the hotline. Reach out to doctors and hospitals in the affected areas. Issue

declarations. Do what we do with other public health crises.

Seven: End the Revolving Door

We saw staffing issues at DEP that caused us concern. But among the most troubling

was the fact that DEP employees were frequently lured away to work for the oil and gas

operators they were supposed to be regulating. In a way, this should be no surprise. The

industry is far better funded than government, and can offer far better compensation to state

employees who have developed, at state expense, an expertise in this regulatory field. But the

resulting potential for conflict of interest cannot be ignored. If DEP employees know there may

be a big paycheck waiting for them on an operator’s payroll, they may be reluctant, consciously

or otherwise, to bring to bear the full force of the law. The solution is to do what Pennsylvania

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has done in other areas: impose a “cooling-off” period that would prohibit DEP employees from

jumping directly into a job with an oil and gas company.

To be clear, this would not be a complete solution to the personnel issues we saw at DEP.

We believe the agency has been understaffed and undertrained; even the Department’s own

representative testified to the need for more resources. DEP must have an appropriate,

sustainable funding source in order to ensure that it can hire, train, and retain the people

necessary to perform the challenging tasks required to regulate this complex industry.

In the meantime, however, a revolving door rule would be a simple and straightforward

means of addressing at least one part of the problem. The Ethics Act provides that former public

employees must wait one year after leaving state government before they can engage in lobbying

before their former agency. And the Gaming Act provides an even more pertinent provision. A

former employee of the Gaming Control Board cannot accept employment, for a period of two

years, with any company that has applied to the Board for a license. The prohibition is

particularly prudent in an industry awash in money, as is gambling. We have some of the same

concern regarding the oil and gas industry. While energy prices may rise and fall, the profits in

the good years are plentiful, and thus enhances the industry’s ability to pluck talent from the

Department. We propose that a cooling-off period, as under the Gaming Act, will protect the

Department’s work force and at the same time enhance integrity.

Eight: Use the Criminal Laws

Pennsylvania has a series of special environmental statutes that make it a crime for

people to pollute the Commonwealth’s air or water, or dispose of industrial waste improperly.

And yet, when it comes to unconventional drilling, these criminal statutes in effect do not exist;

they are virtually never invoked. We wondered why.

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 As it turns out, the lack of criminal prosecution is not because no such crimes have been

committed. As we learned during our investigation, most of this criminal conduct cannot go

forward unless the Department of Environmental Protection refers it to law enforcement for

criminal investigation. Local D.A.s have the authority to prosecute these environmental laws,

but seldom the resources. The Attorney General’s Office, on the other hand, has a special

environmental crimes section for exactly this purpose – but it lacks the legal authority to

prosecute unless DEP asks it to do so.

Yet, in recent years DEP has seldom asked. DEP employees testified to various

explanations for this lack of criminal referrals for oil and gas violations. Some said they don’t

need to seek criminal prosecutions, because their own internal regulations provide sufficient

deterrence. Some said they would refer more cases, if only prosecution didn’t take so long.

Some said they wanted to send out cases for prosecution, but supervisors didn’t always approve.

Whatever the story, there is a simple fix. The legislature should amend the

environmental laws, in particular the Solid Waste Management Act and the Clean Streams Law,

to give the Attorney General direct jurisdiction over environmental crimes. That way the office

will not have to wait for DEP to refer or not refer; it can begin an investigation on its own,

whenever it has proper cause to do so. There are already a number of other specialized areas,

such as child predator and computer crimes, where the Attorney General’s Office has been given

special jurisdiction. It would be a straightforward matter to do the same here.

We think, in appropriate cases, criminal charges can provide an effective way to help

carry out the constitutional mandate of article 1, section 27: to conserve and maintain the

people’s right to clean air, pure water, and a healthy environment. The three presentments issued

by this Grand Jury serve as a first step.

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Response of the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental
Protection

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Response of the Pennsylvania
Department of Health

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 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

IN RE: : SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

: 71 W.D. MISC. DKT. 2017
THE FORTY-THIRD STATEWIDE :
: ALLEGHENY COUNTY COURT OF COMMON
: PLEAS CP-02-MD-0005947-2017
INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY :
:
: NOTICE NO. 42

Response on behalf of the Pennsylvania Department of Health

The Pennsylvania Department of Health (“DOH”) has reviewed Report 1 of the

Forty-Third Statewide Investigating Grand Jury (“the Report” or “the Grand Jury Report”) and

respectfully submits this response and requests that it be attached to the Grand Jury Report.

I. Introduction

DOH respects the comprehensive work performed by the grand jury. DOH has

studied the grand jury’s report carefully and will continue to do so, and takes all of its

observations and recommendations with the utmost seriousness. In that regard, DOH appreciates

the observations that “things have improved under the current gubernatorial administration,” and

that “the Department deserves credit for the efforts it has made in recent years given its available

funding.”

The grand jury also recognizes the challenges that limited state resources present.

This is made all the more challenging by the absence of any meaningful federal action, funding,

studies or response to the many environmental and health questions raised by fracking. That

said, DOH must always strive to do better in realizing its vision of “a healthy Pennsylvania for

all.”

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 As such, DOH welcomed the opportunity to engage in the grand jury process

with the aim that the Report would be accurate and the Report’s recommendations and

observations would be a useful tool in examining and improving DOH’s work related to

fracking. To that end, when offered the opportunity by the Office of Attorney General, DOH

provided written statements and exhibits to the grand jury. In addition, the Secretary of Health

welcomed the opportunity to testify before the grand jury, testified extensively, and answered all

of the questions asked her by the grand jury.

Unfortunately, the secret nature of the grand jury process has resulted in a Report

that contains some factual errors and (in some instances) erroneous conclusions. Further, DOH

has not been provided with the transcripts of testimony or the documents or other materials

presented to the grand jury. These troubling times have underscored many things, including that

transparency, objectivity, facts and science will always be among the critical pillars of effective

public health. It is in that spirit that the following observations are provided. But, the ensuing

comments are not intended in any way to detract from the important work performed by the

grand jury here.

In the current administration DOH has listened and will continue to listen, with

even greater intensity, to the concerns of Pennsylvanians who express health concerns related to

fracking. As evidenced by the Report, fracking is a challenging and complex topic that requires

a thoughtful, coordinated approach. DOH therefore would like to take this opportunity to once

more encourage Pennsylvanians to contact DOH and report their health concerns related to

fracking by telephone at 717-787-3350 or e-mail at [email protected] :

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This is not an empty invitation. DOH relies on these submissions to gather health data that is

vital its work to study this topic and ensure an informed and effective approach.

To the degree that the Grand Jury Report suggests that DOH does not share the

grand jury’s concerns and is not invested in solutions, that is neither fair nor accurate. While

DOH is constantly seeking ways in which to improve its response to fracking, DOH under the

current administration has always been committed to understanding and responding to the

potential health effects associated with fracking. As such, DOH would like to provide additional

information about its programming and strategy, particularly as it relates to fracking.

II. Overview of DOH’s Public Health Response to Fracking

A. Background

DOH is an agency comprised of medical professionals, policy experts, scientists,

and staff who work to achieve DOH’s mission to: “promote healthy behaviors, prevent injury

and disease, and to assure the safe delivery of quality health care to all people in Pennsylvania.”

DOH is currently led by the Pennsylvania Secretary of Health, Dr. Rachel Levine. Dr. Levine

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first joined the Wolf administration in 2015 as Physician General. In July 2017, Governor Wolf

named Dr. Levine the Acting Secretary of Health. She was confirmed as Secretary of Health in

March 2018.

Of course, currently, DOH is deeply engaged in addressing one of its paramount

responsibilities – to address acute public health emergencies. It is, therefore, coordinating

Pennsylvania’s comprehensive response to the COVID-19 pandemic, a public health emergency

the like of which has not been experienced since the influenza pandemic of 1918. Additionally,

DOH operates many ongoing programs related to a multitude of significant public health issues.

Among these are programs addressing environmental health issues (including fracking), the

opioid epidemic, HIV, quality care in health care facilities, school health, emergency

preparedness, maternal and child health, obesity, sexual violence, and many more.

Funding for DOH programming comes from a combination of sources.

Approximately one-third of DOH’s budget comes from state government funding, which, by

necessity, is allocated based on a consideration of a variety of competing needs. The remaining

two-thirds of DOH’s budget comes from the federal government through specific program

grants. Unfortunately, there has not been a single grant from federal sources to address the

health effects of fracking.

By contrast, there are federal grants provided to study health effects associated

with other environmental concerns, such as “PFAS” (or “poly-fluoroalkyl substances” which are

manufactured chemicals included in many household products). The Report highlights DOH’s

health work on PFAS in an effort to contrast that work to fracking. Specifically, the Report

directs readers to compare DOH’s fracking-related program to “the resources marshaled to study

the spread and effects of a group of harmful substances known as PFAS.” (Report at p. 99.) For

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its PFAS-related program, however, DOH received funding through the Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention (“CDC”), as well as the Association of State and Territorial Health

Officials. With this funding, DOH was able to implement three PFAS-related studies – the

testing of a response toolkit, an exospore assessment project, and a multisite health study.

However, while DOH has federal funding available for its PFAS work, there is no federal

funding for fracking, an absence of resources which necessarily impacts DOH’s capabilities with

regard to fracking.

Despite these and other resource constraints, since the beginning of Governor

Wolf’s Administration in January 2015, DOH sought to markedly change the prior

administration’s approach, and to bring a much greater focus to bear on both fracking and

environmental health issues more generally.1 And these efforts are ongoing. For example, at Dr.

Levine’s request, in 2019, the Administration granted DOH funding of over $1 million per year

for three years to study the health effects associated with fracking.

B. Environmental Health Program Development

Beginning in 2015, DOH brought in new staff to the Bureau of Epidemiology to

reassess needs, including those related to environmental health. Since then, DOH has continued

to build its staff and expertise to better address existing and emerging issues in environmental

health, such as fracking, lead, and PFAS. Thus, DOH hired Dr. Sharon Watkins as its Director

1
DOH notes that much of the discussion in the Report relates to conduct that occurred before January 2015
under the prior Administration,. The current DOH Administration is not able to fully comment on the circumstances
surrounding that purported conduct. However, DOH does understand generally that, prior to 2015, DOH focused its
epidemiology resources on disease investigations with an emphasis on pandemic flu, anthrax, emergency response,
and food and water borne disease. While the Report makes some distinction between the prior Administration and
the current Administration, it largely conflates time periods. For example, certain comments and opinions voiced by
Karl Markiewicz from the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (“ATSDR”) and Dr. David Brown
from the Southwest Pennsylvania Environmental Health Project (“SPEHP”) may have related in part or in whole to
activity prior to 2015. However, as DOH was not present for their testimony and has not had the opportunity to ask
questions, DOH does not have sufficient information to fully respond to their observations.

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of the Bureau of Epidemiology. Dr. Watkins is a nationally-recognized epidemiologist who

previously served as the Chief of the Bureau of Epidemiology for the State of Florida, and who is

currently the president of the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists. Dr. Watkins has

a strong background in environmental health.

DOH hired Dr. Anil Nair as the Director of the Environmental Health Division of

the Bureau of Epidemiology. A PhD-level consultant also has been retained by DOH to focus

specifically on fracking. Moreover, DOH hired a full-time toxicologist with expertise in

reviewing environmental testing samples and assessing the associated health risks.

Currently, the Environmental Health Division is comprised of five staff members

and two contractors, as well as one intern and one annuitant. DOH has requested and received

approval for funding in the 2019-2020 year for ten new positions dedicated to environmental

health, including fracking. Eight of those positions are in the Bureau of Epidemiology and two

are in the Bureau of Laboratories. DOH is currently recruiting for those positions.

C. Development of the Fracking Questionnaire and Data Registry

Starting in 2015, DOH developed a complaint questionnaire to gather and analyze

information from individuals with health concerns related to fracking.2 DOH then contracted

with a PhD-level consultant to be the Department’s point person on fracking. The consultant

refined the questionnaire so that it would gather more useful and standardized information, and

developed the data registry so that the information can be stored and analyzed. (See the

questionnaire template at Exhibit A). DOH uses this information to improve its understanding

of the causal links that may exist between fracking and specific health effects.

2
DOH receives $100,000 per year in state funding to develop and operate this registry. In 2019, the
Administration budgeted a much larger amount, over $1 million per year for the next three years, for DOH to work
with an academic partner to conduct two comprehensive studies on health effects associated with fracking.

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 DOH routes all health complaints related to fracking to the Bureau of

Epidemiology. Once routed to the Bureau of Epidemiology, staff members contact every person

who reports a fracking-related health concern to gather additional data as well as to respond to

the individual concern.3 DOH does not take a “wait and see” approach to fracking. Instead,

DOH proactively seeks to gather the information by encouraging individuals impacted by

fracking to participate and report their concerns. DOH’s proactive approach has taken many

forms. For example, DOH spoke directly with individuals within concerned communities about

the data registry at public meetings. DOH also met with the Southwest Pennsylvania

Environmental Health Project to seek their assistance in referring complaints to DOH for

purposes of the data registry. DOH created flyers to publicize the data registry, and placed the

flyers at each of DOH’s six Bureau of Community Health district offices, and all 60 state health

centers, as well as the district offices of the Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”).

(Flyer attached as Exhibit B). DOH publicized the data registry on its website and publicly

invited individuals to contact DOH to report concerns by email, phone, fax or mail. (See

Exhibit C; available at: https://www.health.pa.gov/topics/envirohealth/Pages/Contact-

Environmental-Health.aspx ). DOH set up regular meetings with DEP to facilitate coordination

between the agencies and to receive health complaint referrals. The health complaint reporting

information was also included on DEP’s website, and the information was shared with the

Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry and environmental health physicians to

whom DOH refers individuals. Additionally, DOH regularly conducts statistical analyses of the

3
These complaints do not go to a “black hole” as alleged in the Report. (Report at p. 71). That allegation
appears to refer to policies under the prior Administration rather than the current Administration. Nonetheless,
DOH is providing information about its current policies and practices.

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public health data it collects, and publishes reports of that data on an anonymized basis. These

reports are made available on DOH’s website and provide the public with information on the

reported health effects associated with fracking. This includes data on the number of complaints,

location of the complaints and wells (by county), the environmental source of concern (such as

water or air), health symptoms reported (such as cardiovascular or dermatological), and

demographic and other information. (See Exhibit D; available at

https://www.health.pa.gov/topics/Documents/Environmental%20Health/Q32019_ONGP.pdf).

Pennsylvania is one of the few states that maintains a data registry of fracking-related health

concerns and reports that data publicly.

Despite these measures, the number of reports DOH received for the data registry

was less than anticipated or desired. As of December 2019, DOH received 125 formal health

complaints relating to 263 individuals. The Grand Jury Report acknowledges that DOH

publicized its registry and encouraged participation through a variety of means (Report at p. 91),

yet it suggests that the reason individuals did not report their concerns to DOH was because “the

Department was not offering answers or solutions to their problems.” (Report at p. 75).

That conclusion is not correct. As Secretary Levine explained in her testimony,

DOH’s process for collecting scientifically useful information for the registry necessarily

depended on individuals providing information in response to a detailed survey. That

information provides significant value to the public, as it is used by DOH to study the issue and

to inform the public at large. However, individuals may have been deterred from participating in

the survey because it did not provide an immediate tangible benefit to the person on the phone.

Rather the information gleaned from the survey was meant to provide useful data for DOH to

study and educate the public. Dr. Levine further explained that, in response to low participation

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rates, DOH has since evolved its strategy, and will be conducting two comprehensive studies

using health data maintained by an academic partner.

D. Support and Referrals for Individuals

In addition to gathering health information for purposes of analysis, DOH also

directly responds to individuals who report health concerns. When DOH receives a complaint, a

staff member of the Bureau of Epidemiology contacts the individual. The staff member gathers

information about the complaint and obtains any environmental sampling results in that person’s

possession. DOH also seeks any available sampling results from DEP. DOH’s toxicologist

reviews those results to determine if any potential health risks are identified. DOH informs the

complainant of the results, including the toxicologist’s interpretation of the results related to

health risks, and refers the individual to physicians with particular expertise in environmental

health issues. Additionally, DOH provides educational resources through FAQs on fracking

issues and the contact information to make a report related to Pennsylvania’s drinking water.

Finally, where needed, DOH will request that DEP do further sampling.

E. Other Public Information-Sharing, Research, and Education

DOH has also continued to engage in scholarship, education, and information-

sharing on fracking. Like most government agencies, DOH requires that its employees seek

approval before attending conferences or participating in speaking engagements. Such rules are

in place to ensure that resources are used wisely and that employees do not violate the

Commonwealth-wide ban on gifts to public employees (such as free admission to conferences,

compensation for speaking engagements, or other items that could be considered gifts). It would

be irresponsible not to have them. However, the rules apply across the board and are neither

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specific to fracking, nor in any way designed or utilized to chill participation in fracking related

programs.4

Furthermore, since 2016, DOH has been presenting fracking data at state and

national conferences, and discussing fracking issues in connection with other state programs.

For example, DOH staff attends the annual conference of the Council of State and Territorial

Epidemiologists, including participating in roundtables and workshops related to fracking. From

2016 to 2018, DOH personnel attended the annual Shale in Public Health Conference hosted by

the Pennsylvania League of Women Voters. In 2017 and 2018, DOH staff attended the Shale

Network Conference at Penn State and, in 2018, participated in a fracking-related workshop by

the National Academy of Science. These efforts help keep DOH up to date on the latest

developments in public health related to fracking, and provide an opportunity for DOH attendees

to educate others.

DOH staff also engage in research to advance the understanding of health effects

associated with fracking. For example, in 2019, under Dr. Levine’s direction, DOH and the State

of Colorado published a study titled “A Systematic Review of the Epidemiologic Literature

Assessing Health Outcomes in Populations Living near Oil and Natural Gas Operations: Study

Quality and Future Recommendations.”5 This piece surveyed the most in-depth peer-reviewed

literature on health effects associated with fracking to date. Additionally, DOH is currently

completing a report evaluating the occurrence of a rare form of cancer, Ewing’s Sarcoma, in

communities experiencing fracking issues.

4
The Grand Jury Report alleged that DOH “muzzles” its staff in relation to fracking, which was clearly a
reference to the prior administration. (See Report at p. 70). Since the new administration, DOH has never muzzled
its staff, but has engaged in the numerous efforts to educate itself and the public about ongoing fracking concerns, as
detailed in the Response.
5
The paper can be found at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6616936/#

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 In Spring 2019, DOH began to develop a new initiative for fracking-related

research, which was approved by the Administration in November 2019. This initiative involves

two studies based in southwestern Pennsylvania, where the most fracking activity occurs. The

first study will focus on the potential acute effects of fracking (i.e. asthma and birth defects).

The second study will focus on incidents of cancer in these areas. For both studies, instead of

relying on data that DOH collects from individual complainants, DOH will work with an

academic partner and with existing health system databases, including the Pennsylvania Cancer

Registry and data from regional healthcare systems. DOH will use that data to analyze health

trends in proximity to fracking sites. This initiative is budgeted at just over $3 million for three

years (approximately $1 million per year). DOH has requested to receive this funding in its

2020-2021 budget.

The Grand Jury Report incorrectly claims that these upcoming studies “will

attempt to gather and analyze already existing data from prior complaints. And because DOH

effectively discouraged such complaints in the past, there may be little data to review.” (Report

at p. 9). To the contrary, these studies will not rely on the fracking-related health data that has

been collected by DOH thus far. As detailed above, the studies will rely on robust existing

healthcare system data, which is not limited to individuals who made complaints related to

fracking. This misunderstanding causes the Report to erroneously imply that the studies will not

be sufficiently useful.

To the contrary, these studies will accomplish many of the goals for DOH

outlined in the Report. For example, the Report recommends that DOH “[s]end out the nurses

and doctors to interview health care professionals. Advertise in affected areas. Collect

sophisticated data and conduct sophisticated analysis.” (Report at p. 10). The studies described

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above will accomplish those aims even more effectively by gathering medical data from health

care professionals in a much more comprehensive manner, rather than through anecdotal

interviews that may vary in accuracy or opinion. The studies will also allow DOH to conduct

sophisticated analyses of detailed data that will be published and made available to the general

public.

III. The Science of Health Effects Associated with Fracking

A fundamental criticism of DOH in the Report is that DOH is in a “state of

denial” about the health effects associated with fracking and that it has taken a “wait and see”

approach to the issue. (See Report at p. 2, 9). As explained above, that criticism is unfounded.

DOH has proactively invited people to report health concerns related to fracking, collected

scientifically-useful data, conducted research, collaborated with DEP, published data to inform

the public, referred individuals to doctors expert in environmental health, made available other

resources, and more. While DOH has improved its response to fracking over time, and will

continue to do so, it is wrong to suggest that DOH is sitting idly by or, worse, purposefully

ignoring evidence of the health effects associated with fracking. That suggestion is both untrue

and damaging to the public interest.

The Report cites the following question posed by the grand jury to DOH:

Is it the DOH and administration’s view that there is insufficient evidence proving
that unconventional oil and gas operations, whether in the past or as they
currently exist under the governing legal and regulatory scheme, harm public
health?

In response, DOH explained that “the science in this area is developing, and it is

fair to say that it has not been proven that fracking harms public health.” That is true, and no

amount of grand jury investigating will change the science. Importantly, however, what the

Report omits is the remaining portion of DOH’s response on this point. Immediately after this

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statement, DOH explained: “That said, the number of peer-reviewed epidemiological studies in

this area has increased in recent years, and studies have shown some association between

fracking and a limited number of health-related effects in select areas, though the strength and

the nature of the association still requires further research.” DOH further explained that it had

conducted a detailed review of the existing studies, and provided a copy of that review to the

grand jury. (See “A Systematic Review of the Epidemiologic Literature Assessing Health

Outcomes in Populations Living near Oil and Natural Gas Operations: Study Quality and Future

Recommendations” attached as Exhibit E). That review concluded:

There currently exists limited research and conflicting scientific

information on the health risks for those living next to these
operations.

***

Twenty (20) studies met our criteria of a human health

epidemiologic study evaluating the potential health effects
associated with living near ONG [oil and natural gas] operations in
the United States. Weight-of-evidence conclusions were developed
for a total of 32 different health effects, and ranged from
insufficient evidence to limited evidence. Across all health
outcomes, four of the 20 studies received a moderate level of
certainty rating. All others received a rating of low certainty.6

In further contradiction of the erroneous conclusion of the Grand Jury Report that

DOH is “in denial” about fracking, DOH provides a summary of what is known about the

potential health effects associated with fracking on its public website:

Recently there has been increased interest in UONGD by academic researchers.

When most people think of unconventional oil and natural gas development
(UONGD) they only think of wells and well pads, but there is an entire network
of compressor stations, natural gas processing plants and pipelines in addition to
the drill rigs and accompanying access roads that make for several points of

6
“A Systematic Review of the Epidemiologic Literature Assessing Health Outcomes in Populations Living
near Oil and Natural Gas Operations: Study Quality and Future Recommendations” at pp.1 and 6 (references
omitted).

13

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 concern from a health perspective. UONGD may negatively impact water, air and
soil quality. It may also involve excessive noise, light and vibrations from seismic
testing and cause vehicular injuries from increased truck traffic or other injuries or
emergencies from well explosions or flooding. What is more are the mainly
mental health impacts related to the disruption of rural communities and the influx
of young male workers. Together these factors may directly impact health or
indirectly impact health through increased stress, anxiety and reduced sleep. For
workers and their families and sensitive populations (e.g., pregnant women,
children and elderly), the health consequences of UONGD may be more severe.

Most epidemiologic research to this point has compared the health outcomes of
those living varying distances from unconventional well sites as a substitute for
exposure to UONGD. There have been very few studies that have measured
exposure directly. Overall, epidemiologic work has found some limited evidence
of relationships between living near UONGD and poor infant health and
worsening respiratory symptoms. Infant health is unique in that the timing of
exposure can be pinpointed (within a 9-month period) more precisely than for
other health symptoms or outcomes.

(available at: https://www.health.pa.gov/topics/envirohealth/Pages/OilGas.aspx )

There is no doubt that DOH relies on scientific methods and evidence to shape its

policies and programs. But this does not lead to inaction by DOH. Instead, it is the reason that

DOH’s multi-prong strategy for fracking has included a particular focus on improving the

research and public understanding of the health effects associated with fracking. It is also the

reason that the Administration agreed to spend $1 million per year for three years to conduct two

comprehensive studies on the health effects associated with fracking.

DOH does not address every public health concern with a one-size-fits-all

approach. DOH’s responses differ depending on the specific disease, infection or condition, how

deadly it is, how quickly and easily it spreads, and what is known about the causes of the disease.

For example, DOH takes a different approach to highly-infectious diseases than it does for a

disease that is not infectious. Similarly, DOH takes a different approach to diseases where the

cause or method of transmittal is known versus one that is that is subject to evolving scientific

and medical understanding. DOH is committed to serving the interests of Pennsylvanians, and

14

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addressing the many public health issues that Pennsylvanians face including those related to

fracking. DOH’s response to fracking has continued to evolve and improve, and DOH will

continue this trend into the future.

*****

Respectfully submitted,

By:

_____________________________________
THOMAS M. GALLAGHER
Pa. Attorney ID No. 55984
CHRISTEN M. TUTTLE
Pa. Attorney ID No. 206925
PEPPER HAMILTON LLP
3000 Two Logan Square
Philadelphia, PA 19103
(215) 981-4000
Counsel for Department of Health
Dated: May 8, 2020

15

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 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am this day serving one copy of the foregoing Response on behalf of

the Pennsylvania Department of Health upon the below by electronic mail:

Rebecca S. Frantz
Chief Deputy Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Environment Crime Section
[email protected]

Carson B. Morris
Deputy Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Environmental Crime Section
[email protected]

Dated: May 8, 2020

______________________________
Christen M. Tuttle
Attorney No. 206925
PEPPER HAMILTON LLP
3000 Two Logan Square
Eighteenth & Arch Streets
Philadelphia, PA 19103-2799
Telephone: (215) 981-4000
[email protected]
Counsel for Department of Health

16

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DO YOU HAVE A HEALTH CONCERN ABOUT THE ENVIRONMENT?
Could contaminated air, soil or water be affecting your health?

Have questions about environmental health? The department

has epidemiologists available to answer questions about a
range of environmental health issues.

Have a health concern related to oil and gas production?

The department has a registry to track health complaints.
Call 717-787-3350 to add your information.

Need community resources? The department has relationships

with state and local stakeholders that can help you address
your environmental health concerns.

CONTACT US:

4� pennsylvania
717-787-3350 or [email protected]

VISIT OUR WEBSITE:

https://www.health.pa.gov/topics/envirohealth ,. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
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 Contact Environmental Health
Ways to Contact Us Report an Environmental Health Concern ONGP Health Registry

The Division of Environmental Health Epidemiology is part of the Bureau of Epidemiology in the
Pennsylvania Department of Health. All programs within the division – the Health Assessment
Program, Environmental Public Health Tracking Program, Adult Blood Lead Epidemiology and
Surveillance Program and Unconventional Oil and Natural Gas Development Program – can be
contacted at the bureau office.

Ways to Contact
()

Mail: Pennsylvania Department of Health

Division of Environmental Health Epidemiology
Bureau of Epidemiology
Room 933, Health and Welfare Building
625 Forster Street
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120-0701

Phone: 717-787-3350
Fax: 717-346-3286
[email protected]
Email: (mailto:[email protected])

Hours: Monday-Friday, 8 a.m. to 4 p.m.

Reporting an Environmental Health Concern

() The Division of
Environmental Health Epidemiology is part of the Bureau of Epidemiology in the Pennsylvania
Department of Health (DOH). Pennsylvania residents are encouraged to report environmental
health concerns to the Division, where they will be evaluated and referred to an appropriate
program area for potential investigation and follow-up. If applicable, we will analyze
environmental sampling data and/or clinical (i.e., toxicological) data. If environmental sampling
data are not available, we will work with the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) to
collect data, when indicated and as appropriate. Lack of environmental sampling data may limit
the department’s ability to conduct a thorough investigation.
While we do not offer primary health care services, we can provide advice based on the nature of
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the complaint and work closely with the individual who filed the complaint and, if applicable,
their healthcare providers to address health concerns. Depending on the nature of the concern,
DOH environmental health staff members will collaborate with federal, state, county and local
officials, healthcare providers and the public on a regular basis to address environmental health
issues throughout the commonwealth.

Before Contacting Us

If you have an environmental health concern, the tips below are intended to help us address your
concern in the most efficient way possible. Please be patient, as it takes time to investigate the
many variables at play in environmental health concerns and to conduct a health evaluation. You
can expedite the department’s response by having the following things in place before you file a
complaint:

Visit your healthcare provider or doctor first.

Have environmental test results available.
Be prepared to speak about your family’s current health and health history.
Be prepared to talk about your health symptoms.

Difference between DOH and DEP

Both DOH and DEP receive and respond to environmental complaints. Citizens should know that,
in matters of environmental concern, DOH is an advisory agency, not a regulatory one.
Environmental regulation concerns are primarily managed by DEP or, on a national level, the EPA.
The following is a rough guide for when to contact DEP versus DOH. It is possible that you would
contact both departments.

DEP works to protect the state’s air, land and water from pollution and ensure a clean
environment. DEP is the agency to which you primarily direct your complaint or questions if your
concern involves drinking water or the waterways, air quality issues or potential soil pollution
believed to be related to UONGD. Additionally, DEP takes reports of spills, accidents and other
releases of hazardous substances and contaminants. DEP will test the air, water or soil to
determine if there is a problem.

DOH examines how different environments affect a person’s well-being. The health effects of
breathing air, drinking water and more are researched in relation to specific sites where they are
reviewed and investigated. Your complaint should also be directed to DOH’s Division of
Environmental Health Epidemiology if you have an environmental concern that is specific to your
health or the health of a family member or friend, which may be caused by the air, water or soil.

DEP has separate contact information for

(http://www.dep.pa.gov/About/ReportanIncident/Pages/d
reporting an incident efault.aspx) 197 of 235
(emergency) and
 (http://www.dep.pa.gov/About/ReportanIncident/Pages/EnvironmentalComplain
reporting an environmental complaint ts.aspx)
.

ONGP Health Registry

()

The Division of Environmental Health Epidemiology manages the oil and natural gas (ONG) health
complaints registry. If you have a health concern related to the oil and gas industry in your area,
please contact the division to be included in the registry. DOH environmental health staff are also
available to answer general questions about health impacts of the oil and gas industry.

Mail: Pennsylvania Department of Health

Division of Environmental Health Epidemiology
Bureau of Epidemiology
Room 933, Health and Welfare Building
625 Forster Street
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120-0701

Phone: 717-787-3350
Fax: 717-346-3286
[email protected]
Email: (mailto:[email protected])

Hours: Monday-Friday, 8 a.m. to 4 p.m.

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EXHIBIT D

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 1

ONGP Quarterly Report | Quarter 4 2019 (October to December)

Oil and Natural Gas Production (ONGP) Health Concerns

ONGP in Pennsylvania Figure 1. Total Health Complaints Logged by DOH Division of
ONGP is a significant industry in Environmental Health Epidemiology Since 2011 (N=164)
Pennsylvania. The latest wave of ONGP
30
activity in the state began in 2005 with the
start of unconventional oil and natural gas 20
development (UONGD). Unconventional Number of
wells are distinct from conventional wells complaints 10
by the geologic formation being tapped.
They use horizontal and vertical drilling 0
and hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) to 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
access traditionally unavailable reservoirs
of oil and natural gas. Table 1. Reason for Contact (N=164)

As of Dec. 31, 2019, the Pennsylvania Reason Q4 2019 2019 YTD Total since
2011
% of Total
since 2011
Department of Environmental Protection
(DEP) reported there were 10,819 active General inquiry 0 0 24 14.6%
unconventional wells in the state. Thirty- News update/alert 0 0 3 1.8%
four of Pennsylvania’s 67 counties had
Information sharing 0 0 12 7.3%
active unconventional wells, with
a
Washington (1,772), Susquehanna (1,601) Formal health complaint 2 15 125 76.2%
and Greene (1,367) counties having the a
General inquiries, news updates/alerts and information sharing cases were no longer logged in the
health complaints registry effective March 2017.
greatest numbers of active unconventional
wells.* Table 2. Environmental Source of Concerna (N=164)

ONGP Health Registry Source Q4 2019 2019 YTD Total since

2011
% of Total
since 2011
In response to growing concerns about
Water 2 14 115 70.1%
UONGD, the Pennsylvania Department of
Health (DOH) developed a confidential Air 0 5 96 58.5%
health registry to better track and respond Soil 1 7 31 18.9%
to public health complaints related to
ONGP. Noise 0 2 54 32.9%
As of Dec. 31, 2019, DOH received 164 Truck traffic 0 2 50 30.5%
ONGP-related health complaints, with b
Other 2 3 48 29.3%
Washington (41), Susquehanna (31) and
Bradford (22) counties having the most Missing 0 0 9 5.5%
health complaints. a
More than one environmental source of concern may be selected per complaint.
b
Other category includes light, drilling mud or solid waste, vibrations or seismic testing, etc.

Referrals _
One hundred % of Q4 2019 health
complaints were referred by DEP.

Figure 2. Active Unconventional Oil and Natural Gas Wells in Pennsylvania,

as of Dec. 31, 2019*
*Based on the number of active wells from DEP Spud Data Report, Wells Drilled by County
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 2

Table 3. Demographic Information of Individuals in ONGP Registry With a Formal Health Complaint
(N=125 formal health complaints, 263 individuals*)
Q4 2019 2019 YTD Total since % of Total
Characteristic 2011 since 2011 Demographic Summary
Female 1 11 136 51.7% This table summarizes the
Male 2 15 123 46.8% demographic and health insurance
Missing 0 0 4 1.5% information of individuals included in
Non-Hispanic white 3 22 109 41.4% the formal health complaints received
Non-Hispanic black 0 0 0 0.0% for Q4 2019, YTD 2019 and total since
Hispanic 0 0 0 0.0% 2011. This does not necessarily reflect
Other 0 2 3 1.1% the demographic characteristics of the
Missing 0 2 151 57.4% entire community.
0-17 years old 0 4 43 16.3%
18-64 years old 3 16 130 49.4%
65+ years old 0 4 41 15.6%
Missing 0 2 49 18.6%
Any private insurance 3 20 79 30.0%
Public only insurance 0 3 28 10.6%
Uninsured 0 1 6 2.3%
Missing 0 2 150 57.0%
*Table excludes general inquiries, news updates and information sharing complaints. Each health complaint may pertain to more than one individual.
Race/ethnicity, age and health insurance were not systematically collected until March 2017. Percentages within each group may not sum to 100% due to rounding.

Table 4. Health Information of Individuals in ONGP Registry With a Formal Health Complaint
(N=125 formal health complaints, 263 individuals*)
Q4 2019 2019 YTD Total since % of Total
Symptom Group 2011 since 2011 Symptom Summary
Cardiovascular 1 2 42 (11)† 16.0% This table summarizes the symptoms
Dermatological 2 10 100 38.0% reported by individuals for Q4 2019,
Ear 0 2 32 12.2% YTD 2019 and total since 2011.
Eye 1 5 54 20.5%
Gastrointestinal 0 9 93 35.4%
General systemica 2 10 95 36.1%
Neurological 2 10 115 (6)† 43.7%
Psychological 0 4 60 (8)† 22.8%
Respiratory 0 10 (2)† 140 (22)† 53.2%
Urogenital 0 1 26 (6)† 9.9%
Missing 0 0 36 13.7%
*Table excludes general inquiries, news updates and information sharing complaints. Each health complaint may pertain to more than one individual.
a
Includes sleep disturbance, fatigue, fever, chills, night sweats, shaking, weight loss/gain, decreased appetite, muscle aches/cramps, joint pain, fainting and swelling
†Numbers in parentheses correspond to newly diagnosed conditions relevant to that symptom group: heart disease and/or hypertension (cardiovascular group),
neurological disease (neurological), psychological disease (psychological), asthma or COPD (respiratory), kidney disease or failure (urogenital). They do not
represent pre-existing conditions. Therefore, someone could report that UONGD exacerbated their asthma (noted in the respiratory count) but was diagnosed
before UONGD activity started in their area (not reflected in number of parentheses).

Health Overview 2019 Year-to-Date Based on Formal Health Complaints (N=15 complaints, 26 individuals)
 42% of individuals reported being in poor or fair health.
 8% of individuals reported being disabled.
 0% of individuals reported being diagnosed with cancer since the beginning of 2019.
 65% of individuals visited the doctor for their health concerns.
 Five (33%) of 2019 YTD complaint cases had concerns about animal health (livestock or pets).

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 3

Figure 3. Total Number of Active Oil and Natural Gas Wells in Pennsylvania, 2012 to 2018
100,000 12,000
80,000 10,000
8,000
60,000
6,000
40,000
4,000
20,000 Panel A: Conventional Wells 2,000 Panel B: Unconventional Wells
0 0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
The tables below show data for counties with more than 500 active unconventional oil and natural gas wells
as of Dec. 31, 2019.
Washington (1,772) Susquehanna (1,601) Greene (1,367)
Bradford (1,326) Lycoming (919) Tioga (769) Butler (576)
Table 5. Environmental Source of Concern by County (All Complaints Since 2011)
Source Washington Susquehanna Greene Bradford Lycoming Tioga Butler

Water 24 26 7 20 2 4 3
Air 32 17 4 6 4 2 2
Soil 9 5 2 4 0 1 0
Noise 21 10 4 4 0 1 1
Truck traffic 21 9 3 4 1 2 1
Othera 21 10 2 5 0 0 1
Missing 3 0 0 0 1 0 0
County-specific numbers of complaint cases are as follows: 41 (Washington), 31 (Susquehanna), 8 (Greene), 22 (Bradford), 6 (Lycoming), 4 (Tioga) and 3 (Butler).
More than one environmental source of concern may be selected per complaint.
a
Other category includes light, drilling mud or solid waste, vibrations or seismic testing, etc.

Table 6. Health Symptoms by County (Individuals With a Formal Health Complaint Since 2011)
Symptom Group Washington Susquehanna Greene Bradford Lycoming Tioga Butler

Cardiovascular 6 8 3 12 0 1 0
Dermatological 23 26 10 11 6 1 0
Ear 7 5 0 3 2 1 0
Eye 15 11 2 5 3 2 0
Gastrointestinal 22 23 6 14 0 3 2
General systemica 24 19 9 10 0 3 2
Neurological 29 19 6 15 1 5 3
Psychological 22 13 2 4 3 0 2
Respiratory 37 29 12 15 4 6 2
Urogenital 6 6 2 4 3 0 1
Missing 16 2 3 8 0 0 1
County-specific numbers of individuals are as follows: 66 (Washington), 59 (Susquehanna), 20 (Greene), 34 (Bradford), 8 (Lycoming), 8 (Tioga) and 5 (Butler).
a
Includes sleep disturbance, fatigue, fever, chills, night sweats, shaking, weight loss/gain, decreased appetite, muscle aches/cramps, joint pain, fainting and swelling

By far, most oil and natural gas-related complaints received by DOH have been related to UONGD. We have received four
complaints related to conventional oil and natural gas development since 2011.
Figures in this report may slightly differ from previous reports due to the potential for ongoing data collection. Please contact the
Division of Environmental Health Epidemiology for more details at 717-787-3350 or [email protected].

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EXHIBIT E

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 International Journal of
Environmental Research
and Public Health

Review
A Systematic Review of the Epidemiologic Literature
Assessing Health Outcomes in Populations Living
near Oil and Natural Gas Operations: Study Quality
and Future Recommendations
Alison M. Bamber 1, *, Stephanie H. Hasanali 2 , Anil S. Nair 2 , Sharon M. Watkins 2 ,
Daniel I. Vigil 1 , Michael Van Dyke 1 , Tami S. McMullin 1 and Kristy Richardson 1
1 Disease Control and Environmental Epidemiology Division, Colorado Department of Public Health and
Environment, Denver, CO 80246, USA; [email protected] (D.I.V.); [email protected] (M.V.D.);
[email protected] (T.S.M.); [email protected] (K.R.)
2 Bureau of Epidemiology, Pennsylvania Department of Health, Harrisburg, PA 17120, USA;
[email protected] (S.H.H.); [email protected] (A.S.N.); [email protected] (S.M.W.)
* Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +1-303-691-4037

Received: 21 May 2019; Accepted: 12 June 2019; Published: 15 June 2019 

Abstract: A systematic method was used to review the existing epidemiologic literature and determine
the state of the scientific evidence for potential adverse health outcomes in populations living near oil
and natural gas (ONG) operations in the United States. The review utilized adapted systematic review
frameworks from the medical and environmental health fields, such as Grading of Recommendations,
Assessment, Development and Evaluations (GRADE), the Navigation Guide, and guidance from the
National Toxicology Program’s Office of Health Assessment and Translation (OHAT). The review
included 20 epidemiologic studies, with 32 different health outcomes. Studies of populations living
near ONG operations provide limited evidence (modest scientific findings that support the outcome,
but with significant limitations) of harmful health effects including asthma exacerbations and various
self-reported symptoms. Study quality has improved over time and the highest rated studies within
this assessment have primarily focused on birth outcomes. Additional high-quality studies are
needed to confirm or dispute these correlations.

Keywords: oil and natural gas; hydraulic fracturing; fracking; unconventional oil and gas;
environmental health; epidemiology; systematic literature review

1. Introduction
The United States has significantly increased its capacity for oil and natural gas (ONG) development
through the technological advancements of directional drilling and hydraulic fracturing, with
natural gas production reaching a high in 2017 and 2018 [1]. In 2016, more than two-thirds of
the 977,000 producing ONG wells in the U.S. used these technologies to access energy reserves in shale
and tight oil sands [2]. In places like the Colorado Front Range and Dallas-Fort Worth, Texas, ONG
operations are occurring directly alongside population growth. It is estimated that 17.6 million people
in the U.S. live within 1 mile of an active ONG well [3].
There currently exists limited research and conflicting scientific information on the health risks
for those living next to these operations. The industry surrounding ONG expanded faster than
evidence-based epidemiologic research could respond [4,5]. Early community health assessments and
surveys of health symptoms in people living near ONG operations raised concerns about the potential
chemical hazards, including exposures to air and water pollution [6–8]. Additional studies pointed

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to non-chemical stressors, including psychosocial stress, from living near ONG operations [9–11].
These early hypothesis-generating studies gave way to a growing body of observational epidemiologic
literature that has quantified associations between residential proximity to ONG operations and the
potential for certain adverse human health effects. Several review articles published within the last
five years summarize this literature [5,12–14].
Our study is the first of its kind to systematically review the entirety of existing epidemiologic
literature on the associations between living near ONG development and the potential for harmful
health effects. We weigh the level of evidence for each health outcome and aim to present a clear
assessment of the methodological rigor, study strengths, and weaknesses, to identify approaches to
future research. The scholarship published to date varies in the types of ONG operations studied, the
populations of interest (e.g., based on their geography, time period, or demographic characteristics),
the health outcomes measured, and the quality of the methods used. While Saunders and colleagues
do raise important methodological concerns about many of the articles they review [14], no existing
review addresses study quality in a systematic way. In research on the health effects of potential
environmental contaminants, where randomized controlled trials are neither ethical nor appropriate,
study quality, or certainty in the study aligning with its stated objectives, is integral to interpreting
scientific results and extrapolating them for regulatory and other science-based decisions.
The need for public health scientists to systematically evaluate the body of a literature base for
an important issue, with limited resources, is necessary to assist in science-based regulatory decision
making. Often, these issues are not entirely characterized and may include multiple chemical stressors
(which are typically unknown) and variable health outcomes. The current established systematic
review frameworks focus on an in-depth evaluation of the toxicological and epidemiological literature
for a specific chemical and/or health outcome, however, this approach is unable to be applied directly
to the epidemiological literature surrounding ONG development. Therefore, we have adapted these
approaches to better answer this environmental health question.
The steps used to conduct the review were adapted from various established systematic review
frameworks for the medical and public health fields, including as Grading of Recommendations,
Assessment, Development and Evaluations (GRADE) [15] and Meta-analyses Of Observational Studies
in Epidemiology (MOOSE for observational studies) [16], and emerging methods in environmental
health as outlined by the Navigation Guide [17], and Office of Health Assessment and Translation
(OHAT) [18] guidance (Figure 1). Each study was evaluated using 14 study evaluation questions to
assess the level of certainty in, or scientific plausibility of, the study findings. The overall weight of
evidence was determined for each health outcome separately. This review is not intended to replicate
any previous frameworks nor is it to be the single word on study quality in this area of research. Our
aim is to be objective and transparent, in a way that can be understood by community members,
government and non-government public health and environmental officials and policymakers.

Step 1: Step 2: Step 3: Step 4:

Identify Rate the level of Group related study Weigh the overall
relevant certainty for the findings by health evidence for each
studies findings in each study outcome health outcome

Figure 1. Steps in the current systematic review of epidemiologic literature.

2. Materials and Methods

2.1. Scope of Analysis

The scope of this literature review is defined by a PECO (populations, exposures, comparators,
and outcomes) question [19]: “In humans (including unborn fetuses) living in the U.S., is exposure to

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chemicals emitted from ONG operations, compared to people who are not exposed (or who are exposed
at lower levels), associated with adverse changes in health?” (Figure 2). Unborn fetuses were included
as a population of interest to account for the possibility of ONG activities affecting fetal development
within the mother’s womb. The term “oil and natural gas operations” (or development) was defined
to include all upstream processes involved in the extraction of ONG resources using any combination
of vertical drilling, directional/horizontal drilling, and hydraulic fracturing to access energy reserves
from conventional and unconventional geologic formations. This review does not include studies
evaluating mid- and downstream processes. Since October 2011, the majority of new ONG wells in the
U.S. overall have been hydraulically fractured horizontal wells, typically referred to as unconventional
wells [2]. Study authors will often use a variety of these terms, and the distinction between conventional
and unconventional wells—in source rock, depth, or drilling technique—is muddled in practice [20].
We sought to look across a range of comparators since exposures to ONG-associated chemicals occur
along a continuum and it may not always be clear what the pathway of exposure is, how far that
pathway reaches, or whether multiple exposure pathways produce synergistic effects on health [5,19].
We then considered whether any and all adverse changes in health occur with these exposures. While
it is plausible that ONG may impact health through indirect pathways such as income (e.g., from
monetary gains from leasing land or mineral rights), or investment in community infrastructure such
as healthcare services [10,21,22], indirect effects were not included in this paper.

Figure 2. Populations, exposures, comparators, and outcomes (PECO) statement.

The PECO question informed our exclusion criteria and studies were excluded if one or more
of the following five criteria were met: (1) exposure to ONG chemicals was not directly measured
in, or estimated for, study subjects (i.e., excluded studies focused on indirect health effects including
community stressors such as degradation of rural life, sexually transmitted infections from newly
arrived young male workers, and traffic accidents from increased heavy truck traffic); (2) the study failed
to quantify associations between exposures and a specific health outcome (i.e., excluded studies did
not measure odds ratios, relative risk, etc.); (3) the study did not include original data or observations
(e.g., review articles, commentaries); (4) the study did not define ONG operations to include any or
all processes associated with the upstream development and production of ONG, including but not
limited to horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing; or (5) the study did not take place in the U.S.

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2.2. Data Search

PubMed was the primary research database used to obtain articles. We identified relevant records
using the following PubMed search terms: ((“Oil and Gas Industry”[Mesh] OR “Natural Gas”[Mesh])
AND (epidemiolog* or symptom*)) OR ((oil OR natural gas) AND (epidemiolog* OR health OR
symptom*) AND (unconventional OR drilling OR shale OR coal OR production OR development) NOT
(“Occupational Health”[Mesh] OR “Animal Experimentation”[Mesh]) AND (“2013/01/01”[PDAT]:
“2018/10/01”[PDAT])) AND Humans[Mesh]. We verified that no relevant study was published before
2013, and any studies published after our search date of October 1, 2018 were not included in the
assessment. In total, 1253 articles were returned by the search and all were screened for eligibility
(Figure 3). Review articles, risk assessments, and included studies were also screened for references
and identified six additional studies. The majority of articles (98%) did not meet our study inclusion
criteria because they were related to the fields of environmental engineering, geology, hydrology or
biomedical topics such as plant-based oil extracts/lipids. We kept the search terms broad in an effort to
capture the wide variety of terminology that has been used within the interdisciplinary ONG health
effects field.

Records identified through Additional records identified

database searching through other sources
(n = 1253) (n = 6)

Records after duplicates removed

(n = 1259)

Records screened Records excluded *

(n = 1259) (n = 1224)

Full-text articles assessed Full-text articles excluded

for eligibility with reasons *
(n = 15)

Studies included in
qualitative synthesis
(n = 20)

Figure 3. Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) flow
diagram for study inclusion. * Exclusion criteria is detailed within the methods.

2.3. Level of Certainty Rating and Level of Evidence Conclusions for Individual Studies
A modified systematic review framework was used to rate the level of certainty (or the certainty
in an estimate of effect) for each health outcome (Figure 4). We developed our framework based on
established methods of systematic reviews for the medical, public health and environmental health
fields. These frameworks incorporate, either explicitly or implicitly, most of Bradford Hill’s criteria
for causation such as studies with specificity and biological plausibility and that were temporal and
consistent [23]. We consulted these classic criteria to develop a meaningful scope of review (as reflected
in the PECO question) and determine criteria for study certainty and weight of evidence [24].

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2. Consider Raising 3. Final Level of

1. Establish Initial Level of Certainty
Level of Certainty Certainty Rating
Initial certainty in an Certainty in an
Study design Higher certainty if:
estimate of effect estimate of effect
Randomized
High certainty Percentage of study High
control trials *
evaluation questions
Moderate certainty Ö Ö Moderate
adequately addressed
Observational in the study
Low certainty Low
studies

Figure 4. The approach used for developing level of certainty ratings for each study outcome.
* No randomized control trials were identified in this review.

We rated study findings as having low, moderate, or high certainty that the estimated effect was
close to that of the true effect. The findings of observational epidemiologic studies were initially ranked
as low certainty and were upgraded according to fourteen (14) study evaluation questions that assessed
various domains (Table 1). These criteria were based on established frameworks which specify the
domains, questions, or study limitations used to evaluate individual studies for use in a systematic
review [17,18,25–27]. We categorized the study evaluation questions into five groups: population and
sample, exposure, health outcomes, confounders, and reporting. Two or more authors reviewed each
study evaluation question with a yes-or-no response for each study (Supplementary Tables S1–S20).
Conflicting responses were resolved through discussion and additional review of the study. Studies
with greater than 50% “yes” answers (i.e., 8 “yes” answers out of 14) were considered for potential
upgrade of their findings to moderate certainty; studies with greater than 75% “yes” answers (i.e.,
11 “yes” answers out of 14) were considered for potential upgrade to high certainty [28]. All findings
of each study were ascribed the same level of certainty after evaluations were complete.

Table 1. Key study evaluation questions to determine the level of certainty ratings for health outcomes.

Study Evaluation Questions

Population and Sample
1. Does the control group match the exposed group?
2. Is the sample generalizable to the population of interest?
3. Did the study a priori quantify sample and power?
4. Were missing data addressed and tested?
Exposure
5. Was exposure directly measured and quantified?
6. Was the exposure or proxy/surrogate of exposure measured from a point location?
7. Does the proxy/surrogate adequately estimate exposure?
8. Was there a temporal relationship between exposure and outcome?
Health Outcomes
9. Was the health outcome determined by a medical provider?
10. Was a dose-response relationship seen in any outcome?
Confounders
11. Did the study design or analysis account for important confounding and modifying variables?
12. Did the study design or analysis adjust or control for other environmental exposures that were anticipated
to bias results?
13. Were sensitivity analyses attempted for population, outcome, or exposure?
Reporting
14. Did the study conclusions match the results?
Final level of certainty rating: Low/Moderate/High

We derived weight-of-evidence conclusions using standards outlined in GRADE [29], the Cochrane
Handbook [30], and developed by the Institute of Medicine [31]. For each health outcome, relevant

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findings from individual studies were grouped and evaluated to derive one of the following
weight-of-evidence levels: substantial, moderate, limited, mixed, failing to show an association,
or insufficient (Table 2).

Table 2. Weight-of-evidence determinations.

Evidence Level Definition

Strong scientific findings that support an association between oil and gas
Substantial
exposure and the outcome, with no credible opposing scientific evidence.
Strong scientific findings that support an association between oil and gas
Moderate
exposure and the outcome, but these findings have some limitations.
Modest scientific findings that support an association between oil and gas
Limited
exposure and the outcome, but these findings have significant limitations.
Both supporting and opposing scientific findings for an association between oil
Mixed
and gas exposure and the outcome, with neither direction dominating.
Body of research failing to show an association—indicates that the topic has been
Failing to show an association researched without evidence of an association; is further classified as a limited,
moderate or substantial body of research failing to show an association.
Insufficient The outcome has not been sufficiently studied.

3. Results
Twenty (20) studies met our criteria of a human health epidemiologic study evaluating the
potential health effects associated with living near ONG operations in the United States (Table 3,
Supplementary Table S21). Weight-of-evidence conclusions were developed for a total of 32 different
health effects, and ranged from insufficient evidence to limited evidence (Table 4).
Across all health outcomes, four of the 20 studies received a moderate level of certainty rating.
All others received a rating of low certainty. The majority of the studies were retrospective cohort (six
studies) or ecological (six studies) study designs. There were five cross sectional studies, two nested
case controls, and two case-controls. The average score across all studies was 6, with a score range
from 2 to 9 (Supplementary Table S22).

3.1. Birth Defects and Birth Outcomes

This review identified nine studies comprising 12 low to moderate certainty findings that identified
the relationship between women who lived near ONG operations and the likelihood that their child
was born with birth defects or other types of adverse health outcomes at birth.
Two studies evaluated birth defects (congenital heart defects, oral clefts, and neural tube defects)
in infants of mothers who lived at varying proximities to ONG development during pregnancy [32,33].
These low-certainty studies resulted in insufficient evidence to determine if living near ONG operations
during pregnancy is associated with birth defects since there was only one study per outcome.
Eight studies evaluated adverse birth outcomes [32,34–40]. These studies examined commonly
used indicators of infant health status such as preterm birth, gestational age, Apgar score, birth weight,
infant mortality, and fetal death. Overall, there are conflicting findings across studies resulting in either
mixed or insufficient evidence of adverse birth outcomes associated with living near ONG operations
during pregnancy (Table 4). Three of the eight studies and their findings were upgraded to a moderate
level of certainty rating due to strength in their study designs that reduced risk-of-bias [35,37,38]. These
studies demonstrated both positive and null associations for multiple health outcomes. All three were
retrospective cohort studies that demonstrated evidence of a dose-response relationship and included a
valid exposure surrogate as taken from a point location. All other studies were ranked as low certainty
because of limitations within the study design or missing key elements. For example, most studies
failed to adequately quantify exposure either directly, or through a proxy/surrogate estimate. In many
cases, this measure of exposure was limited to either presence or absence of wells in a county or was

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solely proximity-based. Although some studies calculated inverse distance-weighted well counts, they
failed to quantify other metrics such as well development phase or total natural gas volume [39].
Birth outcomes have received the most scholarly attention for this topic, due to the relatively easy
access to birth certificate or birth health records data, and the ability to pinpoint exposures to ONG
operations during the 40-week gestation period [36]. While the overall evidence is rated as mixed or
insufficient for various outcomes, the most recently published studies on ONG and birth outcomes have
used innovative methodologies that improve or alleviate some of the weaker assumptions in early work.
For example, Hill in 2018 took advantage of the little assumed difference between pregnant women
living near permitted but not yet drilled wells and those living near active wells to define a better
comparison or control group [37]. Additionally, three of the four moderate certainty studies evaluated
birth outcomes and have identified positive associations between living near ONG operations and
these adverse health outcomes.
ONG operations can emit volatile organic compounds (VOCs) into the air and contribute to
increased particulate matter 10 micrometers or less in diameter (≤PM10 ) during upstream development
activities. Some of these VOCs have the potential to cause developmental effects in test animals
following high levels of exposure—generally at much higher levels than what has been observed for
individual VOCs at ONG operations [41]. Systematic reviews of a broad set of data have identified
positive associations between maternal exposures to fine particulate matter in ambient outdoor air
pollution in urban areas and adverse birth outcomes. Other studies have documented adverse
developmental and reproductive health outcomes in animals exposed to ONG-related chemicals used
as fracturing fluids in the hydraulic fracturing process [42–45]. Although these substances may be
released from operations, the exposure concentrations and complete routes of exposure have not been
well characterized.

3.2. Cancer
We identified seven low certainty study outcomes from three studies that assessed the relationship
between living near ONG operations and the likelihood of developing cancer [46–48]. The studies
examined various types of both adult-onset and childhood cancers. Specifically, they looked at the
incidence of cancers of the urinary bladder and thyroid, leukemia, all childhood cancers, childhood
leukemia (and specifically acute lymphocytic leukemia), childhood non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, and
childhood central nervous system tumors. Overall, the weight of evidence is insufficient for all but one
of the cancer outcomes since there is only one study for each. There is mixed evidence for childhood
leukemia owing to conflicting study findings.
None of the three cancer studies and their findings were upgraded to a moderate level of certainty
rating. Two of the studies were ecological, conducted at the county level in Pennsylvania, and did not
control for potential confounding variables [46,47]. For example, it is probable that there are social
characteristics of county populations (e.g., race or ethnicity, occupation, smoking status, etc.), differing
access to medical care and screening, and other environmental exposures (e.g., major roadways,
particularly in a place like Allegheny County where Pittsburgh is located) that would explain some
of the study findings. Fryzek et al. also incorrectly interpreted their standardized incidence ratio
results, as has been noted by Saunders et al. [14]. McKenzie et al. used a case-control design to study
childhood cancers in rural Colorado [48]. However, their data source was exclusively the state’s
cancer registry and therefore there was no comparison group made up of children without cancer.
Additional research on this topic might consider incorporating a more appropriate comparison group
from household surveys [49]. For studies of cancer, it is crucial for researchers to consider what would
be an appropriate time frame from exposure to ONG operations to the potential development of cancer.
ONG operations began in earnest in the late 2000s in Pennsylvania, but Fryzek et al. used data only
through 2009; this truncated period between community exposure and cancer endpoint is a major
limitation [47]. As noted elsewhere [50], the study period was not matched to the theoretical lag period
or latency period for adult carcinogenesis.

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ONG operations may release chemicals into the air and water, such as benzene, polycyclic aromatic
hydrocarbons, and diesel exhaust [51]. Although long-term exposure to these substances, such as
benzene, may increase the risk of developing certain types of cancer, the development of cancer is
complex because many other non-environmental influences, such as genetics and lifestyle behaviors,
also contribute to cancer risk.

3.3. Respiratory Health Outcomes

There were three low to moderate rated health outcomes from six studies evaluating the associations
between living near ONG and respiratory health effects [52–57]. A single moderate certainty study
with one study outcome indicated a limited weight of evidence for an association with asthma
exacerbations [56]. The current literature provides a link between regulated air pollutants (ozone and
particulate matter) and lung, heart disease and other respiratory health effects [58]. The influence,
specifically, of ONG contributing to respiratory health outcomes is not fully understood, particularly
within the context of other behavioral/lifestyle influences (e.g., smoking) exacerbating the deleterious
effects of air pollutants. Additionally, there may be many other environmental sources of emissions for
air pollutants including vehicles and wildfires.
Five other low-rated studies evaluated the occurrence of respiratory effects (various self-reported
symptoms and hospitalizations) and found conflicting evidence for both categories. The two
hospitalization studies used ecological study design, which is limited since the estimation of exposure
is based on an average in the population. The three other studies documented self-reported symptoms.
Health outcomes were not determined by a medical provider.

3.4. Neurological Health Outcomes

We identified four studies that assessed the relationship between living near ONG
development and the likelihood of neurological health effects [52,53,55,57]. Three studies identified
self-reported neurological symptoms (Elliott et al. [52]: severe headaches, dizziness; Rabinowitz et
al. [55]: neurologic problems, severe headache/migraine, dizziness/balance problems, depression,
difficulty concentrating/remembering, difficulty sleeping/insomnia, anxiety/nervousness, seizures;
Tustin et al. [57]: migraine headache, fatigue) and yielded a limited weight of evidence for a null
association with neurological health effects. The other outcome, neurological hospitalizations, had
insufficient evidence, with only one positive study published [53]. VOCs are known to produce
neurological effects, such as central nervous system damage, headaches, dizziness, visual disorders,
loss of coordination, and memory impairment in test animals and humans [59].

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Table 3. Summary details of epidemiologic studies included in this systematic review.

Health Finding Level of

First Author Year Title Publication State Study Type Positive Associations Null Associations
Category Certainty
There’s a World Going on
Journal of
Underground—Infant
Busby [34] 2017 Environmental Pennsylvania Ecological Birth outcomes Early infant mortality NA Low (3)
Mortality and Fracking in
Protection
Pennsylvania
Unconventional Natural
Apgar score, small for
Gas Development and Retrospective Preterm birth and
Casey [35] 2016 Epidemiology Pennsylvania Birth outcomes gestational age, term Moderate (9)
Birth Outcomes in cohort high-risk pregnancy a
birth weight
Pennsylvania, USA
Associations of
Unconventional Natural
Self-reported
Gas Development with Case-control and Depression symptoms Disordered sleep
Casey [60] 2018 Scientific Reports Pennsylvania symptoms and Low (6)
Depression Symptoms and cross-sectional (self-reported) (diagnoses)
diagnoses
Disordered Sleep in
Pennsylvania
Hydraulic Fracturing and Low birth weight,
Infant Health: New Retrospective decreased birth weight,
Currie [36] 2017 Science Advances Pennsylvania Birth outcomes NA Low (5)
Evidence from cohort decreased score on infant
Pennsylvania health index
A Community-based Respiratory,
General symptoms
Evaluation of Proximity to neurological b ,
(stress, fatigue, muscle or
Unconventional Oil and Self-reported dermal,
Elliott [52] 2018 Cross-sectional Ohio Cross-sectional joint pain, any other Low (6)
Gas Wells, Drinking Water symptoms gastrointestinal
self-reported health
Contaminants, and Health symptoms
symptoms)
Symptoms in Ohio (self-reported)
Shale Gas Development
Thyroid cancer,
Finkel [46] 2016 and Cancer Incidence in Public Health Pennsylvania Ecological Cancer Urinary bladder cancer Low (2)
leukemia
Southwest Pennsylvania
Childhood Cancer
Incidence in Pennsylvania Journal of All childhood cancer
Central nervous system
Fryzek [47] 2013 Counties in Relation to Environmental Pennsylvania Ecological Cancer (child) incidence and Low (2)
tumors
Living in Counties with Medicine leukemia
Hydraulic Fracturing Sites
Low birth weight,
Unconventional Natural
decreased term birth
Gas Development and Journal of Health Retrospective
Hill [37] 2018 Pennsylvania Birth outcomes weight, premature birth Gestation periods Moderate (9)
Infant Health: Evidence Economics cohort
small for gestational age,
from Pennsylvania
Apgar score less than 8

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Table 3. Cont.

Health Finding Level of

First Author Year Title Publication State Study Type Positive Associations Null Associations
Category Certainty
Hospitalizations for
Unconventional Gas and
Cardiology and various medical
Oil Drilling is Associated
Jemielita [53] 2015 PLOS ONE Pennsylvania Ecological Hospitalizations neurology categories, including Low (7)
with Increased Hospital
hospitalizations pulmonary
Utilization Rates
hospitalizations
Time Series Evaluation of
Journal of
Birth Defects in Areas with
Epidemiology Interrupted time Birth defects
Ma [33] 2016 and without Pennsylvania Birth defects NA Low (5)
and Public Health series prevalence
Unconventional Natural
Reviews
Gas Development
Birth Outcomes and Oral clefts, preterm
Maternal Residential Environmental birth + , term low
Retrospective Birth outcomes Congenital heart defects
McKenzie [32] 2014 Proximity to Natural Gas Health Colorado birth weight + , Low (6)
cohort and birth defects and neural tube defects
Development in Rural Perspectives decreased term birth
Colorado weight +
Childhood Hematologic
Childhood
Cancer and Residential Childhood acute
McKenzie [48] 2017 PLOS ONE Colorado Case-control Cancer (child) non-Hodgkin’s Low (8)
Proximity to Oil and Gas lymphocytic leukemia
lymphoma
Development
Hospitalizations for
acute myocardial
The Health Implications of infarction, chronic
Unconventional Natural Pneumonia obstructive
Peng [54] 2018 Health Economics Pennsylvania Ecological Hospitalizations Low (6)
Gas Development in hospitalizations pulmonary disease
Pennsylvania (COPD), asthma,
upper respiratory
infections
Proximity to Natural Gas Lower respiratory,
Wells and Reported Health cardiovascular,
Environmental Dermal and upper
Rabinowitz Status: Results of a Self-reported gastrointestinal,
2015 Health Pennsylvania Cross-sectional respiratory symptoms Low (7)
[55] Household Survey in symptoms neurological
Perspectives (self-reported)
Washington County, symptoms
Pennsylvania (self-reported)
Association Between
Unconventional Natural
JAMA Intern Nested Respiratory
Rasmussen [56] 2016 Gas Development in the Pennsylvania Asthma exacerbations NA Moderate (8)
Med. case-control diagnoses
Marcellus Shale and
Asthma Exacerbations

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Table 3. Cont.

Health Finding Level of

First Author Year Title Publication State Study Type Positive Associations Null Associations
Category Certainty
Perinatal Outcomes and
Decreased birth weight
Unconventional Natural Retrospective
Stacy [38] 2015 PLOS ONE Pennsylvania Birth outcomes and small for gestational Premature birth+ Moderate (8)
Gas Operations in cohort
age
Southwest Pennsylvania
Joint pain, sleep
Throat irritation, sinus disturbances,
problems, nasal irritation, shortness of breath,
Investigating Links
eye burning, persistent forgetfulness, sleep
Between Shale Gas
cough, frequent nose disorders, feeling
Development and Health Self-reported
Steinzor [61] 2013 New Solutions Pennsylvania Cross-sectional bleeds, loss of sense of weak and tired, Low (3)
Impacts Through a symptoms
smell, severe headaches, increased fatigue,
Community Survey Project
skin rashes, swollen lumbar pain, muscle
in Pennsylvania
painful joints symptoms aches or pain,
(self-reported) diarrhea symptoms
(self-reported)
Chronic rhinosinusitis
(CRS), migraine
Associations between headache, and fatigue
Unconventional Natural symptoms in
Environmental
Gas Development and Self-reported combination
Tustin [57] 2016 Health Pennsylvania Cross-sectional NA Low (5)
Nasal and Sinus, Migraine symptoms (self-reported): CRS and
Perspectives
Headache, and Fatigue fatigue, migraine
Symptoms in Pennsylvania headache and fatigue,
and all three symptoms
together
Maternal Residential
Proximity to
Small for gestational
Unconventional Gas Retrospective Preterm birth and fetal
Whitworth [39] 2017 PLOS ONE Texas Birth outcomes age and term birth Low (7)
Development and Perinatal cohort death
weight
Outcomes among a Diverse
Urban Population in Texas
Drilling and Production
Activity Related to Environmental
Nested
Whitworth [40] 2018 Unconventional Gas Health Texas Birth outcomes Preterm birth NA Low (9)
case-control
Development and Severity Perspectives
of Preterm Birth
NA = Not applicable (no result). + Denotes evidence of a significant negative relationship (i.e., with increasing exposure, poor health outcomes improved). a High risk pregnancy was an a
priori conclusion and is not a direct effect and therefore was not included in a weight of evidence determination. b Elliot et al. defined the neurologic category to include symptoms of
frequent headaches or migraines, dizziness or balance problems, feeling down, difficulties with concentration or memory, difficulty sleeping or insomnia, feeling anxious or nervous, and
seizures. Some of these symptoms are traditionally categorized as psychological.

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Table 4. Summary of the overall weight-of-evidence determinations for each health outcome.

Health Number of Studies Per Certainty Rating

Outcome Total Number Weight of Evidence
Health Outcomes Reference Positive Association Null Association
Categories of Studies
High Moderate Low Low Moderate High
Congenital heart defects McKenzie [32] 1 Insufficient
Oral clefts McKenzie [32] 1 Insufficient
Birth defects 2
Neural tube defects McKenzie [32] 1 Insufficient
Birth defects prevalence Ma [33] 1 Insufficient
Casey [35]; Currie [36]; Hill [37];
Decreased term birth weight or low
McKenzie [32]; Stacy [38]; Whitworth 2 1 2 1 Mixed
birth weight
[39]
Early infant mortality Busby [34] 1 Insufficient
Fetal death Whitworth [39] 1 Insufficient
Gestation period Hill [37] 1 Insufficient
Birth outcomes 8
Low infant health index Currie [36] 1 Insufficient
Low APGAR score a Casey [35]; Hill [37] 1 1 Mixed
Casey [35]; Hill [37]; McKenzie [32];
Preterm/premature birth 1 3 1 1 Mixed
Stacy [38]; Whitworth [39,40]
Casey [35]; Hill [37]; Stacy [38];
Small for gestational age 2 1 1 Mixed
Whitworth [39]
Cancer incidence (childhood) Fryzek [47] 1 Insufficient
Leukemia (childhood non-specific and
Fryzek [47]; McKenzie [48] 1 1 Mixed
acute lymphocytic leukemia)
Non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma
McKenzie [48] 1 Insufficient
Cancer 3 (childhood)
CNS tumorsb (child) Fryzek [47] 1 Insufficient
Urinary bladder Finkel [46] 1 Insufficient
Thyroid Finkel [46] 1 Insufficient
Leukemia Finkel [46] 1 Insufficient
Hospitalizations Jemielita [53]; Peng [54] 1 1 Mixed
Cardiovascular 3
Self-reported symptoms Rabinowitz [55] 1 Insufficient
Dermal 2 Self-reported symptoms Elliott [52]; Rabinowitz [55] 1 1 Mixed
Limited- failing to show
Gastrointestinal 2 Self-reported symptoms Elliott [52]; Rabinowitz [55] 2
an association

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Table 4. Cont.

Health Number of Studies Per Certainty Rating

Outcome Total Number Weight of Evidence
Health Outcomes Reference Positive Association Null Association
Categories of Studies
High Moderate Low Low Moderate High
Hospitalizations Jemielita [53] 1 Insufficient
Neurological 4 Limited- failing to show
Self-reported symptoms Elliott [52]; Rabinowitz [55]; Tustin [57] 3
an association
Self-reported symptoms Casey [36]; Tustin [57] 1 1 Mixed
Psychological 2
Diagnosed sleep disturbances Casey [36] 1 Insufficient
Self-reported symptoms Elliott [52]; Rabinowitz [55]; Tustin [57] 1 2 Mixed
Respiratory 6 Hospitalizations Jemielita [53]; Peng [54] 1 1 Mixed
Asthma exacerbation Rasmussen [56] 1 Limited
Self-reported symptoms (multiple) Elliott [52]; Tustin [57] 2 Limited
Other 2
Hospitalizations (all) Jemielita [53] 1 Insufficient
a APGAR score: Appearance, Pulse, Grimace, Activity and Respiration score. b CNS: Central Nervous System.

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3.5. Other Health Outcomes

We found limited evidence of a positive association between general multiple self-reported
symptoms and living near ONG development, with two studies assessing this relationship [52,57].
The two studies however characterized symptoms differently: Elliott and her colleagues combined
feeling stress, fatigue, muscle or joint pain, or any other health symptom into a “general health
symptom” grouping [52]; while Tustin and his co-authors found significant effects only when at least
two of the three symptoms they considered—chronic rhinosinusitis, migraine, and fatigue—were
experienced jointly [57].
Two epidemiologic studies evaluated a variety of indicators of psychological well-being, including
depression, anxiety and sleep disturbances [60,61]. Measures of mental health are not necessarily a
result of direct exposure to substances emitted from oil and gas operations but could be indirectly
associated with non-chemical environmental stressors such as noise, light, odors, or social stress of
living near a hotly debated, politicized, and potentially risky industry. For example, studies have
shown associations between living in areas with increased noise and traffic, such as by airports, with
increased psychological symptoms [62–65].
There was mixed evidence for self-reported dermal symptoms, self-reported psychological
symptoms, and cardiovascular hospitalizations. Other health effects, including neurological and
all hospitalizations, diagnosed sleep disturbances, and self-reported cardiovascular symptoms, had
insufficient evidence due to a single low-rated study per outcome. There was a demonstrated lack
of evidence (no association) for gastrointestinal self-reported symptoms. Three studies evaluated
self-reported dermal symptoms, such as rash, irritation, burning, itching, and hair loss, in relation
to ONG in Pennsylvania, resulting in mixed evidence [52,55,61]. Skin-related health effects may be
possible due to direct exposure to soil or water. However, the routes of exposure to ONG-related
chemicals were not well characterized in these studies and encounters with other skin irritants were
not documented, making it difficult to interpret these conclusions.

4. Discussion
In this paper, we summarized the observational epidemiologic literature on the health effects
of populations living near ONG operations and assessed the methodological rigor of the studies
published to date. Specifically, we used a modified systematic review framework, adapted from
GRADE, the Navigation Guide, and guidance from OHAT, to determine the level of certainty that
the study findings represent the true effect of exposures to ONG-related substances, and to make
overarching weight-of-evidence determinations for a variety of health outcomes.
The strength of our review lies in its transparency and objectivity. We adapted previous systematic
review guidelines to make the criteria for evaluating studies as clear as possible. We considered a wide
variety of study evaluation questions to represent those domains. Our review framework can also
be applied to other research questions in environmental health. For researchers, policymakers, and
public health practitioners, this type of review can swiftly help elucidate key findings and gaps in the
knowledge base that need to be addressed.
We found 20 published epidemiologic studies that evaluate potential associations between ONG
operations and health outcomes. These studies assessed 32 different health outcomes ranging from
self-reported symptoms to confirmed disease diagnoses. Since only a few outcomes were covered
by multiple studies, there was insufficient weight of evidence for most health outcomes. We found
studies of populations living near ONG operations provide limited evidence (modest scientific findings
that support the outcome, but with significant limitations) of harmful health effects including asthma
exacerbations and various self-reported symptoms. For all other health outcomes, we found conflicting
evidence (mixed), insufficient evidence, or in some cases, a lack of evidence of the possibility for
harmful health effects.
There are important limitations to our approach. First, it is not a meta-analysis as the current
line of inquiry, including different exposure measures (and surrogates), health outcomes, and

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geographic/geologic locations, is not suited to conducting a meta-analysis. Second, although we clearly

stated our criteria for upgrading a study to a moderate or high level of certainty ranking, the number
of study evaluation questions and the ranking cutoffs may still be viewed as arbitrary since Rooney et
al. (2016) compares these systematic review methods and notes that the scoring of studies may be
influenced by the number of elements and may not account for the differences in relative importance
across the risk of bias domains [66]. Study certainty is difficult to quantify, but we used a quantifiable
framework and did not allow factors such as media coverage or other publicity (positive or negative)
to color our ranking system.
The majority of findings from the studies were ranked as low certainty, primarily due to limitations
of the study designs that make it difficult to establish clear links between exposures to substances
potentially emitted directly from ONG operations and the health outcomes evaluated. These limitations
are inherent to observational epidemiologic studies and include indirect exposure measurements,
confounding bias, and subjective methods to determine health outcomes. The field of environmental
health incorporates these types of studies along with exposure and risk assessments to inform public
health and policies. In addition to these factors, differences in the observational epidemiologic study
types (e.g., retrospective cohort, case-control, ecological) make it difficult to compare results across
studies with various health outcomes. These epidemiologic studies may also reflect the interactions
of non-chemical or chemical stressors that may or may not be related to ONG operations that can
contribute to adverse health outcomes in a population. Study quality has improved in recent years
with better exposure measures and more thorough methods to account for possible confounders.
Although these observational epidemiologic studies alone are not sufficient to determine causality,
they provide helpful information to direct further investigation into the public health implications of
ONG activity near residential areas. Taken together, these studies make it clear that the identities and
exposure levels of substances people are exposed to when living, working, or going to school near ONG
development have not been well characterized. Epidemiologic studies that include more controlled
designs with direct measurement of exposure and diagnosed health outcomes are needed to confirm
or dispute the associations published in the literature. Incorporating a health impact assessment
framework within an epidemiologic study may be useful. One such framework, developed by the
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) can be used to assess the health impacts of
multiple chemicals and stressors [67].
Additionally, we have little empirically driven understanding of the factors (biological, geological,
meteorological, and social) that drive ONG-related exposure patterns and vulnerability to such
exposures. For example, there may be regional differences across the U.S., with varying technological
controls or regulatory environments. Researchers should integrate community members [68–70] and
concepts of health equity and environmental justice [69] into their research approaches. They should
also consider using policy as a starting point rather than the conclusion in order to evaluate policies
and ONG industry practices that have been implemented thus far (e.g., setback distances, number of
wells drilled per well pad, etc.). Having an understanding and familiarity with the populations at
risk for health effects from ONG development across states and regions within states is also important
to prioritize evidence-based health-protective policy interventions and to improve public health
prevention strategies [52,68–71].
ONG regulatory policy has not been informed by robust epidemiologic research literature. Now,
15–20 years since the widespread application of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling in states
as diverse as Colorado, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Kansas, the epidemiologic literature on the potential
health effects of ONG operations is still inadequate to definitively guide policy, as evidenced by the
mainly low certainty and conflicting studies reviewed here. Regulators and policymakers, then, should
work with public health researchers to pose specific questions that need to be answered, and partner
with public health officials to evaluate the public’s concerns. Public health officials should continue to
monitor health concerns in areas with substantial ONG operations through centralized data collection
and analysis. Multi-state collaborations should be considered to collect consistent data from differing

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oil and gas basins across the United States with the aim to more comprehensively evaluate the potential
for adverse health effects.

Supplementary Materials: The following materials are available online at http://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/16/12/

2123/s1, Tables S1–S20: Study evaluation individual assessments, Table S21: Full summary details of epidemiologic
studies included in systematic review, Table S22: Summary of answers to study evaluation questions.
Author Contributions: A.M.B., T.S.M., M.V.D., and D.I.V. initiated the manuscript and developed the overall
strategy. A.B. and S.H. conceptualized the systematic review study evaluation questions and coded the articles for
study quality (certainty). A.M.B. and S.H.H. wrote the first draft of the manuscript. A.S.N., S.M.W., M.V.D., K.R.,
T.S.M., and D.I.V. revised the final manuscript.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Acknowledgments: We thank Katelyn Hall for assistance with criteria question development. This research was
supported by general funds from the State of Colorado.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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© 2019 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

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Response of Michael Krancer

224 of 235
 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

IN RE: : SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

: 71 W.D. MISC. DKT. 2017
THE FORTY-THIRD STATEWIDE :
: ALLEGHENY COUNTY COMMMON PLEAS
INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY : CP-02-MD-5947-2017
:
: NOTICE NO. 42

RESPONSE TO CERTAIN ALLEGATIONS

IN INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY REPORT NO. 1

Pursuant to the Court’s April 7, 2020 Order, and by his undersigned counsel, respondent

Michael Krancer hereby responds to the allegations in the report that may be construed as

offering constructive or critical guidance to him. Such allegations are found at pages 6-7 and 62-

63 of the report, and state as follows.

Mr. Krancer was the Secretary of the Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”)

from January 18, 2011 through April 13, 2013. The gravamen of the allegations is that, based

upon a March 23, 2011 email from DEP’s then Executive Deputy Secretary John Hines, “any

actions, NOVs, and such” required approval of the Executive Deputy Secretary and Dana

Aunkst, with “final clearance from” then Secretary Krancer.

The report accurately and fairly states that Mr. Krancer testified before the Grand Jury

that this was a “misunderstanding.” However, the report unfairly omits reference to an email

authored the very next day by Dana Aunkst, an email that was presented to the Grand Jury, in

which Mr. Aunkst apologized for the confusion caused by the Hines email of the day before.

Although we are unable to have access to that email because it is a Grand Jury document, that

email, as Mr. Krancer recalls it, specifically clarified that no such “final clearance” by the

Secretary was necessary. Mr. Krancer was shown this email in the Grand Jury; yet no mention

of it is made in the report. Given (i) the immediate correction that was made to Hines’s email,

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and (ii) the fact that the Grand Jury report specifically emphasizes that, although the

communication was based upon a misunderstanding, “employees who learned of the email did

not take it that way,” this omission leaves an unfair, incomplete, inaccurate, and impression.

Even if “employees who learned of the email did not take it that way,” it was corrected the very

next day. In fairness, the next day email (and this Response) should be added to the report.

It is also important for context to note that, at the time of the Hines email, as Mr.

Krancer recollects it now, nine years later, the Department was specifically undertaking (or was

about to undertake) a formal consistency review regarding the different Regional Offices of DEP

for NOVs and enforcement actions in the Oil and Gas program. That accounts for particular

attention’s being directed toward DEP actions at that time relating to oil and gas operations. The

results of that review process were released in November 2011. This, Mr. Krancer believes, is

the background and context of the Hines email.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, respondent Krancer respectfully requests that this

Response, and the next day Aunkst email, be attached to the report before it is made part of the

public record.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/Joseph G. Poluka
JAMES T. SMITH
Pennsylvania Attorney I.D. 39933
JOSEPH G. POLUKA
Pennsylvania Attorney I.D. 42035
BLANK ROME LLP
One Logan Square
130 North 18th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103
(215) 569-5624

Dated: April 28, 2020

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Response of Scott Perry

228 of 235
 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

IN RE: : SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

: 71 W.D. MISC. DKT. 2017

THE FORTY-THIRD STATEWIDE :

: ALLEGHENY COUNTY COMMON PLEAS

INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY : CP-02-MD-5947-2017

: NOTICE 42

MOTION FOR INCLUSION OF RESPONSE OF DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION WITNESS SCOTT PERRY
TO GRAND JURY REPORT

1. The Forty-Third Statewide Investigating Grand Jury has produced a Report that

outlines the Commonwealth’s findings on, inter alia, the issues that Department of

Environmental Protection (“DEP”) has had in exercising its regulatory authority against

companies that use hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) to harvest natural gas in Pennsylvania. That

report has been referred to by this Court in prior orders as Investigating Grand Jury Report No. 1.

2. DEP Deputy Secretary of the Office of Oil and Gas Management, Scott Perry,

testified before the grand jury, and his testimony is quoted in Investigating Grand Jury Report

No. 1. He is also specifically named in multiple places in the Report.

3. On April 7, 2020, this Court entered an Order stating that pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. §

4552(e), Mr. Perry would be permitted to prepare and submit a response to allegations made

against him in Investigating Grand Jury Report No. 1 that “may be construed as offering

constructive or critical guidance to him.”

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 4. On April 20, 2020, this Court entered an Order permitting disclosure of the

transcript of Mr. Perry’s own testimony in front of the Forty-Third Grand Jury pursuant to 42

Pa.C.S. § 4549 so that he could properly prepare his Response to the Report in accordance with

this Court’s April 7, 2020 Order.

5. This Court further granted Mr. Perry until May 8, 2020 to file his Response.

6. Mr. Perry has reviewed the Report and his Grand Jury Testimony.

7. Pages 77-78 of the Report do not provide a complete and accurate description of

the joint efforts by the Pennsylvania Department of Health (DOH) and the Pennsylvania

Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) to incorporate health questions into DEP’s

forms used when registering complaints from complainants. Accordingly, Mr. Perry, who is

specifically identified in an unfavorable light in those paragraphs of the Report, asks that

Attachment A (which is the information set forth in ¶¶ 8-13 below) be appended as his Response

to any public release of the Report, which to date, has remained under seal.

8. The Grand Jury Report at pp. 77-78 talks about efforts at incorporating health

questions into DEP’s environmental complaints. At page 77, the Report states that “DOH had

proposed adding an ‘active’ box to DEP’s water quality complaint form, which would require a

DEP employee registering a complaint to ask the complainant whether they had any health

concerns.” The Report further states that this idea was opposed by “DEP, principally through

Scott Perry, the Deputy Secretary of the Oil and Gas Management Program” because “it would

constitute a ‘leading question’ and [a health complaint] was outside the area of DEP’s expertise.”

The Report then states that DEP agreed to a ‘passive’ box on the complaint form; meaning if the

complainant mentioned a health issue, unprompted, a notation to that effect would occur and be

passed to DOH.”

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 9. The Report states at page 77 that “[a]dditionally, DOH and DEP were only

discussing adding a health question to water quality complaints, but health complaints regularly

pertained to air quality, truck traffic, and other effects of unconventional oil and gas

operations[]” and “DOH was interested in developing ways they could gather information about

these health issues as well.”

10. The Report further states at page 77 that DOH “continued to push DEP to take

further action aimed at gathering public health information, including adding an ‘active’ question

on health. Ultimately, however, Scott Perry refused to agree to more than adding the passive box

to the water quality complaint form, and the [November 2018] meeting, which was contentious

at times, ended.” The Report states at page 78 that after the November 2018 meeting, DEP

cancelled all future regularly scheduled meetings by DOH without discussion and by deleting

meetings from a shared outlook calendar.

11. These allegations of the Report do not accurately reflect what occurred. The

decision to include a “passive” box to the DEP water quality complaint form regarding health

concerns - as opposed to an “active” box - was not a unilateral decision made by Mr. Perry or by

DEP but rather a joint decision by DEP and DOH. Mr. Perry and his counterpart at DOH - a

DOH Deputy Secretary - discussed this matter and jointly agreed that the best procedure to

employ would be the passive box, and not an active box. The DOH Deputy Secretary told Mr.

Perry that he did not support adding an “active” box because it would constitute a “leading

question.” The use of the phrase, leading question, originated with the DOH Deputy Secretary;

not with Mr. Perry.

12. DEP did not limit the health question to water quality complaints but expanded it

to include all investigations conducted by DEP where the DEP employee encountered a

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complainant with health concerns. In all such matters, DEP would forward the complainant’s

contact information to DOH.

13. Moreover, the meetings between DEP and DOH stopped because DOH had not

asked for another meeting and also because the objective of the meetings - to make sure there

was a flow of information from DEP to the DOH registry - was accomplished. Mr. Perry notes

that he would be willing to meet in the future with DOH provided there was an agenda with new

matters to discuss.

WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, Scott Perry respectfully requests that the

Court include his Response (Attachment A) to the Investigating Grand Jury Report No. 1 if and

when such Report is publicly released.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Linda Dale Hoffa

LINDA DALE HOFFA

DILWORTH PAXSON LLP
1500 Market Street, Suite 3500E
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Phone: (267) 767-6275 (mobile)
Email: [email protected]

Dated: 5/8/2020

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 ATTACHMENT A

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 RESPONSE OF MR. SCOTT PERRY,

DEPUTY SECRETARY,

PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PRODUCTION.

TO GRAND JURY REPORT #1

43rd STATEWIDE INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY

The Grand Jury Report at pp. 77-78 talks about efforts at incorporating health questions

into DEP’s environmental complaints. At page 77, the Report states that “DOH had proposed

adding an ‘active’ box to DEP’s water quality complaint form, which would require a DEP

employee registering a complaint to ask the complainant whether they had any health concerns.”

The Report further states that this idea was opposed by “DEP, principally through Scott Perry,

the Deputy Secretary of the Oil and Gas Management Program” because “it would constitute a

‘leading question’ and [a health complaint] was outside the area of DEP’s expertise.” The

Report then states that DEP agreed to a ‘passive’ box on the complaint form; meaning if the

complainant mentioned a health issue, unprompted, a notation to that effect would occur and be

passed to DOH.”

The Report states at page 77 that “[a]dditionally, DOH and DEP were only discussing

adding a health question to water quality complaints, but health complaints regularly pertained to

air quality, truck traffic, and other effects of unconventional oil and gas operations[]” and “DOH

was interested in developing ways they could gather information about these health issues as

well.”

The Report further states at page 77 that DOH “continued to push DEP to take further

action aimed at gathering public health information, including adding an ‘active’ question on

health. Ultimately, however, Scott Perry refused to agree to more than adding the passive box to

the water quality complaint form, and the [November 2018] meeting, which was contentious at

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times, ended.” The Report states at page 78 that after the November 2018 meeting, DEP

cancelled all future regularly scheduled meetings by DOH without discussion and by deleting

meetings from a shared outlook calendar.

These allegations of the Report do not accurately reflect what occurred. The decision to

include a “passive” box to the DEP water quality complaint form regarding health concerns - as

opposed to an “active” box - was not a unilateral decision made by Mr. Perry or by DEP but

rather a joint decision by DEP and DOH. Mr. Perry and his counterpart at DOH - a DOH

Deputy Secretary - discussed this matter and jointly agreed that the best procedure to employ

would be the passive box, and not an active box. The DOH Deputy Secretary told Mr. Perry that

he did not support adding an “active” box because it would constitute a “leading question.” The

use of the phrase, leading question, originated with the DOH Deputy Secretary; not with Mr.

Perry.

DEP did not limit the health question to water quality complaints but expanded it to

include all investigations conducted by DEP where the DEP employee encountered a

complainant with health concerns. In all such matters, DEP would forward the complainant’s

contact information to DOH.

Moreover, the meetings between DEP and DOH stopped because DOH had not asked for

another meeting and also because the objective of the meetings - to make sure there was a flow

of information from DEP to the DOH registry - was accomplished. Mr. Perry notes that he

would be willing to meet in the future with DOH provided there was an agenda with new matters

to discuss.

DATED: 5/8/2020

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