THE NEW ORLEANS

HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM:

What Went Wrong and Why

A Report by the American Society of Civil Engineers
Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel
Christine F. Andersen, P.E., M.ASCE
Jurjen A. Battjes, Ph.D.
David E. Daniel, Ph.D., P.E., M.ASCE (Chair)
Billy Edge, Ph.D., P.E., F.ASCE
William Espey, Jr., Ph.D., P.E., M.ASCE, D.WRE
Robert B. Gilbert , Ph.D., P.E., M.ASCE
Thomas L. Jackson, P.E., F.ASCE, D.WRE
David Kennedy, P.E., F.ASCE
Dennis S. Mileti, Ph.D.
James K. Mitchell, Sc.D., P.E., Hon.M.ASCE
Peter Nicholson, Ph.D., P.E., F.ASCE
Clifford A. Pugh, P.E., M.ASCE
George Tamaro, Jr., P.E., Hon.M.ASCE
Robert Traver, Ph.D., P.E., M.ASCE, D.WRE

ASCE Staff:
Joan Buhrman
Charles V. Dinges IV, Aff.M.ASCE
John E. Durrant, P.E., M.ASCE
Jane Howell
Lawrence H. Roth, P.E., G.E., F.ASCE
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The New Orleans hurricane protection system : what went wrong and why : a report / by the American
Society of Civil Engineers Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel.
p. cm.
ISBN-13: 978-0-7844-0893-3
ISBN-10: 0-7844-0893-9
1. Hurricane Katrina, 2005. 2. Building, Stormproof. 3. Hurricane protection. I. American Society of Civil
Engineers. Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel.

TH1096.N49 2007
627’.40976335--dc22
2006031634

Published by American Society of Civil Engineers

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www.pubs.asce.org

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Copyright © 2007 by the American Society of Civil Engineers.

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ISBN 13: 978-0-7844-0893-3
ISBN 10: 0-7844-0893-9
Manufactured in the United States of America.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why iii

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY v
CHAPTER 1: Introduction 1
Interagency Performance Evaluation Taskforce. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
ASCE’s Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Other Teams of Investigators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
This Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

CHAPTER 2: New Orleans 5

A City on the River. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Development on the Marshes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
New Orleans is Sinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The People of New Orleans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A Cultural Treasure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

CHAPTER 3: Hurricane Katrina 11

The Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Wind, Water, and Waves. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

CHAPTER 4: Hurricane Protection System 17

Standard Project Hurricane. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Levees and Floodwalls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Datums and Elevations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Interior Drainage and Pump Stations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

CHAPTER 5: The Levees Fail 25

Storm Surge Damage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Cracks in the System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Flooding Ensues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
A City Under Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Pump Stations Shut Down . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

CHAPTER 6: Consequences 33
Tragic Deaths. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Exposure, Injury, and Disease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Catastrophic Financial Losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Had the Hurricane Protection System Not Failed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Cascading Financial Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Prospects for Economic Growth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Long Term Health and Safety. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Evacuees and Their Receiving Communities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Impacts to New Orleans’s Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
The Natural Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

CHAPTER 7: Direct Causes of the Catastrophe 47

17th Street Canal Breach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Soil Strength Over-estimated. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Factor of Safety. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
The Water-Filled Gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
London Avenue Canal South Breach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
iv THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

Table of Contents
(continued)

Oversimplified Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
The Water-Filled Gap – Again . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
London Avenue Canal North Breach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Industrial Canal East Bank North Breach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Industrial Canal East Bank South Breach and
Industrial Canal West Bank Breach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Industrial Canal West Bank South and All Other Levee Breaches. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Pumping System: Useless During Hurricane Katrina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

CHAPTER 8: Contributing Factors 61

Risk to New Orleans Not Fully Appreciated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Hurricane Protection System Constructed Piecemeal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Hurricane Protection System Under-designed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Many Levees Not High Enough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
No One Entity Is In Charge of Hurricane Protection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
External Peer Review Lacking. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Funding Process Flawed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

CHAPTER 9: What Must We Do Next? 73

Understand Risk and Embrace Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Re-evaluate and Fix the Hurricane Protection System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Revamp the Management of the Hurricane Protection System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Demand Engineering Quality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Acknowledgements 83
Credits 84
 

Executive Summary

On the morning of August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina — one of the strongest

storms ever to hit the coast of the United States — brought intense winds, high
rainfall, waves, and storm surge to the Gulf of Mexico shores of Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama. Communities in all three states suffered damage,
but this report focuses on the devastation to New Orleans and southeast
Louisiana.
New Orleans was built on low-lying marshland along the Mississippi
River. Levees and floodwalls were built around the city and adjacent parishes
to protect against flooding. During and after Hurricane Katrina, many of those
levees and floodwalls were overtopped and several were breached, allowing
billions of gallons of water from the Gulf of Mexico, Lake Borgne, and Lake
Pontchartrain to flow into New Orleans and flood major portions of the city.
As of August 2, 2006, 1,118 people were confirmed dead in Louisiana
as a result of Hurricane Katrina. Another 135 people are still missing and
presumed dead. Thousands of homes were destroyed. Direct damage to
residential and non-residential property is estimated at $21 billion, damage to
public infrastructure another $6.7 billion. Nearly half the region’s population
has not yet returned after evacuating. Nearly 124 thousand jobs were lost,
and the region’s economy was crippled.
The catastrophic failure of New Orleans’s hurricane protection system
represents one of the nation’s worst disasters ever. The members of the
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Hurricane Katrina External Review
Panel have conducted an in-depth review of the comprehensive work of the
United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Interagency Performance
Evaluation Taskforce (IPET) — at the USACE’s request. The ASCE Hurricane
Katrina External Review Panel’s findings and conclusions are presented in this
report.
A storm of Hurricane Katrina’s strength and intensity is expected to
cause major flooding and damage. A large portion of the destruction from
Hurricane Katrina was caused not only by the storm itself, however, but
also by the storm’s exposure of engineering and engineering-related policy
failures. The levees and floodwalls breached because of a combination of
unfortunate choices and decisions, made over many years, at almost all levels
of responsibility.
There were two direct causes of the levee breaches: collapse of
several levees with concrete floodwalls (called I-walls) because of the way
they were designed, and overtopping, where water poured over the tops of
the levees and floodwalls and eroded the structures away. Furthermore, the
many existing pump stations that could have helped remove floodwaters
were inoperable during and after the storm.
vi THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

The I-walls failed because the margin of safety used in the design
process was too low — especially considering that the hurricane protection
system was a critical life-safety structure. The engineering design did not
account for the variability in the strength of soft soils beneath and adjacent
to the levees. The designers failed to take into account a water-filled gap that
developed behind the I-walls as they bowed outward from the forces exerted
by the floodwaters.
Some overtopping of levees is to be expected in a major storm.
However, the levees were not armored or protected against erosion — an
engineering choice of catastrophic consequences because this allowed the
levees, some constructed of highly erodible soil, to be scoured away, allowing
water to pour into New Orleans.
In addition to these direct causes of the levee breaches, a number of
other factors also contributed to the catastrophe:

• The risk to New Orleanians (i.e., the probability of failure combined

with the consequences to human health and safety if that failure
were to occur) was much higher than many people are generally
willing to accept. Because these risks were not well understood
or communicated effectively to the public, the importance of
evacuating people and protecting property was under-estimated.

• The hurricane protection system was constructed as individual

pieces — not as an interconnected system — with strong portions
built adjacent to weak portions, some pump stations that could not
withstand the hurricane forces, and many penetrations through the
levees for roads, railroads, and utilities. Furthermore, the levees
were not designed to withstand overtopping.

• The hurricane protection system was designed for meteorological

conditions (barometric pressure and wind speed, for example) that
were not as severe as the Weather Bureau and National Weather
Service listed as being characteristic of a major Gulf Coast
hurricane.

• Levee builders used an incorrect datum to measure levee

elevations — resulting in many levees not being built high enough.
Some levees were built 1 to 2 feet lower than the intended
design elevation. Furthermore, despite the acknowledged fact
that New Orleans is subsiding (sinking), no measures were taken
into account in the design to compensate for the subsidence by
monitoring the levees and raising them up to the pre-subsidence
design elevation.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why vii

• No single agency was in charge of hurricane protection in New

Orleans. Rather, responsibility for the maintenance and operation
of the levees and pump stations was spread over many federal,
state, parish, and local agencies. This lack of inter-agency
coordination led to many adverse consequences from Hurricane
Katrina.

• The hurricane protection system was funded on a project-by-

project basis over many years. As a result, the system was
constructed in a piecemeal fashion. In addition, there were
pressures for tradeoffs and low-cost solutions that compromised
quality, safety, and reliability.

• The design of the New Orleans hurricane protection system was

not subject to the rigorous external review by senior experts that is
often conducted for similar life-safety structures and systems.

The first of ASCE’s Fundamental Canons in its Code of Ethics states,

“Engineers shall hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public….”
Serious deficiencies in the southeast Louisiana hurricane protection system
must be corrected if the New Orleans area is to avoid a similar catastrophe
when the next major hurricane strikes.
The ASCE Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel strongly urges
that organizations responsible for critical life-safety facilities be organized
and operated to enable, not to inhibit, a focus on safety, and that engineers
continually evaluate the appropriateness of design criteria, always considering
how the performance of individual components affects the overall performance
of a system. Specific recommendations include:

• Keep safety at the forefront of public priorities by having all

responsible agencies re-evaluate their policies and practices to
ensure that protection of public safety, health, and welfare is the
top priority for infrequent but potentially devastating impacts from
hurricanes and flooding. Also, encourage Congress to establish and
fund a mechanism for a nationwide levee safety program, similar
to that which is in place for dams.

• Quantify and periodically update the assessment of risk. This

approach should be extended to all areas in the United States that
are vulnerable to major losses from hurricanes and flooding.

• Determine the level of acceptable risk in the community through

quality interactive public risk communication programs in New
viii THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

Orleans and other areas threatened by hurricanes and flooding.

Once determined, manage the risks accordingly.

• Correct the system’s deficiencies by establishing mechanisms to

incorporate changing information, making the levees survivable if
overtopped, strengthening the I-walls and levees, and upgrading
the pumping stations.

• Assign to a single entity or individual (a licensed engineer) the

responsibility of managing critical hurricane and flood protection
systems such as the one in New Orleans.

• Implement more effective mechanisms for coordination and

cooperation. (For example, those responsible for maintenance of
the system must collaborate with system designers and must
upgrade their inspection, repair, and operations processes to
ensure that the system is hurricane- and flood-ready.)

• Upgrade engineering design procedures and practice to place

greater emphasis on safety.

• Engage independent experts in high-level reviews of all critical life-

safety structures, including hurricane and flood-protection systems.

In a very real sense, the findings and conclusions in this report extend
far beyond the New Orleans hurricane protection system. The lessons learned
from the engineering and engineering-related policy failures triggered by
Hurricane Katrina have profound implications for other American communities
and a sobering message to people nationwide: we must place the protection
of safety, health, and welfare at the forefront of our nation’s priorities. To
do anything less could lead to a far greater tragedy than the one witnessed in
New Orleans.
 

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

On the morning of August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck southeast

Louisiana and triggered what would become one of the worst disasters
ever to befall an American city. The storm overtopped levees and floodwalls
throughout southeast Louisiana and also caused the levees and floodwalls in
the New Orleans area to fail or breach in more than 50 locations. Water rushed
into New Orleans and flooded over 80 percent of the city — more than 10 feet
deep in some neighborhoods.
One thousand one hundred eighteen (1,118) people lost their lives in
the New Orleans area, and 135 more are still missing and presumed dead.
Tens of billions of dollars worth of property was damaged. More than 400,000
people fled the city. Many have not returned. The educational and health care
systems of the New Orleans area have been crippled. The devastation was so
extensive, and the residual risk looms so ominous, that, more than a year and
a half later, the future of New Orleans remains clouded.
The members of the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)
extend their sincere condolences to the families and friends of those who
lost their lives during and after Hurricane Katrina. Our heartfelt sympathy
goes out to the people of the New Orleans area who are left without homes,
communities, and jobs, and to those who face an uncertain future.
The members of the ASCE Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel
have conducted an in-depth review of the comprehensive work of the United
States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Interagency Performance Evaluation
Taskforce (IPET). We are indebted to the dedicated efforts of more than 150
engineers and scientists who have, in the year and a half following Hurricane
Katrina, evaluated the causes of the New Orleans area hurricane protection
system failures.
As a result of this excellent work, we now better understand what
went wrong and why. The ASCE Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel has
an obligation to share its findings and insights, which go beyond the scope
of the IPET review, so that others may learn from this tragedy and prevent
similar disasters from happening again, not only in New Orleans, but in
other communities throughout the United States that are also vulnerable to
hurricanes and flooding.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

Interagency Performance Evaluation Taskforce

In the aftermath of the storm and flooding, Lieutenant General Carl A. Strock,
P.E., Chief of Engineers, USACE, ordered an investigation to provide credible,
objective engineering and scientific answers to fundamental questions about
the operation and performance of the hurricane protection system in southeast
Louisiana. The results of the performance evaluation were intended to answer
the following four questions:

1. What were the storm surges and waves generated by Hurricane Katrina
and did overtopping occur?

2. How did the floodwalls, levees, and drainage canals, acting as an integrated
system, perform and breach during and after Hurricane Katrina?

3. How did the pumping stations, canal gates, and road closures, acting as
an integrated system, operate in preventing and evacuating the flooding
due to Hurricane Katrina?

4. What was and what is the condition of the hurricane protection system
before and after Hurricane Katrina and, as a result, is the New Orleans
protection system more susceptible to flooding from future hurricanes
and tropical storms?

The objectives of the IPET work included identifying lessons learned

and ways to potentially improve the performance of the existing hurricane
protection system at the authorized level of protection. The IPET’s work is
documented in a comprehensive final report that is available at https://ipet.
wes.army.mil/.

ASCE’s Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel

The Chief of Engineers requested that ASCE form an external review panel to
review and comment on IPET’s work. ASCE brought together 14 experts in the
key engineering and scientific disciplines related to the hurricane protection
system failure to form the ASCE Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel.
The ASCE Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel’s scope of work
was to provide an ongoing, real-time, and objective technical review of the
IPET report findings on the performance of the hurricane protection system in
New Orleans and surrounding areas. ASCE Hurricane Katrina External Review
Panel members visited New Orleans, examined the damaged areas, and had
access to large amounts of information about the catastrophe and its causes.
Beginning with the formulation of IPET’s scope of work, the ASCE Hurricane
Katrina External Review Panel members have been in close contact with IPET
investigators, have actively submitted informal comments to the IPET, and
have reviewed each IPET report in detail.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 

The factual and technical foundation for the findings presented in this
report is the extensive work by IPET, although this report also draws from
ideas expressed by others. Even though IPET’s work formed the basis of the
technical analysis, this report was prepared independently of IPET and the
USACE, and solely reflects the views of the ASCE Hurricane Katrina External
Review Panel members.

Other Teams of Investigators

Among the first groups of engineers to visit New Orleans after Hurricane
Katrina was a levee assessment team from ASCE. This team examined and
documented post-flood conditions to aid in investigating the causes of the
failure. The results are presented in Report No. UCB/CITRIS–05/01, “Preliminary
Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in Hurricane
Katrina on August 29, 2005,” November 17, 2005. Two of the members of the
ASCE levee assessment team are members of the ASCE Hurricane Katrina
External Review Panel.
The National Research Council of the National Academies performed
a review of both IPET’s and the ASCE Hurricane Katrina External Review
Panel’s work under NRC/NAE project DEPS-L-05-02-A, “New Orleans Regional
Hurricane Protection Projects.” The scope of the National Academies review
was:

1. Review the data gathered by the IPET and the ASCE teams and provide
recommendations regarding the adequacy of those data, as well as
additional data that will be important to the IPET study and which should
be gathered.

2. Review the analyses performed by the IPET and ASCE to ensure their
consistency with accepted engineering approaches and practices.

3. Review and comment upon the conclusions reached by the IPET and ASCE
teams, and;

4. Seek to determine lessons learned from the Katrina experience and

identify ways that hurricane protection system performance can be
improved in the future at the authorized level of protection.

This Report
Through this report, the ASCE Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel offers
an assessment of what happened to the New Orleans hurricane protection
system as a result of Hurricane Katrina — and why it happened. This report
focuses on the direct physical causes and contributing factors to the hurricane
protection system failures. This report was developed not to repeat the IPET
information but, rather, to interpret the broader significance of the findings. In
the broadest sense, the lessons learned from this catastrophe are not limited to
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

New Orleans or to levees and floodwalls: they are applicable to all engineering
projects where public health, safety, and welfare are at risk. Issues pertaining
to pre- or post-hurricane evacuation, rescue operations, or recovery efforts
were not part of the scope of this study, although all of these issues have
an impact on the ultimate consequences of the hurricane protection system
failures.
The report is written for both the scientist/engineer and the layperson.
The scientist/engineer will glean valuable information related to the science
and technology of hurricane flood protection. The layperson will gain a broad
understanding of exactly what caused the disaster.
Perhaps the most difficult question is not so much “What went wrong
and why?” but “What must we do next?” to avoid a similar catastrophe in the
future — in New Orleans and in other hurricane- and flood-prone areas of the
country. The ASCE Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel believes strongly
that if lives and public safety are to be protected, significant changes will
be required in the way hurricane and flood protection systems are funded,
designed, managed, and maintained.
 

CHAPTER 2

New Orleans

New Orleans is located in southeastern Louisiana near where the Mississippi

River flows into the Gulf of Mexico (Figure 2.1). The busy Port of New Orleans
provides a gateway for imports including petroleum, steel, copper, rubber,
cement, coffee, and containerized goods. The chief exports are grain and other
foods from the midwestern United States and petroleum products. Thousands
of ocean vessels from Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Africa move through
New Orleans on the Mississippi River every year.

Figure 2.1 Satellite Photo of New Orleans Area

New Orleans, Louisiana, located near where the Mississippi River flows into the Gulf of
Mexico, is one of the nation’s most important ports.

From New Orleans, products reach Americans either via a 14,500-

mile inland waterways network including the Mississippi, Missouri, and Ohio
Rivers, or via other transportation modes, including six railroad lines, 50 ocean
carriers, 16 barge lines, and 75 truck lines with access to the port. In addition
to cargo, cruise ships and riverboats transport more than 700,000 passengers
through the port annually.
New Orleans is a part of Louisiana’s extensive petroleum infrastructure
that provides oil and other petroleum products to the nation. Louisiana ranks
fifth in United States oil production, and is home to a network of pipelines
and storage facilities plus 17 petroleum refineries, as well as to two of the
nation’s four Strategic Petroleum Reserves, which encompass the world’s
largest business center supply of emergency crude oil (Figure 2.2). New
Orleans also serves as a business center for energy companies such as BP,
Shell Oil, Chevron, and ConocoPhillips.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

Figure 2.2 Flooded Petroleum Storage Tank Farm

New Orleans is a major hub of regional petroleum production and refining operations
providing up to 30 percent of the nation’s oil. Damage to the petroleum complex from
Hurricane Katrina was extensive.

A City on the River

Over the millennia, the Mississippi River has carried billions of tons of sediment
from its headwaters toward the Gulf of Mexico. As the water flowed into
the gulf, the sediment was deposited in the river delta, creating the land on
which New Orleans and surrounding areas is now built. Within the river delta,
high ground tends to be close to the Mississippi River due to natural river
processes. New Orleans was established in the early 1700s on high ground
adjacent to the Mississippi River.
When floods occur on a major river, water mixed with sediment spills
over the banks. The coarsest sediments (sand and gravel) settle out first,
close to the river, forming natural levees near the river banks. Fine sediments
(silt and clay) settle out further away into the swampland.
Over many floods and many alterations in the course of the river
channel, this natural process has created a complex, highly variable geology.
Layers of gravel, sand, silt, and clay are inter-fingered with layers of organic
marsh deposits (often called peat) at various locations.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 

Development on the Marshes

A map of the east bank of New Orleans from 1849 (Figure 2.3) shows
developed areas adjacent to the river, with cypress swamps, marshes, and
bayous flanking the city to the north and east. The bayous naturally flowed
northward into Lake Pontchartrain and eastward into Lake Borgne; Lake Borgne
opens directly to the Gulf of Mexico. As New Orleans grew and prospered,
levee systems were built around segments of the low swamplands to the
north of the city, and the land was drained and developed.

Figure 2.3 New Orleans in 1849

An 1849 map shows New Orleans built adjacent to the Mississippi River, with marshlands
and bayous to the north.

The parishes of New Orleans and the neighborhoods within the

parishes are shown in Figure 2.4. (Parishes are equivalent to counties in
other parts of the United States.) Of primary significance to this report are
Orleans and St. Bernard parishes. Significant flooding occurred in both due to
failures in New Orleans’s hurricane protection system.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

Figure 2.4 The Parishes and Neighborhoods of New Orleans

St. Bernard, Plaquemines, and Orleans parishes were the most affected by flooding after
Hurricane Katrina.

Levees and floodwalls were also built on the banks of several of the
former bayous from Lake Pontchartrain into New Orleans. Waterways of
significance to this report (as shown in Figure 2.5) include:
• 17th Street Canal
• Orleans Canal
• London Avenue Canal
• Inner Harbor Navigation Canal (also called the Industrial Canal)
• Gulf Intracoastal Waterway
• Mississippi River Gulf Outlet

New Orleans is Sinking

Large portions of Orleans, St. Bernard, and Jefferson parishes are currently
below sea level — and continue to sink. New Orleans is built on thousands of
feet of soft sand, silt, and clay. Subsidence, or settling of the ground surface,
occurs naturally due to the consolidation and oxidation of organic soils (called
“marsh” in New Orleans) and local groundwater pumping. In the past, flooding
and deposition of sediments from the Mississippi River counterbalanced the
natural subsidence, leaving southeast Louisiana at or above sea level.
However, due to major flood control structures being built upstream
on the Mississippi River and levees being built around New Orleans, fresh
layers of sediment are not replenishing the ground lost by subsidence. The
natural subsidence has also been exacerbated by groundwater withdrawals,
petroleum production, development, and other factors. Based on data
collected by the United States Geological Survey from benchmarks located
primarily in Orleans Parish (1951-1995), subsidence has been estimated to
occur at an average rate of about 0.15 to 0.2 inches per year, although rates in
excess of 1 inch per year occur in some locations.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 

Figure 2.5 The New Orleans Waterways

New Orleans is surrounded by – and inter-fingered with – water: lakes, rivers, bayous,
and canals.

The People of New Orleans

According to the 2004 United States Census, the population of the greater
New Orleans metropolitan area affected most by Hurricane Katrina was
approximately one million — 67 percent African American, 28 percent
Caucasian, and small percentages of Hispanics and Asians (3 percent and 2
percent, respectively). Studies attempting to estimate the city’s post-Katrina
population have set the 2006 population at around 580,000 — a 44 percent
decrease (Figure 2.6).

Figure 2.6 Population of the New Orleans Region

The combined populations of Jefferson, Orleans, St. Bernard, and Plaquemines parishes
dropped by 44 percent after Hurricane Katrina. Orleans Parish’s population dropped 63
percent.
10 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

A Cultural Treasure
New Orleans fell under French, Spanish, and — following the Louisiana
Purchase — American control, all within 100 years. Influences from the ruling
nations blended with contributions from others entering the port city: African
slaves, Caribbean islanders, and several waves of Italians, Germans, and Irish
fleeing famine or simply seeking a new life in America. As a result, celebrations
of Mardi Gras, St. Patrick’s Day, St. Joseph’s Day, and voodoo rituals all find a
welcome home in New Orleans. The blend of languages also created words
and phrases unheard in any other part of the country.
Some of the nation’s oldest and most historic structures are located in
New Orleans. Lacy ironwork and French- and Spanish-style architecture lend
the city a European flavor. New Orleans’s most famous export, jazz, also grew
out of the city’s mesh of cultures as European music styles gradually fused
with ragtime, blues, and gospel (Figure 2.7).
Creole cuisine, essentially classic French cooking incorporating local
ingredients, is served in homes and restaurants, as is Cajun food, which was
introduced to New Orleans by French-Canadian settlers in Louisiana.

Figure 2.7 A New Orleanian Leaving the City after the Hurricane

New Orleans is one of the most culturally rich and diverse cities in the U.S. in terms of
music, architecture, food, and language. New Orleans is the home of jazz, America’s most
widely recognized indigenous musical art form.
 11

CHAPTER 3

Hurricane Katrina

Hurricane Katrina was one of the strongest storms ever to hit the coast of the
United States; New Orleans was directly in Hurricane Katrina’s path. Hurricane
Katrina brought intense winds, rainfall, waves, and storm surges that caused
widespread devastation in New Orleans and along the coasts of Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama.
Hurricanes are not new to the Gulf Coast. Major hurricanes to have hit
the Gulf Coast in the vicinity of southeast Louisiana are listed in Table 3.1:

Table 3.1 Major Hurricanes to Have Crossed Southeast Louisiana or Vicinity (1851-2004)
HURRICANE YEAR CATEGORY AT CENTRAL PRESSURE
FIRST LANDFALL AT FIRST LANDFALL
(millibars)
Camille 1969 5 909
Katrina 2005 3 920
Andrew 1992   5* 922
LA (New Orleans) 1915 4 931
LA (Last Island) 1856 4 934
SE FL/SE LA/MS 1947 4 940
Audrey 1957 4 945
LA (Chenier Caminanda) 1893 3 948
Betsy (SE FL/SE LA) 1965 3 948
LA/MS 1855 3 950
LA/MS/AL 1860 3 950
LA 1879 3 950
LA (Grand Isle) 1909 3 952
Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Technical
Memorandum NWS TPC-4, “The Deadliest, Costliest, and Most Intense United States
Tropical Cyclones from 1851 to 2005 (and Other Frequently Requested Hurricane Facts)”
*Hurricane Andrew was a Category 5 hurricane in Florida but a Category 3 hurricane as it
reached Louisiana.

The Storm
Hurricanes are intense low-pressure areas that form over warm ocean waters
in the summer and early fall. As warm, moist air rises from the ocean surface
into cooler air above, the water vapor condenses to form droplets and clouds.
This condensation releases heat, boosting the rise of the air, lowering the
central pressure, and drawing more warm, moist air into the storm. In this
manner, the energy builds up and the wind speed increases. The low pressure
causes wind to spiral inward toward the center of the low-pressure area,
creating the hurricane. In the northern hemisphere, hurricane wind rotation
12 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

around the eye of a hurricane is counter-clockwise. Hurricanes are categorized

based on maximum wind speed according to the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane
Scale, as summarized in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2 The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale

CATEGORY WIND SPEED TYPICAL STORM
(mph) WATER SURGE (ft)

1 74 - 95 4-5
2 96 - 110 6-8
3 111 - 130 9 - 12
4 131 - 155 13 - 18
5 > 155 > 18

The path of and intensity history of Hurricane Katrina are shown in

Figure 3.1. The storm started as a tropical depression in the Bahamas on
August 23, 2005. It crossed south Florida on August 25 as a Category 1
hurricane, and then entered the Gulf of Mexico. The storm intensified as it
tracked westward.

Figure 3.1 Path and Intensity History of Hurricane Katrina

This image is a montage of four satellite photographs taken in late August 2005, as Hurricane
Katrina made its way from the Bahamas through the Gulf of Mexico, gaining strength.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 13

On August 28, the storm began tracking toward the northwest, and
intensified from a Category 2 to a Category 5 storm in just 12 hours. As it
approached land, the warm, moist air and energy that Hurricane Katrina could
draw from the Gulf of Mexico decreased, and Hurricane Katrina was degraded
to a Category 3 storm. The path of the storm as it crossed into Louisiana is
shown in Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2 Traced Path of Hurricane Katrina over New Orleans

The eye of Hurricane Katrina tracked nearly due north across southern Louisiana, about
30 miles east of downtown New Orleans.

Wind, Water, and Waves

The strong wind and low atmospheric pressure of a hurricane causes storm
surges. Storm surges typically cause the most damage near the coast, whereas
winds cause the most damage away from the coast. Three factors contribute
to the formation and intensity of a storm surge:

1. Wind-induced motion of water. The wind drags along the ocean’s surface
and causes the water to pile up as a surge higher than tide level. This is
the main contributor to high water from a major hurricane. As the water
and waves reach the shore, flooding typically occurs. Wind also generates
waves on the water’s surface, increasing the momentum of the surge
toward land and adding to the water height on top of the surge. As Katrina
crossed the Gulf, easterly winds blowing for several days caused water to
14 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

pile up against the east bank of the Mississippi River that juts out into the
Gulf.

2. Reduced pressure from the storm. Atmospheric pressure is roughly

30 inches of mercury. Hurricane Katrina had a minimum central pressure
of about 27 inches, or 3 inches below atmospheric pressure. Typically,
water will rise about 1 foot of water for every inch drop of mercury.
Therefore, sea level was about 3 feet above normal because of the low
pressures of Hurricane Katrina.

3. Favorable or unfavorable timing with high and low ocean tides. The
worst combination is when a hurricane-induced storm surge occurs during
high tide which was, indeed, the case when Hurricane Katrina hit land.

A satellite view of Hurricane Katrina taken at 10:15am on August 29,

2005 is shown in Figure 3.3. At its peak strength about 200 miles off the
Louisiana coast (24 hours prior to landfall), Hurricane Katrina generated winds
with speeds of up to 160 miles per hour (mph) (1-minute average). Hurricane
Katrina also reached a minimum central pressure of 902 millibars (27 inches
of mercury) at its peak, ranking fourth lowest on record for all Atlantic basin
hurricanes, and produced offshore individual waves approximately 100 feet
high in the Gulf of Mexico, which are some of the largest waves for any
hurricane over the past century.

Figure 3.3 The Eye of Hurricane Katrina as seen from a NOAA Satellite

Hurricane Katrina was one of the strongest storms to hit the coast of the United States.
The eye of Hurricane Katrina is shown in the center of the photo. The maximum wind
speeds estimated during Hurricane Katrina were 160 miles per hour.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 15

The leading edge of Hurricane Katrina made landfall at Buras,

Louisiana, at 6:10am, August 29, 2005. The central pressure at landfall was
920 millibars, which ranked third lowest on record for United States land-
falling storms. Although Katrina struck Louisiana as a Category 3 storm, its
earlier status as a massive Category 5 storm added to the magnitude of the
storm surge as Katrina approached the coast with ever greater intensity.
When the eye of Hurricane Katrina struck at Buras at 6:30am, winds were
approximately 127 mph.
Figure 3.4 shows wind vectors and storm surge elevation at about
7:30am on August 29, when the eye of the storm was just southeast of
downtown New Orleans. The eastern edge of the New Orleans area was
pounded by wind and water from the east. The northern edge of the New
Orleans area along Lake Pontchartrain was pounded by wind and waves from
the north. An enormous storm surge of water from the Gulf of Mexico built
up in Lake Borgne.
The Mississippi River delta, which juts out to the southeast of New
Orleans, created a barrier of land just to the west of the eye against which the
massive storm surge also piled up. In south Plaquemines Parish, peak water
levels reached 20 feet above mean sea level along the hurricane protection
levees.

Figure 3.4 Wind Vectors and Calculated Storm Surge about 7:30am on August 29, 2005

New Orleans was pounded by wind and water on the north and east. Wind drove water
from the Gulf of Mexico into Lake Borgne. Water from Lake Pontchartrain was driven
against New Orleans’s lakeshore by winds blowing from the north.
16 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

The wind on Lake Pontchartrain was out of the north, piling up water
along the southern shore of the lake. Peak water levels at the entrances to
canals along the lakeshore of New Orleans were nearly 12 feet above sea
level.
During a storm surge, the water level rises significantly above tide
level for a few hours. After the hurricane passes and the direction of the wind
shifts, water levels recede. A hydrograph, a graph of water level versus time,
for the canal entrances at Lake Pontchartrain is shown in Figure 3.5. The
highest water level occurred at approximately 9:30am on August 29, after
which the water levels fell.

Figure 3.5 Hydrograph for the Canal Entrances at Lake Pontchartrain

On the lakeshore of New Orleans, water levels from the storm surge built up to a peak at
9:30am By 10:00am, the eye of the hurricane had passed slightly to the northeast of New
Orleans, and the water levels began to fall.

In addition to the storm surges, Hurricane Katrina brought intense

rainfall to the New Orleans area. Within Orleans Parish, for example, estimates
of precipitation based on radar rainfall data indicate that up to 13.6 inches fell
in some areas over the 24-hour period encompassing Hurricane Katrina. The
100-year rainfall (24-hour duration) for New Orleans is 12.58 inches, based on
United States Weather Bureau Technical Paper 40 (1961). This means that
there is a 1 in 100 probability in any given year that there will be 24-hour
period where the accumulated rainfall will be greater than 12.58 inches.
 17

CHAPTER 4

Hurricane Protection System

The USACE is responsible for the design and construction of most of the flood
and hurricane protection levees along the Mississippi River and in the New
Orleans area. Congress authorized the first major project to address hurricane-
induced flooding in 1946. Since that time, as New Orleans’s infrastructure
and population has expanded, Congress has authorized a number of additional
hurricane protection projects.
In addition, there are several other flood protection systems in and around
New Orleans that are owned or operated by other agencies. These include:
• Interior drainage and pumping stations
• The Mississippi River Levee Flood Protection System
• Non-USACE levee features

The USACE’s overall strategy to protect against flooding caused by

hurricanes and storm surge was to build levees or floodwalls around segments
of New Orleans. The USACE projects are generally grouped into three main
units, as shown in Figure 4.1:
• Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana and Vicinity Hurricane Protection
Project
• West Bank and Vicinity, New Orleans, Louisiana, Hurricane
Protection Project
• New Orleans to Venice, Louisiana, Hurricane Protection Project

Figure 4.1 Three USACE Hurricane Protection Systems in Southeast Louisiana

Over the past several decades, the USACE has designed and built three main hurricane
protection systems to protect New Orleans and surrounding parishes from hurricane-
induced flooding. The USACE designed and built the majority of the levees and floodwalls
but they are maintained by local levee boards. Other levees and floodwalls are owned and
operated by local levee boards. All of the pump stations are owned and operated by local
agencies.
18 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

The Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana and Vicinity Hurricane Protection

Project (Figure 4.2) was intended to protect St. Bernard, Orleans, Jefferson,
and St. Charles parishes between the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain.
The project generally included earthen levees with floodwalls along Lake
Pontchartrain, the 17th Street Canal, the Orleans Canal, the London Avenue
Canal, and the Industrial Canal.

Figure 4.2 Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project

Failures within this hurricane protection system, comprised of earthen levees and
floodwalls, caused the majority of the widespread flooding and damage during and after
Hurricane Katrina.

The West Bank and Vicinity, New Orleans, Louisiana, Hurricane

Protection System (Figure 4.3) was intended to provide improved hurricane
protection and flood control to portions of Jefferson Parish lying between
the Mississippi River and Lake Salvador. The recommended plan included 22
miles of earthen levees and 2 miles of floodwalls extending from the canal to
the V-levee near Jean Lafitte National Historical Park back north to the town
of Westwego.
The New Orleans to Venice, Louisiana, Hurricane Protection Project is
located along the east bank of the Mississippi River from Phoenix, Louisiana,
(approximately 28 miles southeast of New Orleans) down to Bohemia,
Louisiana, and along the west bank of the river from St. Jude, Louisiana,
(approximately 39 miles southeast of New Orleans) down to the vicinity of
Venice, Louisiana. As shown in Figure 4.4, the project generally consisted of
earthen levees built along the Mississippi River.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 19

Figure 4.3 West Bank and Vicinity, New Orleans, Louisiana, Hurricane Protection System

This hurricane protection system consists of earthen levees and floodwalls in New
Orleans on the west bank of the Mississippi River.

Figure 4.4 New Orleans to Venice, Louisiana, Hurricane Protection Project

This hurricane protection system is intended to protect the low-lying land between the
Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico from storm surge.
20 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

Standard Project Hurricane

The United States Congress directed the USACE to design the hurricane
protection system for “the most severe combination of meteorological
conditions that are considered ‘reasonably characteristic’ of the region.” The
approach historically taken by the USACE for design of Gulf Coast structures
employs the concept of the “standard project hurricane,” or SPH.
Following Hurricane Betsy in 1965, the USACE’s selection of site-
specific storm meteorological criteria was guided by the 1959 National
Hurricane Research Project Report 33, “Meteorological Considerations
Pertinent to Standard Project Hurricane, Atlantic and Gulf Coasts of the
United States.” In Project Report 33, the United States Weather Bureau (now
the National Weather Service) recommended a single value for the central
pressure index, three values each for forward speed and radius to maximum
wind, one gradient wind speed value, and two values of surface wind speed.
These criteria were based on historic hurricanes from 1900 to 1956.
In memoranda issued in 1959 and 1961, the USWB defined a probable
maximum hurricane (PMH) as one that may be expected from the most
severe combination of critical meteorological conditions that are “reasonably
possible” for the region. The PMH had a lower central pressure index than
the SPH.
At the outset of each hurricane protection project, the USACE chose
design meteorological conditions that comprised the SPH based on the USWB
recommendations. Facilities and structures were then designed to withstand
the impacts of the SPH. The SPH meteorological criteria from Project Report
33 were used to design the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity and the New
Orleans to Venice Hurricane Protection Projects.
In 1979, NOAA issued Technical Report NWS 23, “Meteorological
Criteria for Standard Project Hurricane and Probable Maximum Hurricane
Windfields, Gulf and East Coasts of the United States.” This report contained
revised criteria for the SPH, incorporating the characteristics of more recent
hurricanes, including Hurricane Betsy, which directly hit New Orleans. Report
NWS 23 also contained revised criteria for the PMH.
The West Bank and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project was designed
and constructed after Report NWS 23 was issued. It does not appear that the
USACE used the updated SPH criteria, however.

Levees and Floodwalls

The USACE designed and built three types of flood protection structures in
New Orleans’s hurricane protection system, as shown in Figure 4.5. Earthen
levees comprised the majority of the system.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 21

Figure 4.5 Typical USACE Flood Protection Structures

The USACE’s levees and floodwalls followed a standard design, although the height of
levees and walls varied throughout the hurricane protection system. In some places,
hydraulic fill was used instead of compacted material to construct levees.

When an earthen levee is raised with additional earth fill, it can

typically only be heightened by increasing the width at the base, as shown in
Figure 4.6. In most urban areas of New Orleans, the land has been developed
right up to the base of the levee. To raise and widen the levee would require
private property to be purchased and buildings to be removed. Local opposition
to such use of land is almost always considerable. A floodwall constructed in
an existing levee allows the height of the levee to be raised without requiring
the taking of adjacent property for levee expansion.

Figure 4.6 Increasing the Top Elevation of an Earthen Levee

Raising the top elevation of an existing earthen levee with additional earth fill also
involves increasing its width. Where an existing levee was located adjacent to buildings,
canals, or other structures, the USACE often resorted to using I-walls to avoid impacting
adjacent development.
22 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

Some levee segments — particularly at gated closure structures where

the levee alignment crosses roads or railroads — were constructed of T-walls
instead of I-walls. T-walls are concrete structures shaped like an inverted T,
supported on pre-cast pre-stressed concrete piles or steel H piles. Although
T-walls are more robust than I-walls, they also cost much more to construct.

Datums and Elevations

The USACE authorized, designed, and modeled flood control structures in
southeast Louisiana relative to a water level reference datum (e.g., Mean Sea
Level (MSL); local MSL). MSL was assigned an elevation of zero. However, the
structures were constructed relative to a geodetic (land-based) vertical datum
that was incorrectly assumed as being equivalent to, or constantly offset
from, the water level datum. This resulted, in the case of the outfall canals, in
structures built approximately 1 to 2 feet below the intended elevation.
Each of the hurricane protection projects was designed and
constructed on a project-by-project basis over the course of many years as
funding became available. At the time of Hurricane Katrina, segments of the
levee system were not yet complete, or the top elevations had not been
raised to the authorized protective levels. Furthermore, because of regional
subsidence, the hurricane protection structures had subsided as well, so that
their top elevations were lower than originally designed or constructed. The
Industrial Canal structures, for example, are more than 2 feet below their
intended design elevations, mostly from subsidence over the 35-year life of
the project.

Interior Drainage and Pump Stations

The average annual rainfall for the New Orleans area is 60 inches. Because
much of New Orleans is below sea level (in effect, a series of large “bowls”
surrounded by levees), nearly all runoff must be pumped out to prevent
flooding. The interior drainage system was designed to remove stormwater
runoff from rainfall events, not to remove water that enters the area from
levee or floodwall overtopping or breaches.
New Orleans’s interior drainage system consists of overland flow,
storm sewers, roadside ditches, collector ditches, interior canals, interior
pump (lift) stations, outfall pump stations, and outfall canals -- all designed
to work together to gather runoff and then pump it into Lake Pontchartrain,
Lake Borgne, or other nearby bodies of water. In Orleans Parish, this water
is pumped out via major canals such as the 17th Street, Orleans, and London
Avenue Canals. In a few locations, the pump stations discharge directly into
the Industrial Canal and Intracoastal Waterway.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 23

New Orleans’s pumping system is one of the largest in the world.

There are nearly 100 pumping stations in the greater New Orleans area. Some
have been recently completed; others are approaching 100 years of age. Most
of the pump stations appear to have been designed to handle flows from a
10-year, 24-hour storm, or around 9 inches of rainfall. For purposes of pump
station design, each of the four parishes in the New Orleans area was divided
into drainage subbasins. The basins usually follow natural topographical lines.
They are often bordered by levees or ridges of relatively higher elevation.
Operational power is provided by various means. Some stations use
pumps directly connected to diesel engines. For many stations, power is
normally provided by the electrical grid, with back-up diesel generators or
direct-drive diesel engines available when the electrical grid is out of service.
Some of the older stations use 25 Hertz (Hz) power provided by a central
generating plant to run the pumps. These stations use frequency changers to
change 25 Hz power to 60 Hz power for the operation of their station service
system.
24 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why
 25

CHAPTER 5

The Levees Fail

The Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project system

experienced the worst damage during and after Hurricane Katrina and resulted
in the most serious consequences to the city and people of New Orleans.
The massive, destructive flooding of New Orleans was caused by ruptures
at approximately 50 locations in the city’s hurricane protection system. Of
the 284 miles of federal levees and floodwalls — there are approximately 350
miles in total — 169 miles were damaged.
Levees in the USACE’s New Orleans to Venice Hurricane Protection
Project sustained significant damage caused by powerful flood waters
overtopping and breaching the levees.
The levees in the USACE’s West Bank and Vicinity Hurricane Protection
Project experienced the least amount of damage.

Storm Surge Damage

Even before Hurricane Katrina made landfall, storm surge energized by the
storm’s outer bands began to creep into low-lying areas around Lake Borgne.
Before dawn on August 29, rising water levels reached the Industrial Canal.
Waves, in conjunction with high storm surge, overtopped and eroded the
Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet levees (Figure 5.1) and flooded portions of St.
Bernard Parish.

Figure 5.1 Storm Surge under the Paris Road Bridge in New Orleans East

Entergy Corporation personnel took this photo of storm surge waters cascading over a
levee near the Entergy power plant in the New Orleans East area.
26 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

At 6:10am, Hurricane Katrina made landfall at Buras, east of New

Orleans, and storm surge flooded most of Plaquemines Parish (Figure 5.2).
Strong east-west winds built up a significant surge level at the Intracoastal
Waterway. By 6:30am, levees lining the south side of the New Orleans East
neighborhood were overtopped and breached, flooding the area. Within an
hour of the hurricane’s landfall, wind-generated waves reached heights of at
least 4 feet in the Industrial Canal, causing overtopping into portions of the
Gentilly and Bywater neighborhoods.

Figure 5.2 Hurricane Damage in Plaquemines Parish

The storm surge from Hurricane Katrina overtopped levees (seen in this photo adjacent to
the water) in Plaquemines Parish and knocked hundreds of homes off their foundations.
(This photo was taken after flood waters had receded.)
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 27

Cracks in the System

Before and during Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, ruptures (or breaches) in four
I-walls developed (Figure 5.3) —all before water levels in the adjacent canals
overtopped them .

Figure 5.3 Major Breaches in the New Orleans Hurricane Protection System

Failures of several I-walls and levees along the canals that finger into New Orleans
allowed massive amounts of water to flood New Orleans.

At about 5am, a breach in the east bank of the Industrial Canal

I‑wall contributed the first flow of floodwaters to the Lower Ninth Ward in
St. Bernard Parish. At about 6:30am, a breach was observed in the I-wall on
the Orleans Parish side of the 17th Street Canal, which flooded a portion of
Lakeview.
At about 7:00am, a breach occurred in a London Avenue Canal I‑wall
near Mirabeau Avenue in Gentilly (South Breach). About an hour later, a second
breach occurred on the London Avenue Canal near Robert E. Lee Boulevard
(North Breach).
28 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

Flooding Ensues
Within a few hours of the initial breach observed at the Industrial Canal, rising
water in the canal overtopped and eroded levees. Torrents of water rushed
into city streets. Multiple levee failures inundated some neighborhoods from
several sides with such speed that houses filled to their rooftops in minutes
(Figure 5.4). In other areas, the rise of water was slower, but constant, filling
homes at a rate of 1 foot every 10 minutes. On the west side of the Industrial
Canal, I-wall failures allowed water to flood into the Upper Ninth Ward,
Bywater, and Tremé neighborhoods. Another large floodwall breach on the
east side of the Industrial Canal quickly flooded the Lower Ninth Ward in what
witnesses describe as a “wall of water.” Floodwaters from this break (shown
in Figure 5.5) reached other neighborhoods of St. Bernard Parish including
Arabi and Chalmette.
As the hurricane moved north, flooding in St. Bernard Parish was
compounded by storm surge overtopping the Forty Arpent Canal levee and
filling the balance of the parish. Storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain added
to floodwaters already filling New Orleans East. Storm surge also overtopped
an embankment at the foot of the Orleans Canal and flooded the City Park
neighborhood.
By 8:30am the breach at the London Avenue Canal (Figure 5.6)
created a rush of water and sand into the already-flooded Gentilly area. Soon
afterward, a floodwall failed at the 17th Street Canal, releasing a massive
wave of water into Lakeview (Figure 5.7).

Figure 5.4 Industrial Canal, East Bank, North Breach

Floodwater from the Industrial Canal (top) rushed through a breach in the east bank I-wall
into the Lower Ninth Ward (bottom). Water from the Industrial Canal also flowed into the
Upper Ninth Ward, Bywater, and Tremé neighborhoods from breaches on the west side
of the canal. (This photo was taken after floodwaters began to recede and water flowed
from the Lower Ninth Ward back into the Industrial Canal.)

 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 29

Figure 5.5 Industrial Canal, East Bank, South Breach

Water cascading over the floodwall at this location scoured out the wall’s support and
caused the breach. Waters from the Industrial Canal (bottom) rushed into the Lower
Ninth Ward (top) with great force. (This photo was taken after the floodwaters began to
recede and water flowed from the Lower Ninth Ward back into the Industrial Canal.)

Figure 5.6 London Avenue Canal South Breach

An I-wall failure on the east side of the London Avenue Canal allowed water to spill into
the Gentilly neighborhood of New Orleans.
30 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

Figure 5.7 17th Street Canal Breach

The 17th Street Canal breach began at approximately 6:30am. By 9:00am, torrents of
water from Lake Pontchartrain were rushing in to flood the Lakeview neighborhood (top
of photo) and, ultimately, much of midtown New Orleans and surrounding areas.

Figure 5.8 London Avenue Canal North Breach

The I-wall along the west side of the London Avenue Canal failed at about 8:00am,
allowing water to flood into the City Park neighborhood of New Orleans.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 31

Water from the 17th Street Canal’s 450-foot long breach eventually
filled New Orleans as far south as Mid-City and west to Old Metairie. City-
wide flooding was further compounded by another I-wall failure on the west
side of the London Avenue Canal (Figure 5.8).

A City Under Water

By the time the most significant I-wall failures had occurred, the peak
of the surge levels was over. Though surge levels in the Gulf and in Lake
Pontchartrain dropped, water continued to pour through the many damaged
levees and floodwalls. This flooding continued until water in the city’s bowl-
shaped landscape equalized with the water level in Lake Pontchartrain.
By September 1, over 80 percent of the New Orleans metropolitan area
was flooded as shown in Figures 5.9 and 5.10, with approximately two-thirds
of the flooding attributed to water flowing through breaches. The remainder
was attributed to overtopping and significant rain from the hurricane.

Figure 5.9 New Orleans Flooded

Overtopping and breaching at approximately 50 locations in the hurricane protection

system led to destructive flooding that covered more than 80 percent of New Orleans.
32 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

Figure 5.10 Maximum Flooding Depth

By September 1, 2005, portions of Lakeview, Gentilly, New Orleans East, and the Lower
Ninth Ward were submerged in more than 10 feet of water (orange and red colored
areas). Significant portions of the city stood in water more than 6 feet deep (green and
aqua colored areas).

Pump Stations Shut Down

During and after Hurricane Katrina, area pump stations could offer no
relief to the flooding city because they were, themselves, left inaccessible
and inoperable by the hurricane protection system failures. Figure 5.11
shows one of the area’s largest pump stations, Station No. 6, submerged in
floodwaters.

Figure 5.11 Submerged Pump Station No. 6

Rapid and far-reaching flooding caused by the hurricane protection system failure left
most pump stations, such as Station No. 6 (on the 17th Street Canal), inoperable.
 33

CHAPTER 6

Consequences

The people who found themselves in New Orleans on the morning of August
29, 2005, not only witnessed history, they became a part of it. After many
grueling days, survivors joined those who had evacuated before the storm
in the largest mass migration in the United States since the Civil War. In the
following weeks, receding floodwaters revealed billions of dollars in personal,
public, and commercial property losses. With this massive property damage
came the loss of 124,000 jobs.
More than a year and a half later, areas of New Orleans remain, in
a practical sense, nearly unlivable. While many historic sites of the French
Quarter and Garden District were, for the most part, spared, elements of
every day life have been reduced to the bare minimum. Many homes are
uninhabitable. Others, overrun with mold, require major repairs. Small
businesses and restaurants remain shuttered, their proprietors unable to afford
repairs or find housing for workers due to the dramatic loss of residential
property. Medical care systems are compromised.
These losses, and the loss of people who will never return to New
Orleans, bring further gaps in the city’s economy as well as to its unique
social and cultural foundation. As of August 2, 2006, 1,118 people were
confirmed dead and 135 people are still missing and presumed dead, marking
the grimmest consequence of the hurricane protection system failure.

Tragic Deaths
Floodwaters rose fast in some neighborhoods on August 29. While many
people were able to evacuate either before or after the storm, many of the less
fortunate drowned in the onslaught of water. Rapid flooding caused people to
lose hold of family members as floodwaters rose. Some victims drowned in
attempts to save others. In Orleans Parish, many people fled up into their
attics to escape the rising waters, and then had to hack their way through the
roofs to find a dry place to stand and wait for rescue. Some people evacuated
their homes, only to die as they waited for food, water, or medical care.
Dead bodies eventually floated to higher ground, where passersby mercifully
covered them with stray tarps or soaked blankets.
Further from the breached levees and damaged floodwalls, water rose
approximately 1 foot every 10 minutes. Some elderly or disabled residents
could not reach their attics fast enough, leaving other family members to
witness their deaths by drowning. One woman reportedly died of a heart
attack while trying to escape through the roof. Others, trapped in their homes
and attics, were found days, weeks, even months later. In St. Bernard Parish,
many deaths were attributed to drowning in the storm surge.
34 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

Though the sick and the elderly were hardest hit (Figure 6.1), causes
of death were varied. Six deaths resulted from bacterial infection when new
or existing wounds were immersed in floodwaters. Five people reportedly
died of carbon monoxide poisoning from improperly using gasoline-powered
generators during power outages. A bus accident during post-storm evacuation
attempts killed one person, and one woman died when a helicopter cable
failed during a rooftop rescue.

Figure 6.1 The Sick and the Elderly Were Hardest Hit

Above, many died when fast-rising floodwaters caught them off guard. Here, evacuees
pass a drowning victim. Below, the sick and elderly were the most likely to be killed by
the flooding and its aftermath. More than 30 people drowned when water levels nearly
reached the ceiling at St. Rita’s Nursing Home (left). Some residents already weak from
illness died at evacuation centers (right).

Three people committed suicide. Only one person was murdered in the
immediate aftermath, a remarkable number given New Orleans’s extremely
high homicide rate (10 times the national rate) prior to Hurricane Katrina.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 35

However, the risk for additional homicides grew as rescue efforts stalled and
residents took up arms against potential looting. Hospital pharmacies were
threatened by armed assailants seeking drugs. The police, responding to
shootings city-wide, fired on people, killing four.
Of the known fatalities, approximately 52 percent were African
American, 40 percent were Caucasian, and 8 percent were of other or
unknown race. Deaths were divided equally between men and women. As
mentioned earlier, older residents were the hardest hit demographic group.
Among all races, victims over the age of 70 accounted for 60 percent of all
deaths.

Exposure, Injury, and Disease

The flood and its immediate aftermath were rife with potential for injury
and illness. Throughout New Orleans, residents seeking safe haven waded
through an opaque slush of mud, water, trash, and a mélange of chemicals—
cleaners, solvents, and gasoline leached from flooded homes, businesses,
and automobiles (Figure 6.2). Added to the mix was output from seven major
oil spills resulting from the flooding, plus runoff from up to 54 United States
Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) Superfund sites in the area.

Figure 6.2 Exposure to Toxic Chemicals

Survivors waded through a gruesome soup of mud and water plus chemicals and gasoline
from flooded homes, businesses, and vehicles. Petroleum products left their telltale
rainbow sheen on floodwaters.

Levels of E. coli and fecal Coliform bacteria in floodwaters were

similar to typical stormwater runoff levels for the region, but much higher than
standards for human contact. This exposure resulted in increased incidences
of gastrointestinal illness, skin infections, and upper-respiratory infections.
36 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

Residents hurt themselves while hacking through their roofs or breaking

windows to escape their flooded houses. People, such as those shown in
Figure 6.3, sometimes waited on rooftops for days for rescue. Among them,
several developed rashes from contact with hot roofing materials. Among
rescue workers, a number of infections and non-infectious rashes were
identified from contact with contaminated water, mite bites, and excessive
chafing.

Figure 6.3 Rooftop Rescue

When floodwaters rose high and fast, residents had nowhere to go but up. Once water
levels topped windows and doors, residents hacked through their roofs to await rescue.

Outbreaks of illness, exacerbated by person-to-person contact in

close quarters, were reported in a Houston shelter where more than half
the evacuees suffered acute diarrhea and vomiting for a week, and in Dallas,
where an antibiotic-resistant strain of staph infection broke out. Fortunately,
the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported no confirmed
cases of dysentery, typhoid fever, or cholera.
Due to flooded hospitals and crowding at evacuation centers, the
health of evacuees suffering from pre-existing conditions (such as diabetes
and kidney failure) and those requiring prescriptions (for cancer, seizure
illnesses, asthma, and psychiatric disorders) became compromised. Shortages
of medication plagued shelters in the following weeks.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 37

Catastrophic Financial Losses

To assess the financial losses in the New Orleans metropolitan area, researchers
used the most recent inventories and field surveys of land use, properties lost,
and estimated values. Assumptions made to determine expected personal
property losses were based on reported flood depths in each neighborhood.
Residential property throughout the New Orleans metropolitan area (Figures
6.4 and 6.5) was more than twice as likely as commercial property to be
destroyed by the failure of the hurricane protection system.

Figure 6.4 Lower Ninth Ward after Floodwaters Were Removed

The force of the torrential waters raging through Industrial Canal East Bank North
Breach (upper right) knocked some houses in the Lower Ninth Ward many feet off their
foundations and completely obliterated others. (This photo was taken after floodwaters
had been removed.)

Figure 6.5 Residential Property Decimated

The IPET estimates that single-family residential property sustained over $13.3 billion in
direct losses. (These photos were taken after floodwaters had been removed.)
38 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

Direct damages to residential and non-residential capital (commercial,

industrial, and public buildings) reached approximately $21 billion. Region-wide,
25 percent of the value of residential properties, including autos, was destroyed
compared with 12 percent of the value of non-residential properties.
Losses to public structures and damages to infrastructure (roads,
public transit systems, drainage and sewage systems, potable water service,
telecommunications systems, and electrical utilities) reached between
$6 billion and $6.7 billion. Damage to drinking water service resulted in an
estimated leakage rate of 85 million gallons per day of treated water. The loss
of electricity, which lasted for weeks, led to massive food spoilage and the
ruin of more than 300,000 refrigerators, all of which required special handling
prior to disposal. As floodwaters receded, widespread cleanup efforts began.
Figure 6.6 illustrates just a portion of the extensive public clean-up effort
required to eliminate health hazards so residents could return to begin their
own clean-up and rebuilding efforts.

Figure 6.6 Massive Cleanup Efforts

In Chalmette (top), workers vacuumed a thick layer of oil from city streets. More than
300,000 refrigerators (below), ruined by spoiled food after weeks of power outages, had
to undergo hazardous materials removal before disposal.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 39

Had the Hurricane Protection System Not Failed

For a storm the size of Hurricane Katrina, loss of life and property due to
heavy rain, wind damage, and overtopping of levees is expected. A modeling
exercise conducted by the USACE compared expected deaths from the
hurricane protection system failure with scenarios in which the system did
not fail. Results of this modeling indicate that had the levees and floodwalls
not failed and had the pump stations operated, nearly two-thirds of the deaths
would not have occurred.
Even without levee breaching, Hurricane Katrina’s rainfall and levee
overtopping would have caused the worst property loss ever experienced
by New Orleanians. However, as pictured in Figure 6.7, less than half the
actual property losses — an estimated $10 billion loss in residential and non-
residential capital — would have occurred had the levees not failed and had
the pump stations operated. This estimate did not consider damages to
infrastructure and public utilities, which would have suffered far less damage
had flooding not been as widespread.

Figure 6.7 Property Damage Modeling Results

Comparing regional property damage from the hurricane protection system failure (left)
to a scenario in which the levees and pumping stations had not failed (right) indicates far
less property loss would have occurred. Similarly, nearly two-thirds of deaths could have
been avoided.

Cascading Financial Impacts

Researchers have compared data quantifying the pre-Katrina economic base
for the New Orleans metropolitan area with anecdotal post-Katrina data. While
limited, this preliminary assessment proves useful in estimating the indirect
economic consequences brought on by the levee failures and the subsequent
dislocation of hundreds of thousands of residents. However, household,
business, and policy decisions yet to be made may have a profound impact on
the region’s long-term economic forecast.
As of June 2006, the population of New Orleans was still less than
half the pre-Katrina population (more than a million people in 2004 versus just
over half a million in 2006). Many jobs are still not available due to the reduced
40 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

customer base and the destruction of business property, infrastructure, and

residences. Total employment in the New Orleans metro area plummeted 25
percent (from 512,000 jobs to 388,000 jobs) between August (pre-Hurricane
Katrina) and September 2005 (post-Hurricane Katrina).
The significant damage to infrastructure will likely slow the recovery
of population and business activities. Repair work and labor force return has
occurred unevenly, but predictably, across the area. Where flood water was
shallow, more recovery has proceeded. In areas where flood water was deep,
little recovery or reinvestment has taken place. Figure 6.8 illustrates the
contrast in rebuilding efforts between two neighborhoods—Lakeview, which
was decimated by floodwaters as high as 10 feet, and a portion of Chalmette
that saw lower flood levels.

Figure 6.8 Recovery is Slow

Rebuilding efforts vary directly with the level of flooding that occurred. In Lakeview (top),
where floodwaters reached 8 to 10 feet, City officials have posted survey cards on
abandoned houses to determine if residents plan to return. In areas where flood levels
were lower, such as portions of Chalmette (bottom), residents have started repair work
while they live in Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) trailers.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 41

Impacts to the economy of the State of Louisiana are significant,

although impacts to the United States economy from the hurricane and
flooding were short-lived. In the 2001/2002 fiscal year, combined general
revenues for the five-parish region, including taxes and other income streams,
totaled $3.4 billion, more than a third of local government general revenues in
Louisiana. Since Hurricane Katrina this tax revenue has plummeted.

Prospects for Economic Growth

A regional economic forecasting model compiled for the IPET study presented
economic forecasts for the New Orleans area, the rest of Louisiana, and the
United States population following Hurricane Katrina. Economic outlooks
reflecting pre-Katrina conditions were used as control values, and two scenarios
were examined —flat population growth and a more brisk population growth.
Both scenarios yielded some economic growth, but not enough growth
to reach levels anticipated, pre-Katrina, by 2010. According to the model, the
economic growth of the New Orleans area will impact the overall growth of
the state, but has little effect on the Gulf Coast region and the remainder
of the United States The flat population scenario does, however, have the
expected impact of increasing growth in the nation, reflecting the contribution
of evacuees who choose not to return to the New Orleans metro area.

Long Term Health and Safety

Almost every hospital in the New Orleans area was crippled in some way
from the floodwaters. As of March 2006, only 456 staffed hospital beds were
available, one-fifth the pre-Katrina number. Less than half the adult acute-
care facilities remain open. The Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans
sustained so much damage that it has closed. This leaves a significant gap in
health-care services for Medicaid patients and the uninsured, and removes
a Level I Trauma Center from the Gulf Coast region. Residents must seek
emergency care and other treatment at temporary facilities, as pictured in
Figure 6.9.
Workers who lost their jobs and medical insurance coverage may or
may not qualify for Medicaid coverage. Many people may go untreated for
minor or serious medical conditions. Thousands of doctors and other health-
care providers remain dispersed throughout the country. As of April 2006, New
Orleans’s physicians-per-resident rate had dropped from a pre-Katrina rate of
9.6 physicians per 3,200 residents to less than one primary care physician per
3,200 residents and less than one psychiatrist per 21,000 residents.
42 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

Figure 6.9 Outposts for Care

Due to extensive damage to almost every New Orleans hospital, including the Medical
Center of Louisiana at New Orleans and its trauma center, residents must seek care in
temporary medical facilities. Above, an emergency care and dental facility operated out
of the Ernest N. Morial Convention Center for a time, and was then set up in a gutted,
downtown department store.

With the exception of mold issues, environmental health impacts — for

instance, from contaminated air, water, or soil — are not expected to be far-
reaching. Reports of “Katrina cough” thought to be brought about by the
presence of higher levels of dust and mold have not been substantiated. Still,
health officials advised protection for construction workers, waste-handlers,
and residents during clean-up and rebuilding.
Mold, as shown in Figure 6.10, grew in most homes that remained
flooded over several weeks, introducing a potential environmental health
problem. While mold has no established exposure limits, it presents a risk of
opportunistic fungal infection in immuno-compromised persons. The CDC’s
measurements of airborne endotoxins that result from molds indicate that
typical mold growth has reached levels associated with respiratory symptoms
and skin rash.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 43

Figure 6.10 Overrun by Mold

Mold covering interior walls presents a significant challenge for homeowners determined
to restore their houses.

Most people exposed to traumatic events, such as serious accidents,

combat, assault, or natural disasters, will experience feelings such as fear,
anger, uncertainty, and sorrow. A subset of those exposed will experience
symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, the result of structural and
functional changes in the brain. Mental health impacts have already been
observed; the suicide rate in New Orleans is nearly triple the pre-Hurricane
Katrina suicide rate. Up to 6 months after the hurricane, calls to a city suicide
hotline had doubled from pre-hurricane rates, despite the significantly smaller
population. Others exposed to trauma may experience depression and
substance abuse.

Evacuees and Their Receiving Communities

Counting pre- and post-hurricane evacuations, Hurricane Katrina displaced
more than one million people. Evacuees left the city in droves by airplane or
bus, as shown in Figure 6.11, in the days following the extensive flooding. By
early October 2006, displaced individuals were located in 369 different cities
in every state of the nation, with thousands clustered in large southern cities
such as Houston, Atlanta, Memphis, and Baton Rouge.
44 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

Figure 6.11 Mass Migration

The evacuation of New Orleanians before and after Hurricane Katrina represents the
largest mass migration in United States history since the Civil War. Above, immediately
following the hurricane, the Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport became a
processing center for rescued people leaving the city. Below, thousands of evacuees left
the area by bus.

Receiving communities quickly found their services over-burdened.

Before Katrina, nearly one-half of New Orleans’s residents were either on
Medicaid or uninsured. These evacuees have created an unanticipated strain
on other communities’ health-care systems. In Baton Rouge, the addition of
100,000 evacuees to the city’s pre-Katrina population of 225,000 residents has
led to over-crowding, traffic jams, and long waits for services. In Houston, 33
of 189 homicides (17 percent) involved Hurricane Katrina evacuees, although
they increased the population by only about seven percent.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 45

Impacts to New Orleans’s Culture

The failure of the hurricane protection system, massive infrastructure damage,
and the lack of jobs and residential properties for residents to return to have
caused a breakdown in New Orleans’s social structure. Many victims have lost
homes, schools, jobs, shops, places of worship, and networks of family and
friends.
Of New Orleans’s 73 neighborhoods, only eight neighborhoods did not
flood. Thirty-four were completely inundated. Many neighborhoods remain
uninhabitable because of damage to residential structures.
Most religious congregations, a key source of community connectedness
in New Orleans, have not resumed services. Many churches flooded and
sustained significant damages, and, in the most devastated neighborhoods,
few parishioners have returned.
Following Hurricane Katrina, school enrollment (primary and secondary)
was down 52 percent in the five-parish metro area and down 86 percent in
Orleans Parish. Students attend schools in other parishes or in cities where
they have relocated. Enrollment is limited at University of New Orleans and
Dillard, Xavier, Loyola, and Tulane Universities.
Two of New Orleans’s most famous commodities — fine food and live
music — remain severely affected. The majority of the city’s musicians have
not returned to the city (Figure 6.12), and many restaurants damaged by the
flooding remain closed. Losses in these two areas affect economic recovery
as well as the recovery of New Orleans’s social norms.

Figure 6.12 Awaiting Music’s Return

A piano is removed from music legend Fats Domino’s destroyed home in the Lower Ninth
Ward. Many musicians have not returned to New Orleans due to a lack of housing and
damaged performance venues.
46 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

The Natural Environment

Although an estimated 295 square kilometers (114 square miles) of wetland
loss has been attributed to Hurricane Katrina, the loss was independent of
failures of the hurricane protection system. The observed loss in wetlands
— and associated losses in plants and animals — is consistent with long-term
wetland loss trends plus losses from the storm surge (Figure 6.13).

Figure 6.13 Wetlands Loss

Approximately 114 square miles of wetland loss resulted from storm surge and typical
wetland loss trends, not from the hurricane protection system failure.
 47

CHAPTER 7

Direct Causes of the Catastrophe

What is unique about the devastation that befell the New Orleans area from
Hurricane Katrina — compared to other natural disasters — is that much of
the destruction was the result of engineering and engineering-related policy
failures. The levees were engineered structures intended to protect people
from high water — the very disaster that they failed to prevent. The pump
stations were engineered structures intended to remove rainwater from the
New Orleans bowl, but they weren’t always designed to withstand a hurricane
or levee breach and they failed to pump.
As outlined in Chapter 5, the levees in the New Orleans area breached
at about 50 distinct locations. At least seven of the major failures were related
to breaching of levees containing I-walls. The I-wall failures were particularly
devastating because of the heavy residential development and low elevations
they were attempting to protect. The rest of the levees breached when they
were overtopped by the floodwaters, which eroded the levee material away.

17th Street Canal Breach

At about 6:30am on August 29, a 450-foot-long section of I-wall along the
east side of the 17th Street Canal failed, sending torrents of water into New
Orleans’s Lakeview neighborhood. The water level in the 17th Street Canal at
the time of failure was about 5 feet lower than the top of the wall, well below
the design water level.
A cross-section of the levee and flood wall is shown in Figure 7.1. The
levee and floodwall were built over a layer of organic soil called peat or marsh,
which, in turn, overlays a layer of very soft clay. A principal concern with levees
founded on soft soil is the possibility that the entire levee might slide either
into the canal or away from the canal because of the low strength of the soft
soil. This is a design problem that engineers deal with routinely. Indeed, the
mechanism of failure was the levee sliding away from the canal.

Figure 7.1 Cross-Section of 17th Street Canal Levee and Floodwall

The levee and I-wall failed by sliding away from the canal along a failure surface in the
weak soft clay below the levee.
48 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

Soil Strength Over-estimated

To prevent the failure of a levee or I-wall such as that along the 17th Street
Canal, the “resisting forces” (i.e., the strength of the underlying soil) must be
greater than the “driving forces” imposed upon it (i.e., the weight of the levee
and the pressure of the canal water acting against the levee and the wall). The
“factor of safety” against failure occurring is the ratio of the shear resistance
of the soil divided by the shear force that develops along a potential sliding
surface.
If the factor of safety is less than one, failure will occur. Because the
factor of safety is directly proportional to the soil strength, determining the
soil strength is one of the most important decisions that an engineer makes
for levee design.
The engineers responsible for the design of the levee and I-wall over-
estimated the soil strength — meaning that the soil strength used in the
design calculations was greater than what actually existed under and near the
levee during Hurricane Katrina.
Figure 7.2 illustrates how the soil data were mis-interpreted. During
a soil investigation, samples are obtained from drill holes and tested in a
laboratory to determine soil properties. From a plot of the soil strength data,
conservative values should be selected for design.
For the 17th Street Canal failure, the critical zone for sliding was the
soft clay between elevations -15 and -30 feet. The soil strength value chosen
for design is highlighted by the red line. There are twice the number of data
points to the left of (weaker than) the design shear strength profile than to
the right (stronger than). The engineers made an unconservative (i.e., erring
toward unsafe) interpretation of the data: the soil below the levee was actually
weaker than that used in the I-wall design.
Two additional important factors led to an over-estimate of the soil
strength below the 17th Street Canal. First, the data shown in Figure 7.2
represent the values from borings drilled along the centerline of the levee
over a distance of 8,000 feet — about 1½ miles. Lumping together data over
distances is not uncommon. However, care must be taken in areas where
there is geologic variability — such as in the New Orleans area — where
the soil is stronger in some areas and weaker in others. Data from borings
closest to the 17th Street Canal failure indicate that the actual average soil
strength in the critical stability zone at the breach site is around 0.13 tons per
square foot (tsf), compared to the engineer’s design strength of 0.19 tsf — or
approximately 32 percent lower.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 49

Figure 7.2 Plot of Soil Strength beneath the 17th Street Canal Levee

Mis-interpretation of soil data below the 17th Street Canal levee was one of three primary
reasons the I-wall failed.

Second, the data shown in Figure 7.2 were obtained from borings drilled
along the centerline of the levee; the key word here is the word “centerline.”
It is well understood that clay soil is consolidated and strengthened by the
weight of overlying soil. The soft clay below the centerline of the levee was
therefore stronger than the soil below and beyond the edge of the levee.
Recent soil investigations by the USACE verify this: the orange-dashed line
in Figure 7.2 shows the average strength profile below the centerline of the
levee, whereas the blue-dashed line shows the lower strength beneath and
beyond the toe of the levee slope. The design engineers did not take this into
account, and, accordingly, over-estimated the strength of the soil outside the
footprint of the levee.

Factor of Safety
Over-estimating the soil strength below the levee set the stage, but was
not the sole cause of the 17th Street Canal failure. The factor of safety for
slope stability analyses such as these — the resisting forces divided by driving
forces — must be greater than one. The higher the factor of safety above one,
the less likely the levee will fail.
50 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

The target factor of safety chosen by the design engineers for the
17th Street Canal levee and floodwall design was 1.3. A target factor of
safety of 1.3 is at the low end of generally accepted engineering values, and
is inconsistent with current USACE standards. Key USACE design guidance
documents call for a target factor of safety of at least 1.4 to 1.5 under long-
term conditions.
The cumulative effect of using a target factor of safety of 1.3 and
over-estimating the soil strength — a compounding error — was disastrous.
The design was simply too close to the margin of safety, allowing little or no
room to account for variables or uncertainties.

The Water-Filled Gap

Another critical engineering oversight that led to the failure of the 17th Street
Canal involves not taking into account the possibility of a water-filled gap,
which is illustrated in the diagram in Figure 7.3. The water-filled gap turned
out to be a very important aspect of the failures of the I-walls around New
Orleans.

Figure 7.3 The Water-Filled Gap

As floodwaters pushed against the I-wall and the I-wall leaned away from the canal, water
flowed into the gap created between the wall and the soil behind it. The water-filled gap
was an important factor in several I-wall failures.

Figure 7.4 illustrates the reason the water-filled gap led to failure
of several I-walls. The first diagram in Figure 7.4 shows the critical sliding
surface passing beneath the 17th Street Canal I-wall and through soil between
the wall and the canal — without a water-filled gap. The shearing resistance
provided by this segment along the failure surface adds to the stability. In
the second diagram of Figure 7.4, representing the actual situation with a
gap, the critical sliding surface starts at the base of the water-filled gap. The
sliding surface cuts through less soil, so that less resisting soil strength can
be mobilized. In addition, the pressure on the wall generated by the water in
the gap adds to the forces tending to slide the wall away from the canal.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 51

Analyses indicate that, with the presence of a water-filled gap, the

factor of safety is about 30 percent lower. Because a factor of safety of 1.3
was used for design, a reduction by 30 percent would reduce the factor of
safety to approximately one: a condition of incipient failure.

Figure 7.4 17th Street Canal Failure Mechanism

1: Sliding surface without a water-filled gap.

2: Sliding surface with a water-filled gap.

Without the water-filled gap (top), the critical sliding surface is longer, which increases the
stability of the wall. The wall with the water-filled gap (bottom) has a significantly lower
factor of safety. As the water level rose in the canal, the factor of safety decreased from
1.21 to 1.0, or incipient failure.

In 1985, the USACE performed a full-scale field test on an I-wall to

help verify design criteria for I-walls under high-water conditions. This field
test, although focused on structural design criteria, also revealed the potential
for large I-wall deflections. The observed deflections, nearly 3 inches at the
ground surface, caused researchers to include the following statement in the
report: “Although the test wall was not loaded to ‘failure,’ … failure may
have been imminent.” (USACE (1988), “E-99 Sheet Pile Wall, Field Load Test
Report,” Lower Mississippi Valley Division, Vicksburg, MS, 85 p.)
52 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

In the late 1990s, sophisticated computer modeling of the field test

indicated that, “As the water level rises, the increased loading may produce
separation of the soil from the pile on the flooded side (i.e., a tension crack
develops behind the wall). Intrusion of free water into the tension crack
produces additional hydrostatic pressures on the wall side of the crack…”
Thus, USACE researchers clearly recognized the potential for a
water-filled gap to develop. This knowledge has now been found to be very
important. As research and new information evolved in the 1980s and 1990s,
the design of the existing I-walls was not checked for safety and stability in
the light of new information.

London Avenue Canal South Breach

The London Avenue Canal South Breach occurred around 6 to 7am on
August 29th, sending tons of sand and water into the New Orleans Gentilly
neighborhood. As with the 17th Street Canal, the water level in the London
Avenue Canal at the time of failure was about 5 feet lower than the top of the
wall, well below the design water level.
The soil beneath the London Avenue Canal South Breach area is sand
beneath the marsh layer, rather than soft clay, as was the case at the 17th
Street Canal breach location. A cross-section describing the failure mechanism
is shown in Figure 7.5.

Figure 7.5 Cross-Section of London Avenue Canal Levee and Floodwall

The levee and I-wall failed when pressure from the water seeping through the sand below
the levee caused the marsh layer to crack. The sand then flowed out with the water,
undermining the levee and I-wall.

As the water level rose in the canal, water seeped into the highly
permeable sand, flowing under the levee toward the land-side of the wall. The
water pressure acted upward on the bottom of the marsh layer. The stability
of the levee under this type of condition hinges on whether the weight of
the overlying material is great enough to resist the uplift water pressure
acting upward on it. In well-designed structures, the uplift water pressure
is never allowed to come close to the weight of the overlying soil. At the
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 53

London Avenue Canal South Breach, however, the water pressure exceeded
the weight of the marsh layer and the topsoil above it.
The marsh layer was lifted up off the sand and cracked open, which
allowed water to rush through the cracks. After the cracks developed, the
upward-rushing water carried sand with it, gouging and scouring a hole that
rapidly expanded and worked its way back under the levee, undermining and
destroying it (Figure 7.6).

Figure 7.6 Cars and Houses Partially Buried by Sand

Tons of sand were washed out from beneath the levee and floodwall at the London
Avenue Canal South Breach and flowed into the adjacent neighborhood. (This photo was
taken after floodwaters had been removed.)

Oversimplified Assumptions
The mechanisms of seepage and subsurface erosion have been well known
for decades. Seepage beneath levees is discussed in depth in the USACE
Engineer Manual EM1110-2-1913, “Design and Construction of Levees.”
Chapter 5, “Seepage Control,” begins as follows:

“Without control, underseepage in pervious foundations beneath

levees may result in (a) excessive hydrostatic pressures beneath
an impervious stratum on the landside, (b) sand boils, and (c)
piping beneath the levee itself. Underseepage problems are
most acute where a pervious substratum underlies a levee and
extends both landward and riverward of the levee and where a
relatively thin top stratum exists on the landside of a levee.”
54 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

The design engineers of the London Avenue Canal levees and

floodwalls did evaluate seepage. However, it was not apparent from the
design information reviewed by the Hurricane Katrina External Review
Panel that the potential uplift of the marsh layer was accounted for properly.
Flow nets were drawn, but none included the marsh layer. The potential for
uplift was assessed, but calculations used a critical hydraulic gradient value
appropriate for soil, not for marsh.
Because the problem with uplift for situations such as those existing
at the London Avenue Canal is so well known, the Hurricane Katrina External
Review Panel would have expected the design memoranda to contain
a thorough, well-documented assessment of the potential for uplift of the
marsh. No logical explanation for the lack of such information in the design
memoranda could be identified.
Recent computer analyses of the London Avenue Canal South Breach
indicate that the water pressures in the sand were sufficient to lift and rupture
the marsh, and that the ensuing cracked condition would be expected to rapidly
lead to erosion and collapse. The implication is that if a more rigorous analysis
had been performed at the time of design, the potential problem would have
been predicted and corrective action taken. Proactive measures to control
the seepage—such as extending the depth of the sheet pile wall or installing
relief wells—were not employed, leaving no redundancy or secondary means
to protect from severe underseepage problems. Unfortunately, there was no
second line of defense.

The Water-Filled Gap — Again

The failure of the London Avenue Canal I-wall was exacerbated by, and perhaps
even caused by, the water-filled gap that developed behind the wall. Just as
with the 17th Street Canal, the water in the London Avenue Canal pushed
the I-wall away from the canal side, leaving a gap between the I-wall and the
levee, which filled with water. As shown in Figure 7.7, the elevated water
pressures were brought much closer to the land-side of the levee, significantly
increasing the uplift forces on the clay and worsening the situation. As with
the 17th Street Canal, a water-filled gap was not considered in the design of
the London Avenue Canal levees and floodwalls.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 55

Figure 7.7 London Avenue Canal South Breach Failure

1: Conditions without a water-filled gap.

2: Conditions with a water-filled gap.

Without the water-filled gap (top), there is less pressure on the underside of the marsh
layer. The water in the water-filled gap (bottom) exerts significantly higher pressure on the
marsh layer because it is closer.

London Avenue Canal North Breach

The London Avenue Canal North Breach occurred on the west side of London
Avenue Canal around 7 or 8am on August 29th, allowing water to flood into
the adjacent neighborhood. The upper 15 feet or so of soil beneath the London
Avenue Canal North Breach consists of marsh underlain by a thick stratum
of sand, similar to the conditions at the London Avenue Canal south failure.
However, the sand at the North Breach was much looser and weaker than the
sand at the South Breach.
The levee and I-wall probably failed in much the same way as the 17th
Street Canal failure, in which the driving forces (the weight of the levee and
the pressure of the canal water against the wall) exceeded the resisting forces
(the strength of the underlying soil). The sliding failure was exacerbated by
underseepage and associated water pressures.
Recent analyses of the London Avenue Canal North Breach indicate
that the failure probably would not have occurred had a water-filled gap not
developed. Factors of safety against stability failure without a crack were
computed to be around 2.0. With a crack, the factor of safety was about 1.0
at the water elevation associated with failure.
56 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

Industrial Canal East Bank North Breach

The failure of the Industrial Canal East Bank north I-wall was likely the source of
the earliest flooding (observed at 5:00am) in the Lower Ninth Ward. The water
level in the Industrial Canal was below the top of the floodwall. The soil conditions
in this area consisted of marsh deposits overlying soft clay, which overlies sand.
The Industrial Canal East Bank north I-wall failed in much the same
way as the 17th Street Canal I-wall failed: by slope failure along a sliding
surface in the marsh. As with the 17th Street Canal, the presence of a water-
filled gap (not considered during design) greatly reduced the factor of safety.

Industrial Canal East Bank South Breach and

Industrial Canal West Bank Breach
Both the Industrial Canal East Bank south I-wall and Industrial Canal West
Bank I-wall were overtopped by floodwaters from Hurricane Katrina. The peak
water level was estimated to be 1.7 feet above the tops of the floodwalls and
levees. The apparent failure mechanism is shown in Figure 7.8 and 7.9.

Figure 7.8 Overtopped I-wall Failure Mechanism

1: Floodwaters overtop the I-wall.

2: The water scours soil from the land-side of the I-wall and washes it away.

3: I-wall fails due to lack of foundation support.

Water flowing over the floodwalls scoured and eroded the land-side of the levee at the
base of the walls. The sheetpiles that support the I-walls were undermined. In some
locations, the sheetpile walls may have lost all of their foundation support, resulting in
failure of the wall.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 57

Figure 7.9 Industrial Canal East Bank South Failed I-wall

Cascading floodwaters gouged a deep trench on the land-side of the Industrial Canal.
Without foundation support from the soil, the sheetpile wall (upper left) was tossed aside.
(This photo was taken after floodwaters had been removed.)

Industrial Canal West Bank South and All Other Levee

Breaches
Earthen levees without I-walls all around New Orleans — including the levee at
the Industrial Canal West Bank South breach — were overtopped by Hurricane
Katrina’s storm surge. Out of the 50 total estimated levee breaches system-
wide, the majority can be attributed to overtopping and erosion. The failure
mechanism from overtopping is shown in Figure 7.10.
Levees constructed with properly compacted clay with a good grass
cover appeared to have withstood the storm the best, as shown in Figure
7.11. Levees with higher silt and sand content in the embankment material
—or levees built with hydraulic fill (in which the levee material was mixed
with water to create a slurry, then pumped or flowed into place)—sustained
the worst erosion damage, and in some cases were completely washed
away, as shown in Figure 7.12.
58 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

Figure 7.10 Overtopped Levee Erosion Failure Mechanism

1: Floodwaters overtop the levee.

2: The water scours soil from the crest and land-side of the levee and washes it away.

3: Some levees constructed of sand and silt washed away completely.

Water overtopping the levees caused serious scour and erosion. Some levees were
completely washed away.

Figure 7.11 Levee Under the Paris Road Bridge in New Orleans East

Even though this earthen levee was overtopped (as was shown in Figure 5.1), it sustained
relatively minor damage. (This photo was taken after floodwaters had receded.)
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 59

Figure 7.12 Obliterated Levee along the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet

Many levees that were constructed with hydraulic fill severely eroded or washed away
entirely. (This photo was taken after floodwaters had receded.)

Pumping System: Useless During Hurricane Katrina

The pumping stations throughout the New Orleans area could have been — but
were not — an integral part of the hurricane protection system. Most hurricanes
and tropical storms bring heavy rainfall, but the pump stations were designed
only to remove stormwater runoff and routine seepage water from the interior
drainage system and pump it into Lake Pontchartrain or other nearby bodies
of water.
During Hurricane Katrina, more than 12 inches of rain fell on parts
of New Orleans. During and after Hurricane Katrina, a few pump stations
operated, but their output, approximately 18,000 cubic feet per second (about
16 percent of total pumping capacity for the region), played no significant role
in lowering floodwaters because the pump stations were not located in the
areas of worst flooding.
Pumping stations could not be operated for many reasons. Nearly all
pump station operators in Jefferson and St. Bernard Parishes were evacuated
when Hurricane Katrina threatened the area because the stations were
not designed to withstand hurricane forces. Without operators, the pump
stations lay idle. The storm knocked out electrical power early on, and many
of the pump station engines cannot run without electricity. Pump stations
themselves were flooded by water from levee overtopping and floodwall
breaching, causing widespread equipment damage and failure. The buildings
housing many of the older pump stations could not withstand the wind and
water forces from the hurricane and sustained significant damage.
60 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

Even if the pumping system had survived the hurricane, it simply

would not have been able to pump the huge amount of water that flooded into
New Orleans because of overtopping and breaches. Ironically, the discharge
from the stations was hard-piped into the same canals and waterways that
had experienced significant breaches. Even if the pumps had continued to
operate, they would have recirculated water back into the canals, only to have
it flow back through the breaches.
Unintended reverse flow through some pumps in Jefferson Parish
even added to the flooding. While methods were available to prevent reverse
flow, they depended on human operators and electrical power, neither
of which were present at the time. In the absence of automatic backflow
preventers within the pump stations, water in the canals flowed through
some idle pumps back into the city.
 61

CHAPTER 8

Contributing Factors

Chapter 7 outlined the direct physical causes of the New Orleans hurricane
protection system failures. This chapter describes the contributing factors.
With the benefit of hindsight, we now see that questionable engineering
decisions and management choices, and inadequate interfaces within and
between organizations, all contributed to the problem.
Hurricane Katrina simply overwhelmed the hurricane protection
system. The storm’s forces exceeded the hurricane protection system’s ability
to withstand them. No one person or decision is to blame. The engineering
failures were complex, and involved numerous decisions by many people
within many organizations over a long period of time.

Risk to New Orleans Not Fully Appreciated

In terms of large engineered systems such as nuclear power plants or dams,
the concept of “risk” captures both (a) the consequences to human health
and safety if a failure were to occur, and (b) the probability of a failure. A
hurricane protection system is a large engineered system like a nuclear power
plant or a dam, and comprises the same complicated infrastructure and
management issues. Therefore, it is helpful to look at risk through the lens of
risk quantification for one of those structures.
A common approach for quantifying and comparing risks is to develop
a risk evaluation chart, as shown in Figure 8.1, which is based on the United
States Bureau of Reclamation’s (USBR’s) guidelines for public protection for
major dams. “Thresholds” have been established — based on engineering
judgment — that represent the level of risk that a society is willing to accept
in order to benefit from accepting that risk. For combinations of fatalities
and frequencies that plot above the upper line in Figure 8.1, there is “strong
justification for taking actions to reduce risk for both long-term and short-term
continued operations.”
Relative to what people are generally willing to accept or tolerate for
dams, the level of risk to the residents of New Orleans was very high. For
instance, if the hurricane protection system had been treated as a major dam,
it would have needed to be designed so that the likelihood of failure would
occur roughly once in 100,000 years to once in 1,000,000 years of operation.
The red box shown in Figure 8.1 is an approximate graphical representation of
the historical performance of the hurricane protection system: a catastrophic
failure, resulting in approximately 1,000 fatalities, which occurred once in 40
years of operation.
62 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

Figure 8.1 Risk Evaluation Chart

The USBR guidelines for achieving public protection in dam safety are shown in yellow.
The risks posed by New Orleans’s hurricane protection system (shown in red) were
significantly higher than people are generally willing to accept.

The risk that society is willing to tolerate from a dam is not necessarily
the same as that from a hurricane- or flood-protection system, primarily because
the systems are different in terms of, for instance, size, resiliency, the speed
with which an emergency develops, and the options available during actual
emergencies. Among other differences, a dam is typically several thousand feet
long, whereas a levee system is several hundred to several thousand miles long.
Dams are generally more resilient than levees because they have emergency
spillways to divert excess water, thus protecting the dam structure from
catastrophic failure. Reservoir water levels are monitored, and water levels tend
to rise slowly, as opposed to storm surges that rise rapidly. Areas downstream
of the dams have emergency action plans in place to protect downstream
residents. Also, evacuation of rural areas where most major dams are located is
far easier than evacuation of major cities such as New Orleans.
Unlike a major dam in the United States, the risks associated with
New Orleans’s hurricane protection system had never been quantified prior to
Hurricane Katrina. As a result, the residents of New Orleans could not have
known the actual risks with which they were living. Risk quantification could
have raised the awareness of planners and policy-makers so they understood
that this system might have been massively under-designed relative to the
standards for other critical life-safety infrastructure.
One of the most glaring results of not taking risk into account in
the design and construction of the hurricane protection system is this: the
consequence of failure — catastrophic loss of life — did not seem to be
acknowledged. If nothing else, understanding these risks could have led to
a much more proactive and effective evacuation program for people to be
removed from harm’s way.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 63

Critical questions need to be answered about hurricane-induced levee

and floodwall failure. What is the risk? How much risk is acceptable? How
can this level of risk be effectively communicated? How should the hurricane
protection system be designed based on risk? Work to define the frequency
of hurricanes in New Orleans is on-going. It appears that Hurricane Katrina
had a probability-based recurrence interval in the range of 50 to 500 years,
meaning that, in the future, a storm such as Hurricane Katrina has 1 in 50 to
1 in 500 chance of occurring in any one year. Furthermore, work to define the
probability that the hurricane protection system would fail from the hurricane
forces is also on-going.

Hurricane Protection System Constructed Piecemeal

The southeast Louisiana hurricane protection system was planned, designed,
and constructed over four decades without a system-wide approach or
integration with land use, emergency evacuation, or recovery plans. Originally,
the system grew in response to the need to protect from floods and to remove
rainfall from the city. At some point, the decision was made to incorporate
hurricane protection. Construction of the hurricane protection system began
in earnest following Hurricane Betsy in 1965. Construction was not scheduled
for completion until 2015.
The hurricane protection system, however, is a system in name only.
In reality, it is a disjointed agglomeration of many individual projects that were
conceived and constructed in a piecemeal fashion. Parts were then joined
together in “make-do” arrangements.
For example, the pump stations at the south ends of the 17th Street,
Orleans (Figure 8.2), and London Avenue Canals are old masonry structures
that were built nearly a century ago to pump out rainfall. Although they were
thought of as being part of the hurricane protection system, they were never
strengthened or retrofitted. As a result, the pump station walls could not
resist the hydrostatic (water pressure) loads caused by a storm surge.
In addition to the gaps at the pump stations, there are hundreds of
penetrations for roadways, rail lines, and pipelines throughout the levee
system. Many of these penetrations have gates that are supposed to be
moved into place under flood conditions either automatically or by hand
operation. It was found, however, that many of the closure systems were
either missing or inoperable, and offered little resistance to floodwaters.
64 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

Figure 8.2 Pump Station No. 7 on the Orleans Canal

The buildings housing the pump stations were not strengthened to withstand high water
pressures from a storm surge. At Pump Station No. 7, a deliberate gap was left between
the I-wall (top) and the pump station (bottom) to allow the water to flow around, so as not
to damage the pump station.

The gates for the levee penetrations are often supported by concrete
and steel structures, built several feet higher than the adjacent earthen levees.
Many levee breaches occurred immediately adjacent to penetration structures
where the floodwaters preferentially overtopped the lower earthen sections,
which are much more erodible than the adjacent structures. Segmented
construction of levees sometimes resulted in abrupt discontinuities in top
elevations as well. For example, there are several reaches of levee where the
concrete I-wall ends abruptly. The steel sheet pile wall continues at a lower
top elevation, eventually transitioning to an earthen levee, again several feet
lower in elevation. As with the penetration structures described above, water
flowed over the more fragile, erodible sections first because the tops were
lower, resulting in failure in numerous locations (Figure 8.3).
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 65

Figure 8.3 Failed I-Wall and Levee Sections

The levees and I-walls were constructed piecemeal with different top elevations and of
different materials: earth, steel, and concrete. The floodwaters preferentially attacked the
lower-elevation erodible earth first, causing major breaches.

Hurricane Protection System Under-designed

The USACE defines the standard project hurricane (SPH) as a
hypothetical hurricane intended to represent the most severe combination of
hurricane parameters that is reasonably characteristic of a specified region.
The definition “reasonably characteristic” implies that the SPH is not an
extreme hurricane event — particularly when compared with the probable
maximum hurricane (PMH), which the National Weather Service defines as “a
combination of meteorological parameters that will give the highest sustained
wind speed that can probably occur at a specified coastal location.”
The relationships between the meteorological parameters (central
pressure index, forward speed, wind direction, and wind speed) are
interrelated and complex. It appears that the USACE:

• Chose SPH meteorological parameters at the low end of the range

of 101 to 111 mph listed by the USWB (now the National Weather
Service) in 1959 as representative maximum wind speeds for a
hurricane striking New Orleans
66 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

• Did not evaluate the hurricane protection system for the effects of a
more severe storm such as the PMH,

• Did not update its SPH meteorological parameters when the

National Weather Service issued revised numbers in 1979, and

• Did not improve previously designed and constructed components

of the hurricane protection system to match updated design criteria.

Consistently using the SPH — when more severe hurricane parameters

had been defined — led to hurricane protection systems that were not strong
or high enough to withstand the forces of Hurricane Katrina. As an example,
the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project was designed
for a surface wind speed of 100 miles per hour (mph), even though the 1959
stated SPH values were 101 (moderate) and 111 (high) mph. The National
Weather Service’s 1979 PMH stated values for surface wind speed were 151
(moderate) and 160 (high) mph. Hurricane Katrina’s maximum wind speed
was measured at 161 mph as it traversed the Gulf of Mexico.
While it is clear that using a stronger wind field would have led to a
higher estimated surge level, without extensive modeling there is no way
to predict how much higher the levees would have been had the PMH been
used instead of the SPH. Regardless of the actual numbers, had the hurricane
protection system been evaluated using PMH criteria, the consequences of
a more severe storm could have been incorporated. For example, levees
susceptible to overtopping and erosion could have been armored. Pump
stations could have been strengthened. More comprehensive evacuation
programs could have been instated. The USACE’s apparent non-conservative
selection of the design hurricane is inconsistent with that needed to protect
public safety when an extreme natural force such as Hurricane Katrina strikes.

Many Levees Not High Enough

Using the SPH and associated meteorological conditions ultimately resulted in
the hurricane protection system being under-designed. However there were
other factors that compounded the problem of the levees being unable to
withstand the storm surge from Hurricane Katrina.
Establishing an accurate vertical datum (the basis from which
all elevations are measured) is a necessary first step for the design and
construction of all engineered structures. Over time, the New Orleans levees
and floodwalls were designed relative to local mean sea level. However,
some were constructed relative to datums that were incorrectly assumed to
be equal to (or offset from) the local mean sea level data (Figure 8.4).
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 67

Figure 8.4 Discrepancies between Design and Construction Elevations

Because of errors in the reference datums, segments of the hurricane protection system
were constructed so that the top elevations are lower than intended by the design.

It is well understood that the entire New Orleans region is subsiding.

The average rate of subsidence is about 0.2 inches per year, although rates in
excess of 1 inch per year occur at some locations. Compounding the problems
of using improper datums was the fact that designers and engineers did not
build in an allowance for subsidence in designing the hurricane protection
system. Prudent engineering would dictate that the levees and floodwalls be
built higher than needed, so that over time, as the ground subsided, the levees
and floodwalls would still be high enough to protect against floodwaters. This
was not done.
A “freeboard” (extra height at the top of the wall to accommodate
waves) allowance was included, but the freeboard was not intended to
compensate for subsidence impacts. In many projects, the freeboard has
been completely lost to subsidence. In older parts of the system, along
the Industrial Canal (built more than 35 years ago) for instance, the impact
of subsidence plus incorrect use of datum has resulted in the levees and
floodwalls being up to 3 feet lower than the original design. The peak storm
surges were generally only 1 to 3 feet above the tops of the levees and walls;
therefore, had the tops of levees and floodwalls been at the proper elevations,
fewer overtoppings and breaching failures would have occurred.
USACE officials have stated that Congressional authorization would
not allow the USACE to consider water levels above “authorized levels” as
68 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

estimated from the SPH. By this logic, the USACE did not specify the tops of
the levees to be above authorized levels to account for possible subsidence.
Similarly, the USACE did not call for armoring to protect from erosion caused
by overtopping.
The result of these ill-considered decisions­ — coupled with the fact that
the area is experiencing ongoing subsidence — is that the tops of some levees
and floodwalls are as much as several feet lower than originally intended.
Floodwaters from Hurricane Katrina more easily overtopped these levees. If
it were not for the fact that the levees breached and I-walls toppled due to
geotechnical failures (as described in Chapter 7), the overtopping caused by
walls that were too low would have been the major source of flooding in New
Orleans.

No One Entity Is In Charge of Hurricane Protection

In addition to discontinuities in the physical hurricane protection system
caused by its piecemeal construction and incorrect elevations, there were
discontinuities in organizational responsibility for the hurricane protection
system as well. The management of the hurricane protection system is chaotic
and dysfunctional.
As shown in Table 8.1, various federal, state, and local agencies are
responsible for the construction, operation, and maintenance of segments
of the hurricane protection system. No single agency or organization is
empowered to provide the much-needed system-wide oversight or focus
on the critical life-safety issues. No formal coalition of agencies is directed
to provide strategic direction, definition of roles and responsibilities, and
coordination of critical construction, maintenance, and operations. Indeed,
it appears that no agency or group of agencies ever defined clear, mutually
agreed-upon expectations of what the hurricane protection system was really
intended to achieve.

Table 8.1 Agencies and Organizations Responsible for Portions of New Orleans’s
Hurricane Protection System
AGENCY ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY
United States Authorization and funding.
Congress
USACE Headquarters USACE guidance and oversight.
USACE Engineer Research to support new design approaches.
Research and

Development Center
USACE New Orleans Design and construction oversight as the “Engineer”
District for each of the five independent levee districts in the
New Orleans metropolitan area.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 69

AGENCY ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY

East Jefferson Levee Maintenance and operation of the flood protection
District levee system around the east bank portion of Jefferson
Parish to protect the citizens of East Jefferson from
Lake Pontchartrain and Mississippi River flooding.
Lake Borgne Basin Maintenance and operation of 13 miles of the Mississippi
Levee District River Levee, 26 miles of back protection levee, 23
miles of the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane
Protection Levee, the Bayou Dupre Control Structure,
12 flood gates, the Violet Freshwater Siphon, 55 miles
of drainage canals, and eight major drainage pumping
stations.
Orleans Levee Maintenance and operation of the hurricane and flood
District protection improvements for the City of New Orleans
on the southern shores of Lake Pontchartrain and
along the Mississippi River, including inspection and
maintenance of 129 miles of levees and floodwalls,
189 floodgates, 97 flood valves, and two flood control
structures.
Pontchartrain Levee Maintenance and operation of the hurricane and
District flood protection improvements for St. Charles Parish,
including the southern shores of Lake Pontchartrain,
the Bonnet Carré Spillway, and along the Mississippi
River, including inspection and maintenance of
associated miles of levees and floodwalls.
West Jefferson Levee Maintenance and operation of hurricane and flood
District protection improvements for the west bank of
Jefferson Parish, including the levee system east
and west of the Harvey Canal, along each side of the
Harvey Canal, and along the Mississippi River, including
inspection and maintenance of more than 50 miles of
levees and floodwalls and associated floodgates.
Drainage Pump Administration, direction, coordination, and
Stations Department implementation of major drainage and flood control
of Jefferson Parish programs and direct construction, operation, and
maintenance of 340 miles of canal waterways, drainage
ditches, cross drains, culverts, and internal levee
systems; 1,465 miles of street subsurface drainage
systems; and operation and maintenance of 52
drainage pump stations.
70 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

AGENCY ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY

Sewerage and Administration, direction, coordination, and

Water Board of New implementation of major drainage and flood control
Orleans programs and direct operation, construction, and
maintenance of 90 miles of open canal waterways,
drainage ditches, cross drains, and culverts; 90 miles
of street subsurface drainage systems larger than
36 inches in diameter; and operation and maintenance
of 22 drainage pump stations.
The Sewerage and Water Board also operates
and maintains all drainage pump stations in Orleans
Parish, east and west banks, and is responsible for
waterways’ trash pick-up and grass cutting.

Examples of the consequences of the lack of inter-agency coordination

are plentiful. For instance, the agencies responsible for floodgates at France
Road in Orleans Parish (the crossing for the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad)
include the Port of New Orleans, the Orleans Levee District, the New
Orleans Public Belt Railroad, and the New Orleans District of the USACE. The
floodgates were out of service and left open during Hurricane Katrina because
of repairs, allowing water to flood through them unimpeded.
Separate organizations control design and maintenance. By necessity,
the USACE made assumptions that the levees would be maintained properly
over time. In fact, the levees were not always maintained properly. For
instance, trees were allowed to grow on the levees, and swimming pools and
hot tubs had encroached on levee rights-of-way. Although there was likely
some informal or semi-formal communication between agencies, the group
of agencies did not work together to ensure that the New Orleans area was
protected from hurricane damage.
It is only natural that during an emergency situation such as Hurricane
Katrina, without pre-planning and coordination, major gaps in emergency
response will occur. Nowhere is this more evident than in Jefferson Parish,
where the parish president — apparently out of concern for the safety and
welfare of the pump station operators — ordered the operators to evacuate
prior to the storm. There was evidently no plan or infrastructure in place
to enable safe, continuous operation of pumping stations during a major
hurricane. If the five pump stations on the east bank of Jefferson Parish
had remained operable, significantly less flooding would have occurred in
Jefferson Parish, east bank.
The USACE acts as “Engineer” on behalf of the levee districts.
However, the USACE’s position is that it cannot do anything that a local
sponsor (in this case, a levee district) does not approve. Several key USACE
attempts to implement system-wide solutions were often met by fierce local
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 71

opposition, and were not approved. For instance, following Hurricane Betsy, the
USACE proposed providing hurricane protection along the Lake Pontchartrain
lakefront instead of along the canals. This proposal was strongly opposed by
the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans and by the Orleans Levee
District, and ultimately dropped by the USACE.
The problems that led to poor decision-making — the root cause of the
catastrophe in New Orleans — thus lie within and amongst the cultures of
key organizations. Protecting against life-threatening risk was put on the back
burner of public priority. Perhaps no one truly realized how catastrophic levee
failures would be. Perhaps no one was willing to pay the price necessary
to build a reasonably safe levee system. Perhaps the levee boards became
distracted by development projects, airports, parks, casinos, or other matters
that were given priority above the primary task of caring for the levees.
Perhaps the political will needed to implement a rationally based hurricane
protection system was simply too great to be achieved. However, to achieve
a different outcome in the future, these cultures must change, focusing more
on protecting peoples’ lives and less on “business as usual.”

External Peer Review Lacking

During the design of major engineering projects, senior experts in the
appropriate fields of engineering are often called in to conduct external peer
review. These peer reviewers typically provide input on the overall direction of
the project, the validity of assumptions, the correctness of analytical methods,
and the design approach. Design peer reviews are conducted to provide a
completely independent assessment of a public works project.
External peer reviews were conducted on very few, if any, of New
Orleans’s hurricane protection system projects. In fact, the USACE’s internal
directives fall short of ASCE’s recommended policies to protect the public health,
safety, and welfare against the catastrophic failure of water resources projects.
The USACE’s peer reviews are discretionary, are not triggered by
sound engineering principles, do not have a mechanism to gauge their fidelity,
and contain vague processes for selecting reviewers. As a result, questionable
engineering decisions were made for the New Orleans hurricane protection
system. Margins of safety were too low in designing the levees. Improper
datums were used in construction. The standard project hurricane was not
updated.
The engineering decision-making process became “self-referential,”
meaning that designers were forced to look to their own organizations to help guide
decisions, not to the greater engineering community. Individuals within a self-
referential organization can lose step with technological advances and alternative
solutions. The organizational culture (for instance, “it’s how we’ve always done
it”) influenced behavior over the many years that the hurricane protection system
was under design and construction. Proper and effective external peer review
could have prevented these errors of judgment from occurring.
72 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

Funding Process Flawed

As a federal agency, the USACE and its projects are funded by the federal
government, with a share of the costs borne by the local sponsor. Every year,
the USACE requests funding. Through the federal budget-setting process, the
Executive Branch (via the Office of Management and Budget) and the United
States Congress authorize a project and allocate funding, but not necessarily
at the same dollar amounts as requested or required.
Because of the Congressional budgeting process, the stream of
funding for the New Orleans hurricane protection system was irregular, at
best. If a project was not sufficiently funded, the USACE was often required
to delay implementation or to scale back the project.
This “push-pull” mechanism for the funding of critical life-safety
structures such as the New Orleans hurricane protection system is essentially
flawed. The process creates a “disconnect” between those responsible
for design and construction decisions and those responsible for managing
the purse-strings. The pressure for tradeoffs and low-cost solutions likely
compromised quality, safety, and reliability.
The project-by-project approach — in which projects are built over
time based on the availability of funding — resulted in the hurricane protection
system being constructed piecemeal, with an overall lack of attention to
“system” issues. In effect, it appears that the project-by-project approach
was associated with Congressional limitations. The USACE was forced into
a “reductionist’s” way of thinking: reduce the problem into one that can be
solved within the given authority and budget. Focusing only on the primary
problem to be solved inevitably makes the issues of risk, redundancy, and
resilience a lower priority.
Decisions were made, for example, not to armor the land-side of the
floodwalls and levees in the high-risk areas; this armoring, if installed, could
conceivably have limited the flood damage from an infrequent storm event
such as Hurricane Katrina. It has been stated by some that the USACE may
have considered this option to be outside of their Congressional authority,
because to armor the levees would apparently concede that the USACE was
designing for storm surges above the “authorized level.”
The design and construction of critical life-safety systems is beyond
the expertise of the Executive Branch or United States Congress. However,
the Congress exercised tight control over spending and even over design
criteria. The USACE accepted these controls without fully addressing the
associated issues, risks, and tradeoffs. For whatever reason, the USACE and
its local sponsors did not argue vigorously enough for adequate funding to
provide a high level of assurance for the public safety of New Orleanians.
 73

CHAPTER 9

What Must We Do Next?

Serious deficiencies in the southeast Louisiana hurricane protection

system must be corrected if the New Orleans area is to avoid a similar
catastrophe when the next major hurricane strikes. There are flaws in the way
the hurricane protection system was conceived, budgeted, funded, designed,
constructed, operated, and managed.
There is no quick fix for problems of this complexity. Overcoming the
deficiencies in the New Orleans hurricane protection system — and instituting
real change in its engineering, management, and governance — will require
leadership, courage, conviction, and funding.
The lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina also have profound
implications for other American communities and a sobering message for people
nationwide: we must place the protection of public safety, health, and
welfare at the forefront of our nation’s priorities. To do anything less could
lead to a far greater tragedy than the one we have witnessed in New Orleans.
What follows are ten critical actions the ASCE Hurricane Katrina
External Review Panel believes necessary. Each action falls under one of four
required shifts in thought and approach: understand risk and embrace safety;
re-evaluate and fix the hurricane protection system; revamp the management
of the hurricane protection system; and demand engineering quality. We
consider each action essential, and we strongly recommend that each be
implemented.

Understand Risk and Embrace Safety

When Hurricane Katrina came ashore, the hurricane protection system failed,
with tragic consequences. The catastrophe that befell New Orleans was born,
in part, out of failure to recognize the fragility of the levee system in the face
of storms of Hurricane Katrina’s magnitude. Few appreciated how devastating
the consequences of failure could be. There was far too little priority or urgency
given to the hurricane protection system by political leaders at all levels of
government, by designers and operators, and by the people who lived in its
shadow — evidenced by the fact that the system took decades to build and
remains incomplete yet today.
The people of New Orleans — and all those who live in hurricane-
and flood-prone communities around the country — must understand and
acknowledge the risks under which they live. From this knowledge comes
insight into what risks are acceptable for their communities and for the nation.
74 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

CALL-TO-ACTION NUMBER 1:

Keep safety at the forefront of

public priorities.

No single authority has ever been charged with responsibility for defining in
clear, specific, and unambiguous terms what was to be expected from the
hurricane protection system in the New Orleans region in terms of protection
from flooding and loss of life. As the hurricane protection system for New
Orleans was being designed and debated amongst the USACE and state
and local stakeholders, compromises were made based on cost, land use,
environmental issues, and other conflicting priorities. Protection of the public’s
safety was not always the outcome of these compromises.
It is human nature — both at a personal and institutional level — to lose
focus of long-term needs in the light of short-term demands. The infrequency
of major hurricanes tends to lull society into neglect and inaction, but long-
term safety must take precedence. Without a significant elevation of safety
as a priority, the hurricane and flood protection systems in New Orleans, and
across the nation, have the potential to return to a low priority. All responsible
agencies in New Orleans and throughout the nation should re-evaluate
their policies and practices to ensure that protection of public safety,
health, and welfare is the top priority for the infrequent but potentially
devastating impacts from hurricanes and flooding.
Consistent inspection, maintenance, and repair of the hurricane
protection system are essential. We cannot afford to permit our hurricane
and flood protection systems to deteriorate. The United States Congress
should establish and fund a program for nationwide levee safety and
rehabilitation, much as we do for major dams. The levee safety program
will help ensure that levee structures and components — in New Orleans and
throughout the country — receive the level of attention needed for critical life-
safety systems.

CALL-TO-ACTION NUMBER 2:

Quantify the risks.

Assessment of risk is a key engineering function. Engineers must assess and

communicate clearly to decision-makers and the public how risk-cost-benefit
tradeoffs will impact performance and safety. They must take an active role in
formulating public policy and in decision-making at all levels of government.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 75

The IPET has undertaken the critically important effort of quantifying

the risks associated with the New Orleans hurricane protection system. Using
sophisticated risk models, the IPET is analyzing the potential consequences
from a range of storm scenarios. Among the variables considered are hurricane
intensity, hurricane location and direction of approach, height and strength of
levees, ability of pump stations to remove water, whether levee penetrations
are closed, and land elevation and its propensity for flooding.
The ASCE Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel encourages the
IPET’s work toward quantifying risk for each geographic region of the New
Orleans area. Completing this work must remain a very high priority. Only
then can fully informed decisions be made regarding the future of the region.
The level of risk also changes with time, depending on changes in the
natural and man-made environment. Therefore, the risk analyses need to be
updated as new information becomes available.
The USACE should complete the work necessary to quantify
and effectively communicate the risk as soon as possible, and, because
risk assessment and communication is not static, should periodically
update the assessment of risk. This risk assessment approach should be
extended to all areas of the nation that are vulnerable to major losses
from hurricanes and flooding.

CALL-TO-ACTION NUMBER 3:

Communicate the risks to the public and

decide how much risk is acceptable.

The future of New Orleans and the State of Louisiana depends on peoples’
confidence in the hurricane protection system. Local, state, and federal
leaders — in concert with the engineering community — need to embrace a
common risk-based decision support tool for planning and decision-making.
These leaders need to initiate and maintain an honest and open dialogue with
all major stakeholders about the risks of living in a hurricane-prone region.
The people of New Orleans — and those who live in flood- and
hurricane-prone communities around the country — must have a voice in
decisions about the conditions under which they live. Decisions that have
the potential for profound impact are best based on knowledge, insight, and
timely, structured debate.
Local, state, and federal agencies should create and maintain
quality programs of public risk communication in New Orleans and other
areas threatened by hurricanes and flooding. The public risk communication
program should be based on state-of-the-art best practices for process and
76 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

content, and address a full range of pertinent topics. The public needs to know,
for instance, the probability that a major hurricane will hit a particular region
and the level of protection provided by their region’s hurricane protection
system. People also need to know the full range of citizen-based emergency
preparedness and response options and evacuation plans.
The ultimate goal of the risk communication program should be to
produce an informed and engaged public. A number of examples could be
used as a model for the New Orleans risk communication initiative, including
the work of the State of California’s Office of Emergency Services as part of
the Parkfield Earthquake Prediction Experiment in the 1980s, and the work
done by the United States Geological Survey in the San Francisco Bay area
after the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989.
Major hurricanes of the scale of Katrina are infrequent. Without an
effective risk communication program, people will gradually forget about
the risks. In doing so, they will unknowingly contribute to the severity of the
consequences from the next hurricane that strikes.

Re-evaluate and Fix the Hurricane Protection System

The first line of defense in the hurricane protection system for New Orleans
includes levees and floodwalls to hold back the high water from a storm
surge, yet it failed catastrophically at more than 50 different locations during
Hurricane Katrina. There was no second line of defense except for the pump
stations, which were ineffective.
Not only did the hurricane protection system have many weak links—
in the form of penetrations, low points, and gaps—but it lacked “redundancy.”
If one component failed, there was no back-up component or strategy to take
its place to reduce the damage. Internal levees were not used as much as
they could have been to isolate various sub-sections of the city and prevent
floodwaters from spreading. The pump stations, which might have removed
water from the city more quickly, were not designed to function in a major
hurricane or mitigate flooding if the levees were overtopped or breached. The
“system” was not a system.

CALL-TO-ACTION NUMBER 4:

Rethink the whole system, including

land use in New Orleans.

The nation learns lessons after every major disaster: lessons in decision-making,
structural integrity, disaster response, and communications. The nation is now
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 77

at a unique juncture where past mistakes in the hurricane protection system

for New Orleans can be learned from and rectified.
The IPET has made excellent progress on the task of identifying
deficiencies in the hurricane protection system. There is still much to be
done to build on IPET’s work, and we strongly urge that this work be funded
and pursued to its completion. Information from the IPET analyses, coupled
with a clear definition of the public’s expectations (as framed in Call-to-Action
Number 3), will form the basis for rethinking the entire hurricane protection
system.
At the outset, the design hurricane and storm surge levels need to be
re-assessed and updated using a risk-based approach. The design hurricane
conditions cannot be static design criteria. Risk and levels of acceptable
risk evolve with time — as does the knowledge on which storm criteria are
based.
The future system will incorporate existing infrastructure (such
as levees and pump stations) but must include other appropriate tools
and strategies as well. Prudent land-use decisions (for example, limiting
development in the most flood-prone areas, or establishing minimum first-
floor elevations) can put fewer people and less property at risk. More rigorous
building requirements can reduce the impact of flooding on structures. A
more effective hurricane warning, response, and evacuation protocol can
be instituted and practiced in regular training exercises. Pre-planning can
expedite recovery and reconstruction after a major hurricane.
The ASCE Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel calls on New
Orleans and all hurricane- and flood-prone communities around the nation
to use the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina to develop roadmaps for
safety and protection. Local, state, and federal leaders should review the
overall strategy and systems approach, integrating hurricane protection
tactics, land-use considerations, and emergency response strategies into
a coherent and well-thought-out system.

CALL-TO-ACTION NUMBER 5:

Correct the deficiencies.

Hurricane Katrina obliterated many critical hurricane protection structures and

wreaked great damage on others. The disaster also brought to light many
weaknesses and deficiencies in the existing system that, if not fixed, will
remain vulnerable to future hurricanes. The work to be done includes making
up for past design deficiencies as well as strengthening existing components
of the system to make them more resilient to damage.
78 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

Hurricane Katrina offers a cautionary tale and subsequent mandate to

other hurricane-prone communities as well. Now is the time to fix deficient
or damaged parts of existing flood and hurricane protection systems
throughout the country to provide the intended levels of protection. Local,
state, and federal leaders should continue the work necessary to correct
the deficiencies in the hurricane protection systems, and bring this work
to completion with urgency. In the New Orleans region, “must-do” items
include:

• Establish mechanisms to incorporate changing information.

The dynamics of the hurricane protection system — such as levee
heights and meteorological and oceanographic conditions — need
to be monitored routinely, especially when processes like
subsidence are known to occur. Advances in surveying technology
need to be fully utilized to establish and regularly update geodetic
vertical datum and water surface elevations. Levee design,
construction, and maintenance must be tied to elevations that
provide the true level of flood and hurricane protection intended for
New Orleans.

• Make the levees functional even if overtopped. During

Hurricane Katrina, water rushing over the levees severely damaged
and compromised their integrity. Overtopping of levees due to
hurricanes is inevitable. To prevent damage, the levees need to
be armored by resurfacing them with protective non-erodible
materials.

• Strengthen or upgrade the floodwalls and levees. Floodwalls

and levees must be fully investigated and analyzed to ensure that
they have adequate margins of safety against failure, consistent
with critical life-safety structures. Such was not the case pre-
Katrina, and may not always be the case now.

• Upgrade the pumping stations. Not only was the pumping

system not fully integrated into the hurricane protection system,
but many of the pump stations were not strong enough to
withstand the forces of a hurricane. The pump stations need to
be made survivable from flooding caused by hurricanes and un-
anticipated levee breaches. If this is not done, New Orleans will
remain unnecessarily vulnerable.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 79

Revamp the Management of the Hurricane Protection System

The management of New Orleans’s hurricane protection system
was dysfunctional because there were too many organizations involved
in managing individual pieces of the system. No one entity or person was
in charge. Many agencies had partially overlapping roles, yet there was no
effective coordination between agencies.
The members of the ASCE Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel
believe that correcting the management deficiencies of the hurricane
protection system is just as important as correcting the physical deficiencies.
With effective management comes a more unified approach to hurricane
protection — which is greatly needed in New Orleans.

CALL-TO-ACTION NUMBER 6:

Put someone in charge.

No complex program or system can be successful without good leadership,

management, and someone in charge. The New Orleans hurricane protection
system evolved over decades under the initiative and management of
numerous agencies, none of which had definitive authority to adjudicate
conflicting priorities. Until someone is put in charge of overall management
and made accountable, organizational dysfunction will continue.
Local, state, and federal leaders should agree to assign to a single
individual the responsibility for managing critical hurricane and flood
protection systems such as the one in the New Orleans area. The ASCE
Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel recommends that the “person-in-
charge” or “authority” or commissioner be a high-level, licensed engineer (or,
alternatively, a panel comprising licensed engineers). We suggest that this
authority should have the wherewithal and latitude of a direct gubernatorial
appointment.
This authority must be empowered and authorized by the mutual
consent of all responsible agencies to become deeply engaged with all these
agencies. The authority’s over-arching responsibility will be to keep hurricane-
related safety at the forefront of public priorities. The authority will provide
leadership, strategic vision, definition of roles and responsibilities, formalized
avenues of communication, prioritization of funding, and coordination of
critical construction, maintenance, and operations.
Changes to the New Orleans area levee board structure approved by
voters in 2006 will help streamline communications and establish a stronger
80 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

technical basis for managing the levees. The ASCE Hurricane Katrina External
Review Panel endorses this effort, which comprises a good first step until the
appointment of the authority goes into effect.

CALL-TO-ACTION NUMBER 7:

Improve inter-agency coordination.

There has been an historic lack of coordination between agencies at all levels:
local, state, and federal. The only practical way to overcome this organizational
confusion is to implement strong, sustainable mechanisms for communication,
cooperation, and coordination. We envision that the commissioner (as identified
in Call-to-Action Number 6) will be able to provide overall direction and make
sure that all parties are working together.
All agencies involved in the hurricane protection system should
implement far better and more effective mechanisms for coordination
and cooperation. The agencies responsible for funding must coordinate with
and advocate for those responsible for implementation. Those responsible
for the hurricane protection system must establish iron-clad protocols with
those who are responsible for emergency response. Those responsible
for maintenance of the hurricane protection system must collaborate with
system designers and constructors to upgrade their inspection, repair, and
operations to ensure that the system is hurricane-ready and flood-ready.
Those responsible for operating the floodgates must take direction from those
responsible for emergency preparedness, and close the levee penetrations
when a hurricane threatens.

Demand Engineering Quality

The ASCE Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel believes that the failures
in New Orleans’s hurricane protection system constitute one of the worst
catastrophes ever to befall this country. The flaws uncovered as a result
of Hurricane Katrina must serve as a sobering reminder to engineers
everywhere that their work has life-or-death implications. Whatever the
constraints — whether related to cost, schedule, political resistance, or
inertia — engineers must continue to uphold the highest standards of their
profession, knowing that peoples’ lives are at stake.
 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why 81

CALL-TO-ACTION NUMBER 8:

Upgrade engineering design procedures.

The USACE and its consultants — as well as ASCE and its members — must
upgrade engineering design procedures, placing greater emphasis on safety,
taking into account lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, and incorporating
the latest research findings and best engineering practices. The engineering
community should review and update engineering design procedures
for hurricane and flood protection systems to ensure that these updated
procedures take all reasonable steps to protect the public safety, health,
and welfare.
The USACE—and engineering research organizations around the country
—should increase research into the design and construction of better hurricane
protection systems. The latest technological advances should be used to
improve the models, designs, retrofits, and maintenance of hurricane protection
systems in New Orleans and other parts of the country.

CALL-TO-ACTION NUMBER 9

Bring in independent experts.

ASCE has a long-standing policy that recommends independent external peer

review for all public works projects where performance is critical to public
safety, health, and welfare; where reliability of performance under emergency
conditions is critical; that use innovative materials or techniques; that lack
redundancy in design; or that have unique construction sequencing or a short/
overlapping design-construction schedule.
The ASCE Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel believes that many
of the major deficiencies in New Orleans’s hurricane protection system could
have been avoided if the engineering plans and designs had undergone high-
level, independent engineering review by external experts.
Agencies responsible for design of hurricane and flood protection
systems and other critical life-safety structures should engage independent
experts in high-level review of every project.
82 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

CALL-TO-ACTION NUMBER 10:

Place safety first.

Although the conditions leading up to the New Orleans catastrophe are unique,
the fundamental constraints placed on engineers for any project are not. Every
project has funding and/or schedule limitations. Every project must integrate
into the natural and man-made environment. Every major project has political
ramifications.
In the face of pressure to save money or to make up time, engineers
must remain strong and hold true to the requirements of the profession’s
canon of ethics, never compromising the safety of the public. Organizations
must be structured to enable, not to inhibit, this focus on safety. Engineers
must continually evaluate the appropriateness of design criteria. They must
always consider how the performance of individual components affects the
overall performance of a system.
The first Fundamental Canon of ASCE’s Code of Ethics states that
“Engineers shall hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the
public….” This canon must be the guiding principle for rebuilding the hurricane
protection system in New Orleans. And it must be applied with equal rigor
to every aspect of an engineer’s work—in New Orleans, in America, and
throughout the world. ASCE, working in partnership with the USACE and
other engineering organizations, should reinforce the need to place the
safety, health, and welfare of the public first, and should communicate
that public safety must always be the highest priority.
 83

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The ASCE Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel would like to express its heartfelt
gratitude to Sybil E. Hatch, P.E., M.ASCE, and her colleagues at Convey, for their
outstanding efforts at pulling together the manuscript, figures, and photographs that
compose this report. Sybil’s considerable writing and editing skills were invaluable in
helping us better explain what went wrong with the New Orleans hurricane protection
system, and why.
The ASCE Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel would also like to sincerely
thank the members of ASCE staff who provided timely and effective support during
this effort, especially Lawrence H. Roth, P.E., G.E., ASCE’s Deputy Executive Director,
for his leadership. In addition, John E. Durrant, P.E., M.ASCE, Charles V. (Casey) Dinges
IV, Aff.M.ASCE, Jane Howell, and Joan Buhrman made themselves available day and
night to assist in our review effort, manage logistics, and deftly handle extensive
media relations. Our work would not have been possible without their dedicated help
and their excellent contributions.
Finally, and most importantly, the ASCE Hurricane Katrina External Review
Panel extends its deep appreciation to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and
to the Chief of Engineers, Lieutenant General Carl A. Strock, P.E., for their decision to
seek a comprehensive, real-time review of the work of the Interagency Performance
Evaluation Taskforce (IPET). It took considerable courage to call for detailed external
peer review of a project with such high visibility, and USACE should be commended
for this action. USACE should also be commended for the constructive and
professional manner in which our review was engaged. In particular we thank Donald
L. Basham, P.E., USACE Chief of Engineering and Construction, Lewis E. (Ed) Link,
Ph.D., IPET Project Director, and John J. Jaeger, Ph.D., P.E., IPET Technical Director,
for establishing a sound technical framework for this enormous effort as well as for
creating an atmosphere of collegiality and cooperation.
The nation owes a debt of gratitude to the dedicated efforts of the more than
150 engineers and scientists who labored long and hard to provide meaningful input
into rebuilding the New Orleans and Southeast Louisiana hurricane protection system.
It was indeed an honor for each of us to be associated with such a comprehensive
evaluation and analysis leading to useful findings and critical lessons learned. ASCE and
the ASCE Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel greatly appreciate the opportunity
to be of service to USACE and to the nation.
84 THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong And Why

CREDITS

Cover Background: The Dallas Morning News/Smiley N. Pool; Inset top left: Photo by
Ted Jackson © 2006 The Times-Picayune; Inset top right: Photo by Ellis Lucia © 2006
The Times-Picayune; Inset bottom left: The Dallas Morning News/Smiley N. Pool;
Inset bottom right: Photo by David Grunfeld © 2006 The Times-Picayune.

Title Page Satellite view of Hurricane Katrina: courtesy of NASA, found at Visible
Earth (http://visibleearth.nasa.gov/)

Chapter 2 Figures 2.1, 2.4, and 2.5: base photos courtesy of NASA, found at Visible
Earth (http://visibleearth.nasa.gov/); Figure 2.2: original public domain photo by
FEMA edited, displayed, and delivered by IllinoisPhoto.com. The photographer and
agencies that provided this photo, as well as any subjects depicted in this photo, are
not endorsing any products, services, conclusions, or findings contained within this
report; Figure 2.3: courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of
Texas at Austin; Figure 2.7: The Dallas Morning News/Irwin Thompson.

Chapter 3 Figure 3.1: courtesy of University of Wisconsin-CIMSS; Figure 3.2:

courtesy of Dr. Hassan Mashriqui, Louisiana State University Hurricane Center;
Figure 3.3: courtesy of National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration; Figure 3.4:
courtesy of the Louisiana State University Hurricane Public Health Center; Figure 3.5:
courtesy of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Interagency Performance Evaluation
Task Force.

Chapter 4 Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5: courtesy of the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force.

Chapter 5 Figure 5.1: courtesy of Don McCrosky, Entergy; Figure 5.2: courtesy
of Robert G. Traver, Ph.D., P.E., D.WRE, Associate Professor, Villanova University;
Figure 5.3: base photo courtesy of NASA, found at Visible Earth (http://visibleearth.
nasa.gov/); Figures 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7: courtesy of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers;
Figures 5.8, 5.10, and 5.11: courtesy of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force; Figure 5.9: AP Photo/David J. Phillip.

Chapter 6 Figure 6.1 top: John Pendygraft, St. Petersburg Times/WpN; Figure 6.1
bottom left: Photo by Chris Granger © 2006 The Times-Picayune; Figures 6.1 bottom
right and 6.11 top: Photo by David Grunfeld © 2006 The Times-Picayune; Figure 6.2:
AP Photo/Bill Haber; Figure 6.3: The Dallas Morning News/Smiley N. Pool;
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 left: Robert G. Traver, Ph.D., P.E., D.WRE, Associate Professor,
Villanova University; Figures 6.5 right, 6.8 bottom, and 6.12: Photo by Chris Granger
© 2006 The Times-Picayune; Figure 6.6 top: The Dallas Morning News/Tom Fox;
Figure 6.6 bottom: Photo by Eliot Kamenitz © 2006 The Times-Picayune; Figure
6.7: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force;
Figure 6.8 top, and 6.10: Photo by John McCusker © 2006 The Times-Picayune;
Figure 6.9: Photo by Ellis Lucia © 2006 The Times-Picayune; Figure 6.11 bottom: AP
Photo/Dave Martin; Figure 6.13: Photo by Bob Marshall © 2006 The Times-Picayune.

Chapter 7 Figures 7.2, 7.6, 7.9, 7.11, and 7.12: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force.

Chapter 8 Figure 8.1: Robert B. Gilbert, Ph.D., P.E., M.ASCE, ASCE/ERP; Figure
8.2: Google Earth™ mapping service; Figure 8.3 top: Peter G. Nicholson, Ph.D., P.E.,
F.ASCE, ASCE/ERP & University of Hawaii; Figure 8.3 bottom: Photograph by Joseph
Wartman, Drexel University; Figure 8.4: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Interagency
Performance Evaluation Task Force.