EUROPEAN ORGANISATION FOR THE SAFETY OF

AIR NAVIGATION

EUROCONTROL

Validation Master Plan for

A-SMGCS Implementation
Level I

DSA / AOP

Edition : 1.0
Edition Date : 02/10/2003
Status : Released Issue
Class : General Public

EUROPEAN AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME

 DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION SHEET

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Document Title
Validation Master Plan for A-SMGCS Implementation Level I

EWP DELIVERABLE REFERENCE NUMBER:

PROGRAMME REFERENCE INDEX: EDITION: 1.0

EDITION DATE: 02/10/2003
Abstract

Keywords

CONTACT PERSON: Paul Adamson TEL: UNIT: DSA / AOP

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 Validation Master Plan for A-SMGCS Implementation DSA / AOP
Level I

DOCUMENT APPROVAL

The following table identifies all management authorities that have successively approved
the present issue of this document.

AUTHORITY NAME AND SIGNATURE DATE

A-SMGCS

Project Manager Paul Adamson

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DOCUMENT CHANGE RECORD

The following table records the complete history of the successive editions of the present
document.

SECTIONS
EDITION DATE REASON FOR CHANGE PAGES
AFFECTED
0.a 20/05/2003 Initial template proposed by ADVS

0.b 28/05/2003 Template updated with CENA comments All

0.c 24/06/2003 First draft All

0.d 08/07/2003 Comments from Progress Meeting 1 All

0.e 23/07/2003 Inputs from CENA 7 to 9

0.f 18/08/2003 Comments from Progress Meeting 2

0.g 21/08/2003 Comments from CENA

1.0 02/10/2003 Released Issue

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................7
1.1 Background ...............................................................................................................................7
1.2 Scope of the document .............................................................................................................8
1.3 Methodology..............................................................................................................................8
1.4 Structure of the document.........................................................................................................9
1.5 Reference Documents ............................................................................................................10
1.6 Acronyms ................................................................................................................................11
1.7 Explanation of terms ...............................................................................................................12

2. ISSUES OF THE CURRENT SITUATION ..........................................................17

2.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................17
2.2 Degradation of Safety .............................................................................................................17
2.3 Airport Capacity shortfall .........................................................................................................17
2.4 ATC procedures ......................................................................................................................18
2.5 Technology Deficiencies .........................................................................................................18
2.6 Technology Cost .....................................................................................................................18
2.7 Aerodrome Activities Coordination..........................................................................................19

3. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT FOR A-SMGCS IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL I......20

3.1 Objectives ...............................................................................................................................20
3.2 Services...................................................................................................................................20
3.3 Roles of Actors........................................................................................................................21
3.4 Operational Procedures ..........................................................................................................23
3.5 Benefits ...................................................................................................................................24
3.6 Level of maturity......................................................................................................................25

4. IDENTIFICATION OF STAKEHOLDERS ...........................................................26

5. IDENTIFICATION OF VALIDATION AIMS.........................................................28

6. IDENTIFICATION OF HIGH-LEVEL, LOW-LEVEL AND SUBSIDIARY

VALIDATION OBJECTIVES...............................................................................29
6.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................29
6.2 High-level objectives of the validation process .......................................................................29

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6.3 Low-level objectives of the validation process ........................................................................32

7. IDENTIFICATION OF METRICS AND INDICATORS.........................................36

8. IDENTIFICATION OF HYPOTHESES ................................................................39

8.1 Statistical analysis aims ..........................................................................................................39
8.2 Human Factors Investigation ..................................................................................................40
8.3 Safety Investigation................................................................................................................41
8.4 Capacity Investigation .............................................................................................................42
8.5 Environment Investigation......................................................................................................43

9. DEFINITION OF HIGH-LEVEL EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN................................44

9.1 Validation techniques ..............................................................................................................44
9.2 Validation exercises ................................................................................................................44
9.3 Focus of Validation Exercises .................................................................................................46
9.4 Planning ..................................................................................................................................49

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Despite implementation of SMGCS (Surface Movement Guidance and Control

System) in the ECAC area, some European airports have faced severe runways
incursions lately which ended up as major incidents or accidents. The increasing
number of accidents and incidents on airports movement areas has now become
the biggest concern in terms of airport safety.
As a consequence, EUROCONTROL recognised the need of “Improved Traffic
Management on the Movement Area” through the ATM Strategy for the Years
2000+. This direction for change includes four Operational Improvements as follows:
1. Improvement of Aerodrome Control Service on the manoeuvring Area;
2. Improvement of Conflict Detection and Alert for all Traffic on the Movement
Area;
3. Improvement of Planning and Routing on the Movement Area;
4. Improvement of Guidance and Control on the Movement Area.
The application of the Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System
concept is considered essential to achieve this objective. A-SMGCS has been
considerably developed in Europe through working groups of ICAO, EUROCAE, the
European Commission which launched several projects (BETA, DEFAMM,…), and
major airports which are already equipped with A-SMGCS.
The approach to the implementation of the A-SMGCS technologies and the new
procedures needs to be coordinated and harmonised in Europe. This coordination
will make the ECAC members concentrate their efforts in aiming at the same
objectives so as to faster achieve the A-SMGCS. The harmonisation will reduce the
diversity of both embedded and ground equipment for A-SMGCS. It should have a
considerable impact on costs. In that sense, EUROCONTROL launched the A-
SMGCS project which proposes an evolutionary implementation of A-SMGCS. The
successive levels of implementation form a coherent series that :
• Recognises operational needs;
• Reflects the evolution of technologies and procedures;
• Enables airports to equip according to local requirements.
The EUROCONTROL A-SMGCS project focuses on the A-SMGCS implementation
levels I and II. The first phase of the project defined theses levels in terms of
operational concept, procedures, and functional specification. Now, the next step is
to validate all the requirements and procedures identified for A-SMGCS
implementation levels I and II. The validation of the concept, requirements and
procedures for A-SMGCS Implementation levels I and II will be performed in
accordance with an agreed Validation Master Plan.

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1.2 Scope of the document

This document aims at defining the Validation Master Plan for A-SMGCS
implementation Level I. The Validation Master Plan identifies the objectives and the
steps of the validation process. It provides for each step a full description
(resources, timeframe, training etc.) and identifies its prerequisites.
This documents also identifies the techniques of evaluation (fast time and real time
simulations, pre-operational trials at representative airports,…) to assess,
demonstrate and confirm that A-SMGCS fulfil the Operational Concept with respect
to the airport manoeuvring area, for all visibility conditions, times of the day and
traffic densities.
At the end of the validation activity, the different documents about A-SMGCS
procedures [A-SMGCS Proc], concepts [D3] and requirements [D5] developed
within EUROCONTROL A-SMGCS Project will be updated according to the
conclusions of the validation.
A particular emphasis is placed upon the validation of A-SMGCS related
procedures, with the view to providing the data necessary to support their
submission to ICAO. Once validated, the operational concepts for A-SMGCS
implementation level I may be submitted to ICAO for updating the A-SMGCS
manual [ICAO-A-SMGCS].
The present document only addresses A-SMGCS Implementation Level I, the
Validation Master Plan for Level II is developed in [VMP II].

1.3 Methodology

To develop the Validation Master Plan, we applied the MAEVA methodology

[MAEVA] which has been especially designed for this kind of exercise by the Master
ATM European Validation Plan (MAEVA) project. This project is sponsored by the
European Commission’s Directorate General for Energy and Transport within its
Fifth Framework Programme (5th FP) for research and development.
MAEVA establishes a uniform framework for the validation of ATM concepts such as
A-SMGCS. This methodology is not only helpful to define a coherent Validation
Master Plan but also to provide guidelines along the entire validation process. This
methodology allows to ask the good questions related to validation and presents
concrete examples of applications of the methodology. Its step-by-step approach
helps the validation team to address the validation activity in an exhaustive way.
In the MAEVA’s Validation Guideline Handbook (VGH) [MAEVA], it is proposed a
five-step process for conducting validation exercises. These steps are as follows:
• Step 1: Define validation aims, objectives and hypotheses.
• Step 2: Prepare the validation plan and exercise runs.
• Step 3: Execute the exercise runs and take measurements.
• Step 4: Analyse results.
• Step 5: Develop and disseminate conclusions.

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The Validation Master Plan is the result of the step 1 of the MAEVA methodology. It
will allow to prepare the next validation steps from 2 to 5.
The Step 1 is devoted to obtaining an understanding of the ATM problem that needs
to be solved and the operational concept to address this problem. The process
related to step 1 is described Figure 1-1 provides information required for the
detailed design of the exercise in step 2.

validation team
development team
Understanding the customer
ATM Problem (4.1)

Understanding the
Operational Concept (4.1)

Identification of
Stakeholders (4.2)
ATM 2000+
Strategic
Identification of Validation
Objectives
Aim (4.3)

Identification of High Identification of Subsidiary

Level Objectives (4.4) Objectives (4.4)

Establishing Validation Identification of Low

Platform Requirements (4.5) Level Objectives (4.4)

Platform Identification of Identification of Metrics

Capabilities Hypotheses (4.7) / Indicators (4.6)
Operational
& statistical
significance
Definition of High Level
(4.9)
Experimental Design (4.8)

Figure 1-1 : Process Diagram for Step 1

During this step the ATM problem is decomposed into quantifiable high-level and
lower level objectives. Hypotheses associated with the lower level objectives are
set-up and metrics/indicators are identified, including the required measurements.
This step can be seen as the requirement specification of the validation exercise;
everything is known to plan and prepare the validation exercise in detail. It is an
important step to prevent obtaining results that do not help evaluating whether the
operational concept contributes to solving the ATM problem (garbage in, garbage
out).

1.4 Structure of the document

Introduction
Describes, in Chapter 1, the purpose of this document, its structure, the reference
documents and gives an explanation of terms used throughout the document.

Issues of the current situation

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Are presented in chapter 2, in terms of degradation of safety, airport capacity

shortfall, ATC procedures, technology deficiencies, technology cost, and aerodrome
activities coordination.

Operational concept for A-SMGCS implementation level I

Describes, in chapter 3, the objectives, services, roles of actors, operational
procedures, benefits, and level of maturity for A-SMGCS level I.

Identification of stakeholders
Lists, in chapter 4, the stakeholders involved in the acceptance of A-SMGCS level I.

Identification of validation aims

Describes, in chapter 5, the aims of the validation activity planned in this document.

Identification of high-level, low-level and subsidiary validation

objectives
Derives, in chapter 6, the validation aims the high and low levels objectives of the
validation.

Identification of metrics and indicators

Presents in chapter 7, the metrics and indicators that will be used to validate
each low-level objective of the validation.

Identification of hypotheses
Described, in chapter 8, are used in the statistical techniques of validation.

Definition of high-level experimental design

Presents, in chapter 9, the different exercises of validation.

1.5 Reference Documents

[VMP II] Validation Master Plan for A-SMGCS Implementation Level II

[MAEVA] MAEVA Validation Guideline Handbook
[D1] A-SMGCS Project Strategy
[D2] Definition of A-SMGCS Implementation Levels
[D3] A-SMGCS Level I Operational Concept and Requirements
[D4] A-SMGCS Level II Operational Concept and Requirements

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[D5] Functional Specification for A-SMGCS Implementation Level I

[D6] Functional Specification for A-SMGCS Implementation Level II
[A-SMGCS Proc] Current ATC Ground Procedures & the use of A-SMGCS Surveillance
Data
[ATCO Training] Implementation of A-SMGCS – ATCO Training and Licensing
Requirements.
[ATM-2000+] EUROCONTROL Air Traffic Management Strategy for the Years 2000+,
Volume 1 and 2, January 2000
[SRC] Safety Regulation Commission, Aircraft Accidents/Incidents and ATM
contribution: Review and Analysis of Historical Data, Edition 2.0, 19
October 2001.
[ICAO-A-SMGCS] ICAO European Manual on Advanced Surface Movement Control and
Guidance Systems (A-SMGCS) AOPG, Final Draft, Nov 2001
[EUROCAE-MASPS] EUROCAE WG-41, MASPS for A-SMGCS, Edition ED-87A, January
2001
[ICAO-Annex14] ICAO Annex 14, Volume I, Chapter 8
[ICAO-4444] ICAO Doc 4444-RAC/501 RULES OF THE AIR AND AIR TRAFFIC
SERVICES

1.6 Acronyms

ADS Automatic Dependent Surveillance

ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast
AOP Airport Operations Unit
AOPG ICAO Aerodrome Operations Group
AOT Airport Operation Team
A-SMGCS Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATCO ATC Controller
ATM Air Traffic Management
ATS Air Traffic Services
AVOL Aerodrome Visibility Operational Level
CDG Charles De Gaulle
CDM Collaborative Decision Making
ECAC European Civil Aviation Conference
ESARR Eurocontrol Safety Regulatory Requirements
EUROCAE European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
HMI Human Machine Interface
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
LVP Low Visibility Procedures

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MASPS Minimum Aviation System Performance Specification

R/T Radio Telephony
SMGCS Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems
SMR Surface Movement Radar
SRC Safety Regulation Commission

1.7 Explanation of terms

This section provides the explanation of terms required for a correct understanding
of the present document. Most of the following explanations are drawn from the A-
SMGCS manual [ICAO-A-SMGCS], the ICAO Annex 14 [ICAO-Annex14] or the
EUROCAE MASPS for A-SMGCS [EUROCAE-MASPS], in that case it is indicated
in the definition. [ICAO-A-SMGCS] definitions are used as a first option. In general,
other definitions are only used where there is no ICAO definition. If not, it is
explained why another definition is preferred to the ICAO one.
Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (A-SMGCS)
[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

Systems providing routing, guidance, surveillance and control to aircraft and

affected vehicles in order to maintain movement rates under all local weather
conditions within the Aerodrome Visibility Operational Level (AVOL) whilst
maintaining the required level of safety.
Aerodrome
[ICAO-Annex14] and [ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

A defined area on land or water (including any buildings, installations, and

equipment) intended to be used either wholly or in part for arrival, departure and
surface movement of aircraft.
Aerodrome movement
[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition addresses only aircraft movement, we extended the definition to all
mobiles.

The movement of a mobile (aircraft or vehicle) on the movement area.

Airport authority
[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

The person(s) responsible for the operational management of the airport.

Alert
[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

An indication of an existing or pending situation during aerodrome operations, or an

indication of abnormal A-SMGCS operation, that requires attention/action.
Alert Situation
[EUROCAE-MASPS] definition

Any situation relating to aerodrome operations which has been defined as requiring
particular attention or action.
Apron

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[ICAO-Annex14] and [ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

A defined area on a land aerodrome, intended to accommodate aircraft for purposes

of loading or unloading passengers, mail or cargo, fuelling, parking or maintenance.
A-SMGCS capacity
[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

The maximum number of simultaneous movements of aircraft and vehicles that the
system can safely support within an acceptable delay commensurate with the
runway and taxiway capacity at a particular aerodrome.
Conflict
[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

A situation when there is a possibility of a collision between aircraft and/or vehicles.

Control
[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

Application of measures to prevent collisions, runway incursions and to ensure safe,

expeditious and efficient movement.
Cooperative mobile
“Cooperative target” [EUROCAE-MASPS] definition in which “target” is replaced by “mobile” (see
mobile definition)

Mobile which is equipped with systems capable of automatically and continuously

providing information including its Identity to the A-SMGCS.
Note : as several cooperative surveillance technologies exist, a mobile is
cooperative on an aerodrome only if the mobile and the aerodrome are equipped
with cooperative surveillance technologies which are interoperable.
Cooperative surveillance
The surveillance of mobiles is cooperative when a sensor, named cooperative
surveillance sensor, collects information about the mobiles from an active element of
the transponder type which equips the mobiles. This technique allows to collect
more mobile parameters than the non-cooperative surveillance, for instance the
mobiles identity.
The cooperative surveillance may be :
Either dependant on the cooperative mobile, when the mobile automatically
generates the information and transmits it to the surveillance sensor, for
instance via ADS-B;
Or Non-dependant on the cooperative mobile, when the mobile is
interrogated by the surveillance sensor, for instance Mode S Multilateration.
False Alert
[EUROCAE-MASPS] definition

Alert which does not correspond to an actual alert situation.

Note : It is important to understand that it refers only to false alerts and does not
address nuisance alerts (i.e. alerts which are correctly generated according to the
rule set but are inappropriate to the desired outcome).

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Guidance
[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

Facilities, information and advice necessary to provide continuous, unambiguous

and reliable information to pilots of aircraft and drivers of vehicles to keep their
aircraft or vehicles on the surfaces and assigned routes intended for their use.
Identification
[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

The correlation of a known aerodrome movement callsign with the displayed target
of that mobile on the display of the surveillance system.
Identity
“Aircraft identification” [ICAO-4444] definition extended to all mobiles.

A group of letters, figures or a combination thereof which is either identical to, or the
coded equivalent of, the mobile call sign to be used in air-ground communications,
and which is used to identify the mobile in ground-ground air traffic services
communications.
Incursion
[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

The unauthorized entry by an aircraft, vehicle or obstacle into the defined protected
areas surrounding an active runway, taxiway or apron.
Intruder
Any mobile which is detected in a specific airport area into which it is not allowed to
enter.
Manoeuvring area
[ICAO-Annex14] and [ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

That part of an aerodrome to be used for the take-off, landing and taxiing of aircraft,
excluding aprons.
Mobile
A mobile is either an aircraft or a vehicle.
Note : when referring to an aircraft or a vehicle, and not another obstacle, the term
“Mobile” will be preferred to “Target”. The term “Target” will only be used when
considering an image of a mobile or other obstacle displayed on a surveillance
screen.
Movement area
[ICAO-Annex14] , [ICAO-4444] and [ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

That part of an aerodrome to be used for the take-off, landing and taxiing of aircraft,
consisting of the manoeuvring area and apron(s).
Non-Cooperative mobile
“Non-cooperative target” [EUROCAE-MASPS] definition in which “target” is replaced by “mobile” (see
mobile definition)

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Mobile which is not equipped with systems capable of automatically and

continuously providing information including its Identity to the A-SMGCS.
Non-Cooperative surveillance
The surveillance of mobiles is non-cooperative when a sensor, named non-
cooperative surveillance sensor, detects the mobiles, without any action on their
behalf. This technique allows to determine the position of any mobile in the
surveillance area and in particular to detect intruders. Examples of non-cooperative
surveillance sensors are the Primary Surveillance Radars.
Normal Visibility
Visibility conditions sufficient for personnel of control units to exercise control over
all traffic on the basis of visual surveillance (correspond to visibility condition 1
defined by ICAO [ICAO-A-SMGCS]).
Nuisance Alert
[EUROCAE-MASPS] definition

Alert which is correctly generated according to the rule set but are inappropriate to
the desired outcome.
Obstacle
[ICAO-Annex14] and [ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition extended to all mobiles.

All fixed (whether temporary or permanent) and mobile obstacles, or parts thereof,
that are located on an area intended for the surface movement of mobiles or that
extend above a defined surface intended to protect aircraft in flight.
Reduced Visibility
Visibility conditions insufficient for personnel of control units to exercise control over
all traffic on the basis of visual surveillance (correspond to visibility conditions 2, 3,
and 4 defined by ICAO [ICAO-A-SMGCS]).
Restricted Area
Aerodrome area where the presence of an aircraft or a vehicle is permanently or
temporarily forbidden.
Route
[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

A track from a defined start point to a defined endpoint on the movement area.
Runway Incursion
EUROCONTROL Runway Incursion Task Force definition
The unintended presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the runway or runway
strip.
Stand
[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

A stand is a designated area on an apron intended to be used for the parking of an

aircraft.
Surveillance

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[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

A function of the system which provides identification and accurate positional

information on aircraft, vehicles and obstacles within the required area.
Target
[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition (this definition has been preferred to the [EUROCAE-MASPS] definition)

An aircraft, vehicle or other obstacle, which image is displayed on a surveillance

display.
Note : when referring to an aircraft or a vehicle, and not another obstacle, the term
“Mobile” will be preferred to “Target”. The term “Target” will only be used when
considering an image of a mobile or other obstacle displayed on a surveillance
screen.
Validation (System)
EATMP Glossary document

The process of determining whether the requirements for a system or component

are complete and correct, the product of each development phase fulfil the
requirements or conditions imposed by the previous phase, and the final system or
component complies with specified requirements.
Verification
EATMP Glossary document

Confirmation by examination of evidence that a product, process or service fulfils

specified requirements.
VIS1, VIS2, VIS3, VIS4
[ICAO-A-SMGCS] definition

VIS1, VIS2, VIS3, VIS4 are the four visibility conditions defined by ICAO in [ICAO-A-
SMGCS].

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2. ISSUES OF THE CURRENT SITUATION

The objective of this section is to give a clear understanding of the ATM problem
that needs to be solved by the implementation of A-SMGCS. The ATM problem is
already presented in the “Strategy for A-SMGCS Implementation” document [D1] by
a description of the current issues in airport operations such as degradation of
safety, all visibility operation, capacity optimisation, ATC procedures,… These
issues are summarised hereafter.

2.1 Introduction

Despite implementation of SMGCS in the ECAC area, some European airports have
faced severe runways incursions lately which ended up as major incidents or
accidents. The escalating number of accidents and incidents on surface movements
has now become the biggest concern in terms of airport safety. The progressive
growth in traffic, the complexity of aerodrome layouts and the increasing number of
operations which take place in low visibility conditions are amongst the contributing
factors in the increasing number of ground incidents. The existing systems
demonstrate weaknesses in coping with the present situation and the future systems
should tackle the following concerns and needs.

2.2 Degradation of Safety

The Safety Regulation Commission (SRC) has recently carried out a study giving an
overview of safety data, aircraft accidents and incidents that have occurred in the
European Civil Aviation Conference region (ECAC) area over the last twenty years,
see [SRC].
As an indicative figure, this study shows that the number of ATM related incidents
collected by EUROCONTROL (referring to runway incursions) in the year 2000 were
more than double the ones recorded in 1999. The doubling of reported incidents is
perhaps also to be related to an increase in the incursion reporting rate (due to the
implementation of ESARR2).
Safety data for the year 2001 have not yet been published, but are expected to
follow the same trend, even if the 11th September events have produced a
temporary decrease in traffic. This document also highlights the relative importance
of accidents occurring during the taxi phase. Accidents during this phase in Western
Europe and North America represent two thirds of the world-wide number of
accidents.

2.3 Airport Capacity shortfall

Due to the current capacity shortfall in all the major ECAC airports, it is necessary to
generates efficient flows of aircraft from/to the runway to allow optimum arrival and
departure streams. By planning the traffic, it is possible to optimise aircraft routes on
the airport surface, and thus make a more efficient use of the airport capacity.
Moreover, in adverse meteorological conditions, the airport capacity is decreased by
the implementation of Low Visibility Procedures. Those procedures imply to reduce

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the number of mobiles on the manoeuvring area and to close several taxiways.
Therefore, those procedures curtail the airport capacity in reducing the aircraft
throughput under reduced visibility conditions.

2.4 ATC procedures

In order to cope with the increasing traffic and to enable airports to make the best
use of possible capacity set up by the aerodrome infrastructure, current ATCO
working practices have evolved. Those local practices such as multiple line-up or
conditional clearance have not yet been standardised. Consequently, they are not
always taken into account by the current SMGCS. For instance, in a multiple line-up
situation cleared by the controller, some conflict detection tools generate alarms. To
avoid being continually disturbed by these inappropriate alarms, controllers tend to
shut down this function in order to cope with the traffic.
The new procedures should allow controllers to issue clearances and instructions on
the basis of surveillance data alone. A-SMGCS will permit the implementation of
these new procedures and shall be aware of them in order to generate alarms only
in appropriate situations.

2.5 Technology Deficiencies

The major airports in the ECAC area comply with chapter 8.9 of [ICAO-Annex14]
which mentions that SMGCS shall be installed in airports according to the traffic
density, operation visibility conditions, layout complexity and ground vehicle traffic.
The most developed SMGCS in operation are currently based on a Surface
Movement Radar to monitor ground traffic movements (see requirements
concerning the provision of SMR [ICAO-Annex14]). This technology has presented
some deficiencies (loss of the target due to masking, plot clutter due to rain or grass
reflection, flight label overlap, etc.) and only a very small number of airports exploit
the fusion of data from other surveillance sensors. An even smaller number benefits
from flight tracking and correlation with flight plan data.
Those elements render the SMGCS surveillance function not very effective which,
combined with false alarms from any associated conflict detection and alerting
system, cause the ATCO to express a lack of confidence in the system.

2.6 Technology Cost

Equipment which tracks and displays non co-operative targets currently on the
markets is expensive and ATM providers or airports operators tend to reserve such
equipment for major airports.
Mid-size airports are usually not equipped with a SMGCS which means that
controllers and pilots should prevent runways incursions using visual observations
and complying with RT reports. The technology cost puts a brake on SMGCS
implementation and ATM providers or airports operators expect less expensive A-
SMGCS. They have high expectations in the actual experimentations, in particular
concerning the average cost of marine radar as a non cooperative surveillance
sensor.

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2.7 Aerodrome Activities Coordination

The improvement of coordination between all aerodrome activities requires the

sharing of operations data between the ATC and all airport operators. In particular,
there is a need from the flight dispatch/apron control service perspective to know the
availability of stands/parking areas in order to reduce taxi delays to a minimum. A
better coordination between ATCOs in charge of the manoeuvring area and the
apron area operators will contribute to optimising the airport resources and the flows
between both areas.

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3. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT FOR A-SMGCS IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL I

The growing occurrence of runway incursions combined with the relentless traffic
increase, the need to improve airport activities in low visibility conditions, the
emergence of new ATC procedures associated with the evolution of technology lead
to the necessary improvement in the current SMGCS. This improvement sets up the
Advanced SMGCS (A-SMGCS).
Aiming at coordinating and harmonising A-SMGCS implementation in Europe,
EUROCONTROL defined several levels of A-SMGCS implementation. The purpose
of the following sections is to describe the operational concept for A-SMGCS
implementation level I, and how this concept intends to address the ATM problem
describe in the previous chapter. This operational concept has been defined in [D3],
and is summarised hereafter.

3.1 Objectives

The A-SMGCS level I intends primarily to enhance safety and efficiency of ground
surface operations through the introduction of the surveillance service.
The main objective is to enhance ATM operations, in particular visual surveillance
(performed in SMGCS) by an automated system capable of providing the same level
of service in all-visibility operations.
Level I surveillance forms a pragmatic and basic first step in A-SMGCS
implementation, allowing the progressive introduction of other A-SMGCS services
such as Control and Guidance.

3.2 Services

At level I, A-SMGCS consists in the introduction of an automated system capable of

providing airport traffic situational awareness through the automated identification
and positioning of aircraft and vehicles within a predefined area of interest.
The area of interest considered at Level I is defined as follows :
- manoeuvring area for vehicles;
- movement area for aircraft.
At level I, situational awareness is provided only to ATCOs.
A-SMGCS level I will differ from an SMGCS in that it provides a surveillance service
that is effective over a much wider range of visibility conditions, traffic density and
aerodrome layout.
In particular, an A-SMGCS Level I should be able to assist the controller in
preventing collisions between all moving aircraft and vehicles especially in
conditions when visual contact cannot be maintained.
The application of A-SMGCS Level I will lead to reallocation of responsibilities for
positioning the mobiles when the controller cannot establish visual contact. Less

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reliance is placed on the ability of the pilot or control authority to provide a visual
surveillance function.

3.3 Roles of Actors

Actors take part in A-SMGCS operations as user or contributor. In A-SMGCS level I,

the main actor is the controller, as user of the surveillance service. The pilots and
the drivers will not be users of the system, but only contributor, and their role will be
impacted by the A-SMGCS implementation. Operators will also be needed for
configure the system. The role of all these actors is described in the following
sections.

3.3.1 Controllers
In the SMGCS current situation, the role of ATCO is to manage aircraft and vehicles
movements in the manoeuvring area with respect to safety requirements and
planning constraints.
With the implementation of A-SMGCS level I, the role of the controller will evolve in
the sense that the surveillance service will provide to the controller a new source of
data about the traffic situation in all visibility conditions. This new source of data will
complement and could even replace the usual sources of traffic data (Visual means,
Mobiles R/T reports).

Airport Traffic Context

Airport Traffic

Traffic Context Actions on

Position, Identity Traffic
of Mobiles

Traffic
Situation Surveillance
Picture Information

Air Traffic Controller

Figure 3-1 : ATCO role

As illustrated by the Figure 3-1, the traffic situation picture, containing traffic context,
position and identity of the mobiles, is provided by A-SMGCS to the controller to

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help him performing its Control task by actions on the traffic via R/T. The controller
uses this surveillance information as following :
• The controller analyses the global view of the traffic situation;
• The controller focuses on particular airport areas (runway for instance) or
mobiles (landing aircraft for instance) requiring his attention;
• The position of all the mobiles allows the controller to detect intruders, or
participating mobiles without authorisation;
• The identification of the mobile through its label allows the controller to
communicate with the mobile by R/T;
• The mobiles positions with respect to airport layout help the controller to set
up a traffic planning and provide guidance to the pilots / drivers;
• The controller monitors on the display that mobiles apply the clearances he
issued;
• Mobile position compared with airport layout allows the controller to check
the mobile is on the right way and to provide guidance to the pilot / driver;
• Mobile position compared with airport areas status allows the controller to
anticipate incursions in restricted areas and to alert the mobile;
• Mobile position compared with other mobiles position allows the controller to
inform the mobile on its surrounding traffic and to anticipate collisions with
other mobiles and to alert the mobile;
• Information on A-SMGCS status (failures,…) which could affect safety allows
the controller to apply the appropriate procedure.

3.3.2 Pilots and drivers

In the SMGCS current situation, the role of the pilot / driver is to navigate / drive his
aircraft / vehicle following ATCO instructions and clearances provided through R/T,
with the help of visual aids and ATCO. The use of a A-SMGCS level I by the
controllers will have the following impact on the pilot / driver role :
Reduction of R/T report
Since the controller knows the position and identity of mobiles provided by A-
SMGCS, it is possible that some mobile position reports not be necessary anymore.
This statement has to be confirmed by the definition of the procedures related to the
use of A-SMGCS.
Cooperative sensor checking
Since mobile are supposed to provide their identity through cooperative surveillance
sensors (see [D3]), aircrew and drivers should check that this piece of equipment
operates satisfactorily on board and should use it in the correct manner.

3.3.3 Other operators

If not automatic, one or more operators are needed to update the traffic context
required by A-SMGCS, this includes :

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• MET data, visibility conditions (including transition between visibility 1,2,3

and 4), …
• Airport Configuration : runway in use, open taxiways,…
• List of participating mobiles,…
The role of these operators is essential to configure the system, and provide up-to-
date information to the controller.

3.4 Operational Procedures

The implementation of A-SMGCS level I requires the review of SMGCS procedures

and the definition of a new set of operational procedures to be applied by ATC
controllers, pilots and vehicle drivers.
In addition, procedures benefiting from A-SMGCS surveillance service are being
harmonised on a European level. The activities on procedures are carried out by
EUROCONTROL in close cooperation with ICAO. The following section purpose is
to present the categories of procedures associated to A-SMGCS Level I.

3.4.1 Controller
The ATC ground procedures are defined in [A-SMGCS Proc]. This document aims
at establishing the chronological and operational practice currently in use by Airport
ATC, and how they are adapted or changed by applying future and expected A-
SMGCS surveillance capability. All the procedures from the initial clearance delivery
to the holding position and from clearing the runway to engine stop at the gate for
arrival are described :
Pre-departure
Push-back, Power back and Towed-out Clearance
Taxi Clearance
Control of taxiway intersection
TAXIING on the runway
LINE-UP Procedure from threshold
LINE UP Procedure from intersection
MULTIPLE line up
TAKE-OFF Clearance
INTERSECTION Take-off clearance
LANDING Clearance
CONDITIONAL Clearance
The above procedures will not change in VIS 1 and VIS 2 from the present
procedures (Pre-departure, push back or towed out, taxi clearance and control of
taxiway intersection, taxiing on runway) in the sense that the pilot will remain in
charge of visual ”separation”. The approved surveillance tool given to the controller

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will increase his situational awareness and decrease its workload in VIS 2 conditions
but the present sharing of responsibility will remain the same.
Under VIS1 and VIS 2 conditions, as far as the flight crew is concerned the present
ruling conditions “see and avoid” continue to be applied. To assume that clearances
can be executed with no potential conflict on the manoeuvring area, the ATC
controller can rely on the identified aircraft and vehicles positions on the surveillance
display under VIS 2, as he does in VIS 1 when the traffic is visible outside.

3.4.2 Pilots
In A-SMGCS level I, there will be limited changes to pilot responsibilities. As
explained in section 3.3.2, the pilot must check if the equipment operates correctly.
A-SMGCS category of each airport, defining its A-SMGCS level, and the aircraft
equipment required to interoperate, is expected to be determined in, for example,
the aeronautical publications. Procedures will be written to describe the use of the
A-SMGCS equipment in the aircraft.

3.4.3 Vehicle Drivers

In A-SMGCS level I, there will be limited changes to vehicle drivers responsibilities.
The driver must check if the A-SMGCS equipment of its vehicle operates correctly in
case it is equipped. Procedures will be written to describe the use of the A-SMGCS
equipment in the vehicle.

3.4.4 Other procedures

• Procedures to determine the A-SMGCS category of each airport (A-SMGCS
level, cooperative sensors,…). Aircraft will operate on different aerodromes,
not equipped with the same kind of A-SMGCS. Therefore, to facilitate
aircrew operations, A-SMGCS categories need to be defined corresponding
to the implementation levels (I / II / III / IV), as well as potentially required
aircraft equipment. A formal agreement that aircraft will be equipped to
provide cooperative surveillance (e.g. carriage of mode S transponder) may
be needed. Airport A-SMGCS category will be notified to airspace users in
order to allow aircrews to anticipate provided services and applicable
procedures.
• Procedures to provide A-SMGCS surveillance data to other users. Even if
Collaborative Decision Making is not expected to be implemented at level I,
surveillance data can be provided to other users such as airport operators,
airlines, handling agencies to support them in managing their fleets.
• Procedures for users training and licensing.

3.5 Benefits

The benefits expected from implementation of A-SMGCS level I will be mainly

associated with, but not limited to, safety and capacity issues at airports.
Significant improvements of aerodrome safety can be achieved under all visibility
conditions through enhanced ATCO’s situation awareness.
Usually airports declare 2 capacities. E.G, sample for one airport :

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• Normal ARRIVAL Capacity : 70 movements / hour

• ARRIVAL Capacity in LVP : 39 movements / hour
The number of movements cannot be reduced in one shot from 70 to 39. In reality,
there is a transition phase when evolving from good visibility conditions to LVP. LVP
is anticipated and the capacity is progressively reduced from 70 mvt/h to 39 mvt/h. A
controller provided with a surveillance service will have a better traffic situation
awareness, especially when the visibility is degrading. Therefore, it could be able to
better optimise the traffic and manage a maximum of movements when evolving
from good visibility conditions to LVP.
A-SMGCS implementation level I will also provide a basis for aerodrome activities
coordination. A-SMGCS will participate in the CDM process by sharing useful
information such as position and identity of mobiles. In particular, it will help in a
better coordination between ATCOs in charge of the manoeuvring area and the
apron area operators in order to optimise airport resources and the flows between
both areas. This is more part of the Collaborative Decision Making (CDM) concept
than A-SMGCS concept, and will not be addressed in the validation activity.
A-SMGCS level I will also have to take up a technical challenge in using efficient
technologies for a reasonable cost. It is essential to overcome the technology
deficiencies and reduce their cost (see chapter 2), to allow the implementation of A-
SMGCS in the ECAC area.

3.6 Level of maturity

A-SMGCS is currently being implemented at some major European airports such as

Heathrow and Roissy. However, the functions, performances and procedures may
differ from an airport to another one. EUROCONTROL intends to harmonise them,
that is why they need to be validated.
It is not the objective here to favour a specific technology supporting A-SMGCS level
I. However, to illustrate the operational A-SMGCS level I, here are some examples
of technologies :
o One or several Surveillance Movement Radars to detect any mobile,
including intruders ;
o Mode S multilateration as cooperative surveillance sensor to also
collect the identity of cooperative mobiles (most of aircraft are already
equipped with Mode S transponders).
Other technologies such as ADS-B / GNSS are also candidate for cooperative
surveillance in A-SMGCS.
A-SMGCS level I is a mature concept. This should benefit to the validation activity
addressed by the present document. The validation should concentrate its effort on
which has not been validated yet.

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4. IDENTIFICATION OF STAKEHOLDERS

ATM is a complex system involving many agencies, services and countries. If any
change in the operational concept is to be successfully brought into operation, it is
critical that all the actors who will be involved in its implementation and its use are
fully committed to its success. Validation exercises are frequently used as one of the
means to provide these actors with the necessary confidence in the concept.
These actors, or stakeholders, will be different according to the nature of the
operational concept and its intended role. If the stakeholders are identified at an
early stage in the validation exercise, and their needs considered at critical points,
the eventual outcome is more likely to be acceptable and convincing to all, thereby
minimising the problems for the eventual operational implementation of the concept.
The stakeholders identified in A-SMGCS implementation level I are ordered in the
following table, with their respective role related to A-SMGCS level I, according to
their level of involvement in A-SMGCS level I.

Stakeholders Role related to A-SMGCS level I

Airport Air Traffic Controllers Users of services provided by A-SMGCS.

Air Traffic Service Provider Train Air Traffic Controllers to use services provided by A-
SMGCS, provide and maintain Ground Equipment for A-
SMGCS.
Pilots Actors that are part of the system

Vehicle drivers Actors that are part of the system

Other A-SMGCS Operators Actors that are part of the system

Airlines Train aircrew. Equip and Operates aircraft

Airport Operators Train vehicle drivers. Equip and Operates vehicles

Population living in the Impacted by aircraft noise and gaseous emissions.

vicinity of airports
EUROCONTROL Coordinate and harmonise implementation of A-SMGCS
technologies and the associated procedures in Europe.
Table 1 – Role of Stakeholders

The ATM Problem and performance shortfalls will be understood and judged
differently according to these viewpoints, so it is important that these are all taken

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into account in setting the aims of the validation exercise. This can be presented in a
table giving for each stakeholder its acceptance / rejection criteria.

Stakeholders Acceptance / rejection criteria

Airport Air Traffic Controllers Usable HMI, compatible with other ATCO tools
Confidence in information provided on the HMI
Workload remains acceptable
Relevance of notifications of degraded mode
Air Traffic Service Provider Feasibility of equipment integration in existing ground
systems
Cost of equipment
Cost of maintenance
Cost of ATCO training
Gains in safety
Increased ground movement throughput
Pilots Simple, well defined, harmonised procedures
Workload remains acceptable
Gains in safety
Vehicle drivers Simple, well defined, harmonised procedures
Workload remains acceptable
Gains in safety
Other A-SMGCS Operators Simple, well defined, harmonised procedures
Workload remains acceptable
Airlines Cost of aircraft equipment
Cost of maintenance
Gains in safety
Cost / Time savings
Airport Operators Feasibility of equipment integration in vehicles
Cost of vehicles equipment
Cost of maintenance
Gains in safety
Cost / Time savings
Population living in the Aircraft noise
vicinity of airports Gaseous emissions
EUROCONTROL Validation of A-SMGCS concept (procedures + operational
requirements)
Table 2 – Stakeholders Acceptance / rejection criteria

As a conclusion, Identification of Stakeholders is necessary to ensure that all parties

relevant to the validation of the A-SMGCS concept are known so that they can
provide information and develop confidence in the proposed A-SMGCS concept in
meeting the operational needs.

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5. IDENTIFICATION OF VALIDATION AIMS

The ATM Problem, the Operational Concept and the Stakeholders, described in the
previous chapter, will set the context for the Identification of Validation Aims. The
purpose of this activity is to clarify what is to be achieved from the validation
exercise.
The validation aim is an unambiguous, qualitative definition of what is to be
achieved through the conduct of the validation exercise. In the context of A-SMGCS
validation, it is to provide information that demonstrates the feasibility of the
operational concept and that the concept provides a solution to the specific ATM
problem.
Before starting any validation exercise, the aim has to be clearly understood, agreed
and stated unambiguously. It will reduce the risk that the validation exercise will not
deliver what was expected.
The validation aims are to assess, demonstrate and confirm the :
• Ability of the technical system to fulfil the Operational Concept for A-SMGCS
level I ;
• Ability of the procedures to fulfil the Operational Concept for A-SMGCS level I ;
• Ability of the A-SMGCS Operational Concept to efficiently address the issues of
the current situation.
Validation will be with respect to the airport manoeuvring area, for all visibility
conditions, times of the day, aerodrome layouts and traffic densities.
EUROCONTROL also planned to perform a common Safety / Human Factors Case
for A-SMGCS implementation levels I and II. This activity is out of the scope of the
present document but linked to the Validation results. Indeed, the results of the
simulations and operational trials performed in the frame of the validation activity
should feed the Safety / Human Factors Case.

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6. IDENTIFICATION OF HIGH-LEVEL, LOW-LEVEL AND SUBSIDIARY

VALIDATION OBJECTIVES

6.1 Introduction

The purpose of this activity is to convert the Validation Aims, couched in qualitative
terms, into quantitative objectives that can be measured in a validation exercise.
From the validation aims defined in the previous chapter, high-level objectives may
be derived. Related to these strategic objectives are questions that contribute to the
validation aim. A question related to "safety" could be for example "will the new
operational concept reduce safety?".
Since it usually proves difficult to answer these questions immediately, lower level
objectives need to be derived. The lowest level objectives need to be parameters
that can be measured using a known technique. This may mean that more than one
detailing step is required. The decomposition should continue until the lowest level
objectives are measurable and related to elementary ATM items. This is when
feasible metrics and indicators can be identified (defined in chapter 0).
Through this, the objectives of the validation exercises will be clearly defined and
the parameters to be measured, that will address the high-level objectives, will be
specified. This is illustrated in the following figure :

Figure 6-1 : Relationship between Higher Level Objectives, Lower Level Objectives and
Metrics/Indicators

This activity aims at providing a structured hierarchy of objectives for A-SMGCS

level I validation. These objectives are presented in the following sections.

6.2 High-level objectives of the validation process

The high-level objectives of the validation process could be grouped in three

categories:
• Feasibility

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• Benefits
• Cost efficiency

6.2.1 Feasibility
The validation process will demonstrate the feasibility of A-SMGCS Implementation
Level I. Both technical and human aspects of the feasibility will be assessed. The
validation will confirm that A-SMGCS level I correctly works according to the
operational and functional requirements.
The feasibility of the integration of A-SMGCS level I in existing ATC systems,
vehicles and aircraft has already been demonstrated at operational airport platform
such as Heathrow or Roissy airports. Therefore, it will not be an objective of the
validation, but simply verified.
The Human Factors (procedures, workload, training, situational awareness etc. for
controllers) will be evaluated to ensure that the A-SMGCS services are acceptable
by the users : ATCOs. Other A-SMGCS actors (pilots, and vehicles drivers) have a
minor contribution to A-SMGCS level I, thus it does not seem necessary to evaluate
their human factors. It is out of the scope of the present validation activity.
A particular emphasis will be placed upon the validation of A-SMGCS related
procedures, with the view to providing the data necessary to support their
submission to ICAO. Therefore, the validation will confirm the ability of the system
and the procedures to fulfil the A-SMGCS Operational Concept.
Technical feasibility :
• To validate the functional requirements
• To validate the operational requirements
Human Factors :
• To validate the controller procedures (including training,…)
• To assess acceptance from actors

6.2.2 Benefits
The validation shall not only demonstrate that A-SMGCS works, but also it brings
benefits. The strategic objectives of the A-SMGCS are to optimise the airport
capacity in maintaining or even increasing safety of operations, minimizing the costs
and the impact on environment.

6.2.2.1 Safety
The objective is to minimise the air navigation services’ contribution to the risk of an
aircraft accident as far as it is reasonably practicable. The target will be to improve
safety levels by ensuring that ATM induced accident and incident rates do not
increase and, wherever possible, will even decrease. It will be achieved through the
assessment and mitigation of the risks associated with the introduction of changes
in technology and operations.
The improvement of safety could be monitored by the occurrence of runway
incursions which is, by far, the most dangerous and hazardous situations for

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airplanes and passengers. The occurrence of runway incursions represents an

efficient and reliable key performance indicator for ground safety management.

6.2.2.2 Capacity
As stated in the EUROCONTROL ATM 2000+ Strategy [ATM-2000+], capacity is a
complex mix of access to airports, airspace and services, predictability of schedules,
flexibility of operations, flight efficiency, delay and network effects. The strategic
objective regarding airport capacity is stated so as to enable airports to make the
best use of possible airside and landside capacity, as determined by the
infrastructure in place, political/environmental restrictions and the economic
response to the traffic demand.
The measurement of airport delay due to ground taxiing and operations, especially
during reduced visibility conditions, will constitute an efficient key performance
indicator of the A-SMGCS impact on capacity.

6.2.2.3 Environment
The steady growth in air travel demand leads to more intense aircraft operations at
and around airports, where they are most noticeable to the public. Even though
aircraft have become less noisy over the past two decades, the compounded effects
of more movements over longer periods of the day and night have increased the
disturbance. This has fuelled the resistance in the population living in the vicinity of
an airport to further expansion of the facility and its operations.
At the same time there is greater awareness of citizen’s rights and political influence
through action groups. This trend is expected to become stronger in the near future.
At a local level, this may turn into a volatile mix bearing a substantial risk for the
sustainability of further airport expansion and traffic growth. If not handled with
political skill, great care, courage and sincerity, the environmental factor will stand in
the way of further growth until the advent of newer and quieter aircraft/engine
combinations. It is important in this context that airports actively address the
environmental issue before it becomes a real problem. Once the confidence and
goodwill of those living within the vicinity of the airport have been lost it will take a
long and costly battle to restore them. The environmental protection requirements
are expected to become the most important constraint to the further growth of
commercial aviation.
The strategic objective is to sustain the expansion of airport airside capacity despite
more stringent environmental requirements through :
a) new technology application;
b) improved procedures;
c) better utilisation of improved aircraft operational capabilities.
A-SMGCS will contribute to attaining the overall environmental target. The
surveillance service provided to ATCO by A-SMGCS level I should help him to
optimise each ground movement. This will participate to mitigate the environmental
impact of noise and gaseous emissions per aircraft operation at and around airports.
The key performance indicators shall be, for instance, the average taxiing time and
the average holding time.

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6.2.3 Economics/Cost-effectiveness
It is not enough to demonstrate the benefits of the A-SMGCS, its implementation will
only be performed if its cost is acceptable. The economic strategic objective is to
minimise the direct and indirect airport and mobile A-SMGCS-related costs per
aircraft operation. In particular, it means that each airport will not implement the
same A-SMGCS in terms of cost according to the number of aircraft operations. The
cost-effectiveness is the ability to provide an agreed level of service at the least cost
over the long term, given safety and environmental constraints. The coordination
and harmonisation of the A-SMGCS implementation in Europe will contribute to its
cost-effectiveness.
However, the cost analysis is out of the scope of the validation activity addressed in
the present document. The results of such a study rely on each aerodrome
specificities. Therefore, ATS providers have the responsibility to perform a cost
assessment and balance it against the expected benefits before implementing A-
SMGCS level I at each airport.

6.3 Low-level objectives of the validation process

6.3.1 Technical feasibility

6.3.1.1 To validate functional requirements

The functions and associated functional requirements defined in [D5] shall be
validated.
Each functional requirement should be derived in low level validation objectives in
order to determine the metrics / indicators to be measured in order to validate the
requirement.
This activity is obvious for performance requirements. For instance, for the “Fn_Perf-
10-Response Time to Operator Input” requirement, the metric to be measured will
be the Response Time to Operator Input, and it shall be demonstrated that the value
required (250ms) is achieved.
This is less trivial for other types of requirements. For instance, for a “pure”
functional requirement such as “Fn-16-Display Airport traffic situation : This function
shall display the complete airport traffic situation.”, it shall be verified that the
function “Interface with user” displays all the elements of the airport traffic situation.
For each functional requirement, the metrics / indicators will be determined when
preparing the validation exercise(s) addressing the validation of functional
requirements.

6.3.1.2 To validate operational requirements

The operational requirements defined in [D3] shall be validated. The operational
requirements are broken down into the following categories :
Operational Definitions Abbreviations
Requirements Op_
Categories
Services They define the services to be provided to the users Serv

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requirements
Operational range These requirements define the operational range Range
covered by the systems, they fix the operational limits
of the system
Responsibilities Requirements related to assignment of responsibilities Resp
when using A-SMGCS
Interfaces Requirements related to interfaces between A-SMGCS If
and users or other systems
Performances These requirements define the performances to be Perf
fulfilled by A-SMGCS at an operational level
Monitoring Requirements related to monitoring of A-SMGCS Mon
equipment, Quality of Service, Performances,…
Environmental Requirements related to interference between A- Env
constraints SMGCS and its environment
Design They are not “pure” operational requirements but more Ds
general principles on system design
System evolution They are not “pure” operational requirements but more Evo
general principles on future evolutions of the system
Table 6-1: Categories of Operational Requirements

Each operational requirement should be derived in low level validation objectives in

order to determine the metrics / indicators to be measured in order to validate the
requirement. This activity is obvious for performance requirements. For instance, for
the “Op_Perf-05-Position Accuracy” requirement, the metric to be measured will be
the position accuracy, and it shall be demonstrated that the value required (12m) is
achieved. This is less trivial for other types of operational requirements. For each
one, the metrics / indicators will be determined when preparing the validation
exercise(s) addressing the validation of operational requirements.
The operational requirements rely on assumptions which will also have to be
validated.

6.3.2 Human Factors

6.3.2.1 To validate the ATC ground procedures

The ATC ground procedures defined in [A-SMGCS Proc] shall be validated. These
procedures will be applied during representative scenarios in order to check whether
they are applicable and safe. Each procedure will be tested separately and through
sequences of procedures for representative aircraft movement scenarios (e.g. a
typical arrival from approach to gate and a typical departure from gate to take-off).
These procedures are very sensitive to visibility conditions and thus will have to be
assessed during all visibility conditions.
Possibly these procedures could be improved. This will be also assessed. In
particular, procedures such as line up from intersection, multiple line up, and
conditional clearance could be less constrained in their applications. For instance, it
will give the opportunity to go through the constraint of “visual observation” imposed
by ICAO DOC4444 7.1.1.2.
Moreover, the impact of A-SMGCS breakdown on procedures will be assessed.
During validation and in particular under reduced visibility conditions, it will be

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observed how the ATCO manage the transition period from a situation when using
the A-SMGCS surveillance service to a situation when this service is not available
anymore.

6.3.2.2 To validate the training and licensing procedures

Procedures for A-SMGCS actors training and users licensing will have to be written
before the validation activity in order to be validated. Concerning the controller,
these procedures will be based on the requirements described in [ATCO Training].

6.3.2.3 To verify acceptance from ATCO

To verify acceptance from ATCO, the ATCO participating to the validation will be
provided with an efficient and usable Human Machine Interface (HMI). This is a
prerequisite to :
To verify the procedures are acceptable ;
To verify the workload decreases or remains acceptable ;
To asses the transition between VIS1 to VIS2 ;
To assess other negative effects of A-SMGCS equipment on ATCO.

6.3.3 Safety

6.3.3.1 To assess the improvement of ATCO’s Situational Awareness

The A-SMGCS aptitude of displaying on a screen the exact picture of the ground
traffic provides the ground controller with an accurate traffic situation. This capability
enhances the controller’s situation awareness and improves overall ATC safety.
In normal visibility conditions, the A-SMGCS can be used as a backup to what the
ground controller sees from the tower window. It allows the ground controller to spot
more easily the vehicles which could sometimes be difficult to detect with the naked
eye especially when the taxiway and runway layouts are very intricate.
In reduced visibility conditions, the use of a A-SMGCS allows the ground controller
to provide the same quality of control as in normal visibility conditions.

6.3.3.2 To assess the reduction of the number of incidents on the manoeuvring area
There are reported cases of reduced visibility conditions during which collisions
between aircraft and vehicles were or could have been prevented thanks to the use
of an A-SMGCS.
The most frequently quoted incidents related to reduced visibility conditions are :
• Planes backtracking or crossing on a runway (without informing air traffic
control) when others are cleared to land or takeoff,
• Aircraft and airport service vehicles lost on the runways, thus requiring the
airport to close down for a time,
• Runway confusion by the pilots,

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• Runway vehicle intrusion as a result of a mistake or a control

misunderstanding.

6.3.4 Capacity
A controller provided with a surveillance service will have a better traffic situation
awareness, especially when the visibility is degrading. Therefore, it could be able to
better optimise the traffic and manage a maximum of movements when evolving
from good visibility conditions to LVP.

6.3.4.1 To assess whether each control unit can take in charge a greater number of
aircraft
Under specific circumstances, mainly when the ground controller encounters
difficulties in establishing visual contact (night, degrading visibility conditions, hidden
areas, etc.) with taxiing aircraft, the use of an A-SMGCS allows the ground controller
to track aircraft on the manoeuvring area. This increases controllers’ awareness of
traffic situation and consequently allows them to handle more aircraft.

6.3.4.2 To assess aircraft delay reduction, diversion avoidance

For a fixed demand from the airlines, the provision of extra capacity brings about a
reduction in total delays. This reduction of total delays would be particularly
substantial in reduced visibility conditions during which ATC capacity is curbed. In
some cases, it could even prevent some aircraft from flying in holding patterns and
would thus reduce the risk of diversion.

6.3.5 Environment
The aircraft operations at airport impact the environment through noise and gaseous
emissions. A-SMGCS level I is expected to contribute to reduce this environmental
impact. This will be assessed during the validation activity :

6.3.5.1 To assess the reduction of noise impact on environment

The surveillance service provided to ATCO by A-SMGCS level I should help him to
optimise each ground movement and reduce the traffic congestions especially when
the visibility conditions are degrading. Therefore, each aircraft is expected to spend
less time on the airport platform with its engines on, and thus reducing its noise
impact.

6.3.5.2 To assess the reduction of gaseous emissions

As for noise, each aircraft being expected to spend less time on the airport platform
and on holding paths with its engines on, the gas emissions per aircraft operation
are supposed to be reduced.

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7. IDENTIFICATION OF METRICS AND INDICATORS

The purpose of this activity is to convert the low level objectives defined in section 6.3 into metrics and indicators that can
be measured on a validation platform. For each validation objective, a set of relevant metrics is established. For each
metric, it is interesting to qualify it by attributes:
o Objective metrics: relate directly to the performance of the A-SMGCS system, or part of it. They are derived from
measurements.
o Or Subjective metrics: Opinion requested and response based on subjective viewpoint of the data provider.
o Quantitative: numerically expressed values.
o Or Qualitative: text based descriptions or opinions (e.g. opinion about perceived workload).

For each validation objectives, the metrics are presented in the following table.

High level objectives Low-level objectives Metrics / Indicators Attributes

To validate functional For each requirement, the low level objectives and metrics / indicators will be determined when preparing the validation exercise(s)
requirements addressing the validation of functional requirements.
For instance, for a performance requirement, the metric is the associated performance parameter.
To validate operational
requirements

To validate the To validate the ATC ground procedures Metrics to validate procedures cannot be identified at this stage. The
procedures To validate the other operators procedures procedures have firstly to be written and then tested during operational
scenarios.
To validate the training and licensing procedures

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High level objectives Low-level objectives Metrics / Indicators Attributes

To verify the procedures are acceptable Verbal description on what the participant do Subjective, Qualitative
and why (after exercise)
Opinion requested after the exercise
To verify acceptance To verify the workload decreases or remains acceptable Measured User Workload Objective, Quantitative
from ATCO Global feeling of workload Subjective, Qualitative
Communications Time on R/T for each aircraft Objective, Quantitative
To assess other negative effects of A-SMGCS equipment Questionnaire about other negative effects Subjective, Qualitative
on ATCO
To assess the improvement of ATCO’s Situational User feeling on his situational awareness Subjective, Qualitative
To assess the benefits Awareness
in terms of safety
To assess the reduction of the number of incidents on the Number of incidents on the manoeuvring area Objective, Quantitative
manoeuvring area
To assess whether each control unit can take in charge a Maximum number of aircraft taken in charge Objective, Quantitative
greater number of aircraft by a control unit during reduced visibility
conditions Objective, Quantitative
Maximum number of aircraft taken in charge
by a control unit during good visibility
conditions Objective, Quantitative
To assess the benefits Number of Aircraft movements at peak hours Objective, Quantitative
in terms of capacity Peak hour demand realised / Scheduled peak
hour capacity
To assess aircraft delay reduction, diversion avoidance ATC delay (only Departure?) per aircraft Objective, Quantitative
Holding time per aircraft
Number of diversions Objective, Quantitative
Objective, Quantitative

To assess the reduction of noise impact on environment Holding time / optimum holding time (%) Objective, Quantitative
To assess the benefits
in terms of environment To assess the reduction of gaseous emissions Holding time / optimum holding time (%) Objective, Quantitative
Taxi time / optimum taxi time (%) Objective, Quantitative

Figure 7-1 : Metrics and Indicators

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8. IDENTIFICATION OF HYPOTHESES

The purpose of this activity is to convert the low-level objectives into a rigorous
mathematical framework that can be tested using statistical techniques.
The effect of introducing the A-SMGCS application and the operational procedures
they support will be examined in the context of the exercise 2 (section 9.3) by
comparing a Baseline organisation (SMGCS environment) with the Advanced
organisation (A-SMGCS environment) in different visibility conditions.

8.1 Statistical analysis aims

Statistical analysis embodies both descriptive and inferential statistics:

o Descriptive statistics enables to describe the gathered measurements by
their average, variance, with the help of graphs and histograms.
o Inferential statistics enables to draw conclusion about a large group of
subjects on the basis of measurements from a small sample.
Inferential statistics enable to draw conclusion with a specified level of confidence,
that a particular measurement made under the baseline experimental conditions
really differs from a measurement made under the advanced experimental
conditions.
This confidence level relates to the fact that there is always the possibility that a
difference between the measurements simply occurred by chance. Hence,
conclusions are stated with an associated probability. This is the probability that the
observed difference between the measurements of the two systems would have
occurred by chance if there was, in reality, no difference between the systems. The
level of statistical significance chosen for each test will be set at p < 5%, as usually
accepted in the ATM validation community.
Formally, the statement that there is no statistically significant difference between
two sets of measurements is stated as a « null hypothesis » (H0). An « alternative
hypothesis » (H1) describes a contradiction of the null hypothesis, i.e. that there is a
statistically significant difference between the two sets of measurements. The
process of statistical inference either accepts the null hypothesis or rejects it in
favour of the alternative hypothesis.
The effect of introducing the A-SMGCS application and related procedures will be
examined by comparing Baseline environment with Advanced (Adv.) environment in
different visibility conditions (visibility conditions 1,2 and 3)1.
The effect of different visibility conditions will be examined by comparing Advanced
V1 (visibility 1) vs. Advanced V2 (visibility 2) vs. Advanced V3 (visibility 3)
environments. This further comparison between different visibility conditions into the
Advanced environment aims to refine results obtained through the first set of
hypotheses (comparing Baseline environment with Advanced environment).

1
Four visibility conditions have been defined by ICAO. However, as the fourth one correspond to a situation in which control
and mobiles movements are no more possible, only the first three visibility conditions will be simulated.

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The low-level objectives studied below are those allowing to measure potential
difference between Baseline and Advanced environments. It excludes low-level
objectives such as technical feasibility, other operators procedures and training and
licensing procedures.

8.2 Human Factors Investigation

o Does the A-SMGCS application decrease ATCOs’ workload (per aircraft) or

remain acceptable ?
o Are the procedures related to the use of A-SMGCS application acceptable
(appropriate) for ATCOs ?
In order to examine the controller workload, subjective and objective measurements
will be conducted. The following null hypotheses (H0) will be stated to statistically
test the data, using data pooled across controller rotation and traffic volumes. H1
refers to the alternative hypothesis which will be accepted if the H0 is rejected.

8.2.1 Workload
Baseline vs. Adv.
- H0 : There is no difference of workload between the Baseline and the
Advanced environments.
- H1 : The workload is different as an effect of introducing the A-SMGCS
application and related procedures.
Adv. (V1) vs. Adv. (V2) vs. Adv. (V3)
- H0 : There is no difference of workload between different visibility
conditions.
- H1 : Workload is different, depending on visibility conditions.
The statistical tests will be applied separately for low, medium and high traffic load
for each of the workload measurements described in Chapter 7. Separate analyses
will be conducted for each controller working position.

8.2.2 Acceptance of procedures

The hypotheses of acceptance will apply to the distributions of controller responses
to the individual questionnaire items. For each item, the following hypotheses will be
tested:
Baseline vs. Adv.
- H0 : There is no difference in the frequency of positive and negative
controller responses between the Baseline and the Advanced environments.
- H1 : There is a difference in the frequency of positive and negative
controller responses.
Adv. (V1) vs. Adv. (V2) vs. Adv. (V3)
- H0 : There is no difference in the frequency of positive and negative
controller responses between different visibility conditions.

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- H1 : The frequency of positive and negative controller responses is

different, depending on visibility conditions.
The test will be applied using the subjective indicators of acceptance of procedures
as described in Chapter 7.

8.3 Safety Investigation

o Does the aptitude of A-SMGCS application to provide an accurate traffic

situation enhance the ATCOs’ situation awareness ?
o Does the use of A-SMGCS application induce a significant reduction of
number of incidents on the manoeuvring area ?
The following set of hypotheses will be tested, using data pooled across the
controller rotation and the traffic volumes.

8.3.1 ATCOs’ situation awareness

Baseline vs. Adv.
- H0 : There is no difference in terms of ATCOs’ situation awareness
between the Baseline and the Advanced environments.
- H1 : The ATCOs’ situation awareness is different as an effect of
introducing the A-SMGCS application and the related procedures.
Adv. (V1) vs. Adv. (V2) vs. Adv. (V3)
- H0 : There is no difference of ATCOs’ situation awareness between
different visibility conditions.
- H1 : ATCOs’ situation awareness is different, depending on visibility
conditions.
The tests will be applied using the subjective and objective indicators of situation
awareness as described in Chapter 7.

8.3.2 Incidents on the manoeuvring area

Baseline vs. Adv.
- H0 : There is no difference in terms of number of incidents on the
manoeuvring area between the Baseline and the Advanced environments.
- H1 : The number of incidents on the manoeuvring area is different as
an effect of introducing the A-SMGCS application and the related
procedures.
Adv. (V1) vs. Adv. (V2) vs. Adv. (V3)
- H0 : There is no difference of number of incidents between different
visibility conditions.
- H1 : The number of incidents is different, depending on visibility
conditions.
The statistical tests will be applied in the same way on low, medium and high traffic
load for the objective indicators described in Chapter 7.

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8.4 Capacity Investigation

o Does the use of A-SMGCS application allow the airport to maintain

throughput in all visibility conditions ?
- Can each control unit take in charge a greater number of a/c
without discomfort or impairing safety due to the A-SMGCS
environment and concept ?
o Does the use of A-SMGCS application induce a significant reduction of total
delays (particularly in reduced visibility conditions) ?
First, the capacity measures of each organisation within the same traffic sample and
controller will be compared. The following null hypotheses (H0) will be stated to test
statistically the capacity data, using data pooled across the controller rotation and
the traffic volumes. H1 refers to the alternative hypothesis which will be accepted if
the H0 is rejected.

8.4.1 Airport throughput

Baseline vs. Adv.
- H0 : There is no difference in terms of airport throughput between the
Baseline and the Advanced environments.
- H1 : The airport throughput is different as an effect of introducing the
A-SMGCS application and related procedures.
Adv. (V1) vs. Adv. (V2) vs. Adv. (V3)
- H0 : There is no difference of airport throughput between different
visibility conditions.
- H1 : Airport throughput is different, depending on visibility conditions.
The statistical tests will be applied in the same way on medium and high traffic load
for the objective indicators described in Chapter 7.

8.4.2 Delays
Baseline vs. Adv.
- H0 : There is no difference in terms of total delays between the
Baseline and the Advanced environments.
- H1 : Total delays are different as an effect of introducing the A-
SMGCS application and related procedures.
Adv. (V1) vs. Adv. (V2) vs. Adv. (V3)
- H0 : There is no difference of total delays between different visibility
conditions.
- H1 : Total delays are different, depending on visibility conditions.
The statistical tests will be applied in the same way on medium and high traffic load
for the objective indicators described in Chapter 7.

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8.5 Environment Investigation

o Does the use of A-SMGCS application induce a significant reduction of noise

impact on environment ?
o Does the use of A-SMGCS application induce a significant reduction of
gaseous emissions at and around the airport ?
The following set of hypotheses will be tested, using data pooled across the
controller rotation and the traffic volumes.

8.5.1 Noise impact

Baseline vs. Adv.
- H0 : There is no difference in terms of noise impact on environment
between the Baseline and the Advanced environments.
- H1 : The noise impact on environment is different as an effect of
introducing the A-SMGCS application and the related procedures.
Adv. (V1) vs. Adv. (V2) vs. Adv. (V3)
- H0 : There is no difference of noise impact on environment between
different visibility conditions.
- H1 : Noise impact on environment is different, depending on visibility
conditions.
The tests will be applied using the objective indicators of noise impact as described
in Chapter 7.

8.5.2 Gaseous emissions

Baseline vs. Adv.
- H0 : There is no difference in terms of gaseous emissions between the
Baseline and the Advanced environments.
- H1 : Gaseous emissions are different as an effect of introducing the A-
SMGCS application and the related procedures.
Adv. (V1) vs. Adv. (V2) vs. Adv. (V3)
- H0 : There is no difference of gaseous emissions between different
visibility conditions.
- H1 : Gaseous emissions are different, depending on visibility
conditions.
The tests will be applied using the objective indicators of gaseous emissions as
described in Chapter 7.

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9. DEFINITION OF HIGH-LEVEL EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

This step identifies the evaluation exercises and validation environments required to
validate A-SMGCS level I.

9.1 Validation techniques

This section justifies the choice of the validation techniques and of a coherent set of
validation exercises which should offer a quite complete coverage of all the
validation objectives.
It is deemed obvious that validation of operational requirements requires shadow
mode trials or live trials in a real operational environment. On the other hand, an
assessment of overall efficiency of the procedures should benefit from real-time
human-in-the-loop simulations.

9.2 Validation exercises

Three validation exercises are proposed, comprising a fast-time simulation, a real-

time simulation and an operational trial. These exercises can be carried out
sequentially or in parallel for some of them. They can also be performed extensively
from the first to the last one, but they do not necessarily have to. The fast-time
simulation can be considered as optional. On the other hand, given the maturity of
the operational concept, it seems advisable to plan a real-time simulation and an
operational trial. It is also recommended to have the real-time simulation preceded
by a pre-experimental phase (i.e. pre-exercise testing) in order to pre-test the whole
environmental simulation platform in terms of reliability, quality of the systems,
training and procedures.

9.2.1 Fast-time simulation (optional)

Fast-time simulation (exercise 1) is suitable for a preliminary assessment of great
number of options. Its aim is to evaluate the performance related to the introduction
of A-SMGCS application through a mathematically model. This exercise enables to
assess ideal throughput of a given airport and to correlate the data collected with
those obtained through the real-time simulation. Provided the models used are
representative for the conditions being investigated, it could give an indication of the
possible gain margin between an ideal throughput in a flawless environment (in
which all systems and operators always respond in the most efficient way) and the
throughput obtained in a real-time simulation environment.
The results obtained by fast-time simulation for A-SMGCS level I could be used in
the future for comparison with A-SMGCS level III and IV when validating these
implementation levels in the future.

9.2.2 Real-time simulation

Real-time simulation (exercise 2) involves the participation of actors (controllers,
pilots…) performing their operational tasks in a realistic environment. Hypotheses
related to human factors objectives can be tested in addition to safety, capacity and

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environment objectives. This exercise uses a baseline system to carry out a relative
type of analysis. Two environments are used, a baseline (SMGCS) and an
advanced one (i.e. without and with A-SMGCS application), so as to compare both
results and determine whether there is a difference between them, i.e. whether the
introduction of A-SMGCS application brings some benefits or not. In the SMGCS
baseline, the ATC controllers are only provided with the display of mobiles’ position
without their identity (e.g. Surface Movement Radar without labels providing targets’
identity)
This exercise is intended to assess the following issues:
- A-SMGCS related procedures
- A-SMGCS transition from VIS1 to VIS2
- A-SMGCS breakdown and in particular the transition from a situation with the
surveillance service to a situation without the surveillance service in visibility
conditions 2.

9.2.2.1 ATM platform

The validation platform to be used in real-time simulation should use a test-bench
which offers a realistic environment of simulation. It should be an airport test-bench
dedicated to aeronautical control system and addressing airport events (e.g. aircraft
and vehicles movements, aircraft states, some meteorological parameters…).
The airport simulator should be equipped with a system capable of reproducing the
external view that controllers have in tower. This system enables the controllers to
have a direct access to information from the airport platform2.

9.2.2.2 Airspace and platform model

Several configurations (e.g. two for Roissy airport: face to East and face to West)
will allow to assess a wide range of operational situations.
For example, for an airport like Roissy Charles-de-Gaulle, composed of two sets of
two mixed-mode runways, only the south area of the airport will be concerned. The
north area of the airport comprising the north set of runways will not be simulated.

9.2.2.3 Simulated traffic data

Scenarios will be build from real traffic samples which will be modelled so as to
obtain medium to high traffic loads. Towed aircraft and vehicles will be added.
Events such as runway incursions will be included.
Among these scenarios, some of them will be planned to be used as exercises for
training.

9.2.3 Operational trial

Operational trial (exercise 3) is an important exercise, the closest to real operations.
It implies that previous simulations have already assessed and validated the new
concept and its related procedures. The operational trials will mainly validate the

2
This proposal stems from the experience of the CENA about real-time simulations on the airport simulator it has developed:
the SALSA – SALADIN platform settled in a 3D simulation environment.

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technical feasibility of A-SMGCS (technical feasibility implies the system is able to

fulfil the required operational performances, which can only be validated during
operational trials).

9.3 Focus of Validation Exercises

The tables below present the validation objectives studied in the validation
exercises. To stress to which extent the objectives will be studied, the level of focus
of each validation objective is specified.

Exercise 1 : Fast-time Simulation (optional)

Technique Fast-time simulation
Objective To assess an optimal throughput of a representative airport (or more)
through the use of appropriate models (airport and controller activity) in
order to compare the data collected with those of real-time simulation.
High level validation objectives Level of focus
To provide information about airport throughput. Collect information

Exercise 2 : Real-time Simulation (Comparison Baseline/Adv.)

Technique Real-time simulation
Pre- To assess the reliability of the whole system and the applicability
experimental and effectiveness of A-SMGCS related procedures.
phase
To consolidate the A-SMGCS related procedures and to measure
benefits of introducing A-SMGCS application through the use of
Objective two simulation environments - SMGCS (Baseline) and A-SMGCS
Experimental (Advanced Organisation).
phase To assess A-SMGCS transition from VIS1 to VIS2.
To assess A-SMGCS breakdown and transition issues from a
nominal situation (with surveillance service) to a non nominal
situation (without surveillance service).
Validation point of view ATC Controllers
High level validation objectives Level of focus
To ensure that the A-SMGCS related procedures are applicable and Focus
effective.
To assess the increase of safety in ground operations specially in Focus
reduced visibility conditions (e.g. number of runway incursions).
To assess the increase of throughput in reduced visibility conditions. Focus
To assess the reduction of noise and gaseous emissions in reduced Focus
visibility conditions.
To provide information about ATCO workload. Collect information

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To provide information about situational awareness. Collect information

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Exercise 3 : Operational Trials

Technique Operational trials in a large airport (Roissy, Heathrow…)
Objective To consolidate A-SMGCS related procedures in a real environment in all
expected operational situations (including a variety of visibility conditions,
technical and human factors events).
Validation ATC Controllers, Pilots, Vehicle Drivers
point of view
High level validation objectives Level of focus
To verify technical feasibility of A-SMGCS level I. Focus
To ensure that the A-SMGCS application and related Focus
procedures are acceptable by ATCO.
To verify that the application fulfil performance and safety Collect information
requirements.
To assess the increase of safety in ground operations specially Collect information
in reduced visibility conditions (e.g. number of runway
intrusions).
To assess the increase of throughput in reduced visibility Collect information
conditions.
To assess the reduction of noise and gaseous emissions in Collect information
reduced visibility conditions.

Focus: this objective is a target objective so that hypotheses and related indicators
or metrics will be defined and analysed to try to provide response.
Collect information: this validation objective is not a target objective of the exercise
but it will be partially studied. Some data will be collected to provide first results (i.e.
tendency).

Warning: Focusing on a validation objective does not mean that it is easy to find
relevant indicators or metrics. Therefore, the table does not prejudge on the quality
of the results and on the level of confidence to be given to the answer to the related
hypothese(s). It is particularly true for the safety objectives.
Each exercise is further detailed in Annex, specifying how the steps are to be
undertaken, when they will be performed and the responsibilities in the exercise.

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9.4 Planning

The validation timeframe is expected to be from 01/11/2003 to 31/07/2005. The

following chart present the planning for A-SMGCS level I Validation within this time
frame. This is just an example based on the validation exercises provided in Annex.
2004 2005
Nº Nom de la tâche Durée 42 45 48 51 2 5 8 11 14 17 20 23 26 29 32 35 38 41 44 47 50 53 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
1 Exercice 1 : Fast-Time Simulation (Optional) 6,05 mois
2 Validation of the simulator 4 mois
3 experimental phase 1 jour
4 final report 2 mois
5 Exercice 2 : Real-Time Simulation 8,75 mois
6 describe airspace model 4 mois
7 define the simulation data (e.g. traffic samples, scenarios…) 1 mois
8 pre-experimental phase 0,25 mois
9 experimental phase 0,5 mois
10 final report 4 mois
11 Exercice 3 : Operational Trial 13 mois
12 experimental phase 9 mois
13 final report 4 mois

Figure 9-1 : VMPI planning

Appendix A Example of Validation Exercises

Exercise 1 (optional)

How the steps could be undertaken

Approach, method(s), Fast-time technique
technique(s) and
tool(s) used Factors to be varied:
- Traffic load
- ATCO model

Quantitative data analyses

Runs Series of fast-time assessments
Procedures to ensure Validate data and analyse output of the model used so as to verify
quality of the work representativeness for the conditions being investigated

When the steps could be performed

Planning of tasks - Definition of a baseline
- Definition of the number of scenarios
Key decision points
The milestones in the - Validation of the simulator (assumed to be already developed) :
project minimum 4 months
- Execution of the exercise : 1 day simulation
- Delivery of the final report 2 months (full-time effort) after the end
of the exercise
Responsibilities in the exercise

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Resources - 1 technical manager responsible for the mathematical model

design of the fast-time simulator
- 1 expert having an in-depth knowledge of A-SMGCS
developments, requirements and familiar with contemporary A-
SMGCS surveillance systems and procedures
Input and/or co- 1 or 2 controllers to assess realism and suitability of the model
operation expected according to the validation objectives
from third parties
Prerequisites for each The fast-time simulator is assumed to be already developed
step of the validation To carry out a comparison between theoretical throughput obtained in
process fast-time simulation including A-SMGCS, throughput measured in real-
time simulation with A-SMGCS and real throughput in real
environment, same airport environment has to be used in the model

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Exercise 2

How the steps could be undertaken

Approach, method(s), Real-time simulation
technique(s) and Comparison between Baseline and Advanced environments
tool(s) used
Factors to be varied:
- Traffic load
- Visibility conditions
- Roles on controllers positions (Ground and Local positions)
- Disturbing events (e.g. runway incursion, towed aircraft with gate
problem)

Qualitative and quantitative analyses

- Qualitative data : observations, verbalisations, briefings,
questionnaire
- Quantitative data : automatic data logging of events related to the
use of the available functions

Traffic samples : 24 traffic samples could be defined :

- 4 low loaded samples for training purposes
- 20 simulation exercises meant for validation runs
- Each sample lasts 30 to 45 minutes

Number of experimental sessions :

- 1 experimental session of 10 days (1 to 4 days for training3 and
5,5 days for simulation runs)
- 1 set of 3 controllers
Training Pilots’ training4: 2 days before the simulations
- Experimental context
- Pilots’ role
- Airport map
- HMI
- Training exercises

Controllers’ training: 4 days training

- Project presentation
- Experimental and environmental context
- HMI principles
- Controller’s role
- HMI training
- Procedures
- Training exercises

3
Training time will depend on the familiarity the controllers will have with HMI and whether they are experienced with SMGCS or
not.
4
Pilots (pseudo-pilots) are in charge of several aircraft each. They are trained to the Human-Machine Interface allowing them to
guide aircraft according to ATCO instructions.

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Runs 2 controllers rotate on control position to assess the different

-
scenarios (at least one Local and one Ground controllers are
required to participate to the validation, even if the simulation run
focuses on one of the controller. This is important because local
and ground controllers interact during the procedures, and so it
could have an impact on the validation results).
- The runs could take place during 5,5 days, preceded by the 4
days of training phase.
Procedures to ensure - Evaluate the products of system development activity to determine
quality of the work correctness and consistency with respects to the specifications
provided as input to that activity.
- Implement a pre-experimental phase before the experimental
phase to assess realism and technical quality of the test-bench
(response times, bugs, restarting, traffic levels, scenarios, pilots’
behaviour…):
o 1 week for training and simulation runs
o 3 weeks to make and test the changes (ahead the
experimental phase)
o participation of some controllers involved in the project team
and aware of the objective of this pilot phase, pilots, 1 expert
controller, 1 ergonomics and technical engineers
When the steps could be performed
Planning of tasks - 4 months to describe the airspace model
- 3 days/scenario (e.g. traffic samples). Total time to define
simulation data depending on the number of scenarios
- 1 week for the pre-experimental phase preceding the experimental
phase (3 weeks ahead at least)
- 10 days for the experimental phase, comprising the training phase
(4 days) and the simulation phase (5,5 days with 2 runs per half
day)
Key decision points Validation of procedures during pre-experimental phase
The milestones in the - Acceptance of the validation platform
project - Execution of the exercise : 1day for pilots training + 10 days for
simulation
- Delivery of the final report 4 months (full-time effort) after the end
of the exercise
Responsibilities in the exercise

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 Validation Master Plan for A-SMGCS Implementation DSA / AOP
Level I

Resources - 3 controllers (2 Ground controllers + 1 Local controller)

- 5 pilots (4 could be necessary per run)
- Experimental team:
o 1 technical manager responsible for the test-bench
supervision
o 1 or 2 computer engineer responsible for pilot environment
design
o 1 computer engineer responsible for controller environment
design
o 1 human factors (ergonomics) expert responsible for
preparation, training and follow up of the experiment
o 1 expert controller with good knowledge of simulation
context (responsible for the definition of traffic samples and
related scenarios) and playing the role of Wizard of Oz5
o 1 expert having an in-depth knowledge of A-SMGCS
developments, requirements and familiar with
contemporary A-SMGCS surveillance systems and
procedures
Input and/or co- 1 or 2 controllers to assess realism and suitability of traffic samples
operation expected according to the validation objectives
from third parties
Prerequisites for each - Preliminary assessment of the procedures.
step of the validation - Representative prototype system is tested in a relevant
process environment.

5
The Wizard of Oz is in charge of generating some events described in validation scenarios such as incidents on the
manoeuvring area. He/she is equipped with tools and HMI allowing him/her to guide vehicles on airport platform.

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 DSA / AOP Validation Master Plan for A-SMGCS Implementation
Level I

Exercise 3

How the steps could be undertaken

Approach, method(s), Operational trial:
technique(s) and - Small scale trial6 (one airport, delimited areas of the airport,
tool(s) used limited to specific flights…) and/or full implementation in order to
gain experience and collect data on how the A-SMGCS
application and associated procedures work in the real
environment.

Conditions of trial:
- All visibility conditions
- Normal conditions to bad conditions (i.e. controlled failure of
equipment)

Qualitative and quantitative analyses

- Qualitative data : observations, verbalisations, briefings,
questionnaire
- Quantitative data
Training Necessary, except if participants are already familiar with the system
and concepts.

Drivers’ training if not familiar with the system.

Controllers’ training: time devoted to training depends on the difference

between the current system and the new one. Also depends on
whether controllers already participated to previous real-time
simulation exercises on the system
Runs The runs could take place for several months (to be defined), preceded
by a training phase.
Procedures to ensure Preliminary phase of technical feasibility validation for verification of
quality of the work functional and operational requirements.
Then, involvement of ATCO for a full system validation.
When the steps could be performed
Planning of tasks At least 6 months for the operational trial, including the training phase
Key decision points Acceptance of the preliminary phase of technical validation
- Acceptance of the validation platform
- Execution of the exercise : 6 months for operational trial
- Delivery of the final report 4 months (full-time effort) after the end
of the exercise
Responsibilities in the exercise

6
Small-scale trial is optional in case airport platform is not already equipped with A-SMGCS application. Transition to full
operational implementation is made after smaller scale trials proved beneficial.

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 Validation Master Plan for A-SMGCS Implementation DSA / AOP
Level I

Resources - Controllers (all or some selected ones)

- Experimental team:
o 1 technical manager responsible for the test-bench
supervision
o 1 or 2 computer engineer responsible for pilot environment
design
o 1 computer engineer responsible for controller environment
design
o 1 human factors (ergonomics) expert responsible for
preparation, training and follow up of the experiment
o 1 expert controller with good knowledge of simulation
context
o 1 expert having an in-depth knowledge of A-SMGCS
developments, requirements and familiar with
contemporary A-SMGCS surveillance systems and
procedures
Input and/or co- - 1 or 2 controllers to assess realism and suitability of traffic samples
operation expected according to the validation objectives
from third parties
Prerequisites for each - Actual system prototype near, or at, planned operational system.
step of the validation - Preliminary assessment of the procedures.
process
- Implementation of one or more validation exercises (real-time and
possibly fast-time) demonstrating that the system is workable from
a technical, safety, human factors and benefits viewpoint.
- Safety and human factors assessment demonstrates no major non
solved problems.

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