234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Miguel vs. Catalino

No. L-23072. November 29, 1968.

SIMEON B. MIGUEL, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.

FLORENDO CATALINO, defendant-appellee.

Rules of Court; Appeal; Effect of direct appeal to Supreme

Court upon findings of fact of trial court.—In case of a direct
appeal from the trial court to the Supreme Court and the value of
the property involved in the controversy does not exceed
P200,000.00, only issues of law are reviewable by the Supreme
Court, the findings of fact of the trial court being conceded by the
appellant (Jacinto v. Jacinto, 105 Phil. 1218; Del Castillo v.
Guerro, L-11994, 25 July 1960; Abuyo et al. v. De Suazo, L-21202,
29 Oct. 1966; 18 SCRA 600, 601).
Evidence; Decision of barrio council respecting fact of
ownership and possession of real property is inadmissibility.—The
decision of a barrio council, respecting the settlement of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land, is ultra vires
because barrio councils, which are not courts, have 110 judicial
powers (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, Constitution. Sec Sec. 12 Rep. Act 2370
otherwise known as the Barrio Charter). Therefore, said decision,
if introduced as an exhibit, is not admissible in a judicial
proceeding as evidence for ascertaining the truth respecting the
fact of ownership and possession (See. 1, Rule 128, Rules of
Court).
Civil law; Laches; Elements; Where the four elements of laches
were applied; Case at bar.—As in De Lucas v. Gamponia. 100 Phil.
277, the four elements of laches are present in the case at bar,
namely: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under
whom he claims, giving- rise to the situation of which complaint is
made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (b) delay in
asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice, of the defendant's conduct and having been
afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (c) lack of knowledge or
notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would
assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (d) injury or
prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred. In the case at
bar, Bacaquio sold the land in 1928 but the sale is void for lack of
the governor's approval. The vendor, and also his heirs after him,
could have instituted an action to annul the sale from that time,
since they knew of the invalidity of the sale, which is a matter of
law; they did not have to wait for 34 years to institute suit. The
defendant was made to feel secure in the belief that no action
would be filed against him by such passivity, and also because he
"bought" again the land in 1949 from Grace Ventura who alone
tried to question his ownership; so that the defendant will be
plainly prejudiced in the event the present action is not held

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VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 29, 1968 235

Miguel vs. Catalino

to be barred (See Go Chi Gun v. Co Cho, 96 Phil. 622; De Lucas v.

Gamponia, supra).
Same; Prescription distinguished from laches.—The defense
of laches applies independently of prescription. Laches is different
from the statute of limitations. Prescription is concerned with the
fact of delay, whereas laches is concerned with the effect of delay.
Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a question of
inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being
founded on some change in the condition of the property or the
relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not.
Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law.
Prescription is based on fixed time, laches is not (30 C.J.S., p. 522,
See also Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 2, 5th ed., p. 177,
cited in Nielson & Co., Inc. v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co.,
L-21601, 17 Dec. 1966, 18 SCRA p. 1040).
 Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu; Sections 145 (b)
and 146, same Code, applied; Sale of land by a non-Christian
inhabitant without approval of provincial governor; Legal effect;
Where action for recovery of possession of land registered under
Act 496 was considered barred; Case at bar.—In the present case,
the sale of the land in 1928 by Bacaquio (a non-Christian
inhabitant) to Catalino Agyapao, defendant's father, is null and
void ab initio, for lack of executive approval (Mangayao, et al. v.
Lasud, et al., L-19252, May 29, 1964). The laws applicable to the
said sale are: Section 145 (b) of the Administrative Code of
Mindanao and Sulu, providing that no conveyance or
encumbrance of real property shall be made in that department
by any non-christian inhabitant of the same, unless, among other
requirements, the deed shall bear indorsed upon it the approval of
the provincial governor or his representative duly authorized in
writing for the purpose; Section 146 of the same Code, declaring
that every contract or agreement made in violation of Section 145
"shall be null and void"; and Act 2798, as amended by Act 2913,
extending the application of the above provisions to Mountain
Province and Nueva Viscaya.
Since the 1928 sale is technically invalid, Bacaquio remained,
in law, the owner of the land until his death in 1943, when his
title passed on, by the law on succession, to his heirs, the
plaintiffs-appellant's.
Notwithstanding the errors aforementioned in the appealed
decision, we are of the opinion that the judgment in favor of
defendant-appellee Florendo Catalino must be sustained. For
despite the invalidity of his sale to Catalino Agyapao, father of
defendant-appellee, the vendor Bacaquio suffered the latter to
enter, possess and enjoy the land in question without protest,
from 1928 to 1943, when the seller died; and the appellants, in
turn, while succeeding the deceased, also remained inactive,

236

236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Miguel vs. Catalino

without taking any step to reivindicate the lot from 1944 to 1962,
when the present suit was commenced in court. Even granting
appellant's proposition that no prescription lies against their
father's recorded title, their passivity and inaction for more than
34 years (1928-1962) justifies the defendant-appellee in setting up
the equitable defense of laches in his own behalf. As a result, the
action of plaintiffs-appellants must be considered barred and the
Court below correctly so held. Courts can not look with favor at
parties who, by their silence, delay and inaction, knowingly
induce another to spend time, effort and expense in cultivating
the land, paying taxes and making improvements thereon for 30
long years, only to spring from ambush and claim title when the
possessor's 'efforts and the rise of land values offer an opportunity
to make easy profit at his expense (De Lucas v. Gamponia, supra).

DIRECT APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First

Instance of Baguio. Kayonan, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Bienvenido L. Garcia for plaintiffs-appellants.
     Moises P. Cating for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeal from the judgment in Civil Case No. 1090 of

the Court of First Instance of Baguio, dismissing the
plaintiffs' complaint for recovery of possession of a parcel of
land, registered
1
under Act 496, in the name of one
Bacaquio, a long-deceased illiterate non-Christian resident
of Mountain Province, and declaring the defendant to be
the true owner thereof.
On January 22, 1962, appellants Simeon, Emilia and
Marcelina Miguel, and appellant Grace Ventura brought
suit in the Court below against Florendo Catalino for the
recovery of the land above-described, plaintiffs claiming to
be the children and heirs of the original registered owner,
and averred that defendant, without their knowledge or
consent, had unlawfully taken possession of the land,
gathered its produce and unlawfully excluded plaintiffs
therefrom. Defendant answered pleading ownership and
adverse possession for 30 years, and counterclaimed for
attorney's fees. After trial the Court dismissed the
complaint, declared defendant to be the rightful owner, and

________________
 1 No surname.

237

VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 29, 1968 237

Miguel vs. Catalino

ordered the Register of Deeds to issue a transfer certificate

in lieu of the original. Plaintiffs appealed directly to this
Court, assailing the trial Court's findings of fact and law.
As found by the trial Court, the land in dispute is
situated in the Barrio of San Pascual, Municipality of
Tuba, Benguet, Mountain Province and contains an area of
39,446 square meters, more or less. It is covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 31, which was issued on 28
December 1927 in the name of Bacaquio (or Bakakew), a
widower. No encumbrance or sale has ever been annotated
in the certificate of title. 2
The plaintiff-appellant Grace Ventura is the only child
of Bacaquio by his first wife, Debsay, and the other
plaintiffs-appellants, Simeon, Emilia and Marcelina, all
surnamed "Miguel", are his children by his third wife,
Cosamang. He begot no issue with his second wife,
Dobaney. The three successive wives have all died.
Bacaquio, who died in 1943, acquired the land when his
second wife died and sold it to Catalino Agyapao, father of
the defendant Florendo Catalino, for P300.00 in 1928. Of
the purchase price P100.00 was paid and receipted f or
when the land was surveyed, but the receipt was lost; the
balance was paid after the certificate of title was issued. No
formal deed of sale was executed, but since the sale in
1928, or for more than 30 years, vendee Catalino Agyapao
and his son, defendant-appellee Florendo Catalino, had
been in possession of the land, in the concept of owner,
paying the taxes thereon and introducing improvements.
On 1 February 1949, Grace Ventura, by herself alone,
"sold" (as per her Transferor's Affidavit, Exhibit "6") anew
the same land for P300.00 to defendant Florendo Catalino.
In 1961, Catalino Agyapao in turn sold the land to his
son, the defendant Florendo Catalino.
 This being a direct appeal from the trial court, where
the value of the property involved does not exceed
P200,000.00, only the issues of law are reviewable by the
Su-

________________

2 Local custom in the place is for a person to adopt a surname of his

choice, even if it is not that of the father, if he has any. (Decision, Record
on Appeal, p. 17.")

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238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Miguel vs. Catalino

preme Court, the findings of fact of the court a quo being

deemed conceded by the appellant (Jacinto v. Jacinto, 105
Phil. 1218; Del Castillo v. Guerro, L-11994 25 July 196.0;
Abuyo, et al. v. De Suazo, L-21202, 29 Oct. 1966; 18 SCRA
600, 601). We are thus constrained to discard appellant's
second and third assignments of error.
In their first assignment, appellants assail the
admission in evidence over the objection of the appellant of
Exhibit "3". This exhibit is a decision in favor of the
defendant-appellee against herein plaintiff-appellant Grace
Ventura, by the council of Barrio of San Pascual, Tuba,
Benguet, in its Administrative Case No. 4, for the
settlement of ownership and possession of the land. The
decision is ultra vires because barrio councils, which are
not courts, have no judicial powers (Sec. 1, Art. VIII,
Constitution; see Sec. 12, Rep. Act 2370, otherwise known
as the Barrio Charter). Therefore, as contended by
appellants, the exhibit is not admissible in a judicial
proceeding as evidence for ascertaining the truth
respecting the fact of ownership and possession (Sec. 1,
Rule 128, Rules of Court).
Appellants are likewise correct in claiming that the sale
of the land in 1928 by Bacaquio to Catalino Agyapao,
defendant's father, is null and void ab initio, for lack of
executive approval (Mangayao, et al. vs. Lasud, et al.,
L19252, 29 May 1964). However, it is not the provisions of
the Public Land Act (particularly Section 118 of Act 2874
and Section 120 of Commonwealth Act 141) that nullify the
transaction, for the reason that there is no finding, and the
contending parties have not shown, that the land titled in
the name of Bacaquio was acquired from the public domain
(Palad vs. Saito, 55 Phil. 831). The laws applicable to the
said sale are: Section 145 (b) of the Administrative Code of
Mindanao and Sulu, providing that no conveyance or
encumbrance of real property shall be made in that
department by any non-christian inhabitant of the same,
unless, among other requirements, the deed shall bear
indorsed upon it the approval of the provincial governor or
his representative duly authorized in writing for the
purpose; Section 146 of the same Code, declaring that every
contract or agreement made in vio-

239

VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 29, 1968 239

Miguel vs. Catalino

lation of Section 145 "shall be null and void"; and Act 2798,
as amended by Act 2913, extending the application of the
above provisions to Mountain Province and Nueva Vizcaya.
Since the 1928 sale is technically invalid, Bacaquio
remained, in law, the owner of the land until his death in
1943, when his title passed on, by the law on succession, to
his heirs, the plaintiffs-appellants.
Notwithstanding the -errors aforementioned in the
appealed decision, we are of the opinion that the judgment
in favor of defendant-appellee Florendo Catalino must be
sustained. For despite the invalidity of his sale to Catalino
Agyapao, father of defendant-appellee, the vendor Bacaquio
suffered the latter to enter, possess and enjoy the land in
question without protest, from 1928 to 1943, when the
seller died; and the appellants, in turn, while succeeding
the deceased, also remained inactive, without taking any
step to reivindicate the lot from 1944 to 1962, when the
present suit was commenced in court. Even granting
appellants' proposition that no prescription lies against
their father's recorded title, their passivity and inaction for
more than 34 years (1928-1962) justifies the
defendantappellee in setting up the equitable defense of
laches in his own behalf. As a result, the action of
plaintiffs-appellants must be considered barred and the
Court below correctly so held. Courts can not look with
favor at parties who, by their silence, delay and inaction,
knowingly induce another to spend time, effort and expense
in cultivating the land, paying taxes and making
improvements thereon for 30 long years, only to spring
from ambush and claim title when the possessor's efforts
and the rise of land values offer an opportunity to make
easy profit at his expense. In Mejia de Lucas vs. Gamponia,
100 Phil. 277, 281, this Court laid down a rule that is here
squarely applicable:

"Upon a caref ul consideration of the facts and circumstances, we

are constrained to find, however, that while no legal defense to
the action lies, an equitable one lies in f avor of the def endant
and that is, the equitable defense of laches. We hold that the
defense of prescription or adverse possession in derogation of the
title of the registered owner Domingo Mejia does not He, but that
of the equitable defense of laches. Otherwise stated. we hold that
while defendant may not be considered as having acquired title by
virtue of his and his predecessors' long con

240

240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Miguel vs. Catalino

tinued possession for 37 years, the original owner's right to

recover back the possession of the property and title thereto from
the defendant has, by the long period of 37 years and by
patentee's inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale
demand."
3
As in the Gamponia case, the four -elements of laches are
present in the case at bar, namely: (a) conduct on the part
of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims. giving
rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for
which the complaint seeks a remedy; (b) delay in asserting
the complainant's rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice, of the defendant's conduct and having
been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (c) lack of
knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his
suit; and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the
event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is
not held to be barred. In the case at bar, Bacaquio sold the
land in 1928 but the sale is void for lack of the governor's
approval. The vendor, and also his heirs after him, could
have instituted an action to annul the sale from that time,
since they knew of the invalidity of the sale, which is a
matter of law; they did not have to wait for 34 years to
institute suit. The defendant was made to feel secure in the
belief that no action would be filed against him by such
passivity, and also because he "bought" again the land in
1949 from Grace Ventura who alone tried to question his
ownership; so that the defendant will be plainly prejudiced
in the event the present action is not held to be barred.
The difference between prescription and laches was
elaborated in Nielson & Co., Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated
Mining Co., L-21601, 17 December 1966, 18 SCRA p. 1040,
as follows:

"Appellee is correct in its contention that the defense of laches

applies independently of prescription. Laches is different from the
statute of limitations. Prescription is concerned with the fact of
delay, whereas laches is concerned with the

_________________

3 See Go Chi Gun vs. Co Cho, 96 Phil. 622; Mejia vs. Gamponia, ante.

241

VOL. 26, NOVEMBER 29, 1968 241

Miguel vs. Catalino

effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is

principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be
enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in the
condition of the property or the relation of the parties.
Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity,
whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on fixed
time laches is not, (30 C.J.S., p. 522. See also Pomeroy's Equity
Jurisprudence, Vol. 2, 5th ed., p. 177)" (18 SCRA 1053).

With reference to appellant Grace Ventura, it is well to

remark that her situation is even worse than that of her co-
heirs and co-plaintiffs, in view of her executing an affidavit
of transfer (Exh. 6) attesting under oath to her having sold
the land in controversy to herein defendantappellee, and
the lower Court's finding that in 1949 she was paid
P300.00 for it, because she, "being a smart woman of
enterprise, threatened to cause trouble if the defendant
failed to give her P300.00 more, because her stand (of being
the owner of the land) was buttressed by the fact that
Original Certificate of Title No. 31 is still in the name of
her father, Bacaquio" (Decision, Record on Appeal, p. 24).
This sale, that was in fact a quitclaim, may not be
contested as needing executive approval; for it has not been
shown that Grace Ventura is a non-christian inhabitant
like her father, an essential fact that cannot be assumed
(Sale de Porkan vs. Yatco, 70 Phil. 161, 175).
Since the plaintiffs-appellants are barred from recovery,
their divestiture of all the elements of ownership in the
land is complete; and ,the Court a quo was justified in
ordering that Bacaquio's original certificate be cancelled,
and a new transfer certificate in the name of Florendo
Catalino be issued in lieu thereof by the Register of Deeds.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed
decision is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
plaintiffsappellants.

          Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar,

Sanchez, Fernando and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
     Castro, J., did not take part.

Decision affirmed.

Note.—See the annotation on "Doctrine of Laches," 5

SCRA 57-65.

242