S. HRG.

111–557

CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY

THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES

HEARING
BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 2, 2010

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 SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah

RON WYDEN, Oregon OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
EVAN BAYH, Indiana SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
BILL NELSON, Florida JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio
MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio
JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio

DAVID GRANNIS, Staff Director

LOUIS B. TUCKER, Minority Staff Director
KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, Chief Clerk

(II)

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 CONTENTS

FEBRUARY 2, 2010

OPENING STATEMENTS
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, A U.S. Senator From California ................. 1
Bond, Hon. Christopher S., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Missouri ....... 3

WITNESSES
Blair, Dennis, USN (RET.), Director of National Intelligence ............................. 7
Panetta, Leon, Director, Central Intelligence Agency .......................................... 11
Mueller, Robert S., III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation ..................... 12
Burgess, Ronald, USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency ............................ 13
Dinger, John, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Re-
search .................................................................................................................... 15

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Prepared statement of Dennis Blair, USN (RET.), Director of National Intel-
ligence ................................................................................................................... 44
Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department
of Justice ............................................................................................................... 90
Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the Federal Courts, 2009 Update and Recent
Developments ....................................................................................................... 126
Examples of Leaks in Federal Terrorism Cases ................................................... 131
Prepared statement of Hon. Russ Feingold, a U.S. Senator from Wisconsin ..... 134

(III)

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 CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL
SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 2010

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in Room
SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne Fein-
stein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Rockefeller,
Wyden, Mikulski, Feingold, Whitehouse, Bond, Hatch, Snowe and
Risch.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN,
CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Chairman FEINSTEIN. The hearing will come to order. The com-
mittee meets today in open session to receive the coordinated ana-
lytic assessment of the intelligence community of the threats facing
the United States.
We welcome our witnesses, Admiral Dennis Blair, the Director of
National Intelligence, who will provide a summary of the written
statement he has submitted on behalf of the intelligence commu-
nity; the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Leon Panetta;
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bob Mueller;
the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant Gen-
eral Ron Burgess; and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research, Ambassador John Dinger.
This hearing presents an annual opportunity to focus on the
threats our nation faces, and it provides a rare forum for the public
to receive strategic intelligence analysis. I think that right now the
top threat on everyone’s mind is the heightened terrorism threat,
especially against our own homeland. The committee has held
hearings in the past two weeks to review the Christmas Day at-
tempted attack by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and the Fort Hood
shootings by United States Army Major Nidal Hassan. We have
also reviewed the attack on CIA’s Khowst base in eastern Afghani-
stan on December 30th, the most deadly attack against CIA per-
sonnel in decades.
These three events are reminders of the ongoing threat the na-
tion faces from within and without and the challenges and dangers
with which the intelligence community must deal on a daily basis.
We’ve been briefed on the continuing terrorist threat, and I want
to thank Director Mueller for our discussion yesterday. I received
a lengthy follow-up briefing on the status of ongoing terrorism in-
(1)

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 2

vestigations and intelligence we’ve received as part of those inves-

tigations.
I know this is a very sensitive matter and will ask if members
who have questions relating to counterterrorism operations will
hold them until we can go to a classified session at the end. The
written testimony submitted to us today provides an important re-
minder stating that—and I quote—‘‘the recent successful and at-
tempted attacks represent an evolving threat in which it is even
more difficult to identify and track small numbers of terrorists, re-
cently recruited and trained, and short-term plots than to find and
follow terrorist cells engaged in plots that have been going on for
years.’’
Our committee stands ready and willing to provide the tools, gen-
tlemen, you need to make sure our counterterrorism efforts are the
very best they can be. Despite the Christmas Day and Fort Hood
intelligence shortcomings, the intelligence community has thwarted
numerous terrorist plots and apprehended several suspects in
2009. And I’d like to tick a few off: al-Qa’ida operative Najibullah
Zazi, living outside Denver, was identified through good intel-
ligence work as having trained in Pakistan and conspiring with
others to detonate a bomb in the United States. Two of Zazi’s asso-
ciates were arraigned in January, and his father also has been
charged.
Secondly, Chicago-based David Headley was identified for his in-
volvement in the Lashkar-e-Taiba attacks on Mumbai in 2008 and
for his connection to a plot to bomb a Danish newspaper. Three,
14 people were charged in Minnesota this year for recruiting So-
mali-American youth to travel to Somalia, train and fight alongside
terrorist groups. In October, Tarek Mehanna was arrested in Bos-
ton and charged with plotting to attack shopping malls and seeking
out terrorist training.
In September, Hosam Maher Husein Smadi was arrested for
plotting to bomb a Dallas skyscraper. And earlier in the year, Dan-
iel Boyd was identified as having traveled to terrorist training
camps and plotting an attack on U.S. military personnel at the
Quantico Marine Base. He was charged, along with six others, on
charges that include conspiring to provide material support to ter-
rorists. So clearly, there have been both counterterrorism successes
and a few failures. Also clear is that the threat to the homeland
is high and that terrorist groups have identified ways of getting op-
erators and facilitators into the country without raising suspicion.
Let me shift from terrorism to the topic that DNI Blair high-
lights in his written testimony, the threat to our government, pub-
lic and private sector from cyber espionage, crime and attack. Di-
rector, your description of the problem is very blunt, and I believe
it to be accurate. The need to develop an overall cyber security
strategy is very clear. This committee has carefully examined cyber
security through five hearings in the past year, carefully reviewed
various cyber attacks and penetrations from foreign actors and ap-
pointed a cyber task force of three members—Senators Whitehouse,
Mikulski and Snowe—to conduct a six-month analysis of our gov-
ernment’s current plans. The task force will be reporting to the full
committee shortly.

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 3

It is my belief—and I think the belief of others—that certain na-

tions represent serious cyber attack potential to our country. And
I believe that robust diplomatic efforts should be made, with the
goal of effecting international agreements among key actors regard-
ing cyber security. The time has come to look at the value of a
cyber treaty with built-in mutual assurances of behavior. It is note-
worthy and commendable that the State Department has, for the
first time, demarched another country for its cyber activity.
It is also worth noting that this country has stated its willing-
ness to cooperate internationally on these matters. There are far
more developments around the world that threaten the national se-
curity interests of the United States. The past year saw a Taliban
surge in Afghanistan that led to the President’s decision to shift
strategy and increase troop levels. Pakistan continues to be an un-
even partner in our counterterrorism and counterinsurgency ef-
forts. Somalia and Yemen are failed and failing states that require
enormous attention.
These and many other threats are outlined in the DNI’s testi-
mony. So now, let me turn to the Vice Chairman, with whom I
have had the pleasure of working this year. And I thank him very
much for his cooperation on all matters. Mr. Vice Chairman.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, VICE

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Vice Chairman BOND. Madam Chair, let me welcome our wit-
nesses and thank you for the very open and generous way that you
and your staff have worked with the minority. We believe that this
is the way we can achieve what we’re supposed to achieve—bipar-
tisan, nonpartisan oversight of the critically important intelligence
community.
This hearing today comes at a time where the importance of the
national security threats are currently highlighted by recent
events.
From the terror plots disrupted this fall by the FBI to the deadly
attacks at Fort Hood and the Little Rock recruiting station to the
failed attack on Christmas Day, we have seen an alarming number
of terrorist threats, in particular within and against the homeland,
and they’re being carried out.
As members and witnesses are aware, this will be my last an-
nual worldwide threat hearing, as I intend to depart from the Sen-
ate upon the completion of the 111th Congress. No applause please.
Ironically, I believe we find ourselves, today, in the same place we
were in when I first joined the committee years ago—analyzing de-
ficiencies within the intelligence community to make recommenda-
tions for changes that will help us better prevent plots and connect
the dots.
So as we embark on our final year together, I offer these
thoughts for the path forward over the next year and into the fu-
ture. First, our priority as congressional oversight committee mem-
bers and your constant challenge as the leaders of the IC is to focus
on threats to the homeland and to our interests overseas. Al-
Qa’ida, its affiliates and other terrorist organizations today have a
global reach. In Pakistan, Afghanistan, Algeria, Yemen, the Horn

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 4

of Africa and elsewhere, terrorist operators train and prepare for

attacks against us and our allies.
Our focus must be on these entities wherever they operate. This
is a global conflict, and yes, it is a war—a war of terror these radi-
cals have declared on America and the West. The intelligence com-
munity must lean forward in this war, and we on congressional
oversight committees must back you up. When we ask you, behind
closed doors, to be aggressive, and we do that quite freely, it is our
responsibility to stand behind you when the doors are open and to
support your actions when they are under the spotlight. And I
pledge we will try to continue to do so.
At the same time, our committee will hold the IC accountable,
and the IC must hold itself accountable, because the threats we are
dealing with are far too dangerous to tolerate any kind of sloppy
work or careless mistakes. As the saying goes, the terrorists only
have to get it right once to be successful; you and we have to get
it right all of the time. We must use all avenues available for ob-
taining the crucial information we need to protect our people, and
that includes a full and humane interrogation of captured suspects
prior to or without Miranda rights. And I emphasize enemy com-
batants must be questioned to the fullest by the intelligence com-
munity before—if they are Mirandized, before they are Mirandized
and given an attorney.
Treating terrorists like common criminals can cost us lifesaving
intelligence. While I have no doubt that the FBI obtained useful in-
formation from the Christmas bomber, we just don’t know how
many timely leads have been lost as a result of his refusal to co-
operate after he was Mirandized. This approach gave his terrorist
colleagues time to cover their tracks while Americans remained at
risk. Any FBI interrogator or other interrogator will tell you that
50 minutes is not long enough to build rapport and get all needed
intelligence.
And any interrogator will tell you that you study up on your sub-
ject and read everything in the file first before you’re ready to go
in for a full and productive interrogation. That takes time and that
time must be devoted to the preparation prior to effective ques-
tioning. We must plan ahead for how we can bring intelligence to
bear in interrogation, whether at home or abroad. Timely action de-
mands timely intelligence, and we must ensure that all intelligence
tools are used when we find ourselves in a similar circumstance
again.
I am frankly appalled—I am appalled—that one year after the
President ended the previous administration’s interrogation pro-
gram, that there was nothing in place, nothing in place to handle
the sort of situation presented by the Christmas Day bomber. I
submit to our witnesses today that we cannot afford to make that
same mistake again. I presume that the high-value interrogation
group that is still coming online will solve a number of these prob-
lems. And rest assured that this committee will be following this
closely to ensure that it does.
Similarly, we cannot let campaign promises blindly guide deci-
sions, no matter what the consequences to our society. The ideal of
closing the Guantanamo Bay detention facility cannot become more
important than protecting our American citizens from the terrorists

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 5

imprisoned there. And we cannot put Americans at risk by letting

detainee after detainee rejoin the fight. That was a mistake made
in a prior administration. That mistake must not continue to be re-
peated today.
The top two al-Qa’ida operatives in Yemen today, just as one ex-
ample, are both Gitmo graduates that have returned to the fight,
despite the fact they were supposedly in a rehab program. We also
must not let our desire to showcase American justice outweigh the
requirement to protect our citizens. Terror show trials in New York
or anywhere else are clearly not the most expedient way to try the
9/11 suspects. It has taken a while for some to wake up to this re-
ality, but I believe Mayor Bloomberg’s evolution on this topic and
his comments from this past week are telling.
Some in the administration have said they want to try them,
now, in a rural area. Well, I’m from a rural area, and speaking
from a rural state, I can tell you that we want nothing to do with
those trials in our state. Aside from the security concerns and
costs, domestic terror trials have exposed sensitive classified infor-
mation in the past and have given intelligence to al-Qa’ida. The ex-
amples are well known; I need not recount them there.
Former judge, former Attorney General Mike Mukasey has spo-
ken eloquently about that. There are some who’ve tried to con-
tradict him, but they have proven no contradiction. It is an unac-
ceptable risk, essentially, since this Congress has passed and the
court has upheld the military commission process, which ensures
that even a foreign terrorist/enemy combatant can get a fair trial.
Now, turning to Afghanistan, we must win there; we cannot af-
ford to fail. The addition of 30,000 troops to implement General
McChrystal’s counterinsurgency strategy was a positive step. Em-
ploying smart power as a whole-of-government approach is the best
way to eliminate al-Qa’ida and the Taliban insurgency in Pakistan.
But the intelligence community must rally around General
McChrystal’s COIN strategy and continue to shift from a CT-only
focus to both a CT—or counterterrorist—and counterinsurgency ap-
proach.
There are other threats that are serious, and terrorism and the
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are by no means the only threats fac-
ing our community. For more than a decade, the intelligence com-
munity has debated Iran’s nuclear intent and all the while Iran
has progressed closer and closer to a nuclear weapons capability.
Today, Iran seems to be capable of producing highly enriched ura-
nium. And that, gentlemen, is the long pole in the tent of a nuclear
weapons program.
And we are left waiting for a nation that provides support, train-
ing and weapons to our enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan, along
with their allies like Hezbollah, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic
Jihad, to come to the bargaining table. While Iran’s intent may
change over time and I’m hopeful that the people of Iran will be
successful in pressuring their government for change, I, for one, do
not believe it is in any nation’s interest—United States or other na-
tions in the world—for Iran to possess a nuclear weapons capa-
bility. I trust that our witnesses will address the threat from Iran
and other nation states today.

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 6

Turning now to how we spend the money in the IC to combat the

threats we face, I believe we must be good stewards of taxpayer re-
sources. Unless we start moving in the right direction with our big-
dollar overhead purchases, we’ll continue to waste billions of dol-
lars on one-trick ponies, some of which never, ever come to fruition.
Those of you in the community know the examples of large and ul-
timately unsustainable programs that have followed this path.
Now, the NRO Director told Madam Chair and me last week that
he agreed with our committee’s approach to a cheaper, more
versatile acquisition that this committee has recommended for
years, and he was moving forward to execute the program. That
means we were very surprised, yesterday, in the President’s budget
that this option is not even funded. I believe that’s a mistake our
committee will be closely following and hope we will be able to cor-
rect that through the legislative process.
Finally, Director Blair, I was encouraged, as was the Chair, to
see that in your written opening statement, you spent the first two
and a half pages discussing cyber threats. Recent cyber attacks
against Google underscore the importance of sound cyber policies
and initiatives. And we know that the intelligence community rec-
ognizes this threat as real and of highest importance and goes well
beyond what we are discussing publicly.
Yet, to my chagrin, the administration’s solution has been to cre-
ate another position, I am afraid, as a figurehead—a cyber czar—
with less than a half-dozen staff. In a few years, I believe we could
lament the fact that more was not done now to confront this chal-
lenge when we had the chance. As Senator Feinstein, the Chair
said, Senators Whitehouse, Snowe and Mikulski comprise a cyber
working group on our committee and should have much to say on
this cyber topic. I believe all on the committee agree that it’s very
real, very serious and the administration needs to treat it as such.
In conclusion, the greatest danger comes from the unknown—the
threat not yet on the radar. Further threats are unlikely to be re-
peat performances, so we must create new methods and tradecraft
to recognize terror threats we haven’t seen before.
Unfortunately, the process of intelligence community reform, leg-
islatively, is not complete. Congress gave the DNI a load of respon-
sibility without the requisite authority. The squabble between the
DNI and the CIA Director, which unfortunately surfaced earlier
this year, over who will serve as the DNI representatives over this
past year, is just another disappointing example to me that we
don’t have the right balance and clear rules of the road for the IC.
We must get the balance right if you are expected, Mr. Director,
to meet the challenges ahead.
Congress still has work to do in reforming itself in this regard.
I pushed a proposal for 7 years—one that 14 members of this com-
mittee signed on to a few years ago—that would provide better co-
ordination between the authorization and appropriations process
for intelligence in the Senate by creating an intelligence sub-
committee on the Appropriations Committee. The 9/11 Commission
and others have said we have to bring the authorization and appro-
priations together. Unfortunately, there are some who still strongly
oppose making these necessary changes within the Congress to
serve our intelligence community better. I would hope to see

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 7

progress on that. I’m not holding my breath, but it still needs to

be done.
Additionally, I would mention that the Project on National Secu-
rity Reform, led by Jim Locher, has made excellent and prescient
recommendations concerning long-needed national security reform
within the U.S. government. Leaders in the current administration,
like National Security Advisor Jim Jones, Deputy Secretary of
State James Steinberg, Ambassador to the United Nations Susan
Rice, among others, all sat on the guiding coalition of that project
before assuming positions in this administration. And yet, the ad-
ministration subsequently moved to strip all funding for the project
and has not shown any interest, yet, in making the necessary
changes the project rightly recommended. I hope they’re listening
today, because we need some leadership to make sure that we are
better equipped to face the challenges of tomorrow.
As we remember the sacrifices made by the men and women
fighting these threats on the front lines every day, including those
who so tragically paid the ultimate price recently in Khowst, our
primary concern must be to prevent attacks on the United States
and to ensure the safety of the American people, as well as our
friends and interests abroad. Today’s hearing will give us a good
idea how we can measure up. And I thank you, Madam Chair, and
look forward to hearing the testimony of our witnesses.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman.
Here’s how we will proceed, gentlemen: Director Blair, if you will
begin, representing the entire intelligence community, we will then
go to Mr. Panetta, Mr. Mueller, General Burgess and Mr. Dinger
for five minutes or so each. And then each one of us will proceed
with questions. So Director Blair, we’d be delighted to hear from
you.

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL DENNIS BLAIR, USN (RET.),

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Director BLAIR. I thank you, Madam Chairman, Vice Chairman
Bond, members of the committee. In providing you with this intel-
ligence community annual threat assessment, I’m proud to rep-
resent the thousands of patriotic, highly skilled, brave professionals
of the world’s finest intelligence team, and we’re especially con-
scious of this as we mourn the recent loss of seven of our officers
and care for a dozen others who’ve been wounded in recent months.
All intelligence agencies participated in preparing my statement
for the record, and I’m pleased to be accompanied by my colleagues
here this afternoon.
Every day, as we know, information technology brings gadgets
and services that make our lives better and more efficient. How-
ever, malicious cyber activity is growing at an unprecedented rate,
assuming extraordinary scale and sophistication. In the dynamic of
cyberspace, the technology balance right now favors malicious ac-
tors rather than legal actors, and it’s likely to continue that way
for quite some time. In addition, the growing role of international
companies supplying software and hardware for private networks—
even for sensitive U.S. government networks—increases the poten-
tial for subversion and mischief.

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The recent intrusions reported by Google are yet another wake-

up call to those who have not taken this problem seriously. Cyber
crime is on the rise. Global cyber bank and credit card fraud has
serious implications for economic and financial systems. Attacks
against networks controlling critical infrastructure, transportation,
financial networks, and energy could create havoc. Just the facts
of the matter are that cyber defenders have to spend more, have
to work harder than cyber attackers, and American efforts are not
strong enough in this regard right now. The United States govern-
ment and the private sector, who are interlinked inextricably in
this space, have to ensure that adequate cyber defenses are in
place.
Let me turn to the global economy, where the trends are more
positive. It was a year ago that I sat here and warned of the dan-
gers of a global depression. But an unprecedented policy response
by governments and central banks around the world laid a founda-
tion for global recovery that most forecasters expect will continue
through 2010, although high unemployment and pockets of dif-
ficulty will still persist. Not all countries have emerged from the
slump, and several of them are important to the United States.
Pakistan and the Ukraine are still struggling to put their eco-
nomic houses in order. Our allies are trying to insulate spending
on Afghanistan, where many of them are helping us, from budget
cuts.
China is emerging with enhanced clout. Its economy will grow
from being a third of the size of that of the U.S. to roughly half
by 2015, an earlier date than we had previously projected. This is
assuming it maintains the rapid growth, which it appears to have
the ingredients to do.
Last year, Beijing contributed to the G–20’s pledge to increase
IMF resources. It deployed naval forces to international anti-piracy
operations in the Gulf of Aden. It supported a new U.N. Security
Council sanction resolution against North Korea. However, Beijing
still believes that the United States seeks to contain it, seeks to
transform it, and it reinforces Chinese concerns about internal sta-
bility and about perceived challenges to their sovereignty claims.
China continues to increase its defense spending. Preparation for
a Taiwan conflict involving a U.S. intervention continues to domi-
nate their modernization and contingency plans. And China also
increasingly worries about how to protect its global interests.
Turning to violent extremism, as you mentioned, Madam Chair-
man, we’ve been warning in the past several years about al-Qa’ida
itself, al-Qa’ida-associated groups and al-Qa’ida-inspired terrorists
striking the United States. And we’ve seen the reality of all three
of those characteristics of al-Qa’ida in the examples that you cited
in your opening statement—Najibullah Zazi, Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab and Major Nidal Hasan.
But the violent extremist threat, al-Qa’ida at center, is evolving.
We have made the complex, multiple-team attacks very difficult for
al-Qa’ida to pull off. As we saw with the recent successful and at-
tempted terrorist attacks however, identifying individual terrorists,
small groups with short histories using simple attack methods, is
a new degree of difficulty. We did not identify Mr. Abdulmutallab

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 9

before he boarded Northwest Flight 253 on Christmas Day. We

should have and we are working to improve so that we can.
On a positive note, however, only a decreasing minority of Mus-
lims support violent extremism, according to numerous polls within
the Muslim community. But even with a decreasing and smaller
amount, al-Qa’ida’s radical ideology still seems to appeal strongly
to some disaffected young Muslims, a pool of potential suicide
bombers and other fighters. And this pool unfortunately includes
Americans. Although we don’t have the high-level, home-grown
threat that faces European countries right now, we have to worry
about the appeal that figures like Anwar al-Aulaqi exert on young
American Muslims.
However much we improve our intelligence—and we intend to
improve it even more than it is, however—we cannot count on it
to catch every threat. So intensified counterterrorism efforts in the
Afghan- Pakistan theater as well as around the world in places like
Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere will be critical to further dimin-
ishing the threat.
We have to continue to work with allies and partners in this
campaign, enhance law enforcement, security measures, immigra-
tion and visa controls, aviation and border security; all of these are
important for a multi-layered, dynamic defense that can disrupt
terrorist plans.
Let me turn to the outlook in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Since
January of 2007, the Taliban has increased its influence and ex-
panded the insurgency while holding onto its Pashtun belt thresh-
olds. The challenges that we face are clear.
Number one: reversing the Taliban’s momentum while we rein-
force security elsewhere. Second: improving Afghan security forces,
governance and economic capability so that security gains will en-
dure and that responsibility can be transferred to the Afghanis
themselves.
Early successes in places like Helmand, where Marines have
been deployed for several months, where aggressive counter-drug
and economic programs are in place, and where local governance
is competent, show that we can make solid progress even when the
threat is high.
The safe haven that Afghanistan insurgents have in Pakistan is
the group’s most important outside support. Disrupting that safe
haven won’t be sufficient by itself to defeat the insurgency but dis-
rupting insurgent presence in Afghanistan is a necessary condition
for making substantial progress.
The increase in terrorist attacks in that country has made the
Pakistani public more concerned about the threat from Islamic ex-
tremists, including al-Qa’ida. Pakistanis continue to support mili-
tary action against insurgents. Islamabad has demonstrated deter-
mination and persistence in combating militants that it perceives
are dangerous to Pakistan’s interests. But it also has continued to
provide some support to other Pakistan-based groups that operate
in Afghanistan.
U.S. and coalition success against the insurgency in Afghanistan
could provide new, long-term incentives for Pakistan to take steps
against Afghan-focused militants. Increased Pakistani cooperation
is more likely if Pakistan is persuaded that the United States is

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committed to stabilizing Afghanistan and will ultimately have suc-

cess.
Finally, turning to Iran, the available intelligence continues to
indicate that Tehran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear
weapons. This is being done in part by developing various nuclear
capabilities that bring it closer to the ability to produce weapons.
One of the key capabilities Iran continues to develop is its ura-
nium enrichment program. Published information from the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA, indicates that Iran has
significantly expanded the number of centrifuges installed in its fa-
cility in Natanz. But it has had problems operating its centrifuges,
which constrain its production of low-enriched uranium.
The United States and other countries announced last September
that Iran for years has been building in secret a second enrichment
facility near Qom. Overall, we continue to assess that Iran has the
scientific, the technical and the industrial capacity to produce
enough highly-enriched uranium for a weapon in the next few
years, if it chooses to do so, and ultimately, to produce nuclear
weapons. The central issue is a political decision to do so. Iran also
continues to improve its ballistic missile force, which enhances its
power projection and provides Tehran a means of delivering a pos-
sible nuclear payload.
We do not know if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear
weapons. And we continue to judge that Iran takes a cost-benefit
approach in its nuclear decisionmaking. We judge that this offers
the international community opportunities to influence Tehran’s
decisionmaking.
The Iranian regime meanwhile has found itself in a weaker in-
ternal position—internal political situation—following last June’s
disputed Presidential election and the crackdown on protestors. Re-
acting to stronger-than-expected opposition and the regime’s nar-
rowing base of support, supreme leader Khamenei, President
Ahmadinejad and their hard-line allies appear determined to retain
the upper hand by force. They are moving Iran in a more authori-
tarian direction to consolidate their power. However, they have not
been successful so far in suppressing the opposition.
Madam Chairman, this is the top layer of threats and opportuni-
ties. Other areas demand our continued attention and focus. They
include security in Iraq, on the Korean Peninsula, weapons of mass
destruction-proliferation, and challenges right here in the Western
hemisphere, especially working with Mexico in its efforts against
the drug cartels. But I’m also prepared with my colleagues to dis-
cuss important transnational issues like global health.
Really, it’s the very complexity of the issues and multiplicity of
actors—state, nonstate—that increasingly constitute one of our big-
gest challenges. The intelligence community is meeting these chal-
lenges every day both to policymakers and to units in the field,
both civil and military.
In my year on the job, I’ve been enormously impressed by the
abilities, dedication and the results of the 100,000 military and ci-
vilian intelligence professionals I have the honor to lead.
Thank you, Madam Chairman. We’ll be glad to answer questions
after my colleagues have a chance to make statements.

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Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Director Blair. Mr.

Panetta.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LEON PANETTA, DIRECTOR,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Director PANETTA. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, Mr. Vice
Chairman and members of the committee. Thank you for this op-
portunity to be able to share our thoughts with regards to the
threats, both current and future, that face this country.
I think the Director has presented a summary of some of the key
threats that we confront. Of those, I would share with you that my
greatest concern and what keeps me awake at night is that al-
Qa’ida and its terrorist allies and affiliates could very well attack
the United States in our homeland. That’s the primary reason the
President provided the mission that we follow, which is the mission
to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qa’ida and its allies.
Having said that, the biggest threat I see is not so much that we
face another attack similar to 9/11. I think the greater threat is
that al- Qa’ida is adapting their methods in ways that oftentimes
make it difficult to detect. We have done a very effective job at dis-
rupting their operations in the FATA. And I think intelligence con-
firms that they are finding it difficult to be able to engage in the
planning and the command-and-control operations to put together
a large attack.
What’s happening instead is that they are moving to other safe
havens and to other regional nodes in places like Yemen and Soma-
lia, the Maghreb and others. And what’s happening is that they are
pursuing an effort to try to strike at the United States in three
ways.
One is that they deploy—they have deployed—individuals to this
country. We’ve had a series of arrests. I think the Nazi arrest, the
Headley arrest, are indicative of those that have been deployed
here and continue to stay in touch with al-Qa’ida. Secondly, it’s the
concern about the terrorist who has ‘‘clean credentials,’’ that
doesn’t have a history of terrorism that has come to our attention.
Abdulmutallab obviously was someone that was out there. He had
a visa and, as a result, they decided to make use of somebody like
that within a very short period of time that he arrived. I think
they’re going to be looking for other opportunities like that. And
thirdly, there is the loner—the individual like Hasan who, out of
self-radicalization, decides that the moment has come to engage in
an attack by himself.
So it’s the lone-wolf strategy that I think we have to pay atten-
tion to as a threat to this country. We are being aggressive at going
after this threat. We’ve expanded our human intelligence. We are
engaging with our liaison partners in other countries to try to track
these kinds of threats. We obviously are checking and reviewing
watch-lists and other lists to determine who among them could be
that potential lone wolf. And we are taking the fight to the enemy,
and we will continue to do that.
But in addition to the fight against al-Qa’ida, we are also facing
threats from other terrorist groups—terrorists like al-Shabaab,
Hezbollah, Hamas, other jihadist militant groups. And a particular
concern is LeT—Lashkar-e-Taiba—which, if they should conduct an

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attack against India, could very well undermine our efforts in Paki-
stan.
In addition, the Director has mentioned the threat from North
Korea and Iran, and while obviously we’re concerned about the nu-
clear side, they also continue to export terrorism—providing weap-
ons, providing support to a whole series of other terrorist groups.
So the bottom line here is that the war on terrorism is not just
al-Qa’ida. It is a series of terrorist groups that are basically con-
fronting us. And it is the kind of changes that we see in their
method of approaching the United States that I think represents
a very important threat that we have to pay attention to.
We are being aggressive, we are taking the fight to the enemy,
and at the same time, we have to be agile, we have to be vigilant
and we’ve got to be creative in the way we approach these new
threats. The fundamental mission we have is, obviously, to protect
this country. It’s the mission that the people at Khowst gave their
lives for. And it’s the mission that the CIA will follow because we
believe our greatest mission is to keep this country safe.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Panetta. Mr.
Mueller.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. MUELLER, III,

DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Director MUELLER. Thank you and good afternoon, Chairman
Feinstein, Vice Chairman Bond and members of the committee.
Director Blair and Director Panetta rightly pointed to the global
nature of many of the threats we face, from international terrorism
in Pakistan, Yemen and elsewhere to cyber attacks to computer
crime committed by international criminal enterprises.
And what is striking is how many of these overseas threats reach
directly into the United States. Today, events outside the United
States often have immediate impact on our security here at home.
And as I discuss our mission and the overall threat assessment, I
do want to highlight how quickly these threats are evolving and
how globalization has often led to the integration of these foreign
and domestic threats.
Over the past decade, the focus of strategic terrorism threats has
been South Asia, the heartland of al-Qa’ida. But now, as Director
Panetta pointed out, al-Qa’ida trainers see the tribal areas of Paki-
stan as less secure and this had led al-Qa’ida to franchise into re-
gional components in places such as North Africa and the Arabian
Peninsula. This evolution has been most rapid with al-Qa’ida in the
Arabian Peninsula, which has changed from a regional group with
links to al-Qa’ida to a global threat with reach into American cities
such as Detroit.
These changes affect the way we at the FBI think about the tar-
gets we pursue and what tools we need to pursue them. They also
require us to keep changing continuously to meet the evolving
threats of tomorrow. The expansion of violent ideology has proven
to be persistent and global, as demonstrated by the plots we have
seen in the past year—those plots listed by the Chairman in her
opening statement. Those cases demonstrate the global diversity of
the new terrorism threats.

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Some extremists were radicalized over the Internet or in prison.

Others received training from known terrorist organizations
abroad. They were of different ages and nationalities. A number
were U.S.-born. The targets of these attacks range from civilians
to government facilities to transportation infrastructure to our mili-
tary, both in the United States and overseas.
The threat from cyber attacks, as has been pointed out by Direc-
tor Blair, reflects the same globalization and pace of change. In the
past, we focused primarily on state actors seeking national security
information from our military or intelligence services or seeking to
acquire technology related to defense systems. But as the global
economy integrates, many cyber threats now focus on economic or
nongovernment targets, as we have seen with the recent cyber at-
tack on Google. Targets in the private sector are at least as vulner-
able as traditional targets and the damage can be just as great.
Our focus on the cyber threat does not mean that we have seen
a decline in classic intelligence and counterintelligence activities in
the United States. The presence of foreign intelligence officers in
the United States is not declining and they are increasingly using
non-traditional collection methods to gather information. These
services continue to pose a significant threat and our counterintel-
ligence mission remains a high priority for the FBI.
Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Bond, let me conclude
by thanking you and the committee for your support of the bureau
and on behalf of the men and women of the FBI, we look forward
to continue to work with you to improve the FBI and to keep Amer-
ica safe. And thank you, and I’d be happy to answer any questions
you might have.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Mueller. General Burgess.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL RONALD BURGESS,
USA, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
General BURGESS. Madam Chairman, Vice Chairman Bond,
members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to be
here today to present the Defense Intelligence Agency assessment
of current and projected threats to the security of the United
States.
The global strategic environment today remains marked by a
broad array of dissimilar threats and challenges. As the United
States continues to conduct combat operations in several theaters,
the nation also faces the threat of terrorist attacks at home. Simul-
taneously, we continue to face risk posed by other nations’ growing
abilities to challenge our qualitative military superiority in other
regions. It is a time that significantly challenges the international
system and the Department of Defense. Therefore, our armed
forces and DIA must remain cognizant of dynamic global forces and
trends.
As the 2010 QDR states, the United States faces a complex and
uncertain security landscape in which the pace of change continues
to accelerate. Al-Qa’ida remains the most significant terrorist
threat to the United States. Al-Qa’ida’s propaganda, attack plan-
ning and support of the Taliban and Haqqani networks continues.
The group still pursues chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear
materials for attacks. Al-Qa’ida’s affiliates continue to extend the

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terrorist group reach and brand. Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Penin-

sula is growing in size and is broadening its repertoire of attacks.
Once focused mainly inside Algeria, al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the
Islamic Maghreb is conducting operations in neighboring countries.
Violence levels in Afghanistan increased last year while security
declined because of an increasingly capable insurgency, the govern-
ment’s inability to extend security throughout the country and in-
surgent access to sanctuaries in Pakistan. Originally concentrated
in the Pashtun-dominated south and east, the insurgency retains
momentum and has spread west and north. Afghanistan’s security
forces are growing but not keeping pace with the Taliban’s ability
to exploit the security vacuum.
Pakistan’s Federally Administrated Tribal Area continues to pro-
vide the insurgency, al-Qa’ida and terrorist groups with valuable
sanctuary for training, recruitment, planning and logistics. Suc-
cessful strikes against al-Qa’ida and other militant leaders in the
FATA have disrupted terrorist activities but the groups are resil-
ient. Pakistan’s military has demonstrated increased counterinsur-
gency training and doctrinal adjustments but its priority remains
India. We have confidence in Pakistan’s ability to safeguard its nu-
clear weapons, though vulnerabilities exist.
Notwithstanding recent high profile bombings claimed by al-
Qa’ida in Iraq, the country is still on a generally secure path. The
group remains the most capable Sunni terrorist group, though con-
strained by a lack of safe havens. It has regained some freedom of
movement following U.S. forces’ withdrawal from Iraqi cities. Iraq’s
security forces conduct the majority of security operations inde-
pendently but still require improvements in logistics, tactical com-
munications and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.
In Iraq, Iran continues to rely heavily upon the Islamic Revolu-
tionary Guards Corps Quds Force, its special operations command,
to undermine U.S. efforts by providing weapons, money and train-
ing to Iraqi Shia militants for attacks against U.S. personnel.
Turning briefly to nations, region and trends of interest, Iran
supports terrorist groups and insurgents in Iraq, Afghanistan, Leb-
anon, Gaza and elsewhere as a means to expand its own influence,
frustrate regional rivals and impede U.S. strategy across the re-
gion. It invests heavily in developing ballistic missiles with greater
accuracy and new payloads. With more than 8000 installed cen-
trifuges at Natanz, Iran now has enough low-enriched uranium for
a nuclear weapon if it further enriched and processed.
China’s military modernization continues with the acquisition of
growing numbers of very sophisticated aircraft, warships, missiles
and personnel required to employ these capabilities. China seeks
military superiority along its periphery, with a focus against tradi-
tional U.S. military advantages in air and naval power projection
and in space.
North Korea remains unlikely to eliminate its nuclear weapon
capability for the foreseeable future, believing the weapons serve as
a strategic deterrent and leverage while also counterbalancing the
logistic shortages, aging equipment and insufficient training that
plague its conventional forces.
Russia is proceeding with ambitious military reform. The effects
of the global recession, an aging industrial base, corruption, mis-

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management and demographic trends will limit Moscow’s ability to

realize the full benefits of the reform plan, but the sweeping reor-
ganization likely will increase the military advantages over adja-
cent nations.
In Latin America, Mexico remains locked in a violent struggle
against drug trafficking organizations which pose a grave threat to
the state.
Venezuelan arms purchases, primarily from Russia, continue. Co-
lombian operations have reduced the Marxist-oriented Revolu-
tionary Armed Forces of Colombia guerillas’ end strength by nearly
50 percent to approximately 8500 personnel. Sustained pressure
could splinter the FARC until it poses less of a threat to democratic
institutions, though it would remain involved in criminal activities.
The threat posed by ballistic missiles is likely to increase and
grow more complex over the coming decade as they become more
mobile, survivable, reliable and accurate at greater ranges. Pre-
launch survivability also grows as potential adversaries strengthen
their denial and deception methods.
Let me conclude by saying that while DIA’s top war time priority
is to provide the intelligence required by our military commanders
and policymakers in support of our ongoing combat operations, this
agency concurrently retains a core responsibility to prevent stra-
tegic surprise and be positioned to respond to a wide range of con-
tingencies.
That requires the most prudent and judicious use of our re-
sources, especially our most important resource, our people—both
civilians and those in uniform. In visits with DIA’s forward-de-
ployed military and civilian personnel, including in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan, I remain impressed by and thankful for their willing-
ness to serve the nation in wartime. Many are on their second or
third deployment alongside our troops in harm’s way. Some have
been wounded by roadside bombs and mortar attacks.
Notwithstanding their sacrifices, they continue to serve knowing
that the intelligence they provide saves lives and speeds oper-
ations. On their behalf, I want to thank this committee for your
strong support and continuing confidence in the Defense Intel-
ligence Agency and our mission.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, General Burgess.
Ambassador Dinger, if you’d be the wrap-up speaker, please.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JOHN DINGER, ACTING ASSIST-
ANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RE-
SEARCH
Ambassador DINGER. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman,
members of the committee. It’s my pleasure to be here today to rep-
resent the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State De-
partment.
Although one of the smallest intelligence community elements,
we consider ourselves to be mighty contributors to the Secretary of
State as she fulfills her responsibility as the President’s chief for-
eign policy advisor and we’re proud of our contribution to the intel-
ligence community as it ensures the security of the United States.
One of INR’s principal missions is to provide timely and accurate
intelligence analysis that enables U.S. diplomacy to anticipate and

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address threats and opportunities and to do so early enough so that

policymakers can take action. The average analyst in INR has 11
years of experience on his account, allowing him to offer what we
believe is an uncommon depth of understanding of the characters
and issues at play in the world.
INR is proud to put its analytical depth at the service of the Sec-
retary and the intelligence community. Through our intelligence
policy and coordination staff, INR also ensures that intelligence ac-
tivities are consistent with and advance U.S. foreign policy inter-
ests and that other components of the intelligence community un-
derstand the information and analytical needs of the foreign policy
decisionmakers.
INR has other important missions. One is to act as the IC’s exec-
utive agent for analytical outreach, bringing outside expertise to
bear on the most challenging intelligence and foreign policy issues
of the day. INR’s Office of Opinion Research aims to be the U.S.
government’s foremost authority on worldwide public opinion.
DNI Blair’s written statement comprehensively addresses the
global challenges before us. I will take just a few moments to high-
light two areas that DNI and others have already spoken to in
which INR is supporting the priorities of Secretary Clinton and the
intelligence community and the United States government.
First, countering terrorism. Terrorism remains a key focus for
INR’s analysts. We have a small but dedicated team of analysts in
our Office of Terrorism, Narcotics and Crime. They work closely
with our regional analysts and with those throughout the IC to
produce all-source strategic counterterrorism analysis with
nuanced context and perspective.
The second area I also want to highlight is cyber. In 2008, the
State Department established a new office, INR’s Office of Cyber
Affairs, INR Cyber, to analyze cyber issues and help coordinate the
department’s cyber activities. Currently housed in INR, INR Cyber
collaborates across corridors in the State Department and through-
out the IC to strengthen cyber security. It is also engaging with
other nations to help establish norms that will help maintain the
stability of and confidence in the Internet.
INR believes the intelligence community has an obligation to pro-
vide global intelligence coverage. I want to very briefly mention two
regions, only one of which has been covered today in today’s oral
statements.
First, economic and political progress in Africa remains uneven,
varies greatly from nation to nation and is still subject to sudden
reversal or gradual erosion. The daunting array of challenges fac-
ing African nations makes it highly likely in the coming year that
a number of African countries will face new outbreaks of political
instability and economic distress that will join ongoing and seem-
ingly intractable conflicts in places such as Sudan and Somalia.
Nigeria, for example, faces serious social, economic and security
challenges over the next year. Guinea provides an example of how
quickly African crises can emerge. Many African nations also risk
humanitarian crises.
In some Latin American countries, democracy and market poli-
cies remain at risk because of crime, corruption and poor govern-
ance. Powerful drug cartels and violent crime undermine basic se-

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curity elsewhere. Elected populist leaders in some countries are

moving toward a more authoritarian and statist political and eco-
nomic model and oppose U.S. influence and policies in the region.
Madam Chairman, members of the committee, INR will continue
to think, analyze and write strategically to identify for Secretary
Clinton the threats, challenges and opportunities arising from a
complex and dynamic global environment. We will work hand-in-
glove with the rest of the intelligence community to ensure the se-
curity of the United States. INR will strive to put intelligence at
the service of foreign policy and make certain that intelligence ac-
tivities advance America toward our foreign policy goals and pro-
tect us from threats.
Thank you, once again, for the opportunity to appear before you
and I am happy to answer any questions you may have.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.
To begin the questions, I’d like to ask a very specific question of
each one of you if you would answer it. The question is, what is
the likelihood of another terrorist attempted attack on the U.S.
homeland in the next three to six months—high or low? Director
Blair?
Director BLAIR. An attempted attack, the priority is certain, I
would say.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Mr. Panetta.
Director PANETTA. I would agree with that.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Mr. Mueller.
Director MUELLER. Agree.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. General Burgess.
General BURGESS. Yes, ma’am. Agree.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Mr. Dinger.
Ambassador DINGER. Yes.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. All right. I think that tells us something
very clearly. There has been a response to the Abdulmutallab case
that all suspected terrorists should be labeled enemy combatants
and prosecuted through the military commissions system, if at all.
Candidly, my view is that the President should have the flexi-
bility to make a determination based on the individual cir-
cumstances of the case—the location of the terrorist activity, the lo-
cation of the arrest, the nationality of the suspect, whether federal
crimes or law of armed conflict have been violated, et cetera.
I’d like to ask this question, Mr. Mueller. What is the FBI’s track
record in gaining intelligence and collecting evidence to convict ter-
rorists since 9/11?
Director MUELLER. Well, Madam Chairman, in your opening
statement, you mentioned many of the cases that we addressed last
year: a number of disruptions from Dallas to Springfield, Illinois;
Charlotte, North Carolina; the Zazi case in Denver and New York.
In almost all of the cases, we have gathered intelligence. Some of
that intelligence has become evidence so that we could arrest, in-
dict and continue to prosecute those individuals.
Since September 11th we’ve had numerous disruptions. In just
about every one of these cases where there are two or more in-
volved, one or more of the individuals have ultimately cooperated,
given the leverage of the criminal justice system to cooperate not

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just against the conspirators but also to provide intelligence as to

other potential threats.
And to the extent that we have had success since September
11th, it has been because we have been able to convince persons
to provide intelligence, to provide evidence on others who may be
involved in the plot and persuade individuals both here in the
United States as well as elsewhere in the world to contribute intel-
ligence as well as evidence to disrupt plots and to assure that those
who were engaged in the plots are successfully prosecuted and in-
carcerated.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much.
I’d like to just quickly ask one question on the status of
Hezbollah which has not been mentioned. Director, you assess that
Hezbollah is the largest recipient of Iranian financial aid, training
and weaponry. And Iran’s senior leadership has cited Hezbollah as
a model for other militant groups. How has Hezbollah rebuilt its
military arsenal since its 2006 war with Israel?
Director BLAIR. Let me get some help from General Burgess here
too, but overall, Hezbollah is stronger now than in 2006, when the
last war took place. And it’s also developed politically.
General BURGESS. Madam Chairman, I would agree with his as-
sessment. They in fact reinforced and replaced very quickly what
they had lost in the 2006 war with Israel. And today I think they
are actually stronger and have improved themselves.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Can you comment on the sophistication of
these replacements?
General BURGESS. In some cases, from a missile standpoint, I
think there are indications that they have improved. Hezbollah has
increased the quantity of their missiles and may have acquired ad-
ditional systems with improved accuracy. But at a minimum, their
overall missile effectiveness remains the same.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. I think that’s going
to be it for me, for now.
Mr. Vice Chairman, why don’t you go ahead?
Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you, Madam Chair. Director
Mueller, we appreciate and congratulate you on the excellent work
that the FBI has done in capturing and bringing to justice Zazi and
other people whose capture was announced last fall.
Do you believe that questioning of an enemy combatant, someone
with potential knowledge of battlefield intelligence for the future,
can be done briefly or within a short timeframe needed to give the
customary Miranda rights of a normal criminal suspect, a bank
robber, in the United States?
Do you agree with those in the intelligence community who say
that the only effective way of interrogating somebody like
Abdulmutallab would be to spend the time to collect the informa-
tion otherwise available in the intelligence community, background
and what other intelligence may be available, in order to question
him effectively, to be able to ask him questions about issues where
we know the answers to see if he’s telling the truth and to confront
him with other intelligence? Do you believe that that is necessary
in some cases to get information on an enemy combatant?
Director MUELLER. Well, Senator, let me talk generally but then
also somewhat specifically about the events of Christmas Day. Let

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me start off with a belief that we in the FBI—as everybody in this

room understands—know the importance of intelligence. Since Sep-
tember 11th, it has been the mission of the FBI to prevent terrorist
attacks—not just indict and arrest and convict persons for those
terrorist attacks but to prevent the terrorist attack and intelligence
is key.
If you look at the circumstances of Christmas Day, the plane
came in at approximately 12:00. Shortly there afterwards, we start-
ed pushing out information relating to the events that had occurred
on the plane as it went into Detroit. We then, as I think everybody
in this room knows and understands, Mutallab was arrested on the
plane and taken to a hospital.
We had agents from the Joint Terrorism Task Force go to the
hospital. They were given an opportunity to talk to Abdulmutallab
before he went through surgical procedures. He had burned himself
in trying to light the explosives. They had a window of opportunity;
they exploited that window of opportunity to try to find out infor-
mation as to whether there were other bombs on the plane, were
there other bombs in other planes, who was responsible—and took
that opportunity because it was given and there was an immediate
need to have that information, that intelligence, to determine what
the threat was at that time.
The doctors then took him in for surgical procedures. Going into
that afternoon, there were discussions here amongst most of the
agencies here as to what should occur down the road, although no
specific instructions or consultations with persons at this table as
to whether the individual should be Mirandized.
We were then given an opportunity later that night to again
interview him. And after consultation, or in consultation with Jus-
tice Department attorneys, we determined to follow our protocols—
protocols established by the Supreme Court—in terms of how you
interrogate and question individuals in custody in the United
States. A team went in to talk with him. He talked for a few mo-
ments and then afterwards, after he was given his Miranda warn-
ings, asked for an attorney and we discontinued the questioning.
We felt we had to take that opportunity at the outset to gather
the intelligence. It was not ideal; we did not have much informa-
tion at 3:30 in the afternoon when the plane came in at 1:00. We
gathered information throughout the afternoon to do a better inter-
rogation that evening. We have found over a period of time that the
Miranda warnings can, but often are not, an impediment to obtain-
ing additional intelligence.
And the story continues. We have been successful, very success-
ful in gathering intelligence over a period of time with teams, per-
sons from various agencies, the most recent example being the in-
telligence we’ve gotten from David Headley, who was arrested in
Chicago for his participation in the Copenhagen plot but also sub-
sequently indicated his involvement in the Mumbai shootings.
As I say, this case as in all cases, we will continue to try to pro-
vide or obtain, I should say, information and intelligence from
Abdulmutallab and to the extent that you wish further information
on that——
Vice Chairman BOND. We will ask that. I’m asking a general pro-
cedural question. You’re not saying that an enemy combatant that

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comes into the United States has been ruled by the Supreme Court
to be entitled to Miranda rights before questioning proceeds, are
you?
Director MUELLER [continuing]. No, what I’m saying is that if a
person is accepted by DOD for prosecution before a military com-
mission, he is not entitled under the procedures that are extant to
Miranda warnings. However, that has not yet gone up to the Su-
preme Court. And so there is a difference between having a person
in the federal district court and the civilian courts and under mili-
tary commissions.
Vice Chairman BOND. And that’s the point. That’s the point.
Many commentators and I have agreed that treating this person as
a common United States criminal when he was clearly an enemy
combatant—I don’t know how much more clearly you can be an
enemy combatant, like the German saboteurs who arrived in the
United States in the early 1940s. Nobody thought that they were
bank robbers coming from Germany to rob some banks. They didn’t
treat them as such.
And from the press reports of what we’ve seen, this was not your
average bank robber. He was not a car hijacker. This person was
an enemy combatant. Who ultimately made the decision to
Mirandize him? Who was the individual—where did that decision
rest in the chain?
Director MUELLER. It rested with the head of our Counterter-
rorism Division along with attorneys from the Department of Jus-
tice.
Vice Chairman BOND. So it was a Department of Justice decision
to Mirandize.
Director MUELLER. No, it was a combination of our providing the
facts to the Department of Justice and in consultation with the De-
partment of Justice making a decision that he should be
Mirandized.
Vice Chairman BOND. While other agencies took part in it, we
have heard that they felt that they needed to have more oppor-
tunity to question him.
Director BLAIR. Mr. Vice Chairman, on that score, I’m as strong
for getting as much intelligence as we can from anybody remotely
connected with terrorism, much less somebody who’s carried a
bomb into the country. But I think that we need to have a flexi-
bility in the tools that we have available to use. And I’m not con-
vinced that you can make a—in fact, I’m convinced that you cannot
make a hard decision that everything should be taken through a
military tribunal or everything should be taken through a federal
court.
There are decisions that have to be made in which you balance
the requirement for intelligence with the requirement for a pros-
ecution and the sorts of pressure that you bring onto the people
that you arrest in either form. It’s got to be a decision made at the
time. And I think the balance struck in the Abdulmutallab case
was an understandable balance. We got good intelligence, we’re
getting more.
Vice Chairman BOND. I disagree very strongly with that conclu-
sion, but I agree with you that there should be a decision made
after consultation with the relevant agencies and the intelligence

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community when an enemy combatant comes in before the Depart-

ment of Justice gives the order to Mirandize him.
He’s an enemy combatant and the decision ought to be made
with the participation of the intelligence community, whether he
thinks the future safety of the United States would make it imper-
ative to question that enemy combatant before giving him a lawyer
and Mirandizing him.
I see my time is up, Madam Chair.
Director BLAIR. Let me just say that we consider Director
Mueller a full member of the intelligence community. He’s one of
the brothers.
Vice Chairman BOND. But he reports to the Attorney General
and you, Mr. Director, in my view, should be the head of the intel-
ligence community. If we haven’t made it clear in IRTPA, we need
to make that clear.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman.
Senator Rockefeller.
Senator ROCKEFELLER. I don’t relish pursuing this, but in that
it’s become kind of a cause du jour, I think it’s important to. I
agree totally, Director Blair, with what you said, that it should be
done on a case-by-case basis. Nothing should be ruled in; nothing
should be ruled out. There’s an instinct on the part of some that
the only way that you can correctly get intelligence and then pros-
ecute the enemy combatant or whatever you want to call him is
through the military commissions.
And I think their record is they’ve condemned three and two of
them are gone, on the streets. You, through the criminal justice
system, Director Mueller, have prosecuted hundreds and they’re
around or in jail. Let me just ask, Director Mueller, in your experi-
ence as FBI Director in the 8 years since 9/11—and you’ve been
there every single one of those days—have terrorist suspects pro-
vided valuable intelligence after they have been Mirandized?
Director MUELLER. On a number of occasions, yes, sir.
Senator ROCKEFELLER. Case by case?
Director MUELLER. Case by case. There are two cases—one that
was already mentioned, David Headley out of Chicago, which is one
of the more recent ones. Back in 2004, there was an individual by
the name of Mohammed Junaid Zabar.
Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you.
Director MUELLER. Another individual who provided substantial
intelligence.
Senator ROCKEFELLER. On the flipside, do terrorist suspects al-
ways automatically come forth with intelligence unless and until
they are Mirandized?
Director MUELLER. No, it differs from case to case.
Senator ROCKEFELLER. Case by case.
Director MUELLER. Circumstance to circumstance.
Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you. Is it true that, depending on
the circumstances, in some cases the best method for gaining intel-
ligence is by charging the terrorist with a crime, Mirandizing him
and conducting a thorough criminal investigation?
Director MUELLER. We have found that the system of justice in
the United States, which allows for consideration for a contributing
intelligence and information and credit for that is a powerful incen-

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tive to persons to provide truthful, actionable information, evidence

and intelligence.
You have other countries that don’t have the same system of jus-
tice, where there is no incentive to cooperate or provide intelligence
and the person stays in jail without any incentive to provide intel-
ligence and without providing, ultimately, any intelligence. So in
case after case here, we have been successful in entering into some
sort of agreement with the defendant and having that defendant
provide actionable intelligence.
Senator ROCKEFELLER. I don’t want, particularly, an answer from
any of you on this, but it is my impression, having studied this
some, that the military commissions process for prosecuting is rel-
atively unformed and in a state of play. It is not an experienced,
professional process such as you have at your disposal. It may work
very well. It may not work very well.
I’m not talking about the getting of intelligence, but I’m talking
about the prosecuting. I don’t expect you to answer on that, I’m
simply giving you my opinion. Recognizing the classification issues
at stake here, can you tell me if—and you’ve answered this al-
ready, but I want it on record—if Abdulmutallab had provided the
valuable intelligence in his FBI interrogations?
Director MUELLER. On Christmas Day itself, he provided re-
sponses to questions, information and to the extent that we go into
more detail, I’d ask that we do it in closed session.
Senator ROCKEFELLER. I understand that. I understand that. In
your professional judgment, I would say to Director Blair—and you
sort of answered this, but I’d like it again on the record because
I think this is a debate which is spilling most unhelpfully across
the talk shows and beyond—in your professional judgment, are
there compelling national security reasons to prosecute some ter-
rorism cases in a federal criminal court rather than in a military
commission? And on the other side, would there be some cases
where you might prefer to do it in a military commission, or are
you familiar enough with their processes to make such a rec-
ommendation?
Director BLAIR. Senator, it’s not my responsibility nor do I have
a great deal of expertise in the venue that’s chosen for prosecution.
What I’m interested in is getting the intelligence out so that we
can do a better job against the groups that send these people. And
I’ve seen intelligence come from a variety of interrogations, pri-
marily based on the skill of the interrogators—and there are good
ones in many different places—and by the degree to which we back
them up and back them up quickly with an intelligence team which
can help them with their requirements. I think that’s the key thing
from my point of view.
Senator ROCKEFELLER. Then I would ask both of you, and actu-
ally of all five, it seems to me that what we’ve come down to in
this brief interchange is that this should be done on a case-by-case
basis based upon what seems to be best according to professionals
who carry the responsibility and the judgment for making those de-
cisions, should it be criminal justice, should it be military commis-
sion. Would you agree with that?
Director BLAIR. I think that decision is bound up in the interro-
gation, which is what I care about. So I think yes, it should be a

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rapid, flexible, case-by-case, balancing the requirement for intel-

ligence with the requirement to put these people behind bars and
not let them go free that is what we need.
Senator ROCKEFELLER. Director Mueller.
Director MUELLER. I think our history has been that the decision
whether or not to proceed in a federal district court or in a civilian
court versus a military commission is a weighty decision. We’ve
had two occasions where it’s happened in the past where some-
body’s been taken out of civilian courts and put into the military
courts and then ended up back in civilian courts—al-Mari and an
individual by the name of Padilla.
And so yes, the differences in procedures for interrogation is one
factor, but there probably are a number of other factors that need
to be weighed by the Justice Department and the executive before
that decision is made. And I’m not certain that it is a decision that
can be made very quickly because there are a number of competing
factors and one would want to take some time, I would think, in
order to sort those factors out.
Senator ROCKEFELLER. But in the end, this is a decision that
should be made by professionals according to their responsibilities
and according to the facts of the case?
Director MUELLER. Yes, but ultimately, it is the Attorney Gen-
eral and the President that make the decision.
Senator ROCKEFELLER. But what I’m saying is that we should
not limit the President by saying it has to go here or it has to go
there.
Director MUELLER. Absolutely.
Senator ROCKEFELLER. He should not be limited.
Director MUELLER. Absolutely.
Senator ROCKEFELLER. I thank you both. Thank you Madam
Chairman.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Rockefeller.
Senator Hatch.
Senator HATCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and, first of all,
I’d like to thank all of you for the hard work that you do for our
country and for our people. You’re all great people in my eyes.
Director Blair, let me just start with you. A few minutes ago, we
received from your office a copy of a letter signed by John Brennan,
who’s Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism to Speaker Pelosi on the subject of the closure of
Guantanamo and the transfer of detainees abroad.
Now, the second paragraph of the letter states the following,
‘‘The professional assessment of our military commanders and civil-
ian leaders of the Department of Defense is that closing the deten-
tion facilities at Guantanamo is a national security imperative in
the war against al-Qa’ida. Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen and
General Petraeus have all stated that closing Guantanamo will
help our troops by eliminating a potent recruiting tool.’’
Now, in my mind, the word ‘‘imperative’’ implies something that
has to be addressed for an immediate reaction. Now, Director Blair,
I concur that terrorist propaganda does use Guantanamo as a
theme. It also uses our close relationship with Israel, but I don’t
think we’re going to change our policies toward Israel as a result.

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And by his assertion—or this assertion by Mr. Brennan, let me just

ask you these specific questions.
Is there any intelligence or analysis that you can share here or
provide in closed hearing that proves, indicates or even suggests
that al-Qa’ida would change its plans and intents towards us if we
closed Guantanamo?
Director BLAIR. I don’t think it would change its plans or intent,
but it would deprive al-Qa’ida of a powerful symbol and recruiting
tool, which it has actively exploited over the years.
Senator HATCH. Well, just because they would have one less re-
cruiting theme, is there an intelligence or analysis that the threat
from al-Qa’ida would be diminished?
Director BLAIR. Well, the extent to which they weren’t able to re-
cruit people who the Guantanamo symbol helped to recruit, they
would be weaker without it.
Senator HATCH. Well, is there any intelligence or analysis that
you’re aware of that specifically indicates that U.S. forces abroad
would be under any less threat from al-Qa’ida were Guantanamo
to be closed?
Director BLAIR. You’re a much better lawyer than I am, Senator
Hatch. I’ve learned that in these exchanges, but what I’m trying to
say is that it’s a factor that helps the enemy, that if we can deprive
them of that factor, it’s good.
Senator HATCH. Yeah, I’m not trying to give you a rough time,
nor am I trying to cross examine you. But I am trying to establish
that, my gosh, nothing’s going to change their attitude towards us.
There are a lot of things that we do that they don’t like, including
our friendship with Israel and some other countries in the Middle
East, the Arab countries. Let me ask you this, have you ever pro-
vided intelligence to our policymakers that supports the notion that
the homeland or our troops would be safer after Guantanamo’s
closed?
Director BLAIR. We provided intelligence and I assess, Senator
Hatch, that among the things that we can do that would weaken
al-Qa’ida would be to close Guantanamo and diminish the emo-
tional and symbolic support that that gives them in the pool of peo-
ple they try to recruit in order to come against us.
Senator HATCH. Well, isn’t it true that al-Qa’ida used the pros-
ecution and imprisonment of the blind sheikh as a recruiting tool
and that al-Qa’ida members have said they were inspired to attack
us because of that incarceration? You know that’s true. Is there
any intelligence that suggests al-Qa’ida would not use a prison lo-
cated in the United States as a recruiting tool?
I’ve been to Guantanamo. It’s pretty nice compared to the place
in Illinois where they want to put them. It’d be nice and cold in
the winter time and all I can say is that I imagine there’ll be a hue
and a cry that we’re not fair by bringing them here.
Director BLAIR. Yes, I’m sure there will be stories about wher-
ever they’re incarcerated, but I’m thinking of books that have been
written by former detainees that are passed out, testimonies on the
Internet that Guantanamo has achieved a sort of mythic quality
which helps al-Qa’ida.
Senator HATCH. Well, I think the point I’m trying to make—and,
of course, I think it’s easy to see—is that no matter what we do,

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they’re going to criticize us. We’ve got a very significant courthouse

down there at Guantanamo that could try these in a military com-
mission. We treat them very, very well down there. Some of them
probably are treated better than they’ve ever been treated in their
lifetimes.
But no matter what you do, the terrorists and al-Qa’ida and
Taliban and others are going to complain and say that we’re not
doing it right. Seems to me crazy to, you know, to take the position
that because Guantanamo has been a recruiting tool, then we
ought to close it, when in fact it meets basically every need I think
that we need in handling these matters. I have a lot of other ques-
tions, but I think I’ll submit them in writing, but I’m really con-
cerned.
We’ve seen what’s happened just this past week with regard to
the desire to hold the trial in midtown Manhattan. And now there’s
a great desire not to. As a trial lawyer, I can tell you right now
that there are all kinds of approaches that could be taken that
would be better than trying Khalid Shaykh Mohammed in this
country.
And I think that the Zacarias Moussaoui case—4 years to try it
or to go through the whole process—he ultimately gets off because
one juror didn’t believe in the death penalty. And during that trial,
he was taunting families of those who had been killed and using
it as a propaganda device to act like he was a hero when in fact
he was nothing but a murderer as the twentieth hijacker. And I
can’t even begin to imagine what Khalid Shaykh Mohammed would
do if that trial was within the confines of the United States and
it’s not a military tribunal.
Well, I know that you have to be a loyal member of the adminis-
tration—all of you. And I accept that. But I think it’s a dumb,
dumb, stupid approach to take when we have the facilities that are
perfectly capable of taking care of these people and doing it an a
way with a military commission that makes sense, is legal, after
we corrected the military commission statute and totally accept-
able, it seems to me.
Senator ROCKEFELLER. Would the Senator yield?
Senator HATCH. Sure.
Senator ROCKEFELLER. That was quite a potent statement you
made there.
Senator HATCH. Yeah, it was.
Senator ROCKEFELLER. To recognize that these five men before
us are members of an administration and therefore the implication
that they can only talk based upon what they have been instructed
to say as opposed to being profound professionals in their field, as
opposed to what they might actually feel. So are you saying that
they’re just saying what they’ve been told to say?
Senator HATCH. Well, I’ve only been here 34 years, but I can say
that I’ve seen administration after administration executives that
support their administration. I don’t blame them for that. Their
budgets depend on it. There are lot of other things—their jobs de-
pend on it half the time.
Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you.
Senator HATCH. I don’t have any problem with that. All I do have
a problem with is I think it’s stupid to put the whole country

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through this mess because the Attorney General feels that might
be a better way of doing things, when in fact it’s the worst way of
doing things.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. If I may——
Senator HATCH. Sure.
Chairman FEINSTEIN [continuing]. Now, you know, you’re a good
friend of mine, Senator Hatch.
Senator HATCH. I am.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. And I love and respect that friendship. But
I’ve really got to correct the message.
Senator HATCH. Okay.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. First of all, the policy was really estab-
lished during the regime of Ronald Reagan. And let me quote Jerry
Bremer, who was this President’s—Ronald Reagan’s—first coordi-
nator for counterterrorism in 1986. This is what he said in a
speech in November of 1987 to the Council of Foreign Relations in
Tampa.
He said, ‘‘Terrorists are criminals. They commit criminal actions
like murder, kidnapping and arson. And countries have laws to
punish criminals. So a major element of our strategy’’—and remem-
ber, he’s saying that on behalf of President Reagan—‘‘has been to
delegitimatize terrorists and get society to see them for what they
are.’’
That was the policy then; it was the policy of every President
since that time. George Bush—and I can go chapter and verse on
each individual when they were transferred from one custody to
another—he had flexibility, he made changes, and now all of a sud-
den, it’s a huge political issue. And I think it’s absolutely wrong to
do that. So now I’ve had my say.
Senator HATCH. Now, let me just take a point of personal privi-
lege.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. You may respond, Senator Hatch.
Senator HATCH. Yeah, I think that it’s a question of law. It’s a
question of how you approach the law. And whether Reagan did
that or not, I don’t know. All I know is that we didn’t have 3,000
people killed in one day in New York City, in the three various in-
cidents that occurred. These are vicious people. As I understand it,
Khalid Shaykh Mohammed said he would plead guilty and that he
wanted to be executed so he could be a martyr for his people. And
I think even having said that he deserves at least an opportunity
for a trial.
But I think when you have the capacity of doing it in a place as
good as Guantanamo, it ought to be done there. And it shouldn’t
be brought to this country on our shores. And I think you’re seeing
more and more people getting upset about this. And it’s not so
much a political thing as it is just a domestic security thing that
people are concerned about.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Hatch.
Senator Whitehouse.
Vice Chairman BOND. Madam Chair, I just have to add. I don’t
think Ronald Reagan deserves to be in this discussion. You talk
about 1986. That was before the activities of the 1990s and when
9/11 brought a whole new threat to our views. Now, when 9/11 hap-
pened, President Bush took a number of actions. There’s some that

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I think—where he’s been proven wrong and I would hope we would

learn from releasing detainees. That was wrong. He made the right
decision when he did treat Jose Padilla as an enemy combatant in
questioning.
But if we can’t learn from our mistakes, no matter whether it’s
Republican or Democrat, then we’re doomed to commit them again.
And I just suggest that we are learning a lot. And I would hope
that we would have a different approach next time an enemy com-
batant lands on this soil. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, thank you. Just for the record, I’m
going to submit to the record a list of individuals convicted under
the Bush administration in criminal court, in Article III court—be-
ginning with Richard Reid, going to Omar Abu Ali, Zacarias
Moussaoui, as well as Padilla, Lindh, the Lackawanna Six and so
on and so forth—and put these in the record.
The point is that a President should have flexibility to cite the
venue for trial. And it may be different for different cases. And all
I can say is those of us on this side of the aisle did not criticize
President Bush for doing this at this time. And we view with some
suspicion the fact that President Obama is being criticized for fol-
lowing policy that had been established since 9/11. I’ll now recog-
nize——
Vice Chairman BOND. Madam Chair—I will add ——
Chairman FEINSTEIN [continuing]. I’ll now recognize Senator
Whitehouse.
Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Vice Chairman BOND [continuing]. I will add the names of the
people who—the information released as a result of these trials,
where we held the trials and I will discuss further—I disagree with
your characterization. Thank you.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Senator Whitehouse.
Senator WHITEHOUSE. Madam Chair, I have not been here 34
years. I have been here only three years, but I find it extremely
discouraging that with these gentlemen before us—the head of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the head of the FBI, the Director of
National Intelligence, the head of the Central Intelligence Agency
and the acting head of the State Department’s intelligence serv-
ice—who I would add is the acting head because there is a Repub-
lican blockade of the person who is slated for that position here
more than a year into the Obama administration—that all this
committee can talk about is where Mr. Abdulmutallab was
Mirandized and where trials should be.
There are so many issues that are so important to our national
security that these gentlemen have real expertise in. I think it’s
clear that the tradition has been strongly towards civilian trials.
There is one person in the world incarcerated as a terrorist as a
result of a military tribunal right now, hundreds because of the
other and yet this question persists and persists and persists and
persists and persists.
It seems to be the only talking point on the other side of the
aisle. And because so much of it is fallacious, we then have to re-
spond in order to try to clear up the record and then this whole
hearing turns into a focus on a point for which none of these gen-
tlemen would need to be here and that really does not bear as sig-

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nificantly as other issues, I think, on the responsibilities that they

have to discharge.
So I say that and I will move to another issue, which is your re-
port, Director Blair, leads off with a discussion of the risk of cyber
attack to the country. And I want to read a couple of statements
from a recent article in Foreign Policy magazine by Josh Rogin. He
reported that senior U.S. military officials believe, ‘‘the Chinese
government is supporting hackers that attack anything and every-
thing in the national security infrastructure on a constant basis.’’
He continues, ‘‘the Defense Department has said that the Chi-
nese government, in addition to employing thousands of its own
hackers, manages massive teams of experts from academia and in-
dustry in cyber militias that act in Chinese national interest with
unclear amounts of support and direction from Chinese Peoples
Liberation Army.’’
It seems that the analogy in cyber warfare goes back to the an-
cient days of naval combat when nations not only sent out ships
under their own flag to engage in warfare but also offered to pri-
vate ship owners, to pirates, indeed, letters of mark to go out and
act in that nation’s interest.
What do you believe are the most important structural deficits
that we have and need to fix in dealing with state-sponsored cyber
attacks on our country that either come through false legs or are
hidden behind work stations that are located all around the world
in order to be able to deter these attacks?
And, if it makes a difference, could you distinguish between what
Mr. Rogin referred to as hackers that attack anything and every-
thing in the national security infrastructure on a constant basis
and the brain drain that we face from wholesale industrial espio-
nage—stealing our manufacturing and technological secrets so that
competitors abroad can take advantage of them without paying for
the intellectual property they have stolen.
Director BLAIR. Senator Whitehouse, the individual skills of a
single hacker, whether he is doing it for fun or paid off by a crimi-
nal or employed by an intelligence service of another country, you
can have really ace hackers under all three of those scenarios. The
advantage of a government or the characteristics of government-
sponsored attacks are more the focus on what they do and the abil-
ity to put it together with other forms of intelligence—spies and
humans that they can use, not just sitting there at the keyboard.
Criminals can do some of that, individual hackers generally don’t.
So the nature of this threat is pretty much the same no matter
who is doing it. It’s just the resources they have to put against it.
Senator WHITEHOUSE. Those resources can matter a lot when it
ends up to thousands or even tens of thousands of attacks daily
and weekly.
Director BLAIR. Absolutely. And that brings me to the second
point which is that, as I said in my statement, the general level
of our defenses is just not good enough for either the monetary
value or the intrinsic value of what we keep on the Net—intellec-
tual property and so on. Now, our big international central banks
that send billions of dollars across wires in networked systems
have developed tough defenses. And they spent a lot of money on
them and they put a lot of people on them. They continually check

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them and they can have high confidence that they can be secure
against outsiders—an insider is still a threat.
There are many transactions that involve extremely powerful in-
formation and which people seem to think that a relatively simple
password is enough to protect. And even a moderate hacker can get
into files in major companies in lots of commercial areas that are
not protected at all.
So I think we simply have to raise the game, spend more money
which is proportionate to what we’re protecting rather than just
making it an add-on thing. Do more training of people so that they
are more skilled and take advantage of the techniques that are
available there if we just put them in and apply them.
I’d say if we do that, we would be up at the 90, 95 percent level
of protection and after that, it would take a very skilled, deter-
mined, resourced, timely attack in order to get in. But a lot of ex-
tremely valuable things are available through very, very unsophis-
ticated hackers who just do brute force methods. And they can be
criminals or hackers or they can be government agents.
Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Director. My time has expired.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator White-
house.
Senator Wyden.
Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to all
of you for your service to our country.
We’ve had a number of closed sessions on the Christmas Day at-
tack but I’d like to talk about a couple of issues in public to get
actually on the record what I think the country is especially con-
cerned about. My sense is that the intelligence community does a
good job collecting intelligence but has a harder time integrating it
and analyzing it.
And you all have talked about a number of steps through the
course of the afternoon. Director Panetta, you talked about how
people like Mr. Abdulmutallab are going to be looking for other op-
portunities. And here’s my question, and I want to ask this of you,
Director Blair. If the events leading up to Mr. Abdulmutallab’s at-
tempted attack were repeated over the next several months, how
confident are you now that a new Mr. Abdulmutallab would be
identified as a threat before he boarded an airplane bound for the
United States?
Director BLAIR. Senator Wyden, I’m confident that someone who
left the trail that Mr. Abdulmutallab did would now be found. Even
in the month since the 25th of December, we have added human
resources—we put more people on the problem, we’ve assigned
them more specifically, and we’ve made some more tools available
that would catch an Abdulmutallab.
What I can’t tell you is that even with these improvements we
would be able to catch someone who took more care in—I’d rather
not talk about it in open session—but someone who is more careful,
more skilled, could still leave an intelligence trail that we would
have a hard time——
Senator WYDEN. But you could provide the assurance to the
American people—because this is why I wanted to ask it in pub-
lic—that with the additional resources, with your effort to unpack
everything that took place, you are now significantly more con-

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fident that another Mr. Abdulmutallab would be apprehended be-

fore he got on the plane.
Director BLAIR [continuing]. Yes, sir.
Senator WYDEN. Okay. Director Mueller, if I could, I wanted to
ask you about this homegrown al-Qa’ida and terrorist threat, and
certainly, when you look at some of the high-profile arrests that the
FBI has made over the past year of people like Headley and Mr.
Zazi, this is something also very much on people’s mind. You
touched on it in your statement: How serious do you believe the
threat of a homegrown al-Qa’ida threat is today?
Director MUELLER. I think it’s a very serious threat and increas-
ing, principally because of the enhanced use of the Internet to
radicalize and to be utilized to coordinate actions. And so with the
growth of the Internet, so too has grown the threat domestically.
If you look at individuals like Samadi in Dallas, he was radicalized
by the Internet; the individual up in Springfield; individuals in
Charlotte. The homegrown radicalization by those who were
radicalized in the United States who do not and have not traveled
overseas for training has grown over the last several years.
Senator WYDEN. Are you more concerned about al-Qa’ida terror-
ists coming from inside the United States now or from outside?
Director MUELLER. I’m equally concerned about—probably both
are about the same level of concern. I do think that the attacks un-
dertaken by individuals who have some association or training
overseas tend to be more of a threat in terms of the capabilities
than some of the threats that we’ve seen domestically. And so it
is the training, the enhanced capabilities that come for persons
traveling overseas and then coming back that would make any ter-
rorist attack a more substantial terrorist attack in most cases than
undertaken by a lone individual in the United States.
Senator WYDEN. Let me just close the loop on this. So you think
it’s a serious threat and would you say it’s as significant threat as
you see, say, in Great Britain?
Director MUELLER. I think to a certain extent, in some areas, we
share the same concerns as Great Britain. And by that, I mean
places like Somalia and Yemen and the ability of terrorists in those
countries to identify individuals who can be trained in either Soma-
lia, Yemen or Pakistan and then travel back to the U.K. or the
United States, we have somewhat the same problems—particularly
with Somali youth, individuals, we found last year who were trav-
eling to Somalia and coming back to the United States.
On the other hand, the U.K. has, I believe, a stronger network
of individuals who have been radicalized with close ties to South
Asia—stronger ties to South Asia than you’ll find here in the
United States—which presents a different threat to the U.K. than
it does to us.
Senator WYDEN. Let me turn to one other subject for you, Direc-
tor Panetta. Do you or any of your associates have an estimate
about what it would take to drive al-Qa’ida out of the Pakistani
tribal areas? I think I want to touch briefly on the question of Paki-
stan, and what is your assessment of what it would take to drive
al-Qa’ida out of that area.
Director PANETTA. Senator Wyden, I’ve asked that question a
number of times because obviously our operations are very aggres-

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sive and very directed and, as I said, are very effective with re-
gards to disrupting their operations. Having said that, the reality
is that they continue to operate; they continue to move within the
FATA and the tribal areas. I would just share with you that I
think to effectively be able to disrupt al-Qa’ida and to end their
threat we need to have boots on the ground in addition to our oper-
ations.
Senator WYDEN. One last question if I might, Madam Chair.
What else, Director Panetta, could the Pakistani government do if
Pakistani leaders wanted to provide more assistance on counterter-
rorism issues?
Director PANETTA. Just what I said, which is boots on the
ground. They, in fact, went into South Waziristan. That was very
effective on bringing pressure on these groups. They had to move;
they had to scramble. That helped us in terms of our operations.
We need them to continue that effort.
Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Wyden.
Senator Snowe.
Senator SNOWE. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you all for
being here today.
I just want to be clear because this is obviously a profound con-
cern and I share the sentiments expressed by my colleague, Sen-
ator Bond, about the whole issue and issuing of Miranda rights to
a terrorist on Christmas Day. And I think the American people
need to have reassurances as well in terms of what is going to
change as a result, you know, of what happened, and what is going
to be the process going forward?
Because it seems to me, in this instance, it clearly should have
commanded the attention at the highest levels in the intelligence
community about whether further questions should be posed to this
individual to be certain that the questions being posed were based
on all of the information regarding al-Qa’ida in Yemen, for exam-
ple, about this individual, and putting it all together before issuing
his Miranda rights.
And I think that’s what’s so disturbing here because that did not
occur, so it didn’t seem to me, and I don’t think it seemed to the
American people, that there was a cohesive, concerted effort and
determination based on all of the information that had been gath-
ered in highly-classified settings regarding al-Qa’ida in Yemen and,
of course, this individual and any associates, and whether or not
there was vital information that needed to be gleaned. And we
won’t know that now.
And furthermore, the administration had said they were setting
up in a group called the high-value detainee interrogation group
precisely for this type of circumstance. Has that been done? And
why wasn’t that done? And how are we going forward?
How is the intelligence community going to move forward based
on this particular situation that really does cast a shadow? Because
we won’t ever know about what could have been elicited from this
individual because of who posed the questions, frankly. You weren’t
consulted, Director Blair, at the highest level, for any questions
that should have been posed to this individual. And it seems to me

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it should have warranted consultation with you and others to be

sure under this circumstance.
Director BLAIR. Yes, Senator Snowe, if we’d known all we needed
to know about Mr. Abdulmutallab, he wouldn’t have been on the
airplane. It was a pop-up. There were extraordinary time pressures
on Christmas Day. I said to another committee that the process of
bringing together intelligence and skilled interrogators, in the light
of how we want to prosecute somebody, is the absolute key thing.
A form of that was done on Christmas Day. The Joint Task Force
FBI agents asked good questions. I’ve read the intelligence reports
that they put out and they were good.
We have taken advantage of the time we now have in order to
bring the full intelligence expertise into the support of the FBI, in
this case, which will—we hope—bring even more intelligence which
we can use. We have this high-value interrogation team building
the file so that when we get somebody that we know about, prob-
ably overseas, we can have done a lot of that homework that Sen-
ator Bond referred to first.
So the principle of using intelligence, using good interrogators,
making sure that we are taking the steps we need to get them be-
hind bars in the most effective way are what we need to bring to-
gether. And we just need to do that fast and the right way.
Director MUELLER. I understand the concern in terms of the
public’s understanding of what happened on Christmas Day. I also
share your concern that in doing a thorough interrogation you have
the input from a number of sources, the background, the prepara-
tion and the like. But it also is important to obtain the facts as
soon as you can and the time frame as such that you do not have
the opportunity to do that background such as you would like.
There were very fast-moving events on Christmas Day. We took
advantage—and I say ‘‘we’’—the FBI took advantage, in my mind,
of the opportunities to gather that intelligence as quickly as we
could under the constraints that we operate in and with a person
who is arrested in the United States.
I, along with Director Blair and Director Panetta, believe that
teams of individuals with the appropriate background should be de-
ployed to do interrogations. And the protocol has been established,
has been set up, but we have not waited for that protocol. We have
utilized those teams already. With Headley, for instance, in Chi-
cago, we had a team of individuals who were doing the follow-up
questioning of him with expertise from a variety of areas, and
there we had the luxury of time in order to do it.
We have teams established that will be ready to go, in terms of—
or in the instance where we will pick up somebody in a particular
area of the world—where we will have teams, and do have teams,
ready to go to undertake those interrogations. So we have done a
lot in terms of putting together these teams to interrogate. But you
also have to look at what happened on Christmas Day in the con-
fines of trying to get intelligence on that day as to what was the
immediate threat that the American public faced.
Senator SNOWE. So what was the fast-moving event of that day
that necessitated issuing his Miranda rights? I’m not clear on that.
What was the rush and the extraordinary pressures that were
being faced?

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Director MUELLER. Well, first of all, we had to determine wheth-

er there were any—in the initial interview, we had to determine
whether there were other bombs on the plane, whether there were
other planes that had similar attacks contemplated, wanted to un-
derstand who the bomb maker was, who had directed him. All of
that came in the first series of questions.
Later that night, we had another opportunity to interview him,
and I believe that at that time, not only would we be able to inter-
view him, but we would interview him in the way that we could
utilize his statements to assure his successful prosecution, under-
standing that we have the obligation to take the individual before
a magistrate without undue delay, which would mean he’d go be-
fore a magistrate within the next 24 hours. So we sought to take
advantage of that time to undertake the interrogations we could
with the evidence we gathered at hand.
Senator SNOWE. But why wouldn’t it have been—I guess I’m still
not clear, because I don’t understand why we’d want to issue the
Miranda rights when we’re worried about whatever other subse-
quent events that might be occurring.
Director MUELLER. Because we also want to utilize his state-
ments to effectively prosecute him.
Senator SNOWE. Well, you know, I just profoundly disagree with
that. I think most people do, given those circumstances. It just
doesn’t seem to me to make sense. And frankly, not having the col-
lective weight on the intelligence community to really zero in on
this particular individual at this moment in time is really dis-
concerting and troubling, and I think that’s the point.
Director MUELLER. Now, let me just add one other point, and
that is, it is a continuum. In other words, you can look at it in that
day, but I encourage you to look at what has happened since then.
And it is a continuum in which, over a period of time, we have been
successful in obtaining intelligence not just on day one, but day
two, day three, day four, day five and down the road. And so I en-
courage you to look at it as a continuum as opposed to looking at
it as a snapshot of what happened on one day.
Senator SNOWE. Thank you.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Snowe.
Senator Risch.
Senator RISCH. Thank you. First of all, Senator Snowe is right,
and I’m going to come back to that in just a minute. But I want
to engage in the political sparring that we’ve had here, briefly, to
start with.
First of all, I think the questions by my colleague from Oregon
were very on point, wanting to know if the American people can
be assured that somebody like Mr. Abdulmutallab will not be al-
lowed on a plane again. And I have every confidence that you guys
are right, that you’ve got it figured out, that this isn’t going to hap-
pen. Unfortunately, most people that, if they’re going to do this
again, they won’t have a guy with the credentials that this guy’s
got. There’s a million people out there that have no record, and you
won’t see it again. But it’s important.
As far as the Article III trial, I don’t understand it and I don’t—
you know, whether Bush did it or Reagan did it or this President
did it, when it comes to a combatant, they’re all wrong on this. Ar-

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ticle III courts were put together for the protection of the United
States citizen. It is expensive to try someone in an Article III court.
It is a great protection that most of the world doesn’t have. Cer-
tainly, people that come here that are foreigners that attacked us
are not entitled to an Article III trial. So I don’t care who made
the decision, what party they’re in; they’re dead wrong on that.
Guantanamo—yeah, it’s a political issue only because it became
a political issue during the last campaign. Every one of us here has
met with people from the Arab world and what-have-you. The
flashpoint for them is not Guantanamo; it’s Israel, as was pointed
out. And I’d like to associate myself with remarks from Senator
Hatch.
Let’s talk about Miranda for a minute. Let me try to put this in
perspective for you. I used to be a prosecutor—in fact, I was a pros-
ecutor when Miranda was decided. We all thought it was the end
of the world. It turned out it wasn’t. But we learned a lot of things
from it. Miranda simply—the court said look, in America, we are
not an inquisitorial criminal process, we are an accusatorial crimi-
nal process. That means the government’s got to accuse you,
they’ve got to prove it and you don’t have to come up with any in-
formation to help them do it. That’s what Miranda was all about.
Again, it was done for the protection of United States citizens liv-
ing under the United States Constitution, and not for foreigners.
Miranda is simply an exclusionary rule. Now, I think most people
in this room know what an exclusionary rule is. You don’t go to jail
if you’re a police officer because you don’t Mirandize someone. The
case doesn’t get thrown out because you don’t Mirandize someone.
The only thing that Miranda does is it excludes any evidence that
the police got because they didn’t give the guy his Miranda warn-
ing.
All right, let’s take the Christmas Day bomber. Somebody tell me
why he had to be given his Miranda warnings. With all due re-
spect, Mr. Mueller—and by the way, thank you for what you do.
You guys have tough jobs and I appreciate it—but with all due re-
spect, you didn’t need to give this guy Miranda in order to have a
legitimate criminal prosecution. You had 200 witnesses that saw
what he did. You didn’t need a confession from the guy.
And anything you got out of him, if you didn’t Mirandize him,
couldn’t be used in a court of law, but who cares? You’ve got all
kinds of eyewitnesses; you were going to convict him. I would hope
you’d go back and look at this again and understand that the Mi-
randa rule is simply an exclusionary rule.
Number one, if you’re not going to try him in an Article III court
you don’t need to Miranda him. And number two, if you’ve got all
the evidence you need, you don’t need to Miranda him. Go ahead
and interrogate this guy until the cows come home because it
doesn’t matter.
What you want that for is you want it for intelligence, and if
whatever he says never sees the light of day in a courtroom, who
cares? This guy is going to get convicted. But with all due respect,
I think you lost some information that could have been very, very
valuable to the American people.

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And with that, thank you very much, Madam Chairman. And
there’s a couple minutes left, so maybe, Mr. Blair, you’re in the
middle seat; do you want to comment on that.
Director BLAIR. I find the intelligence committee has an awful lot
of former prosecutors on it but I think that the balance that we’re
trying to strike—it’s interesting, I hear these same conversations
inside the executive branch when we have our meetings on the
same subjects. I mean, these are not easy matters and somebody
would have found the absolute perfect way to balance the prosecu-
tion and intelligence value before now if it had been right there.
So I’d just say these are balance cases and we can talk about in-
dividual ones, but we need to keep all the tools out there, we need
a process to think them through, we need to take advantage of
whatever time we have and the circumstances of the case, and try
to do the best thing.
Senator RISCH. Well, Mr. Blair, let me disagree with you, as far
as this being a balancing matter. This is not a balancing matter.
The question is, whatever I get out of this guy, do I need it in a
court of law? If you don’t need it in a court of law, there’s no bal-
ance that’s necessary or anything else. I mean, there’s no reason—
I mean, just think about this guy. He came from a foreign country
and he wasn’t able to accomplish what he wants, so he gets drug
into the room by American authorities and he’s sitting there think-
ing, geez, I wonder what’s coming next. You know, I don’t know
what these guys do, but I bet it isn’t pretty.
And somebody comes in and says, by the way, we’re going to give
you a lawyer if you’d like one. This guy says, have I died and gone
to heaven? You know, I mean, of course he’s going to shut up.
When you tell him don’t say anything until you talk to a lawyer
and we’re going to give you a free one, of course, he’s going to do
that. With all due respect, this is not difficult. It’s really simple.
Do you need the statement in court or do you not need the state-
ment in court? And if you don’t, wring everything you can out of
that guy.
Madam Chairman, I’m done.
Director MUELLER. May I just add one thing?
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Yes, you may, Mr. Mueller.
Director MUELLER. I don’t disagree with what you said, Senator,
but I will say that you are looking at it in the rear mirror. And
the decisions that are made—you are assuming that, at the point
in time decisions are made, we have a full understanding of the
case that we have against him. And this is but five, six hours after-
wards—four or five hours after he’s gotten off the plane.
And so I don’t disagree with a lot you say, but by the same
token, you’re looking at it in the rear-view mirror. And if you put
yourself at the time and the decisions that you have to make at
that time, you may come down on the other side.
Senator RISCH. And Mr. Mueller, I don’t disagree with that. But
in this case, I’ll bet you guys had talked to about a half a dozen
people that saw exactly what he did and knew you had an airtight
case against this guy.
Director MUELLER. Sir, we were out interviewing that afternoon
the passengers from the plane. But the results of those interviews,
we don’t get until late that night or the following day. The first in-

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formation we have off the plane, when our agents are out there, is
saying an individual has set off some firecrackers on the plane.
And that’s the first information we have. And so, as you well know
as a prosecutor, as the day goes forward and the events, that you
get pieces of information at a particular point in time.
The other point I would make is that, again, as I made it with
Senator Snowe, is this is a continuum over a period of time. And
what happens on that day happens on that day. But do not dis-
count what has happened or what does happen after that in terms
of gaining that intelligence.
Senator RISCH. And that’s fair. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Feingold, you’re up.
Senator FEINGOLD. I thank the Chair. I have a statement that
I ask be included in the record.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Without objection.
Senator FEINGOLD. In light of the discussion this afternoon, I
want to note my strong support for the decision to try Khalid
Shaykh Mohammed and Abdulmutallab in federal court. It’s a deci-
sion that I think actually demonstrates our national strength.
Director Blair, on January 7th, White House Counterterrorism
Advisor John Brennan acknowledged, ‘‘we didn’t know that AQAP
had progressed to the point of actually launching individuals here.’’
Do you agree with that statement?
Director BLAIR. Senator, we had some information that they had
ambitions to attack the United States before that point.
Senator FEINGOLD. You know, this strikes me as an area of stra-
tegic intelligence and perhaps a failure of strategic intelligence.
And it’s important, I think, that we acknowledge and address
that as part of this even as we simultaneously work on how to im-
prove the so-called connect-the-dots tactical capabilities. I just
think it’s important to see that as part of what happened.
CT Advisor Brennan also said that al-Qa’ida is looking in Africa
for recruits and that the government is very concerned about this
and is following up. I’d ask both Directors Blair and Panetta,
where in Africa do you see this occurring? And are you concerned?
Do we have a good enough handle on this threat continent-wide?
Director PANETTA. The areas of principal concern are Somalia
and we have intelligence that obviously there are individuals that
are going to Somalia—in some cases, U.S. citizens that are going
to Somalia and that are involved in training camps there. And
that’s one area of concern. Yemen is another area of concern, as is
obvious. And, again, there al-Qa’ida has a presence and we have
strong intelligence that is trying to target those individuals. More
importantly, we have intelligence that indicates that there is a con-
tinuing effort to try to recruit somebody to institute some kind of
attack on the United States.
Director BLAIR. Senator Feingold, I think you’re familiar with the
organization al-Qa’ida in the Maghreb, which is based in Western
Africa. And I think what we’re learning is that this really is a syn-
dicate al-Qa’ida in South Asia, Yemen, other places, and that
they—in ways that we don’t entirely understand—pass people from
one to the other. Abdulmutallab was a Nigerian; 70 million Mus-

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lims, generally moderate, in Nigeria. But obviously, there is a num-

ber who can be radicalized to the point that he was.
So what I’m finding is to put them into geographic pigeonholes
is kind of limiting our vision. And maybe that was part of the lim-
ited vision that we had before.
Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I think that’s exactly right, Mr. Direc-
tor. And I appreciate your adding that to the items that Director
Panetta mentioned. I tried to talk today to the Secretary of State
about the countries in Western Africa where drug trade, perhaps
from Latin America, is perhaps being connected up with these
things. And of course, your reference to al-Qa’ida in the Islamic
Maghreb is absolutely right in terms of Northern Africa.
So I guess I go back just to comment, do we have the resources?
Do we have the capacity to follow this? These are incredibly vast
areas. And the conditions that allow al-Qa’ida to recruit in Africa
are exactly the kind of problems that I think demand broader re-
form of the sort that I have proposed and this committee and the
Senate have already approved. And I’m hoping that that can be
completed and undertaken in terms of a commission in the near fu-
ture. Until we integrate the intelligence community with the ways
we openly gather information, radicalization, I think, we’ll keep
being one step behind al-Qa’ida.
We also need counterterrorism policies that are informed by
what is actually happening in these countries. Last year, the State
Department concluded that the al-Houthi rebellion in Yemen was
distracting the government from counterterrorism. Do the wit-
nesses have any concerns that Sana’a’s recent interest in CT will
not be sustained or that fighting the rebellion they’re dealing with,
the southern secessionists, will be competing priorities?
Director Panetta.
Director PANETTA. Senator, the situation in Yemen remains a
volatile situation. And although we have gotten strong support
from President Salih to go after targets and to share opportunities
to ensure that we are working together, he is besieged by the
Houthi situation on the border. He’s besieged by what’s happening
in the south and the potential that they might divide from his
country. So there are a series of problems there that could very
well consume him. This is not a clear-cut situation in terms of hav-
ing his support.
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. Director Blair, your prepared tes-
timony is refreshingly candid about Pakistan’s continued support
for militant proxies and about the assistance provided by some of
those groups to al-Qa’ida. You also indicated that Pakistan’s ac-
tions are motivated by a desire, of course, to counter India, which
makes Pakistan’s strategic view of India central to our national se-
curity.
I’m not convinced that the U.S. military operations in Afghani-
stan are going to actually change Islamabad’s calculations in this
regard. Isn’t something else going to have to happen to alter how
Pakistan has looked at the region for the past 60 years?
Director BLAIR. Senator, in conversations with Pakistani officials
and through assessing them with intelligence experts, we think
that that historical foundation that you cite certainly provides the
foundation and the heritage of what they go into these decisions

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 38

with. But they are constantly reevaluating what is happening on

their western border.
What I think General Kayani, for example, one of the key lead-
ers, said yesterday that what he sees as important in Afghanistan
is that it be a friendly state and stable state. And he has offered,
for example, training to Afghanistan armed forces in order to
achieve that. So while the Pakistani threat coming from India is
historically well-grounded and lies at the core of Pakistan’s con-
cern, I think they are realistic in terms of looking around and see-
ing how do they best carry out their interests in that framework.
Senator FEINGOLD. I thank you all.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. I think we should probably begin to wrap
it up. There may be some additional questions. All right, Mr. Vice
Chairman, why don’t you go ahead and then I’ll wrap it up.
Vice Chairman BOND. Okay, just a couple quick things. I admit
to having been on the government and the defense side in a few
criminal cases, limited manner, but I do associate myself with the
country lawyer from Idaho. Not only are there problems with the
trial, but I also recall Khalid Shaykh Mohammed, when arrested,
said something like, my lawyer and I will see you in New York. So
if he were to be tried in New York, which apparently not, it would
be granting his greatest wish.
Now, turning to Gitmo, it was always my understanding that the
many detainees in Gitmo were never intended to come to the
United States for trial. That’s why we worked, in 2007 and 2009,
to get the military tribunals properly established.
Now, moving along, Mr. Director, I was very disappointed—I
wrote you a month and a half ago asking the recidivism numbers
for the past year detainees returning to terrorism to be made pub-
lic. I first got my answer via the media last night, when the letter
from White House Advisor Brennan was sent to the House Speak-
er, which stated openly what we’ve known, that the recidivism rate
was 20 percent.
He went on to note that all those were from the previous admin-
istration. But putting aside all that, and the fact that it took us
a long time to get that answer, number one, I hope that the infor-
mation will be forthcoming on a regular basis in the future. When
I ask a question, I’d like to hear from you in a more timely manner.
But I do know that the detainees released prior to 2009 were
judged to be the very most rehabable or most subject to rehabilita-
tion detainees they had.
So I don’t believe it takes a rocket scientist to realize that letting
any more go would heighten the risk. Do you have any reason to
believe that additional detainees will not go through the so-called
rehab programs, or come back with additional information they can
use to plan and execute terrorist attacks against the United
States?
Director BLAIR. I think you’re absolutely correct on this, Vice
Chairman, that the 500-odd detainees who had been released be-
fore last year, and then the 120-some-odd that have been des-
ignated for release since then are probably easier cases. And I’ve
been personally going through some of these harder cases, and
there’s a fairly large number of them that we shouldn’t——
Vice Chairman BOND. I would hope they would not be released.

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 39

Director BLAIR [continuing]. Yes, sir.

Vice Chairman BOND. Now, moving to the high-value detainee
interrogation group that everybody’s calling HIG for short, when
will the document be finalized and the committee get a copy of it,
and have this operation in place?
Director BLAIR. Sir, the charter—I’ve signed off on the charter,
so it should—it requires a number of sign-offs around the govern-
ment. I’ll look at when it would be available, but it’s moving along,
and, as Director Mueller said, we are using the components that
we expect will coalesce into a HIG right now.
Vice Chairman BOND. But as I understand it from the executive
order, that the HIG is actually under control of the White House
through the National Security Council. Is that correct?
Director BLAIR. The body that makes the decision on deploying
it is in the White House with representatives from everybody at
this table.
Vice Chairman BOND. But it’s the National Security Council. If
Usama bin Ladin were captured tomorrow, would the HIG interro-
gate him? Would he be read his Miranda rights?
Director BLAIR. If Usama bin Ladin were captured, I would very
much hope that the HIG would interrogate him and squeeze all the
information out of him——
Vice Chairman BOND. Prior to Mirandizing him.
Director BLAIR [continuing]. I’m not going to talk about the——
Vice Chairman BOND. Director Panetta, to what extent is the
CIA in the interrogation business at all? I’ve talked to colleagues
who’ve gone overseas and met with commanding officers who, when
asked about who can interrogate them, bring their lawyer in to
give an answer because they don’t seem to know. Does the CIA
have any role in interrogation? If so, what is it?
Director PANETTA. Yes, Senator, we are engaged with these
teams, and what we bring is obviously the intelligence value associ-
ated with whoever is being interrogated. But we do participate in
those kinds of interrogations.
Vice Chairman BOND. So you’ve been participating in the HIG?
Director PANETTA. That’s correct.
Vice Chairman BOND. How long’s that HIG been going?
Director PANETTA. Well, obviously, we have gone ahead and dis-
patched some of these teams with the CIA, with the FBI, in order
to——
Vice Chairman BOND. How long have they—I didn’t know that
the CIA or anybody else was interrogating people; how long has
that been going on?
Director PANETTA [continuing]. Well, we’re participating with the
FBI.
Vice Chairman BOND. Since when?
Director MUELLER. Last fall.
Vice Chairman BOND. So you have been doing this——
Director MUELLER. I mean, we have been doing it in teams in an-
ticipation of the formal signing of the document, but the concept
has been in place since last fall and we have used it on a number
of occasions.
Director BLAIR. Senator, the CIA personnel are not the interroga-
tors; they’re the backup, aren’t they, Director Panetta?

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 40

Director PANETTA. They’re backup, but they are doing some of

the interviewing.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. If I may, the HIG is operational and has
been deployed, correct?
Director BLAIR. Yes.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. Senator Rockefeller, you had a
comment and Senator Whitehouse, will you make a comment?
Senator ROCKEFELLER. I don’t have a question, but just a com-
ment because time is running out. The two things that I’d hoped
to discuss here today, but which we won’t have time to do—but
we’ll have plenty of time in the near future—is, number one, to
meet the two greatest growing threats within our terrorist commu-
nity. One has already been discussed, and that is the youth—I be-
lieve by you, Director Panetta—and that is that Abdulmutallab is—
you know, he had no record; he was clean, had a 2-year visa.
He started in when he was 22 years old. He was arrested when
he was 23 years old. I see this as growing all across the world, in-
cluding in our own country, obviously, because they are clean, be-
cause they cannot be traced. And for that reason, as Director Blair
knows, it’s a concern of mine that when these folks choose to travel
and they pay in cash, and because they pay in cash, there’s simply
an interchange with somebody at an airport or a travel agent,
nothing is known about them—just that they paid in cash and, you
know, maybe checked luggage or maybe didn’t.
So there has to be a way, which we can work out, that when
somebody pays in cash, that the person at the counter or the per-
son at the travel agency asks questions, gets certain information
from that person—Social Security number, telephone number, ad-
dress, address where the person will be overseas. People won’t like
it. Airlines won’t like asking those questions. They’ll think it’s a
harassment upon them. But there is no other protection that I
know of for people who have a paperless trail. So that’s one thing
that concerns me greatly.
And the second one we’ve also talked about in other situations,
and that is the fact that—I think I’ve read it in several books and
plenty of articles—that, let’s say that the entire operation of bring-
ing down the twin towers cost al-Qa’ida about $500,000 and that
with all of the poppy activity, the corruption activity, the criminal
gang activity which interrelates in with the Taliban in Pakistan,
with the Taliban in Afghanistan, and with others. And they cross-
fertilize at some point, because money is money. Also, so much
money is contributed to this from foreign countries, and we all
know who those foreign countries are.
The question of chasing down the financing of terrorism is, to
this Senator, a primary concern. I don’t know how much is being
done about it. I do know that—I think that they can sort of do a
twin tower every three weeks, according to the amount of money
they raise. And that may be just from the drug trade—the nar-
cotics—much less the other types of financial resources that are
coming to them, just in overwhelming hundreds of millions of dol-
lars, hundreds of millions of dollars.
That has to be faced up to. And it’s serious; it’s hard; it’s a hard
thing to shut down because it’s worldwide. You’re dealing with dif-
ferent people; you’re not necessarily dealing with the terrorists

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 41

themselves. You’re dealing with the people who facilitate. But now,
they become equally dangerous. They enable. And that’s scary.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Whitehouse, you had a question?
Senator WHITEHOUSE. I believe that the Chairman in her open-
ing remarks referenced the report that the committee is working
on on cyber security. I believe that the extent to which the country
is under cyber attack is under-appreciated by the public. And I
would like to ask each of you for your cooperation with that report
in making timely decisions about declassification so that we can,
without compromising any national security information, present
information in the report about the scale of the attack that we face
in a meaningful way and in our time frame.
I believe that will require some cooperation from you as
declassifiers since nobody in the legislative branch of government
is a declassifier and our procedures for declassifying information
are so complex that I frankly believe that they have never actually
been used.
So it will require your cooperation and I’d just like to take this
public opportunity to ask you for your cooperation in accomplishing
that.
Director BLAIR. Senator, we’ll do that.
And, Madam Chairman, if I can just clarify one thing in my ex-
change with Senator Feingold, I just had a chance to review the
statement by Mr. Brennan that he mentioned. And we’re not at
odds. It’s a distinction between strategic and tactical intelligence
and we’re both saying the same thing.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. I’d like just to clar-
ify my understanding. My understanding is that the high value de-
tainee interrogation team is in fact operative, that it has been de-
ployed and that it will participate in any future interrogation. Is
that correct?
Director PANETTA. That’s correct.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Panetta.
It is also my understanding that Mr. Abdulmutallab has pro-
vided valuable information. Is that correct?
Director MUELLER. Yes.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. And that the interrogation continues de-
spite the fact that he has been Mirandized.
Director MUELLER. Yes.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. It is also my information that the no-fly
list has been substantially augmented. Is that correct?
Director PANETTA. That’s correct. We have added a number of
names to the no-fly list.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. And can you discuss the definition for
placement on the no-fly list? We discussed this and you read the
definition, which took a Philadelphia lawyer to——
Director BLAIR. Closed session. And we showed you the stack of
paper which is required. And I think it’s a case of practice and in-
terpretation of those rules. And, as Director Panetta said, we are
interpreting those more aggressively right now until we get a bet-
ter handle on this situation with al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Penin-
sula.

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 42

So it’s within the same words written on the paper, but it’s more
aggressive and flexible in terms of actually getting more names on
the list when we’re in the gray area.
Chairman FEINSTEIN [continuing]. And it’s my understanding
that the views of a chief of station will be taken into consideration
in terms of determining whether an individual should be placed on
a no-fly list or a watch list. Is that correct, Mr. Panetta?
Director PANETTA. That’s correct.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. I think that’s very important. And I’m de-
lighted to hear that. All right.
I’d like to thank everybody. I’d like to thank you for your service
to the country. I’d like to thank your staff that have worked on
this. I know it’s a very hard time and that the next six months are
a difficult period. So the committee stands available to be of what-
ever help it can be.
Vice Chairman BOND. I was going to say, before you closed, first,
I join with the Chair in thanking you for your discussions. I be-
lieve, having been around here a little while, that when we have
these open hearings, one of the most important things we can do
is talk about issues that are important to the public. And while
we’ve had very spirited debate on both sides, there is strong dis-
agreement.
I think the public wants to hear from you, from both sides of the
aisle on our views on this. So I find this is a very, very helpful dis-
cussion. It’s difficult because good friends are disagreeing. But I
thank the Chair for having this in open hearing, and letting us
pursue those.
Number two, I’ve said that I believe that we have very strong in-
terest on both sides of the aisle in making sure that cyber security
is pursued as an intelligence matter, but that the American people
understand just how dangerous these cyber attacks are for our per-
sonal bank accounts, credit cards, for the security of our infrastruc-
ture—power supply, water companies and all that—and for our na-
tional security.
So when we find things that can be discussed openly, we will
look forward to doing so.
And finally, Madam Chair, I believe the record normally will stay
open for a couple of days.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. It will stay open.
Vice Chairman BOND. Surprisingly enough, I didn’t even get
through the questions. I would like to give our distinguished wit-
nesses an opportunity to respond to some of the comments that
have been made by former Attorney General, Mike Mukasey, who
was the trial judge in the Blind Sheik and other cases. And I would
like to get your reaction to those.
But I thank you, Madam Chair, for putting up with this and hav-
ing a very spirited, interesting debate.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]

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 Supplemental Material

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 95

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 96

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 97

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 98

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 100

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 101

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 102

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 103

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 104

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 105

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 106

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 107

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 108

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 109

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 110

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 111

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 112

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 113

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 114

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 115

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 116

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 117

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 118

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 119

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 120

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 121

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 122

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 123

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 127

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 129

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 130

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 134
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RUSS FEINGOLD, A U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN
The Christmas Day attack on our country, by a regional al Qaeda affiliate in
Yemen using an operative from Nigeria, underscored the global nature of the ter-
rorist threat we face. If we are to stay ahead of al Qaeda, we must respond by im-
proving our intelligence capabilities and developing better informed and more com-
prehensive counterterrorism strategies.
First, we must maximize our ability to anticipate radicalization and the emer-
gence of new terrorist safe havens by fully integrating our Intelligence Community
with the ways in which our government gathers information openly around the
world. I have proposed an independent commission to do just that, and the Senate
Intelligence Committee and full Senate have approved this proposal.
Second, we need counterterrorism strategies that take into account the local con-
flicts and conditions that allow al Qaeda to operate and that distract our partners
from counterterrorism. That is why, last week, I joined with the chairmen of this
committee and the Foreign Relations Committee to introduce a resolution requiring
a comprehensive strategy for Yemen. In Somalia, the Sahel and elsewhere, our gov-
ernment needs to identify and tackle head-on the conditions that serve as an invita-
tion to al Qaeda.
Finally, we simply cannot afford our current military escalation in Afghanistan.
It is not necessary to counter the fewer than one hundred al Qaeda fighters in Af-
ghanistan, and it risks further destabilizing an already dangerous Pakistan. In-
stead, we must develop and support sustainable, global and effective counterter-
rorism strategies.

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