Genetic Epistemology, Normative Epistemology, and Psychologism

Author(s): Richard F. Kitchener

Source: Synthese, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Oct., 1980), pp. 257-280
Published by: Springer
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 RICHARD F. KITCHENER

GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY, NORMATIVE

EPISTEMOLOGY, AND PSYCHOLOGISM*

The genetic epistemology of Jean Piaget raises many important

philosophical and conceptual questions.1 But perhaps the single mos
important one for philosophy is this: What is the philosophical
relevance of genetic epistemology? Needless to say, it has psy
chological and educational implications, but does it have anything of
relevance for contemporary philosophy? Many contemporar
philosophers would reply that it has no interesting philosophica
implications for contemporary epistemology, for example, since it is
merely a pyschological theory about children, whereas others migh
add that if indeed it does happen to have any philosophical im
plications, this is because it is not really a psychological theory at all
but just another not so cleverly disguised philosophical theory. Thus
David Hamlyn says:

If I am right, however, my answer to the question, "What relevance has genet

epistemology in the more orthodox sense?", must be that in a certain sense geneti
epistemology presupposes a traditional epistemological position. If it has implication
for epistemology, it is in that sense and for that reason, and not because of its status a
a psychological theory.2

Such a view about the philosophical relevance of genetic epist

mology is, I think, one that many philosophers (perhaps a majority
would endorse. The reasons lying behind such a view seem to be two.
First, there is presumed to be a fundamental difference between
philosophy and science. What philosophy is may not be all that clear,
but at the very least it deals with some kind of conceptual analysi
Science, by contrast, is empirical. Thus, philosophical questions an
empirical questions are (in some basic way) different. Secondly (an
this may merely be a version of the first or perhaps the ground for it
if genetic epistemology qua empirical theory were relevant t
philosophical issues, then some elementary fallacy would be com
mitted. We would, for example, be deducing a normative conclusio
(about some epistemological question) from factual information an

Synthese 45 (1980) 257-280. 0039-7857/80/0452-0257 $02.40

Copyright ? 1980 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A

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258 RICHARD F. KITCHENER

thus would be committing the naturalistic fallacy, the fallacy

psychologism, or the is-ought fallacy. On the other hand, to in
anything about the validity, adequacy or truth of a belief or the
from an examination of its genesis would be equally bad since t
would be committing the genetic fallacy. Therefore, either gen
epistemology (and any empirical theory) is begging a philosophi
question by presupposing a philosophical view (and that is why i
relevant), or it is not begging a philosophical question but is commi
ting some elementary fallacy. In either case, however, genetic e
temology really has no "legitimate" relevance to epistemology.
I believe this entire line of reasoning is wrong, but wrong
important ways. The most important way it is wrong is the assu
tion that philosophy and science are fundamentally or radicall
different and thus that conceptual and empirical issues are basic
different. Such a view is mistaken, but I am not going to argue aga
it directly. Instead, I am going to examine the second reason a
vanced in support of the philosophical irrelevance of genetic e
temology, namely that it either "begs the question" or commits som
other fallacy. In Part I, I discuss how Piaget's genetic epistemolo
has empirical relevance to traditional epistemology. In Part
examine the claim that genetic epistemology presupposes some
ticular epistemology or philosophical norm in general and indicate i
what sense this is correct. In so doing, I argue that Piaget's gene
epistemology has more philosophical relevance than Piaget himse
inclined to admit and that this relevance is at least partly normativ
nature. Finally, I briefly consider whether any fallacy is being c
mitted and suggest we need to reexamine the fallacy of psychologis
along with the fact-value (is-ought) distinction (especially in t
context of epistemology).

I. EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY

Genetic epistemology is relevant to traditional philosophical epis

temology, according to Piaget, because epistemologists make empiri
cal claims, and genetic epistemology aims to investigate such issues.
Ordinarily, however, these empirical claims masquerade as something
else, for example as "common sense" knowledge, a disguise that is
relatively easy to spot. But more serious is the situation in which
empirical claims, masquerading as philosophy, forever go undetected;

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 GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY 259

in this case what results is an endless series of philosophical specula

tion about what is really an empirical issue. The seventeenth century
issue about innate ideas clearly falls into this category, since several
of the disputed issues concerned the empirical question of whether
something (an idea, concept, or disposition) existed at birth or not.
(The Molyneux question is another one that readily comes to mind.)
Hume's theory of causality likewise contains an empirical
component - his theory that our idea of necessary connection is
derived from the association of ideas - just as his overall philosophi
cal theory contains an empirical theory about the nature and workings
of the mind, from which several empirical claims follow (e.g., that an
idea is a faint copy of an impression). All of this is well known, of
course, but what tends to be forgotten is that empirical evidence is
available that ought to be weighed when Hume's theory is evaluated.
Piaget claims, for example, to have empirical evidence contrary to
Hume's account,3 and several other researchers have empirical evi
dence in support of Hume's claims (e.g., about ideas being faint
copies of sensations).
We might also mention Kant's epistemology, which contains
empirical predictions as well. One of the most interesting of these is
the following. Kant claims that the structure of the mind (the a priori
forms of intuition, the Categories, etc.) is a priori, and this partially
means temporally a priori. True, Kant characterizes 'a priori'' as
"independent of experience" and this phrase is open to being inter
preted as "logically independent of experience." But also, quite
clearly, Kant believes the a priori forms of intuition (space and time)
exist before our experience of objects,4 and seems to believe the same
with regard to the Categories.5 It would be impossible, Kant thinks, to
have "experience" temporally prior to the appearance or operation of
these structures. Hence, if we could determine that a human being
experiences the world but does not possess the category of (say)
causality (or a spatial form of intuition), this would be empirical
evidence against Kant. Piaget's research can be interpreted as being
fundamentally supportive of Kant's claim, depending upon how we
interpret 'experience.' The infant, according to Piaget, experiences
the world in some sense but not the way an adult does. Unlike the
adult, the infant is a radical phenomenalist - since only sense-im
pressions exist - and (s)he has no concept or experience of objects as
permanently existing, three-dimensional, spatial entities with enduring

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260 RICHARD F. KITCHENER

causal properties. Furthermore, the infant has no self-concept an

does not distinguish the self from the world. Thus, the child
experience of the world is radically different from the adult's, an
radically different form Kant's notion of what experience is. To this
extent, Piaget's research empirically supports Kant's transcendent
claims.
But Piaget also believes Kant is wrong in supposing the categories
do not evolve and develop, but are innate. Kant is unclear about this
point and this is due to a fundamental lack of clarity about the entire
concept of 'innateness,' a confusion that permeates all discussions of
this topic from Locke and Leibniz (on the one hand) to the current
views of Chomsky and Katz. Is the concept of 'innate' something that
refers to the underlying capacity (disposition, ability, endowment,
potentiality) which may require considerable stimulation and exercise
before it functions to produce (say) spatial perception or language
acquisition, or does 'innate' refer to the actual perception (existence
of an idea, linguistic performance) at birth? Kant seems to hold both
views, since in his Dissertation and Correspondence he defends the
first view about what is a priori and claims that the ground of spatial
and temporal intuitions alone is inborn, but the representations them
selves are not. In the Critique, however, he seems to maintain the
second view: spatial representations lie ready in the mind at the birth
of consciousness.6
What is meant by 'innate' is crucial, since (on the first inter
pretation) much of Kant's theory can be interpreted as being in
agreement with Piaget's genetic epistemology and hence there would
be no reason to deny, for example, that the Categories develop and
thus (in the second sense of 'innate') are not innate.7 The point, in any
case, is that genetic epistemology does have relevance to Kant's
philosophy and especially to the empirical issues arising out of Kant's
theory. In fact, I believe it is both correct and illuminating to say that
Kant's concept of a subjective deduction (of the Pure Concepts of the
Understanding) is precisely what Piaget's genetic epistemology
attempts to examine. The subjective deduction is concerned with the
subjective (i.e., pyschological) conditions necessary for experience,
with the question (as Kant puts it), "how is the faculty of thought
itself possible?",8 with the generative processes to whose agency
human knowledge is due.9 This could be used to summarize Piaget's
genetic epistemology in a nut-shell.

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 GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY 261

Various example of Piaget's claim that philosophical epistemology

makes empirical claims could be given from contemporary philoso
phy. But one of the most interesting examples here is that of "the
linguistic theory of the a priori" originally advanced by the logical
positivists. This theory, roughly put, is that the "necessary know
ledge," contained primarily but not exclusively in logic and mathe
matics, is due to our conventions concerning the use of language. The
"necessity" of certain propositions is thus due to "our determination
to use words in a certain fashion" (as Ayer puts it).10 What exactly
this theory is supposed to maintain is not very clear, nor is it very
plausible. But that is a story already well told by several other
philosophers.11
Piaget's criticism of this theory is not philosophical, however, but
empirical, for he claims that this theory has empirical consequences
that are false.

The decisive argument against the position that logical mathematical structures are
derived uniquely from linguistic forms is that, in the course of intellectual development
in any given individual, logical mathematical structures exist before the appearance of
language. Language appears somewhere about the middle of the second year, but
before this, about the end of the first year or the beginning of the second year, there is
a sensory-motor intelligence that is a practical intelligence having its own logic - a logic
of action.12

There is much to criticize in this passage. Piaget is quite frankly not

as clear, careful or precise as analytic philosophers would wish, and
Piaget thus tends to make vague claims and to employ unclear
concepts. What does Piaget mean by 'logic,' for example, and 'logical
mathematical structures'?13 However, although there is much to criti
cize here, the situation is not completely hopeless, as some in
dividuals seem to think. For example, one philosopher claims that
passages such as this one indicate Piaget "displays a fundamental
misunderstanding" of Logical Positivism and related views.14 Since
this is a view likely to be held by other philosophers, I want to point
out why it is wrong.
The fundamental error in this passage (aocording to this criticism)
is that Piaget's view
suffers from a serious confusion of two distinct senses of 'derived': 'derivedx\ meaning
'develops later in the organism,' and 'derived2\ meaning 'is true in virtue of.'... By
clearing up Piaget's confused use of the notions 'basis' and 'derived,' we have
eliminated the force of his critique of the logicists and the positivists.15

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262 RICHARD F. KITCHENER

That is exactly what this author has not done.

First, the author's reliance on the distinction in question is prob
lematic: as Chisholm points out, it won't do to say "is true in virtue
of," nor will it do to say "is true solely in virtue of."16 Furthermore,
what the phrase "is true in virtue of" is supposed to mean is not
indicated by the author and for good reason, for it is simply unclear
what this "linguistic conventionalism" is, or was, supposed to be.
Does "logical truths are true in virtue of linguistic conventions" mean
that "necessary propositions" are really contingent statements about
linguistic usage after all? Does it mean "necessary truths" are not
propositions at all, but linguistic rules? As has become increasingly
clear, neither of these formulations will work. What then is meant by
this claim? To rest one's whole argument on a phrase ("in virtue of")
that is itself so fundamentally vague and unclear is surely less than
adequate.
One way that has been suggested for explicating this view has been
given by Arthur Pap in his thorough and incisive criticism of "the
linguistic theory of the a priori." To say "necessary truth is in some
sense the product of linguistic conventions" might be to say (accord
ing to Pap) "the existence of certain linguistic habits relevant to the
use of a sentence 5 is a necessary and sufficient condition for the
proposition meant by S."17 Here Pap is giving the theory (contrary to
the criticism under discussion) precisely the sense that Piaget gives it,
and, again, it can be claimed (although Pap does not) that this is
empirically false, since (temporally) prior to the existence of such
linguistic habits, according to Piaget, there is a "necessity" (or
quasi-necessity) embedded in the "logic of action" (which is an
algebra of classes involving seriation, inclusion, etc.). Hence the
theory is empirically false.
The point at issue might be put in this way. If something (language)
is claimed to be a necessary condition for something else (logic), then
surely it is being claimed that at all times language is a necessary
condition for logic, i.e., (t) (~ Language(i) D ~ Logic(f )). If we in
stantiate for t, we get (~Language(fm)D ~Logic(fm)). Here then we
have an empirical prediction which would be refuted if at time tm
there were no language, but at tm there were a logic. But this is
precisely what Piaget claims he has found. It is really immaterial for
our purposes whether Piaget has found what he has claimed or not;
that is a question about the evidential status of his claims. The point,

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 GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY 263

however, is this: Piaget's claim that this is (at least partly) an

empirical issue remains plausible and, contrary to the criticism under
discussion, does not seem to be an egregious error.

II. DOES PIAGET'S GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY

HAVE NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS?

Insofar as traditional philosophical epistemology makes empiric

claims, genetic epistemology, since it studies the development o
knowledge in the individual and in the species, is relevant to ep
temology. Of course someone might respond that if, indeed, ep
temologists make empirical claims this only shows that the
philosophers were not careful enough in distinguishing empiric
questions from logical ones. But genetic epistemology has no re
vance to philosophical epistemology properly conceived and executed,
which is purely logical, conceptual or normative. The real issue, i
might be asked, is whether genetic epistemology has any normati
implications, for this is surely what philosophical epistemology
really all about.18
One way Piaget's genetic epistemology might be relevant to nor
mative epistemology would be if it presupposed some normative
account (of knowledge) and thus begged important philosophica
questions. Thus it would not commit the naturalistic (is-ought, py
chologistic) fallacy, since it would not be going from pure facts
norms, but this is because the norms are already there from th
beginning. Two versions of such a claim can be found amon
philosophers: (1) genetic epistemology presupposes a particular ep
temology, and (2) genetic epistemology presupposes certain gener
epistemic norms.

(1) Does genetic epistemology presuppose a normative epistemology?

To the question, what relevance does genetic epistemology have f

philosophical epistemology, one philosopher has replied:
... in a certain sense genetic epistemology presupposes a traditional epistemologic
position. If it has implications for epistemology, it is in that sense and for that reaso
and not because of its status as a psychological theory.19

The epistemology that Piaget is presupposing here, according to t

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264 RICHARD F. KITCHENER

author, is a Kantian epistemology (as opposed to a rationalism or

empiricism). Such a claim is echoed by other individuals, includin
psychologists,20 although arguments for this are strangely lackin
Perhaps it just seems intuitively obvious that every theory must have
epistemological presuppositions. But to Piaget, at least, this does n
seem evident, since he denies his genetic epistemology does presu
pose any particular type of epistemology.
Two questions are crucial here: What does genetic epistemology
include, and what does 'presuppose' mean? As Piaget characteriz
genetic epistemology it is a method -the study of knowledge as
function of its development - and this method does not "presuppose"
or "prejudge" (according to Piaget) any epistemological position,
such as realism, empiricism, a priorism, etc.21 Piaget even insists
does not presuppose a genetic solution, for (on the contrary) no
genetic epistemologies (a priorism, realism, phenomenology) are
compatible with the genetic method, and in fact could be verified by
such a method insofar as they are accounts of how knowled
increases.22 That is, each of these solutions might be an adequat
explanation of how knowledge develops and it would be an op
question, to be settled by empirical research, as to which explanation
was better. The only solution it would rule out, it seems, would be
scepticism which denied that knowledge increases at all. The genet
method does not presuppose a Kantian solution, therefore, ev
though Piaget believes this is the best explanation of the growth
knowledge.
If this answer is to work, it is essential that the genetic method be
characterized in this neutral way, as "the study of knowledge a
function of its real or psychological construction,"23 or better yet, a
"the theory of the mechanisms of the development of knowledge."24
It cannot be described in stage-theoretical terms, nor be characterize
by means of models imported from biology (a tendency Piaget co
stantly has), nor even described in terms of 'constructions' if th
means "construction by the epistemological subject." If Piaget ca
consistently maintain this relatively neutral way of characterizin
genetic epistemology, then it seems to me to be correct to say it
compatible with several different epistemological solutions.
The preceding point has, in a way, already answered the secon
point concerning 'presuppose.' For if 'presuppose' is meant in th
strong sense of "requiring as an antecedent logically necessary co

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 GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY 265

dition" then Kantianism is not being presupposed by Piaget: the

genetic method (if what I have said is correct) does not require a
Kantian epistemology as a necessary condition. On the other hand, if
'presuppose' means something weaker, e.g., "to take for granted" or
"assume", then, aside from the preceding remarks, it would be open
to Piaget to answer that he was assuming a Kantian position as an
initial scientific (or quasi-scientific) theory, subject to subsequent
empirical evaluation and modification. If subsequent empirical evi
dence confirmed or corroborated this initial theory, then the charge of
presupposing it would, I think, be undercut since (in the usual sense)
he would no longer be, merely assuming it (without evidence) but
advancing it as a well-confirmed scientific theory. In either case, the
charge that Piaget "presupposes" a Kantian epistemology seems to
me to be questionable.

(2) Does genetic epistemology presuppose epistemic norms?

Genetic epistemology may presuppose (or entail) normative epis

temology in a different way. Development is obviously ideological in
nature since development is always development towards some goal
(end, telos). In the case of genetic epistemology this goal is know
ledge. Thus, since 'knowing' is not merely a descriptive term but
entails normative evaluation and assessment, it looks as if Piaget is
committed to making claims about the normative status of the
development process. Marx Wartofsky puts it very nicely when he
says:
What is arrived at, both by the developing individual and by the species, in its cognitive
growth is knowledge of the external world. Therefore, what is involved here is not
simply the genesis of concepts taken as a descriptive, empirical study. Rather, the
study is normative and teleological. For the claim is that the development of physical
concepts is a progressive and adaptive one-that it eventuates in knowledge-, that the
conceptual network and the theories thus evolved approximate more adequately to the
truth. Thus, the study is not simply one which concerns the history of genesis of
physical concepts, but their adequacy as well.25

Wartofsky believes it is possible, however, to separate the normative

and the empirical issues.
... apart from the normative question of truth, or of truth seeking, one may deal with
normal cognitive sequence as an "empirical" question. One need not, therefore, ascribe

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 266 RICHARD F. KITCHENER

greater approximation to truth in the later stages, or, to put it differently, the pattern o
cognitive growth may not be, and need not be, interpreted as a pattern of ep
temological growth. The latter would require a criterion of growth of knowledge such
that one could determine a passage from ignorance to knowledge. In short, the latt
would require a definition of truth and a criterion of truth, and the ordering of stages
growth would be determined by this criterion, rather than by an temporal or matu
tional sequences.26

Thus one might ask how Piaget goes from a genetic psychology (whic
is an "empirical" study of conceptual development) to genetic epi
temology (which is normative). If the latter presupposes some ep
temological criterion, what is its source and status? If we say that ou
criterion is simply assumed, that it is the epistemological standar
adopted by current science and adult common sense, then what o
this standard itself? Is there any reason to believe it is a tr
standard, for example, or must we forever leave such a question
open?
Every developmental sequence is teleological in the weak sense
that it has a goal (or telos) towards which it is a development.
Development is thus normative in the sense that different develop
mental sequences can be graded in terms of their tendency to attain
this goal (or not) or to approach it in certain kinds of ways (speed,
probability, ease, naturalness). Thus, developmental sequences as
means inherit normative evaluation in virtue of the telos or goal
which is assumed.
The telos itself, however, is also subject to normative evaluation
and appraisal and here the normative dimension arises most clearly
when one believes that telos to be good, valuable, worthy, etc., or
true, valid, correct, etc. Here development is normative in the strong
sense.
Piaget often writes as if he had some distinction like this in mind.
The telos or goal of epistemological development (or, as he calls it,
"the system of reference") is simply assumed to be the normal adult
(in the case of psychogenesis), or current science (in the case of th
history of science). In talking, for example, about "the child's con
struction of reality," the 'reality' that is the system of reference i
reality as postulated by contemporary science or common-sense.27
The task of what Piaget calls restricted genetic epistemology is t
investigate how such a conception of reality is attained, all the while
leaving open the question of the "true" nature of reality. Thus, Piaget

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 GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY 267

can evaluate the course of development in terms of its tendency to

reach these accepted epistemic norms without claiming that these
norms themselves are good (adequate, etc.). In fact, Piaget often
stresses the point that in studying the development of knowledge
from lower to higher forms of knowledge, the standard by means of
which we judge something as 'lower' or 'higher' knowledge is not to
be decided by psychologists but by logicians or specialists in the
respective field of inquiry.28
Thus (on this interpretation), all development is normative in the
weak (teleological) sense. But what of these epistemological criteria
themselves? Can Piaget have anything to say about them; for exam
ple, their epistemological adequacy or truth, or not? The safest and
most acceptable response would be to reply that such "normative"
issues cannot be handled by a (restricted) genetic epistemology, since
it studies the development of knowledge "from a lower level of
knowledge to a level judged to be higher."29 Certainly this is an
interpretation Piaget would favor since he stresses so strongly the
fact-value distinction, and claims genetic epistemology cannot answer
normative questions.30 I do not think, however, that matters are
nearly as clear-cut as this, even though it certain would flatter
philosophers to think so. Piaget claims, for example, that generalized
genetic epistemology would study this "system of reference" itself
(although Piaget's exact views about this are not very clear).31 In fact,
I think the issue is much cloudier than even Piaget admits and that he
does, contrary to what he says, make normative claims in the strong
sense.

Piaget's equilibration model

According to Piaget, the central task of genetic epistemology (and

genetic psychology) is to explain how a transition is made from a
"lower" level of knowledge to a "higher" level of knowledge. This
applied both to stages of scientific knowledge and to stages of
individual knowledge.
The fundamental concept that explains stage transition is Piaget's
notion of equilibrium and equilibration. In the case of the child, for
example, there are several intellectual stages (of knowledge) through
which the child must pass (sensorimotor, pre-operational, concrete
operational, etc.). Each stage constitutes a particular form of equili

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268 RICHARD F. KITCHENER

brium, and these stages can be characterized as producing increa

ingly greater intellectual equilibration.32 For Piaget, systems are con
ceived to be complex structures containing possible operations an
possessing goal or goal-tending states. Internal or external variable
may assume a particular value that take or tend to take this syste
out of its goal-state, to which the system responds by a compensator
operation that counteracts the disturbance and returns the system to
its goal (or goal-tending) state. These "disturbances" that produc
dis-equilibrium can include not only internal stimuli (hunger) but also
external stimuli (an object), and even such things as questions an
intellectual problems.33 These disequilibrating disturbances give ri
to external and internal action (thinking) and

action terminates when a need is satisfied, that is to say, when equilibrium is

established between the new factor that has provoked the need and the menta
organization that existed prior to the introduction of this factor. Eating or sleepin
playing or reaching a goal, replying to a question or resolving a problem, imitatin
successfully, establishing an affective tie, or maintaining one's point of view are a
satisfactions that, in the preceding examples, will put an end to the particular behavio
aroused by the need. At any given moment, one can thus say, action is disequilibrat
by the transformations that arise in the external or internal world, and each n
behavior consists not only in re-establishing equilibrium but also moving toward a mo
stable equilibrium than that which preceded the disturbance.34

It should be noted here that (what we might call) epistemic needs (fo
example, question asked of a person, or some kind of theoretical o
practical puzzle) constitute one important kind of need. A question
for example, may produce disequilibrium if no answer or solution
forthcoming. What is important, however, is the fact that epistemic
norms are being used here; it is not just that the individual wil
attempt to eliminate the question or problem in any way (such
running away from it or ignoring it) but will attempt to solve it and
moreover solve it correctly. Here criteria of achievement and success
are being employed (just as in Piaget's biological analogue 'ada
tation' is a success concept). When a child, for example, cann
successfully answer a question, this is sometimes manifested in h
speech as a contradiction (which is experienced as a state of d
equilibrium), or as an inability to answer questions about th
explanation offered. The degree of equilibrium or equilibration there
fore seem to be its degree of success or adequacy. One stage, fo
example, is more equilibrated than another (earlier) stage if, for

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 GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY 269

example, it answers the questions (solves the problems) the earli

stage did and, in addition, successfully meets new difficulties. T
fact that a stage is disequilibrated explains why it tends to give way
another stage in which the earlier structure is retained, but retained
a new (and more adequate) form. The tendency towards equilibr
is thus the basic principle of intellectual functioning.
As Piaget has characterized equilibration and equilibrium, it see
laden with normative evaluations. In fact, the very definition
equilibration itself has epistemological norms built into it, since it i
characterized in terms of compensatory or anticipatory reactions th
either avert a disturbing intrusion, satisfy a need, answer a questio
and so forth. If Piaget were content to employ equilibration in
strictly biological sense, then perhaps one could argue that teleonom
systems (such as thermostats or temperature regulation in the body
would not be normative in the strong sense, (that is, normative wit
reference to the goal), but only in the weak sense, (that is,
reference to the means). This would be true, for example, wit
temperature regulation, since the goal of a constant temperature
70? in the living room has no normative dimension, although
means might (for example we could evaluate how well the thermosta
functioned, as well as which compensatory reactions were bette
Similarly with biological needs such as nourishment or oxygen; o
would not be claiming these biological goals were normative in
epistemological sense (although one might argue they were normativ
in an evolutionary sense).
Piaget may seem to be doing precisely this: assuming that the telo
is the set of adult norms, and (in keeping with the aim of restricti
genetic epistemology) not claiming that these norms are themsel
valid, true, adequate, etc. One could, for example, cite the follow
passage in support of this:
Just as the body evolves toward a relatively stable level characterized by the co
pletion of the growth process and by organ maturity, so mental life can be conceived
evolving toward a final form of equilibrium represented by the adult mind,35

But there is considerable other evidence that would argue against th

"value-free" interpretation and would suggest that Piaget is mak
epistemological claims about the telos of development. For examp
the concept of equilibrium itself is often described this way:
In assimilating objects, action and thought must accomodate to these objects, th

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270 RICHARD F. KITCHENER

must adjust to external variation. The balancing of the processes of assimilation an

accommodation may be called "adaptation." Such is the general form of psychologic
equilibrium, and the progressive organization of mental development appears to b
simply an ever more precise adaptation to reality.36

Adaptation is adaptation to reality, and accommodation is accom

modation to reality; they are not merely adaptation and acco
modation to adult norms. When a question or theoretical problem
produces disequilibrium, equilibrium is restored when the question is
correctly or adequately answered or the problem actually or partially
solved. But how well the question is answered and how well t
problem is solved are at least partly dependent on the nature of
objects and the physical structure of the world. Thus, Piaget's cla
that development can be characterized as an increasing equilibrati
of cognitive structures entails the claim that later stages are bett
(independent of adult norms), since they are more equilibrated a
thus more epistemologically adequate. Equilibrium and d
equilibrium, in other words, are not merely subjective psychologic
states, nor can disequilibrium really be restored by an individual
false beliefs or psychological defense mechanisms. True enough,
what counts as an adequate answer or solution is partly a function
the child's social world and cultural indoctrination, but Piaget insists
with equal vigor that reality is not equivalent to "social consensus
Present adult and scientific norms are taken as a reference standa
not arbitrarily, but because they are objectively better than earli
scientific norms.
If this is correct, and if Piaget is claiming that development
describable as a real increase in knowledge (and not merely a
increase in what adults believe knowledge to be), must he have
criterion of the growth of knowledge such that one could determine
passage from ignorance of knowledge? Must he have a definition a
criterion of truth? Piaget's answer with regard to these questions
not explicitly to be found in his writing, but the type of answ
available to him, and one I believe he implicitly adopts, is one that is
very close to (if not identical with) that of Karl Popper, an answ
that is sometimes called "fallibilism": one can never know for certain
when or if one has attained absolute truth; but this is not necessary,
for one can recognize progress towards truth, and thus one can know
when there is an increase in our knowledge.

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 GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY 271

Popper and Piaget

Popper and Piaget have many similarities, an obvious one being th
between Piaget's notion of equilibration and Popper's notion o
verisimilitude. For Popper, the development of science is a growth in
knowledge, and moreover a rational and objective affair. According to
Popper our knowledge increases when a better theory comes alon
and replaces an older one. What makes one theory better th
another? Roughly put, a theory T2 is a better theory than (is rationall
preferable to, gives us an increase in knowledge over) a theory Tx if
T2 explains what Tx explains but in addition explains things Tx could
not explain, T2 explains new facts and leads to new, precise and novel
predictions, and some of these predictions are verified.37 In this case
T2 would give us more knowledge than Tx gave us and moreover T
would be closer to the truth (has a higher degree of verisimilitude
even if T2 is later falsified and replaced by a radically different theor
(T3). Thus we can tell when our knowledge has increased even if w
do not (and. may never) know when we have attained "the Truth
Piaget's account, as we have just seen, is fundamentally the sam
with respect to what an increase in knowledge is; for him it is
increase in equilibrium, and equilibrium and verisimilitude have much
in common.
Popper is a realist about the external world, and believes we
approach the truth about these real objects as our scientific know
ledge increases. Likewise, Piaget believes objects exist independently
of us, but they are only known by means of epistemological categories
actively constructed by the epistemological subject:
To be sure, the object exists and the objective structures exist themselves before being
discovered. But they are not discovered at the end of an operational inquiry (in
Bridgman's sense) in the way in which Columbus discovered America during his
voyage: they are only discovered through being constructed; in other words, we can
gradually approach them, but have not the certainty of ever reaching them.38

Thus objects certainly exist for Piaget, but such objects, since they
are only known through the subjects' actions and constructions, are
really limits "ever tended towards but never finally achieved."39
Piaget's "realism" might thus be characterized as a constructive
realism and it certainly has similarities to Popper's version of realism.
If this is the case, then Piaget does seem to evaluate adult norms of

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272 RICHARD F. KITCHENER

knowledge. They (like current scientific theories) are "the best guess"
as to what reality is like and they can be said to be "closer to th
truth" than earlier theories, as well as being more adequate, mor
equilibrated, etc. Piaget's theory, therefore, does seem to be nor
mative both in the weak and strong senses. At this point, however, it
may be asked whether the "Popperian" interpretation of Piag
doesn't turn Piaget into a straightforward normative epistemologist.
How is any of Piaget's empirical work relevant to these issues? Wh
does Piaget have to say over and above what Popper has to say?
want to hold off answering those questions for the moment and
instead turn to a completely different line of argument designed
show that Piaget's theory has normative implications in a radical and
highly controversial way, a way that one individual characterizes
being an attempt to commit the naturalistic fallacy in ethical matter
and to get away with it. Such an argument can be applied, mutati
mutandis, to Piaget's epistemological theory, the result of which
would be an argument that would show how normative implication
follow from Piaget's theory.

Piaget and Kohlberg

The theory of Lawrence Kohlberg is a cognitive-developmental sta
theory of moral development, and Kohlberg considers it to be a close
off-spring of Piaget's theory. Kohlberg, unlike Piaget however, be
ieves his theory not only has implications for moral philosophy, but
believes that one can go from "is" to "ought" in ethical matters.4
What this "fallacy" is and whether Kohlberg actually commits it o
not remains opaque. In fact, what Kohlberg's argument is remai
largely unclear. Insofar as I understand it, it seems to be the fo
lowing.
The fundamental premise or assumption in Kohlberg's argument
comes directly from Piaget, who claims that

The fundamental hypothesis of genetic epistemology is that there is a parallelism

between the progress made in the logical and rational organization of knowledge and
the corresponding formative psychological process.41

Let us call this the principle of isomorphism (parallelism, cor

respondence) between the logical and the psychological (or the logical
and the temporal). There is an isomorphism, for example, between a

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 GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY 273

causal sequence of brain states (or organic causality in general) and a

set of logical implications entertained in consciousness.42 Likewise,
equilibrium as a logical concept - characterized, for example, by
reversible mathematical operations - is structurally isomorphic to
equilibrium as an empirical biological concept (involving, say, parts
and whole in dynamic equilibrium). The temporal development of the
individual corresponds in some sense to a logical sequence, and so on.
This principle of isomorphism is also the key assumption at the
basis of Lawrence Kohlberg's attempt to "commit the naturalistic
fallacy," for Kohlberg's fundamental assumption is the following:
... an ultimately adequate psychological theory as to why a child does move from stage
to stage, and an ultimately adequate philosophical explanation as to why a higher stage
is more adequate than a lower stage are one and the same theory extended in different
directions.43

Thus the psychologist's explanation of why all individuals universally

move from one stage of morality to the next will be parallel to or
isomorphic with the philosopher's justification of this higher stage of
morality as being more adequate. Such an explanation cannot be
value-neutral, of course. To explain why there is a universal sequence
of stages of moral reasoning, Kohlberg believes, is to explain why
everyone actually moves from stage to stage. But to explain this
universal temporal sequence one must explain why a later stage is
better than an earlier stage; this is the fundamental assumption of any
strict Stage Theory based on the underlying concept of equilibrium. A
later stage is better because it is more equilibrated, and equilibration
includes, as two key concepts, the notions of differentiation (of
cognitive and moral categories) and integration (into new structures).
These cognitive-developmental concepts are thus supposed to explain
why people actually develop the way they do, and the short of it is
that people develop because later stages are better, where 'better'
means more equilibrated. But here it is clear that we already have
normative evaluation coming in. Kohlberg's next step is to suggest
that these developmentally evaluative notions - differentiation, in
tegration, equilibration - which explain why later stages are better are
really the same as (or isomorphic to) certain philosophical criteria of
adequacy: namely, prescriptivity, reversibility, and universalizability.

Thus, we have argued for a parallelism between a theory of psychological development

and a formalistic moral theory on the ground that the formal psychological develop

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274 RICHARD F. KITCHENER

mental criteria of differentiation and integration, of structural equilibrium, map i

[sic] the formal moral criteria of prescriptiveness and universality. If the parallel
were correct in detail, then formalist philosophers could incorporate an equilibriu
concept as part of their normative ethical theory, and vice versa. The ultimate resu
would be a theory of rational moral judgment like that now present in economics,
which the theory of how people ought to make economic decisions and the way they d
make decisions are very closely linked.44

Thus a "factual" explanation, an explanation involving differentiat

and integration, of why people do develop is parallel to a philosop
cal justification, which would be an account of why people ought
develop. Explaining why people do move from stage to stage thu
involves explaining why they ought to move from stage to stage:
explain why they actually move to a higher and better stage is
explain why they ought to move to a higher and better stage. Put
different terms, the increasing logical adequacy of the sequence
Sx-S2- S3 (partly) explains why people actually move in t
sequence Sx - S2 - S3.1 say 'partly' because this by itself would not be
enough. To say that people develop from being illogical to being
logical because logic is better, or that people move from a state i
which they tolerate contradiction to one in which they insist on
consistency because consistency is better than contradiction is no
sufficient as an explanation. Not only must these later stages be mor
adequate-a logical question-we also need a purely psychologic
component to explain why they actually move in that sequence, a
here we must bring in some cognitive concept such as desire an
belief, people must want or desire to be more consistent (logical,
Otherwise put, it must be the case that disequilibrium (logical an
moral inadequacy of a certain mental structure) is motivating, that it
is the basic "motor" pushing people to develop. This is, of cours
exactly what Piaget and Kohlberg believe.45
I have been suggesting that an explanation of moral developmen
requires a logical theory of the relative adequacies of different stages
and, in addition, a psychological component concerning the cognitive
states of people (their beliefs, desires, etc.). Neither of these co
ponents by themselves would be adequate: the logical component
would indicate what people ought to do, but without the psychologica
part one could not explain what people actually do, and thus
fortiori, one could not explain why they move from stage to stag
Likewise, if the psychological and logical aspects were at variance

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 GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY 275

that the stages were evaluated as being logically inadequate as a

sequence but people really moved through this sequence in a certain
order, this would be inadequate. Suppose, for example, individuals
were in fact to move from an Aristotelian (Egoistic, Phenomenalistic)
stage (Si) to a Newtonian (Utilitarian, Realistic) stage (S2), to a
Neo-Aristotelian (Neo-Egoistic, Neo-Phenomenalistic) stage (S3).
Suppose our philosophical theory judged Stage 2 to be better (higher)
than Stage 1, and Stage 3 to be worse than Stage 2. We would surely
need a psychological explanation of why individuals developed in this
"illogical" sequence. What would this psychological explanation look
like? It might involve, if Stage Theory is correct, notions of differen
tiation and integration, but to introduce these explanatory concepts
would be tantamount to saying people believed Stage 3 was better
than Stage 2. Since this, in turn, invites the question, "why?", reasons
for the "belief" would enter and thus questions of logical adequacy
would again emerge. We would be back again with our logical
components, debating which logical account was better. Kohlberg's
claim here seems to be that either our logical (philosophical) assess
ment was initially wrong (e.g., our moral philosophy was mistaken) or
our psychological explanation was wrong (e.g., our Stage Theory
explanation was wrong, our data were incorrectly gathered, etc.). This
seems to lie at the basis of Kohlberg's claim that:
The isomorphism of psychological and normative theory generates the claim that a
psychologically more advanced stage of moral judgment is more morally adequate, by
moral-philosophic criteria. The isomorphism assumptions is a two-way street. While
moral philosophical criteria of adequacy of moral judgment help define a standard of
psychological adequacy or advance, the study of psychological advance feeds back and
clarifies these criteria.46

Such an account works, it should be noted, only with a cognitive

psychological theory, for only in such theories can we ask for the
reasons for a belief and then proceed to asses the logical adequacy of
such beliefs. In a Skinnerian learning theory, by contrast, the
developmental sequence Si - S2 - S3 would be explained by contin
gencies of reinforcement, and here a request for reasons for a
particular stage would be beside the point. A later stage could not be
said to be higher (and better) because it is more reinforcing any more
than an explanation in terms of strengthened habits would be ap
propriate. Likewise in psychoanalytic theory, one cannot say the
Genital Stage is higher (better) than the Anal stage, since criteria of

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276 RICHARD F. KITCHENER

logical adequacy would surely be misplaced on these stages. In short,

cognitive theory is essential, for cognitive theory is essentially an
fundamentally tied to logic and the giving of reasons.
According to Kohlberg, therefore, there is an interaction betwee
the pyschological and the philosophical. As is obvious, however, th
psychological is not the purely factual, devoid of all normativ
appraisal. The concepts of equilibrium (along with integration an
differentiation) are laden with evaluation: they are more "stable
"self-sufficient," "adequate," "not contradictory," etc. If a natural
tic fallacy is being committed, it is not that of inferring a norm from
fact; but likewise if Kohlberg is going from the is to the ought he is
not disembarking from an is that most philosophers would recognize,
since it is not an 'is' denuded of all evaluative components an
appraisal. But, then, perhaps nothing is that barren! Normative an
philosophical implications are to be found in Kohlberg's theory and
by analogous reasoning, in Piaget's. That much should be clear b
now. If so, then the point of this paper has been made. Doubts tha
linger, linger perhaps because of the (reasonable) fear that some
fallacy has been committed. In conclusion I want to briefly touch on
that question.

III. PSYCHOLOGISM

Whether Kohlberg really commits the naturalistic fallacy or not

question that remains open partly because it may not be clear w
the fallacy is. But surely Piaget (and Kohlberg) have committed som
version of the is-ought fallacy, the most likely candidate being
chologism, the fallacy of reducing logic to psychology, or inferr
the truth of something normative (or logical) from something emp
cal, or permitting psychology to answer questions of logic, etc. Thi
at least, is the fallacy Piaget is most concerned with and the one
most explicitly denies committing. In conclusion I have four much t
brief and sketchy comments about this issue.
First, both Piaget and Kohlberg claim that values (and norms
cannot be reduced to facts, that the normative realm is autonomous
that psychology cannot settle questions of normative or formal
dity, that normative judgments cannot be derived from psychologic
facts, etc. In that sense, therefore, they are not committing the falla

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 GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY 277

and if that is what the fallacy is, then it seems to me the question is
settled.
Secondly, factual considerations can be relevant to the normative,
and we have just given several examples of how they can be. It is
perfectly legitimate and correct to say the factual is relevant to the
normative - perhaps even essential, indispensable, or necessary -
without saying the normative is derived from the "purely factual," or
that the factual realm can conclusively answer normative questions.
We have given several actual cases of such relevance in the work of
Piaget and Kohlberg, and we could give even more compelling
examples, I think, from contemporary post-positivistic philosophy of
science. Actual science and its historical development is relevant to
the philosophy of science - this much seems no longer controversial -
the only question is how relevant? But at the very least, however,
actual science places constraints on which normative philosophical
account is adequate. If this is true in the philosophy of science, it is a
fortiori true of epistemology in general.47
Thirdly, the fact-value issue itself may need re-examination in
order to clarify its philosophical nature. Given that facts and values
are not reducible to each other-since they are different concepts
does it follow that they are absolutely and categorically distinct?
Given one cannot derive the truth of a normative proposition from a
factual one, can one derive something (anything) of importance? It
has yet to be shown that the latter is impossible.
Finally, our conception of what facts are may be the source of our
problem and may require r??valuation. The fallacy of psychologism
(or the is-ought fallacy) seems to be based upon the belief that facts
are something entirely devoid of any normative aspects, that they are
"brute facts." The question is whether that is so, or whether there are
different kinds of facts, some relatively "brute," others not so
"brute" at all. If, as was once thought, facts and theories were things
that were radically different and facts were supposed to be free of all
theory, and if this is now legitimately questionable, then perhaps a
similar argument can be suggested with regard to facts and values.
Perhaps facts are "value-laden" as well as being "theory-laden";
perhaps the fact-value distinction (like the theory-observation dis
tinction) is a relative or contextual matter (but not absolute), etc.
Sharp, razor-edged distinctions such as the analytic-synthetic, the
theory-observation distinction, the subject-object distinction, the dis

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278 RICHARD F. KITCHENER

tinction between philosophy and science have a way of being dull

with the passage of time and philosophical reflection. Perhaps w
should have learnt this already from Hegel and the Pragmatists. If w
have to learn it again with regard to epistemology, then Piaget'
genetic epistemology is as good a way to learn it as any other.

Colorado State University

NOTES

* An earlier version of this paper was read at a philosophy colloquium at C

State University. I wish to thank all the participants for their helpful comments
though several continue to be in fundamental disagreement. I specially wish t
Don Crosby for his detailed comments.
1 I have discussed some of these questions in my 'Piaget's genetic epistem
(forthcoming), in which I examine what such an epistemology is supposed to
sentence, we can characterize it as "the study of the growth of knowledge as a f
of its development," or as Piaget puts it, "V ?tude des m?chanismes de r accroi
des connaissances" ["Programme et m?thodes de l'?pist?mologie g?n?tique." In
Beth, W. Mays and J. Piaget (eds.), Epist?mologie g?n?tique et recherche psycholo
Etudes d'epist?mologie g?n?tique, Vol. I. (Paris: P.U.F., 1957), p. 14].
2 D. Hamlyn, 'Epistemology and conceptual development.' In T. Mischel (ed
nitive Development and Epistemology (New York: Academic Press, 1971), p. 1
3 I have discussed the case of Hume in considerable more detail in my 'Piaget's
epistemology' (forthcoming).
4 For example at B41, B42, B60 of the Critique of Pure Reason.
5 Bernard Rollin convinced me of this in private conversation.
6 See N. K. Smith, A Commentary to Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason1. 2nd e
York: Humanities Press, 1962), pp. 88-98.
7 In fact in one of Kant's more obscure passages (B167) he contrasts two v
explaining the agreement of experience with the pure concepts of the understan
empiricism and pref ormationism - and suggests his solution is better, a solut
describes as an epig?nesis of pure reason. What Kant means by this is obscure,
C. Ewing offers the following explanation: "The point seems to be either that
not given innate ideas at the start, but merely possess faculties which
themselves under the influence of the environment and relatively late in life attain
consciousness, of the environment and relatively late in life attain to full co
ness, or that the categories are a new contribution to nature by our mind, no
from the beginning in something existing before we experience it." (A Shor
mentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason [Chicago: University of Chicago
1938], p. 131).
Epig?nesis, of course, is exactly Piaget's preferred biological solution. Se
'Epig?nesis: the role of biological models in developmental psychology,' H
Development 21 (1978), 141-160.
8 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by N. K. Smith. (New York: St. M
Press, 1964), p. 12 [A xvii].

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 GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY 279

9 N. K. Smith, op. cit., p. 236. As N. K. Smith points out (ibid, p. 237) this can be
transcendental psychology.
10 A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic. 2nd ed. (New York: Dover, 1946), p
11 For example A. C. Ewing and B. Blanshard on the one hand and W. V. O. Q
A. Pap on the other.
12 J. Piaget, Genetic Epistemology (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970), p. 41. Cf. a
Piaget, 'Nature et m?thodes de l'?pist?mologie.' In J. Piaget (ed.), Logique
naissance scientifique (Paris: Gallimard, 1967), pp. 93-105.
13 I have discussed these and related issues in my 'Piaget's theory of the a p
(forthcoming).
14 H. Siegel, 'Piaget's conception of epistemology,' Educational Theory 28
16-22.
15 Ibid,p.2\.
16 These points are adequately made in Chisholm's Theory of Knowledge (Englewood
Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 82-83.
17 A. Pap, Semantics and Necessary Truth (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1958), p. 164.
18 In characterizing philosophical epistemology as normative I mean only that it deals
with the validity of epistemic claims, with issues concerning what we are entitled to
have a right to claim to know, with whether our beliefs are warranted, reasonable,
justified, etc. Anglo-Saxon epistemology is largely concerned with evaluating such
claims and such evaluation would normally involve an appeal to epistemological
standards, or norms of validity (just as logic would appeal to standards of validity when
evaluating logical claims). The most radical form of such a view is R. Chisholm's
Perceiving (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1957). For a more moderate view,
see R. Brandt, 'Epistemology and ethics, parallels between.' Encyclopedia of Philoso
phy. Vol. 3 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1967), pp. 6-8.
19 D. Hamlyn, loc. cit.
20 B. Kaplan, 'Genetic psychology, genetic epistemology, and theory of knowledge.' In
T. Mischel (ed.), Cognitive Development and Epistemology (New York: Academic
Press, 1971), p. 74.
21 Introduction a Vepist?mologie g?n?tique (Paris: P.U.F., 1950), Vol. 1, pp. 13, 24.
22 Ibid, p. 25.
23 Ibid, p. 13.
24 'Programme et m?thodes de l'?pist?mologie g?n?tique,' op. cit., p. 14.
25 M. Wartofsky, 'From praxis to logos: Genetic epistemology and physics,' T. Mischel
(ed.), Cognitive Development and Epistemology (New York: Academic Press, 1971), p.
132.
26 Ibid, p. 135.
27 J. Piaget, The Child's Conception of Physical Causality (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield,
Adams & Co., 1969), pp 237-238.
28 Genetic Epistemology, op. cit., p. 13.
29 Ibid (my emphasis).
30 "Insofar as any attempt to solve a logical or mathematical problem by using results
borrowed from psychology is called "psychologism", we likewise condemn psy
chologism without hesitation..." (W. E. Beth and J. Piaget, Mathematical Epis
temology and Psychology, (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1966, p. 132).

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 280 RICHARD F. KITCHENER

31 See his Introduction a Vepist?mologie g?n?tique, op. cit., pp. 45-48.

32 J. Piaget, 'The mental development of the child', in Six Psychological Stud
York: Random House, 1968), pp. 3,6.
33 Ibid, p. 7.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid, p. 3.
36 Ibid, p. 8 (my emphasis).
37 K. Popper, 'Truth, rationality, and the growth of knowledge,' in Conjectures and
Refutations (New York: Harper, 1968), pp. 215-250).
38 Principles of Genetic Epistemology (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 84.
39 Ibid, pp. 17, 82.
40 L. Kohlberg, 'From is to ought: How to commit the naturalistic fallacy and get away
with it in the study of moral development,' in T. Mischel (ed.), Cognitive Development
and Epistemology (New York: Academic Press, 1971), pp. 151-236.
41 Genetic Epistemology, p. 13.
42 The Child and Reality (New York: Viking Press, 1972), pp. 170-172. See also
Piaget's 'Explanation in psychology and psychophysiological parallelism,' in P. Fraisse
and J. Piaget (eds.), Experimental Psychology: Its Scope and Method, Vol. I. (New
York: Basic Books, 1968).
43 Op. cit., p. 154.
44 Kohlberg, op. cit., pp. 224-225.
45 Such an interpretation is at variance with the views of T. Mischel in his 'Piaget:
Cognitive conflict and the motivation of thought,' in T. Mischel (ed.), Cognitive
Development and Epistemology (New York: Academic Press, 1971).
46 L. Kohlberg, 'Moral development and moral philosophy,' Journal of Philosophy 70
(1973), p. 633.
47 I have discussed these issues in more detail in my 'Genetic epistemology and
historicist philosophy of science' (forthcoming).

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