SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 234821, November 07, 2018 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V.
BOBBY PACNISEN Y BUMACAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J:

Before this Court is an ordinary appeal [1] filed by the accused-appellant

Bobby Pacnisen y Bumacas (Pacnisen) assailing the Decision [2] dated June
21, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08271, which
affirmed the Decision[3] dated March 30, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court,
City of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 66 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 9665,
finding Pacnisen guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as "The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," [4] as amended.

The Facts

On October 1, 2012, an Information was filed against the accused-appellant

in this case, the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:

That on or about the 18th day of September 2012, at Brgy. Urbiztondo,

Municipality of San Juan, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without first
securing the necessary permit, license or authority from the proper
government agency, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
sell, dispense, and deliver to PDEA Agent Efren E. Esmin, who acted as a
poseur-buyer, two (2) bricks of Marijuana, a dangerous drug, with an
individual net weight of One Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Seven Point
Sixteen (1857.16) grams and Eight Hundred Fifty Two Point Nineteen
(852.19) grams with a total weight of Two Thousand Seven Hundred Nine
Point Thirty Five (2709.35) grams in consideration of Six Thousand Pesos
(P6,000.00) consisting of one (1) genuine One Thousand Peso (P1,000.00)
boodle money bills with similar serial numbers PP191620 used as marked
money.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Upon arraignment, Pacnisen pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, pre-trial and trial
ensued. The prosecution's version, as summarized by the CA, is as follows:

On September 18, 2012, a confidential informant arrived at the PDEA office,

Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando City, La Union and reported that
a certain Bobby Pacnisen, who turned out to be appellant, was selling
marijuana at Santol and San Juan, La Union. The informant related to
Agents Dexter Asayco and Efren Esmin that he had already won appellant's
trust and so he was able to arrange with appellant a transaction involving
P6,000.00 worth of marijuana. Agent Asayco verified appellant's name from
their office's Intelligence Investigation Division. He learned that appellant's
name was included in the so-called "Summary of Information", a record of
complaints brought by the citizens against persons engaged in selling drugs.
Based thereon, Agent Asayco formed a buy-bust team composed of himself
as team leader, Agent Esmin as poseur buyer, Agent Suminigay Mirindato as
immediate back-up, and Agents Marlon Apolog, Seymoure Sanchez, and
Ramos as regular back-up. Agent Esmin prepared the buy-bust money worth
P6,000.00 composed of one genuine piece of Pl,000.00 bill and five pieces of
boodle money, each marked with the initials "ELE" on the lower right
portion. Agent Esmin then photocopied the buy-bust money and entered it in
the blotter.

The team proceeded to the agreed place of transaction in a vacant lot

between Pentecostal Missionary Church and Ozoteo Building, Brgy.
Urbiztondo, San Juan, La Union. The confidential informant and agent Esmin
alighted from the team's vehicle and proceeded to the place on foot. Once
there, the confidential informant introduced Agent Esmin to the appellant as
the person interested to buy the P6,000.00 worth of marijuana. Agent Esmin
asked appellant if he had the "merchandise", to which the latter answered in
the affirmative. Agent Esmin then asked appellant if the price for the
"merchandise" can be lowered. When the appellant did not agree, Agent
Esmin handed him the buy-bust money worth P6,000.00. Appellant, in turn,
gave him a plastic bag containing 2 packaged bricks. Agent Esmin asked
appellant to show him the "merchandise" which appellant did by cutting a
portion of a packaged brick. Thereafter, Agent Esmin wiped off his sweat
with a handkerchief to signal the other team members to arrest the
appellant.

When the other team members arrived, they introduced themselves as PDEA
agents. Agent Mirindato informed appellant of his constitutional rights and
placed handcuffs on him. Agent Esmin then conducted a body search on
appellant and made an inventory of the confiscated items in the presence of
the buy-bust team, Brgy. Captain of Urbiztondo Erickson N. Valdriz, and
DXNL anchor Dominador Dacanay. Photographs were also taken by team
leader Agent Asayco during the conduct of inventory.

After the inventory, the team returned to their office where Agent Mirindato
prepared the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report. Agent Esmin, on the other
hand, made the request for laboratory examination which he, along with the
seized items, personally delivered to forensic chemist Lei-Yen Valdez.

Per Chemistry Report No. PDEAROI-DDO12-0025 dated September 18,

2012, the contents of the 2 packaged bricks were found positive for
marijuana, a dangerous drug.[6]

On the other hand, the version of the defense, as also summarized by the
CA, is as follows:

On September 18, 2012, he went to Balaoan, La Union to buy his food

supply from the market and eat at Dangle's eatery. While eating, he
received a call from his former live-in partner Maida, asking for his help
because she was detained in San Fernando Police Station. Maida asked him
to bring her some clothes and food which he should get from a certain Liza.
He agreed to help Maida and rode a bus to meet with Liza at the crossing of
San Juan Costa Villa Resort, San Juan, La Union. There, he saw Liza carrying
a plastic bag which he presumed were the clothes for Maida. They walked
towards a shaded area where Liza asked him to hold the plastic bag because
she needed to pee. When Liza left, a man sitting inside an "owner" type jeep
suddenly choked him. The man's two other companions then handcuffed
him. He was brought to a hut near the seashore and was charged with
selling the marijuana found inside the plastic bag. [7]

Ruling of the RTC

After trial on the merits, in its Decision dated March 30, 2016 [8] the RTC
convicted Pacnisen of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the said
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding

accused Bobby-Pacnisen y Bumacas GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for
violating Section 5, Art II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment
and a (sic) to pay fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00)

The two bricks of marijuana, which are the subject matter of this case, are
hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government. The Branch Clerk of
Court is directed to transmit to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency the
bricks of marijuana for said agency's appropriate disposition.

SO ORDERED.[9]

The RTC ruled that the evidence on record was sufficient to pronounce a
verdict of conviction against the accused-appellant. It held that the
prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the crimes charged,
namely: (1) the identities of the buyer and seller, viz., the poseur-buyer
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Agent Efren Esmin (Agent
Esmin), and the accused-appellant as the seller, with the two bricks of
marijuana as the object of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the receipt of the payment.[10]

The RTC did not give credence to the accused-appellant's defense of denial
as it deemed the same self-serving. It held that the flimsy defense of denial
could not stand against the positive testimony of the poseur-buyer, whose
testimony the defense failed to impeach.[11] The RTC ultimately held that the
prosecution sufficiently discharged its burden of proving the accused-
appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Aggrieved, the accused-appellant appealed to the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In his appeal to the CA, the accused-appellant questioned his conviction by

the RTC because, according to him, the prosecution failed to prove (1) that a
legitimate buy-bust operation took place, and (2) that the proper chain of
custody was complied with. According to the accused-appellant, the
prosecution failed to establish that a legitimate buy-bust operation took
place because it only presented Agent Esmin, and no one else, to establish
the fact that it happened. The accused-appellant raised as issue the fact that
the PDEA agents did not conduct any prior surveillance or test buy before he
was apprehended. He also argued that the chain of custody was not properly
established because there was no Department of Justice (DOJ)
representative at the conduct of the inventory, and that the prosecution
likewise failed to show who took custody of the seized items from the
moment Agent Esmin seized them until they were delivered to the forensic
chemist.

In the questioned Decision[12] dated June 21, 2017, the CA affirmed the
RTC's conviction of the accused-appellant, holding that the prosecution was
able to prove the elements of the crime charged. The CA upheld the finding
that the prosecution was able to establish (1) the identity of the buyer, as
well as the seller, the object, and the consideration of the sale; (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. [13] The CA gave
credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses to establish the
integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs seized. The CA added
that the prosecution need not present anyone else, particularly the supposed
informant, to testify on the buy-bust operation because any such testimony
would only be corroborative or cumulative.[14]

As regards compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165, the CA held that the

prosecution was able to establish the proper chain of custody. The CA ruled
that since the prosecution was able to establish an unbroken chain of
custody from Agent Esmin to the forensic chemist and then to the court,
"the absence of a DOJ representative here would not destroy the established
identity and integrity of the seized drugs."[15]

The CA then held that the lack of prior surveillance did not affect the legality
of the buy-bust operation. Quoting Quinicot v. People,[16] the CA held that a
prior surveillance was not necessary especially when the police operatives
were accompanied by their informant during the entrapment. It further
added that when time is of the essence, the police may dispense with the
need for prior surveillance.

Lastly, the CA reiterated that the accused-appellant's alibi and denial do not
deserve credence in light of his positive identification by the prosecution
witnesses.[17] The CA thus upheld the accused-appellant's conviction.

Hence, the instant appeal.

Issue

For resolution of the Court is the issue of whether the RTC and the CA erred
in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is unmeritorious.

At the outset, it bears mentioning that the accused-appellant raises the

same issues as those raised in — and duly passed upon by — the CA. It is
well settled that in the absence of facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would affect the result of the case, appellate courts will not
overturn the factual findings of the trial court. [18] Thus, when the case pivots
on the issue of the credibility of the testimonies of the witnesses, the
findings of the trial courts necessarily carry great weight and respect as they
are afforded the unique opportunity to ascertain the demeanor and sincerity
of witnesses during trial.[19] Here, after examining the records of this case,
the Court finds no cogent reason to vacate the RTC's appreciation of the
testimonial evidence, which was affirmed in toto by the CA.

The Court is thus convinced that the accused-appellant is guilty beyond

reasonable doubt.

Well settled in jurisprudence is the principle that in the prosecution for

violation of Section 5, RA 9165, the following elements must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt: (1) proof that the transaction took place; and (2)
presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. The
existence of the dangerous drug is a condition sine qua non for conviction for
the illegal sale dangerous drug, it being the very corpus delicti of the crime.
[20]
What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti[21] Corpus delicti
is the body or substance of the crime, and establishes the fact that a crime
has been actually committed.[22]

In dangerous drugs cases, it is essential in establishing the corpus delicti

that the procedure provided in Section 21 of RA 9165 is followed. The said
section provides:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or

Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous

drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for
a qualitative and quantitative examination;

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall

be done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued
within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s:
Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not
allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory
examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities
of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided,
however, That a final certification shall be issued on the completed forensic
laboratory examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24)
hours[.]

Furthermore, Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and

Regulations of RA No. 9165 filled in the details as to where the physical
inventory and photographing of the seized items that had to be done
immediately after seizure could be done: i.e., at the place of seizure, at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, thus:

The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the

drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant was served; or at
the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 21 plainly requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical

inventory of the seized items and photograph the same immediately after
seizure and confiscation in the presence of the accused, with (1) an elected
public official, (2) a representative of the DOJ, and (3) a representative of
the media, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof.

In buy-bust situations, or warrantless arrests, the physical inventory and

photographing are allowed to be done at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable.
But even in these alternative places, such inventory and photographing are
still required to be done in the presence of the accused and the
aforementioned witnesses.

To the mind of the Court, the phrase "immediately after seizure and
confiscation" means that the physical inventory and photographing of the
drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the
place of apprehension. And only if it is not practicable can the inventory and
photographing then be done as soon as the apprehending team reaches the
nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending team. There
can be no other meaning to the plain import of this requirement. By the
same token, however, this also means that the required witnesses should
already be physically present at the time of apprehension — a requirement
that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust team considering that the
buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity. Simply put, the
apprehending team has enough time and opportunity to bring with them
said witnesses.

In other words, while the physical inventory and photographing are allowed
to be done "at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures," this does not dispense with the requirement of having all the
required witnesses to be physically present at the time or near the place of
apprehension. The reason is simple, it is at the time of arrest — or at the
time of the drugs' "seizure and confiscation" — that the presence of the
three witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the time of
seizure and confiscation that would insulate against the police
practice of planting evidence.

Recent jurisprudence is clear that the procedure enshrined in Section 21 of

RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a
simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the
conviction of illegal drug suspects. [23] For indeed, however noble the purpose
or necessary the exigencies of our campaign against illegal drugs may be, it
is still a governmental action that must always be executed within the
boundaries of law.
Using the language of the Court in People v. Mendoza,[24] without the
insulating presence of the representative from the media or the DOJ and
any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the drugs, the
evils of switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence that had
tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA No. 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate
the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the subject
drugs that were evidence of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected
the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. [25]

Thus, it is compliance with this most fundamental requirement — the

presence of the "insulating" witnesses — that the pernicious practice of
planting of evidence is greatly minimized if not foreclosed altogether. Stated
otherwise, this is the first and foremost requirement provided by Section 21
to ensure the preservation of the "integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized drugs" in a buy-bust situation whose nature, as already explained, is
that it is a planned operation.

In the present case, however, only two of the three required witnesses – the
elected official and the representative from the media – were present at the
time of seizure, apprehension, and the conduct of the inventory.
Nevertheless, the Court notes, based on the evidence, that the absence of
the DOJ representative could be explained by the urgency with which the
operation needed to be conducted. As the testimony of Agent Esmin reveals,
there was only a two-hour period from the time they received the
information from their confidential informant to the time that they needed to
conduct the buy-bust operation. Agent Esmin testified as follows:

Q Now, on September 18, 2012, Mr. Witness, at around 1:00 o'clock in

the afternoon, can you please tell us where were you?
A We are at our office, sir.
   
Q You are at your office at Camp Diego Silang?
A Yes, sir.
   
Q When you were at your office at that time, do you remember receiving an
information from a certain confidential informant?
A Yes, sir.
 
xxxx
   
Q And what was that information relayed by the confidential informant?
A He also revealed that he already talked to Bobby Pacnisen that there
 is a person who is interested in buying worth Six Thousand (6,000) worth
of marijuana. He told to the subject Bobby Pacnisen, and this Bobby
Pacnisen agreed, sir, and Bobby Pacnisen arranged the place and
time of transaction, sir.
 
xxxx
   
Q So you said that the time and the place has already been arranged by the
confidential informant, where was supposed to be the transaction and
when?
A At around 3:00 p.m. of September 18, 2012, at a vacant lot of
Pentecostal Missionary Church and Osoteo Building, sir at barangay
Urbiztondo, San Juan, La Union.[26] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The absence of the DOJ representative was likewise explained by Agent

Esmin. According to Agent Esmin, a colleague of his tried to contact a DOJ
representative but there was no one available. Agent Esmin testified in this
wise:

Q How about a personal (sic) from the DOJ, Mr. Witness?

A IO1 Marlon Apolog arrived but he told us that no one is available, sir.
   
Q No one is available from the DOJ?
A Yes, sir.
   
Q For the record who again, Mr. Witness?
A IO1 Marlon Apolog, sir.
   
Q So when the barangay captain and the representative from DZNL arrived,
what did you do?
A I conducted markings of the seized evidence, sir and inventory, sir. [27]

It bears stressing that the prosecution has the burden of (1) proving their
compliance with Section 21, RA 9165, and (2) providing a sufficient
explanation in case of non-compliance. As the Court held in the recent case
of People v. Lim:[28]

It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to
the physical inventory and photograph of the illegal drag seized was not
obtained due to reason/s such as:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a
remote area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the
seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the
accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected
official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be
apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media
representative and an elected public official within the period required under
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the
arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary
detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug
operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the
law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even
before the offenders could escape.[29] (Emphasis supplied)

In this relation, the ruling of the Court in People v. Ramos[30] is instructive:

It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per
se render the confiscated items inadmissible. However, a justifiable
reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient
effort to secure the required witnesses under Section 21 of RA 9165
must be adduced. In People v. Umipang, the Court held that the prosecution
must show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the
representatives enumerated under the law for "a sheer statement that
representatives were unavailable without so much as an explanation on
whether serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives,
given the circumstances is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse." Verily, mere
statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the
required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-
compliance. These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are
ordinarily given sufficient time — beginning from the moment they have
received the information about the activities of the accused until the time of
his arrest — to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the
necessary arrangements beforehand knowing full well that they would have
to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section 21 of RA
9165. As such, police officers are compelled not only to state reasons
for their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court
that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated
procedure, and that under the given circumstances, their actions
were reasonable.[31] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In this case, the Court finds that the prosecution was able to provide a
sufficient explanation for its deviation from the requirements of Section 21,
RA 9165. While the Court emphasizes the importance of strictly following the
procedure outlined in Section 21, it likewise recognizes that there may be
instances where a slight deviation from the said procedure is justifiable,
much like in this case where the officers exerted earnest efforts to comply
with the law.

It should be recognized that, with the limited time they had to prepare for
the operation, the apprehending team was still able to secure the attendance
of two of the three required witnesses: the elected official and the media
representative. This fact alone fortifies, in the eyes of the Court, the
testimony of Agent Esmin that they really did attempt to secure the
attendance of a DOJ representative but that there was no one available. The
absence of a DOJ representative was thus attributable to factors beyond
their control. The officers in this case thus showed earnest efforts to
comply with the mandated procedure; they showed that they did their
duties bearing in mind the requirements of the law. It would therefore be
error for the Court not to reward their efforts towards compliance.

It must also be pointed out that the apprehending officers in this case not
only followed the procedure on inventory, but they were likewise able to
follow the rest of the procedure outlined in Section 21. Agent Esmin testified
that after the inventory, they proceeded to the PDEA office, prepared the
Request for Chemical Laboratory examination, and delivered the seized
items to the PDEA's resident chemist. [32] This is well-within the 24-hour
period provided under Section 21. On the same day, the chemist issued a
report, with Chemistry Report Number PDEAROI-DDO12-0025, which noted
that the seized items tested positive of marijuana. [33] This is likewise within
the second 24-hour period provided in Section 21. Prior to the submission to
the RTC of the seized items, they were kept by the forensic chemist in their
evidence vault that only she had access to.[34]

It is indubitable, therefore, that the integrity of the dangerous drugs in this

case was properly preserved as the prosecution was able to convincingly
show an unbroken link in the chain of custody of the seized items. As the
corpus delicti of the crime and the transaction in which they were sold were
properly established in evidence, coupled with the fact that the accused-
appellant only offered denial as his defense, then the RTC and the CA could
not have erred in convicting the accused-appellant. The Court has oft
pronounced that denial is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail
over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witnesses that
the accused committed the crime. Thus, as between categorical testimonies
which have the ring of truth on the one hand, and a mere denial on the
other, the former is generally held to prevail.[35]
In sum, the Court is convinced that the accused-appellant was indeed
engaged in the illegal sale of shabu, thereby violating Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED.

The Court ADOPTS the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the
Decision dated June 21, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
08271 and AFFIRMS the said Decision finding accused-appellant Bobby
Pacnisen y Bumacas GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine in the amount of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).

SO ORDERED.

Carpio (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, and A. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

J. Reyes, Jr.,[*] J., on wellness leave.

[*]
Designated additional Member per Special Order No. 2587 dated August
28, 2018; on wellness leave.
[1]
See Notice of Appeal dated July 12, 2017; rollo, pp. 20-21.
[2]
Id. at 2-19. Penned by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier with
Associate Justices Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and Pedro B. Corales concurring.
[3]
CA rollo, pp. 55-63. Penned by Presiding Judge Victor O. Concepcion
[4]
Titled "AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS
ACT OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS
THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 7, 2002.
[5]
Rollo, p. 3.
[6]
Id. at 4-6.
[7]
Id. at 6-7.
[8]
Supra note 3.
[9]
CA rollo, p. 62.
[10]
Id. at 57, 61.
[11]
Id. at 61-62.
[12]
Supra note 2.
[13]
Rollo, p. 11.
[14]
Id. at 11-12.
[15]
Id. at 16.
[16]
608 Phil. 259 (2009).
[17]
Rollo, p. 17.
[18]
People v. Gerola, G.R. No. 217973, July 19, 2017, pp. 5-6.
[19]
People v. Aguilar, 565 Phil. 233, 247 (2007).
[20]
People v. Magat, 588 Phil. 395, 402 (2008).
[21]
People v. Dumangay, 587 Phil. 730, 739 (2008).
[22]
Id.
[23]
People v. Dela Victoria, G.R. No. 233325, April 16, 2018, p. 10; People v.
Ramos, G.R. No. 233744, February 28, 2018, p. 9; People v. Año, G.R. No.
230070, March 14, 2018, p. 7; People v. Lumaya, G.R. No. 231983, March
7, 2018, p. 12; People v. Manansala, G.R. No. 229092, February 21, 2018,
p. 9; People v. Guieb, G.R. No.233100, February 14, 2018, p. 9; People v.
Paz, G.R. No. 229512, January 31, 2018, p. 11; People v. Miranda, G.R. No.
229671, January 31, 2018, p. 11; People v. Jugo, G.R. No. 231792, January
29, 2018, p. 9; People v. Mamangon, G.R. No. 229102, January 29, 2018, p.
9; People v. Calibod, G.R. No. 230230, November 20, 2017, p. 9; People v.
Ching, G.R. No. 223556, October 9, 2017, p. 10; People v. Geronimo, G.R.
No. 225500, September 11, 2017, p. 10; People v. Segundo, G.R. No.
205614, July 26, 2017, p. 17; People v. Macapundag, G.R. No. 225965,
March 13, 2017, p. 7; Gamboa v. People, 799 Phil. 584, 597 (2016).
[24]
736 Phil. 749 (2014).
[25]
Id. at 764.
[26]
TSN dated February 26, 2013, pp. 3-5.
[27]
Id. at 16-17.
[28]
G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018.
[29]
Id. at 13, citing People v. Sipin, G.R. No. 224290, June 11, 2018, p. 17.
[30]
G.R. No. 233744, February 28, 2018.
[31]
Id. at 8.
[32]
TSN dated February 26, 2013, pp. 20-21.
[33]
Id. at 22.
[34]
TSN dated December 4, 2013, pp. 14-15.
[35]
People v. Piosang, 710 Phil. 519, 527 (2013).

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