APPROACH-AND-LANDING ACCIDENT REDUCTION

TOOL KIT

fsf alar briefing note 4.1

Descent-and-Approach Profile Management

I ncorrect management of the descent-and-approach profile Descent Preparation and Approach Briefing
and/or aircraft energy condition may result in: To help prevent delaying initiation of the descent and to ensure
• A loss of situational awareness; and/or, optimum management of the descent-and-approach profile, the
following procedures are recommended:
• An unstabilized approach.
• Descent preparation and the approach briefing should be
Either situation increases the risk of approach-and-landing completed typically 10 minutes before the beginning-of-
accidents, including those involving controlled flight into ­descent point (or when within very-high-frequency [VHF]
terrain (CFIT). communication range if automatic terminal information sys-
tem [ATIS] information cannot be obtained 10 minutes before
Statistical Data the beginning-of-descent point);
The Flight Safety Foundation Approach-and-landing Accident • If a standard terminal arrival (STAR) is included in the flight
Reduction (ALAR) Task Force found that unstabilized approaches management system (FMS) flight plan but is not expected
(i.e., approaches conducted either low/slow or high/fast) were a to be flown because of radar vectors, the STAR should be
causal factor1 in 66 percent of 76 approach-and-landing accidents checked (track, distance, altitude and airspeed restrictions)
and serious incidents worldwide in 1984 through 1997.2 against the expected routing to adjust the beginning-of-
The task force said that factors associated with being low/ ­descent point;
slow on approach include:
• If descent initiation is delayed by ATC, airspeed should be
• “Inadequate awareness of automation/systems status; reduced (as appropriate to the aircraft model) to minimize
the effect of the delay on the descent profile;
• “Lack of vigilance and crew coordination, including omission
of standard airspeed-and-altitude calls; and, • Wind-forecast data should be programmed on the appropri-
ate FMS page at waypoints near the beginning-of-descent
• “High workload and confusion during execution of nonpre-
point and along the descent-profile path;
cision approaches.”
• If a missed approach procedure is included in the FMS flight
The task force said that factors associated with being high/fast plan, the FMS missed approach procedure should be checked
on approach include: against the approach chart; and,
• “Overconfidence, lack of vigilance and ‘press-on-itis’3; • If FMS navigation accuracy does not meet the applicable
criteria for descent, terminal area navigation or approach,
• “Lack of crew coordination; and,
no descent should be made below the minimum en route
• “Accepting demanding air traffic control (ATC) clearances, altitude (MEA) or minimum safe altitude (MSA) without prior
leading to high-workload conditions.” confirmation of the aircraft position using raw data.4

flight safety foundation ALAR tool kit | ALAR briefing Note 4.1 |1
 Achieving Flight Parameters
The flight crew must “stay ahead of the aircraft” throughout
Recommended Elements of a Stabilized Approach
the flight. This includes achieving desired flight parameters
(e.g., aircraft configuration, aircraft position, energy condition,
track, vertical speed, altitude, airspeed and attitude) during the
A ll flights must be stabilized by 1,000 ft above airport elevation
in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and by 500 ft
above airport elevation in visual meteorological conditions (VMC).
descent, approach and landing. Any indication that a desired An approach is stabilized when all of the following criteria are met:
flight parameter will not be achieved should prompt immediate
1. The aircraft is on the correct flight path;
corrective action or the decision to go around.
At the final approach fix (FAF) or the outer marker (OM), 2. Only small changes in heading/pitch are required to main-
tain the correct flight path;
the crew should decide whether to proceed with the approach,
based on the following factors: 3. The aircraft speed is not more than VREF + 20 kt indicated
airspeed and not less than VREF;
• Ceiling and visibility are better than or equal to applicable 4. The aircraft is in the correct landing configuration;
minimums;
5. Sink rate is no greater than 1,000 fpm; if an approach
• Aircraft is ready (position, altitude, configuration, energy requires a sink rate greater than 1,000 fpm, a special briefing
should be conducted;
condition); and,
6. Power setting is appropriate for the aircraft configuration
• Crew is ready (briefing completed, agreement on the and is not below the minimum power for approach as de-
approach). fined by the aircraft operating manual;
7. All briefings and checklists have been conducted;
If the required aircraft configuration and airspeed are not
attained, or if the flight path is not stabilized when reaching 8. Specific types of approaches are stabilized if they also fulfill
the minimum stabilization height (1,000 feet above airport the following: instrument landing system (ILS) approaches
must be flown within one dot of the glideslope and localizer;
elevation in instrument meteorological conditions or 500 feet
a Category II or Category III ILS approach must be flown within
above airport elevation in visual meteorological conditions), a the expanded localizer band; during a circling approach,
go-around should be initiated immediately. wings should be level on final when the aircraft reaches 300 ft
The pilot not flying/pilot monitoring should announce any above airport elevation; and,
flight parameter that exceeds the criteria for any of the elements 9. Unique approach procedures or abnormal conditions
of a stabilized approach (see recommendations). requiring a deviation from the above elements of a stabilized
approach require a special briefing.
Descent Profile Monitoring An approach that becomes unstabilized below 1,000 ft above
The descent profile should be monitored, using all available airport elevation in IMC or below 500 ft above airport elevation
in VMC requires an immediate go-around.
instruments and chart references, including:
Source: FSF ALAR Task Force
• FMS vertical-deviation indication, as applicable;

• Raw data; and,

• 9,000 feet above airport elevation at 30 nm from touchdown;
• Charted descent-and-approach profile. and,
Wind conditions and wind changes should be monitored closely • 3,000 feet above airport elevation at 15 nm from touchdown
to anticipate any decrease in head wind component or increase (to allow for deceleration and slats/flaps extension).
in tail wind component, and the flight path profile should be
adjusted appropriately. Descent Profile Adjustment/Recovery
The descent also may be monitored and adjusted based on If the flight path is significantly above the desired descent profile
a typical 3,000 feet per 10 nautical mile (nm) descent gradient (e.g., because of ATC restrictions or a greater-than-­anticipated tail
(corrected for the prevailing head wind component or tail wind wind), the desired flight path can be recovered by:
component), while adhering to the required altitude/airspeed
• Reverting from FMS vertical navigation (VNAV) to a selected
restrictions (deceleration management).
vertical mode, with an appropriate airspeed target (e.g., air-
Below 10,000 feet, flying at 250 knots, the following rec-
speed, heading, altitude) or vertical-speed target;
ommendations may be used to confirm the descent profile
and to ensure a smooth transition between the various ap- • Maintaining a high airspeed (and a steep angle of descent) as
proach phases: long as practical;

2| flight safety foundation ALAR Tool Kit | ALAR Briefing Note 4.1
• Using speed brakes (as allowed by applicable standard oper- The following FSF ALAR Briefing Notes provide information to
ating procedures [SOPs], depending on airspeed and configu- supplement this discussion:
ration, keeping one hand on the speed-brake handle until the • 1.1 — Operating Philosophy;
speed brakes are retracted);
• 1.3 — Golden Rules;
• Extending the landing gear, as allowed by airspeed and con-
• 4.2 — Energy Management;
figuration, if speed brakes are not sufficient; or,
• 5.2 — Terrain;
• As a last resort, conducting a 360-degree turn (as practical, and
with ATC clearance). Maintain instrument references throughout • 6.1 — Being Prepared to Go Around; and,
the turn to monitor and control the rate of descent, bank angle • 7.1 — Stabilized Approach. 
and aircraft position; this will help avoid loss of aircraft control
or CFIT, and prevent overshooting the localizer or extended Notes
runway centerline.
1. The Flight Safety Foundation Approach-and-landing Accident
If the desired descent flight path cannot be established, ATC Reduction (ALAR) Task Force defines causal factor as “an event or
should be notified for timely coordination. item judged to be directly instrumental in the causal chain of events
leading to the accident [or incident].” Each accident and incident in
Adverse Factors and Typical Errors the study sample involved several causal factors.

The following factors and errors often are observed during 2. Flight Safety Foundation. “Killers in Aviation: FSF Task Force Presents
transition training and line training: Facts About Approach-and-landing and Controlled-flight-into-terrain
Accidents.” Flight Safety Digest Volume 17 (November–December
• Late descent, which results in rushing the descent, approach 1998) and Volume 18 (January–February 1999): 1–121. The facts
preparation and briefing, and increases the likelihood that presented by the FSF ALAR Task Force were based on analyses of 287
important items will be omitted; fatal approach-and-landing accidents (ALAs) that occurred in 1980
through 1996 involving turbine aircraft weighing more than 12,500
• Failure to cross-check target entry;
pounds/5,700 kilograms, detailed studies of 76 ALAs and serious
• Failure to allow for a difference between the expected routing incidents in 1984 through 1997 and audits of about 3,300 flights.
and the actual routing (e.g., STAR vs. radar vectors); 3. The FSF ALAR Task Force defines press-on-itis as “continuing toward
• Distraction leading to or resulting from two heads down; the destination despite a lack of readiness of the airplane or crew.”

• Failure to resolve ambiguities, doubts or disagreements; 4. The FSF ALAR Task Force defines raw data as “data received directly
(not via the flight director or flight management computer) from
• Failure to effectively monitor descent progress using all avail-
basic navigation aids (e.g., ADF, VOR, DME, barometric altimeter).”
able instrument references;
• Failure to monitor wind conditions and wind changes; and/or,
Related Reading From FSF Publications
• Inappropriate technique to establish the descent profile.
Loukopoulos, Loukia D.; Dismukes, R. Key; Barshi, Immanuel. “The Perils
of Multitasking.” AeroSafety World Volume 4 (August 2009).
Summary Lacagnina, Mark. “Idle Approach.” AeroSafety World Volume 4 (August
The following should be emphasized during transition training, 2009).
line training and line audits:
Lacagnina, Mark. “Short Flight, Long Odds.” AeroSafety World Volume 4
• Conduct timely descent-and-approach preparation; (May 2009).

• Adhere to SOPs for FMS setup; Lacagnina, Mark. “Glideslope Unusable.” AeroSafety World Volume 3
(November 2008).
• Cross-check all target entries;
Lacagnina, Mark. “Bad Call.” AeroSafety World Volume 3 (July 2008).
• Use the primary flight display (PFD), navigation display (ND)
and FMS to support and to illustrate the approach briefing; Lacagnina, Mark. “Close Call in Khartoum.” AeroSafety World Volume 3
(March 2008).
• Confirm FMS navigation accuracy before selecting FMS modes
Lacagnina, Mark. “High, Hot and Fixated.” AeroSafety World Volume 3
for the descent and approach;
(January 2008).
• Review terrain-awareness data and other approach hazards;
Carbaugh, David. “Good for Business.” AeroSafety World Volume 2
and, (December 2007).
• Monitor the descent profile and adjust the descent profile as Bateman, Don; McKinney, Dick. “Dive-and-Drive Dangers.” AeroSafety
required. World Volume 2 (November 2007).

flight safety foundation ALAR tool kit | ALAR briefing Note 4.1 |3
 Tarnowski, Etienne. “From Nonprecision to Precision-Like Approaches.” FSF Editorial Staff. “Crew Loses Control of Boeing 737 While
AeroSafety World Volume 2 (October 2007). Maneuvering to Land.” Accident Prevention Volume 58 (August 2001).
FSF International Advisory Committee. “Pursuing Precision.” AeroSafety FSF Editorial Staff. “Destabilized Approach Results in MD-11 Bounced
World Volume 2 (September 2007). Landing, Structural Failure.” Accident Prevention Volume 58 (January 2001).
Lacagnina, Mark. “CFIT in Queensland.” AeroSafety World Volume 2 FSF Editorial Staff. “Pilot Loses Control of Twin Turboprop During ILS
(June 2007). Approach in Low Visibility.” Accident Prevention Volume 57 (July 2000).
Fahlgren, Gunnar. “Tail Wind Traps.” AeroSafety World Volume 2 (March FSF Editorial Staff. “Learjet Strikes Terrain When Crew Tracks False
2007). Glideslope Indication and Continues Descent Below Published Decision
Lacagnina, Mark. “Outside the Window.” AeroSafety World Volume 2 Height.” Accident Prevention Volume 56 (June 1999).
(February 2007). FSF Editorial Staff. “Boeing 767 Descends Below Glide Path, Strikes Tail
Gurney, Dan. “Last Line of Defense.” AeroSafety World Volume 2 (January on Landing.” Accident Prevention Volume 55 (February 1998).
2007). FSF Editorial Staff. “Preparing for Last-minute Runway Change, Boeing
Berman, Benjamin A.; Dismukes, R. Key. “Pressing the Approach.” 757 Flight Crew Loses Situational Awareness, Resulting in Collision with
AviationSafety World Volume 1 (December 2006). Terrain.” Accident Prevention Volume 54 (July–August 1997).

Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) Editorial Staff. “Fast, Low Approach Leads to FSF Editorial Staff. “Learjet MEDEVAC Flight Ends in Controlled-flight-into-
Long Landing and Overrun.” Accident Prevention Volume 63 (January 2006). terrain (CFIT) Accident.” Accident Prevention Volume 54 (January 1997).

FSF Editorial Staff. “Boeing 767 Strikes Mountain During Circling FSF Editorial Staff. “Commuter Captain Fails to Follow Emergency
Approach.” Accident Prevention Volume 62 (December 2005). Procedures After Suspected Engine Failure, Loses Control of the Aircraft
During Instrument Approach.” Accident Prevention Volume 53 (April 1996).
FSF Editorial Staff. “Hard Landing Results in Destruction of Freighter.”
Accident Prevention Volume 62 (September 2005). FSF Editorial Staff. “Different Altimeter Displays and Crew Fatigue
Likely Contributed to Canadian Controlled-flight-into-terrain Accident.”
FSF Editorial Staff. “Crew’s Failure to Maintain Airspeed Cited in King
Accident Prevention Volume 52 (December 1995).
Air Loss of Control.” Accident Prevention Volume 61 (October 2004).
FSF Editorial Staff. “Captain’s Failure to Establish Stabilized Approach
FSF Editorial Staff. “Airframe Icing, Low Airspeed Cause Stall During
Results in Controlled-flight-into-terrain Commuter Accident.” Accident
Nonprecision Approach.” Accident Prevention Volume 61 (September 2004).
Prevention Volume 52 (July 1995).
FSF Editorial Staff. “Failure to Comply With Nonprecision Approach
FSF Editorial Staff. “Stall and Improper Recovery During ILS Approach
Procedure Sets Stage for Regional Jet CFIT at Zurich.” Accident
Result in Commuter Airplane’s Uncontrolled Collision with Terrain.”
Prevention Volume 61 (June 2004).
Accident Prevention Volume 52 (January 1995).
FSF Editorial Staff. “B-737 Crew’s Unstabilized Approach Results in
Lawton, Russell. “Moving Power Levers Below Flight Idle During Descent
Overrun of a Wet Runway.” Accident Prevention Volume 60 (July 2003).
Results in Dual Engine Flameout and Power-off Emergency Landing of
FSF Editorial Staff. “Failure to Maintain Situational Awareness Cited in Commuter Airplane.” Accident Prevention Volume 51 (December 1994).
Learjet Approach Accident.” Accident Prevention Volume 60 (June 2003).
Lawton, Russell. “Steep Turn by Captain During Approach Results
FSF Editorial Staff. “Descent Below Minimum Altitude Results in Tree in Stall and Crash of DC-8 Freighter.” Accident Prevention Volume 51
Strike During Night, Nonprecision Approach.” Accident Prevention (October 1994).
Volume 58 (December 2001).
Lawton, Russell. “Breakdown in Coordination by Commuter Crew
FSF Editorial Staff. “Pitch Oscillations, High Descent Rate Precede B-737 During Unstabilized Approach Results in Controlled-flight-into-terrain
Runway Undershoot.” Accident Prevention Volume 58 (September 2001). Accident.” Accident Prevention Volume 51 (September 1994).

Notice
The Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) Approach-and-Landing Accident Reduction autopilots, flight directors and autothrottle systems; flight management sys-
(ALAR) Task Force produced this briefing note to help prevent approach-and- tems; automatic ground spoilers; autobrakes; thrust reversers; manufacturers’/­
­landing accidents, including those involving controlled flight into terrain. The brief- operators’ standard operating procedures; and, two-person flight crews.
ing note is based on the task force’s data-driven conclusions and recommendations, This information is not intended to supersede operators’ or manufacturers’
as well as data from the U.S. Commercial Aviation Safety Team’s Joint Safety Analysis policies, practices or requirements, and is not intended to supersede government
Team and the European Joint Aviation Authorities Safety Strategy Initiative. regulations.
This briefing note is one of 33 briefing notes that comprise a fundamental part
Copyright © 2009 Flight Safety Foundation
of the FSF ALAR Tool Kit, which includes a variety of other safety products that also
601 Madison Street, Suite 300, Alexandria, VA 22314-1756 USA 
have been developed to help prevent approach-and-landing accidents.
Tel. +1 703.739.6700  Fax +1 703.739.6708  www.flightsafety.org
The briefing notes have been prepared primarily for operators and pilots of
turbine-powered airplanes with underwing-mounted engines, but they can be In the interest of aviation safety, this publication may be reproduced, in whole
adapted for those who operate airplanes with fuselage-mounted turbine en- or in part, in all media, but may not be offered for sale or used commercially
gines, turboprop power plants or piston engines. The briefing notes also address without the express written permission of Flight Safety Foundation’s director
operations with the following: electronic flight instrument systems; integrated of publications. All uses must credit Flight Safety Foundation.

4| flight safety foundation ALAR Tool Kit | ALAR Briefing Note 4.1