LECHUGAS V.

CA (Rio)
G.R. No. L-39972 & L-40300
August 6, 1986
Gutierrez, Jr., J.

PETITION before the SC: Petition for Review

PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF: Victoria Lechugas
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT: Hon. Court of Appeals, Marina Loza, Salvador Loza, Isidro
Loza, Carmelito Loza, David Loza, Amparo Loza, Erlinda Loza AND Alejandra Loza

SUMMARY:

Victoria Lechugas filed a complaint for recovery and possession of property against private
respondents. Lechugas testified that she bought the land subject of the litigation from Leoncia
Lasangue as evidenced by a public "Deed of Absolute Sale." Seller Lasangue, as a witness for
the private respondents, testified that during his lifetime her father sold a part of his land to
Hugo Loza (private respondents’ predecessor-in-interest), evidenced by a deed of sale; and that
the remaining 12 hectares were transferred by her parents in Lasengue’s name, being the only
child and heir. She further testified that she sold 6 hectares of her inherited property to her first
cousin, Lechugas under a public instrument which was prepared at the instance of Lechugas and
thumbmarked by Lasangue. However the land described in the document was the land sold to
Loza. (There’s a mistake in the description of property in the Deed of Sale between Lechugas
and Lasengue. The description involves the one sold to the private respondents, but Lasuague
really intended to sell the land she inherited from her father. Note: Lasangue, not being able to
read and write, fully relied on the good faith of her first cousin, the petitioner and just placed her
thumbmark) She testified that the 6 hectares sold to Lechugas was not part of the land
subject of the litigation.

The RTC and the CA gave credence to her testimony and dismissed the case. Petitioner now
argues that the CA had no legal justification when it subjected the true intent and agreement to
parol evidence over the objection of petitioner and that to impugn a written agreement, the
evidence must be conclusive.

Whether PER can be invoked against a non-party to the case – No.

(WON TESTIMONY OF LASANGUE IS ADMISSIBLE AND NOT VIOLATIVE OF

PER – YES )

Parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by either party to the
litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a
party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a
right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby. The petitioner's reliance on
the parol evidence rule is misplaced. The rule is not applicable where the controversy is
between one of the parties to the document and third persons. The deed of sale was executed by
Leoncia Lasangue in favor of Victoria Lechugas. The dispute over what was actually sold is
between petitioner and the private respondents. In the case at bar, through the testimony of
Leoncia Lasangue, it was shown that what she really intended to sell and to be the subject of the
deed of sale was Lot No. 5522 but not being able to read and write and fully relying on the good
faith of her first cousin, the petitioner, she just placed her thumbmark on a piece of paper which
petitioner told her was the document evidencing the sale of land. The deed of sale described the
disputed lot instead. Based on Lasangue’s testimony, there can be no other conclusion but that
she did not intend to sell, as she could not have sold, a piece of land already sold by her father to
the predecessor-in- interest of the respondents.

GSA: Remember the parole evidence rule does not apply to third parties, only parties to the case.
It can only be raised against parties to the case. This case is not covered because the person who
testified, was not a party to the case.

FACTS:
This petition for review invokes the parol evidence rule as it imputes grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the appellate court for admitting and giving credence to the testimony of the
vendor regarding the sale of the disputed lot. The testimony is contrary to the contents of the
deed of sale executed by the vendor in favor of the petitioner.

RTC: Dismissed Lechugas’ complaint for forcible entry against private respondents

In the complaint Lechugas alleged that private respondents by means of force, intimidation,
strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered lots A and B, corresponding to the middle and northern
portion of the property owned by the petitioner known as Lot No. 5456 (REMEMBER THIS!).
She alleged that they appropriated the produce thereof for themselves, and refused to surrender
the possession of the same despite demands made by the petitioner. The complaint was
dismissed. Petitioner appealed to the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo.

While the above appeal was pending, the petitioner instituted another action before the CFI of
Iloilo for recovery and possession of the same property against the private respondents. The two
cases were tried jointly.

Lechugas testified that she bought the land now subject of this litigation from Leoncia Lasangue
as evidenced by a public "Deed of Absolute Sale" which plaintiff had caused to be registered in
the Office of the Register of Deeds; preparatory to the execution of the deed, plaintiff had the
land segregated from the bigger portion of 12 hectares owned by Leoncia Lasangue by
contracting a private land surveyor, the Sirilan Surveying Office, to survey the land and establish
its boundaries, shape, form and area in accordance with the said plan which was attached. She
also states that she caused the declaration of the said portion of six hectares subject of the deed
in her name beginning the year 1951 under tax declaration No. 7912, paid taxes on the same
land, and has taken possession of the land through her tenants Jesus Leoncio, Roberta Losarita
and Simeon Guinta, who shared one half of the produce of the riceland with her, while she
shouldered some of the expenses in cultivation and seeds, and one third share in other crops, like
coffee beans, bamboos, coconuts, corn and the like.

One of the witnesses, Simeon Guinta, testified that while he was plowing Lot A preparatory to
rice planting, defendants entered the land and forced him to stop his work. Salvador Anona and
Carmelita Losa, particularly, told him that if he (witness) would sign an affidavit recognizing
them as his landlords, they would allow him to continue plowing the land. On that occasion,
private respondents Salvador Anona, David Loza and Jose Lozada were carrying unsheathed
bolos, which made this witness very afraid, so much so that he left the land and reported the
matter to Victoria Lechugas who reportedly went to the Chief of Police of Lambunao to ask the
latter to intervene. The advice however of the chief of police, who responded to the call of
plaintiff, was not heeded by the defendants who stayed adamantly on Lot A and refused to
surrender the possession thereof to plaintiff appropriating the harvest to themselves.

Defendants, on the other hand, maintain that the land which plaintiff bought from Leoncia
Lasangue in 1950 as evidenced by the deed exhibit A, is different from the land now subject
of this action, and described in paragraph 2 of plaintiff's complaint. To prove this point,
defendants called as their first witness plaintiff herself, to elicit from her the reason why it was
that although her vendor Leoncia Lasangue was also residing at the municipality of Lambunao,
Iloilo, plaintiff did not care to call her to the witness stand to testify regarding the identity of the
land which she (plaintiff) bought from said vendor Leoncia Lasangue; to which query
witness Lechugas countered that she had tried to call her vendor, but the latter refused, saying
that she (Lasangue) had already testified in plaintiff's favor in the forcible entry case in the
Justice of the Peace Court. In connection with her testimony regarding the true identity of the
land plaintiff, as witness of defendants, stated that before the execution of the deed of sale the lot
in question was surveyed by the Sirilan Surveyor Company after due notice to the boundary
owners including Leoncia Lasangue.

Defendant's evidence in chief, as testified to by Carmelita Loza shows that on April 6, 1931
Hugo Loza, father of Carmelita Loza and predecessor-in-interest of the rest of the heirs of herein
defendants, purchased a parcel of land from one Victorina Limor as evidenced by the deed
"Venta Definitiva". This land, containing 53,327 square meters is bounded on the north by
Ramon Lasangue, on the south by Emeterio Lasangue; that immediately after the sale, Hugo
Loza took possession of the said parcel of land and declared the same in his name starting the
year 1935.

On March 17, 1941, Hugo Loza bought from Emeterio Lasangue a parcel of land with an area of
four hectares more or less, adjoining the land Loza had earlier bought from Victoria Limor,
and which sale was duly evidenced by a public instrument. After the execution of the deed of
sale, Hugo Loza caused the transfer of the declaration in his own name beginning 1945, and
started paying the taxes on the land.

These two parcels of land (that purchased by Hugo Loza in 1941 from Emeterio Lasangue, and a
portion of that bought by him from Victoria Limor sometime in 1931) were consolidated and
designated, during the cadastral survey as Lot No. 5456; while the remaining portion of the lot
bought from Victorina Limor, adjoining Lot 5456 on the east, was designated as Lot No. 5515 in
the name of the Heirs of Hugo Loza. Defendants claim that the lot bought by plaintiff from
Leoncia Lasangue as evidenced by the deed of sale, is situated south of the land now subject of
this action and designated during cadastral survey of Lambunao as Lot No. 5522 (REMEMBER
THIS!), in the name of Victoria Lechugas.
Leoncia Lasangue, plaintiff's vendor in the deed of sale, testifying for defendants declared that
during his lifetime her father, Emeterio Lasangue, owned a parcel of land in Lambunao, Iloilo,
containing an area of 36 hectares; that said Emeterio Lasangue sold a slice of 4 hectares of this
property to Hugo Loza, evidenced by a deed of sale; that other sales were made to other persons,
leaving only some twelve hectares out of the original 36; that these 12 hectares were transferred
by her parents in her (witness) name, being the only child and heir; that on December 8, 1950,
Leoncia Lasangue sold six hectares (south side) of her inherited property to
Victoria Lechugas under a public instrument which was prepared at the instance of
Victoria Lechugas and thumbmarked by herself (the vendor). She testified that the six hectares
sold to Lechugas was not part of the land subject of the litigation.

RTC: dismissed both cases

CA: Affirmed

On the basis of the above findings and the testimony of vendor Leoncia Lasangue herself, who
although illiterate was able to specifically point out the land which she sold to the petitioner, the
appellate court upheld the trial court's decision except that the deed of sale was declared as not
null and void ab initio insofar as Leoncia Lasangue was concerned because it could pass
ownership of the lot in the south known as Lot No. 5522 of the Lambunao Cadastre which
Leoncia Lasangue intended to sell and actually sold to her vendee, petitioner Victoria Lechugas.

Now, petitioner contends that the CA had no legal justification when it subjected the true
intent and agreement to parol evidence over the objection of petitioner and that to impugn
a written agreement, the evidence must be conclusive. Petitioner maintains, moreover, that the
CA relied so much on the testimony of the vendor who did not even file a case for the
reformation of the deed of sale.

ISSUE: Whether PER can be invoked against a non-party to the case – No.

HELD:

As explained by a leading commentator on our Rules of Court, the parol evidence rule does not
apply, and may not properly be invoked by either party to the litigation against the other, where
at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written
instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right
originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby. (Francisco on Evidence,
Vol. VII, part I of the Rules of Court, p. 155 citing 32 C.J.S. 79.).
In Horn v. Hansen (57 N.W. 315), the court ruled:
". . . and the rule therefore applies, that as between parties to a written
agreement, or their privies, parol evidence cannot be received to contradict or
vary its terms. Strangers to a contract are, of course, not bound by it, and
the rule excluding extrinsic evidence in the construction of writings is
inapplicable in such cases; and it is relaxed where either one of the parties
between whom the question arises is a stranger to the written agreement, and
 does not claim under or through one who is party to it. In such case the rule is
binding upon neither. . ."
The petitioner's reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. The rule is not
applicable where the controversy is between one of the parties to the document and third
persons. The deed of sale was executed by Leoncia Lasangue in favor of
Victoria Lechugas. The dispute over what was actually sold is between petitioner and
the private respondents. In the case at bar, through the testimony of Leoncia Lasangue, it
was shown that what she really intended to sell and to be the subject of the deed of sale
was Lot No. 5522 but not being able to read and write and fully relying on the good faith
of her first cousin, the petitioner, she just placed her thumbmark on a piece of paper
which petitioner told her was the document evidencing the sale of land. The deed of sale
described the disputed lot instead.
Based on Lasangue’s testimony, there can be no other conclusion but that she did not intend to
sell, as she could not have sold, a piece of land already sold by her father to the predecessor-in-
interest of the respondents.
The fact that vendor Lasangue did not bring an action for the reformation of the deed of sale is of
no moment. The undisputed fact is that the respondents have timely questioned the validity of the
instrument and have proven that, indeed the deed does not reflect the true intention of the vendor.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit with costs against the petitioner.

Others: on whether the respondent’s changed their theory on appeal

There is likewise no merit in the contention of the petitioner that the respondents changed their
theory on appeal.
Respondents, from the very start, had questioned and denied Leoncia Lasangue's capacity to sell
the disputed lot to petitioner. It was their contention that the lot was sold by Leoncia's father
Emeterio Lasangue to their father, Hugo Loza wayback in 1941 while the alleged sale by
Leoncia to the petitioner took place only in 1950. In essence, therefore, the respondents were
already attacking the validity of the deed of sale. Moreover, although the prior sale of the lot to
their father may have been emphasized in their defenses in the civil cases filed against them by
the petitioner in the lower court, nevertheless in their affirmative defense, the respondents
already raised doubt on the true intention of Leoncia Lasangue in signing Exhibit "A" when they
alleged that ". . . Leoncia Lasangue, publicly, and in writing repudiated said allegation and
pretension of the plaintiff, to the effect that the parcel of land now in litigation in the present case
"WAS NOT INCLUDED in the sale she executed in favor of the plaintiff . . ."
Consequently, petitioner cannot impute grave abuse on the part of the appellate court and state
that it allowed a change of theory by the respondents for the first time on appeal for in reality,
there was no such change.