See

discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242612524

Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict

Reconstruction under International Auspices

Article

CITATIONS READS

16 276

2 authors:

Michael Brzoska Andreas Heinemann-Grüder

University of Hamburg Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC)
103 PUBLICATIONS 956 CITATIONS 41 PUBLICATIONS 52 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

Germany's Post-Soviet "Ostpolitik" View project

Irregular Armed Groups and Russia's Covert Intervention in Ukraine's Eastern Donets Basin View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Michael Brzoska on 25 April 2014.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

 Chapter 6

Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict

Reconstruction under International
Auspices
Michael Brzoska and Andreas Heinemann-Grüder

Introduction

In the aftermath of violent conflict and military interventions, international

organisations or coalitions of countries increasingly engage in post-conflict
reconstruction. One part of the international post-conflict agenda is the
‘reconstruction’ or ‘reform’ of the security sector (SSR). In post-conflict
situations, the security sector is often characterised by politicisation,
ethnicisation, and corruption of the security services, excessive military
spending, lack of professionalism, poor oversight and inefficient allocation
of resources. The term ‘reconstruction’ of the security sector pertains to the
necessity of rebuilding domestic public security institutions, and particularly
to re-establish a legitimate monopoly of violence. Such reconstruction is
necessary where security forces cannot provide for order and protection of
citizens, either because they were de facto dissolved, too small, or suffered
from a loss of credibility. In peace support operations,1 where local security
formations were among the targets of international military intervention,
such as in Haiti in 1994 or in Afghanistan in 2001, the need for
reconstruction will go even further. The term ‘reform’ highlights necessary
or desired changes to governing principles and procedures of existing, but
not properly functioning domestic security institutions, particularly with
respect to ‘soft’ issues, such as democratic civilian oversight and observance
of human rights. Both aspects are part of post-conflict transition, which
primarily focuses on the prevention of renewed conflict, the introduction of
rule of law, the democratisation agenda, and the promotion of conditions for
sustainable development.
122 Reform and Reconstruction under International Auspices

Situations where the international community plays a prominent role,

through a peace support operation or has a major political influence in post-
conflict situations are becoming increasingly frequent. The most prominent
post-conflict cases of externally sponsored policy measures in the security
sector include Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia,
Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, Liberia, Macedonia, Mozambique, Tajikistan and East
Timor. It seems safe to predict that the international community will be
faced with more cases where national order breaks down, or where internal
warfare destroys the social and political fabric of societies, increasing the
need for instruments and policies that can support state-building. Yet, views
held in the international community about state-building are often
competing, highly normative and not well tested. For instance, as regards
economic development, international financial institutions such as the World
Bank have developed sets of policies and measures whose success rate,
when applied, is not very impressive.2
Security sector institutions provide another example of a policy area
where the need for action is not concomitant to the stock of sound advice.
While much has lately been produced in terms of suggestions for instruments
and policies of security sector reconstruction and reform, there is still very
little knowledge about the effects of priorities and sequencing in particular
constellations. In this regard, situations with significant international
involvement are particularly prone to yield useful insights for the
accumulation of knowledge about the application of instruments and policies
of security sector reconstruction and reform, as the international community
is in a strong position to apply recently designed recipes.
This chapter explores a number of issues which seem particularly
relevant for empirical analysis of the priorities in security sector
reconstruction and reform. It offers some tentative ideas about dominant
themes and respective priorities for external actors. Security sector
reconstruction and reform is subject to, and generates, a number of policy
dilemmas, some of which are identified in this chapter. The chapter
concludes with a hypothesis about priorities for post-war security sector
reconstruction and reform, which need to be put to further empirical
scrutiny.3
 Reform and Reconstruction under International Auspices 123

Cues in the Security Sector Reform Debate

Security sector reconstruction and reform needs to begin with an appropriate

identification of the security related problems to be solved in the short and
midterm perspective. In all past, and likely future, cases of prominent
international commitment to post-war reconstruction, the provision of
physical security is the key near-term task on which international and
national actors need to focus their efforts. The near-term priority issues for
the provision of physical security include curbing warlordism, disarmament,
demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), the formation of a national army
and police reform, as well as transitional justice. To make the newly created,
or reconstructed, institutions sustainable after the initial phase of security
consolidation, their compatibility with available resources needs to be
achieved. While disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of military
forces make sense for a number of reasons early on, later ‘rightsizing’ of
forces, which entails a downsizing of military forces, is often crucial,
particularly for long-term financial viability. In addition, security forces need
to have clearly identified mandates, be accountable to civilian oversight
bodies and be regulated by law.
Security sector reform is a relatively new concept, originally
introduced by development donors.4 In the late 1990s a comprehensive
approach to the security sector began to be propagated by some development
donors, international organisations and consultants working for them.5 SSR
is supposed to deliver on three fronts:

• Provision of security. This pertains to political violence by state or

non-state actors, criminality, militant opposition group activity
etc., and it is a major problem in most post-conflict situations,
particularly those with international presence. Linked to this
provision of physical security, which primarily involves the police
and the military, is the proper functioning of the courts and the
prison system, as well as, small arms control.
• Governance and Rule of Law. One of the roots of security sector
reform is to bring security institutions within the realm of rule of
law. Issues which affect the conditions of governance, include the
professionalisation of the armed forces in the sense of
Huntington’s ‘objective control’ as well as the ethnic composition
of security forces.
124 Reform and Reconstruction under International Auspices

• Effectiveness and efficiency. In many post-war cases there is a

need to de-militarise, for example, to reduce the number and size
of armed forces and to bring military expenditures in line with
economic means as well as to overcome clientelism and
corruption.

According to the standard SSR argument, these three objectives need to be

pursued in parallel. The propagation of such parallelism between
performance, governance and efficiency is proclaimed in most reform efforts
by development donor organisations as a consequence of criticism of earlier
policies, which only focused on performance or efficiency. While sound in
theory, such a comprehensive approach presents problems in practice. Often
in concrete situations, decisions on priorities and sequencing of steps need to
be made. For instance, external actors may be pressed to provide security
even though this is detrimental to improving domestic control over security
forces. There is no general agreement in the SSR literature which of these
clusters should become a priority under what circumstances. Moreover, there
is no agreement on how important it is to deal with all three simultaneously
or in some order. In the case of East Timor, for example, there were voices
among development donors who questioned the necessity of having a
military force at all. Yet, as a rule external actors come with at least the
semblance of a general idea, which is largely shaped by perceptions of their
own security sectors, as well as larger objectives, such as democratisation
and economic development.
Elements of what is generally now seen as falling under the security
sector reform agenda soon also became an issue for peace support
operations.6 The objectives of massive international interventions in conflict
and post-conflict situations have expanded over time, both in number and
depth. Interventions have become broader in scope and longer in duration.
Earlier interventions, authorised to back-up cease-fires, such as in Somalia,
or to support political settlements, such as in Mozambique and Cambodia,
were primarily aimed at restoring order and facilitating elections.
Demobilisation and disarmament of combatants were an early harbinger of
wider efforts towards security sector reconstruction and reform within peace
support operations.7 In parallel, but generally with little coordination,
development agencies began to operate in areas relevant to public and
human security.
More recent interventions have become very ambitious, attempting to
lay the groundwork for sustainable political, economic and security
 Reform and Reconstruction under International Auspices 125

structures. Elements of this expanded interventionism include stabilisation,

post-war reconstruction, economic rehabilitation, and democratisation. Next
to the concept of ‘human security’ security sector reform thus turned into
one of the most ambitious or holistic approaches.8
External contributions to security sector reform have been made under
a range of circumstances, including where international agreements adopted
following the cessation of armed conflict provided a corresponding mandate
(Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia), where the United Nations Security
Council provided a mandate for international interim administrations
(Afghanistan, Kosovo, Sierra Leone), and where a cease-fire, mediated
and/or backed by international actors, which included security sector reform
policies, put an end to collectively organised and/or large-scale armed
conflict, (for example, in Tajikistan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Northern
Ireland). Security sector reform has also been attempted outside such
situations, for instance through the support of local initiatives by donor
countries, with the focus on administrative reforms. This so far limited
experience has been incorporated into the wider security sector reform
agenda.9
With few exceptions, prescriptions and accounts of SSR are ‘holistic’,
fusing ends and means, prerequisites and results, actors and policies. There
are advantages and disadvantages to such an approach. One advantage is that
the attempt is made to see societies, where reform is to occur, in their
interconnected totalities. However, this advantage only plays out on a rather
abstract level of analysis, or when it is filled with empirical detail relevant to
a particular society. Otherwise it does not provide much guidance for policy.
The major disadvantage of the holistic approach is that it is not very helpful
for making decisions about priorities for or sequencing of policies.
Accumulation of knowledge about security sector reform in particular
settings has only begun fairly recently. For the time being, the security sector
reform debate is marked by a mismatch between long list of general
recommendations of what could and should be done and concrete
suggestions based on a thorough analysis of the problems in a particular
post-conflict situation. This might be one reason why country-specific
accounts often show little progress in security sector reconstruction and
reform on the ground.10 Security sector reform needs to be made concrete
with respect to priorities and sequences, partial objectives and instruments,
to have relevance in particular settings.
126 Reform and Reconstruction under International Auspices

Objectives and Assumptions

Recommendations for security sector reconstruction and reform come from a

variety of sources, including actors ranging from peacekeepers to
development donors and analysts, all of various convictions. The result is a
mixed bag of policy prescriptions and an ever-longer list of suggested
instruments.
However, what unites all these recommendations is the idea to provide
security for the ‘people’, that is the ordinary citizens living in a given state.
This is generally seen as having two interlinked sides. First, the provision of
physical security and second, the control of those institutions providing
security so that they actually provide security to the citizens, and not to
selected groups, or in ways infringing on the rights of citizens.11 Deficits in
the public provision of physical security are usually perceived as one of the
core problems in post-conflict situations. Typical manifestations of
insecurity include organised crime and illegal paramilitary organisations,
trafficking in drugs and weapons, the unregulated possession of firearms,
terrorism and violent extremism and the abuse of power by state security
apparatuses.
At the same time, post-conflict situations are regularly marked by
deficits in governance structures, including democratically legitimised
institutions. The creation and reform of such institutions is another key task
in post-conflict situations.
Solving the security problem is generally perceived as a prerequisite
for development and democratisation. In peace support operations the
burden of providing security initially will fall on the international
community. Reconstruction and reform of domestic security sector
institutions will then have to enable these to successively take on this task.
However, there is also a corresponding link between democratisation
and security sector reform in the opposite direction. Without the functioning
of democratic institutions, governance of the security sector will be prone to
hostage-taking by particular interest groups. It will also be difficult to ensure
that security institutions behave lawfully, as long as the rule of law is not
broadly established in a post-war situation. Security sector reform is unlikely
to be ahead of broader political and institutional reforms, in fact, security
sector governance generally lags behind other reform efforts.12
The linkage between democratisation and security sector reform is
complex and difficult to generalise. In a way, security sector reform and
 Reform and Reconstruction under International Auspices 127

democratisation provide an example of a chicken-and-egg problem.

Traditionally democratisation has been prioritised in peace support
operations, however, in a number of recent cases, such as Bosnia and in
Central Asia, security sector reform has been pushed despite visible deficits
of democratisation. This dilemma will be picked up again in this chapter on
a more theoretical basis.
In addition to these two core facets of security sector reform, there is,
in the view of the authors, a third facet, whose importance is often
underestimated in discussions and theoretical prescriptions of security sector
reform, but which is of great practical relevance, particular in post-conflict
situations under international auspices. This is the economic sustainability of
domestic security sectors constructed and/or reformed by international
actors. International actors will often find it difficult to sustain funding to
build-up national security sector institutions over long periods of time, while
domestic funding is often hard to come by. Therefore, security sector reform,
which aims at sustainable structures of security provision, will often occur
under severe financial constraint, at least after an initial period.
In summary, the authors are guided by the assumption that security
sector reform in post-conflict situations is about three clusters of objectives:
(i) the build-up of new security sector institutions, where none exist or are
acceptable for reform by the international community, or the retrenchment of
overwhelmingly controlling, present, repressive and threatening state
security institutions from intervention into politics, economy, and society,
where such institutions continue to exist; (ii) the disarmament,
demobilisation, reintegration, transformation, and prosecution of illegitimate
armed non-state actors in order to re-establish a state monopoly of legitimate
violence; (iii) the long-term goals of building-up accountable, efficient and
effective security forces.
To achieve these objectives, actors can use a wide spectrum of
instruments, ranging from (a) strengthening civilian and democratic
participation and control through (b) reallocating military (material,
economic and human) resources for civilian ends (‘conversion’,
‘demilitarisation’ and control of military spending) to (c) reforming military
and police institutions to perform specific tasks (‘professionalisation’,
‘capacity building’), (d) developing an independent judiciary and a humane
penal system (‘rule of law’) and (e) undertaking security analysis and
creating policy models.
As a rule external actors generally come with broad ideas about which
instruments are best suited to the particular situation, often shaped by images
128 Reform and Reconstruction under International Auspices

of their own domestic arrangements. Since these ideas differ among major
international actors, lack of policy coherence is a problem, further
complicating the issue of priority setting. In addition, externally sponsored
SSR often has to react in an ad hoc fashion to urgent security requirements.
While the security sector reform debate has clearly widened the
agenda for reconstruction and reform beyond the military, which earlier was
often seen as the only relevant institution, there is no unanimous view of
how far this label should be stretched. A narrow definition of the security
sector focuses on the provision of public security ─ it encompasses all actors
and agencies authorised to threaten or to use violence in order to protect the
state, its citizens or its external environment. The extensive use of the term
SSR pertains to all potential actors, institutions, policies and contextual
factors impacting on security.13 Notions of physical security, rule of law,
civil-military relations, democratic governance, post-conflict disarmament,
demobilisation and reintegration and ‘human security’ intermingle
respectively. In its extended version SSR exemplifies a thrust for good
governance, for example, transparent, accessible, accountable, efficient,
equitable, checked and democratic input, output and process. Accordingly,
the concept covers all institutions and actors that in one way or another
determine, implement or control the provision of public security or are able
to undermine it. Corresponding to this spectrum of understanding of the
security sector, international actors have also adopted somewhat different
perspectives for reform policies. In some cases, such as Afghanistan, police
reform has so far been prioritised over all other possible approaches, while in
Bosnia and Herzegovina a very broad understanding was adopted.14
Post-conflict security sector reform sponsored by the international
community is generally both defensive and offensive. In its defensive mode
it is geared towards meeting contingencies that are often brought about by
fears of disorder, anarchy, resurgence of violence, gross human rights
violations, disloyalty, and mutiny. Compelling recent examples include
Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Iraq and Macedonia. In such
critical cases security sector reform should concentrate on the domestic
security threats, particularly those emanating from an unreformed ‘security
sector’, and potential ways of reducing these threats. In post-conflict
situations ‘security sector reform’ needs initially to focus on activities aimed
at reducing public insecurity and to restore the state monopoly on the
legitimate use of violence. Early post-conflict security sector reform
therefore often requires specific priorities, in contrast to SSR as part of
democratic consolidation. These include containing the spread of violence,
 Reform and Reconstruction under International Auspices 129

emergency stabilisation, quelling the remnants of violence (mostly in the

form of disarmament and other measures to contain the spread of small arms
and light weapons, as well as demobilisation and reintegration of
combatants), preventing relapses into violence and the formation of basic
security agencies.
Security sector reform is time-sensitive and dependent on the conflict
cycle. Given historical experience for the introduction of the rule of law and
recent empirical evidence about the attention span of the international
community, security sector reconstruction and reform does not often go
much beyond initial stabilisation of the security situation, despite the broader
issues raised in the security sector reform agenda. Under such circumstances,
it makes sense to concentrate on the international actors’ time frame rather
than on normative ideas about an extended democratisation agenda. Security
sector reconstruction and reform programmes should therefore avoid simply
enumerating prerequisites or normative goals that can only result from a
multi-year, evolutionary change. Externally promoted security sector reform
can contribute to capacity building, changing forms of legitimisation, and
they add a veto point to the political process. However, security sector
reform cannot change the type of domestic political regime.
Democratic consolidation may require a comprehensive, mutually
reinforcing combination of human rights, rule of law, development and
polyarchy. Regardless of differences among students of democratisation,
democratic consolidation usually includes constitutionalism (formal
democratic principles), institutional consolidation (formation of democratic
institutions), representative consolidation (formation and empowerment of
democratic non-state actors), and normative or behavioural consolidation
(internalisation of democratic norms and values).15 Disputes exist with
respect to the necessary prerequisites – a pre-existing demos, pre-existing
statehood, rule of law, a Weberian bureaucracy, secularism, literacy,
urbanism, and a certain distribution of income between social strata. SSR in
post-conflict situations is not yet about the agenda of democratic
consolidation.

Framing Conditions

Post-conflict situations usually share some legacies or framing conditions

with a bearing on public security, few of which can be changed in months or
even years.
130 Reform and Reconstruction under International Auspices

In many of the cases relevant here, a recent history of war or large-

scale violence led to the breakdown of the state monopoly on the legitimate
use of violence. Interest groups are often armed. Accordingly, civilian norms
of conflict management do not function as internalised guiding principles of
public and private behaviour. Institutions of public security and law
enforcement are either paralysed or factionalised. Furthermore, most of the
post-conflict situations share with typical underdeveloped countries a lack of
traditions of rational, efficient and effective state bureaucracies. Instead they
are characterised by patrimonialism, clientelism, and informal networks
rather than formal institutions.
Most political regimes prior to the conflict, but, given the societal
base, also after the conflict, are authoritarian or semi-authoritarian,16 and
they belong at best to the group of ‘partially free’ or ‘delegative
democracies’ with elected presidential systems, strong majority features,
executive power concentrations, and a strong reliance on security forces as
instruments to stay in power. Political parties, which are the prerequisite of
strong parliaments and provide the crucial state-society nexus, are mostly
organised around ethnic affiliations or clientele networks. Clientele and
charismatic leader parties dominate over democratic programme parties.
Civil societies are usually weak, at least in the sense that evaluative
institutions autonomous of the government or the power elite are missing.
Additionally, most of these post-conflict situations are on the lower end of
the Human Development Index while they rank high on indices measuring
rent-seeking and market distortions, such as Transparency International’s
corruption index.17
Even in those post-conflict situations where international actors are
limiting the external and internal sovereignty of states through military
intervention forces, or administration of territories, they still need to reckon
with domestic characteristics of societies and polities. There are no clean
slates anywhere. Any kind of reform programme, whether in the security or
any other sector, runs its course influenced by reactive, strategic behaviour
of domestic actors. International actors will seldom be able to determine
outcomes. One important example is the provision of physical security in
programmes for security sector reconstruction and reform.
 Reform and Reconstruction under International Auspices 131

Dilemmas of Externally-Driven Security Sector Reform

In terms of the seriousness of the challenges, post-conflict situations seem to

provide fertile ground for security sector reform, but they are characterised
by at least six dilemmas.
Firstly, post-conflict situations are marked by a lack of security and
the need to quickly build up institutions which can provide security for the
people as well as state institutions. Yet, there are often structures and
institutions of war present which need to be disbanded. While the need for
security is obvious, it is often questionable whether post-conflict situations
provide adequate opportunities for security sector reform. Sometimes both
actors and analysts assume that there is a clean slate when in fact, as
mentioned above, this never is the case. Political and societal legacies may
have been thoroughly changed by a war and foreign military intervention,
but they remain relevant, mixing with new interests groups. A tabula rasa
approach with respect to past deeds, for example, blanket amnesty, absence
of lustration policy, the transformation instead of dissolution of repressive
organs as well as paramilitary forces, is often the prerequisite for buying the
acquiescence of former perpetrators. Contrary to the assumed need of an
ideational and jurisdictional break with the past, reform often has to begin
with the fiction of a zero point in order to limit political opposition and
resource needs. Imperatives of transition and legacies evidently clash. The
question in many concrete situations therefore is, to what extent well-
meaning reform policies can in fact contribute to overcome those legacies?
General transition research suggests that after an initial shock, entrenched
actors and traditional structures overwhelm one-fit-for-all programmes.18
Path dependency of societal and political development is difficult to
overcome, even in situations where major shake-ups have occurred in the
form of wars and subsequent international interventions.
Secondly, in peace support operations, foreign troops and/or police,
which initially take over the role of security providers, are faced with the
classical ‘white man’s burden’ problem of setting incentives for reactive,
seemingly passive behaviour of domestic actors, strategically aimed at
exploiting the international actors.19 However, security sector reform – like
all policy which is to be sustainable after the end of international tutelage –
needs to be implemented and enforced by domestic actors with particular
interests. It is, therefore, generally difficult to find the proper place of
external actors in security sector reconstruction and reform. As a rule,
internationals have a strong interest that their input is transitioned, as soon as
132 Reform and Reconstruction under International Auspices

possible, to national institutions. The interest in early transfer is self-evident

– high costs, vanishing consensus and support in donor countries, security
risks for internationals and disincentives for national stakeholders to take
over responsibility. Yet, domestic actors’ thrust for a quick transition
undermines the very basis of external influence. External input clashes with
the need for local ownership.The practical question therefore is what
principles should guide transfer strategies.
A third, related dilemma pertains to the fundamental democracy
deficit of external interventionism. The power of international actors to bring
about security sector reconstruction and reform depends not just on financial
or human resources, but on the ability to shape, direct, and control policies
and outcomes. International actors may reduce security problems and
contribute to capacity building, but they are not subject to principles of
popular sovereignty, constitutionalism, elections, and accountability in the
territories where they act. The capacity to implement programmes depends
on a violation of just those democratic principles to be promoted. The
fundamental question is whether basic, non-arbitrary criteria can define
readiness for self-determination, self-governance and rule of law in security
sector reform agendas.
The fourth dilemma concerns the interdependency of policies. At least
in post-conflict situations externally sponsored SSR is de facto premised on
the assumption that public security and the state monopoly on legitimate
violence are prerequisites for long-term democratic, developmental or
overarching ‘human security’ agendas. Afghanistan, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Iraq and Kosovo are cases in point. They are either politico-
military protectorates or semi-sovereign states. Security sector reform has
been prioritised by international actors in these cases compared to
democratic consolidation. However, some authors hold that democratisation
has to be prioritised, and that with proper democratisation respective
governance of security institutions will emerge over time. Another view
holds that capacity building for ‘good governance’, particularly professional
training, has to be the priority. The question is whether public and physical
security issues have to take precedence over the democratisation agenda or
whether conditioned capacity assistance with a stabilisation and conflict
containment agenda is the adequate option.
A fifth dilemma pertains to the self-interests of national actors. As the
introduction of rule of law and law obedience in general demonstrate, it is
naïve not to take into account the immediate self-interests, in terms of
financial and power games, of all relevant actors in security sector reform
 Reform and Reconstruction under International Auspices 133

programmes.20 Particularly for those key national actors which are powerful
prior to reform, security sector reform is often not in their short-term self-
interest as it threatens to undermine their power bases. This suggests that
security sector reform has to overcome an initial unstable phase where a
wide range of actors are faced with short-term increases in insecurity about
the new arrangements as well as unknown pay-offs. The benefits of stability
through more predictable behaviour of disenchanted segments of society,
helping to channel distress, and increasing social cohesion, generally only
come in the longer term. Yet, the expected long-term benefit of rule of law
may transgress the time frame of national actors primarily interested in
power preservation. The question is, therefore, whether and how the
incentive structure of national actors can be changed in favour of post-
conflict security sector reconstruction and reform.
A sixth dilemma concerns the contradicting interests, divergent
resource endowments, and varying levels of expertise among international
actors. Due to its resource endowment and organisational capacity, the
military often takes the lead in security-related issues in post-conflict
situations, including issues of security sector reconstruction and reform. As
security sector reform entails instruments not generally in the military’s
toolbox, this constitutes a stretch of the capabilities and capacities of military
organisations, in addition to claiming ground traditionally covered by
development agencies. However, development agencies generally have little
experience, and often limited willingness, to deal with security institutions or
to develop programmes for security sector reform such as police reform or
the design of laws for security sector institutions. Discussions about norms,
rules and institutions of civil-military interaction in post-conflict situations
are just emerging and are highly informed by national cultures and interests.
An open question therefore concerns the appropriate qualifications and
forms of interaction among international actors.

Priorities to Improve Security

Judging on the basis of a preliminary analysis of a number of post-conflict

situations, the initial focus of international efforts in post-conflict situations
should be on curbing warlordism and stabilising the security environment,
on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, re-
building military and police forces and on transitional justice.
134 Reform and Reconstruction under International Auspices

Curbing warlordism must involve efforts to undermine the economic

foundations of the warlords’ power and facilitate a transition to a civilian
economy. Rampant violence and disorder in post-conflict areas and the
international community’s unwillingness to commit sufficient peace
enforcement forces is often a major obstacle to security sector reform efforts.
Lasting causes of insecurity usually involve warlordism, trade in narcotics,
illegal arms and precious resources, the interference of regional states, so-
called ‘spoilers’21 and rampant crime. Warlords, or similar actors who can
self-finance organised militant groups, in many cases, pose the most potent
threat to the post-conflict political order. The lack of law enforcement and
unclear legal provisions often allows warlords to create economic and
political niches in the transition phase from a manifest violent conflict to
stabilisation. Warlords aggressively carve out provincial fiefdoms, use
ethnicity for support, and generate resources through drug or arms trade,
controlling external aid, imposing taxation and various forms of criminal
activity.
If the central government lacks the means to curb the influence of the
warlords, it can try to accommodate, co-opt or integrate them. Political
dispensation is in the interest of warlords as it provides them with the veneer
of legitimacy without curbing their activities. However, ‘buying in’ warlords
may pose a threat to SSR – most are war criminals, guilty of grave human
rights violations and unpopular among the general population. Due to the
involvement of many of them in the economies of war, the nascent
government may become hostage of war oligarchs. To undermine the power
of warlords and spoilers security sector reform will have to include
concerted efforts to choke off their sources of revenue. The warlords power
is often primarily predicated on a financial rather than on a military basis.
Accordingly, an effective means to confront warlordism is to equip the
nascent government with economic tools to disrupt and dissolve their
economic networks, for example through controlling transit trade and
bringing customs under central command, and stopping military interference
in economic and political affairs.
Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants
is an indispensable component of post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction.
Its primary purpose should be to demilitarise society by disbanding armed
groups and eliminating military structures outside state control. In addition,
successfully reintegrating former combatants into civilian society reduces
the likelihood that ‘violence experts’ pick up arms again in order to secure
their livelihood. Severing the dependence between militiamen and the
 Reform and Reconstruction under International Auspices 135

warlords often necessitates the offer of alternative employment

opportunities. Incentives for former combatants could include appointments
in the government, military or police, retraining, assistance in establishing
private enterprises and economic inducements. Disincentives refer to the use
of force, recourse to legal measures, and banishment. The main problem is
political and can result from a number of factors, including popular distrust
of the nascent army and police, the existence of armed rival factions,
possibly even a security vacuum where no national or international actor is
in control and the failure of the international community to deploy robust
forces. Small arms and light weapons control programmes can contribute to
ridding post-conflict areas of surplus weapons.22 However, expectations that
more than symbolic numbers of weapons can be collected are generally
unrealistic. Laws controlling the possession and use of weapons are often
comparatively easier to enact and enforce.
The formation of truly national security institutions, whether army or
police, is viewed in many post-conflict situations as a litmus test for the
entire state-building endeavour (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia,
Afghanistan, Iraq, partially Kosovo). Key problems for the creation of
ethnically and politically representative security forces include the resistance
of private militias to reform, as well as, political factionalisation, limited
capacities of existing forces to absorb additional personnel from formerly
excluded groups, lack of equipment and the absence of an overarching
ideology. Externally assisted police reform was, all in all, more successful
than military reform (Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan),
although lack of sufficient training, basic equipment, miserable payment,
and the enrolment of ex-combatants with a militiaman mentality have
inhibited effective policing in a number of cases. However, the most serious
obstacle to successful police reform is often the lack of lasting international
support.
Countless atrocities have been committed in the course of ‘civil’ wars,
including systemic executions, mass killings, mass rape, ethnic cleansing,
torture, indiscriminate shelling, armed robbery, extortion, abduction, assaults
on civilians, violence against journalists, feminists or political activists.
Transitional justice has often treated these atrocities as taboo. While there is
much recent experience with various forms of dealing with the past,
including international tribunals, the international community and national
governments often feel insecure and reluctant about how to address the
problem. This issue is intimately linked to the dilemma, identified above, of
building post-war power coalitions with limited resources. However, in our
136 Reform and Reconstruction under International Auspices

preliminary analysis of relevant cases, silence on accountability for human

rights violations has more disadvantages than advantages. It emboldens ex-
combatants and warlords to consolidate their power. Amnesty might be a
necessary compromise in order to successfully demilitarise and reintegrate
ex-combatants, but amnesty has to be more specifically defined. In view of
the lack of amnesty legislation, the expectation of a blanket amnesty is very
likely to stimulate insurgents to relapse into violent or criminal pursuit of
interests. The promise of amnesty may even make the international
community appear to be aiding and abetting opponents to successful reform
the security sector. Blanket amnesties cast a lasting doubt on the democratic
credentials of paramilitaries transformed into security agencies, but also
inhibit their future control. Evaluation of personnel for post-war security
agencies has, therefore, to cover all potential candidates, including
commanders. Flagrant violations of humanitarian law, including genocide,
war crimes, torture, terrorism, rape, and hostage-taking, should be exempted
from any amnesty. Given the wide array of acts of violence, the reintegration
and re-assimilation of combatants warrants a proactive reconciliation policy.
Insufficient amount of attention has been dedicated to issues of human rights
and gender, which have tremendous implications for security. If mechanisms
to protect the rights of women and prevent human rights abuses are not
erected in the security sector, the SSR process will serve to perpetuate
gender-based discrimination and egregious human rights violations.

Suggested Conditions for Success and Failure

The following tentative conclusions and recommendations are derived from

a preliminary analysis of post-conflict situations with strong international
influence. They constitute hypotheses, which need to be further tested in
empirical analysis. Specifically, they include (1) capacities of international
actors, (2) local ownership, (3) enabling factors, (4) sequencing of models
and (5) cost-benefit and project evaluation.

Capacities of international actors. If international actors intend to play a

substantial part in security sector reform, they must be willing to invest
substantial political and financial capital. Security sector management will
require a multidisciplinary approach involving legal and constitutional
experts, military and police professionals, experts in human resources
management, persons and agencies with experience in demobilisation, re-
 Reform and Reconstruction under International Auspices 137

trainers and labour market experts. Effective security sector reform is best
conducted cooperatively among a wide range of actors. These include, in
addition to those involved in peacekeeping and international administration
in post-war situations, development as well as national and international
donor agencies such as the World Bank and relevant non-governmental
organisations. However, while positive in principle, the multiplicity of
international actors with similar mandates operating in the same areas
constantly creates ‘turf wars’ sometimes even among competing actors from
one donor country. Duplication, parallel chains of command, and fights over
allocation of funds have a noticeable toll on efficiency and effectiveness.
International resources are often spread over too many independent actors
with divergent mandates and limited willingness to coordinate. Overall
responsibility for the various aspects of security sector reform is often
unclear, or deliberately vague. Security sector achievements have been
limited, for example in Afghanistan, because implementation of the division
of labour for elements of the overall reform process agreed among national
donors has been flawed. In some cases, such schemes have served to disjoint
the process, fostering uneven progress in a strategy contingent on
simultaneous movement among its constituent elements. Competing national
agendas, unclear division of labour, budgetary problems, and bureaucratic
sluggishness result mainly from political negligence. A solution could either
exist in nominating a ‘lead nation’ for co-ordination or in establishing an
international working body – not just a supervisory organ − for coordination.

Local Ownership. SSR will only last if it is based on a growing sense of

local ownership. Imposition of security sector reform might seem possible in
protectorates such as Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but even there
external leverage has proven to be limited and external dictates counter-
productive in the long run. It is vital that reform is seen as an expression of
national will and not something imposed by outsiders.

Enabling factors. Within a general framework, external support should be as

demand-driven as possible and take the local socio-economic environment
into account. Projects are too often generated externally and then ‘sold’ to
the recipient country without needs assessments by independent experts or
the recipient government. Needs assessments are rarely performed before
measures are decided on. Chances of successful security sector
reconstruction and reform increase if they form an integral part of post-
conflict agreements, since they tend to reduce the likelihood of a relapse into
138 Reform and Reconstruction under International Auspices

violence. Keeping security sector reform off the initial agenda for post-
conflict reconstruction is likely to increase the long-term costs in political
instability and the danger of reigniting conflict. Security sector reform is also
aided if the message sent by the international community is unambiguous.
Post-war security policy must be geared towards removing the remnants of
war, not to rectifying military imbalances or rewarding warlords. Capacity
building of security sector forces is the core of successful external security
sector reform assistance. In cases where emergency measures for
stabilisation of the security situation are necessary, the initial focus must be
the provision of physical security. Longer-term issues of security sector
governance will need to take second place. Assisting capacity building
should clearly be connected with de-militarisation, de-politicisation and
strengthening the rule of law. Security sector reform should not result in
furthering repressive regimes or authoritarian politics. Raising expectations
not backed by capacities only leads to frustration and shifting responsibilities
to external actors.

Sequencing. The post-conflict SSR policy sequence should start with

deliberations about future tasks of national security, defence and
intelligence, cascading down to changes in organisations and personnel.
Discrete security sector reconstruction and reform projects should form – as
much as possible – part of larger efforts for post-war reconstruction and
democratisation and be aimed at sustainability. It is preferable for the long-
term success of such programmes that security sector reconstruction and
reform flows from a restatement of national security policy and that the
development of defence and intelligence policy is a part of that process. In
an ideal situation, which can serve as guidance for the overall approach, a
restatement of the overall defence policy should form the basis for
constitutional and legal reform, democratic control, the roles and functions
of each security-related organisation, material and equipment, manning, and
force management. Concrete reform elements should be elaborated in
detailed plans, including budgets, for the various new security sector
institutions. A management structure should be created which is capable of
leading and inspiring the respective security organisation, as well as
managing its resources efficiently and effectively within the democratic
requirements of transparency and parliamentary accountability. Each of
these plans will require implementation timelines, as well as the appointment
of change managers to oversee the process. Administrative and technical
reforms are unlikely to succeed unless they are underpinned by progress on
 Reform and Reconstruction under International Auspices 139

the wider post-war reconstruction agenda. The overarching goal of

international assistance must be to facilitate the creation of sustainable
national structures, including legal frameworks. Goals and time frames of
security sector reform should be clearly stated, otherwise donor fatigue
coupled with the slow pace of aid delivery may deprive the process of vital
funds.

Cost-benefit and project evaluation. As each layer of the plan is

implemented, it is important that the solidity of the foundation is regularly
confirmed. The aim of any review should be to conduct a quantitative,
qualitative and effective audit of each step in the SSR process. The review
phase should assess, among other issues, the quality of internal
communications and the distribution of information concerning
implementation of the plan, the quality and relevance of legal advice and
other external expertise, the soundness of financial management, the
effectiveness of the identification of skills and of commercial opportunities
for laid-off personnel, and the overall cost of the implementation in terms of
‘value for money’.
140 Reform and Reconstruction under International Auspices

Conclusion

Post-conflict situations, where the international community is strongly

committed, provide particularly pressing needs for security sector
reconstruction and reform. If existing at all, domestic security institutions are
generally faced with major security challenges, from remaining contenders
to power and/or criminality, in some cases also from neighbouring countries.
At the same time, security forces are often inadequately empowered or lack
legitimacy.
External actors who involve themselves in peace support operations
need to combine priority setting with facilitating the long-term build-up of
professional, legitimate and efficient domestic security institutions.
Unfortunately, little good advice on such priority setting is currently
available. This is partly due to the relative novelty of international peace
support operations including security sector reconstruction and reform, and
partly to deficiencies in the debates on security sector reform, particularly a
lack of empirical studies.
On the basis of preliminary analysis, taking into account the specific
nature of each post-conflict situation, a number of hypotheses are developed
for further empirical testing. One cluster of hypotheses pertains to the
priorities for international actors in the reconstruction and reform of
domestic security sectors. Near-term priority issues generally include
curbing warlordism, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, the
formation of a national army and police reform as well as transitional justice.
Related to this are the long-term goals of building-up accountable, efficient
and effective security forces. Moreover, conditions for the advancement of
security sector reconstruction and reform are often difficult, because of the
existence of semi-authoritarian or authoritarian power structures. However,
in these situations, security sector reform cannot be a substitute for political
reform and democratisation.
Another cluster of hypotheses developed in the chapter address the
enabling conditions for security sector reconstruction and reform. The
success of security sector reconstruction and reform will likely depend on a
number of factors, including the capacities of international actors, the degree
of local ownership, the successful sequencing of models and, finally, the
proper application of cost-benefit analysis and project evaluation.
These hypotheses need to be further tested in field studies. The goal of
such work should be to assess whether security sector reform and
reconstruction has helped to provide more security to people, to avoid
 Reform and Reconstruction under International Auspices 141

politicisation, ethnicisation, and corruption of the security forces, to reduce

excessive military spending and inefficient allocation of resources, and to
improve transparency and accountability. A number of major external
contributions to security sector reconstruction and reform have by now been
made, or are under way, providing a growing body of evidence which needs
to be systematically scrutinised.
26 Reform and Reconstruction under International Auspices

Notes
1
The term is used here loosely, for international interventions with the primary objective to restore peace and
establish sustainable structures for conflict management. See also Fitzgerald, A., ‘Security Sector Reform –
Streamlining National Military Forces to Respond to the Wider Security Needs’, Journal of Security Sector
Management, Vol. 1, No. 1, (2003).
2
See World Bank, The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Reconstruction. An Evolving Agenda, (Washington,
D.C., 2001), available at <http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf> (2001) for an official policy statement
and Batchelor, P., Kingma, K., and Lamb, G., (eds.) Demilitarisation & Peace-Building in Southern Africa: The
Role of the Military in State Formation & Nation-Building, (Ashgate, London, 2004), for a critical account for the
Southern African region.
3
An edited volume, the result of a joint DCAF-BICC research project, with case studies on post-conflict security
sector reconstruction and reform, for which this chapter provides a framework, is planned to be published in early
2005.
4
See DFID (UK Department for International Development) , Poverty and the Security Sector. Policy Statement,
(London, 2000); Welch, C., and Mendelson Forman, J., Civil-Military Relations: USAID`s Role. Centre for
Democracy and Governance, (US Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C. 1998); World Bank,
Security, Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development: Challenges for the New Millennium, (Washington,
D.C., September 1999); GTZ (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit), Security-Sector Reform in
Developing Countries: An Analysis of the International Debate, (Eschborn. 2000); OECD/DAC, ‘Security Issues
and Development Co-operation: A Conceptual Framework for Enhancing Policy Coherence’, The DAC Journal:
International Development, Vol. 2, No. 3, (2001).
5
See Chalmers, M., Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries: An EU Perspective, Saferworld, London,
January 2000; Williams, R., ‘Africa and the Challenges of Security-Sector Reform’, in: J. Cilliers, A. Hilding-
Norberg (eds.), Building Stability in Africa: Challenges for the New Millennium, ISS Monograph Series No. 46,
Pretoria 2000; Hendrickson, D., Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform, DFID, London.2002;
Cooper, N., and Pugh, M., Security Sector Transformation in Post-conflict Societies, The Conflict, Security &
Development Group, Working Papers, King’s College, London, February 2002; Ball, N., Enhancing Security
Sector Governance: A Conceptual Framework for UNDP, October 9, 2002.; UNOG and DCAF (eds.), Security
Sector Reform: Its Relevance for Conflict Prevention, Peace Building, and Development. Compilation of
Presentations Made at the First Joint Seminar of the UNOG and DCAF, Geneva 21.1.2003, Geneva, 2003;
Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, New York, 2003.
6
See United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, (New
York, 2000) , available at
<http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/>.
7
See United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of
Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment, New York: United Nations 2000.
8
Some authors see SSR as a carrier for ‘democratisation of the state’, ‘establishment of good governance’, a basis
for ‘economic development’, ‘international and regional conflict prevention’, ‘post-conflict recovery’, and
‘professionalisation’, see, for example Karkoszka, A., ‘The Concept of Security Sector Reform’, in: UNOG and
DCAF, eds., Security Sector Reform, Geneva , 2003. In this paper, none of such claimed links are further
investigated.
9
See Saferworld/International Alert/Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, Towards a Better
Practice Framework in Security Sector Reform. Broadening the Debate, Occasional SSR Paper no. 1 (The
Hague.2002).
10
See Buwitt, D., Internationale Polizeieinsätze bei UNO-Friedensmissionen. Erfahrungen und Lehren aus Bosnien-
Herzegowina und im Kosovo, BITS Research Report 01.1, Berlin, December 2001; King, J., Dorn, W.and Hodes,
M., An Unprecedented Experiment: Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Hercegovina, Saferworld and BICC,
(London, September 2002); Yusufi, I., Security Sector Reform in South East Europe, Center for Policy Studies,
(Gostivar, 18 February.2003); Sedra, M., Confronting Afghanistan`s Security Dilemma. Reforming the Security
Sector. Brief 28 (BICC: Bonn, 2003).
11
See Ball, N. and. Brzoska, M, (with Kees Kingma and Herbert Wulf), Voice and Accountability in the Security
Sector, BICC Paper 21 (BICC: Bonn, 2002).
12
OECD/DAC, Security System Reform and Governance. Policy and Good Practice, (2004). Available at:
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/44/31870339.pdf .
13
See Hänggi, H, ‘Making Sense of Security Sector Governance’, in: Hänggi, H., Winkler, T. (eds.), Challenges of
Security Sector Governance (LIT: Münster, 2003), pp. 3-18.
14
See King et al, An Unprecedented Experiment, and Sedra,Confronting.
 Reform and Reconstruction under International Auspices 27

15
See Collier, D. and Levitsky, D., ‘Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research’,
World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3, (1997), pp. 430-451, Beichelt, T., Demokratische Konsolidierung im post-
sozialistischen Europa. Die Rolle der politischen Institutionen, (Leske und Budrich, Opladen 2001); Diamond, L.,
‘Thinking about Hybrid Regimes’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2002, pp. 21-35,; Merkel, W., Puhle, H.-
J., Croissant A., Eicher, C., and Thiery, P., Defekte Demokratie, Bd. 1, (Leske und Budrich, Opladen, 2003).
16
Measured e.g. by the Freedom House Index, see <www.freedomhouse.org>.
17
See <www.transparency.org.>.
18
See Linz, J. J., and Stepan, A. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South
America, and Post-Communist Europe, Johns Hopkins University Press, (Baltimore 1996) and Lauth, H. J., Pickel,
G. and Welzel, C. (eds.), Demokratiemessung. Konzepte und Befunde im internationalen Vergleich, (Westdeutscher
Verlag, Opladen, 2000).
19
See Chandler, D., Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton, (Pluto Press, London 1999)
20
See Maravall, J. M.and Przeworski, A. ‘Introduction’, in: J. M. Maravall and A. Przeworski, (eds.), Democracy and
the Rule of Law, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 2003); Weingast, B. R., ‘A Postscript to “Political
Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law”’, in: J. M. Maraval and A. Przeworski, (eds.), Democracy and the
Rule of Law, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003), pp. 109-113.
21
See Stedman, S. J., ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2, (1997), pp. 5-53.
22
See Faltas S. and diChiaro J.III, (eds.), Managing the Remnants of War, (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2001).

View publication stats