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Security - Policy - in Cryptography

The document discusses how security policies form the foundation for cryptographic key management, from high-level information management policies to detailed CKMS security policies. It describes how policies can be specified formally so that they are understandable to humans and enforceable by automated systems. The relationship between different types of security policies is explored, from organizational information policies to specific CKMS policies.

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amma muthu
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
83 views

Security - Policy - in Cryptography

The document discusses how security policies form the foundation for cryptographic key management, from high-level information management policies to detailed CKMS security policies. It describes how policies can be specified formally so that they are understandable to humans and enforceable by automated systems. The relationship between different types of security policies is explored, from organizational information policies to specific CKMS policies.

Uploaded by

amma muthu
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Security Policies as the

Foundation for Cryptographic


Key Management
Elaine Barker, CKMS Project Leader
Dennis Branstad, CKMS Presenter
Miles Smid, CKMS Project
Presentation Summary
• Introduction to Layered Security Policies
– From Information Management to Key Mngt.
– From Dept. of Com. To NIST Employees
• Security Domains – Simple to Complex
• Key Management – Static to Configurable
to Dynamic Security Domain Negotiation
• Policy Negotiation – Local to Global
• Policy Specification – Ad Hoc to Formal
2
Security Policy Specifications
• A Security Policy should be written so that
people can understand and follow it;
• A Security Policy should be encoded so
that an automated system can enforce it;
• A formal specification of a security policy
can be understandable to humans and
automatically enforced by a CKMS.

3
Security-Domain Based
Cryptographic Key Management
• Goal: Automated negotiation of key
management based on the domain security
policies of two or more mutually suspicious
participants in a sensitive transaction.
• Assumption: Security is proportional to cost, the
services used, and the protection provided.
• Approach: Develop an automated Policy
Negotiation method using formal syntax
specifications of compatible Security Policies.

4
Information Management Policy
• Highest-Level Organizational Policy for
Managing and Protecting Information in all
forms (paper, computer data, electronic
storage);
• Established by the Organization’s CEO or
CIO;
• Policy is provided to all the Organization’s
employees so they can follow the policy.

5
Information Management Policy (Con’t)

• Based primarily on organization’s goals


and objectives;
• Based often on industry standards of good
practice (e.g., health patient privacy rules);
• Assigns Information Management Roles
and Responsibilities to individuals;
• Foundation for Information Security Policy.

6
Information Security Policy
• Establishes high-level rules for protecting
organization’s information independent of
the storage media (e.g., paper, electronic);
• Establishes information sensitivity levels;
• Establishes security labels for information;
• Protection services are based on threats;
• Level of protection is based on risks to
information that could result in its loss, or
its unauthorized disclosure or modification.

7
Data Security Policy
• Based on the Information Security Policy;
• Rules for protecting electronic information;
• Governs use of Computers & Applications;
• Covers use of communication networks;
• Specifies data security levels, labels, etc.;
• Basis of Cryptographic Data Protection;
• Basis of Cryptographic Key Management.

8
CKMS Security Policy
• Based on an organization’s Data Security Policy,
specifically on data cryptographic protection;
• Protecting a cryptographic key and its
associated metadata is required to protect the
information protected by the key;
• Often based on CKMS Profiles (e.g., Federal) of
organizations using the services of the CKMS;
• CKMS Technical Capabilities must support and
be used to enforce the CKMS Security Policy.

9
CKMS Security Policy (Con’t)
• Specifies detailed CKMS requirements for
protecting cryptographic keys and their
associated metadata within the CKMS;
• Based on, and supports, the sensitive data
and applications’ protection requirements;
• Governs key and metadata protection and
management throughout the entire lifecycle
of a cryptographic key.

10
Relationships among Policies
• Policy statements should be layered from high to
low ranging from high level goals to details on
how to implement and enforce the policy; e.g.
– Simple high-level policy: Protect sensitive data;
– Simple mid-level policy: Encrypt sensitive data during
communication and in long-term storage;
– Simple low-level policy: Encrypt and Label data with
AES-128 whenever it is stored outside a physically
secure facility;
– Simple CKMS policy: Use a validated FIPS140-2
Cryptographic Module whenever encrypting the
application data and the Key used to encrypt it.

11
DOC/NIST Policies Principles of
Information Security
• DOC/NIST’s Information and Data Security Policies include all
aspects of protecting information and data. These include:
– Confidentiality – Protecting Data from unauthorized disclosure;
– Integrity –Protecting Electronic Data from unauthorized, unanticipated,
or unintentional modification;
– Availability – Electronic Data must be available on a timely basis.
• The potential impact on DOC, NIST, Federal employees, and private
individuals is categorized as:
– low (limited),
– moderate (serious), or
– high (catastrophic or severe)
DOC/NIST Computer Use Policy

• To be authorized access to NIST


Computers and Networks, users must:
– Read the DOC/NIST Policies on IT Usage and
Data Access & sign acceptance form;
– Take the DOC/NIST IT Security Course;
– Retake the Information Security Training
course annually;
– Review and accept all the DOC/NIST Data
Security Policies.

13
DOC/NIST Information Policy on
Personally Identifiable Information (PII)
• NIST computer users should delete unnecessary PII;
• NIST PII should be stored only on NIST-owned
computers, never on personally owned computers
or data storage media;
• Removable data storage media must not be used to
store plaintext PII;
• Laptops , tablets, and removable data storage media
must use FIPS 140-2 encryption if they contain PII
and are intended to be removed from NIST.

14
CKMS Security-Policy Related
Questions
• How does the CKMS Security Policy help enforce an
organization’s Computer & Data Security Policies?
• What security mechanisms must be in the CKMS to
provide the protection required by the security policy?
• What administrators must be notified when the CKMS
Security Policy is modified? How are they notified?
• Under what conditions may a key and its associated
metadata be shared and used?
• Should technical-related portions of the CKMS
security policy be expressed in tabular form or in a
formal language so that the CKMS can automatically
enforce them?

15
CKMS Policy Implementation
• The designer must select CKMS services, functions,
algorithms, protocols, key types, etc. to be included in
an implementation/product based on future markets;
• The designer can selectively implement functions and
features statically by “hard coding” all parameters or
dynamically by “soft coding” support of parameters
specified in a static or dynamic security domain policy;
• Design and implementation of a static CKMS is
simpler; operation is efficient, cost is less, BUT
• A CKMS capable of enforcing several security policies
may support more domains and have a larger market.

16
Structured Policy Specifications
• Flow charts and tables can be manually “encoded”
such that they can be enforced by a CKMS; BUT
• Security Administrators can be aided in using an
automated, template-based, question-answer
program to create a flexible security domain policy;
• A structured security domain policy specification
can be translated into a formal Policy Specification
Language with Formal Syntax Rules defining all
acceptable “sentences” of the Policy Language;
• Semantics (the “meaning” of the “sentences” of a
language) can be structured to be understandable
to humans and enforced directly by a CKMS.

17
Example: Simple Security Policy
• <Level> ::= “High” | “Moderate” | “Low”;
• <Label> ::= “Financial” | “Health”;
• <Protect> ::= “Encrypt” | “Sign”;
• < Data> ::= “Payment” | “Cancer”;
• <Sentence> ::= <Level> <Label>
<Protect> <Data> “.”;
Sentence 1: High Financial Sign Payment.
Sentence 2: Low Health Encrypt Cancer.
Test: How many legal sentences exist in this Policy?
18
Policy Language Semantics
• Formal semantics specify an unambiguous
meaning for each sentence of a language.
• Each sentence of a Formal Security Policy
Language would have semantics that a
CKMS Policy Program would enforce.
• Ex: HIGH HEALTH SIGN PAYMENT.
would be implemented as a process that
signs highly valuable health payment data.

19
Security Domain
• Collection of Computers, Communications,
Applications, and Users processing data in
accordance with a single data security
policy called the Domain Security Policy;
• The mutually trusting entities (e.g., users)
in a Security Domain can easily exchange
data, keys, and metadata in accordance
with the Domain Security Policy currently
being enforced by a CKMS.
20
Domain Security Policy Creation
A Policy Adopted by Similar Organizations
Similar Risks in
Similar Environments Organizations Data Protection
Protection Requirements
Objectives
Similar sensitive
Applications O1 R1,1 Domain Security
R1,2 Policy
Similar Experienced
& Trusted Users Oi Ri,1

On Rn,1
Rn,2

Rn,m

21
Sharing Sensitive Data from
Different Security Domains
• Users in two different Security Domains can
share sensitive information if the Domain
Security Policies are equivalent or compatible;
• Equivalent policies provide protections that are
mutually acceptable to users in both Domains;
• Compatible policies or not equivalent but have
equivalent subsets of protections that satisfy
both security policies if the provided data
processing services are restricted. (Note: Details
and mechanisms are still under study.)
22
Obtaining Assurances of
Security
• Exchanging data from different security domains
may initially require an authority from each
domain to examine the policy from the other
domain and verify that they are equivalent;
• If not equivalent, both authorities have to concur
if and where they are compatible;
• Research question: Can an automated Domain
Security Policy Language Processor be created
to determine if two policies are equivalent,
compatible, or neither?
23
Multi-Level Security Domains

• A Security Domain can have a multi-level policy


for one or more security services;
• Example: A Domain Security Policy may allow
supporting low & moderate confidentiality
services and moderate & high integrity services;
• Two entities from a multi-level domain must be
assured that an appropriate level protection is
provided for the keys and metadata by the
CKMS in accordance with the multi-level policy.
• Question: Can this assurance be automated?

24
Three(+) Cooperating Entities

• Trust among entities in the same simple Security


Domain is associative and commutative.
• Trust among entities in equivalent Security
Domains may be associative and commutative.
• Research Question: Can (How can) Trust
among multiple entities in different Security
Domains be made distributive?
i.e., Does A ~ B and B ~ C imply that A ~ C?

25
CKMS Federal Profile: Future
Features that may be “Nice to Have”
• Multi-Level Security: Selectable based on
requirements and costs (e.g., processing time) ;
• Scalable Security: Selects acceptable level of
protection while minimizing costs;
• Selectable Security: CKMS Multi-Domain Policy
Enforcement supports selectable security;
• Negotiated Security for Transaction: Based on
the policies of two or more entities participating
in a sensitive transaction;
– Requires creation of a new temporary or permanent
Security Policy for the transaction.

26
Federal, National, Global CKMS

• Current Draft Profile created for U.S. Federal


Sector including Agencies and Contractors.
• A Private Sector (e.g., Financial, Health,
Industrial) can create its own CKMS Profile.
• A Foreign organization can create its own Profile
based on local standards, laws, requirements.
• A Global CKMS could provide security for
multiple domains in multiple countries if given a
formal and robust policy specification language.

27
Future CKMS Design Alternatives
• Enforces CKMS Policy + one Domain Policy;
• Enforces CKMS Policy + several Domain
Policies;
• Enforces CKMS Security Policy + assists
Domain Administrators in creating a new
Domain from two compatible Domains;
• Enforces CKMS Security Policy + automatically
creates new Domain from two or more
compatible Domains;
• Automatically creates a new Domain for two or
more mutually suspicious but cooperating
entities from compatible Domains.

28
Final Thoughts
• Organizational policies must identify goals, threats, risks;
• Information policies must establish data categories, labels,
sensitivity levels, handling restrictions, roles, responsibilities;
• Data Security policies must specify human, physical,
communications, and computer protections for data;
• CKMS Policies should be configurable and automated to
manage keys that protect sensitive applications and data.
• Global secure applications must support various policies.
• Goal: Automated security policy specification, negotiation,
and enforcement is desirable for sensitive applications among
mutually suspicious but cooperating organizations.
– Key Management based on automated dynamic Domain
Security Policy support will help meet this goal.

29

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