EN BANC The sole issue for resolution in these consolidated cases 1 is the legality of Section 4, Rule 1

of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10592,2 which
G.R. No. 212719, June 25, 2019 states:

INMATES OF THE NEW BILIBID PRISON, MUNTINLUPA CITY, NAMELY: VENANCIO A. SECTION 4. Prospective Application. - Considering that these Rules provide for new
ROXAS, SATURNINO V. PARAS, EDGARDO G. MANUEL, HERMINILDO V. CRUZ, ALLAN F. procedures and standards of behavior for the grant of good conduct time allowance as
TEJADA, ROBERTO C. MARQUEZ, JULITO P. MONDEJAR, ARMANDO M. CABUANG, provided in Section 4 of Rule V hereof and require the creation of a Management,
JONATHAN O. CRISANTO, EDGAR ECHENIQUE, JANMARK SARACHO, JOSENEL ALVARAN, Screening and Evaluation Committee (MSEC) as provided in Section 3 of the same Rule,
AND CRISENCIO NERI, JR., PETITIONERS, the grant of good conduct time allowance under Republic Act No. 10592 shall be
prospective in application.
v.
The grant of time allowance of study, teaching and mentoring and of special time
SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; AND SECRETARY MANUEL A. allowance for loyalty shall also be prospective in application as these privileges are
ROXAS II, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, RESPONDENTS. likewise subject to the management, screening and evaluation of the MSEC. 3
The Case
ATTY. RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, SR., PETITIONER-INTERVENOR,
On May 29, 2013, then President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law R.A. No. 10592,
WILLIAM M. MONTINOLA, FORTUNATO P. VISTO, AND ARESENIO C. CABANILLA, amending Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 of Act No. 3815, or the Revised Penal
PETITIONERS-INTERVENORS, Code (RPC).4 For reference, the modifications are underscored as follows:
ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. —
[G.R. No. 214637] Offenders or accused who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in
the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during
REYNALDO D. EDAGO, PETER R. TORIDA, JIMMY E. ACLAO, WILFREDO V. OMERES, which they have undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees
PASCUA B. GALLADAN, VICTOR M. MACOY, JR., EDWIN C. TRABUNCON, WILFREDO A. voluntarily in writing after being informed of the effects thereof and with the assistance
PATERNO, FEDERICO ELLIOT, AND ROMEO R. MACOLBAS, PETITIONERS, v. SECRETARY of counsel to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners,
LEILA M. DE LIMA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; SECRETARY MANUEL A. ROXAS II, except in the following cases:
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT; ACTING DIRECTOR
FRANKLIN JESUS B. BUCAYU, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS; AND JAIL CHIEF 1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of
SUPERINTENDENT DIONY DACANAY MAMARIL, BUREAU OF JAIL MANAGEMENT AND any crime; and
PENOLOGY, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION 2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to
surrender voluntarily.
PERALTA, J.:

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If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed other local jail shall entitle him to the following deductions from the period of his
upon convicted prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the assistance of a counsel and sentence:
shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he
has undergone preventive imprisonment.
1. During the first two years of (his) imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction
Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be of twenty days for each month of good behavior during detention;
deducted from thirty (30) years.
2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a
Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to the deduction of twenty-three days for each month of good behavior during detention;
possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced
and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to 3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall
the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under be allowed a deduction of twenty-five days for each month of good behavior during
review. Computation of preventive imprisonment for purposes of immediate release detention;
under this paragraph shall be the actual period of detention with good conduct time
allowance: Provided, however, That if the accused is absent without justifiable cause at
any stage of the trial, the court may motu proprio order the rearrest of the 4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a
accused: Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons deduction of thirty days for each month of good behavior during detention; and
charged with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act. In case the
maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be 5. At any time during the period of imprisonment, he shall be allowed another
released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment. deduction of fifteen days, in addition to numbers one to four hereof, for each month of
study, teaching or mentoring service time rendered.

ART. 94. Partial extinction of criminal liability — Criminal liability is extinguished partially:

An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him of entitlement to the above allowances
1. By conditional pardon; for good conduct.

2. By commutation of the sentence; and ART. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. - A deduction of one fifth of the period of his
sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded his preventive
3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is undergoing imprisonment or the service of his sentence under the circumstances mentioned in
preventive imprisonment or serving his sentence. Article 158 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the
issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe
ART. 97. Allowance for good conduct. - The good conduct of any offender qualified for referred to in said article. A deduction of two-fifths of the period of his sentence shall be
credit for preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of this Code, or of any granted in case said prisoner chose to stay in the place of his confinement
convicted prisoner in any penal institution, rehabilitation or detention center or any

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notwithstanding the existence of a calamity or catastrophe enumerated in Article 158 of (BUCOR) and the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) to retroactively apply
this Code. the law when the prisoners' records are complete and the distinctions between the
pertinent provisions of the RPC and R.A. No. 10592 are easily identifiable. Petitioners
submit that the simple standards added by the new law, which are matters of record, and
This Article shall apply to any prisoner whether undergoing preventive imprisonment or the creation of the Management, Screening and Evaluation Committee (MSEC) should not
serving sentence. override the constitutional guarantee of the rights to liberty and due process of law aside
from the principle that penal laws beneficial to the accused are given retroactive effect.
ART. 99. Who grants time allowances. - Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, the Chief of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology and/or Almost a month after, or on July 11, 2014, Atty. Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. filed a Petition (In
the Warden of a provincial, district, municipal or city jail shall grant allowances for good Intervention).9 He incorporates by reference the Roxas et al. petition, impleads the same
conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be revoked. (Emphases ours) respondents, and adds that nowhere from the legislative history of R.A. No. 10592 that it
Pursuant to the amendatory law, an IRR was jointly issued by respondents Department of intends to be prospective in character. On July 22, 2014, the Court resolved to grant the
Justice (DOJ) Secretary Leila M. De Lima and Department of the Interior and Local leave to intervene and require the adverse parties to comment thereon. 10
Government (DILG) Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II on March 26, 2014 and became effective
on April 18, 2014.5 Petitioners and intervenors assail the validity of its Section 4, Rule 1
that directs the prospective application of the grant of good conduct time allowance Another Petition-in-Intervention11 was filed on October 21, 2014. This time, the Free Legal
(GCTA), time allowance for study, teaching and mentoring (TASTM), and special time Assistance Group (FLAG) served as counsel for William M. Montinola, Fortunato P. Visto,
allowance for loyalty (STAL) mainly on the ground that it violates Article 22 of the RPC. 6 and Arsenio C. Cabanilla (Montinola et al.), who are also inmates of the NBP. The petition
argues that Section 4, Rule I of the IRR is facially void for being contrary to the equal
G.R. No. 212719 protection clause of the 1987 Constitution; it discriminates, without any reasonable basis,
against those who would have been benefited from the retroactive application of the law;
On June 18, 2014, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with Prayer for the Issuance of and is also ultra vires, as it was issued beyond the authority of respondents to
a Preliminary Injunction)7 was filed against respondents DOJ Secretary De Lima and DILG promulgate. In a Resolution dated November 25, 2014, We required the adverse parties
Secretary Roxas by Atty. Michael J. Evangelista acting as the attorney-in-fact 8 of convicted to comment on the petition-in-intervention. 12
prisoners in the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), namely: Venancio A. Roxas, Saturnino V. Paras,
Edgardo G. Manuel, Herminildo V. Cruz, Allan F. Tejada, Roberto C. Marquez, Julito P. On January 30, 2015, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated
Mondejar, Armando M. Cabuang, Jonathan O. Crisanto, Edgar Echenique, Janmark Comment13 to the Petition of Roxas et al. and Petition-in-Intervention of Atty. Saguisag, Sr.
Saracho, Josenel Alvaran, and Crisencio Neri, Jr. (Roxas et al.). Petitioners filed the case as More than two years later, or on July 7, 2017, it filed a Comment 14 to the Petition-in-
real parties-in-interest and as representatives of their member organizations and the Intervention of Montinola et al.
organizations' individual members, as a class suit for themselves and in behalf of all who
are similarly situated. They contend that the provisions of R.A. No. 10592 are penal in G.R. No. 214637
nature and beneficial to the inmates; hence, should be given retroactive effect in
accordance with Article 22 of the RPC. For them, the IRR contradicts the law it On October 24, 2014, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition15 was filed by Reynaldo D.
implements. They are puzzled why it would be complex for the Bureau of Corrections Edago, Peter R. Torida, Jimmy E. Aclao, Wilfredo V. Omeres, Pascua B. Galladan, Victor M.

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Macoy, Jr., Edwin C. Trabuncon, Wilfredo A. Paterno, Federico Elliot, and Romeo R. December 10, 2014, while the OSG did the same on February 9, 2015 19 in behalf of all the
Macolbas (Edago et al.), who are all inmates at the Maximum Security Compound of the respondents.
NBP, against DOJ Secretary De Lima, DILG Secretary Roxas, BUCOR Acting Director
Franklin Jesus B. Bucayu, and BJMP Chief Superintendent (Officer-in-Charge) Diony Subsequently, Edago et al. filed a Motion with Leave of Court to File and Admit
Dacanay Mamaril. The grounds of the petition are as follows: Reply,20 attaching therein said Reply. On July 28, 2015, We granted the motion and noted
A. the Reply.21

SECTION 4, RULE I OF THE IRR PROVIDING FOR A PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF THE The Court's Ruling
PROVISIONS OF R.A. 10592 WAS ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND THEREBY VOID AND ILLEGAL FOR The petition is granted.
BEING CONTRARY AND ANATHEMA TO R.A. 10592.
Procedural Matters
a. R.A. 10592 does not state that its provisions shall have
prospective application. Actual case or controversy

b. Section 4 of the IRR of R.A. 10592 is contrary to Article 22 of the Respondents contend that the petition of Edago et al. did not comply with all the
Revised Penal Code providing that penal laws that are beneficial elements of justiciability as the requirement of an actual case or controversy vis-a-vis the
to the accused shall have retroactive application. requirement of ripeness has not been complied with. For them, the claimed injury of
petitioners has not ripened to an actual case requiring this Court's intervention: First, the
c. Section 4, Rule I of the IRR contravenes public policy and the MSEC has not been constituted yet so there is effectively no authority or specialized body
intent of Congress when it enacted R.A. 10592. to screen, evaluate and recommend any applications for time credits based on R.A. No.
10592. Second, none of petitioners has applied for the revised credits, making their claim
B. of injury premature, if not anticipatory. And third, the prison records annexed to the
petition are neither signed nor certified by the BUCOR Director which belie the claim of
SECTION 4, RULE I OF THE IRR WAS ISSUED BY RESPONDENTS WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF actual injury resulting from alleged extended incarceration. What petitioners did was they
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BECAUSE IT IS PATENTLY immediately filed this case after obtaining their prison records and computing the
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. purported application of the revised credits for GCTA under R.A. No. 10592.

a. Section 4, Rule I of the IRR violates the Equal Protection Clause of We disagree.
the Constitution.
It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
b. Section 4, Rule I of the IRR violates substantive due process. 16 governmental act may be heard and decided unless the following requisites for judicial
inquiry are present: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
Per Resolution17 dated November 11, 2014, respondents were ordered to file their exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to
comment to the petition. In compliance, BJMP Chief Mamaril filed a Comment 18 on question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality

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must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be confinement or detention in the meantime is oppressive. With the prisoners' continued
the very lis mota of the case.22 As to the requirement of actual case or controversy, the incarceration, any delay in resolving the case would cause them great prejudice. Justice
Court stated in Province of North Cotabato, et al. v. Gov't of the Rep. of the Phils. Peace demands that they be released soonest, if not on time.
Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), et al.:23
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to There is no need to wait and see the actual organization and operation of the MSEC.
issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic Petitioners Edago et al. correctly invoked Our ruling in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon.
questions. The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies Aguirre.25 There, We dismissed the novel theory that people should wait for the
defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that implementing evil to befall on them before they could question acts that are illegal or
the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. unconstitutional, and held that "[by] the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite controversy even without any other overt act." Similar to Pimentel, Jr., the real issue in
legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or this case is whether the Constitution and the RPC are contravened by Section 4, Rule 1 of
abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be the IRR, not whether they are violated by the acts implementing it. Concrete acts are not
interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence, x x x. necessary to render the present controversy ripe. 26 An actual case may exist even in the
absence of tangible instances when the assailed IRR has actually and adversely affected
petitioners. The mere issuance of the subject IRR has led to the ripening of a judicial
Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of controversy even without any other overt act. If this Court cannot await the adverse
ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a consequences of the law in order to consider the controversy actual and ripe for judicial
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for intervention,27 the same can be said for an IRR. Here, petitioners need not wait for the
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or creation of the MSEC and be individually rejected in their applications. They do not need
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner to actually apply for the revised credits, considering that such application would be an
must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the exercise in futility in view of respondents' insistence that the law should be prospectively
challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of applied. If the assailed provision is indeed unconstitutional and illegal, there is no better
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of. 24 time than the present action to settle such question once and for all. 28
There is an actual case or controversy in the case at bar because there is a contrariety of
legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and Legal standing
jurisprudence. Respondents stand for the prospective application of the grant of GCTA,
TASTM, and STAL while petitioners and intervenors view that such provision violates the We do not subscribe to respondents' supposition that it is the Congress which may claim
Constitution and Article 22 of the RPC. The legal issue posed is ripe for adjudication as the any injury from the alleged executive encroachment of the legislative function to amend,
challenged regulation has a direct adverse effect on petitioners and those detained and modify or repeal laws and that the challenged acts of respondents have no direct adverse
convicted prisoners who are similarly situated. There exists an immediate and/or effect on petitioners, considering that based on records, there was no GCTA granted to
threatened injury and they have sustained or are immediately in danger of sustaining them.
direct injury as a result of the act complained of. In fact, while the case is pending, It is a general rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
petitioners are languishing in jail. If their assertion proved to be true, their illegal real party-in-interest, who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,

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or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. records is immaterial in determining whether or not petitioners' rights were breached by
the IRR because, to repeat, the possible violation was already fait accompli by the
Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected issuance of the IRR. The prison records were merely furnished to show that respondents
by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere have prospectively applied R.A. No. 10592 and that petitioners will be affected thereby.
incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or Propriety of legal remedy:
consequential interest." "To qualify a person to be a real party-in-interest in whose name
an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right Respondents argue that the petitions for certiorari and prohibition, as well as the
sought to be enforced." petitions-in-intervention, should be dismissed because such petitions are proper only
against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 4,
Rule 1 of the IRR is an administrative issuance of respondents made in the exercise of
"Legal standing" or locus standi calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The their rule-making or quasi-legislative functions.
concept has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is True, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is not an appropriate remedy to assail the
being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such validity of the subject IRR as it was issued in the exercise of respondents' rule-making or
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness quasi-legislative function. Nevertheless, the Court has consistently held that "petitions
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and
of difficult constitutional questions. to review, prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials." 30 In Araullo v.
Aquino III,31 former Associate Justice, now Chief Justice, Lucas P. Bersamin, explained the
A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show "not only that remedies of certiorari and prohibition, thus:
the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government may
thereby in some indefinite way." It must [be] shown that he has been, or is about to be, be determined under the Constitution?
denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of. 29 The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting
In this case, petitioners are directly affected by Section 4, Rule 1 of the IRR because they grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special
are prisoners currently serving their respective sentences at the NBP. They have a civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. A similar
personal stake in the outcome of this case as their stay in prison will potentially be remedy of certiorari exists under Rule 64, but the remedy is expressly applicable only to
shortened (if the assailed provision of the IRR is declared unlawful and void) or their dates the judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the
of release will be delayed (if R.A. No. 10592 is applied prospectively). It is erroneous to Commission on Audit.
assert that the questioned provision has no direct adverse effect on petitioners since
there were no GCTAs granted to them. There is none precisely because of the prospective
application of R.A. No. 10592. It is a proof of the act complained of rather than an The ordinary nature and function of the writ of certiorari in our present system are aptly
evidence that petitioners lack legal standing. Further, the submission of certified prison explained in Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:

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In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to the court itself, while
of certiorari was issued out of Chancery, or the King's Bench, commanding agents or prohibition is a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to
officers of the inferior courts to return the record of a cause pending before them, so as the court itself. The Court expounded on the nature and function of the writ of
to give the party more sure and speedy justice, for the writ would enable the superior prohibition in Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor:
court to determine from an inspection of the record whether the inferior court's A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the
judgment was rendered without authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed
allowed to stand, they would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to whom no against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial,
other remedy was available. If the inferior court acted without authority, the record was quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further
then revised and corrected in matters of law. The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity's or person's
which the inferior court was said to be exceeding its jurisdiction or was not proceeding jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or
according to essential requirements of law and would lie only to review judicial or quasi- any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition
judicial acts. lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative
functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within
The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same as it the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly
has been in the common law. In this jurisdiction, however, the exercise of the power to channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of
issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the instances or situations in jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in
the Rules of Court in which a superior court may issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds
court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court compellingly provides the prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the
requirements for that purpose, viz.: ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief
sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners' remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification,
xxxx an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any
case, petitioners' allegation that "respondents are performing or threatening to perform
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by the
includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order.
this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi- necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be
judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation,
personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set
or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does
a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly
Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.
jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a
corrective remedy used for the re-examination of some action of an inferior tribunal, and Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise

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constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and of Section 4 Rule 1 of the IRR; thus, partaking the nature of a petition for declaratory relief
executive officials. over which We only have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII of
the Constitution. In accordance with Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules, the special civil action
Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set right and undo any act of of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the Nevertheless, the judicial policy has been to entertain a direct resort to this Court in
inquiry provided the challenge was properly brought by interested or affected parties. The exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of
Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary implication with both the serious implications, and those of transcendental importance and of first impression. 39 As
duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed the petitions clearly and specifically set out special and important reasons therefor, We
legislative or executive action. This entrustment is consistent with the republican system may overlook the Rules. Here, petitioners Edago et al. are correct in asserting that R.A.
of checks and balances.32 No. 10592 and its IRR affect the entire correctional system of the Philippines. Not only the
In view of the foregoing, We shall proceed to discuss the substantive issues raised herein social, economic, and moral well-being of the convicts and detainees are involved but also
so as to finally resolve the question on the validity of Section 4, Rule 1 of the IRR, which is their victims and their own families, the jails, and the society at large. The nationwide
purely legal in nature. This is also because of the public importance of the issues implications of the petitions, the extensive scope of the subject matter, the upholding of
raised,33 and the interest of substantial justice, 34 not to mention the absence of any public policy, and the repercussions on the society are factors warranting direct recourse
dispute as to any underlying fact.35 to Us.

Hierarchy of courts Yet more than anything, there is an urgent necessity to dispense substantive justice on
the numerous affected inmates. It is a must to treat this consolidated case with a
Respondents contend that the petition for certiorari and prohibition, as well as the circumspect leniency, granting petitioners the fullest opportunity to establish the merits
petitions-in-intervention, should still be dismissed for failure to observe the rule on of their case rather than lose their liberty on the basis of technicalities. 40 It need not be
hierarchy of courts. According to them, this Court's jurisdiction over actions assailing the said that while this case has been pending, their right to liberty is on the line. An extended
validity of administrative issuances is primarily appellate in nature by virtue of Section period of detention or one that is beyond the period allowed by law violates the accused
5(2)(a), Article VIII of the Constitution.36 An action assailing the validity of an person's right to liberty.41 Hence, We shunt the rigidity of the rules of procedure so as not
administrative issuance is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation, which, to deprive such birthright.42 The Court zealously guards against the curtailment of a
under Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 129, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has exclusive person's basic constitutional and natural right to liberty. 43 The right to liberty, which
original jurisdiction. Further, a petition for declaratory relief filed before the RTC, stands second only to life in the hierarchy of constitutional rights, cannot be lightly taken
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules, is the proper remedy to question the validity away.44 At its core, substantive due process guarantees a right to liberty that cannot be
of the IRR.37 taken away or unduly constricted, except through valid causes provided by law. 45

Substantive Issues
Indeed, under Section 19(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, the question presented here is a matter
incapable of pecuniary estimation, which exclusively and originally pertained to the
Every new law has a prospective effect. Under Article 22 of the RPC, however, a penal law
proper RTC.38 Fundamentally, there is no doubt that this consolidated case captioned as
that is favorable or advantageous to the accused shall be given retroactive effect if he is
petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks to declare the unconstitutionality and illegality

8|Page
not a habitual criminal. These are the rules, the exception, and the exception to the Penal laws and laws which, while not penal in nature, have provisions defining offenses
exception on the effectivity of laws.46 and prescribing penalties for their violation. 62

In criminal law, the principle favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda (penal laws Properly speaking, a statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense
which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect) is well entrenched. 47 It has committed against the state which, under the Constitution, the Executive has the power
been sanctioned since the old Penal Code. 48 to pardon. In common use, however, this sense has been enlarged to include within the
x x x as far back as the year 1884, when the Penal Code took effect in these Islands until term "penal statutes" all statutes which command or prohibit certain acts, and establish
the 31st of December, 1931, the principle underlying our laws granting to the accused in penalties for their violation, and even those which, without expressly prohibiting certain
certain cases an exception to the general rule that laws shall not be retroactive when the acts, impose a penalty upon their commission. 63
law in question favors the accused, has evidently been carried over into the Revised Penal
Code at present in force in the Philippines through article 22 x x x. This is an exception to Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish
the general rule that all laws are prospective, not retrospective, variously contained in the penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and
following maxims: Lex prospicit, non respicit (the law looks forward, not backward); lex provide for their punishment.64
defuturo, judex de proeterito (the law provides for the future, the judge for the past); and The "penal laws" mentioned in Article 22 of the RPC refer to substantive laws, not
adopted in a modified form with a prudent limitation in our Civil Code (article 3). procedural rules.65 Moreover, the mere fact that a law contains penal provisions does not
Conscience and good law justify this exception, which is contained in the well-known make it penal in nature.66
aphorism: Favorabilia sunt amplianda, odiosa restringenda. As one distinguished author
has put it, the exception was inspired by sentiments of humanity, and accepted by In the case at bar, petitioners assert that Article 22 of the RPC applies because R.A. No.
science.49 10592 is a penal law. They claim that said law has become an integral part of the RPC as
According to Mr. Chief Justice Manuel Araullo, the principle is "not as a right" of the Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 thereof. Edago et al. further argue that if an amendment to
offender, "but founded on the very principles on which the right of the State to punish the RPC that makes the penalties more onerous or prejudicial to the accused cannot be
and the commination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception based applied retroactively for being an ex post facto law, a law that makes the penalties lighter
on political considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice." 50 should be considered penal laws in accordance with Article 22 of the RPC.

Further, case law has shown that the rule on retroactivity under Article 22 of the RPC We concur.
applies to said Code51 and its amendments,52 as well as to special laws,53 such as Act No.
2126,54 Presidential Decree No. 603,55 R.A. No. 7636,56 R.A. No. 8293,57 R.A. No. While R.A. No. 10592 does not define a crime/offense or provide/prescribe/establish a
8294,58 R.A. No. 9344,59 and R.A. No. 10586,60 to cite a few. penalty67 as it addresses the rehabilitation component 68 of our correctional system, its
provisions have the purpose and effect of diminishing the punishment attached to the
But what exactly is a penal law? crime. The further reduction on the length of the penalty of imprisonment is, in the
ultimate analysis, beneficial to the detention and convicted prisoners alike; hence, calls
A penal provision or statute has been consistently defined by jurisprudence as follows: for the application of Article 22 of the RPC.
A penal provision defines a crime or provides a punishment for one. 61
The prospective application of the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10592 actually works

9|Page
to the disadvantage of petitioners and those who are similarly situated. It precludes the conduct and diligence.72 Under Act No. 1533 and subsequently under Article 97 of the
decrease in the penalty attached to their respective crimes and lengthens their prison RPC, the time allowance may also apply to detention prisoners if they voluntarily offer in
stay; thus, making more onerous the punishment for the crimes they committed. writing to perform such labor as may be assigned to them. 73 Such prerequisite was
Depriving them of time off to which they are justly entitled as a practical matter results in removed by R.A. No. 10592.
extending their sentence and increasing their punishment. 69 Evidently, this transgresses
the clear mandate of Article 22 of the RPC. Subject to the review, and in accordance with the rules and regulations, as may be
prescribed by the Secretary of Public Instruction, the wardens or officers in charge of
In support of the prospective application of the grant of GCTA, TASTM, and STAL, Insular or provincial jails or prisons were mandated to make and keep such records and
respondents aver that a careful scrutiny of R.A. No. 10592 would indicate the need for take such further actions as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of Act No.
"new procedures and standards of behavior" to fully implement the law by the BUCOR (as 1533.74 When the RPC took effect on January 1, 1932, 75 the Director of Prisons was
to persons serving their sentences after conviction) and the BJMP (as to accused who are empowered to grant allowances for good conduct whenever lawfully justified. 76 With the
under preventive detention). It is alleged that the amendments introduced are substantial effectivity of R.A. No. 10592 on June 6, 2013, such authority is now vested on the Director
and of utmost importance that they may not be implemented without a thorough revision of the BUCOR, the Chief of the BJMP and/or the Warden of a provincial, district, municipal
of the BUCOR and the BJMP operating manuals on jail management. In particular, the or city jail.77
establishment of the MSEC is said to be an administrative mechanism to address the
policy and necessity that the BUCOR superintendents and the BJMP jail wardens must Under the IRR of R.A. No. 10592, the MSECs are established to act as the recommending
follow uniform guidelines in managing, screening and evaluating the behavior or conduct body for the grant of GCTA and TASTM. 78 They are tasked to manage, screen and evaluate
of prisoners prior to their recommendation to the heads of the two bureaus on who may the behavior and conduct of a detention or convicted prisoner and to monitor and certify
be granted time allowances. whether said prisoner has actually studied, taught or performed mentoring
activities.79 The creation of the MSEC, however, does not justify the prospective
Respondents fail to persuade Us. application of R.A. No. 10592. Nowhere in the amendatory law was its formation set as a
precondition before its beneficial provisions are applied. What R.A. No. 10592 only
Except for the benefits of TASTM and the STAL granted to a prisoner who chose to stay in provides is that the Secretaries of the DOJ and the DILG are authorized to promulgate
the place of his confinement despite the existence of a calamity or catastrophe rules and regulations on the classification system for good conduct and time allowances,
enumerated in Article 158 of the RPC, the provisions of R.A. No. 10592 are mere as may be necessary to implement its provisions. 80 Clearly, respondents went outside the
modifications of the RPC that have been implemented by the BUCOR prior to the issuance bounds of their legal mandate when they provided for rules beyond what was
of the challenged IRR. In view of this, the claim of "new procedures and standards of contemplated by the law to be enforced.
behavior" for the grant of time allowances is untenable. Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under
legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for
It appears that even prior to February 1, 1916 when Act No. 2557 was enacted, 70 prisoners the sole purpose of carrying the law's general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot
have already been entitled to deduct the period of preventive imprisonment from the be expanded by such IRRSs, because an administrative agency cannot amend an act of
service of their sentences. In addition, good conduct time allowance has been in existence Congress.81
since August 30, 1906 upon the passage of Act No. 1533. 71 Said law provided for the The contention of Edago et al. stands undisputed that, prior to the issuance of the
diminution of sentences imposed upon convicted prisoners in consideration of good assailed IRR and even before the enactment of R.A. No. 10592, a Classification Board had

10 | P a g e
been handling the functions of the MSEC and implementing the provisions of the RPC on dispatch the time allowances due to petitioners and all those who are similarly situated
time allowances. While there is a noble intent to systematize and/or institutionalize and, thereafter, to CAUSE their immediate release from imprisonment in case of full
existing set-up, the administrative and procedural restructuring should not in any way service of sentence, unless they are being confined thereat for any other lawful cause.
prejudice the substantive rights of current detention and convicted prisoners.
This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
Furthermore, despite various amendments to the law, the standard of behavior in
granting GCTA remains to be "good conduct." In essence, the definition of what SO ORDERED.
constitutes "good conduct" has been invariable through the years, thus:
Act No. 1533: "not been guilty of a violation of discipline or any of the rules of the prison,
and has labored with diligence and fidelity upon all such tasks as have been assigned to
him."82
G.R. No. 192330               November 14, 2012
BUCOR Operating Manual dated March 30, 2000: "displays good behavior and who has no ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, Petitioner,
record of breach of discipline or violation of prison rules and regulations." 83 vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
IRR of R.A. No. 10592: "the conspicuous and satisfactory behavior of a detention or
convicted prisoner consisting of active involvement in rehabilitation programs, productive DECISION
participation in authorized work activities or accomplishment of exemplary deeds coupled
with faithful obedience to all prison/jail rules and regulations" 84 ABAD, J.:

Among other data, an inmate's prison record contains information on his behavior or This case is about a municipal mayor charged with illegal diversion of food intended for
conduct while in prison.85 Likewise, the certificate/diploma issued upon successful those suffering from malnutrition to the beneficiaries of reconsideration projects affecting
completion of an educational program or course (i.e., elementary, secondary and college the homes of victims of calamities.
education as well as vocational training) forms part of the record. 86 These considered, the
Court cannot but share the same sentiment of Roxas et al. It is indeed perplexing why it is The Facts and the Case
complex for respondents to retroactively apply R.A. No. 10592 when all that the MSEC has
The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas accused Arnold James M. Ysidoro before
to do is to utilize the same standard of behavior for the grant of time allowances and refer
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 28228 of violation of illegal use of public propertry
to existing prison records.
(technical malversation) under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. 1
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED. Section 4, Rule 1 of the The facts show that the Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (MSWDO) of
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592 is DECLARED invalid
Leyte, Leyte, operated a Core Shelter Assistance Program (CSAP) that provided
insofar as it provides for the prospective application of the grant of good conduct time
construction materials to indigent calamity victims with which to rebuild their homes. The
allowance, time allowance for study, teaching and mentoring, and special time allowance
beneficiaries provided the labor needed for construction.
for loyalty. The Director General of the Bureau of Corrections and the Chief of the Bureau
of Jail Management and Penology are REQUIRED to RE-COMPUTE with reasonable

11 | P a g e
On June 15, 2001 when construction for calamity victims in Sitio Luy-a, Barangay Ysidoro pointed out that the COA Municipal Auditor conducted a comprehensive audit of
Tinugtogan, was 70% done, the beneficiaries stopped reporting for work for the reason their municipality in 2001 and found nothing irregular in its transactions.
that they had to find food for their families. This worried Lolita Garcia (Garcia), the CSAP
On February 8, 2010 the Sandiganbayan found Ysidoro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Officer-in-Charge, for such construction stoppage could result in the loss of construction
technical malversation. But, since his action caused no damage or embarrassment to
materials particularly the cement. Thus, she sought the help of Cristina Polinio (Polinio),
public service, it only fined him P1,698.00 or 50% of the sum misapplied. The
an officer of the MSWDO in charge of the municipality’s Supplemental Feeding Program
Sandiganbayan held that Ysidoro applied public property to a pubic purpose other than
(SFP) that rationed food to malnourished children. Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had
that for which it has been appropriated by law or ordinance. On May 12, 2010 the
sacks of rice and boxes of sardines in its storeroom. And since she had already distributed
Sandiganbayan denied Ysidoro’s motion for reconsideration. On June 8, 2010 Ysidoro
food to the mother volunteers, what remained could be given to the CSAP beneficiaries.
appealed the Sandiganbayan Decision to this Court.
Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal
The Questions Presented
Mayor, to seek his approval. After explaining the situation to him, Ysidoro approved the
release and signed the withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines In essence, Ysidoro questions the Sandiganbayan’s finding that he committed technical
worth P3,396.00 to CSAP.2 Mayor Ysidoro instructed Garcia and Polinio, however, to malversation. He particularly raises the following questions:
consult the accounting department regarding the matter. On being consulted, Eldelissa
Elises, the supervising clerk of the Municipal Accountant’s Office, signed the withdrawal 1. Whether or not he approved the diversion of the subject goods to a public purpose
slip based on her view that it was an emergency situation justifying the release of the different from their originally intended purpose;
goods. Subsequently, CSAP delivered those goods to its beneficiaries. Afterwards, Garcia 2. Whether or not the goods he approved for diversion were in the nature of savings that
reported the matter to the MSWDO and to the municipal auditor as per auditing rules. could be used to augment the other authorized expenditures of the municipality;
On August 27, 2001 Alfredo Doller, former member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte, 3. Whether or not his failure to present the municipal auditor can be taken against him;
filed the present complaint against Ysidoro. Nierna Doller, Alfredo's wife and former and
MSWDO head, testified that the subject SFP goods were intended for its target
beneficiaries, Leyte’s malnourished children. She also pointed out that the Supplemental 4. Whether or not good faith is a valid defense for technical malversation.
Feeding Implementation Guidelines for Local Government Units governed the distribution The Court’s Rulings
of SFP goods.3 Thus, Ysidoro committed technical malversation when he approved the
distribution of SFP goods to the CSAP beneficiaries. One. The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article 220 of the Revised
Penal Code4 has three elements: a) that the offender is an accountable public officer; b)
In his defense, Ysidoro claims that the diversion of the subject goods to a project also that he applies public funds or property under his administration to some public use; and
meant for the poor of the municipality was valid since they came from the savings of the c) that the public use for which such funds or property were applied is different from the
SFP and the Calamity Fund. Ysidoro also claims good faith, believing that the purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance. 5 Ysidoro claims
municipality’s poor CSAP beneficiaries were also in urgent need of food. Furthermore, that he could not be held liable for the offense under its third element because the four

12 | P a g e
sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines he gave the CSAP beneficiaries were not already finished its project, leaving funds or goods that it no longer needed. The fact that
appropriated by law or ordinance for a specific purpose. Polinio had already distributed the food items needed by the SFP beneficiaries for the
second quarter of 2001 does not mean that the remaining food items in its storeroom
But the evidence shows that on November 8, 2000 the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte
constituted unneeded savings. Since the requirements of hungry mouths are hard to
enacted Resolution 00-133 appropriating the annual general fund for 2001. 6 This
predict to the last sack of rice or can of sardines, the view that the subject goods were no
appropriation was based on the executive budget 7 which allocated P100,000.00 for the
longer needed for the remainder of the year was quite premature.
SFP and P113,957.64 for the Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social
Services8 which covers the CSAP housing projects. 9 The creation of the two items shows In any case, the Local Government Code provides that an ordinance has to be enacted to
the Sanggunian’s intention to appropriate separate funds for SFP and the CSAP in the validly apply funds, already appropriated for a determined public purpose, to some other
annual budget. purpose. Thus:

Since the municipality bought the subject goods using SFP funds, then those goods should SEC. 336. Use of Appropriated Funds and Savings. – Funds shall be available exclusively for
be used for SFP’s needs, observing the rules prescribed for identifying the qualified the specific purpose for which they have been appropriated. No ordinance shall be passed
beneficiaries of its feeding programs. The target clientele of the SFP according to its authorizing any transfer of appropriations from one item to another. However, the local
manual10 are: 1) the moderately and severely underweight pre-school children aged 36 chief executive or the presiding officer of the sanggunian concerned may, by ordinance,
months to 72 months; and 2) the families of six members whose total monthly income is be authorized to augment any item in the approved annual budget for their respective
P3,675.00 and below.11 This rule provides assurance that the SFP would cater only to the offices from savings in other items within the same expense class of their respective
malnourished among its people who are in urgent need of the government’s limited appropriations.
resources.
The power of the purse is vested in the local legislative body. By requiring an ordinance,
Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he approved the distribution of the goods to the law gives the Sanggunian the power to determine whether savings have accrued and
those providing free labor for the rebuilding of their own homes. This is technical to authorize the augmentation of other items on the budget with those savings.
malversation. If Ysidoro could not legally distribute the construction materials
Three. Ysidoro claims that, since the municipal auditor found nothing irregular in the
appropriated for the CSAP housing beneficiaries to the SFP malnourished clients neither
diversion of the subject goods, such finding should be respected. The SB ruled, however,
could he distribute the food intended for the latter to CSAP beneficiaries.
that since Ysidoro failed to present the municipal auditor at the trial, the presumption is
Two. Ysidoro claims that the subject goods already constituted savings of the SFP and that his testimony would have been adverse if produced. Ysidoro argues that this goes
that, therefore, the same could already be diverted to the CSAP beneficiaries. He relies on against the rule on the presumption of innocence and the presumption of regularity in the
Abdulla v. People12 which states that funds classified as savings are not considered performance of official functions.
appropriated by law or ordinance and can be used for other public purposes. The Court
Ysidoro may be right in that there is no basis for assuming that had the municipal auditor
cannot accept Ysidoro’s argument.
testified, his testimony would have been adverse to the mayor. The municipal auditor’s
The subject goods could not be regarded as savings. The SFP is a continuing program that view regarding the transaction is not conclusive to the case and will not necessarily
ran throughout the year. Consequently, no one could say in mid-June 2001 that SFP had negate the mayor’s liability if it happened to be favorable to him. The Court will not,

13 | P a g e
therefore, be drawn into speculations regarding what the municipal auditor would have REYES, J.:
said had he appeared and testified.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 and
Four. Ysidoro insists that he acted in good faith since, first, the idea of using the SFP goods Resolution3 dated April 20, 2012 and October 29, 2012, respectively, of the Court of
for the CSAP beneficiaries came, not from him, but from Garcia and Polinio; and, second, Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33353. The CA affirmed but modified only as to the penalty
he consulted the accounting department if the goods could be distributed to those imposed and damages awarded the Judgment rendered on April 15, 2010 by the Regional
beneficiaries. Having no criminal intent, he argues that he cannot be convicted of the Trial Court (RTC) of Bontoc, Mountain Province, Branch 36, in Criminal Case No. 2227,
crime.1âwphi1 convicting Jester Mabunot (petitioner) of violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, 4 Article
VI, Section 10(a).
But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act
of diverting public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose
to another public purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act
Antecedents
is not inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its
commission based on considerations of public policy, order, and convenience. 13 It is the The Information indicting the petitioner reads:
commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that
determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Hence, malice or criminal That on or about Sept. 14, 2007, in the morning thereof, inside one of the classrooms at
intent is completely irrelevant.14 the Paracelis National High School, Butigue, Paracelis, Mountain Province, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the [petitioner,] with intent to physically abuse and
Dura lex sed lex. Ysidoro’s act, no matter how noble or miniscule the amount diverted, with cruelty, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, box Shiva Baguiwan,
constitutes the crime of technical malversation. The law and this Court, however, a minor who is 14 years and 5 months old, on the left side below her ribs[,] which caused
recognize that his offense is not grave, warranting a mere fine. the latter to lose consciousness, to the damage and prejudice of the said minor-victim.
WHEREFORE, this Court AFFIRMS in its entirely the assailed Decision of the
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 28228 dated February 8, 2010.
Upon arraignment, the petitioner pleaded "not guilty."
SO ORDERED.

In the course of the trial, the prosecution offered the testimonies of: (a) private
complainant Shiva Baguiwan (Shiva); (b) Mercy Baguiwan, Shiva's mother; (c) Melanie
THIRD DIVISION Lipawen (Melanie)8 and James Aquino (James), students at Butigue National High School
G.R. No. 204659, September 19, 2016 (BNHS); (d) PO2 Naida Dumjalan, Women and Children's Desk Officer assigned to handle
Shiva's complaint; and (e) Dr. Jessie Guimbatan, government doctor who provided with
JESTER MABUNOT, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Shiva medical treatment.
RESOLUTION

14 | P a g e
 Wherefore, the Court finds that the [petitioner] is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged as principal by direct participation and is hereby sentenced to suffer
The evidence for the prosecution sought to establish that Shiva and the petitioner were imprisonment of four (4) years, 9 months, and 11 days of prision correccional as minimum
classmates at BNHS. On September 14, 2007, at around 11:00 a.m., Shiva and her group to seven (7) years and 4 months of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay [Shiva] the
were sewing inside the classroom when the petitioner, who was then under the influence amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages.
of alcohol, arrived. The petitioner twisted the arm of Michael Fontanilla, strangled James
and boxed William Thomas (William). The rest of their classmates ran away, but the SO ORDERED.
petitioner went after them. He boxed Shiva on her left flank leaving the latter with a
The RTC convicted the petitioner on the basis of the grounds cited below:
fractured rib. Shiva passed out and was thereafter taken to Potia District Hospital, where
she stayed for two days. Before finally leaving, the petitioner also boxed Dennis Kenept The evidence is positive and convincing that an act of cruelty and physical abuse has been
(Dennis). Back then, Shiva was 14 years old, while the petitioner was 19. The petitioner inflicted upon a female child of fourteen (14) years of age by the [petitioner,] who was an
dropped out from BNHS after the incident. adult of twenty (20) years of age. The credible evidence clearly demonstrates that the
[petitioner] boxed the left side of [Shiva's] body causing excruciating pain[,] which made
On its part, the defense presented the following as witnesses: (a) the petitioner; (b) the latter feel dizzy and lose consciousness. The medical findings confirm that a rib of
Consolacion Saludo (Consolacion), teacher at BNHS; (c) Dennis; and (d) Eva Joy Malindao [Shiva] was fractured[,] which caused pain even long after the incident. It is not hard to
(Eva), also a student at BNHS. imagine that a bare fist of a twenty[-]year[-]old male could fracture a rib of a frail
fourteen[-]year[-]old female. The testimonies of [Shiva], [Melanie], and [James] are found
to be clear, candid and convincing narrations of what happened, of how the [petitioner]
maltreated and injured [Shiva].
The testimonies of the defense witnesses tend to prove that on September 14, 2007, at
around 10:30 a.m., the class, to which both Shiva and the petitioner belonged, was doing
x x x [T]here is nothing on record which shows any evil or improper motive on [the part of
its Technology Livelihood Education project. William suddenly threw an object at the
the prosecution witnesses] to falsely testify or frame up the [petitioner,] hence, said
petitioner's back. The petitioner reacted by boxing William. When the petitioner stepped
testimonies are given full faith and credence x x x. The physical and medical evidence[,]
out of the room, Dennis followed him and a fist fight ensued between the two. Shiva
which show that [Shiva] suffered rib fracture that caused great pain[,] highly corroborate
came to pacify them, but she was shoved, causing her to fall to the ground. The petitioner
and confirm that [Shiva] was hurt by the [petitioner] with a hard fist blow, which made
posited that since he and Dennis were grappling at that time, there cannot be any
her unconscious and [led her to] be hospitalized.
certainty as to who actually injured Shiva.

Ruling of the RTC

x x x [T]he defense of the [petitioner] that he did not box [Shiva], but that the latter fell to
On April 15, 2010, the RTC rendered its Judgment, the fallo of which reads as follows: the ground when she was shoved as she tried to pacify the former and [Dennis,] who
were exchanging blows and grappling with each other, has to be taken with a grain of salt.

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x x x [I]t is highly improbable that a young lass[,] who is not even related to the
combatants [,] would dare to put herself at risk to serious and inevitable injury by trying
to pacify two older male persons[,] who were exchanging hard blows. That would not The CA explained its disquisition, viz:
conform to ordinary human experience; the natural thing for the young girl was to shout
[T]he [petitioner] wants Us to weigh the credibility of prosecution witnesses vis-a-vis the
or run[,] which [Shiva] did but the [petitioner] still got near and boxed her.
defense witnesses, a task entrusted to the trial court. x x x [T]he trial court is in a better
position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and
[It] is also highly indicated and very credibly established by the evidence that the
observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.
[petitioner] boxed and maltreated four other classmates. x x x All these indicate that the
[petitioner] was on a rampage and had no qualm[s] about inflicting injury upon a helpless
It is observed that although [Dennis], [Eva] and [Consolacion] testified for the defense, the
female classmate. At his age of twenty x x x, and in addition to the fact that he was under
court a quo correctly ruled that their testimonies are incredible and unworthy of belief. x
the influence of liquor, the [petitioner] easily terrorized and frightened his classmates. x x
x x [Consolacion] testified that she went out of her classroom at about 10:30 o'clock in the
x The denial of the [petitioner] can not be accorded greater evidentiary value than the
morning of September 14, 2007 because of a commotion, but she failed to recognize the
declarations of credible prosecution witnesses that the [petitioner] boxed [Shiva] x x x.
students involved in the brawl. x x x
Ruling of the CA
xxxx

In the appeal filed before the CA, the petitioner claimed that the injury inflicted on Shiva Q: You said that you rushed outside, what did you see when you were outside?
was not intentional or deliberate. The petitioner insisted that he could not have adopted
a deliberate design to injure Shiva since he was trading punches with Dennis. Further, A: When I was at the porch, I have (sic) seen two boys boxing but I cannot recognize
Article 26515 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and not R.A. No. 7610, should be the them because I haven't taken my eyeglasses and it was twenty (20) meters away.
applicable provision. A single and unintended act of shoving Shiva while the petitioner
was engaged in a fist fight with Dennis can hardly be considered as within the definition of xxxx
child abuse under R.A. No. 7610.
[The petitioner's] testimony revealed that Consolacion was at the second floor of the
On April 20, 2012, the CA affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty imposed and building, hence, supporting the court a quo's conclusion that Consolacion did not see the
the damages awarded. The CA instead sentenced the petitioner to suffer imprisonment of whole incident. x x x
four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum,
to six (6) years, eight months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay xxxx
Shiva actual damages in the amount of P18,428.00.
The court a quo likewise correctly dismissed [Dennis'] testimony as doubtful since on
cross-examination, he stated that he does not know Michael Fontanilla and [James] when
the [petitioner] himself revealed that Fontanilla and [James] were their classmates.

16 | P a g e
x x x [Eva], who was then a third year high school student at [BNHS], corroborated the
[petitioner's] testimony that [Shiva] pacified [the petitioner] and [Dennis]. We note, Q: You said that [the petitioner] boxed Shiva, did you personally see [the petitioner]
however, that she mentioned that [Shiva] was shoved to the ground [w]hen their teacher, boxed [sic] Shiva?
[Consolacion], shouted which caused [the petitioner] and [Dennis] to run away. A perusal
of [Consolacion's] testimony, however, reveals that she directed the students around to A: Yes, ma'am.
pacify [the petitioner] and [Dennis] then she saw a lady going near the two boys fighting.
Afterwhich, she did not witness any incident anymore since she had to pacify her Q: What part of Shiva's body was hit?
students[,] who were then coming out of the classroom. There was no mention that she
shouted at the [petitioner] or [Dennis] after [Shiva] fell to the ground. x x x A: In (sic) the left rib.

Q: How far are (sic) you from Shiva and [the petitioner] when you said you saw [the
x x x [P]rosecution witness [Melanie] bolstered [Shiva's] claim that the [petitioner] boxed petitioner] boxed [sic] Shiva?
her. x x x.
A: x x x (4 to 5 meters).
xxxx
xxxx
Q: How far are you (sic) from [the petitioner] when you said you saw him boxed [sic]
Under Subsection (b), Section 3 of [R.A. No. 7610], child abuse refers to the maltreatment
Shiva?
of a child, whether habitual or not, which includes any of the following:
 
A: Just near him.
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
Q: Will you point from the witness stand?
maltreatment;

A: x x x More or less 2 meters.

xxxx
xxxx
x x x [W]hen the incident happened, [Shiva] was a child entitled to the protection
x x x [James] likewise averred that he personally saw the [petitioner] boxed [sic]
extended by R.A. No. 7610 x x x. As defined [by] law, child abuse includes physical abuse
[Shiva]. He said:
of the child, whether the same is habitual or not. The act of [the petitioner] of boxing
xxxx [Shiva's] left flank falls squarely within this definition. x x x.

17 | P a g e
 within the contemplation of child abuse under R.A. No. 7610.
x x x As a statute that provides for a mechanism for strong deterrence against the
commission of child abuse and exploitation, [R.A. No. 7610] has stiffer penalties for their The petitioner also posits that Section 10 of R.A. No. 7610 penalizes acts of child abuse
commission. which are not covered by the RPC. Assuming arguendo that the petitioner caused Shiva's
injury, Article 265 of the RPC should instead be applied.
xxxx
In its Comment,23 the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the petitioner raises
In the absence of any modifying circumstances, We find that the proper penalty should be factual issues. Besides, even if the merits of the petition are to be considered, the
four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, prosecution witnesses, namely, Melanie and James, positively identified the petitioner as
to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum[,] not the the one, who had boxed Shiva. The RTC and CA properly accorded probative weight to the
maximum term imposed by the trial court which is much higher, i.e., "seven (7) years and testimonies of the eyewitnesses.
[four (4)] months of prision mayor." x x x.
Ruling of the Court
x x x [Shiva] was able to prove actual damages in the amount of Php 18,428.00. The
court a quo incorrectly awarded temperate damages in the amount of Php 25,000.00 in The Court affirms the conviction and the sentence, but imposes interest on the amount of
lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount since such is proper only in cases when the actual damages awarded by the CA.
victim died and no evidence of burial and funeral expenses was presented in the trial
court.18 (Citations omitted and underlining ours) On the propriety of the petitioner's conviction
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in the herein
In Villareal v. Aliga,24 the Court declared:
assailed Resolution19 dated October 29, 2012.
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the province
Issues
of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem — beyond the ambit of
appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine and
Unperturbed, the petitioner presents for the Court's resolution the issues of whether or assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the probative value thereof. It does not
not the CA committed reversible errors in (1) ruling that the injury inflicted on Shiva was include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence. x x x It is not for this
intentional and deliberate, and (2) applying the much higher penalty provided for under Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or
Section 10 of R.A. No. 7610, instead of Article 265 of the RPC for slight physical injuries. 20 substitute the findings of fact of the court a quo.

In the case at bar, the RTC and the CA uniformly accorded probative value to the
The petitioner claims that he and Dennis were trading punches when they saw Shiva
testimonies of two eyewitnesses, namely, Melanie and James, who positively identified
slump to the ground. In Dennis' testimony, he was uncertain as to who actually shoved
the petitioner as the one who had boxed Shiva.
Shiva. Thus, the injury sustained by Shiva merely resulted from an accident and is not

18 | P a g e
Besides, even if the Court were to exercise leniency, a recalibration of the parties' for argument's sake the petitioner's claim that he had no design to harm Shiva, when he
evidence would yield the same result. For one, the defense did not impute and prove any swang his arms, he was not performing a lawful act. He clearly intended to injure another
ill motives on the part of the eyewitnesses in testifying against the petitioner. Note that person. However, it was not Dennis but Shiva, who ended up with a fractured rib.
the two witnesses were classmates of both the petitioner and Shiva, and they saw at close Nonetheless, the petitioner cannot escape liability for his error. Indeed, criminal liability
range what had transpired. Further, the defense witnesses failed to amply refute the shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
statements of Melanie and James. Consolacion was 20 meters away from where the fist done be different from that which he intended.
fight between the petitioner and Dennis took place. She also admitted that she was not
wearing her eyeglasses then. On the other hand, Eva's statements on what she saw were
unclear. Anent Dennis' narrations, he admitted his uncertainty as to who had shoved
On the application of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610
Shiva to the ground. However, Melanie and James were categorical in identifying the
petitioner as the one who boxed Shiva. Dennis' declaration of uncertainty pales in
The petitioner avers that Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610 only penalizes acts of
comparison to Melanie and James' positive testimonies. Dennis was then trading punches
child abuse which are not covered by the RPC. He insists that the acts complained of
with the petitioner, and understandably, his recollection of the details of the event was
should fall under Article 265 of the RPC, which imposes a lighter penalty.
not as comprehensive.

The claim is unpersuasive.

The petitioner also posits that since he and Dennis were exchanging punches then, he Article 265 of the RPC punishes physical injuries in general. On the other hand, R.A. No.
could not have made a deliberate design to injure Shiva. Without intent to harm Shiva, 7610 is intended to "provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse,
the petitioner insists that he deserves an acquittal. neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination and other conditions, prejudicial to their
development."28 Child abuse refers to the infliction of physical or psychological injury,
The foregoing argument is untenable. cruelty to, or neglect, sexual abuse or exploitation of a child. 29 Physical injury includes but
is not limited to lacerations, fractured bones, turns, internal injuries, severe injury or
"When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even serious bodily harm suffered by a child.
if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly
established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed." It is clear that Shiva was 14 years old when she received the blow, which fractured her rib.
Being a child, she is under the protective mantle of R.A. No. 7610, which punishes
The petitioner was convicted of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, a maltreatment of a child, whether the sam habitual or not. 31 Moreover, the Implementing
special law. However, physical abuse of a child is inherently wrong, rendering material the Rules and Regulation R.A. No. 7610 even explicitly refer to fractured bones as falling
existence of a criminal intent on the part of the offender. within coverage of physical injuries, which may be inflicted on a child, for which an
accused shall be held liable. Further, under R.A. No. 7610, s penalties are prescribed to
In the petitioner's case, criminal intent is not wanting. Even if the Court were to consider deter and prevent violations of its provisions.

19 | P a g e
 the rules in the [RPC] for graduating penalties by degrees or determining the proper
On the penalties imposed by the courts a quo period should be applied. Thus, where the special law adopted penalties from the [RPC],
the [IS Law] will apply just as it would in felonies. In People v. Simon, the Court applied the
The RTC imposed upon the petitioner an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, nine first clause of Section 1 of the [IS Law] to cases of illegal drugs. In Cadua v. Court of
(9) months, and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as minimum, to seven (7) years Appeals, the Court applied the same principle to cases involving illegal possession of
and four (4) months of prision mayor as maximum. firearms. In those instances, the offenses were also penalized under special laws. Finally,
in Dulla v. Court of Appeals, a case involving sexual abuse of a child as penalized under
Subsequently, the CA modified the sentence to four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, the Court likewise applied the same first clause of
(11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one the [IS Law]. x x x.35 (Citations omitted)
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
In the petitioner's case, the maximum imposable penalty is prision mayor in its minimum
period. The minimum period is fuither subdivided into three, to wit: (a) six (6) years and
one (1) day to six (6) years and eight (8) months, as minimum; (b) six (6) years, eight (8)
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (IS Law) 32 provides: months and one (1) day to seven (7) years and four (4) months, as medium; and (c) seven
(7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to eight (8) years, as maximum. 36 As there were
Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised
no established attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the CA properly
Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
imposed the penalty of six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day as the maximum of
sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
the indeterminate sentence.
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the
minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
As to the minimum of the indeterminate sentence, Section the IS Law provides that it
the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall
shall be within the range of the per next lower to that prescribed for the offense. The
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall
penalty next to prision mayor in its minimum period is prision correccional maximum
not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
period. The CA imposed four (4) years, nine (9) months eleven (11) days of prision
minimum term prescribed by the same.
correccional, which falls within the maximum range thereof. The CA imposed the
There are, however, instances when the penalties provided for in a special law adopt the minimum indeterminate penalty w the allowable range, and the Court now finds no
nomenclature of the penalties under the RPC. In such cases, the ascertainment of the compelling reaso modify the same.
indeterminate sentence will be based on the rules applied for those crimes punishable
under the RPC. On Damages

In Sanchez v. People, et al.,34 the Court is emphatic that: The Court agrees with the CA's award of actual damages lieu of the temperate damages
imposed by the RTC. To conform, however, to recent jurisprudence, the Court deems it
[T]he penalty for Other Acts of Child Abuse is prision mayor in its minimum period. This proper to impos i an interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the actual damages
penalty is derived from, and defined in, the [RPC]. Although R.A. No. 7610 is a special law,

20 | P a g e
awarded to Shiva to be computed from the date of the finality of this Resolution until fully That, sometime in May or June 1990, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the
paid. jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating,
and mutually helping with one another, knowing fully well that they did not have
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals' Decision and Resolution dated sufficient funds deposited with the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Tagbilaran
April 20, 2012 and October 29, 2312, respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No. 33353, subject to Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, draw and issue UCPB
the MODIFICATION that the actual damages in the amount of P18,428.00 to be paid by Check No. 284743 postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of NINE THOUSAND SEVENTY-
petitioner, Jester Mabunot, to the private complainant, Shiva Baguiwan shall be subject to FIVE PESOS AND FIFTY-FIVE CENTAVOS (₱9,075.55), payable to Alfredo Oculam, and
an interest of six percent (6%) per annum reckoned from the finality of this Resolution thereafter, without informing the latter that they did not have sufficient funds deposited
until full payment. with the bank to cover up the amount of the check, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously pass on, indorse, give and deliver the said check to Alfredo
SO ORDERED. Oculam by way of rediscounting of the aforementioned checks; however, upon
presentation of the check to the drawee bank for encashment, the same was dishonored
for the reason that the account of the accused with the United Coconut Planters Bank,
G.R. No. 141066             February 17, 2005 Tagbilaran Branch, had already been closed, to the damage and prejudice of the said
Alfredo Oculam in the aforestated amount.
EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner,
vs. Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.2
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. The accusatory portions of the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7069 and 7070 are
DECISION similarly worded, except for the allegations concerning the number, date and amount of
each check, that is:
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
(a) Criminal Case No. 7069 - UCPB Check No. 284744 dated July 22, 1990 in the amount of
Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the Decision, 1 dated May 17, 1999, of the ₱12,730.00;3
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443, affirming the Decision dated August 24, 1996,
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and (b) Criminal Case No. 7070 – UCPB Check No. 106136 dated July 22, 1990 in the amount of
7070 convicting her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks ₱8,496.55.4
Law. The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. When arraigned on June 26, 1991, the two
The factual background of the case is as follows: accused pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. 5

On March 27, 1991, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed with the The prosecution presented as its lone witness complainant Alfredo Oculam. He testified
RTC, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 7068 - 7070. The Information in Criminal Case No. that: in 1989, spouses Adronico6 and Evangeline Ladonga became his regular customers in
7068 alleges as follows: his pawnshop business in Tagbilaran City, Bohol; 7 sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga
spouses obtained a ₱9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters

21 | P a g e
Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by 4. That both accused are further ordered to jointly and solidarily pay and reimburse the
Adronico;8 sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, complainant, Mr. Alfredo Oculam, the sum of ₱15,000.00 representing actual expenses
the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of ₱12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB incurred in prosecuting the instant cases; ₱10,000.00 as attorney’s fee; and the amount of
Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico; 9 between May ₱30,302.10 which is the total value of the three (3) subject checks which bounced; but
and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the amount of ₱8,496.55, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by
With Costs against the accused.
Adronico;10 the three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason "CLOSED
ACCOUNT";11 when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated SO ORDERED.15
demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them. 12
Adronico applied for probation which was granted. 16 On the other hand, petitioner
While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no brought the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in finding her
sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks criminally liable for conspiring with her husband as the principle of conspiracy is
were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law; moreover, she is not a signatory of the
encash the checks when they mature; 13 and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof. 17
checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof. 14
On May 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner. 18 It held that
On August 24, 1996, the RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty the provisions of the penal code were made applicable to special penal laws in the
beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22, the dispositive portion of which reads: decisions of this Court in People vs. Parel, 19 U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 and U.S. vs. Bruhez.21 It noted
that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code itself provides that its provisions shall be
Premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment finding accused Adronico
supplementary to special laws unless the latter provide the contrary. The Court of Appeals
Ladonga, alias Ronie, and Evangeline Ladonga guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the
stressed that since B.P. Blg. 22 does not prohibit the applicability in a suppletory character
aforesaid three (3) criminal cases, for which they stand charged before this Court, and
of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the principle of conspiracy may be
accordingly, sentences them to imprisonment and fine, as follows:
applied to cases involving violations of B.P. Blg. 22. Lastly, it ruled that the fact that
1. In Criminal Case No. 7068, for (sic) an imprisonment of one (1) year for each of them, petitioner did not make and issue or sign the checks did not exculpate her from criminal
and a fine in the amount of ₱9,075.55, equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. liability as it is not indispensable that a co-conspirator takes a direct part in every act and
284743; knows the part which everyone performed. The Court of Appeals underscored that in
conspiracy the act of one conspirator could be held to be the act of the other.
2. In Criminal Case No. 7069, for (sic) an imprisonment for each of them to one (1) year
and a fine of ₱12, 730.00, equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 284744; and, Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the Court of Appeals denied the
same in a Resolution dated November 16, 1999. 22
3. In Criminal Case No. 7070, with (sic) an imprisonment of one year for each of them and
a fine of ₱8,496.55 equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 106136; Hence, the present petition.

Petitioner presents to the Court the following issues for resolution:

22 | P a g e
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WHO WAS NOT THE DRAWER OR ISSUER OF THE Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows:
THREE CHECKS THAT BOUNCED BUT HER CO-ACCUSED HUSBAND UNDER THE LATTER’S
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the
ACCOUNT COULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 AS
future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this
CONSPIRATOR.
Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially
2. ANCILLARY TO THE MAIN ISSUE ARE THE FOLLOWING ISSUES: provide the contrary.

A. WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY IS APPLICABLE IN VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the future
BILANG 22 BY INVOKING THE LAST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE REVISED PENAL are made punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC,
CODE WHICH STATES: while the second makes the RPC supplementary to such laws. While it seems that the two
clauses are contradictory, a sensible interpretation will show that they can perfectly be
Art. 10. Offenses not subject of the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the
reconciled.
future may be punished under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code.
This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws are
the contrary. controlling with regard to offenses therein specifically punished. Said clause only restates
the elemental rule of statutory construction that special legal provisions prevail over
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASES CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN
general ones.24 Lex specialis derogant generali. In fact, the clause can be considered as a
AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER AS CONSPIRATOR APPLYING THE
superfluity, and could have been eliminated altogether. The second clause contains the
SUPPLETORY CHARACTER OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE TO SPECIAL LAWS LIKE B.P. BLG.
soul of the article. The main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in the provision
22 IS APPLICABLE.23
that the "code shall be supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter should
Petitioner staunchly insists that she cannot be held criminally liable for violation of B.P. specifically provide the contrary.
Blg. 22 because she had no participation in the drawing and issuance of the three checks
The appellate court’s reliance on the cases of People vs. Parel,25 U.S. vs. Ponte,26 and U.S.
subject of the three criminal cases, a fact proven by the checks themselves. She contends
vs. Bruhez27 rests on a firm basis. These cases involved the suppletory application of
that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in applying the principle of conspiracy, as defined
principles under the then Penal Code to special laws. People vs. Parel is concerned with
under the RPC, to violations of B.P. Blg. 22. She posits that the application of the principle
the application of Article 2228 of the Code to violations of Act No. 3030, the Election Law,
of conspiracy would enlarge the scope of the statute and include situations not provided
with reference to the retroactive effect of penal laws if they favor the accused. U.S. vs.
for or intended by the lawmakers, such as penalizing a person, like petitioner, who had no
Ponte involved the application of Article 1729 of the same Penal Code, with reference to
participation in the drawing or issuance of checks.
the participation of principals in the commission of the crime of misappropriation of
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner and echoes the declaration of public funds as defined and penalized by Act No. 1740. U.S. vs. Bruhez covered Article
the Court of Appeals that some provisions of the Revised Penal Code, especially with the 4530 of the same Code, with reference to the confiscation of the instruments used in
addition of the second sentence in Article 10, are applicable to special laws. It submits violation of Act No. 1461, the Opium Law.
that B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide any prohibition regarding the applicability in a
suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code to it.

23 | P a g e
B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive
the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions evidence.37 Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene
of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. 38 Even knowledge, acquiescence in or
Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs. People,31 the Court applied suppletorily the provisions agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy,
on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 32 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22. absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose. 39
The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the
application of the provision on principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once As the Court eloquently pronounced in a case of recent vintage, People vs. Mandao:40
conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the
To be sure, conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or accepted at every
act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of
turn. It is a legal concept that imputes culpability under specific circumstances; as such, it
them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. 33
must be established as clearly as any element of the crime. Evidence to prove it must be
All these notwithstanding, the conviction of the petitioner must be set aside. positive and convincing, considering that it is a convenient and simplistic device by which
the accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold.
Article 8 of the RPC provides that "a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." To be held Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of conspiracy, and a judgment of
guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have conviction must always be founded on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence. The
performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. 34 The overt act or Court ruled thus in People v. Legaspi, from which we quote:
acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the
At most, the prosecution, realizing the weakness of its evidence against accused-appellant
crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to
Franco, merely relied and pegged the latter’s criminal liability on its sweeping theory of
execute or implement the criminal plan. 35
conspiracy, which to us, was not attendant in the commission of the crime.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt
The rule is firmly entrenched that a judgment of conviction must be predicated on the
act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. As testified to by the lone prosecution
strength of the evidence for the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for
witness, complainant Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was merely present when her husband,
the defense. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest
Adronico, signed the check subject of Criminal Case No. 7068. 36 With respect to Criminal
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that
Case Nos. 7069-7070, Oculam also did not describe the details of petitioner’s
on the defense could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did
participation. He did not specify the nature of petitioner’s involvement in the commission
he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral
of the crime, either by a direct act of participation, a direct inducement of her co-
certainty.
conspirator, or cooperating in the commission of the offense by another act without
which it would not have been accomplished. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act Verily, it is the role of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond
that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first check was reasonable doubt in order to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the
criminal design.

24 | P a g e
In sum, conviction must rest on hard evidence showing that the accused is guilty beyond For resolution is petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration 1 assailing the Decision dated
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. In criminal cases, moral certainty -- not mere September 23, 2005, the dispositive portion of which states:
possibility -- determines the guilt or the innocence of the accused. Even when the
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The resolutions dated July 12, 2004 and
evidence for the defense is weak, the accused must be acquitted when the prosecution
September 6, 2004 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, are AFFIRMED.
has not proven guilt with the requisite quantum of proof required in all criminal cases.
(Citations omitted)41 SO ORDERED.2
All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the petitioner with moral certainty. Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in
Its evidence falls short of the quantum of proof required for conviction. Accordingly, the recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of
constitutional presumption of the petitioner’s innocence must be upheld and she must be Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the
acquitted.1a\^/phi1.net Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by
the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision, dated May 17, 1999,
may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443 affirming the Decision, dated August 24,
presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may
1996, of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 3), Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and
accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan
7070 convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is hereby REVERSED and SET
and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of
ASIDE. Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges against her under B.P.
Manila, all on the ground of prescription.
Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No
pronouncement as to costs. In its Comment,3 the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in
Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter exempt
SO ORDERED.
from criminal prosecution; that new informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should
it find probable cause in the conduct of its preliminary investigation; that the filing of the
complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and
G.R. Nos. 165510-33             July 28, 2006 the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the prescriptive
BENJAMIN ("KOKOY") T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner, period; that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also
vs. interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO, in his official capacity as the Ombudsman, and For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment 4 that, in accordance with the 1987
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, respondents. Constitution and RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Omdudsman need not
RESOLUTION wait for a new complaint with a new docket number for it to conduct a preliminary
investigation on the alleged offenses of the petitioner; that considering that both RA No.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For Violations
Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription

25 | P a g e
Shall Begin To Run, are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run when the Here, the informations were filed by an unauthorized party. The defect cannot be cured
offender is absent from the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which answers the same even by conducting another preliminary investigation. An invalid information is no
in the negative, should be applied. information at all and cannot be the basis for criminal proceedings. 8

The issues for resolution are: (1) whether the preliminary investigation conducted by the In effect, we upheld in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan9 petitioner’s Motion to Quash and
Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 was a nullity; and (2) whether the directed the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 because the informations were
offenses for which petitioner are being charged have already prescribed. filed by an unauthorized party, hence void.

Anent the first issue, we reiterate our ruling in the assailed Decision that the preliminary In such a case, Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court is pertinent and applicable. Thus:
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 is a valid
SEC. 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another prosecution;
proceeding despite the previous dismissal thereof by the Sandiganbayan in its Minute
exception. – An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution
Resolution5 dated February 10, 2004 which reads:
for the same offense unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in section 3(g)
Crim. Cases Nos. 13406-13429–PEO. vs. BENJAMIN T. ROMUALDEZ and (i)10 of this Rule.

Considering that the Decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in G.R. Nos. 143618-41, An order sustaining a motion to quash on grounds other than extinction of criminal
entitled "Benjamin ‘Kokoy’ Romualdez vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division, et liability or double jeopardy does not preclude the filing of another information for a crime
al.)" promulgated on July 30, 2002 annulled and set aside the orders issued by this Court constituting the same facts. Indeed, we held in Cudia v. Court of Appeals11  that:
on June 8, 2000 which, among others, denied the accused’s motion to quash the
In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former
informations in these cases; that in particular the above-mentioned Decision ruled that
prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because it was so
the herein informations may be quashed because the officer who filed the same had no
defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained,
authority to do so; and that the said Decision has become final and executory on
its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no
November 29, 2002, these cases are considered DISMISSED. Let these cases be sent to the
authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar
archives.
in petitioner’s subsequent prosecution. x x x. 12
The aforesaid dismissal was effected pursuant to our ruling in Romualdez v.
Be that as it may, the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in the
Sandiganbayan6 where petitioner assailed the Sandiganbayan’s Order dated June 8, 2000
instant cases was not a violation of petitioner’s right to be informed of the charges against
in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 which denied his Motion to Quash, terminated the
him. It is of no moment that the cases investigated by the Ombudsman bore the same
preliminary investigation conducted by Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero and set his
docket numbers as those cases which have already been dismissed by the Sandiganbayan,
arraignment for violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 on June 26, 2000. 7 In annulling and
to wit: Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429. As we have previously stated:
setting aside the aforesaid Order of the Sandiganbayan, we held that:
The assignment of a docket number is an internal matter designed for efficient record
In the case at bar, the flaw in the information is not a mere remediable defect of form, as
keeping. It is usually written in the Docket Record in sequential order corresponding to
in Pecho v. Sandiganbayan where the wording of the certification in the information was
the date and time of filing a case.
found inadequate, or in People v. Marquez, where the required certification was absent.

26 | P a g e
This Court agrees that the use of the docket numbers of the dismissed cases was merely Thus, the question is whether or not the offenses charged in the subject criminal cases
for reference. In fact, after the new informations were filed, new docket numbers were have prescribed? We held in the case of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan20 that:
assigned, i.e., Criminal Cases Nos. 28031-28049 x x x. 13
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be
Besides, regardless of the docket numbers, the Ombudsman conducted the above- considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period
referred preliminary investigation pursuant to our Decision in Romualdez v. of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted. 21
Sandiganbayan14 when we categorically declared therein that:
Petitioner is being charged with violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 for failure to file his
The Sandiganbayan also committed grave abuse of discretion when it abruptly terminated Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the period 1967-1985 during his tenure as
the reinvestigation being conducted by Prosecutor Lucero. It should be recalled that our Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and for the period 1963-1966 during his
directive in G.R. No. 105248 for the holding of a preliminary investigation was based on tenure as Technical Assistant in the Department of Foreign Affairs.
our ruling that the right to a preliminary investigation is a substantive, rather than a
Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offenses punishable therein shall prescribe in
procedural right. Petitioner’s right was violated when the preliminary investigation of the
15 years. Significantly, this Court already declared in the case of People v.
charges against him were conducted by an officer without jurisdiction over the said cases.
Pacificador22 that:
It bears stressing that our directive should be strictly complied with in order to achieve its
objective of affording petitioner his right to due process. 15 It appears however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P.
Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for offenses
Anent the issue on the prescription of the offenses charged, we should first resolve the
punishable under the said statute was only ten (10) years. The longer prescriptive period
question of whether this Court may validly take cognizance of and resolve the
of fifteen (15) years, as provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg.
aforementioned issue considering that as we have said in the assailed Decision, "this case
195, does not apply in this case for the reason that the amendment, not being favorable
has never progressed beyond the filing of the informations against the petitioner" 16 and
to the accused (herein private respondent), cannot be given retroactive effect. Hence, the
that "it is only prudent that evidence be gathered through trial on the merits to
crime prescribed on January 6, 1986 or ten (10) years from January 6, 1976. 23
determine whether the offense charged has already prescribed."17 We reconsider our
stance and shall rule in the affirmative. Thus, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner from 1962 up to March 15, 1982,
the same shall prescribe in 10 years. On the other hand, for offenses allegedly committed
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the accused may, at any time before he
by the petitioner during the period from March 16, 1982 until 1985, the same shall
enters his plea, move to quash the complaint and information 18 on the ground that the
prescribe in 15 years.
criminal action or liability has been extinguished, 19 which ground includes the defense of
prescription considering that Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code enumerates As to when these two periods begin to run, reference is made to Act No. 3326 which
prescription as one of those grounds which totally extinguishes criminal liability. Indeed, governs the computation of prescription of offenses defined by and penalized under
even if there is yet to be a trial on the merits of a criminal case, the accused can very well special laws. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides:
invoke the defense of prescription.

27 | P a g e
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans. 27
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
However, both respondents in the instant case aver that, applying Article 91 of the
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty Revised Penal Code suppletorily, the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not 1986 until April 27, 2000 prevented the prescriptive period for the alleged offenses from
constituting jeopardy. running.

In the case of People v. Duque,24 we construed the aforequoted provision, specifically the We disagree.
rule on the running of the prescriptive period as follows:
Section 2 of Act. No. 3326 is conspicuously silent as to whether the absence of the
In our view, the phrase "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and offender from the Philippines bars the running of the prescriptive period. The silence of
punishment" may be either disregarded as surplusage or should be deemed preceded by the law can only be interpreted to mean that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not intend
the word "until." Thus, Section 2 may be read as: such an interruption of the prescription unlike the explicit mandate of Article 91. Thus, as
previously held:
"Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law; and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof;" Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an omission,
neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a
or as:
legislative lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of
"Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, the interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and until institution provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of the enactment,
of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment." (Emphasis supplied) 25 whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however after later wisdom
may recommend the inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they
Thus, this Court rules that the prescriptive period of the offenses herein began to run think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its
from the discovery thereof or on May 8, 1987, which is the date of the complaint filed by attention has been called to the omission. 28
the former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez against the petitioner with the PCGG.
The only matter left to be resolved is whether the filing of the complaint with the PCGG in
In the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. 1987 as well as the filing of the informations with the Sandiganbayan to initiate Criminal
Desierto26  this Court already took note that: Case Nos. 13406-13429 in 1989 interrupted the running of the prescriptive period such
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA that when the Ombudsman directed petitioner to file his counter-affidavit on March 3,
Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as 2004, the offenses have already prescribed.
the aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned Under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period shall be interrupted "when
transactions were made. Moreover, no person would have dared to question the legality proceedings are instituted against the guilty person."  However, there is no such
of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the

28 | P a g e
proceeding instituted against the petitioner to warrant the tolling of the prescriptive In the case at bar, however, the complaint was filed with the wrong body, the PCGG.
periods of the offenses charged against him. Thus, the same could not have interrupted the running of the prescriptive periods.

In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,29  petitioner averred that PCGG acted without jurisdiction However, in his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Carpio contends that the offenses charged
and/or grave abuse of discretion in conducting a preliminary investigation of cases not against the petitioner could not have prescribed because the latter was absent from the
falling within its competence.30 This Court, in its resolve to "deal with the merits of the Philippines from 1986 to April 27, 2000 and thus the prescriptive period did not run from
case to remove the possibility of any misunderstanding as to the course which it wishes the time of discovery on May 8, 1987, citing Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code which
petitioner’s cases in the Sandiganbayan to take" 31declared invalid – provides that "[t]he term of prescription should not run when the offender is absent from
the Philippine Archipelago."
the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG over the 24 offenses ascribed to
Romualdez (of failure to file annual statements of assets and liabilities), for lack of Mr. Justice Carpio argues that –
jurisdiction of said offenses.32
Article 10 of the same Code makes Article 91 "x x x supplementary to [special laws], unless
In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,33 petitioner assailed the validity of the informations filed the latter should x x x provide the contrary." Nothing in RA 3019 prohibits the
with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 considering that the same supplementary application of Article 91 to that law. Hence, applying Article 91, the
were subscribed and filed by the PCGG. In granting petitioner’s plea, this Court held, thus: prescriptive period in Section 11 of RA 3019, before and after its amendment, should run
only after petitioner returned to this jurisdiction on 27 April 2000.
Here, the informations were filed by an unauthorized party. The defect cannot be cured
by conducting another preliminary investigation. An invalid information is no information There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article 10 of the RPC applies
at all and cannot be the basis for criminal proceedings. 34 suppletorily, as the Court has held in a long line of decisions since 1934, starting
with People v. Moreno. Thus, the Court has applied suppletorily various provisions of the
Indeed, the nullity of the proceedings initiated by then Solicitor General Chavez in 1987
RPC to resolve cases where the special laws are silent on the matters in issue. The law on
with the PCGG and by the PCGG with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 is judicially settled. In
the applicability of Article 10 of the RPC is thus well-settled, with the latest reiteration
contemplation of the law, no proceedings exist that could have merited the suspension of
made by this Court in 2004 in Jao Yu v. People.
the prescriptive periods.
He also expresses his apprehension on the possible effects of the ruling of the Majority
Besides, the only proceeding that could interrupt the running of prescription is that which
Opinion and argues that –
is filed or initiated by the offended party before the appropriate body or office. Thus, in
the case of People v. Maravilla,35 this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the The accused should not have the sole discretion of preventing his own prosecution by the
municipal mayor for purposes of preliminary investigation had the effect of suspending simple expedient of escaping from the State’s jurisdiction. x x x An accused cannot acquire
the period of prescription. Similarly, in the case of Llenes v. Dicdican,36 this Court held that legal immunity by being a fugitive from the State’s jurisdiction. x x x.
the filing of a complaint against a public officer with the Ombudsman tolled the running of
To allow an accused to prevent his prosecution by simply leaving this jurisdiction
the period of prescription.
unjustifiably tilts the balance of criminal justice in favor of the accused to the detriment of
the State’s ability to investigate and prosecute crimes. In this age of cheap and accessible

29 | P a g e
global travel, this Court should not encourage individuals facing investigation or In the case of People v. Li Wai Cheung, 38 this Court applied the rules on the service of
prosecution for violation of special laws to leave Philippine jurisdiction to sit-out abroad sentences provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code in favor of the accused who
the prescriptive period. The majority opinion unfortunately chooses to lay the basis for was found guilty of multiple violations of RA No. 6425 or The Dangerous Drugs Act of
such anomalous practice. 1972 considering the lack of similar rules under the special law.

With all due respect, we beg to disagree. In the case of People v. Chowdury, 39 the Court applied Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the
Revised Penal Code to define the words "principal," "accomplices" and "accessories"
Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
under RA No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 because it
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the was not defined therein although it referred to the same terms in enumerating the
future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.
Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially
In the case at bar, the silence of RA No. 3019 on the question of whether or not the
provide the contrary.
absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents or tolls the running of the
Pursuant thereto, one may be tempted to hastily conclude that a special law such as RA prescriptive period is more apparent than real.
No. 3019 is supplemented by the Revised Penal Code in any and all cases. As it is, Mr.
Even before the enactment of RA No. 3019 in 1960, Act No. 3326 was already in effect as
Justice Carpio stated in his Dissenting Opinion that –
early as December 4, 1926. Section 3 thereof categorically defines "special acts" as "acts
There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article 10 of the RPC applies defining and penalizing violations of the law not included in the Penal Code".
suppletorily, as the Court has held in a long line of decisions since 1934, starting
Thus, in the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
with People v. Moreno. Thus, the Court has applied suppletorily various provisions of the
Desierto,40 this Court was categorical in ruling that –
RPC to resolve cases where the special laws are silent on the matters in issue. The law on
the applicability of Article 10 of the RPC is thus well-settled, with the latest reiteration The law on prescription of offenses is found in Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal
made by this Court in 2004 in Jao Yu v. People. Code for offenses punishable thereunder. For those penalized under special laws, Act No.
3326 applies.
However, it must be pointed out that the suppletory application of the Revised Penal
Code to special laws, by virtue of Article 10 thereof, finds relevance only when the Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to run from the day of
provisions of the special law are silent on a particular matteras evident from the cases the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time,
cited and relied upon in the Dissenting Opinion: from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment. The running of the prescriptive period shall be interrupted when
In the case of People v. Moreno,37 this Court, before ruling that the subsidiary penalty
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
under Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code may be applied in cases of violations of Act No.
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act
3992 or the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, noted that the special law did not contain any
No. 3326 did not provide that the absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents
provision that the defendant can be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
the running of the prescriptive period. Thus, the only inference that can be gathered from
insolvency.
the foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326, did not consider the

30 | P a g e
absence of the accused from the Philippines as a hindrance to the running of the This could not have been the intention of the framers of the law.
prescriptive period. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. To elaborate, -
While it is true that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code makes the Code suppletory to
Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one special laws, however, Act No. 3326 cannot fall within the ambit of "special law" as
person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the contemplated and used in Article 10 of the RPC.
familiar maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is
In the case of United States v. Serapio,42 the Court had the occasion to interpret the term
expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
"special laws" mentioned in Article 7 of then Penal Code of the Philippines, which is now
extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not
Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, as referring to penal laws that punish acts not
have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its
defined and penalized by the Penal Code of the Philippines. Thus –
meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. 41
This contention makes it necessary to define "special laws," as that phrase is used in
Had the legislature intended to include the accused’s absence from the Philippines as a
article 7 of the Penal Code. Does this phrase "leyes especiales," as used in the Penal Code
ground for the interruption of the prescriptive period in special laws, the same could have
(article 7) have the meaning applied to the phrase "special laws," as the same is generally
been expressly provided in Act No. 3326. A case in point is RA No. 8424 or the Tax Reform
used? x x x It is confidently contended that the phrase "leyes especiales," as used in the
Act of 1997 where the legislature made its intention clear and was thus categorical that –
Penal Code (article 7) is not used with this general signification: In fact, said phrase may
SEC. 281. Prescription for Violations of any Provision of this Code – All violations of any refer not to a special law as above defined, but to a general law. A careful reading of said
provision of this Code shall prescribe after five (5) years. article 7 clearly indicates that the phrase "leyes especiales" was not used to signify
"special laws" in the general signification of that phrase. The article, it will be noted,
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
simply says, in effect, that when a crime is made punishable under some other law than
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution
the Penal Code, it (the crime) is not subject to the provisions of said code. 43
of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
Even if we consider both Act No. 3326 and Article 91 as supplements to RA No. 3019, the
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
same result would obtain. A conflict will arise from the contemporaneous application of
persons and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
the two laws. The Revised Penal Code explicitly states that the absence of the accused
constituting jeopardy.
from the Philippines shall be a ground for the tolling of the prescriptive period while Act
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippines. No. 3326 does not. In such a situation, Act No. 3326 must prevail over Article 91 because
(Emphasis supplied) it specifically and directly applies to special laws while the Revised Penal Code shall apply
to special laws  only suppletorily and only when the latter do not provide the contrary.
According to Mr. Justice Carpio, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code fills the so-called Indeed, elementary rules of statutory construction dictate that special legal provisions
"gap" in Act No. 3326. Thus, while Act No. 3326 governs the operation of the prescriptive must prevail over general ones.
period for violations of R.A. No. 3019, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code can and shall
still be applied in cases where the accused is absent from the Philippines. In effect, Article The majority notes Mr. Justice Carpio’s reservations about the effects of ruling that the
91 would supplement Act No. 3326. absence of the accused from the Philippines shall not suspend the running of the

31 | P a g e
prescriptive period. Our duty, however, is only to interpret the law. To go beyond that statute is interposed by the legislature as an impartial arbiter between two contending
and to question the wisdom or effects of the law is certainly beyond our constitutionally parties. In the construction of the statute, therefore, there is no intendment to be made
mandated duty. As we have already explained – in favor of either party. Neither grants the right to the other; there is therefore no grantor
against whom the ordinary presumptions, of construction are to be made. But it is,
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an omission,
otherwise when a statute of limitation is granted by the State. Here the State is the
neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a
grantor, surrendering by act of grace its rights to prosecute, and declaring the offense to
legislative lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of
be no longer the subject of prosecution.' The statute is not a statute of process, to be
interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided
scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time
nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of the enactment, whether
oblivion shall be cast over the offence; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to
careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however after later wisdom may
his country, and resume his immunities as a citizen and that from henceforth he may
recommend the inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they think
cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out.
should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its
Hence it is that statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the
attention has been called to the omission. 44
defendant, not only because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty
Mr. Justice Carpio also remarks that the liberal interpretation of the statute of limitations and grace, but because the very existence of the statute, is a recognition and notification
in favor of the accused only relates to the following issues: (1) retroactive or prospective by the legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence,
application of laws providing or extending the prescriptive period; (2) the determination of has assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt.
the nature of the felony committed vis-à-vis the applicable prescriptive period; and (3) the Independently of these views, it must be remembered that delay in instituting
reckoning of when the prescriptive period runs. Therefore, the aforementioned principle prosecutions is not only productive of expense to the State, but of peril to public justice in
cannot be utilized to support the Majority Opinion’s conclusion that the prescriptive the attenuation and distortion, even by mere natural lapse of memory, of testimony. It is
period in a special law continues to run while the accused is abroad. the policy of the law that prosecutions should be prompt, and that statutes, enforcing
such promptitude should be vigorously maintained. They are not merely acts of grace, but
We take exception to the foregoing proposition. checks imposed by the State upon itself, to exact vigilant activity from its subalterns, and
We believe that a liberal interpretation of the law on prescription in criminal cases equally to secure for criminal trials the best evidence that can be obtained." (Emphasis supplied)
provides the authority for the rule that the prescriptive period runs while the accused is Indeed, there is no reason why we should deny petitioner the benefits accruing from the
outside of Philippine jurisdiction. The nature of the law on prescription of penal statutes liberal construction of prescriptive laws on criminal statutes. Prescription emanates from
supports this conclusion. In the old but still relevant case of People v. Moran, 45 this Court the liberality of the State. Any bar to or cause of interruption in the operation of
extensively discussed the rationale behind and the nature of prescription of penal prescriptive periods cannot simply be implied nor derived by mere implication. Any
offenses – diminution of this endowment must be directly and expressly sanctioned by the source
"We should at first observe that a mistake is sometimes made in applying to statutes of itself, the State. Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of the grantee
limitation in criminal suits the construction that has been given to statutes of limitation in thereof, the accused.
civil suits. The two classes of statutes, however, are essentially different. In civil suits the

32 | P a g e
The foregoing conclusion is logical considering the nature of the laws on prescription. The petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit, the alleged offenses subject therein have
exceptions to the running of or the causes for the interruption of the prescriptive periods already prescribed. Indeed, the State has lost its right to prosecute petitioner for the
may and should not be easily implied. The prescriptive period may only be prevented offenses subject of Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan
from operating or may only be tolled for reasons explicitly provided by the law. and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.
In the case of People v. Pacificador,46 we ruled that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED.
It bears emphasis, as held in a number of cases, that in the interpretation of the law on
Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case
prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted. The
Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila are all
said legal principle takes into account the nature of the law on prescription of crimes
hereby ordered DISMISSED.
which is an act of amnesty and liberality on the part of the state in favor of the offender.
In the case of People v. Moran, this Court amply discussed the nature of the statute of SO ORDERED.
limitations in criminal cases, as follows:

The statute is not statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an
amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offense; that
the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and resume his immunities as a
citizen; and that from henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence,
for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence, it is that statues of limitation are to be
liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only because such liberality of
construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of
the statute is a recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it
gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed and positive periods in
which it destroys proofs of guilt.

In view of the foregoing, the applicable 10-and-15-year prescriptive periods in the instant
case, were not interrupted by any event from the time they began to run on May 8, 1987.
As a consequence, the alleged offenses committed by the petitioner for the years 1963-
1982 prescribed 10 years from May 8, 1987 or on May 8, 1997. On the other hand, the
alleged offenses committed by the petitioner for the years 1983-1985 prescribed 15 years
from May 8, 1987 or on May 8, 2002.

Therefore, when the Office of the Special Prosecutor initiated the preliminary
investigation of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 on March 3, 2004 by requiring the

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