SECTION 1.

After March thirty-first, nineteen hundred and twenty-five

b existing contracts for the importation of cattle into this country to the
contrary notwithstanding, it shall be strictly prohibited to import, bring or
introduce into the Philippine Islands any cattle from foreign
Republic of the Philippines countries: Provided, however, That at any time after said date, the
SUPREME COURT Governor-General, with the concurrence of the presiding officers of both
Manila Houses, may raise such prohibition entirely or in part if the conditions of
the country make this advisable or if decease among foreign cattle has
EN BANC ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and live stock of the lands.

G.R. No. L-34674             October 26, 1931 SEC. 2. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this Act are hereby
repealed.
MAURICIO CRUZ, petitioner-appellant,
vs. SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect on its approval.
STANTON YOUNGBERG, Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, respondent-
appellee. Approved, March 8, 1924.

Jose Yulo for appellant. The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts
Office of the Solicitor-General Reyes for appellee. sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons,
namely, (1) that if Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional and void, the
petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No. 3052
would automatically become effective and would prohibit the respondent from
giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and,
therefore, valid.
OSTRAND, J.:
The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the
This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of Manila for failure of the petitioner to file another complaint. From that order of dismissal, the
the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent, Stanton petitioner appealed to this court.
Youngberg, as Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, requiring him to issue a
permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and for the
The appellee contends that even if Act No. 3155 be declared unconstitutional by the
slaughter thereof. The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155,
fact alleged by the petitioner in his complaint, still the petitioner can not be allowed
which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the
to import cattle from Australia for the reason that, while Act No. 3155 were
Philippine Islands.
declared unconstitutional, Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective. Act
No. 3052 reads as follows:
Among other things in the allegation of the petition, it is asserted that "Act No.
3155 of the Philippine Legislature was enacted for the sole purpose of preventing
SECTION 1. Section seventeen hundred and sixty-two of Act Numbered
the introduction of cattle diseases into the Philippine Islands from foreign countries,
Twenty-seven hundred and eleven, known as the Administrative Code, is
as shown by an explanatory note and text of Senate Bill No. 328 as introduced in
hereby amended to read as follows:
the Philippine Legislature, ... ." The Act in question reads as follows:

1
 "SEC. 1762. Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries This court has several times declared that it will not pass upon the constitutionality
into the Philippine Islands. — It shall be unlawful for any person or of statutes unless it is necessary to do so (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil.,
corporation to import, bring or introduce live cattle into the 563, 568; Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad, 43 Phil., 259) but in this
Philippine Islands from any foreign country. The Director of case it is not necessary to pass upon the validity of the statute attacked by the
Agriculture may, with the approval of the head of the department petitioner because even if it were declared unconstitutional, the petitioner would
first had, authorize the importation, bringing or introduction of not be entitled to relief inasmuch as Act No. 3052 is not in issue.
various classes of thoroughbred cattle from foreign countries for
breeding the same to the native cattle of these Islands, and such But aside from the provisions of Act No. 3052, we are of the opinion that Act No.
as may be necessary for the improvement of the breed, not to 3155 is entirely valid. As shown in paragraph 8 of the amended petition, the
exceed five hundred head per annum: Provided, however, That Legislature passed Act No. 3155 to protect the cattle industry of the country and to
the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the prevent the introduction of cattle diseases through importation of foreign cattle. It
importation, bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public
cattle for the manufacture of serum: Provided, further, That all live welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the
cattle from foreign countries the importation, bringing or scope of the police power (12 C.J., 927; 6 R.C.L., 203-206 and decisions cited
introduction of which into the Islands is authorized by this Act, therein; Reid vs. Colorado, 187 U.S., 137, 147, 152; Yeazel vs. Alexander, 58 Ill.,
shall be submitted to regulations issued by the Director of 254). In this connection it is said in the case of Punzalan vs. Ferriols and Provincial
Agriculture, with the approval of the head of the department, Board of Batangas (19 Phil., 214), that the provisions of the Act of Congress of July
prior to authorizing its transfer to other provinces. 1, 1902, did not have the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine
Islands the right to the exercise of the sovereign police power in the promotion of
"At the time of the approval of this Act, the Governor-General the general welfare and the public interest. The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the
shall issue regulations and others to provide against a raising of amended petition shows that at the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there
the price of both fresh and refrigerated meat. The Governor- was reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be said that the Legislature
General also may, by executive order, suspend, this prohibition for exceeded its power in passing the Act. That being so, it is not for this court to avoid
a fixed period in case local conditions require it." or vacate the Act upon constitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine
whether the measures are wise or the best that might have been adopted. (6 R.C.L.,
SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect six months after approval. 243 and decisions cited therein.)1awphil.net

Approved, March 14, 1922. In his third assignment of error the petitioner claims that "The lower court erred in
not holding that the power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-General to
The petitioner does not present any allegations in regard to Act No. 3052 to show suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an
its nullity or unconstitutionality though it appears clearly that in the absence of Act unlawful delegation of the legislative powers." We do not think that such is the
No. 3155 the former act would make it impossible for the Director of the Bureau of case; as Judge Ranney of the Ohio Supreme Court in Cincinnati, Wilmington and
Animal Industry to grant the petitioner a permit for the importation of the cattle Zanesville Railroad Co. vs. Commissioners of Clinton County (1 Ohio St., 77, 88) said
without the approval of the head of the corresponding department. in such case:

An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former laws or The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to
parts of laws by implication, since, being void, it is not inconsistent with make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
such former laws. (I Lewis Sutherland, Statutory Construction 2nd ed., p. and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
458, citing McAllister vs. Hamlin, 83 Cal., 361; 23 Pac., 357; Orange exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to
Country vs. Harris, 97 Cal., 600; 32 Pac., 594; Carr vs. State, 127 Ind., 204; the latter no valid objection can be made.
11 L.R.A., 370, etc.)
2
Under his fourth assignment of error the appellant argues that Act No. 3155 San Miguel Bay, located between the provinces of Camarines Norte and Camarines
amends section 3 of the Tariff Law, but it will be noted that Act No. 3155 is not an Sur, a part of the National waters of the Philippines with an extension of about 250
absolute prohibition of the importation of cattle and it does not add any provision square miles and an average depth of approximately 6 fathoms (Otter trawl
to section 3 of the Tariff Law. As stated in the brief of the Attorney-General: "It is a explorations in Philippine waters p. 21, Exh. B), is considered as the most important
complete statute in itself. It does not make any reference to the Tariff Law. It does fishing area in the Pacific side of the Bicol region. Sometime in 1950,
not permit the importation of articles, whose importation is prohibited by the Tariff trawl1 operators from Malabon, Navotas and other places migrated to this region
Law. It is not a tariff measure but a quarantine measure, a statute adopted under most of them settling at Sabang, Calabanga, Camarines Sur, for the purpose of using
the police power of the Philippine Government. It is at most a `supplement' or an this particular method of fishing in said bay. On account of the belief of sustenance
`addition' to the Tariff Law. (See MacLeary vs. Babcock, 82 N.E., 453, 455; 169 Ind., fishermen that the operation of this kind of gear caused the depletion of the marine
228 for distinction between `supplemental' and `amendatory' and O'Pry vs. U.S., resources of that area, there arose a general clamor among the majority of the
249 U.S., 323; 63 Law. ed., 626, for distinction between `addition' and inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay.
`amendment.')" This move was manifested in the resolution of December 18, 1953 (Exh. F), passed
by the Municipal Mayors' League condemning the operation of trawls as the cause
The decision appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So of the wanton destruction of the shrimp specie and resolving to petition the
ordered. President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay by declaring it
closed for trawl fishing at a certain period of the year. In another resolution dated
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Romualdez, Villa-Real, and March 27, 1954, the same League of Municipal Mayor, prayed the President to
Imperial, JJ., concur. protect them and the fish resources of San Miguel Bay by banning the operation of
trawls therein (Exh. 4). The Provincial Governor also made proper presentations to
this effect and petitions in behalf of the non-trawl fishermen were likewise
Republic of the Philippines
presented to the President by social and civic organizations as the NAMFREL
SUPREME COURT
(National Movement for Free Elections) and the COMPADRE (Committee for
Manila
Philippine Action in Development, Reconstruction and Education), recommending
the cancellation of the licenses of trawl operators after investigation, if such inquiry
EN BANC would substantiate the charges that the operation of said fishing method was
detrimental to the welfare of the majority of the inhabitants (Exh. 2).
G.R. Nos. L-8895 and L-9191             April 30, 1957
In response to these pleas, the President issued on April 5, 1954, Executive Order
SALVADOR A. ARANETA, ETC., ET AL., petitioners, No. 22 (50 Off. Gaz., 1421) prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, but said
vs. executive order was amended by Executive Order No. 66, issued on September 23,
THE HON. MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, ETC., ET AL., respondents. 1954 (50 Off. Gaz., 4037), apparently in answer to a resolution of the Provincial
Board of Camarines Sur recommending the allowance of trawl fishing during the
EXEQUIEL SORIANO, ET AL., petitioners-appellees, typhoon season only. On November 2, 1954, however, Executive Order No. 80 (50
vs. Off. Gaz., 5198) was issued reviving Executive Order No. 22, to take effect after
SALVADOR ARANETA, ETC., ET AL., respondents-appellants. December 31, 1954.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Jose G. A group of Otter trawl operators took the matter to the court by filing a complaint
Bautista and Solicitor Troadio T. Quiazon for petitioners. for injunction and/or declaratory relief with preliminary injunction with the Court of
San Juan, Africa and Benedicto for respondents. First Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 24867, praying that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
FELIX, J.: Resources and the Director of Fisheries from enforcing said executive order; to

3
declare the same null and void, and for such other relief as may be just and national importance. To accept respondents' view would be to sanction the
equitable in the premises. exercise of legislative power by executive decrees. If it is San Miguel Bay
now, it may be Davao Gulf tomorrow, and so on. That may be done only by
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries, Congress. This being the conclusion, there is hardly need to go any further.
represented by the Legal Adviser of said Department and a Special Attorney of the Until the trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned
Office of the Solicitor General, answered the complaint alleging, among other from San Miguel Bay by executive proclamation. The remedy for
things, that of the 18 plaintiff (Exequiel Soriano, Teodora Donato, Felipe respondents and population of the coastal towns of Camarines Sur is to go
Concepcion, Venancio Correa, Santo Gaviana, Alfredo General, Constancio to the Legislature. The result will be to issue the writ prayed for, even
Gutierrez, Arsenio de Guzman, Pedro Lazaro, Porfirio Lazaro, Deljie de Leon, Jose though this be to strike at public clamor and to annul the orders of the
Nepomuceno, Bayani Pingol, Claudio Salgado, Porfirio, San Juan, Luis Sioco, President issued in response therefor. This is a task unwelcome and
Casimiro Villar and Enrique Voluntad), only 11 were issued license to operate fishing unpleasant; unfortunately, courts of justice use only one measure for both
boats for the year 1954 (Annex B, petition — L-8895); that the executive orders in the rich and poor, and are not bound by the more popular cause when
question were issued accordance with law; that the encouragement by the Bureau they give judgments.
of Fisheries of the use of Otter trawls should not be construed to mean that the
general welfare of the public could be disregarded, and set up the defenses that IN VIEW WHEREOF, granted; Executive Order Nos. 22, 66 and 80 are
since plaintiffs question the validity of the executive orders issued by the President, declared invalid; the injunction prayed for is ordered to issue; no
then the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of pronouncement as to costs.
Fisheries were not the real parties in interest; that said executive orders do not
constitute a deprivation of property without due process of law, and therefore Petitioners immediately filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of
prayed that the complaint be dismissed (Exh. B, petition, L-8895). injunction which was opposed by the Solicitor General and after the parties had
filed their respective memoranda, the Court issued an order dated February 19,
During the trial of the case, the Governor of Camarines Sur appearing for the 1955, denying respondents' motion to set aside judgement and ordering them to
municipalities of Siruma, Tinambac, Calabanga, Cabusao and Sipocot, in said file a bond in the sum of P30,000 on or before March 1, 1955, as a condition for the
province, called the attention of the Court that the Solicitor General had not been non-issuance of the injunction prayed for by petitioners pending appeal. The
notified of the proceeding. To this manifestation, the Court ruled that in view of the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of
circumstances of the case, and as the Solicitor General would only be interested in merit, and the Court, acting upon the motion for new trial filed by respondents,
maintaining the legality of the executive orders sought to be impugned, section 4 of issued another order on March 3, 1965, denying said motion and granting the
Rule 66 could be interpreted to mean that the trial could go on and the Solicitor injunction prayed for by petitioners upon the latter's filing a bond for P30,000
General could be notified before judgement is entered. unless respondents could secure a writ of preliminary injunction from the Supreme
Court on or before March 15, 1955. Respondents, therefore, brought the matter to
After the evidence for both parties was submitted and the Solicitor General was this Court in a petition for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction,
allowed to file his memorandum, the Court rendered decision on February 2, 1955, docketed as G.R. No. L-8895, and on the same day filed a notice to appeal from the
the last part of which reads as follows: order of the lower court dated February 2, 1955, which appeal was docketed in this
Court as G.R. No. L-9191.
The power to close any definite area of the Philippine waters, from the fact
that Congress has seen fit to define under what conditions it may be done In the petition for prohibition and certiorari, petitioners (respondents therein)
by the enactment of the sections cited, in the mind of Congress must be of contended among other things, that the order of, the respondent Judge requiring
transcendental significance. It is primarily within the fields of legislation petitioners Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of
not of execution: for it goes far and says who can and who can not fish in Fisheries to post a bond in the sum of P30,000 on or before March 1, 1955, had
definite territorial waters. The court can not accept that Congress had been issued without jurisdiction or in excess thereof, or at the very least with grave
intended to abdicate its inherent right to legislate on this matter of abuse of discretion, because by requiring the bond, the Republic of the Philippines

4
was in effect made a party defendant and therefore transformed the suit into one As Our decision in the prohibition and certiorari case (G.R. No. L-8895) would
against the Government which is beyond the jurisdiction of the respondent Judge to depend, in the last analysis, on Our ruling in the appeal of the respondents in case
entertain; that the failure to give the Solicitor General the opportunity to defend G.R. No. L-9191, We shall first proceed to dispose of the latter case.
the validity of the challenged executive orders resulted in the receipt of
objectionable matters at the hearing; that Rule 66 of the Rules of Court does not It is indisputable that the President issued Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 in
empower a court of law to pass upon the validity of an executive order in a response to the clamor of the inhabitants of the municipalities along the coastline
declaratory relief proceeding; that the respondent Judge did not have the power to of San Miguel Bay. They read as follows:
grant the injunction as Section 4 of Rule 39 does not apply to declaratory relief
proceedings but only to injunction, receivership and patent accounting proceedings; EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 22
and prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the respondent
Judge from enforcing its order of March 3, 1955, and for such other relief as may be
PROHIBITING THE USE OF TRAWLS IN SAN MIGUEL BAY
deem just and equitable in the premises. This petition was given due course and the
hearing on the merits was set by this Court for April 12, 1955, but no writ of
In order to effectively protect the municipal fisheries of San Miguel Bay,
preliminary injunction was issued.
Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur, and to conserve fish and other
aquatic resources of the area, I, RAMON MAGSAYSAY, President of the
Meanwhile, the appeal (G.R. No. L-9191) was heard on October 3, 1956, wherein
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order
respondents-appellants ascribed to the lower court the commission of the following
that:
errors:
1. Fishing by means of trawls (utase, otter and/or perenzella) of any kind,
1. In ruling that the President has no authority to issue Executive Orders
in the waters comprised within San Miguel Bay, is hereby prohibited.
Nos. 22, 66 and 80 banning the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay;
2. Trawl shall mean, for the purpose of this Order, a fishing net made in the
2. In holding that the power to declare a closed area for fishing purposes
form of a bag with the mouth kept open by a device, the whole affair being
has not been delegated to the President of the Philippines under the
towed, dragged, trailed or trawled on the bottom of the sea to capture
Fisheries Act;
demersal, ground or bottom species.

3. In not considering Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 as declaring a

3. Violation of the provisions of this Order shall subject the offender to the
closed season pursuant to Section 7, Act 4003, as amended, otherwise
penalty provided under Section 83 of Act 4993, or more than six months,
known as the Fisheries Act;
or both, in the discretion of the Court.

4. In holding that to uphold the validity of Executive Orders Nos. 22 and 80

Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of April, nineteen hundred and
would be to sanction the exercise of legislative power by executive
fifty-four and of the Independence of the Philippines, the eighth. (50 Off.
decrees;
Gaz. 1421)

5. In its suggestion that the only remedy for respondents and the people of
EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 66
the coastal towns of Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte is to go to the
Legislature; and
AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 22, DATED APRIL 5, 1954, ENTITLED
"PROHIBITING THE USE OF TRAWLS IN SAN MIGUEL BAY"
6. In declaring Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 invalid and in ordering
the injunction prayed for to issue.

5
 By virtue of the powers voted in me by law, I, RAMON MAGSAYSAY, P30,000 if the writ of injunction restraining them from enforcing the executive
President of the Philippines, do hereby amend Executive Order No. 22, orders in question must be stayed.
dated April 5, 1954, so as to allow fishing by means of trawls, as defined in
said Executive Order, within that portion of San Miguel Bay north of a The Solicitor General avers that the constitutionality of an executive order cannot
straight line drawn from Tacubtacuban Hill in the Municipality of be ventilated in a declaratory relief proceeding. We find this untenable, for this
Tinambac, Province of Camarines Sur. Fishing by means of trawls south of Court taking cognizance of an appeal from the decision of the lower court in the
said line shall still be absolutely prohibited. case of Hilado vs. De la Costa, et al., 83 Phil., 471, which involves the
constitutionality of another executive order presented in an action for declaratory
Done in the City of Manila, this 23rd day of September, in the year of our relief, in effect accepted the propriety of such action.
Lord, nineteen hundred and fifty-four, and of the Independence of the
Philippines, the ninth." (50 Off. Gaz. 4037). This question being eliminated, the main issues left for Our determination with
respect to defendants' appeal (G.R. No. L-9191), are:
EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 80.
(1) Whether the Secretary of an Executive Department and the Director of a Bureau,
FURTHER AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 22, DATED APRIL 5, 1954, AS acting in their capacities as such Government officials, could lawfully be required to
AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 66, DATED SEPTEMBER 23, 1954. post a bond in an action against them;

By virtue of the powers vested in me by law, I, RAMON MAGSAYSAY, (2) Whether the President of the Philippines has authority to issue Executive Orders
President of the Philippines, do hereby amend Executive Order No. 66 Nos. 22, 66 and 80, banning the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay, or, said in
dated September 23, 1954, so as to allow fishing by means of trawls, as other words, whether said Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 were issued in
defined in Executive Order No. 22, dated April 5, 1954, within the portion accordance with law; and.
of San Miguel Bay North of a straight line drawn from Tacubtacuban Hill in
the Municipality of Mercedes, Province of Camarines Norte to Balocbaloc (3) Whether Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 were valid, for the issuance
Point in the Municipality of Tinambac, Province of Camarines Sur, until thereof was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the
December 31, 1954, only. President.

Thereafter, the provisions of said Executive Order No. 22 absolutely Counsel for both parties presented commendable exhaustive defenses in support of
prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all the waters comprised within their respective stands. Certainly, these cases deserve such efforts, not only
the San Miguel Bay shall be revived and given full force and effect as because the constitutionality of an act of a coordinate branch in our tripartite
originally provided therein. system of Government is in issue, but also because of the number of inhabitants,
admittedly classified as "subsistence fishermen", that may be affected by any ruling
Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of November, in the year of Our that We may promulgate herein.
Lord, nineteen hundred and fifty-four and of the Independence of the
Philippines, the ninth. (50 Off. Gaz. 5198) I. As to the first proposition, it is an elementary rule of procedure that an appeal
stays the execution of a judgment. An exception is offered by section 4 of Rule 39 of
It is likewise admitted that petitioners assailed the validity of said executive orders the Rules of Court which provides that:
in their petition for a writ of injunction and/or declaratory relief filed with the Court
of First Instance of Manila, and that the lower court, upon declaring Executive SEC. 4. INJUNCTION, RECEIVERSHIP AND PATENT ACCOUNTING, NOT
Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 invalid, issued an order requiring the Secretary of STAYED. — Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a judgment in an action
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries to post a bond for for injunction or in a receivership action, or a judgment or order directing

6
 an accounting in an action for infringement of letter patent, shall not be defendants' motion to set aside judgment and they were required to file a bond for
stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the P30,000 to answer for damages that plaintiffs were allegedly suffering at that time,
pendency of an appeal. The trial court, however, in its discretion, when an as otherwise the injunction prayed for by the latter would be issued.
appeal is taken from a judgement granting, dissolving or denying an
injunction, may make an order suspending, modifying, restoring, or Because of these facts, We agree with the Solicitor General when he says that the
granting such injunction during the pendency of an appeal, upon such action, being one against herein petitioners as such Government officials, is
terms as to bond or otherwise as it may consider proper for the security of essentially one against the Government, and to require these officials to file a bond
the rights of the adverse party. would be indirectly a requirement against the Government for as regards bonds or
damages that may be proved, if any, the real party in interest would be the Republic
This provision was the basis of the order of the lower court dated February 19, of the Philippines (L. S. Moon and Co. vs. Harrison, 43 Phi., 39; Salgado vs. Ramos,
1955, requiring the filing by the respondents of a bond for P30,000 as a condition 64 Phil., 724-727, and others). The reason for this pronouncement is
for the non-issuance of the injunction prayed for by plaintiffs therein, and which the understandable; the State undoubtedly is always solvent (Tolentino vs. Carlos 66
Solicitor General charged to have been issued in excess of jurisdiction. The State's Phil., 140; Government of the P. I. vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, 34
counsel, however, alleges that while judgment could be stayed in injunction, Phil., 167, cited in Joaquin Gutierrez et al. vs. Camus et al. * G.R. No. L-6725,
receivership and patent accounting cases and although the complaint was styled promulgated October 30, 1954). However, as the records show that herein
"Injunction, and/or Declaratory Relief with Preliminary Injunction", the case is petitioners failed to put up the bond required by the lower court, allegedly due to
necessarily one for declaratory relief, there being no allegation sufficient to difficulties encountered with the Auditor General's Office (giving the impression
convince the Court that the plaintiffs intended it to be one for injunction. But aside that they were willing to put up said bond but failed to do so for reasons beyond
from the title of the complaint, We find that plaintiffs pray for the declaration of the their control), and that the orders subjects of the prohibition
nullity of Executive Order Nos. 22, 66 and 80; the issuance of a writ of preliminary and certiorari proceedings in G.R. No. L-8895, were enforced, if at all, 2 in accordance
injunction, and for such other relief as may be deemed just and equitable. This with section 4 of Rule 39, which We hold to be applicable to the case at bar, the
Court has already held that there are only two requisites to be satisfied if an issue as to the regularity or adequacy of requiring herein petitioners to post a bond,
injunction is to issue, namely, the existence of the right sought to be protected, and becomes moot and academic.
that the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right
(North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Serafin Hidalgo, 63 Phil., 664). There is no question II. Passing upon the question involved in the second proposition, the trial judge
that at least 11 of the complaining trawl operators were duly licensed to operate in extending the controversy to the determination of which between the Legislative,
any of the national waters of the Philippines, and it is undeniable that the executive and Executive Departments of the Government had "the power to close any definite
enactment's sought to be annulled are detrimental to their interests. And area of the Philippine waters" instead of limiting the same to the real issue raised by
considering further that the granting or refusal of an injunction, whether temporary the enactment of Executive Orders No. 22, 26 and 80, especially the first and the
or permanent, rests in the sound discretion of the Court, taking into account the last "absolutely prohibiting fishing by means trawls in all the waters comprised
circumstances and the facts of the particular case (Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, 76 Phil,, 225, within the San Miguel Bay", ruled in favor of Congress had not intended to abdicate
42 Off. Gaz., 2439), We find no abuse of discretion when the trial Court treated the its power to legislate on the matter, he maintained as stated before, that "until the
complaint as one for injunction and declaratory relief and executed the judgment trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel
pursuant to the provisions of section 4 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Bay by executive proclamation", and that "the remedy for respondents and
population of the coastal towns of Camarines Sur is to go to Legislature," and thus
On the other hand, it shall be remembered that the party defendants in Civil Case declared said Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 invalid".
No. 24867 of the Court of First Instance of Manila are Salvador Araneta, as
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and, Deogracias Villadolid, as The Solicitor General, on the contrary, asserts that the President is empowered by
Director of Fisheries, and were sued in such capacities because they were the law to issue the executive enactment's in question.
officers charged with duty of carrying out the statutes, orders and regulations on
fishing and fisheries. In its order of February 19, 1955, the trial court denied

7
Sections 6, 13 and 75 of Act No. 4003, known as the Fisheries Law, the latter two destroy or kill in any of the places aforementioned, or in any manner
sections as amended by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 471, read as follows: disturb or drive away or take therefrom, any fish fry or fish eggs.

SEC. 6. WORDS AND PHRASES DEFINED. —Words and terms used in this Act No. 4003 further provides as follows:
Act shall be construed as follows:
SEC. 83. OTHER VIOLATIONS. — Any other violation of the provisions of this
xxx     xxx     xxx Act or any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall subject the
offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or imprisonment
TAKE or TAKING includes pursuing, shooting, killing, capturing, trapping, for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the Court.
snaring, and netting fish and other aquatic animals, and all lesser acts, such
as disturbing, wounding, stupefying; or placing, setting, drawing, or using As may be seen from the just quoted provisions, the law declares unlawful and fixes
any net or other device commonly used to take or collect fish and other the penalty for the taking (except for scientific or educational purposes or for
aquatic animals, whether they result in taking or not, and includes every propagation), destroying or killing of any fish fry or fish eggs, and the Secretary of
attempt to take and every act of assistance to every other person in taking Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
or attempting to take or collect fish and other aquatic animals: PROVIDED, Resources) is authorized to promulgate regulations restricting the use of any fish
That whenever taking is allowed by law, reference is had to taking by net or fishing device (which includes the net used by trawl fishermen) for the
lawful means and in lawful manner. protection of fry or fish eggs, as well as to set aside and establish fishery
reservations or fish refuges and sanctuaries to be administered in the manner
xxx     xxx     xxx prescribed by him, from which no person could lawfully take, destroy or kill in any
of the places aforementioned, or in any manner disturb or drive away or take
SEC. 13. PROTECTION OF FRY OR FISH EGGS. — Except for scientific or therefrom any small or immature fish, fry or fish eggs. It is true that said section 75
educational purpose or for propagation, it shall be unlawful  to take or mentions certain streams, ponds and waters within the game refuges, . . .
catch fry or fish eggs and the small fish, not more than three (3) communal forest, etc., which the law itself declares fish refuges and sanctuaries,
centimeters long, known as siliniasi, in the territorial waters of the but this enumeration of places does not curtail the general and unlimited power of
Philippines. Towards this end, the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in the first part of section 75, to
shall be authorized to provide by regulations such restrictions as may be set aside and establish fishery reservations or fish refuges and sanctuaries, which
deemed necessary to be imposed on THE USE OF ANY FISHING NET OR naturally include seas or bays, like the San Miguel Bay in Camarines.
FISHING DEVICE FOR THE PROTECTION OF FRY OR FISH EGGS; Provided,
however, That the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall permit the From the resolution passed at the Conference of Municipal Mayors held at
taking of young of certain species of fish known as hipon under such Tinambac, Camarines Sur, on December 18, 1953 (Exh. F), the following
restrictions as may be deemed necessary. manifestation is made:

SEC. 75. FISH REFUGEES AND SANCTUARIES. — Upon the recommendation WHEREAS, the continuous operation of said trawls even during the close
of the officer or chief of the bureau, office or service concerned, the season as specified in said Executive Order No. 20 caused the wanton
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce may set aside and establish fishery destruction of the mother shrimps laying their eggs and the millions of
reservation or fish refuges and sanctuaries to be administered in the eggs laid and the inevitable extermination of the shrimps specie; in order
manner to be prescribed by him. All streams, ponds and waters within the to save the shrimps specie from eventual extermination and in order to
game refuge, birds, sanctuaries, national parks, botanical gardens, conserve the shrimps specie for posterity;
communal forest and communal pastures are hereby declared fishing
refuges and sanctuaries. It shall be unlawful for any person, to take, In the brief submitted by the NAMFREL and addressed to the President of the
Philippines (Exh. 2), in support of the petition of San Miguel Bay fishermen
8
(allegedly 6, 175 in number), praying that trawlers be banned from operating in San violation of his instructions, regulations or orders are caught fishing with trawls in
Miguel Bay, it is stated that: the Philippine waters.

The trawls ram and destroy the fish corrals. The heavy trawl nets dig deep Now, if under the law the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has
into the ocean bed. They destroy the fish foods which lies below the ocean authority to regulate or ban the fishing by trawl which, it is claimed, obnoxious for it
floor. Their daytime catches net millions of shrimps scooped up from the carries away fish eggs and fry's which should be preserved, can the President of the
mud. In their nets they bring up the life of the sea: algea, shell fish and star Philippines exercise that same power and authority? Section 10(1), Article VII of the
fish . . . Constitution of the Philippines prescribes:

The absence of some species or the apparent decline in the catch of some SEC. 10 (1). The President shall have control  of all the executive
fishermen operating in the bay may be due to several factors, namely: departments, bureaus or offices, exercises general supervision over all
the indiscriminate catching of fry and immature sizes of fishes, the wide- local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws
spread use of explosives inside as well as at the mouth and approaches of be faithfully executed.
the bay, and the extensive operation of  the trawls. (p.9, Report of Santos B.
Rasalan, Exh. A) Section 63 of the Revised Administrative Code reads as follows:

Extensive Operation of Trawls: — The strenuous effect of the operations of SEC. 63. EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND EXECUTIVE PROCLAMATION. —
the 17 TRAWLS of the demersal fisheries of San Miguel Bay  is better Administrative acts and commands of the President of the Philippines
appreciated when we consider the fact that out of its about 850 square touching the organization or mode of operation of the Government or
kilometers area, only about 350 square kilometers of 5 fathoms up could rearranging or readjusting any of the district, divisions, parts or ports of the
be trawled. With their continuous operation, is greatly strained. This is Philippines, and all acts and commands governing the general performance
shown by the fact that in view of the non-observance of the close season of duties by public employees or disposing of issues of general concern shall
from May to October, each year, majority of their catch are immature. If be made in executive orders.
their operation would continue unrestricted, the supply would be greatly
depleted. (p. 11), Report of Santos B. Rasalan, Exh. A) xxx     xxx     xxx

San Miguel Bay — can sustain 3 to 4 small trawlers  (Otter Trawl Regarding department organization Section 74 of the Revised Administrative Code
Explorations in Philippine Waters, Research Report 25 of the Fish and also provides that:
Wildlife Service, United States Department of the Interior, p. 9 Exhibit B).
All executive functions of the government of the Republic of the Philippines
According to Annex A of the complaint filed in the lower court in Civil Case No. shall be directly under the Executive Departments subject to the
24867 — G.R. No. L-9191 (Exh. D, p. 53 of the folder of Exhibits), the 18 plaintiffs- supervision and control of the President of the Philippines in matters of
appellees operate 29 trawling boats, and their operation must be in a big scale general policy. The Departments are established for the proper distribution
considering the investments plaintiffs have made therefore, amounting to P387,000 of the work of the Executive, for the performance of the functions
(Record on Appeal, p. 16-17). expressly assigned to them by law, and in order that each branch of the
administration may have a chief responsible for its direction and policy.
In virtue of the aforementioned provisions of law and the manifestation just copied, Each Department Secretary shall assume the burden of, and responsibility
We are of the opinion that with or without said Executive Orders, the restriction for, all activities of the Government under his control and supervision.
and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come, under the law, within
the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who in
compliance with his duties may even cause the criminal prosecution of those who in
9
 For administrative purposes the President of the Philippines shall be which is vested in the Governor-General, the act is delegation of legislative
considered the Department Head of the Executive Office. power, is unconstitutional and void.

One of the executive departments is that of Agriculture and Natural Resources From the provisions of Act No. 4003 of the Legislature, as amended by
which by law is placed under the direction and control of the Secretary, who Commonwealth Act No. 471, which have been aforequoted, We find that Congress
exercises its functions subject to the general supervision and control of the (a) declared it unlawful "to take or catch fry or fish eggs in the territorial waters of
President of the Philippines (Sec. 75, R. A. C.). Moreover, "executive orders, the Philippines; (b) towards this end, it authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and
regulations, decrees and proclamations relative to matters under the supervision or Natural Resources to provide by the regulations such restrictions as may be deemed
jurisdiction of a Department, the promulgation whereof is expressly assigned by law necessary to be imposed on the use of any fishing net or fishing device for the
to the President of the Philippines, shall as a general rule, be issued upon protection of fish fry or fish eggs (Sec. 13); (c) it authorized the Secretary of
proposition and recommendation of the respective Department" (Sec. 79-A, R.A.C.), Agriculture and Natural Resources to set aside and establish fishery reservations or
and there can be no doubt that the promulgation of the questioned Executive fish refuges and sanctuaries to be administered in the manner to be prescribed by
Orders was upon the proposition and recommendation of the Secretary of him and declared it unlawful for any person to take, destroy or kill in any of said
Agriculture and Natural Resources and that is why said Secretary, who was and is places, or, in any manner disturb or drive away or take therefrom, any fish fry or fish
called upon to enforce said executive Orders, was made a party defendant in one of eggs (See. 75); and (d) it penalizes the execution of such acts declared unlawful and
the cases at bar (G.R. No. L-9191). in violation of this Act (No. 4003) or of any rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder, making the offender subject to a fine of not more than P200, or
For the foregoing reasons We do hesitate to declare that Executive Orders Nos. 22, imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or both, in the discretion of the court
66 and 80, series of 1954, of the President, are valid and issued by authority of law. (Sec. 83).

III. But does the exercise of such authority by the President constitute and undue From the foregoing it may be seen that in so far as the protection of fish fry or fish
delegation of the powers of Congress? egg is concerned, the Fisheries Act is complete in itself, leaving to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources the promulgation of rules and regulations to
As already held by this Court, the true distinction between delegation of the power carry into effect the legislative intent. It also appears from the exhibits on record in
to legislate and the conferring of authority or discretion as to the execution of law these cases that fishing with trawls causes "a wanton destruction of the mother
consists in that the former necessary involves a discretion as to what the law shall shrimps laying their eggs and the millions of eggs laid and the inevitable
be, wile in the latter the authority or discretion as to its execution has to be extermination of the shrimps specie" (Exh. F), and that, "the trawls ram and destroy
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter the fish corrals. The heavy trawl nets dig deep into the ocean bed. They destroy the
no valid objection can be made (Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil., 234, 239. See also fish food which lies below the ocean floor. Their daytime catches net millions of
Rubi, et al. vs. The Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660). shrimps scooped up from the mud. In their nets they bring up the life of the sea"
(Exh- 2).
In the case of U. S. vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1, We also held:
In the light of these facts it is clear to Our mind that for the protection of fry or fish
eggs and small and immature fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation of
THE POWER TO DELEGATE. — The Legislature cannot delegate legislative
Act No. 4003, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing device like trawl nets that
power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself, and it does
could endanger and deplete our supply of sea food, and to that end authorized the
nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations such
regulations to carry it into effect, then the Legislature created the law.
restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of
There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the act
the land. Consequently, when the President, in response to the clamor of the
within itself does not define a crime and is not complete, and some
people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued Executive Order No. 80 absolutely
legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of
prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel

10
Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of
said coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern (Sec. 63, R.A.C.)
which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law. AQUINO, J.:têñ.£îhqwâ£

Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations We render This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in
judgement, as follows: fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the
(a) Declaring that the issues involved in case G.R. No. L-8895 have become moot, as law creating the Fisheries Commission.
no writ of preliminary injunction has been issued by this Court the respondent
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila Branch XIV, from enforcing his order On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario
of March 3, 1955; and Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the
municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative
(b) Reversing the decision appealed from in case G. R. No. L-9191; dissolving the Order No. 84-1.
writ of injunction prayed for in the lower court by plaintiffs, if any has been actually
issued by the court a quo; and declaring Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80, series It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1,
of 1954, valid for having been issued by authority of the Constitution, the Revised 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by
Administrative Code and the Fisheries Act. "using their own motor banca, equipped with motor; with a generator colored
green with attached dynamo colored gray or somewhat white; and electrocuting
Without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered. device locally known as sensored with a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip
or other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was attached to
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. the dynamo direct and with the use of these devices or equipments catches fish
and Endencia, JJ., concur. thru electric current, which destroy any aquatic animals within its cuffed reach, to
the detriment and prejudice of the populace" (Criminal Case No. 5429).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The
Manila prosecution appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order of
dismissal (Civil Case No. SC-36). The case is now before this Court on appeal by the
SECOND DIVISION prosecution under Republic Act No. 5440.

G.R. No. L-32166 October 18, 1977 The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current
is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section I I of the
Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that, since the law does not
vs.
clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot
HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN CFI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, JOSE BUENAVENTURA,
consider it unlawful.
GODOFREDO REYES, BENJAMIN REYES, NAZARIO AQUINO and CARLO DEL
ROSARIO, accused-appellees.
As legal background, it should be stated that section 11 of the Fisheries Law
prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing.
Office of the Solicitor General for appellant.

Rustics F. de los Reyes, Jr. for appellees.

11
Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or SEC. 2. — Prohibition. — It shall be unlawful for any person to
poisonous substance in fishing with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos nor engage in electro fishing or to catch fish by the use of electric
more than five thousand, and by imprisonment for not less than six months nor current in any portion of the Philippine waters except for
more than five years. research, educational and scientific purposes which must be
covered by a permit issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and
It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish .electro fishing." Natural Resources which shall be carried at all times.
Notwithstanding the silence of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries, SEC. 3. — Penalty. — Any violation of the provisions of this
promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224), prohibiting Administrative Order shall subject the offender to a fine of not
electro fishing in all Philippine waters. The order is quoted below: ñé+.£ªwph!1 exceeding five hundred pesos (P500.00) or imprisonment of not
extending six (6) months or both at the discretion of the Court.
SUBJECT: PROHIBITING ELECTRO FISHING IN ALL WATERS ñé+.
£ªwph!1 SEC. 4. — Repealing Provisions. — All administrative orders or
parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this
OF THE PHILIPPINES. Administrative Order are hereby revoked.

Pursuant to Section 4 of Act No. 4003, as amended, and Section 4 of R.A. No. 3512, SEC. 5. — Effectivity. — This Administrative Order shall take effect
the following rules and regulations regarding the prohibition of electro fishing in all six (60) days after its publication in the Office Gazette.
waters of the Philippines are promulgated for the information and guidance of all
concerned.ñé+.£ªwph!1 On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the
recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative
SECTION 1. — Definition. — Words and terms used in this Order Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting
11 construed as follows: the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries (63 O.G. 9963).

(a) Philippine waters or territorial waters of the Philippines' Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the Philippine waters" found in section 2, was
includes all waters of the Philippine Archipelago, as defined in the changed by the amendatory order to read as follows: "in fresh water fisheries in the
t between the United States and Spain, dated respectively the Philippines, such as rivers, lakes, swamps, dams, irrigation canals and other bodies
tenth of December, eighteen hundred ninety eight and the of fresh water."
seventh of November, nineteen hundred. For the purpose of this
order, rivers, lakes and other bodies of fresh waters are included. The Court of First Instance and the prosecution (p. 11 of brief) assumed that electro
fishing is punishable under section 83 of the Fisheries Law (not under section 76
(b) Electro Fishing. — Electro fishing is the catching of fish with the thereof), which provides that any other violation of that law "or of any rules and
use of electric current. The equipment used are of many electrical regulations promulgated thereunder shall subject the offender to a fine of not more
devices which may be battery or generator-operated and from than two hundred pesos (P200), or in t for not more than six months, or both, in the
and available source of electric current. discretion of the court."

(c) 'Persons' includes firm, corporation, association, agent or That assumption is incorrect because 3 of the aforequoted Administrative Order No.
employee. 84 imposes a fm of not exceeding P500 on a person engaged in electro fishing,
which amount the 83. It seems that the Department of Fisheries prescribed their
(d) 'Fish' includes other aquatic products. own penalty for swift fishing which penalty is less than the severe penalty imposed
in section 76 and which is not Identified to the at penalty imposed in section 83.
12
Had Administrative Order No. 84 adopted the fighter penalty prescribed in on 83, pesos, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of
then the crime of electro fishing would be within the exclusive original the court."
jurisdiction  of the inferior court (Sec. 44 [f], Judiciary Law; People vs. Ragasi, L-
28663, September 22, As already pointed out above, the prosecution's reference to section 83 is out of
place because the penalty for electro fishing under Administrative order No. 84 is
We have discussed this pre point, not raised in the briefs, because it is obvious that not the same as the penalty fixed in section 83.
the crime of electro fishing which is punishable with a sum up to P500, falls within
the concurrent original jurisdiction of the inferior courts and the Court of First We are of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
instance (People vs. Nazareno, L-40037, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 531 and the cases the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries
cited therein). Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted
under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512.
And since the instant case was filed in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, a
provincial capital, the order of d rendered by that municipal court was directly The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As
appealable to the Court, not to the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Sec. 45 and electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and
last par. of section 87 of the Judiciary Law; Esperat vs. Avila, L-25992, June 30, 1967, Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it.
20 SCRA 596). In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro
fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
It results that the Court of First Instance of Laguna had no appellate jurisdiction
over the case. Its order affirming the municipal court's order of dismissal is void for Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to
lack of motion. This appeal shall be treated as a direct appeal from the municipal that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.
court to this Court. (See People vs. Del Rosario, 97 Phil. 67).
That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in
In this appeal, the prosecution argues that Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine
were not issued under section 11 of the Fisheries Law which, as indicated above, molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the
punishes fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance. This contention kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations.
is not well-taken because, as already stated, the Penal provision of Administrative
Order No. 84 implies that electro fishing is penalized as a form of fishing by means Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order
of an obnoxious or poisonous substance under section 11. No. 84, in punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense fails
within the category of "other violations" because, as already shown, the penalty for
The prosecution cites as the legal sanctions for the prohibition against electro electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of
fishing in fresh water fisheries (1) the rule-making power of the Department obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in section 76, and is not the same as the
Secretary under section 4 of the Fisheries Law; (2) the function of the Commissioner penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations fixed in section 83 of the
of Fisheries to enforce the provisions of the Fisheries Law and the regulations Fisheries Law.
Promulgated thereunder and to execute the rules and regulations consistent with
the purpose for the creation of the Fisheries Commission and for the development The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare
of fisheries (Sec. 4[c] and [h] Republic Act No. 3512; (3) the declared national policy what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations
to encourage, Promote and conserve our fishing resources (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. (People vs. Exconde
3512), and (4) section 83 of the Fisheries Law which provides that "any other 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11 Am. Jur. 965 on p. 11 32).
violation of" the Fisheries Law or of any rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder "shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred

13
Originally, Administrative Order No. 84 punished electro fishing in all waters. Later, An examination of the rule-making power of executive officials and administrative
the ban against electro fishing was confined to fresh water fisheries. The agencies and, in particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
amendment created the impression that electro fishing is not condemnable per se. (now Secretary of Natural Resources) under the Fisheries Law sustains the view that
It could be tolerated in marine waters. That circumstances strengthens the view he ex his authority in penalizing electro fishing by means of an administrative order.
that the old law does not eschew all forms of electro fishing.
Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking
However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the
the Fisheries Law and that it cannot be penalized merely by executive revolution multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law.
because Presidential Decree No. 704, which is a revision and consolidation of all All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the defects and
laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries and which was promulgated on May purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the law
16, 1975 (71 O.G. 4269), expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh water and salt prescribes (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125; Director of Forestry vs. Muñ;oz, L-
water areas. 24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183, 1198; Geukeko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706,
712).
That decree provides: ñé+.£ªwph!1
The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement
SEC. 33. — Illegal fishing, dealing in illegally caught fish or of a particular statute (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 125, citing U.S. vs.
fishery/aquatic products. — It shall he unlawful for any person to Grimaud 220 U.S. 506; Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. vs. Coll. of Internal Revenue,
catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish 98 Phil. 290, 295-6).
or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of
explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the
electricity as defined in paragraphs (1), (m) and (d), respectively, principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondeleption of
of Section 3 hereof: ... legislative, powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation calculated
to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of
The decree Act No. 4003, as amended, Republic Acts Nos. 428, 3048, 3512 and modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
3586, Presidential Decrees Nos. 43, 534 and 553, and all , Acts, Executive Orders, increased difficulty of administering the law" Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726;
rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with it (Sec. 49, P. D. No. 704). People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeñ;a, 68 Phil. 328).

The inclusion in that decree of provisions defining and penalizing electro fishing is a Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
clear recognition of the deficiency or silence on that point of the old Fisheries Law. department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for
It is an admission that a mere executive regulation is not legally adequate to the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations,
penalize electro fishing. of course, the law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, supra). An
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos vs. Estenzo, 109
Note that the definition of electro fishing, which is found in section 1 (c) of Fisheries Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the d of Administrators, L-25619, June 30,
Administrative Order No. 84 and which is not provided for the old Fisheries Law, is 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29,
now found in section 3(d) of the decree. Note further that the decree penalty 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).
electro fishing by "imprisonment from two (2) to four (4) years", a punishment
which is more severe than the penalty of a time of not excluding P500 or The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
imprisonment of not more than six months or both fixed in section 3 of Fisheries proceeding to carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be
Administrative Order No. 84. extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace
matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be
sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas vs. Board of Tax A 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12
14
C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see of Internal Revenue vs. Villaflor 69 Phil. Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Santiago, L-29236, August 21, 1974, 58
319, Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del March vs. Phil. Veterans SCRA 493, 496-8).
Administrative, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).
"Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or
There is no question that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of
rule-making powers. Section 4 of the Fisheries law provides that the Secretary "shall a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided
from time to time issue instructions, orders, and regulations consistent" with that in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after
law, "as may be and proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof." That power expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the
is now vested in the Secretary of Natural Resources by on 7 of the Revised Fisheries legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are oftentimes left to
law, Presidential December No. 704. the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been
said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new
Section 4(h) of Republic Act No. 3512 empower the Co of Fisheries "to prepare and or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law." The rule or regulation
execute upon the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to
forms instructions, rules and regulations consistent with the purpose" of that the administrative agency. (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited in Victories
enactment "and for the development of fisheries." Milling Co., Inc. vs. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558).

Section 79(B) of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "the Department In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to
Head shall have the power to promulgate, whenever he may see fit do so, all rules, implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go
regulates, orders, memorandums, and other instructions, not contrary to law, to beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law (People vs. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091).
regulate the proper working and harmonious and efficient administration of each
and all of the offices and dependencies of his Department, and for the strict This Court in its decision in the Lim case, supra, promulgated on July 26, 1960, called
enforcement and proper execution of the laws relative to matters under the the attention of technical men in the executive departments, who draft rules and
jurisdiction of said Department; but none of said rules or orders shall prescribe regulations, to the importance and necessity of closely following the legal provisions
penalties for the violation thereof, except as expressly authorized by law." which they intend to implement so as to avoid any possible misunderstanding or
confusion.
Administrative regulations issued by a Department Head in conformity with law
have the force of law (Valerie vs. Secretary of culture and Natural Resources, 117 The rule is that the violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer of the
Phil. 729, 733; Antique Sawmills, Inc. vs. Zayco, L- 20051, May 30, 1966, 17 SCRA government in conformity with and based upon a statute authorizing such
316). As he exercises the rule-making power by delegation of the lawmaking body, regulation constitutes an offense and renders the offender liable to punishment in
it is a requisite that he should not transcend the bound demarcated by the statute accordance with the provisions of the law (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 124).
for the exercise of that power; otherwise, he would be improperly exercising
legislative power in his own right and not as a surrogate of the lawmaking body. In other words, a violation or infringement of a rule or regulation validly issued can
constitute a crime punishable as provided in the authorizing statute and by virtue of
Article 7 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle that administrative or the latter (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125, 1132).
executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary
to the laws or the Constitution." It has been held that "to declare what shall constitute a crime and how it shall be
punished is a power vested exclusively in the legislature, and it may not be
As noted by Justice Fernando, "except for constitutional officials who can trace their delegated to any other body or agency" (1 Am. Jur. 2nd, sec. 127, p. 938; Texas Co.
competence to act to the fundamental law itself, a public office must be in the vs. Montgomery, 73 F. Supp. 527).
statute relied upon a grant of power before he can exercise it." "department zeal
may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute." (Radio
15
In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in or by necessary implication conferred upon it. (Glustrom vs. State, 206 Ga. 734, 58
accordance with the Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was issued, because Second 2d 534; See 2 Am. Jr. 2nd 129-130).
the law itself does not expressly punish electro fishing.
Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and
The instant case is similar to People vs. Santos, 63 Phil. 300. The Santos  case boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the
involves section 28 of Fish and Game Administrative Order No. 2 issued by the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the aforementioned which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise
section 4 of the Fisheries Law. of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to
legislate (State vs. Miles, Wash. 2nd 322, 105 Pac. 2nd 51).
Section 28 contains the proviso that a fishing boat not licensed under the Fisheries
Law and under the said administrative order may fish within three kilometers of the In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear
shoreline of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval that the order is one which falls within the scope of the authority conferred upon
and military reservations authorities of the United States only upon receiving the administrative body, and the order will be scrutinized with special care. (State
written permission therefor, which permission may be granted by the Secretary vs. Miles supra).
upon recommendation of the military or naval authorities concerned. A violation of
the proviso may be proceeded against under section 45 of the Federal Penal Code. The Miles case involved a statute which authorized the State Game Commission "to
adopt, promulgate, amend and/or repeal, and enforce reasonable rules and
Augusto A. Santos was prosecuted under that provision in the Court of First regulations governing and/or prohibiting the taking of the various classes of game.
Instance of Cavite for having caused his two fishing boats to fish, loiter and anchor
without permission from the Secretary within three kilometers from the shoreline Under that statute, the Game Commission promulgated a rule that "it shall be
of Corrigidor Island. unlawful to offer, pay or receive any reward, prize or compensation for the hunting,
pursuing, taking, killing or displaying of any game animal, game bird or game fish or
This Court held that the Fisheries Law does not prohibit boats not subject to license any part thereof."
from fishing within three kilometers of the shoreline of islands and reservations
over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United Beryl S. Miles, the owner of a sporting goods store, regularly offered a ten-down
States, without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources cash prize to the person displaying the largest deer in his store during the open for
upon recommendation of the military and naval authorities concerned. hunting such game animals. For that act, he was charged with a violation of the rule
Promulgated by the State Game Commission.
As the said law does not penalize the act mentioned in section 28 of the
administrative order, the promulgation of that provision by the Secretary "is It was held that there was no statute penalizing the display of game. What the
equivalent to legislating on the matter, a power which has not been and cannot be statute penalized was the taking of game. If the lawmaking body desired to prohibit
delegated to him, it being expressly reserved" to the lawmaking body. "Such an act the display of game, it could have readily said so. It was not lawful for the
constitutes not only an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon the administrative board to extend or modify the statute. Hence, the indictment against
Secretary but also an exercise of a legislative power which he does not have, and Miles was quashed. The Miles case is similar to this case.
therefore" the said provision "is null and void and without effect". Hence, the
charge against Santos was dismiss. WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision of June 9, 1970 is set aside for lack of
appellate jurisdiction and the order of dismissal rendered by the municipal court of
A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right to Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Criminal Case No. 5429 is affirmed. Costs de oficio.
make ranks and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power
should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. An SO ORDERED.
administrative agency can have only the administrative or policing powers expressly
16
 Republic of the Philippines use and enjoy their private property and of their freedom to travel and hold family
SUPREME COURT gatherings, reunions and outings on week-ends and holidays," inviting attention to
Manila the fact that others not included in the ban enjoying "unrestricted freedom." 6 It
would follow, so they contend that Memorandum Circular No. 39 imposing
EN BANC penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license is likewise
unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of "undue delegation of
G.R. No. L-50908 January 31, 1984 legislative power." 7 It is to be noted that such Memorandum Circular does not
impose the penalty of confiscation but merely that of impounding, fine, and for the
third offense that of cancellation of certificate of registration and for the rest of the
MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA and ENRIQUE D. BAUTISTA, petitioners,
year or for ninety days whichever is longer.
vs.
ALFREDO L. JUINIO, ROMEO F. EDU and FIDEL V. RAMOS, respondents.
This Court gave due course to the petition requiring respondent to answer. There
was admission of the facts as substantially alleged except, as previously noted, that
Mary Concepcion Bautista for and in his own behalf.
the ban starts at 12:00 a.m. rather than 1:00 a.m. of a Saturday or of a holiday and
as to the mention of a Willy's Kaiser jeep being registered in the name of a certain
The Solicitor General for respondents. Teresita Urbina, about which respondents had no knowledge. There was a denial of
the allegations that the classification of vehicles into heavy H and extra heavy (EH)
on the other hand and light and bantam on the other hand was violative of equal
protection and the regulation as to the use of the former cars on the dates specified
FERNANDO, C.J.: a transgression of due process. The answer likewise denied that there was an undue
delegation of legislative power, reference being made to the Land Transportation
The validity of an energy conservation measure, Letter of Instruction No. 869, issued and Traffic Code. 8 There was also a procedural objection raised, namely, that what
on May 31, 1979 — the response to the protracted oil crisis that dates back to 1974 is sought amounts at most to an advisory opinion rather than an ajudication of a
— is put in issue in this prohibition proceeding filed by petitioners, spouses Mary case or controversy.
Concepcion Bautista and Enrique D. Bautista, for being allegedly violative of the due
process and equal protection guarantees 1 of the Constitution. The use of private Petitioners filed a motion to be allowed to reply to the answer. It was granted. The
motor vehicles with H and EH plates on week-ends and holidays was banned from reply, considering its exhaustive character serving as its memorandum, stressed
"[12:00] a.m. Saturday morning to 5:00 a.m. Monday morning, or 1:00 a.m. of the anew what it emphasized as the arbitrary, unreasonable, and oppressive aspects of
holiday to 5:00 a.m. of the day after the holiday." 2 Motor vehicles of the following the challenged Letter of Instruction and Memorandum Circular No. 39. It disputed
classifications are exempted: (a) S (Service); (b) T (Truck); (e) DPL (Diplomatic); (d) what it characterized as an "erroneous and arbitrary presumption that heavy car
CC (Consular Corps); (e) TC (Tourist Cars). 3 Pursuant thereto, respondent Alfredo L. owners unnecessarily use and therefore waste gasoline whenever they drive their
Juinio, then Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications and cars on week-ends and holidays;" 9 it stigmatized the ban as defeating its "avowed
respondent Romeo P. Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission purpose in the case of the affluent who own not only heavy limousines but also
issued on June 11, 1979, Memorandum Circular No. 39, which imposed "the many small cars [as] they may be compelled to use at least two small
penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners cars;" 10 referred to the high cost of taxis or other public transports for those "not
of the above-specified vehicles" found violating such Letter of Instruction. 4 It was able to afford expensive small cars [possibly] only one heavy and possible old
then alleged by petitioners that "while the purpose for the issuance of the LOI 869 model;" 11 cited the case of "many eight cylinder vehicles which because of their
is laudable, to wit, energy conservation, the provision banning the use of H and EH weight have been registered as light but in fact consume more or as much gasoline
[vehicles] is unfair, discriminatory, [amounting to an] arbitrary classification" and as the banned vehicles." 12 Their conclusion is that "the ban imposed, in result and
thus in contravention of the equal protection clause. 5 Moreover, for them, such effect is class legislation." 13
Letter of Instruction is a denial of due process, more specifically, "of their right to

17
The parties were required to submit memoranda. Respondents did so but not constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality
petitioners. They relied on their reply to the answer — as noted, a rather must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing
comprehensive pleading. For reasons to be set forth, this Court holds that the the statute.' " 21
petition cannot prosper.
3. It is true, of course, that there may be instances where a police power measure
1. First as to the procedural objection. In the memorandum for respondents, one of may, because of its arbitrary, oppressive or unjust character, be held offensive to
the issues raised was whether "the power of judicial review may be invoked the due process clause and, therefore, may, when challenged in an appropriate
considering the inadequacy of the record and the highly abstract and academic legal proceeding, be declared void on its face. This is not one of them. A recital of
questions raised by the petitioners." 14 It is inaccurate to say that the record is the whereas clauses of the Letter of Instruction makes it clear. Thus: "[Whereas],
inadequate. It does not admit of doubt that the ban applies to petitioners who are developments in the international petroleum supply situation continue to follow a
"the registered owners of an eight cylinder 1969 Buick, and the vendees of a six trend of limited production and spiralling prices thereby precluding the possibility of
cylinder Willy's kaiser jeep, which are both classified as heavy or H." 15 To that immediate relief in supplies within the foreseeable future; [Whereas], the
extent, therefore, the enforcement of the assailed Letter of Instruction will amount uncertainty of fuel supply availability underscores a compelling need for the
to a deprivation of what otherwise would be a valid exercise of a property right. adoption of positive measures designed to insure the viability of the country's
Thus they fall squarely within "the unchallenged rule" as to who may raise a economy and sustain its developmental growth; [Whereas], to cushion the effect of
constitutional question, namely, to quote the language of Justice Laurel in the increasing oil prices and avoid fuel supply disruptions, it is imperative to adopt a
leading case of People v. Vera, 16 "that the person who impugns the validity of a program directed towards the judicious use of our energy resources complemented
statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has with intensified conservation efforts and efficient utilization thereof; * * *." 22 That
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. 17 Moreover, is undeniable is that the action taken is an appropriate response to a problem that
that rule has been considerably relaxed. 18 The question then is neither abstract presses urgently for solution. It may not be the only alternative, but its
nor academic as contended by respondents. reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus, to repeat, substantive due process,
which is the epitome of reasonableness and fair play, is not ignored, much less
2. There is, however, this formidable obstacle that confronts petitioners. What they infringed.
seek is for this Court to hold that a Letter of Instruction, a regulatory measure
precisely enacted to cope with the serious and grave problem of energy 4. In the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power, especially so
conservation, is void on its face. Such a task is rendered unusually difficult by what where the assailed governmental action deals with the use of one's property, the
has been referred to by Justice Laurel in the leading case of Angara v. Electoral latter is accorded much leeway. That is settled law. What is more, it is good law.
Commission 19 as the "presumption of constitutionality" and by the same jurist in Due process, therefore, cannot be validly invoked. As stressed in the cited Ermita-
the case of People v. Vera  20 in slightly different words "a presumption that such an Malate Hotel decision: "To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow
act falls within constitutional limitations." There is need then for a factual the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most
foundation of invalidity. In the language of Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operations essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does 'to all the
Association, Inc. v. City Mayor or Manila: "It admits of no doubt therefore that there great public needs.' It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy
being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived
unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the
case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading general welfare. Negatively put, police power is 'that inherent and plenary power in
case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., where the American the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and
Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the welfare of society.' " 23
matter thus: 'The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the
scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the 5. The due process question having been disposed of, there is still the objection
specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the based on the equal protection clause to be considered. A governmental act may not
plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the be offensive to the due process clause, but may run counter to such a guarantee.

18
Such is the case when there is no rational basis for the classification followed. That Constitution to adhere to the policy of all or none." 27 It is quite obvious then that
is the point raised by petitioners. For them, there is no rational justification for the no equal protection question arises.
ban being imposed on vehicles classified as heavy (H) and extra-heavy (EH), for
precisely those owned by them fall within such category. Tested by the applicable 7. It may not be amiss to refer to a 1981 American Supreme Court
standard that must be satisfied to avoid the charge of a denial of equal protection, decision, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Company. 28 Respondent along with
the objection of petitioners is shown to be lacking in merit. Such a classification on several other business corporations adversely affected involved in the manufacture
its face cannot be characterized as an affront to reason. A legal norm according and utilization of plastic milk containers filed suit in a Minnesota district court
to J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration,  24 "whether embodied in seeking to enjoin enforcement of a Minnesota statute banning the retail sale of milk
a rule, principle, or standard, constitutes a defense against anarchy at one extreme in plastic nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, but permitting such sale in other
and tyranny at the other. Thereby, people living together in a community with its nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, such as paperboard, milk cartons. After
myriad and complex problems can minimize the friction and reduce the conflicts, to conducting extensive evidentiary hearings, the Minnesota court enjoined
assure, at the very least, a peaceful ordering of existence. The Ideal situation is for enforcement of the statute, finding that it violated among others the equal
the law's benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The
its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of reversed, with only Justice Stevens dissenting. The opinion by Justice Brennan noted
the Idea of law. The actual, given things as they are and likely to continue to be, that "proponents of the legislation argued that it would promote resource
cannot approximate the Ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it conservation, ease solid waste disposal problems, and conserve energy." 29 That
does not take into account the realties of the situation. * * * To assure that the sufficed for the Court to conclude "that the ban on plastic nonreturnable milk
general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may containers bears a rational relation to the State's objectives, and must be sustained
cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such under the Equal Protection Clause." 30 It does show that notwithstanding the "new
circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the equal protection approach" with its emphasis on "suspect classification" and
governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the "fundamental rights and interests standard," a concept so ably expounded by
common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, professor Gunther, the "rational relation test" 31 still retains its validity. Not that
discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate there could be any objection to the classification here followed as being in any way
equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons susceptible to such a pejorative expression as "suspect" or that the assailed Letter
must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the of Instruction does not qualify under "the fundamental rights and interests"
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference standard
cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be
given to every person under circumstances, which if not Identical are analogous. If 8. There was set forth in the petition what were referred to as "other reasonable
law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class measures which the authorities concerned with energy conservation can take
should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the immediately, which are in fact acceptable and obviously called for and should have
group equally binding on the rest." 25 been done long ago, to wit: 1. require and establish taxi stands equipped with
efficient telephone and communication systems; 2. strict implementation and
6. Nor does it militate against the validity of the Letter of Instruction just because observance of cargo truck hours on main arteries; 3. strict observance of traffic
the ban imposed does not go as far as it could have and therefore could be less rules; 4. effective solution of traffic problems and decongestion of traffic through
efficacious in character. That was the solution which for the President expressing a rerouting and quick repair of roads and efficient operation of double decker buses;
power validly lodged in him, recommended itself. There was a situation that called 5. rationing of gasoline to avoid panic buying and give the private car owner the
for a corrective measure. He decided that what was issued by him would do just option and responsibility of deciding on the use of his allocation; 6. allow neon and
that or, at the very least, help in easing the situation. That it did not cover other electrically devised advertising signs only from five o'clock p.m. to nine o'clock p.m.
matters which could very well have been regulated does not call for a declaration of 7. prohibit immediately the importation of heavy and luxury cars and seriously re-
nullity. The President, to paraphrase Lutz v. Araneta,  26 "is not required by the examine the car manufacturing program." 32 Admittedly, such measures are

19
conducive to energy conservation. The question before us however is limited to is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law
whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum Circular means.' It cannot be otherwise as the Constitution limits the authority of the
No. 39 is violative of certain constitutional rights. It goes no further than that. The President, in whom all executive power resides, to take care that the laws be
determination of the mode and manner through which the objective of minimizing faithfully executed. No lesser administrative executive office or agency then can,
the consumption of oil products may be attained is left to the discretion of the contrary to the express language of the Constitution, assert for itself a more
political branches. 33 Absent therefore the alleged infringement of constitutional extensive prerogative." 36 It was alleged in the Answer of Solicitor General Estelito P.
rights, more precisely the due process and equal protection guarantees, this Court Mendoza that Letter of Instruction 869 and Memorandum Circular No. 39 were
cannot adjudge Letter of Instruction No. 869 as tainted by unconstitutionality. adopted pursuant to the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. 37 It contains a
specific provision as to penalties. 38 Thus: "For violation of any provisions of this Act
9. It was likewise contended that Memorandum Circular No. 39, issued by the then or regulations promulgated pursuant hereto, not hereinbefore specifically
respondent Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, and punished, a fine of not less than ten nor more than fifty pesos shall be
then respondent Land Transportation Commissioner, imposing the penalties "of imposed." 39 Memorandum Circular No. 39 cannot be held to be ultra vires as long
fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of license is likewise unconstitutional," as the fine imposed is not less than ten nor more than fifty pesos. As to suspension
petitioners invoking the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. 34 To that of registration, 40 the Code, insofar as applicable, provides: "Whenever it shall
extent that a Letter of Instruction may be viewed as an exercise of the decree- appear from the records of the Commission that during any twelve-month period
making power of the President, then such an argument is futile. If, however, viewed more than three warnings for violations of this Act have been given to the owner of
as a compliance with the duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, as a a motor vehicle, or that the said owner has been convicted by a competent court
consequence of which subordinate executive officials may in turn issue more than once for violation of such laws, the Commissioner may, in his discretion,
implementing rules and regulations, then the objection would properly be suspend the certificate of registration for a period not exceeding ninety days and,
considered as an ultra vires allegation. There is this relevant excerpt from Teoxon v. thereupon, shall require the immediate surrender of the number plates * * *." 41 It
Member of the Board of Administrators:  35  "1. The recognition of the power of follows that while the imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under
administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of the statute, the conditions therein set forth is valid under the Land Transportation and Traffic
necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment, may be Code, the impounding of a vehicle finds no statutory justification. To apply that
found in the early case of United States v. Barrias decided in 1908. Then came, in a portion of Memorandum Circular No. 39 would be ultra vires. It must likewise be
1914 decision, United States v. Tupasi Molina, a delineation of the scope of such made clear that a penalty even if warranted can only be imposed in accordance
competence. Thus: 'Of course the regulations adopted under legislative authority by with the procedure required by law. 42
a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for
the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.
of course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as the regulations
relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid.' In 1936, Aquino, Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr.,
in People v. Santos, this Court expressed its disapproval of an administrative order JJ., concur.
that would amount to an excess of the regulatory power vested in an administrative
official. We reaffirmed such a doctrine in a 1951 decision, where we again made Makasiar and Concepcion J., took no part.
clear that where an administrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the
provisions of the Act, 'the mandate of the Act must prevail and must be followed.'
Justice Barrera, speaking for the Court in Victorias Milling Company, Inc. v. Social
Security Commission, citing Parker as well as Davis did tersely sum up the matter
thus: 'A rule is binding on tile courts so long as the procedure fixed for its Republic of the Philippines
promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory granted by the SUPREME COURT
legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or Manila
its innate wisdom * * *. On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law
EN BANC
20
G.R. No. 78385 August 31, 1987 The DECS took note of the report of the Task Force and on the basis of the same,
the DECS, through the respondent Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports
PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner, (hereinafter referred to as the respondent Secretary), issued an Order
vs. authorizing, inter alia, the 15% to 20% increase in school fees as recommended by
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondent. the Task Force. The petitioner sought a reconsideration of the said Order,
apparently on the ground that the increases were too high. 2 Thereafter, the DECS
issued Department Order No. 37 dated April 10, 1987 modifying its previous Order
and reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10% to 15%, accordingly. 3 Despite
this reduction, the petitioner still opposed the increases. On April 23, 1987, the
GANCAYCO, J.:
petitioner, through counsel, sent a telegram to the President of the Philippines
urging the suspension of the implementation of Department Order No. 37. 4 No
This is an original Petition for prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of response appears to have been obtained from the Office of the President.
preliminary injunction.
Thus, on May 20, 1987, the petitioner, allegedly on the basis of the public interest,
The record of the case discloses that the herein petitioner Philippine Consumers went to this Court and filed the instant Petition for prohibition, seeking that
Foundation, Inc. is a non-stock, non-profit corporate entity duly organized and judgment be rendered declaring the questioned Department Order
existing under the laws of the Philippines. The herein respondent Secretary of unconstitutional. The thrust of the Petition is that the said Department Order was
Education, Culture and Sports is a ranking cabinet member who heads the issued without any legal basis. The petitioner also maintains that the questioned
Department of Education, Culture and Sports of the Office of the President of the Department Order was issued in violation of the due process clause of the
Philippines. Constitution in asmuch as the petitioner was not given due notice and hearing
before the said Department Order was issued.
On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education created by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (hereinafter referred to as the DECS) In support of the first argument, the petitioner argues that while the DECS is
submitted a report entitled "Report and Recommendations on a Policy for Tuition authorized by law to regulate school fees in educational institutions, the power to
and Other School Fees." The report favorably recommended to the DECS the regulate does not always include the power to increase school fees. 5
following courses of action with respect to the Government's policy on increases in
school fees for the schoolyear 1987 to 1988 —
Regarding the second argument, the petitioner maintains that students and parents
are interested parties that should be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before
(1) Private schools may be allowed to increase its total school fees school fees are increased. In sum, the petitioner stresses that the questioned Order
by not more than 15 per cent to 20 per cent without the need for constitutes a denial of substantive and procedural due process of law.
the prior approval of the DECS. Schools that wish to increase
school fees beyond the ceiling would be subject to the discretion
Complying with the instructions of this Court, 6 the respondent Secretary submitted
of the DECS;
a Comment on the Petition. 7 The respondent Secretary maintains, inter alia, that
the increase in tuition and other school fees is urgent and necessary, and that the
(2) Any private school may increase its total school fees in excess assailed Department Order is not arbitrary in character. In due time, the petitioner
of the ceiling, provided that the total schools fees will not exceed submitted a Reply to the Comment. 8 Thereafter, We considered the case submitted
P1,000.00 for the schoolyear in the elementary and secondary for resolution.
levels, and P50.00 per academic unit on a semestral basis for the
collegiate level. 1
After a careful examination of the entire record of the case, We find the instant
Petition devoid of merit.

21
We are not convinced by the argument that the power to regulate school fees prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process.
"does not always include the power to increase" such fees. Section 57 (3) of Batas As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-
Pambansa Blg. 232, otherwise known as The Education Act of 1982, vests the DECS judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates.
with the power to regulate the educational system in the country, to wit: When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to
apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of
SEC. 57. Educations and powers of the Ministry. The Ministry a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a
shall: particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in
character. 9a
xxx xxx xxx
Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislative
(3) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the function? We believe so. The assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum
administration, supervision and regulation of the educational school fees that may be charged by all private schools in the country for schoolyear
system in accordance with declared policy. 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity
of its issuance.
xxx xxx xxx 9
This observation notwithstanding, there is a failure on the part of the petitioner to
show clear and convincing evidence of such arbitrariness. As the record of the case
Section 70 of the same Act grants the DECS the power to issue rules which are
discloses, the DECS is not without any justification for the issuance of the
likewise necessary to discharge its functions and duties under the law, to wit:
questioned Department Order. It would be reasonable to assume that the report of
the Task Force created by the DECS, on which it based its decision to allow an
SEC. 70. Rule-making Authority. — The Minister of Education and increase in school fees, was made judiciously. Moreover, upon the instance of the
Culture, charged with the administration and enforcement of this petitioner, as it so admits in its Petition, the DECS had actually reduced the original
Act, shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and rates of 15% to 20% down to 10% to 15%, accordingly. Under the circumstances
regulations. peculiar to this case, We cannot consider the assailed Department Order arbitrary.

In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to Under the Rules of Court, it is presumed that official duty has been regularly
prescribe school fees. No other government agency has been vested with the performed. 10 In the absence of proof to the contrary, that presumption prevails.
authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged This being so, the burden of proof is on the party assailing the regularity of official
with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties proceedings. In the case at bar, the petitioner has not successfully disputed the
under the law. presumption.

We find the remaining argument of the petitioner untenable. The petitioner invokes We commend the petitioner for taking the cudgels for the public, especially the
the due process clause of the Constitution against the alleged arbitrariness of the parents and the students of the country. Its zeal in advocating the protection of the
assailed Department Order. The petitioner maintains that the due process clause consumers in its activities should be lauded rather than discouraged. But a more
requires that prior notice and hearing are indispensable for the Department Order convincing case should be made out by it if it is to seek relief from the courts some
to be validly issued. time in the future. Petitioner must establish that respondent acted without or in
excess of her jurisdiction; or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal
We disagree. or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
before the extraordinary writ of prohibition may issue. 11
The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a
legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of

22
This Court, however, does not go to the extent of saying that it gives its The tax refund is being re-claimed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
judicial imprimatur to future increases in school fees. The increases must not be (Commissioner) in this petition.
unreasonable and arbitrary so as to amount to an outrageous exercise of
government authority and power. In such an eventuality, this Court will not hesitate The following undisputed facts, summarized by the Court of Appeals, are quoted in
to exercise the power of judicial review in its capacity as the ultimate guardian of the assailed Decision1 dated 28 September 2004:
the Constitution.
CAG.R. SP No. 80675
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for prohibition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs. xxxx

SO ORDERED. Petitioner2 is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under and by
virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, with principal address at
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Fortune Avenue, Parang, Marikina City.
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Petitioner is the manufacturer/producer of, among others, the following cigarette
brands, with tax rate classification based on net retail price prescribed by Annex "D"
to R.A. No. 4280, to wit:

Republic of the Philippines Brand Tax Rate

SUPREME COURT
Manila Champion M 100 ₱1.00
Salem M 100 ₱1.00
SECOND DIVISION
Salem M King ₱1.00
G.R. Nos. 167274-75               July 21, 2008
Camel F King ₱1.00
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, Camel Lights Box 20’s ₱1.00
vs.
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, Respondent. Camel Filters Box 20’s ₱1.00
Winston F Kings ₱5.00
DECISION
Winston Lights ₱5.00
TINGA, J.:
Immediately prior to January 1, 1997, the above-mentioned cigarette brands were
Simple and uncomplicated is the central issue involved, yet whopping is the amount subject to ad valorem tax pursuant to then Section 142 of the Tax Code of 1977, as
at stake in this case. amended. However, on January 1, 1997, R.A. No. 8240 took effect whereby a shift
from the ad valorem tax (AVT) system to the specific tax system was made and
After much wrangling in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) and the Court of Appeals, subjecting the aforesaid cigarette brands to specific tax under [S]ection 142 thereof,
Fortune Tobacco Corporation (Fortune Tobacco) was granted a tax refund or tax now renumbered as Sec. 145 of the Tax Code of 1997, pertinent provisions of which
credit representing specific taxes erroneously collected from its tobacco products. are quoted thus:
23
Section 145. Cigars and Cigarettes- increase shall take effect in two tranches: fifty percent (50%) of the increase shall be
effective in 1997 and one hundred percent (100%) of the increase shall be effective
(A) Cigars. – There shall be levied, assessed and collected on cigars a tax of in 1998.
One peso (₱1.00) per cigar.
Duly registered or existing brands of cigarettes or new brands thereof packed by
"(B) Cigarettes packed by hand. – There shall be levied, assessesed and machine shall only be packed in twenties.
collected on cigarettes packed by hand a tax of Forty centavos (P0.40) per
pack. The rates of excise tax on cigars and cigarettes under paragraphs (1), (2) (3) and
(4) hereof, shall be increased by twelve percent (12%) on January 1, 2000.
(C) Cigarettes packed by machine. – There shall be levied, assessed and (Emphasis supplied)
collected on cigarettes packed by machine a tax at the rates prescribed
below: New brands shall be classified according to their current net retail price.

(1) If the net retail price (excluding the excise tax and the value- For the above purpose, ‘net retail price’ shall mean the price at which the cigarette
added tax) is above Ten pesos (₱10.00) per pack, the tax shall be is sold on retail in twenty (20) major supermarkets in Metro Manila (for brands of
Twelve (₱12.00) per pack; cigarettes marketed nationally), excluding the amount intended to cover the
applicable excise tax and value-added tax. For brands which are marketed only
(2) If the net retail price (excluding the excise tax and the value outside Metro [M]anila, the ‘net retail price’ shall mean the price at which the
added tax) exceeds Six pesos and Fifty centavos (₱6.50) but does cigarette is sold in five (5) major supermarkets in the region excluding the amount
not exceed Ten pesos (₱10.00) per pack, the tax shall be Eight intended to cover the applicable excise tax and the value-added tax.
Pesos (₱8.00) per pack.
The classification of each brand of cigarettes based on its average retail price as of
(3) If the net retail price (excluding the excise tax and the value- October 1, 1996, as set forth in Annex "D," shall remain in force until revised by
added tax) is Five pesos (₱5.00) but does not exceed Six Pesos and Congress.
fifty centavos (₱6.50) per pack, the tax shall be Five pesos (₱5.00)
per pack; Variant of a brand shall refer to a brand on which a modifier is prefixed and/or
suffixed to the root name of the brand and/or a different brand which carries the
(4) If the net retail price (excluding the excise tax and the value- same logo or design of the existing brand.
added tax) is below Five pesos (₱5.00) per pack, the tax shall
be One peso (₱1.00) per pack; To implement the provisions for a twelve percent (12%) increase of excise tax on,
among others, cigars and cigarettes packed by machines by January 1, 2000, the
"Variants of existing brands of cigarettes which are introduced in the domestic Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the respondent Commissioner of
market after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8240 shall be taxed under the highest Internal Revenue, issued Revenue Regulations No. 17-99, dated December 16, 1999,
classification of any variant of that brand. which provides the increase on the applicable tax rates on cigar and cigarettes as
follows:
The excise tax from any brand of cigarettes within the next three (3) years from the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8240 shall not be lower than the tax, which is due from each NEW SPECIFIC
brand on October 1, 1996. Provided, however, that in cases were (sic) the excise tax PRESENT SPECIFIC
SECTIO TAX RATE
rate imposed in paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) hereinabove will result in an increase ARTICLES TAX RATE PRIOR
N EFFECTIVE JAN.
in excise tax of more than seventy percent (70%), for a brand of cigarette, the TO JAN. 1, 2000
1, 2000

24
 145 (A) P1.00/cigar ₱1.12/cigar As there was no action on the part of the respondent, petitioner filed the instant
petition for review with this Court on December 11, 2001, in order to comply with
  (B)Cigarettes packed the two-year period for filing a claim for refund.
by machine
(1) Net retail price ₱12.00/pack ₱13.44/ pack In his answer filed on January 16, 2002, respondent raised the following Special and
(excluding VAT and Affirmative Defenses;
excise) exceeds
₱10.00 per pack 4. Petitioner’s alleged claim for refund is subject to administrative
routinary investigation/examination by the Bureau;
(2) Exceeds ₱10.00 ₱8.00/pack ₱8.96/pack
per pack 5. The amount of ₱35,651,410 being claimed by petitioner as alleged
(3) Net retail price ₱5.00/pack ₱5.60/pack overpaid excise tax for the month of January 2000 was not properly
(excluding VAT and documented.
excise) is ₱5.00 to
₱6.50 per pack 6. In an action for tax refund, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to
establish its right to refund, and failure to sustain the burden is fatal to its
(4) Net Retail Price ₱1.00/pack ₱1.12/pack claim for refund/credit.
(excluding VAT and
excise) is below ₱5.00 7. Petitioner must show that it has complied with the provisions of Section
per pack 204(C) in relation [to] Section 229 of the Tax Code on the prescriptive
period for claiming tax refund/credit;
Revenue Regulations No. 17-99 likewise provides in the last paragraph of Section 1
thereof, "(t)hat the new specific tax rate for any existing brand of cigars, cigarettes 8. Claims for refund are construed strictly against the claimant for the
packed by machine, distilled spirits, wines and fermented liquor shall not be lower same partake of tax exemption from taxation; and
than the excise tax that is actually being paid prior to January 1, 2000."
9. The last paragraph of Section 1 of Revenue Regulation[s] [No.]17-99 is a
For the period covering January 1-31, 2000, petitioner allegedly paid specific taxes valid implementing regulation which has the force and effect of law."
on all brands manufactured and removed in the total amounts of ₱585,705,250.00.
CA G.R. SP No. 83165
On February 7, 2000, petitioner filed with respondent’s Appellate Division a claim
for refund or tax credit of its purportedly overpaid excise tax for the month of The petition contains essentially similar facts, except that the said case questions
January 2000 in the amount of ₱35,651,410.00 the CTA’s December 4, 2003 decision in CTA Case No. 6612 granting
respondent’s3 claim for refund of the amount of ₱355,385,920.00 representing
On June 21, 2001, petitioner filed with respondent’s Legal Service a letter dated erroneously or illegally collected specific taxes covering the period January 1, 2002
June 20, 2001 reiterating all the claims for refund/tax credit of its overpaid excise to December 31, 2002, as well as its March 17, 2004 Resolution denying a
taxes filed on various dates, including the present claim for the month of January reconsideration thereof.
2000 in the amount of ₱35,651,410.00.
xxxx

25
In both CTA Case Nos. 6365 & 6383 and CTA No. 6612, the Court of Tax Appeals Meanwhile, on December 4, 2003, the Court of Tax Appeals rendered decision in
reduced the issues to be resolved into two as stipulated by the parties, to wit: (1) CTA Case No. 6612 granting the prayer for the refund of the amount of
Whether or not the last paragraph of Section 1 of Revenue Regulation[s] [No.] 17-99 ₱355,385,920.00 representing overpaid excise tax for the period covering January 1,
is in accordance with the pertinent provisions of Republic Act [No.] 8240, now 2002 to December 31, 2002. The tax court disposed of the case as follows:
incorporated in Section 145 of the Tax Code of 1997; and (2) Whether or not
petitioner is entitled to a refund of ₱35,651,410.00 as alleged overpaid excise tax IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. Accordingly,
for the month of January 2000. respondent is hereby ORDERED to REFUND to petitioner the amount of
₱355,385,920.00 representing overpaid excise tax for the period covering January 1,
xxxx 2002 to December 31, 2002.

Hence, the respondent CTA in its assailed October 21, 2002 [twin] Decisions[s] SO ORDERED.
disposed in CTA Case Nos. 6365 & 6383:
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision, but the same was denied in a
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court finds the instant petition Resolution dated March 17, 2004.4 (Emphasis supplied) (Citations omitted)
meritorious and in accordance with law. Accordingly, respondent is hereby
ORDERED to REFUND to petitioner the amount of ₱35,651.410.00 representing The Commissioner appealed the aforesaid decisions of the CTA. The petition
erroneously paid excise taxes for the period January 1 to January 31, 2000. questioning the grant of refund in the amount of ₱680,387,025.00 was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 80675, whereas that assailing the grant of refund in the amount of
SO ORDERED. ₱355,385,920.00 was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 83165. The petitions were
consolidated and eventually denied by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
Herein petitioner sought reconsideration of the above-quoted decision. In [twin] also denied reconsideration in its Resolution 5 dated 1 March 2005.
resolution[s] [both] dated July 15, 2003, the Tax Court, in an apparent change of
heart, granted the petitioner’s consolidated motions for reconsideration, thereby In its Memorandum6 22 dated November 2006, filed on behalf of the Commissioner,
denying the respondent’s claim for refund. the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeks to convince the Court that the literal
interpretation given by the CTA and the Court of Appeals of Section 145 of the Tax
However, on consolidated motions for reconsideration filed by the respondent in Code of 1997 (Tax Code) would lead to a lower tax imposable on 1 January 2000
CTA Case Nos. 6363 and 6383, the July 15, 2002 resolution was set aside, and the than that imposable during the transition period. Instead of an increase of 12% in
Tax Court ruled, this time with a semblance of finality, that the respondent is the tax rate effective on 1 January 2000 as allegedly mandated by the Tax Code, the
entitled to the refund claimed. Hence, in a resolution dated November 4, 2003, the appellate court’s ruling would result in a significant decrease in the tax rate by as
tax court reinstated its December 21, 2002 Decision and disposed as follows: much as 66%.

WHEREFORE, our Decisions in CTA Case Nos. 6365 and 6383 are hereby The OSG argues that Section 145 of the Tax Code admits of several interpretations,
REINSTATED. Accordingly, respondent is hereby ORDERED to REFUND petitioner the such as:
total amount of ₱680,387,025.00 representing erroneously paid excise taxes for the
period January 1, 2000 to January 31, 2000 and February 1, 2000 to December 31, 1. That by January 1, 2000, the excise tax on cigarettes should be the
2001. higher tax imposed under the specific tax system and the tax imposed
under the ad valorem tax system plus the 12% increase imposed by par. 5,
SO ORDERED. Sec. 145 of the Tax Code;

26
 2. The increase of 12% starting on January 1, 2000 does not apply to the This entire controversy revolves around the interplay between Section 145 of the
brands of cigarettes listed under Annex "D" referred to in par. 8, Sec. 145 Tax Code and Revenue Regulation 17-99. The main issue is an inquiry into whether
of the Tax Code; the revenue regulation has exceeded the allowable limits of legislative delegation.

3. The 12% increment shall be computed based on the net retail price as For ease of reference, Section 145 of the Tax Code is again reproduced in full as
indicated in par. C, sub-par. (1)-(4), Sec. 145 of the Tax Code even if the follows:
resulting figure will be lower than the amount already being paid at the
end of the transition period. This is the interpretation followed by both the Section 145. Cigars and Cigarettes-
CTA and the Court of Appeals.7
(A) Cigars.—There shall be levied, assessed and collected on cigars a tax of
This being so, the interpretation which will give life to the legislative intent to raise One peso (₱1.00) per cigar.
revenue should govern, the OSG stresses.
(B). Cigarettes packed by hand.—There shall be levied, assessed and
Finally, the OSG asserts that a tax refund is in the nature of a tax exemption and collected on cigarettes packed by hand a tax of Forty centavos (₱0.40) per
must, therefore, be construed strictly against the taxpayer, such as Fortune pack.
Tobacco.
(C) Cigarettes packed by machine.—There shall be levied, assessed and
In its Memorandum8 dated 10 November 2006, Fortune Tobacco argues that the collected on cigarettes packed by machine a tax at the rates prescribed
CTA and the Court of Appeals merely followed the letter of the law when they ruled below:
that the basis for the 12% increase in the tax rate should be the net retail price of
the cigarettes in the market as outlined in paragraph C, sub paragraphs (1)-(4), (1) If the net retail price (excluding the excise tax and the value-
Section 145 of the Tax Code. The Commissioner allegedly has gone beyond his added tax) is above Ten pesos (₱10.00) per pack, the tax shall be
delegated rule-making power when he promulgated, enforced and implemented Twelve pesos (₱12.00) per pack;
Revenue Regulation No. 17-99, which effectively created a separate classification
for cigarettes based on the excise tax "actually being paid prior to January 1, 2000." 9
(2) If the net retail price (excluding the excise tax and the value
added tax) exceeds Six pesos and Fifty centavos (₱6.50) but does
It should be mentioned at the outset that there is no dispute between the fact of not exceed Ten pesos (₱10.00) per pack, the tax shall be Eight
payment of the taxes sought to be refunded and the receipt thereof by the Bureau Pesos (₱8.00) per pack.
of Internal Revenue (BIR). There is also no question about the mathematical
accuracy of Fortune Tobacco’s claim since the documentary evidence in support of
(3) If the net retail price (excluding the excise tax and the value-
the refund has not been controverted by the revenue agency. Likewise, the claims
added tax) is Five pesos (₱5.00) but does not exceed Six Pesos and
have been made and the actions have been filed within the two (2)-year
fifty centavos (₱6.50) per pack, the tax shall be Five pesos (₱5.00)
prescriptive period provided under Section 229 of the Tax Code.
per pack;

The power to tax is inherent in the State, such power being inherently legislative,
(4) If the net retail price (excluding the excise tax and the value-
based on the principle that taxes are a grant of the people who are taxed, and the
added tax) is below Five pesos (₱5.00) per pack, the tax shall be
grant must be made by the immediate representatives of the people; and where
One peso (₱1.00) per pack;
the people have laid the power, there it must remain and be exercised. 10

27
Variants of existing brands of cigarettes which are introduced in the domestic effective implementation of the Tax Code,12 interprets the above-quoted provision
market after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8240 shall be taxed under the highest and reflects the 12% increase in excise taxes in the following manner:
classification of any variant of that brand.
NEW SPECIFIC
The excise tax from any brand of cigarettes within the next three (3) years from the PRESENT SPECIFIC
SECTIO DESCRIPTION OF TAX RATE
effectivity of R.A. No. 8240 shall not be lower than the tax, which is due from each TAX RATES PRIOR
N ARTICLES Effective Jan.. 1,
brand on October 1, 1996. Provided, however, That in cases where the excise tax TO JAN. 1, 2000
2000
rates imposed in paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) hereinabove will result in an
increase in excise tax of more than seventy percent (70%), for a brand of cigarette, 145 (A) P1.00/cigar ₱1.12/cigar
the increase shall take effect in two tranches: fifty percent (50%) of the increase
(B)Cigarettes packed
shall be effective in 1997 and one hundred percent (100%) of the increase shall be
by Machine
effective in 1998.
(1) Net Retail Price ₱12.00/pack ₱13.44/pack
Duly registered or existing brands of cigarettes or new brands thereof packed by (excluding VAT and
machine shall only be packed in twenties. Excise) exceeds ₱10.00
per pack
The rates of excise tax on cigars and cigarettes under paragraphs (1), (2) (3) and
(2) Net Retail Price ₱8.00/pack ₱8.96/pack
(4) hereof, shall be increased by twelve percent (12%) on January 1, 2000.
(excluding VAT and
Excise) is ₱6.51 up to
New brands shall be classified according to their current net retail price. ₱10.00 per pack

For the above purpose, ‘net retail price’ shall mean the price at which the cigarette (3) Net Retail Price ₱5.00/pack ₱5.60/pack
is sold on retail in twenty (20) major supermarkets in Metro Manila (for brands of (excluding VAT and
cigarettes marketed nationally), excluding the amount intended to cover the excise) is ₱5.00 to
applicable excise tax and value-added tax. For brands which are marketed only ₱6.50 per pack
outside Metro Manila, the ‘net retail price’ shall mean the price at which the (4) Net Retail Price ₱1.00/pack ₱1.12/pack
cigarette is sold in five (5) major intended to cover the applicable excise tax and the (excluding VAT and
value-added tax. excise) is below ₱5.00
per pack)
The classification of each brand of cigarettes based on its average retail price as of
October 1, 1996, as set forth in Annex "D," shall remain in force until revised by
Congress. This table reflects Section 145 of the Tax Code insofar as it mandates a 12% increase
effective on 1 January 2000 based on the taxes indicated under paragraph C, sub-
paragraph (1)-(4). However, Revenue Regulation No. 17-99 went further and added
Variant of a brand’ shall refer to a brand on which a modifier is prefixed and/or
that "[T]he new specific tax rate for any existing brand of cigars, cigarettes packed
suffixed to the root name of the brand and/or a different brand which carries the
by machine, distilled spirits, wines and fermented liquor shall not be lower than the
same logo or design of the existing brand.11 (Emphasis supplied)
excise tax that is actually being paid prior to January 1, 2000."13
Revenue Regulation 17-99, which was issued pursuant to the unquestioned
Parenthetically, Section 145 states that during the transition period, i.e., within the
authority of the Secretary of Finance to promulgate rules and regulations for the
next three (3) years from the effectivity of the Tax Code, the excise tax from any
brand of cigarettes shall not be lower than the tax due from each brand on 1
28
October 1996. This qualification, however, is conspicuously absent as regards the As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to details for
12% increase which is to be applied on cigars and cigarettes packed by machine, regulating the mode or proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has
among others, effective on 1 January 2000. Clearly and unmistakably, Section 145 been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory
mandates a new rate of excise tax for cigarettes packed by machine due to the 12% requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative
increase effective on 1 January 2000 without regard to whether the revenue regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any
collection starting from this period may turn out to be lower than that collected resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic
prior to this date. law.17

By adding the qualification that the tax due after the 12% increase becomes In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Michel J. Lhuillier Pawnshop,
effective shall not be lower than the tax actually paid prior to 1 January 2000, Inc.,18 Commissioner Jose Ong issued Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 15-
Revenue Regulation No. 17-99 effectively imposes a tax which is the higher amount 91, as well as the clarificatory Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) 43-91,
between the ad valorem  tax being paid at the end of the three (3)-year transition imposing a 5% lending investor’s tax under the 1977 Tax Code, as amended by
period and the specific tax under paragraph C, sub-paragraph (1)-(4), as increased Executive Order (E.O.) No. 273, on pawnshops. The Commissioner anchored the
by 12%—a situation not supported by the plain wording of Section 145 of the Tax imposition on the definition of lending investors provided in the 1977 Tax Code
Code. which, according to him, was broad enough to include pawnshop operators.
However, the Court noted that pawnshops and lending investors were subjected to
This is not the first time that national revenue officials had ventured in the area of different tax treatments under the Tax Code prior to its amendment by the
unauthorized administrative legislation. executive order; that Congress never intended to treat pawnshops in the same way
as lending investors; and that the particularly involved section of the Tax Code
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Reyes,14 respondent was not informed in explicitly subjected lending investors and dealers in securities only to percentage
writing of the law and the facts on which the assessment of estate taxes was made tax. And so the Court affirmed the invalidity of the challenged circulars, stressing
pursuant to Section 228 of the 1997 Tax Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) that "administrative issuances must not override, supplant or modify the law, but
No. 8424. She was merely notified of the findings by the Commissioner, who had must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out." 19
simply relied upon the old provisions of the law and Revenue Regulation No. 12-85
which was based on the old provision of the law. The Court held that in case of In Philippine Bank of Communications v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 20 the
discrepancy between the law as amended and the implementing regulation based then acting Commissioner issued RMC 7-85, changing the prescriptive period of two
on the old law, the former necessarily prevails. The law must still be followed, even years to ten years for claims of excess quarterly income tax payments, thereby
though the existing tax regulation at that time provided for a different procedure. 15 creating a clear inconsistency with the provision of Section 230 of the 1977 Tax
Code. The Court nullified the circular, ruling that the BIR did not simply interpret the
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation,16 the tax law; rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the statute passed by Congress. The
authorities gave the term "tax credit" in Sections 2(i) and 4 of Revenue Regulation Court held:
2-94 a meaning utterly disparate from what R.A. No. 7432 provides. Their
interpretation muddled up the intent of Congress to grant a mere discount privilege It bears repeating that Revenue memorandum-circulars are considered
and not a sales discount. The Court, striking down the revenue regulation, held that administrative rulings (in the sense of more specific and less general interpretations
an administrative agency issuing regulations may not enlarge, alter or restrict the of tax laws) which are issued from time to time by the Commissioner of Internal
provisions of the law it administers, and it cannot engraft additional requirements Revenue. It is widely accepted that the interpretation placed upon a statute by the
not contemplated by the legislature. The Court emphasized that tax administrators executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it, is entitled to great respect by the
are not allowed to expand or contract the legislative mandate and that the "plain courts. Nevertheless, such interpretation is not conclusive and will be ignored if
meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction should be applied such that judicially found to be erroneous. Thus, courts will not countenance administrative
where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be issuances that override, instead of remaining consistent and in harmony with, the
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. law they seek to apply and implement.21

29
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. CA, et al.,22 the central issue was the validity purpose behind the passage of the Tax Code is to generate additional revenues for
of RMO 4-87 which had construed the amnesty coverage under E.O. No. 41 (1986) the government. Revenue generation has undoubtedly been a major consideration
to include only assessments issued by the BIR after the promulgation of the in the passage of the Tax Code. However, as borne by the legislative record, 25 the
executive order on 22 August 1986 and not assessments made to that date. shift from the ad valorem system to the specific tax system is likewise meant to
Resolving the issue in the negative, the Court held: promote fair competition among the players in the industries concerned, to ensure
an equitable distribution of the tax burden and to simplify tax administration by
x x x all such issuances must not override, but must remain consistent and in classifying cigarettes, among others, into high, medium and low-priced based on
harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement. Administrative rules and their net retail price and accordingly graduating tax rates.
regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law. 23
At any rate, this advertence to the legislative record is merely gratuitous because,
xxx as we have held, the meaning of the law is clear on its face and free from the
ambiguities that the Commissioner imputes. We simply cannot disregard the letter
If, as the Commissioner argues, Executive Order No. 41 had not been intended to of the law on the pretext of pursuing its spirit. 26
include 1981-1985 tax liabilities already assessed (administratively) prior to 22
August 1986, the law could have simply so provided in its exclusionary clauses. It did Finally, the Commissioner’s contention that a tax refund partakes the nature of a
not. The conclusion is unavoidable, and it is that the executive order has been tax exemption does not apply to the tax refund to which Fortune Tobacco is
designed to be in the nature of a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the entitled. There is parity between tax refund and tax exemption only when the
cases specifically excepted by it.24 former is based either on a tax exemption statute or a tax refund statute. Obviously,
that is not the situation here. Quite the contrary, Fortune Tobaccos claim for refund
In the case at bar, the OSG’s argument that by 1 January 2000, the excise tax on is premised on its erroneous payment of the tax, or better still the government’s
cigarettes should be the higher tax imposed under the specific tax system and the exaction in the absence of a law.
tax imposed under the ad valorem tax system plus the 12% increase imposed by
paragraph 5, Section 145 of the Tax Code, is an unsuccessful attempt to justify what Tax exemption is a result of legislative grace. And he who claims an exemption from
is clearly an impermissible incursion into the limits of administrative legislation. the burden of taxation must justify his claim by showing that the legislature
Such an interpretation is not supported by the clear language of the law and is intended to exempt him by words too plain to be mistaken. 27 The rule is that tax
obviously only meant to validate the OSG’s thesis that Section 145 of the Tax Code exemptions must be strictly construed such that the exemption will not be held to
is ambiguous and admits of several interpretations. be conferred unless the terms under which it is granted clearly and distinctly show
that such was the intention.28
The contention that the increase of 12% starting on 1 January 2000 does not apply
to the brands of cigarettes listed under Annex "D" is likewise unmeritorious, absurd A claim for tax refund may be based on statutes granting tax exemption or tax
even. Paragraph 8, Section 145 of the Tax Code simply states that, "[T]he refund. In such case, the rule of strict interpretation against the taxpayer is
classification of each brand of cigarettes based on its average net retail price as of applicable as the claim for refund partakes of the nature of an exemption, a
October 1, 1996, as set forth in Annex ‘D’, shall remain in force until revised by legislative grace, which cannot be allowed unless granted in the most explicit and
Congress." This declaration certainly does not lend itself to the interpretation given categorical language. The taxpayer must show that the legislature intended to
to it by the OSG. As plainly worded, the average net retail prices of the listed brands exempt him from the tax by words too plain to be mistaken. 29
under Annex "D," which classify cigarettes according to their net retail price into
low, medium or high, obviously remain the bases for the application of the increase Tax refunds (or tax credits), on the other hand, are not founded principally on
in excise tax rates effective on 1 January 2000. legislative grace but on the legal principle which underlies all quasi-contracts
abhorring a person’s unjust enrichment at the expense of another. 30 The dynamic of
The foregoing leads us to conclude that Revenue Regulation No. 17-99 is indeed erroneous payment of tax fits to a tee the prototypic quasi-contract, solutio
indefensibly flawed. The Commissioner cannot seek refuge in his claim that the indebiti, which covers not only mistake in fact but also mistake in law. 31
30
The Government is not exempt from the application of solutio indebiti. 32 Indeed, G.R. No. L-59234 September 30, 1982
the taxpayer expects fair dealing from the Government, and the latter has the duty
to refund without any unreasonable delay what it has erroneously collected. 33 If the TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO and ACE
State expects its taxpayers to observe fairness and honesty in paying their taxes, it TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, petitioners,
must hold itself against the same standard in refunding excess (or erroneous) vs.
payments of such taxes. It should not unjustly enrich itself at the expense of THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LAND
taxpayers.34 And so, given its essence, a claim for tax refund necessitates only TRANSPORTATION, respondents.
preponderance of evidence for its approbation like in any other ordinary civil case.

Under the Tax Code itself, apparently in recognition of the pervasive quasi-contract
principle, a claim for tax refund may be based on the following: (a) erroneously or MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
illegally assessed or collected internal revenue taxes; (b) penalties imposed without
authority; and (c) any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner
This Petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction
wrongfully collected.35
and Temporary Restraining Order" filed by the Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila,
Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation, seeks to declare the nullity of
What is controlling in this case is the well-settled doctrine of strict interpretation in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42, dated October 10, 1977, of the Board of
the imposition of taxes, not the similar doctrine as applied to tax exemptions. The Transportation, and Memorandum Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, of the
rule in the interpretation of tax laws is that a statute will not be construed as Bureau of Land Transportation.
imposing a tax unless it does so clearly, expressly, and unambiguously. A tax cannot
be imposed without clear and express words for that purpose. Accordingly, the
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic
general rule of requiring adherence to the letter in construing statutes applies with
corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of
peculiar strictness to tax laws and the provisions of a taxing act are not to be
Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other
extended by implication. In answering the question of who is subject to tax statutes,
place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace Transportation
it is basic that in case of doubt, such statutes are to be construed most strongly
Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of TOMMI, each being
against the government and in favor of the subjects or citizens because burdens are
an operator and grantee of such certificate of public convenience.
not to be imposed nor presumed to be imposed beyond what statutes expressly
and clearly import.36 As burdens, taxes should not be unduly exacted nor assumed
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued
beyond the plain meaning of the tax laws. 37
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of
SP No. 80675, dated 28 September 2004, and its Resolution, dated 1 March 2005,
are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Old and Dilapidated Taxis
SO ORDERED.
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the government to insure that only
safe and comfortable units are used as public conveyances;
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila WHEREAS, the riding public, particularly in Metro-Manila, has,
time and again, complained against, and condemned, the
continued operation of old and dilapidated taxis;
EN BANC

31
 WHEREAS, in order that the commuting public may be assured of after the project has been implemented in Metro-Manila and only
comfort, convenience, and safety, a program of phasing out of old after the date has been determined by the Board. 1
and dilapidated taxis should be adopted;
Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land
WHEREAS, after studies and inquiries made by the Board of Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980,
Transportation, the latter believes that in six years of operation, a instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all
taxi operator has not only covered the cost of his taxis, but has within the National Capitol Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a
made reasonable profit for his investments; schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as
public conveyances. To quote said Circular:
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to this policy, the Board hereby
declares that no car beyond six years shall be operated as taxi, Pursuant to BOT Memo-Circular No. 77-42, taxi units with year
and in implementation of the same hereby promulgates the models over six (6) years old are now banned from operating as
following rules and regulations: public utilities in Metro Manila. As such the units involved should
be considered as automatically dropped as public utilities and,
1. As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of Model 1971 and earlier are therefore, do not require any further dropping order from the
ordered withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no BOT.
longer be registered and operated as taxis. In the registration of
cards for 1978, only taxis of Model 1972 and later shall be Henceforth, taxi units within the National Capitol Region having
accepted for registration and allowed for operation; year models over 6 years old shall be refused registration. The
following schedule of phase-out is herewith prescribed for the
2. As of December 31, 1978, all taxis of Model 1972 are ordered guidance of all concerned:
withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer be
registered and operated as taxis. In the registration of cars for
Year Model Automatic
1979, only taxis of Model 1973 and later shall be accepted for
Phase-Out
registration and allowed for operation; and every year thereafter,
Year
there shall be a six-year lifetime of taxi, to wit:
  1980
1980 — Model 1974
1974 1981
1981 — Model 1975, etc.
1975 1982
All taxis of earlier models than those provided above are hereby
1976 1983
ordered withdrawn from public service as of the last day of
registration of each particular year and their respective plates 1977  
shall be surrendered directly to the Board of Transportation for
subsequent turnover to the Land Transportation Commission. etc. etc.

For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the

Strict compliance here is desired. 2
rules herein shall immediately be effective in Metro-Manila. Its
implementation outside Metro- Manila shall be carried out only

32
In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year (1) Equal protection of the
1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of law;
model 1974, in 1981.
(2) Substantive due process;
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. and
80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the
registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, (3) Protection against arbitrary
as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time and unreasonable
of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. classification and standard?

On February 16, 1981, petitioners filed before the BOT a "Manifestation and Urgent On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:
Motion", praying for an early hearing of their petition. The case was heard on
February 20, 1981. Petitioners presented testimonial and documentary evidence, Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power
offered the same, and manifested that they would submit additional documentary
proofs. Said proofs were submitted on March 27, 1981 attached to petitioners'
4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations,
pleading entitled, "Manifestation, Presentation of Additional Evidence and
practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed,
Submission of the Case for Resolution." 3
observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor
vehicles.
On November 28, 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board a "Manifestation
and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition" praying that the case be
Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in
resolved or decided not later than December 10, 1981 to enable them, in case of
the exercise of its powers:
denial, to avail of whatever remedy they may have under the law for the protection
of their interests before their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on January 1, 1982.
Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. — In the exercise of the powers
granted in the preceding section, the Board shag proceed
Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case,
promptly along the method of legislative inquiry.
but was later informed that the records of the case could not be located.
Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its
On December 29, 1981, the present Petition was instituted wherein the following
discretion, may require the cooperation and assistance of the
queries were posed for consideration by this Court:
Bureau of Transportation, the Philippine Constabulary, particularly
the Highway Patrol Group, the support agencies within the
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum Department of Public Works, Transportation and
circulars in accord with the manner required by Presidential Communications, or any other government office or agency that
Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners' may be able to furnish useful information or data in the
constitutional right to procedural due process? formulation of the Board of any policy, plan or program in the
implementation of this Decree.
B. Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with the
procedural requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, The Board may also can conferences, require the submission of
would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed position papers or other documents, information, or data by
memorandum circulars violate the petitioners' constitutional operators or other persons that may be affected by the
rights to.

33
 implementation of this Decree, or employ any other suitable reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to an vehicles affected uniformly,
means of inquiry. fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The
product of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated, their
In support of their submission that they were denied procedural due process, cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generally
petitioners contend that they were not caged upon to submit their position papers, dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public specially
nor were they ever summoned to attend any conference prior to the issuance of the considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in
questioned BOT Circular. three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and
absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been met.
It is clear from the provision aforequoted, however, that the leeway accorded the
Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in On Equal Protection of the Law:
the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should
first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other Petitioners alleged that the Circular in question violates their right to equal
documents from operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of protection of the law because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only and
the options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. is directed solely towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should be pointed out
Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they were deprived of that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in Memorandum
procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public Circular No. 77-42. To repeat the pertinent portion:
respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the
challenged Circulars. operators of public conveyances are not the only primary For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the
sources of the data and information that may be desired by the BOT. rules herein shall immediately be effective in Metro Manila. Its
implementation outside Metro Manila shall be carried out only
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is neither after the project has been implemented in Metro Manila and only
violative of procedural due process. As held in Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel and after the date has been determined by the Board. 4
Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA 307 (1972):
In fact, it is the understanding of the Court that implementation of the Circulars in
Pevious notice and hearing as elements of due process, are Cebu City is already being effected, with the BOT in the process of conducting
constitutionally required for the protection of life or vested studies regarding the operation of taxicabs in other cities.
property rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss
takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that
proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or event which taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier
has to be established or ascertained. It is not essential to the traffic pressure and more constant use. This is of common knowledge. Considering
validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists
future conduct of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the law so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully
provides otherwise. (Emphasis supplied) claimed.

Petitioners further take the position that fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the
and oppressive because the roadworthiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the
maintenance and the use to which they are subjected, and, therefore, their actual dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its police
physical condition should be taken into consideration at the time of registration. As power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
public contend, however, it is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to
recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. 5 It may also regulate property rights. 6 In the
adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public
34
welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded". 7 vs.
ADRIANO PANLILIO, defendant-appellant.
In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation
services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does Pedro Abad Santos for appellant.
not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things Office of the Solicitor General Corpus for appellee.
or persons Identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object
or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial
distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class. 8 What is required under the equal protection clause is the
uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under Identical or similar MORELAND, J.:
circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred
and the liabilities imposed. 9 The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Pampanga convicting the accused of a violation of the law relating to the
Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from any quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious
constitutional infirmity. To declare a law unconstitutional, the infringement of diseases and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40, with subsidiary imprisonment in
constitutional right must be clear, categorical and undeniable. 10 case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial.

WHEREFORE, the Writs prayed for are denied and this Petition is hereby dismissed. The information charges: "That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1913, all of
No costs. the carabaos belonging to the above-named accused having been exposed to the
dangerous and contagious disease known as rinderpest, were, in accordance with
SO ORDERED. an order of duly-authorized agent of the Director of Agriculture, duly quarantined in
a corral in the barrio of Masamat, municipality of Mexico, Province of Pampanga, P.
Fernando, CJ., Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De I.; that, on said place, the said accused, Adriano Panlilio, illegally and voluntarily and
Castro, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur. without being authorized so to do, and while the quarantine against said carabaos
was still in force, permitted and ordered said carabaos to be taken from the corral
Teehankee and Aquino, JJ., concur in the result. in which they were then quarantined and conducted from one place to another;
that by virtue of said orders of the accused, his servants and agents took the said
  carabaos from the said corral and drove them from one place to another for the
purpose of working them."
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT The defendant demurred to this information on the ground that the acts
Manila complained of did not constitute a crime. The demurrer was overruled and the
defendant duly excepted and pleaded not guilty.
EN BANC
From the evidence introduced by the prosecution on the trial of the cause it
G.R. No. L-9876 December 8, 1914 appears that the defendant was notified in writing on February 22, 1913, by a duly
authorized agent of the Director of agriculture, that all of his carabaos in the barrio
of Masamat, municipality of Mexico, Pampanga Province, had been exposed to the
disease commonly known as rinderpest, and that said carabaos were accordingly

35
declared under quarantine, and were ordered kept in a corral designated by an settlement any class of domestic animal, it shall be unlawful for any person, firm or
agent of the Bureau of Agriculture and were to remain there until released by corporation to ship, drive or otherwise remove the kind of animals so specified from
further order of the Director of Agriculture. such locality except when accompanied by a certificate issued by authority of the
Director of Agriculture stating the number and the kind of animals to be shipped,
It further appears from the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution that the driven, taken or transported, their destination, manner in which they are authorized
defendant fully understood that, according to the orders of the Bureau of to be shipped, driven, taken, or transported, and their brands and distinguishing
Agriculture, he was not to remove the animals, or to permit anyone else to remove marks.
them, from the quarantine in which they had been placed. In spite, however, of all
this, the carabaos were taken from the corral by the commands of the accused and A simple reading of these sections demonstrates clearly that the case at bar does
driven from place to place on his hacienda, and were used as work animals thereon not fall within any of them. There is no question here of importation and there is no
in the same manner as if they had not been quarantined. charge or proof that the animals in question were suffering from a dangerous
communicable disease or that the Secretary of the Interior had made the
The contention of the accused is that the facts alleged in the information and declaration provided for in section 5 or that the accused had driven or taken said
proved on the trial do not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760 or any portion animals from one island, province, municipality, township or settlement to another.
thereof. It was alleged had been exposed to a dangerous communicable disease and that
they had been placed in a corral in quarantine on the premises of the accused and
We are forced to agree with this contention.1awphil.net that he, in violation of the quarantine, had taken them from the corral and worked
them upon the lands adjoining. They had not been in highway nor moved from one
municipality or settlement to another. They were left upon defendant's hacienda,
The original information against the accused charged a violation of section 6 of Act
where they were quarantined, and there worked by the servants of the accused.
No. 1760 committed by the accused in that he ordered and permitted his carabaos,
which, at the time, were in quarantine, to be taken from quarantine and moved
from one place to another on his hacienda. An amended information was filed. It The Solicitor-General in his brief in this court admits that the sections referred to
failed, however, to specify that section of Act No. 1760 alleged to have been are not applicable to the case at bar and also admits that section 7 of said Act is not
violated, evidently leaving that to be ascertained by the court on the trial. applicable. This section provides: "Whenever the Director of Agriculture shall order
any animal placed in quarantine in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the
owner of such animal, or his agent, shall deliver it at the place designated for the
The only sections of Act No. 1760, which prohibit acts and pronounce them
quarantine and shall provide it with proper food, water, and attendance. Should the
unlawful are 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any of them. Section 3
owner or his agent fail to comply with this requirement the Director of Agriculture
provides, in effect, that it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation
may furnish supplies and attendance needed, and the reasonable cost of such
knowingly to ship or otherwise bring into the Philippine Islands any animal suffering
supplies and attendance shall be collectible from the owner or his agent."
from, infected with, or dead of any dangerous communicable disease, or any of the
effects pertaining to such animal which are liable to introduce such disease into the
Philippine Islands. Section 4 declares, substantially, that it shall be unlawful for any We are in accord with the opinion expressed by the Solicitor-General with respect
reason, firm, or corporation knowingly to ship, drive or otherwise take or transport to this section, as we are with his opinion as to sections 3, 4, and 5. the law
from one island, province, municipality, township, or settlement to another any nowhere makes it a penal offense to refuse to comply with the provisions of section
domestic animal suffering from any dangerous communicable diseased or to expose 7, nor is the section itself so phrased as to warrant the conclusion that it was
such animal either alive or dead on any public road or highway where it may come intended to be a penal section. The section provides the means by which the refusal
in contact with other domestic animals. Section 5 provides that whenever the of the owner to comply therewith shall be overcome and the punishment, if we may
Secretary of the Interior shall declare that a dangerous communicable animal call it punishment, which he shall receive by reason of that refusal. It has none of
disease prevails in any island, province, municipality, township, or settlement and the aspects of a penal provision or the form or substance of such provision. It does
that there is danger of spreading such disease by shipping, driving or otherwise not prohibit any act. It does not compel an act nor does it really punish or impose a
transporting or taking out of such island, province, municipality, township, or criminal penalty. The other sections of the law under which punishments may be

36
inflicted are so phrased as to make the prohibited act unlawful, and section 8 quarantine, removed the animals and used them in the ordinary work of his
provides the punishment for any act declared unlawful by the law. plantation. We consider these acts a plain violation of the article of the Penal Code
as above quoted. The fact that the information in its preamble charged a violation
The Solicitor-General suggests, but does not argue, that section 6 is applicable to of act No. 1760 does not prevent us from finding the accused guilty of a violation of
the case at bar. Section 6 simply authorizes the Director of Agriculture to do certain an article of the Penal Code. The complaint opens as follows: "The undersigned
things, among them, paragraph (c) "to require that animals which are suffering from accuses Adriano Panlilio of a violation of Act No. 1760, committed as follows:" Then
dangerous communicable diseases or have been exposed thereto be placed in follows the body of the information already quoted in this opinion. We would not
quarantine at such place and for such time as may be deemed by him necessary to permit an accused to be convicted under one Act when he is charged with the
prevent the spread of the disease." Nowhere in the law, however, is the violation of violation of another, if the change from one statute to another involved a change of
the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there the theory of the trial or required of the defendant a different defense or surprised
provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 provides that "any him in any other way. The allegations required under Act No. 1760 include those
person violating any of the provisions of this  Act shall, upon conviction, be punished required under article 581. The accused could have defended himself in no different
by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not more manner if he had been expressly charged with a violation of article 581.
than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the
court, for each offense." A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as In the case of United States vs. Paua  (6 Phil. Rep., 740), the information stating the
authorized by paragraph (c), is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The orders facts upon which the charge was founded terminated with his expression: "In
of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the force of violation of section 315 of Act No. 355 of the Philippine Commission, in effect on the
law, are statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders 6th of February, 1902."
is not a penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof
unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the In the resolution of this case the Supreme Court found that the facts set forth in the
Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any information and proved on the trial did not constitute a violation of section 315 of
way therein. Act No. 355 as alleged in the information, but did constitute a violation of article
387 in connection with article 383 of the Penal Code, and accordingly convicted the
Finally, it is contended by the Government that if the offense stated in the accused under those articles and sentenced him to the corresponding penalty.
information and proved upon the trial does not constitute a violation of any of the
provisions of Act No. 1760, it does constitute a violation of article 581, paragraph 2, In that case the court said: "The foregoing facts, duly established as they were by
of the Penal Code. It provides: the testimony of credible witnesses who heard and saw everything that occurred,
show beyond peradventure of doubt that the crime of attempted bribery, as
A fine of not less than fifteen and not more than seventy pesetas and defined in article 387, in connection with article 383 of the Penal Code, has been
censure shall be imposed upon: . . . committed, it being immaterial whether it is alleged in the complaint that section
315 of Act No. 355 of the Philippine Commission was violated by the defendant, as
2. Any person who shall violate the regulations, ordinances, or the same recites facts and circumstances sufficient to constitute the crime of
proclamations issued with reference to any epedemic disease among bribery as defined and punished in the aforesaid articles of the Penal Code." (U.
animals, the extermination of locusts, or any other similar S. vs. Lim San, 17 Phil. Rep., 273; U.S. vs. Jeffrey, 15 Phil. Rep., 391; U. S. vs. Guzman,
plague.1awphil.net 25 Phil. Rep., 22.)

It alleged in the information and was proved on the trial that the Bureau of The accused is accordingly convicted of a violation of article 581, paragraph 2, of the
agriculture had ordered a quarantine of the carabaos at the time and place Penal Code, and is sentenced to pay a fine of seventy pesetas (P14) and censure,
mentioned; that the quarantine had been executed and completed and the animals with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs of this appeal. So
actually segregated and confined; that the accused, in violation of such quarantine ordered.
and of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, duly promulgated, broke the
37
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur. known as the "National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act
Johnson, J., dissents. of 2003."

Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners

association from the West Side of the NGC. It is represented by its president,
Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own personal capacity and
on behalf of the association.

Named respondents are the ex-officio members of the National Government Center

Administration Committee (Committee). At the filing of the instant petition, the
Committee was composed of Secretary Michael Defensor, Chairman of the Housing
and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), Atty. Edgardo Pamintuan,
EN BANC
General Manager of the National Housing Authority (NHA), Mr. Percival Chavez,
Chairman of the Presidential Commission for Urban Poor (PCUP), Mayor Feliciano
G.R. No. 163980 August 3, 2006 Belmonte of Quezon City, Secretary Elisea Gozun of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), and Secretary Florante Soriquez of the Department
HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and NESTORIO F. APOLINARIO, in of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).
his personal capacity and as President of Holy Spirit Homeowners Association,
Inc., Petitioners, Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, a number of presidential issuances authorized
vs. the creation and development of what is now known as the National Government
SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR, in his capacity as Chairman of the Housing and Center (NGC).
Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), ATTY. EDGARDO
PAMINTUAN, in his capacity as General Manager of the National Housing
On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No.
Authority (NHA), MR. PERCIVAL CHAVEZ, in his capacity as Chairman of the
1826, reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little
Presidential  Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP), MAYOR FELICIANO
over 440 hectares as a national government site to be known as the NGC. 1
BELMONTE, in his capacity as Mayor of Quezon City, SECRETARY ELISEA GOZUN, in
her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137,
Resources (DENR) and SECRETARY FLORENTE SORIQUEZ, in his capacity as
excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of
Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) as ex-officio
Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded
members of the NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CENTER ADMINISTRATION
portion by direct sale to the bona fide  residents therein. 2
COMMITTEE, Respondents.

In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by

DECISION
Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former
President Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993,
TINGA, J.:
authorizing the vertical development of the excluded portion to maximize the
number of families who can effectively become beneficiaries of the government’s
The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil socialized housing program. 3
Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing the
On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207.
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise
Among the salient provisions of the law are the following:

38
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3.1 (A.4), 3.1 (B.2), 3.2 (A.1) AND 3.2 (C.1) OF THE
the land tenure of the urban poor. Toward this end, lands located in the NGC, RULES AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9207, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
Quezon City shall be utilized for housing, socioeconomic, civic, educational, religious "NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CENTER (NGC) HOUSING AND LAND UTILIZATION ACT OF
and other purposes. 2003" SHOULD BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID FOR BEING ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS
AND WHIMSICAL. 5
Sec. 3. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center Site to
Bona Fide Residents. – Proclamation No. 1826, Series of 1979, is hereby amended First, the procedural matters.
by excluding from the coverage thereof, 184 hectares on the west side and 238
hectares on the east side of Commonwealth Avenue, and declaring the same open The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that petitioner Association cannot
for disposition to bona fide residents therein: Provided, That the determination of question the implementation of Section 3.1 (b.2) and Section 3.2 (c.1) since it does
the bona fide residents on the west side shall be based on the census survey not claim any right over the NGC East Side. Section 3.1 (b.2) provides for the
conducted in 1994 and the determination of the bona fide residents on the east maximum lot area that may be awarded to a resident-beneficiary of the NGC East
side shall be based on the census survey conducted in 1994 and occupancy Side, while Section 3.2 (c.1) imposes a lot price escalation penalty to a qualified
verification survey conducted in 2000: Provided, further, That all existing legal beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell within the prescribed
agreements, programs and plans signed, drawn up or implemented and actions period. 6 Also, the OSG contends that since petitioner association is not the duly
taken, consistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby adopted. recognized people’s organization in the NGC and since petitioners not qualify as
beneficiaries, they cannot question the manner of disposition of lots in the NGC. 7
Sec. 4. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center Site for
Local Government or Community Facilities, Socioeconomic, Charitable, Educational "Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial
and Religious Purposes. – Certain portions of land within the aforesaid area for local interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
government or community facilities, socioeconomic, charitable, educational and result of the governmental act that is being challenged…. The gist of the question of
religious institutions are hereby reserved for disposition for such standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the
purposes: Provided, That only those institutions already operating and with existing controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
facilities or structures, or those occupying the land may avail of the disposition presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
program established under the provisions this Act; Provided, further, That in constitutional questions." 8
ascertaining the specific areas that may be disposed of in favor of these institutions,
the existing site allocation shall be used as basis therefore: Provided, finally. That in Petitioner association has the legal standing to institute the instant petition,
determining the reasonable lot allocation of such institutions without specific lot whether or not it is the duly recognized association of homeowners in the NGC.
allocations, the land area that may be allocated to them shall be based on the area There is no dispute that the individual members of petitioner association are
actually used by said institutions at the time of effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis residents of the NGC. As such they are covered and stand to be either benefited or
supplied.) injured by the enforcement of the IRR, particularly as regards the selection process
of beneficiaries and lot allocation to qualified beneficiaries. Thus, petitioner
In accordance with Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, 4 the Committee formulated the association may assail those provisions in the IRR which it believes to be
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9207 on June 29, 2004. unfavorable to the rights of its members. Contrary to the OSG’s allegation that the
Petitioners subsequently filed the instant petition, raising the following issues: failure of petitioner association and its members to qualify as beneficiaries
effectively bars them from questioning the provisions of the IRR, such circumstance
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3.1 (A.4), 3.1 (B.2), 3.2 (A.1) AND 3.2 (C.1) OF THE precisely operates to confer on them the legal personality to assail the IRR.
RULES AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9207, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS Certainly, petitioner and its members have sustained direct injury arising from the
"NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CENTER (NGC) HOUSING AND LAND UTILIZATION ACT OF enforcement of the IRR in that they have been disqualified and eliminated from the
2003" SHOULD BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID FOR BEING INCONSISTENT WITH THE selection process. While it is true that petitioners claim rights over the NGC West
LAW IT SEEKS TO IMPLEMENT. Side only and thus cannot be affected by the implementation of Section 3.1 (b.2),
39
which refers to the NGC East Side, the rest of the assailed provisions of the IRR, issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative
namely, Sections 3.1 (a.4), 3.2 (a.1) and 3.2 (c.1), govern the disposition of lots in function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. 14
the West Side itself or all the lots in the NGC.
Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed
We cannot, therefore, agree with the OSG on the issue of locus standi. The petition IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the
does not merit dismissal on that ground. judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
There are, however, other procedural impediments to the granting of the instant concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
petition. The OSG claims that the instant petition for prohibition is an improper warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the
remedy because the writ of prohibition does not lie against the exercise of a quasi- petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. 15
legislative function. 9 Since in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the
Committee was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function, which is True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition
the scope of a petition for prohibition under Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of filed directly with it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the
Civil Procedure, the instant prohibition should be dismissed outright, the OSG issues raised, so warrant. 16 A direct invocation of the Court’s original jurisdiction to
contends. For their part, respondent Mayor of Quezon City 10 and respondent issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
NHA 11 contend that petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in filing reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. 17
the instant petition with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals, which has
concurrent jurisdiction over a petition for prohibition. In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, 18 the Court said that it will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts,
The cited breaches are mortal. The petition deserves to be spurned as a and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest
consequence. and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of
writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. 19 A perusal,
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi- however, of the petition for prohibition shows no compelling, special or important
judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making reasons to warrant the Court’s taking cognizance of the petition in the first instance.
power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated Petitioner also failed to state any reason that precludes the lower courts from
legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of passing upon the validity of the questioned IRR. Moreover, as provided in Section 5,
non-delegability and separability of powers. 12 Article VIII of the

In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an Constitution, 20 the Court’s power to evaluate the validity of an implementing rule
administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before or regulation is generally appellate in nature. Thus, following the doctrine of
going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the hierarchy of courts, the instant petition should have been initially filed with the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial Regional Trial Court.
function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-
legislative power. 13 A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the
exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed
The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising
Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to
theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of
is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. said entity’s or person’s jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of
Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. 21 Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial
40
functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the xxxx
purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its
jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly (b.2) Applications for qualification as beneficiary shall be processed and evaluated
channels. 22 Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of based on the Code of Policies including the minimum and maximum lot allocation of
jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in 35 sq. m. and 60 sq. m.
handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the
bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available xxxx
in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. 23 Where the
principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an ordinary
3.2. Execution of the Contract to Sell
action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners’ allegation that "respondents are
(a) Westside
performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their
jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of
injunction or a temporary restraining order. (a.1) All qualified beneficiaries shall execute Contract to Sell (CTS) within sixty (60)
days from the effectivity of the IRR in order to avail of the lot at P700.00 per sq. m.
In a number of petitions, 24 the Court adequately resolved them on other grounds
without adjudicating on the constitutionality issue when there were no compelling xxxx
reasons to pass upon the same. In like manner, the instant petition may be
dismissed based on the foregoing procedural grounds. Yet, the Court will not shirk (c) for both eastside and westside
from its duty to rule on the merits of this petition to facilitate the speedy resolution
of this case. In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the (c.1) Qualified beneficiaries who failed to execute CTS on the deadline set in item
interest of substantial justice. And the power of the Court to except a particular a.1 above in case of westside and in case of eastside six (6) months after approval of
case from its rules whenever the purposes of justice require it cannot be the subdivision plan shall be subjected to lot price escalation.
questioned. 25
The rate shall be based on the formula to be set by the National Housing Authority
Now, we turn to the substantive aspects of the petition. The outcome, however, is factoring therein the affordability criteria. The new rate shall be approved by the
just as dismal for petitioners. NGC-Administration Committee (NGC-AC).

Petitioners assail the following provisions of the IRR: Petitioners contend that the aforequoted provisions of the IRR are constitutionally
infirm as they are not germane to and/or are in conflict with the object and purpose
Section 3. Disposition of Certain portions of the NGC Site to the bonafide residents of the law sought to be implemented.

3.1. Period for Qualification of Beneficiaries First. According to petitioners, the limitation on the areas to be awarded to
qualified beneficiaries under Sec. 3.1 (a.4) and (b.2) of the IRR is not in harmony
xxxx with the provisions of R.A. No. 9207, which mandates that the lot allocation to
qualified beneficiaries shall be based on the area actually used or occupied by bona
fide residents without limitation to area. The argument is utterly baseless.
(a.4) Processing and evaluation of qualifications shall be based on the Code of
Policies and subject to the condition that a beneficiary is qualified to acquire only
one (1) lot with a minimum of 36 sq. m. and maximum of 54 sq. m. and subject The beneficiaries of lot allocations in the NGC may be classified into two groups,
further to the availability of lots. namely, the urban poor or the bona fide residents within the NGC site and certain
government institutions including the local government. Section 3, R.A. No. 9207
41
mandates the allocation of additional property within the NGC for disposition to Sec. 3.2 (c.1) penalizes a beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell within six
its bona fide residents and the manner by which this area may be distributed to (6) months from the approval of the subdivision plan by imposing a price escalation,
qualified beneficiaries. Section 4, R.A. No. 9207, on the other hand, governs the lot while there is no such penalty imposed by R.A. No. 9207. Thus, they conclude that
disposition to government institutions. While it is true that Section 4 of R.A. No. the assailed provisions conflict with R.A. No. 9207 and should be nullified. The
9207 has a proviso mandating that the lot allocation shall be based on the land area argument deserves scant consideration.
actually used or occupied at the time of the law’s effectivity, this proviso applies
only to institutional beneficiaries consisting of the local government, Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or contained in the
socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious institutions which do not have statute being implemented, that provision does not necessarily contradict the
specific lot allocations, and not to the bona fide residents of NGC. There is no statute. A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to
proviso which even hints that a bona fide resident of the NGC is likewise entitled to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. 27 All that is
the lot area actually occupied by him. required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of
the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the
Petitioners’ interpretation is also not supported by the policy of R.A. No. 9207 and standards prescribed by the law. 28
the prior proclamations establishing the NGC. The government’s policy to set aside
public property aims to benefit not only the urban poor but also the local In Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee is granted the power to
government and various government institutions devoted to socioeconomic, administer, formulate guidelines and policies, and implement the disposition of the
charitable, educational and areas covered by the law. Implicit in this authority and the statute’s objective of
urban poor housing is the power of the Committee to formulate the manner by
religious purposes. 26 Thus, although Proclamation No. 137 authorized the sale of which the reserved property may be allocated to the beneficiaries. Under this broad
lots to bona fide residents in the NGC, only a third of the entire area of the NGC was power, the Committee is mandated to fill in the details such as the qualifications of
declared open for disposition subject to the condition that those portions being beneficiaries, the selling price of the lots, the terms and conditions governing the
used or earmarked for public or quasi-public purposes would be excluded from the sale and other key particulars necessary to implement the objective of the law.
housing program for NGC residents. The same policy of rational and optimal land These details are purposely omitted from the statute and their determination is left
use can be read in Proclamation No. 248 issued by then President Ramos. Although to the discretion of the Committee because the latter possesses special knowledge
the proclamation recognized the rapid increase in the population density in the and technical expertise over these matters.
NGC, it did not allocate additional property within the NGC for urban poor housing
but instead authorized the vertical development of the same 150 hectares The Committee’s authority to fix the selling price of the lots may be likened to the
identified previously by Proclamation No. 137 since the distribution of individual rate-fixing power of administrative agencies. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing
lots would not adequately provide for the housing needs of all the bona power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the
fide residents in the NGC. guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just.
However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to
In addition, as provided in Section 4 of R.A. No. 9207, the institutional beneficiaries reasonableness, this standard may be implied. 29 In this regard, petitioners do not
shall be allocated the areas actually occupied by them; hence, the portions intended even claim that the selling price of the lots is unreasonable.
for the institutional beneficiaries is fixed and cannot be allocated for other non-
institutional beneficiaries. Thus, the areas not intended for institutional The provision on the price escalation clause as a penalty imposed to a beneficiary
beneficiaries would have to be equitably distributed among the bona fide  residents who fails to execute a contract to sell within the prescribed period is also within the
of the NGC. In order to accommodate all qualified residents, a limitation on the area Committee’s authority to formulate guidelines and policies to implement R.A. No.
to be awarded to each beneficiary must be fixed as a necessary consequence. 9207. The Committee has the power to lay down the terms and conditions
governing the disposition of said lots, provided that these are reasonable and just.
Second. Petitioners note that while Sec. 3.2 (a.1) of the IRR fixes the selling rate of a There is nothing objectionable about prescribing a period within which the parties
lot at P700.00 per sq. m., R.A. No. 9207 does not provide for the price. They add must execute the contract to sell. This condition can ordinarily be found in a
42
contract to sell and is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN
public policy. OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.

Third. Petitioners also suggest that the adoption of the assailed IRR suffers from a
procedural flaw. According to them the IRR was adopted and concurred in by
several representatives of people’s organizations contrary to the express mandate PUNO, J.:
of R.A. No. 9207 that only two representatives from duly recognized peoples’
organizations must compose the NGCAC which promulgated the assailed IRR. It is The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to
worth noting that petitioner association is not a duly recognized people’s prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis
organization. considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men." 1 Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No.
In subordinate legislation, as long as the passage of the rule or regulation had the 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
benefit of a hearing, the procedural due process requirement is deemed complied System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of
with. That there is observance of more than the minimum requirements of due the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our
process in the adoption of the questioned IRR is not a ground to invalidate the citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to
same. be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.

In sum, the petition lacks merit and suffers from procedural deficiencies. A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos On December 12, 1996 and
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED. Costs against
petitioners. ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED

SO ORDERED. IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM

Republic of the Philippines WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign
SUPREME COURT residents with the facility to conveniently transact business with
Manila basic service and social security providers and other government
instrumentalities;
EN BANC
WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly
  and efficiently identify persons seeking basic services on social
security and reduce, if not totally eradicate fraudulent
G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998 transactions and misrepresentations;

BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner, WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the

various basic services and social security providing agencies and
vs. other government intrumentalities is required to achieve such a
system;
RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO,
ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA,
43
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic in the use of Biometrics Technology and in computer application
of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, designs of their respective systems.
do hereby direct the following:
Sec. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The
Sec. 1. Establishment of a National Compoterized Identification Office of the Press Secretary, in coordination with the National
Reference System. A decentralized Identification Reference Statistics Office, the GSIS and SSS as lead agencies and other
System among the key basic services and social security concerned agencies shall undertake a massive tri-media
providers is hereby established. information dissemination campaign to educate and raise public
awareness on the importance and use of the PRN and the Social
Sec. 2. Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Security Identification Reference.
Coordinating Committee (IACC) to draw-up the implementing
guidelines and oversee the implementation of the System is Sec. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the implementation of
hereby created, chaired by the Executive Secretary, with the the system shall be sourced from the respective budgets of the
following as members: concerned agencies.

Head, Presidential Management Staff Sec. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS
shall submit regular reports to the Office of the President
Secretary, National Economic Development Authority through the IACC, on the status of implementation of this
undertaking.
Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government
Sec. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect
Secretary, Department of Health immediately.

Administrator, Government Service Insurance System, DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the
year of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Six.
Administrator, Social Security System,
(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS
Administrator, National Statistics Office
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January
22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant
Managing Director, National Computer Center.
petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the
heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency
Sec. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308.
hereby designated as secretariat to the IACC and as such shall On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its
provide administrative and technical support to the IACC. implementation.

Sec. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Petitioner contends:

Number (PRN) generated by the NSO shall serve as the common
reference number to establish a linkage among concerned
A. THE ESTABLISNMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
agencies. The IACC Secretariat shall coordinate with the different
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE
Social Security and Services Agencies to establish the standards
44
 ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308
OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. is a usurpation of legislative power. 4 As taxpayer and member of the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No.
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN 308. 5
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF
CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE. The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that
the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is
THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects.
BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION. 2 Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O.
No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent
Respondents counter-argue: Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the
manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. 6 Respondent Executive
Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and
A. THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD
the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system. 7 All
WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW;
signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No.
308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its
B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on
ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an
ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS; important constitutional principle and a fundamental right.

C. THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE II

IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM
THE BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES;
We now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere
administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to
D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-
PRIVACY. 3 encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and
foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
We now resolve.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking
I domain of Congress is understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line
between the power of the Legislature to make laws and the power of the
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of power and cannot
relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at be allowed. Hence, the exercise by one branch of government of power belonging
bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to to another will be given a stricter scrutiny by this Court.
uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be
promulgated. The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct.
Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to
45
alter and repeal them." 8 The Constitution, as the will of the people in their An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which
original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government.
of the Philippines. 9 The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of
and comprehensive. 10 The legislative body possesses plenary power for all implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. 24 We reject
purposes of civil government. 11 Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the
tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and "incorporates
it elsewhere. 12 In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural
impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of principles of governance." 25 and "embodies changes in administrative
general concern or common interest. 13 structure and procedures designed to serve the
people." 26 The Code is divided into seven (7) Books: Book I deals with
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the Sovereignty and General Administration, Book II with the Distribution of
laws. 14 The executive power is vested in the Presidents. 15 It is generally defined Powers of the three branches of Government, Book III on the Office of
as the power to enforce and administer the laws. 16 It is the power of carrying the the President, Book IV on the Executive Branch, Book V on Constitutional
laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. 17 Commissions, Book VI on National Government Budgeting, and Book VII
on Administrative Procedure. These Books contain provisions on the
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He organization, powers and general administration of the executive,
represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by legislative and judicial branches of government, the organization and
the officials and employees of his department. 18 He has control over the administration of departments, bureaus and offices under the executive
executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority branch, the organization and functions of the Constitutional Commissions
to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office and other constitutional bodies, the rules on the national government
or interfere with the discretion of its officials. 19 Corollary to the power of control, budget, as well as guideline for the exercise by administrative agencies of
the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The Code covers both the
maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative internal administration of government, i.e, internal organization,
power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his personnel and recruitment, supervision and discipline, and the effects of
duties effectively. 20 the functions performed by administrative officials on private individuals
or parties outside government. 27
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and
enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables the It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the
President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National
official conduct of his agents. 22 To this end, he can issue administrative orders, Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate
rules and regulations. adjustment of various contending state policies — the primacy of national
security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government,
the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that
the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of thought. As said
is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative
administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our
order is:
citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative
power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law.
relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in
pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No. 308 is not a law
promulgated in administrative orders. 23
because it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no proctection, and creates

46
no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not
agencies delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment
identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given the people."
this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty
cannot stand. In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc, 32 we adopted the Griswold ruling
that there is a constitutional right to privacy. Speaking thru Mr. Justice,
Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits of later Chief Justice, Enrique Fernando, we held:
administrative legislation and consequently erodes the plenary power of Congress
to make laws. This is contrary to the established approach defining the traditional x x x           x x x          x x x
limits of administrative legislation. As well stated by Fisher: ". . . Many regulations
however, bear directly on the public. It is here that administrative legislation must The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made
he restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are not supposed to be a the use of contraceptives a criminal offence on the ground of its
substitute for the general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy
public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the of married persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying
authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental
power to make laws." 28 constitutional guarantees." It has wider implications though. The
constitutional right to privacy has come into its own.
III
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it accorded recognition independently of its identification with
cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept
alone." 29 In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 30 the United States of limited government has always included the idea that
Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy when it ruled that the governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the
right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic
can be found within the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate
Amendments, 31 viz: and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is
the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of
Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs
by emanations from these guarantees that help give them life to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector,
and substance . . . various guarantees create zones of privacy. which the state can control. Protection of this private sector —
The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the
Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in individual — has become increasingly important as modern
its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" society has developed. All the forces of a technological age —
in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another industrialization, urbanization, and organization — operate to
facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In
the ''right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a
Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the totalitarian society."
47
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. 33 It is himself.
expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence provides that "[e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable
when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of
law. another. 35 It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual
liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another
Other facets of the right to privacy are protectad in various provisions of person, 36 and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private
the Bill of Rights, viz: 34 communications. 37 The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets
by an officer, 38 the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, 39 and trespass to
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property dwelling. 40 Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the Wiretapping Law, 41 the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act 42 and the Intellectual
equal protection of the laws. Property Code. 43 The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise
recognize the privacy of certain information. 44
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the considerations: (1) the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if
be seized. not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons
seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling
enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the
x x x           x x x          x x x
broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented
will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population
lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage
impaired except in the interest of national security, public
among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and
safety, or public health as may be provided by law.
"computer application designs."
x x x           x x x          x x x
Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the applicatin of statistical methods to
biological facts; a mathematical analysis of biological data." 45 The term
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the "biometrics" has evolved into a broad category of technologies which provide
public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or precise confirmation of an individual's identity through the use of the individual's
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. own physiological and behavioral characteristics. 46 A physiological characteristic
is a relatively stable physical characteristic such as a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand
48
geometry or facial features. A behavioral characteristic is influenced by the store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the
individual's personality and includes voice print, signature and keystroke. 47 Most individual through his PRN.
biometric idenfication systems use a card or personal identificatin number (PIN)
for initial identification. The biometric measurement is used to verify that the The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be
individual holding the card or entering the PIN is the legitimate owner of the card undarplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative order, an
or PIN. 48 individual must present his PRN everytime he deals with a government agency to
avail of basic services and security. His transactions with the government agency
A most common form of biological encoding is finger-scanning where technology will necessarily be recorded — whether it be in the computer or in the
scans a fingertip and turns the unique pattern therein into an individual number documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may include his transactions
which is called a biocrypt. The biocrypt is stored in computer data banks 49 and for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities,
becomes a means of identifying an individual using a service. This technology reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use
requires one's fingertip to be scanned every time service or access is of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge formidable informatin base
provided. 50 Another method is the retinal scan. Retinal scan technology employs through the electronic linkage of the files. 55 The data may be gathered for gainful
optical technology to map the capillary pattern of the retina of the eye. This and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of
technology produces a unique print similar to a finger print. 51 Another biometric personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that
method is known as the "artificial nose." This device chemically analyzes the may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. 56
unique combination of substances excreted from the skin of people. 52 The latest
on the list of biometric achievements is the thermogram. Scientists have found We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the
that by taking pictures of a face using infra-red cameras, a unique heat name, address and other basic personal infomation about the individual. 57 Even
distribution pattern is seen. The different densities of bone, skin, fat and blood that hospitable assumption will not save A.O. No. 308 from constitutional
vessels all contribute to the individual's personal "heat signature." 53 infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear and categorical terms how
these information gathered shall he handled. It does not provide who shall
In the last few decades, technology has progressed at a galloping rate. Some control and access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose.
science fictions are now science facts. Today, biometrics is no longer limited to the These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of
use of fingerprint to identify an individual. It is a new science that uses various the information. 58 Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government
technologies in encoding any and all biological characteristics of an individual for agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against
identification. It is noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific leakage of information. When the access code of the control programs of the
biological characteristics and what particular biometrics technology shall be used particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or
to identify people who will seek its coverage. Considering the banquest of options penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate
available to the implementors of A.O. No. 308, the fear that it threatens the right the data stored within the system. 59
to privacy of our people is not groundless.
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for
does not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone unequivocally specified purposes. 60 The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of
for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the adoption A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by
of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the "generation of enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable
population data for development planning." 54 This is an admission that the PRN unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right
will not be used solely for identification but the generation of other data with against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by
remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and
indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to seizures. 61 The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and
computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks

49
control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness The rules and regulations to be by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal defect. Rules
of the data encoded. 62 They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks and regulations merely implement the policy of the law or order. On its face, A.O.
to prevent. 63 No. gives the IACC virtually infettered discretion to determine the metes and
bounds of the ID System.
The ability of sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-to-
grave dossier on an individual and transmit it over a national network is one of Nor do your present laws prvide adequate safeguards for a reasonable
the most graphic threats of the computer revolution. 64 The computer is capable of expectation of privacy. Commonwealth Act. No. 591 penalizes the disclosure by
producing a comprehensive dossier on individuals out of information given at any person of data furnished by the individual to the NSO with imprisonment and
different times and for varied purposes. 65 It can continue adding to the stored fine. 73 Republic Act. No. 1161 prohibits public disclosure of SSS employment
data and keeping the information up to date. Retrieval of stored date is simple. records and reports. 74 These laws, however, apply to records and data with the
When information of a privileged character finds its way into the computer, it can NSO and the SSS. It is not clear whether they may be applied to data with the
be extracted together with other data on the subject. 66 Once extracted, the other government agencies forming part of the National ID System. The need to
information is putty in the hands of any person. The end of privacy begins. clarify the penal aspect of A.O. No. 308 is another reason why its enactment
should be given to Congress.
Though A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn, the dissenting opinions
would dismiss its danger to the right to privacy as speculative and hypothetical. Next, the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of the
Again, we cannot countenance such a laidback posture. The Court will not be true right of privacy by using the rational relationship test. 75 He stressed that the
to its role as the ultimate guardian of the people's liberty if it would not purposes of A.O. No. 308 are: (1) to streamline and speed up the implementation
immediately smother the sparks that endanger their rights but would rather wait of basic government services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication of
for the fire that could consume them. services, and (3) generate population data for development planning. He cocludes
that these purposes justify the incursions into the right to privacy for the means
We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a are rationally related to the end. 76
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the Natioal ID and the use of
biometrics technology as it stands on quicksand. The reasonableness of a person's We are not impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc, 77 we upheld the
expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid
individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this police power measure. We declared that the law, in compelling a public officer to
expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. 67 The factual make an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of income
circumstances of the case determines the reasonableness of the and expenses, did not infringe on the individual's right to privacy. The law was
expectation. 68 However, other factors, such as customs, physical surroundings enacted to promote morality in public administration by curtailing and minimizing
and practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in
expectation. 69 The use of biometrics and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 the public service. 78
does not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation of privacy. 70 As
technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy decreases. 71 The The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A. 3019 is a
measure of protection granted by the reasonable expectation diminishes as statute, not an administrative order. Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself is sufficiently
relevant technology becomes more widely accepted. 72 The security of the detailed. The law is clear on what practices were prohibited and penalized, and it
computer data file depends not only on the physical inaccessibility of the file but was narrowly drawn to avoid abuses. IN the case at bar, A.O. No. 308 may have
also on the advances in hardware and software computer technology. A.O. No. been impelled by a worthy purpose, but, it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for
308 is so widely drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable expectation of it is not narrowly drawn. And we now hod that when the integrity of a
privacy, regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions. fundamental right is at stake, this court will give the challenged law,
administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny. It will not do for the
authorities to invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
50
duties. Nor is it enough for the authorities to prove that their act is not irrational Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon that the Court is
for a basic right can be diminished, if not defeated, even when the government not  per se agains the use of computers to accumulate, store, process, retvieve and
does not act irrationally. They must satisfactorily show the presence of compelling transmit data to improve our bureaucracy. Computers work wonders to achieve
state interests and that the law, rule or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude the efficiency which both government and private industry seek. Many
abuses. This approach is demanded by the 1987 Constitution whose entire matrix information system in different countries make use of the computer to facilitate
is designed to protect human rights and to prevent authoritarianism. In case of important social objective, such as better law enforcement, faster delivery of
doubt, the least we can do is to lean towards the stance that will not put in public services, more efficient management of credit and insurance programs,
danger the rights protected by the Constitutions. improvement of telecommunications and streamlining of financial
activities. 81 Used wisely, data stored in the computer could help good
The case of Whalen v. Roe 79 cited by the Solicitor General is also off-line. In administration by making accurate and comprehensive information for those who
Whalen, the United States Supreme Court was presented with the question of have to frame policy and make key decisions. 82 The benefits of the computer has
whether the State of New York could keep a centralized computer record of the revolutionized information technology. It developed the internet, 83 introduced
names and addresses of all persons who obtained certain drugs pursuant to a the concept of cyberspace 84 and the information superhighway where the
doctor's prescription. The New York State Controlled Substance Act of 1972 individual, armed only with his personal computer, may surf and search all kinds
required physicians to identify parties obtaining prescription drugs enumerated in and classes of information from libraries and databases connected to the net.
the statute, i.e., drugs with a recognized medical use but with a potential for
abuse, so that the names and addresses of the patients can be recorded in a In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar
centralized computer file of the State Department of Health. The plaintiffs, who all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific
were patients and doctors, claimed that some people might decline necessary and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common
medication because of their fear that the computerized data may be readily good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused 85 and a compelling
available and open to public disclosure; and that once disclosed, it may stigmatize interest justify such intrusions. 86 Intrusions into the right must be accompanied
them as drug addicts. 80 The plaintiffs alleged that the statute invaded a by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional
constitutionally protected zone of privacy, i.e., the individual interest in avoiding invasions. We reiterate that any law or order that invades individual privacy will
disclosure of personal matters, and the interest in independence in making certain be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny. The reason for this stance was laid
kinds of important decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court held that while an down in Morfe v. Mutuc, to wit:
individual's interest in avoiding disclosuer of personal matter is an aspect of the
right to privacy, the statute did not pose a grievous threat to establish a The concept of limited government has always included the idea
constitutional violation. The Court found that the statute was necessary to aid in that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into
the enforcement of laws designed to minimize the misuse of dangerous drugs. the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic
The patient-identification requirement was a product of an orderly and rational disctinctions between absolute and limited government.
legislative decision made upon recommmendation by a specially appointed Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of
commission which held extensive hearings on the matter. Moreover, the statute his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a
was narrowly drawn and contained numerous safeguards against indiscriminate system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which
disclosure. The statute laid down the procedure and requirements for the belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public
gathering, storage and retrieval of the informatin. It ebumerated who were sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private
authorized to access the data. It also prohibited public disclosure of the data by sector — protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity
imposing penalties for its violation. In view of these safeguards, the infringement of the individual — has become increasingly important as
of the patients' right to privacy was justified by a valid exercise of police power. modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological
As we discussed above, A.O. No. 308 lacks these vital safeguards. age — industrialization, urbanization, and organization —
operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion
into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support

51
 this enclave of private life marks the difference between a THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION (PSDSA), its officers,
democratic and a totalitarian society. 87 to wit: DR. ANILLA A. CALAMBA, President; DR. CARMELITA L. PALABAY, Gen.
Vice-President; MS. ESTELITA R. REYES, Board Secretary; DR. THELMA A. GALANG,
IV Asst. Board Secretary; MR. FERNANDO LAVITA, Treasurer; MS. LITA DIONISIO,
Asst. Treasurer; MS. ROSELILY PADRE, Auditor; MR. ROMAN CALICDAN, Asst.
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass Auditor; MR. TOMO-AY, MR. OSCAR PEÑAFLORIDA, Bus. Managers; DR.
society. The threats emanate from various sources — governments, journalists, ANTONETTE ANG, DR. MAGNITA LABRADOR, P.R.O.’S; MR. BONIFACIO MIGUEL
employers, social scientists, etc. 88 In th case at bar, the threat comes from the (Region I), MR. JOSE CALAGUI (Region II), DR. REYNALDO SAGUM (Region III), MR.
executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the RUBEN PANAHON (Region IV), MR. OSCAR BARBA (Region V), MS. IRMA GANELA
people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the (Region VI), DR. ERLINDA NAPULI (Region VII), DR. PONCIANO GABIETA (Region
pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping VIII), MR. FEDERICO FIDEL (Region IX), MR.EMILIANO V. RODRIGUEZ (Region X),
power of the computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. MS. EDWINA ALAG (Region XI), MR. DOMINADOR ATAM (Region XII), MS.
No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating dossier against CONSUELO VELASCO (NCR), MR. VICTORINO AGMATA (CAR), MS. NATIVIDAD
unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-worded warning of SALASAB (ARMM-CARAGA), All PSDSA Vice-Presidents for their respective
Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an Regions: DR. LOLITA CABANAYAN, MR. CICERO AKLANG, DR. RUSTICO OCAMPO,
unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that MR. ROMEO SANTOS, MR. EMMANUEL CAMA, MR. ROMEO TUMAOB, MR.
because of its record-keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to JOVENCIO MENDOZA, MR. ALEJANDRO BARING, JR., MS. BERNARDITA APOSTOL,
forget." 89 Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too MS. LORETA MACALUDAS, DR. MYRNA LYN MARACON, MS. ELIZABETH SAN
quick in labelling the right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the DIEGO, SITH HINDRON DAMMANG, MS. IMMACULADA BRINGAS, and MS. GLORIA
statement that the right to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for DERECHO, all members of the PSDSA Board of Directors, in their own behalf as
flattery. current District Supervisors and IN REPRESENTATION OF ALL DISTRICT
SUPERVISORS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Petitioners,
vs.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Adminisrative Order No. 308
HON. EDILBERTO C. DE JESUS, Department Secretary, THE DEPARTMENT OF
entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System"
EDUCATION, and THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a Petition for Prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction filed by the Public Schools District Supervisor Association
(PSDSA) seeking to declare as unconstitutional Rule IV, Section 4.3; Rule V, Sections
5.1 and the second paragraph of Section 5.2; and Rule VI, Section 6.2, paragraph 11
of Department of Education Order No. 1, Series of 2003. The petition likewise seeks
to compel, by way of a writ of mandamus, the Department of Education, Culture,
EN BANC and Sports (DECS) and the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to
upgrade the salary grade level of the district supervisors from Salary Grade (SG) 19
G.R. No. 157286             June 16, 2006 to SG 24.

52
 The Antecedents centers;10 to hire, place and evaluate all division supervisors and schools district
supervisors as well as all employees in the divisions, both teaching and non-
Ever since the Department of Education (DepEd)1 was founded decades ago, its teaching personnel, including school heads, except for the assistant division
management had been so centralized in the Manila office. Schools in the national, superintendent;11 and perform other functions as may be assigned by proper
regional, and division levels merely followed and implemented the orders and authorities.12
memoranda issued by the Education Secretary. Due to the evolution of the learning
process and the onset of information technology, there was a need for a radical The office of the schools district supervisor has been retained under the law. Each
change in the governance of the DepEd. Thus, a study on how to improve the district is headed by a school district supervisor and an office staff for program
management of the Department was conducted, and one of the proposals was the promotion. However, the responsibilities of the schools district supervisor are
abolition of the office of the district supervisor. limited to the following: (1) providing professional and instructional advice and
support to the school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools and learning
Then Senator Tessie Aquino-Oreta, the Chairman of the Committee on Education, centers in the district or cluster thereof; (2) curricula supervision; and (3)
authored Senate Bill No. 2191, the thrust of which was to change the existing performing such other functions as may be assigned by proper authorities. The
management style and focus on the schools where the teaching-learning process schools district supervisors have no administrative, management, control or
occurs. The bill was intended to highlight shared governance in the different levels supervisory functions over the schools and learning centers within their respective
in the DECS hierarchy and establish authority, accountability, and responsibility for districts.13
achieving higher learning outcomes. While the governance of basic education would
begin at the national level, the field offices (regions, divisions, schools, and learning On the school level, an Elementary School Principal (ESP) was designated as school
centers) would translate the policy into programs, projects, and services to fit local head for all public elementary schools; and a Secondary School Principal (SSP) for
needs.2 The national level was likewise to be tasked to define the roles and high schools or a cluster thereof.14 The ESP and the SSP serve as both instructional
responsibilities of, and provide resources to the field offices which would leaders and administrative managers with the following authority, accountability
implement educational programs, projects, and services in communities they and responsibility:
serve.3 At the forefront would be the DepEd Secretary, vested with the overall
authority and supervision over the operations of the department on the national, (7) Administering and managing all personnel, physical, and fiscal resources
regional, division, and schools district level.4 of the school;

Republic Act No. 9155, otherwise known as the "Governance of Basic Education Act (8) Recommending the staffing complement of the school based on its
2001," became a law on August 11, 2001, in accordance with Section 27(1), Article needs;
VI of the Constitution. Under the law, each regional office shall have a director, an
assistant director, and an office staff for program promotion and support, planning, (9) Encouraging staff development;
administrative and fiscal services.5 The regional director was given the authority to
hire, place and evaluate all employees in the regional office except for the position
xxxx
of assistant director,6 as well as the authority, accountability, and responsibility to
determine the organization component of the divisions and districts, and approve
(11) Accepting donations, gifts, bequests, and grants for the purpose of
the staffing pattern of all employees therein;7 evaluate all division superintendents
upgrading teachers’/learning facilitators’ competencies, improving and
and assistant division superintendents in the region; 8 and other functions as may be
expanding school facilities, and providing instructional materials and
assigned by the proper authorities.9
equipment. Such donations or grants must be reported to the appropriate
district supervisors and division superintendents; and
A division, on the other hand, is headed by a schools division superintendent with
the following responsibilities, among others: to supervise the operations of all
public and private elementary, secondary, and integrated schools, and learning
53
 (12) Performing such other functions as may be assigned by proper The PSDSA thus requested the DepEd Secretary to call an immediate consultation
authorities.15 with the district supervisors nationwide through a convention, and their valid inputs
be considered in formulating the rules and regulations to be urged by the DepEd.
Under Section 14 of the law, the DepEd Secretary is mandated to "promulgate the However, the Secretary failed to reply. Thus, the IBP reiterated the concerns raised
implementing rules and regulations within ninety (90) days after the approval of the by the PSDSA in a Letter18 to the DepEd dated April 15, 2002.
Act, provided that the principle of shared governance shall be fully implemented
within two (2) years" after such approval. On January 6, 2003, DepEd Secretary Edilberto C. De Jesus issued DECS Office Order
No. 1, which constitutes the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No.
Before the DepEd could issue the appropriate implementing rules and regulations, 9155. Sections 4.1 to 4.3, Rule IV of the IRR provide:
petitioner sought the legal assistance of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
National Committee on Legal Aid to make representations for the resolution of the SECTION 4.1. The Schools Division Superintendent. – A division shall consist of a
following administrative issues: province or city which shall have a schools division superintendent. There shall be at
least one assistant schools division superintendent and office staff for programs
1. Restoration of the functions, duties, responsibilities, benefits, promotion, planning, administrative, fiscal, legal, ancillary, and other support
prerogatives, and position level of Public Schools District Supervisors. services.

2. Upgrading of Salary Grade level of Public Schools District Supervisors SECTION 4.2. Authority, Accountability, and Responsibility of the Schools Division
from Salary Grade Level 19 to Salary Grade Level 24 under DBM Circular Superintendent. – Consistent with the national educational policies, plans, and
No. 36, otherwise known as the Compensation and Position Classification standards, the schools division superintendents shall have authority, accountability,
Rules and Regulation.16 and responsibility for the following:

In a Letter dated March 1, 2002 addressed to then DepEd Secretary Raul Roco, the 1) Developing and implementing division education development plans;
IBP stated that, per its review of the documents submitted by the PSDSA, it found
the latter’s position valid and legal, to wit: 2) Planning and managing the effective and efficient performance of all
personnel, physical, and fiscal resources of the division, including
First: The basis for the abolition of the position of District Supervisors under the professional staff development;
Attrition Law and DECS Department Order No. 110, Series of 1991 is no longer valid
and rendered moot and academic due to issuance of DECS Department Order No. 3) Hiring, placing, and evaluating all division supervisors and schools
22, Series of 1996 and the passage by Congress of the Philippines of Republic Act district supervisors as well as all employees in the division, both teaching
No. 9155, otherwise known as the Basic Education Governance Act of 2000. Under and non-teaching personnel, including school heads, except for the
R.A. 9155, school districts are mandated to be maintained and responsibilities of assistant division superintendents;
Public School’s Districts Supervisors have been clearly defined.
4) Monitoring the utilization of funds provided by the national government
Second: There is a clear case of discrimination of grant of salaries and benefits to and the local government units to the schools and learning centers;
District Supervisors compared to salaries and benefits received by the School
Principals – which position is lower in the hierarchy of positions as prepared by the 5) Ensuring compliance of quality standards for basic education programs
Department of Education and the Department of Budget and Management. School and for this purpose strengthening the role of division supervisors as
Principals and District Supervisors enjoy the same level of Salary Grade even if the subject area specialists;
latter position is considered as a promotion and enjoys a higher level of position
than that of the position of School Principals. 17

54
 6) Promoting awareness of, and adherence by, all schools and learning The schools district supervisor shall primarily perform staff functions and shall not
centers to accreditation standards prescribed by the Secretary of exercise administrative supervision over school principals, unless specifically
Education; authorized by the proper authorities. The main focus of his/her functions shall be
instructional and curricula supervision aimed at raising academic standards at the
7) Supervising the operations of all public and private elementary, school level.
secondary, and integrated schools, and learning centers; and
The schools district supervisor shall be specifically responsible for:
8) Performing such other functions as may be assigned by the Secretary
and/or Regional Director. 1) Providing professional and instructional advice and support to the
school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers in
SECTION 4.3. Appointing and Disciplinary Authority of the Schools Division the district or cluster thereof;
Superintendent. – The schools district superintendent shall appoint the division
supervisors and school district supervisors as well as all employees in the division, 2) Curricula supervision; and
both teaching and non-teaching personnel, including school heads, except for the
assistant schools division superintendent, subject to the civil service laws, rules and 3) Performing such other functions as may be assigned by the Secretary,
regulations, and the policies and guidelines to be issued by the Secretary of Regional Directors, and Schools Division Superintendents where they
Education for the purpose. belong.

The schools division superintendent shall have disciplinary authority only over the The schools district supervisor being mentioned in this section shall refer to a public
non-teaching personnel under his jurisdiction. schools district supervisor.

Such exercise of disciplinary authority by the schools division superintendent over SECTION 5.2. The School District. – A school district already existing at the time of
the non-teaching personnel shall be subject to the civil service laws, rules and the passage of this Act shall be maintained. However, an additional school district
regulations, and procedures and guidelines to be issued by the Secretary of may be established by the regional director based on criteria set by the Secretary
Education relative to this matter. and on the recommendation of the schools division superintendent. For this
purpose, the Secretary of Education shall set standards and formulate criteria as
The Regional Director shall continue exercising disciplinary authority over the basis of the Regional Directors of the establishment of an additional school
teaching personnel insofar as the latter are covered by specific and exclusive district.20
disciplinary provisions under the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers (R.A. No.
4670).19 On March 13, 2003, the PSDSA, the national organization of about 1,800 public
school district supervisors of the DepEd, in behalf of its officers and members, filed
Sections 5.1 and 5.2, Rule V of the IRR, in turn, provide: the instant petition for prohibition and mandamus, alleging that:

SECTION 5.1. The Schools District Supervisor. – A school district shall have a school
district supervisor and office staff for program promotion.

55
I. THE ACT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION IN REMOVING PETITIONERS’ use if the office has no administrative supervision over schools within its respective
ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS AND ITS PRINCIPALS districts.
(SCHOOL HEADS) WITHIN HIS/HER DISTRICT AND CONVERTING HIS/HER
ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION TO THAT OF PERFORMING STAFF FUNCTION FOR THE Petitioners assert that under the IRR, the schools district supervisors primarily
DIVISION OFFICE PER SECTION 5.1 RULE V OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND perform staff functions and shall not exercise administrative supervision over school
REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT 9155 (DEPED ORDER NO. 1, SERIES OF 2003) IS A principals, unless specifically authorized by the proper authorities. Thus, under the
GROSS VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 9155 – THE GOVERNANCE OF BASIC IRR, the exercise of administrative supervision over school principals was made
EDUCATION ACT OF 2001. discretionary and subject to the whims and caprices of "the proper authorities." The
logical inference of this provision, petitioners aver, is that the administrative
II. THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 9155 AS supervisory powers can be withdrawn from a district supervisor without any reason
PROMULGATED UNDER DEPED ORDER NO. 1, SERIES OF 2003 EXPANDED THE LAW at all, a provision which has no basis in the enabling law.
AND INCLUDED PROVISIONS WHICH ARE DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO THE LETTER
AND SPIRIT OF THE SUBJECT LAW. Petitioners further contend that the DepEd has no authority to incorporate its plan
of downgrading the position of district supervisor, that is, from being an
III. THE DOWNGRADING OF SALARY GRADE LEVEL OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS administrator of a particular district office to a position performing a staff function,
DISTRICT SUPERVISOR OR THE NEGLECT OR REFUSAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF to exercise administrative supervision over the school principals only when
EDUCATION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT TO UPGRADE specifically authorized by proper authorities. Petitioners insist that respondent
THE SALARY GRADE LEVEL OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT TO A RESPECTABLE LEVEL Education Secretary was focused on removing the level of management in the
OF SALARY GRADE HIGHER THAN THAT OF THE PRINCIPALS – DESPITE CLEAR district office, such that the IRR empower school heads (principals) to have
INTENTION OF R.A. 9155 TO RETAIN THE POSITION OF PSDS IN THE HIERARCHY OF administrative and instructional supervision of school or cluster of schools, while
ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGERS AND OFFICERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION supervision of all public and private elementary, secondary, and integrated schools
– IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL.21 and learning centers was given to the division office.

Petitioners maintain that the questioned provisions of the IRR are invalid because Petitioners further insist that respondent Education Secretary failed to consider the
they "extended or expanded and modified" the provisions of R.A. No. 9155. They fact that R.A. No. 9155 strengthened the district office as a mid-level administrative
argue that the said law should be read in harmony with other "existing educational field office of the DepEd. The law even mandates to allow the district supervisor to
laws" which it did not specifically repeal, such as Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, have an office staff for program promotion in the district office. Apart from the
otherwise known as "The Education Act of 1982," as amended by R.A. No. 7798; current administrative functions inherent in the district office, DECS Service Manual
R.A. No. 4670, otherwise known as the "Magna Charta for Public School Teachers"; 2000 vested additional specific functions to the district offices, to provide
and R.A. No. 7784 captioned "An Act to Strengthen Teacher Education in the professional and instructional advice and support to the school heads and
Philippines by Establishing Centers of Excellence, Creating a Teacher Education teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers in the district, as well as
Council for the Purpose, Appropriating Funds Therefore, and for Other Purposes." curricula supervision.

Petitioners assert that under Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155, the district offices of the Petitioners posit that R.A. No. 9155 did not, in anyway, allow or authorize the
DepEd are intended as field offices where the district supervisors can assist the ESPs reorganization of the entire DepEd; it never reduced the position, rank,
and teachers/learning facilitators within their district as experienced educational classification, and salary grade level of district supervisors, nor abolished the district
managers. Thus, the district supervisors were not divested of the inherent offices which are responsible for the administration and management of
administrative functions to manage and oversee the schools within their respective elementary schools within its jurisdiction. It did not remove from the district
districts, including their subordinates. They emphasize that the law provides an supervisors the function of administrative supervision over schools within their
"office staff for program promotion" in the school districts, which would be of no respective areas. In fact, petitioners insist, what the law did was to give the district
supervisor additional responsibility of providing professional and instructional
56
advice and support to the school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools and shall be reported to the appropriate district supervisors and division
learning centers in the district or cluster thereof. superintendents. However, under Section 6.2(11), Rule VI of the IRR, on the
authority, accountability, and responsibility of school heads, district supervisors
Petitioners point out that under Section 4.3, paragraph (b), Rule IV of the IRR, the were deleted as one of the administrative officers to whom such reporting is to be
schools division superintendent was given the power to appoint the division made. Petitioners conclude that to the extent that the division superintendents are
supervisors and schools district supervisor and other employees subject to civil not mandated to report donations and grants to district supervisors, the IRR is void.
service laws, rules, and regulations, and the policies and guidelines to be issued by
the Secretary of Education for the purpose. On the other hand, the school division On their plea for mandamus, petitioners pray that the Court compel the DepEd and
superintendent shall have disciplinary authority only over the non-teaching the DBM to upgrade their present salary grade. They claim that the position of an
personnel under his jurisdiction. Such exercise of disciplinary authority by the ESP is already classified as SG 21, which is higher by two grades than that of district
schools division superintendent over the non-teaching personnel shall be subject to supervisors, SG 19. Considering their higher position in the department’s pecking
civil service laws, rules, and regulations, and procedures and guidelines to be issued order, vis-à-vis that of the ESPs, petitioners opine that to rectify the present grade-
by the Secretary of Education relative to this matter. The regional director shall level distortion, their salary grade should be upgraded to SG 24. 22
continue exercising disciplinary authority over the teaching personnel in so far as
the latter are covered by specific and exclusive disciplinary provisions under the For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) avers that a perusal of Section
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers (R.A. 4670). 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155 shows that the district supervisor has limited responsibilities,
and that the power to exercise administrative supervision over the ESPs is not
Petitioners posit that this grant of disciplining authority to the regional director for covered by any of those responsibilities. The Education Secretary is the disciplining
teaching personnel who commit violations of laws, rules, and regulations is authority in the DepEd, with the regional directors acting as the disciplining
definitely not provided for in R.A. No. 9155. The division superintendent was given authority in their respective regions.
the power not only to hire and appoint the division supervisors, district supervisors,
school heads, or principals as well as employees in the division, both teaching and As to petitioners’ gripe that the IRR deleted district supervisors from among those
non-teaching positions. However, when it comes to disciplining officers and school heads who should report when "[a]ccepting donations, gifts, bequests, and
teaching personnel who commit infractions or violations of law, rules, and grants for the purpose of upgrading teachers’/learning facilitators’ competencies,
regulations of the DepEd, the exercise of such disciplining authority is lodged in the improving and expanding school facilities, and providing instructional materials and
hands of the regional director. Petitioners point out that the power to hire teachers equipment," the OSG avers that this reportorial function is "directory" and merely
is in the hands of the division superintendent; principles of administrative rules and for "convenience."
procedure provide that the authority to hire and appoint carries with it the
authority to discipline and fire the hired and appointed personnel particularly if the Anent petitioners’ grievance on their alleged stagnant salary grade level, the OSG
law is silent thereon. Since the division superintendent has the authority to hire points out that the same is "already provided for under FY 2003 GAA, [thus],
teaching personnel within its division, he/she should also take the responsibility of petitioners’ complaint against the non-increase of their SG level is already moot and
disciplining erring teachers and employees. If the set-up of placing the power of academic." The OSG also emphasizes that the upgrading of the ESP’s salary grade
hiring and power to discipline or fire an errant personnel is separated or divided over the petitioners is not violative of petitioners’ right to equal protection of the
between two offices of the DepEd, the proliferation of "palakasan" or "bata-bata" law, since "district supervisors and ESPs are not similarly situated."
system will flourish, to the detriment of the public education system and public
service.
In reply, petitioners contend that the upgrading of the salary grade level of district
supervisors to SG 21 is an admission by the DepEd and by the DBM of the validity of
Petitioners also point out that under Section 7(E)(11) of R.A. No. 9155, school heads their demand to increase their salary grade to a respectable SG 24.
are authorized to accept gifts, donations, bequests, and grants for the purpose of
upgrading teacher’s/learning facilitator’s competencies, improving and expanding
The petition is partially granted.
school facilities and providing instructional materials and equipment, which, in turn,

57
It must be stressed that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in (1) Providing professional and instructional advice and support to the
the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers in
legislative enactment.23 The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot the district or cluster thereof;
extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is
vested in the legislature.24 It bears stressing, however, that administrative bodies (2) Curricula supervision; and
are allowed under their power of subordinate legislation to implement the broad
policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details. All that is required is that (3) Performing such other functions as may be assigned by proper
the regulation be germane to the objectives and purposes of the law; that the authorities.
regulation does not contradict but conforms with the standards prescribed by
law.25 Moreover, as a matter of policy, this Court accords great respect to the
As gleaned from the Senate deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2191, the district
decisions and/or actions of administrative authorities not only because of the
supervisors were divested of any administrative supervision over elementary and
doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed knowledgeability and
public high schools. The Senate resolved to vest the same in the division
expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations entrusted to their
superintendents, and the Lower House concurred. Senator Rene Cayetano
jurisdiction.26 The rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of the
proposed that the traditional function of the school supervisors of exercising
multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing society and the establishment of
administrative supervision over the elementary and public high schools be
diverse administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying those needs; it also
maintained. However, Senator Tessie Aquino-Oreta, the Chairperson of the Senate
relates to the accumulation of experience and growth of specialized capabilities by
Committee on Education and the Sponsor of the Bill, objected to such proposal:
the administrative agency charged with implementing a particular statute. 27
The President:
We have reviewed the IRR and find that Section 4.3 of Rule IV, and Sections 5.1 and
5.2 of Rule V are valid. The provisions merely reiterate and implement the related
Why do we not say AND SHALL NOT BE INCLUDED?
provisions of R.A. No. 9155. Under the law, a division superintendent has the
authority and responsibility to hire, place, and evaluate all division supervisors and
district supervisors as well as all employees in the division, both teaching and non- Senator Cayetano:
teaching personnel, including school heads.28 A school head is a person responsible
for the administrative and instructional supervision of the schools or cluster of Yes, better yet, Mr. President. I thank the Chair for that amendment.
schools.29 The division superintendent, on the other hand, supervises the operation
of all public and private elementary, secondary, and integrated schools and learning The President:
centers.30
All right. Can we approve that? The sponsor accepts the amendment, I assume.
Administrative supervision means "overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that their subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or Senator Aquino-Oreta:
neglects to fulfill them, the former may take such action or steps as prescribed by
law to make them perform their duties." 31 Yes, Mr. President.

A plain reading of the law will show that the schools district supervisors have no The President:
administrative supervision over the school heads; their responsibility is limited to
those enumerated in Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155, to wit:
Is there any objection from the floor? (Silence) There being none, the amendment is
approved.

Senator Cayetano:
58
Thank you, Mr. President. supervise school principals is now being removed or have been removed simply
because – and I may be inaccurate here – the Japanese government – I know it is a
In line 17, it ends with the conjunction "and." I would like to propose an foreign government that funded a study of the organizational setup of the DECS –
amendment by inserting a new paragraph (b). This is, of course, the duties and has recommended the abolition of school supervisors.
responsibilities of schools district supervisors. It is to SUPERVISE SCHOOL
PRINCIPALS IN THE DISTRICT, because right now, this is exactly their job. This is the reason this representation would like to ensure that the traditional
function of the school supervisors, among which is to supervise school principals,
Again, the reality is, there are efforts to minimize, if not remove, the principal remain as such. What is good for the Japanese education is not necessarily good for
function of school supervisors, which is to supervise school principals in the district. the Philippines. This representation knows that this is precisely one of the
I just want it to be there to ensure that their primary functions remain as such. complaints of the school supervisors.

Therefore, what appears as paragraph (b) in line 18 will now be subparagraph (c). The lady sponsor admitted that, indeed, there is an effort to phase out the school
supervisors. That is precisely my point, Mr. President. I do not want the school
The President: supervisors to be phased out simply because a foreign government which funded
the study of our education has suggested it.
What does the sponsor say?
The President:
Senator Aquino-Oreta:
What does the sponsor say?
Mr. President, may I just explain. There are two school supervisors. One is for the
academic function and the other is for the administrative function. As such, if these Senator Aquino-Oreta:
two supervisors will dictate to the principals, then our thrust in reducing the level of
bureaucracy might not be met. Also, the thrust of this governance bill really is to Mr. President, actually, it is not Japanese. It is an ADB proposal to the DECS. The
flesh out the importance of the school as the heart of education here. In that heart, DECS had a study made on how to improve the management order of the DECS.
we have the teacher, the student, and the school head. That was one of the proposals. They gave three proposals. One of them was to take
out the school supervisors.
What we are trying to do here is to bring to the forefront the school itself. In fact,
right now, there is a move in the DECS to do away with the school supervisor in But precisely, Mr. President, we are not doing that, we are not taking them out.
charge of administrative and leave that function to the principal. If the principal, the What we are saying is for the school supervisor to focus on the curriculum because
school head will be dictated upon by these two school supervisors, we might not be in the administration of the affairs of the school, we are saying that the principal
able to achieve what we want to do here – putting to the forefront the school itself. knows best how to administer or how to run the school better. And so, we are
Meaning, putting to the forefront the school head, the teacher, and the student. saying here that school supervisors will be there contrary to the view of that ADB
study. We will maintain them, but the focus of the school supervisors will be on the
Senator Cayetano: curriculum of the schools.

Mr. President, I would like to thank the sponsor for that enlightenment. That is Senator Cayetano:
precisely my point.
Mr. President, again I thank the lady senator. But again let us look at who
Not too long ago, I was a speaker before the school supervisors all over the land. supervisors of schools are. Supervisors of schools once upon a time were all school
One of the points that they complained about was, in most cases, their job to principals. They rose from the ranks, that is why they are fully aware of the

59
administrative as well as the instructional capability of the principals now who are – the antecedent for that is, "The schools district supervisor shall be responsible
under them. To remove their right to supervise, – now it is the ADB, I am correct, for."
the lady senator is correct because as I said I was not sure – to remove this
traditional function would really render the supervisors practically without anything Senator Cayetano:
to do. That is why they are now being justified that henceforth there will be no
principals that will be promoted as school supervisors because when the school That is right, Mr. President. Supervision, yes.
supervisors reach the age of retirement and retire, no principals shall be promoted
to that level. But these school supervisors now, Mr. President, were once upon a
The President:
time in their professional lives principals, and they know best how the schools
should be run – administratively and instructionally. That is the reason for that, Mr.
What does the sponsor say?
President.

Senator Aquino-Oreta:
The President:

Mr. President, may I have one minute?

What does the sponsor say?

SUSPENSION OF SESSION
Senator Cayetano:

Senator Tatad:
So, may I ask the sponsor to accept this, Mr. President.

Mr. President, I move that we suspend the session for one minute.
Senator Aquino-Oreta:

The President:
Mr. President, what was the amendment?

Is there any objection? (Silence) There being none, the session is suspended for one
Senator Cayetano:
minute.
To insert a new paragraph, paragraph (b) in line 18, which states: SUPERVISE
It was 5:33 p.m.
SCHOOL PRINCIPALS IN THE DISTRICT.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION
The President:

At 5:43 p.m., the session was resumed.

May I suggest, THE SUPERVISION OF SCHOOL PRINCIPALS IN THE DISTRICT,
because –
The President:
Senator Cayetano:
The session is resumed.
Yes, Mr. President.
SUSPENSION OF CONSIDERATION OF S. NO. 2191
The President:
Senator Tatad:
60
Mr. President, we are still trying to find a way out of these conflicting points of view The President:
on the role of the supervisor. To allow the parties to have a little more time to work
on this, I move that we suspend consideration of Senate Bill No. Just that?
2191. (Underscoring supplied)32
Senator Cayetano:
When the session resumed, Senator Cayetano no longer pursued his proposed
amendment, and moved instead that the same be amended to read "Curricula Just that, Mr. President.
Supervision." The Senate approved the proposal of the Senator:
Senator Tatad:
The President:
Put a semicolon (;).
The session is resumed. Senator Cayetano is recognized.
Senator Cayetano:
CAYETANO AMENDMENT
And because of that, line 18 which is paragraph (b), should now be paragraph (c).
Senator Cayetano:
The President:
Thank you, Mr. President.
What does the sponsor say?
With the permission of the lady senator, after consulting her and the Majority
Leader, I would like to propose an amendment by rewording the original
Senator Aquino-Oreta:
amendment I was proposing last night. The reworded proposed amendment would
be like this: CURRICULA SUPERVISION.
The amendment is accepted, Mr. President. (Underscoring supplied)33
The President:
Thus, under R.A. No. 9155, administrative supervision over school heads is not one
of those responsibilities conferred on district supervisors.
That would be on what page?
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person,
Senator Cayetano:
thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is
That would be on page 10, line 17, as a new paragraph (b). expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction,
be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature
The President: would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been
not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. 34
And how will it read?
It is not surprising that Senator Aquino-Oreta maintained her position that district
Senator Cayetano: supervisors should not have administrative control or even supervision over ESPs
and SSPs. As early as 1990, the DECS had adopted the policy that, effective January
CURRICULA SUPERVISION. 1, 1991, the positions of district supervisors and division supervisors would be
gradually phased out by not filling-up these positions as they become vacant. 35 On
61
September 17, 1991, then DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño issued DECS Order No. 110, It is enjoined that regional directors and schools superintendents shall exert special
Series of 1991, declaring that, to foster better considerations and articulation of effort to ensure that the implementation of this Order shall be harmonious and
progress in the elementary level, all elementary school principals shall report conducive to field supervision.37
directly to the school division superintendents. In his Order dated June 22, 1994,
then DECS Secretary Armand V. Fabella declared that DECS Order No. 110 shall Under DECS Order No. 36, Series of 1998 issued by DECS Secretary Erlinda C.
remain in effect, with the recommendation that, in order to facilitate the phase-out Pefianco, the positions of district supervisors were restored to their original status
of district supervisor positions, incumbent district supervisors were encouraged to as a supervisory level in the DECS administrative hierarchy subject to the following
transfer to vacant division supervisor positions, provided they meet the guidelines:
qualification standards for such positions.36 For his part, in his DECS Order No. 22,
Series of 1996, DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria restored the district supervisor 1.1 The positions of Education and District Supervisors are hereby restored to their
positions but only on a selective basis and subject to the following guidelines: original status as a supervisory level in the DECS administrative hierarchy, subject to
the following guidelines:
a) Schools superintendents, with the concurrence/approval of their
regional directors, may have the option to restore the position in selected 1.1.1 The functions of a district supervisor as an instructional leader and
districts after a careful evaluation of need. For this purpose, the number of resource person for teachers should be emphasized.
schools and their geographical location and distance for effective
monitoring, the availability of regular transportation, urban-rural setting,
In the event of restoration and appointment of public schools district supervisor,
etc., should be considered in the decision.
the designation of the coordinating principal shall be withdrawn.

b) The role of the district supervisor as an instructional leader and resource

Appointment of district supervisors shall be issued by regional directors only upon
for teachers, rather than merely as an administrative supervisor, should be
verification from the Department of Budget and Management that the positions still
emphasized in their functions and duties.
exist since a number of vacated district supervisor positions in some divisions may
have been converted to other positions and/or otherwise phased out since 1991. 38
c) In the event of restoration and appointment of the position in a
particular district, the school superintendent shall ensure that the system
However, as already stated, the Senate resolved to maintain the positions of district
of field supervision previous to the issuance of DECS Orders No. 110, s.
supervisors but limited their responsibilities only to those enumerated in Section
1991 and No. 41, s. 1994 shall, likewise, be restored. Correspondingly, the
7(D) of R.A. No. 9155 to conform to the basic thrust and objectives of the law. Far
designation of coordinating principals in affected districts shall be
from strengthening the office of the district supervisors as a mid-head field office of
withdrawn.
the DepEd, the law limited the authority and responsibility attached to such
position.
d) Should a division office opt not to restore some or all district supervisor
positions, the funds for such positions may be used to create new positions
While it is true that the district supervisor is given a support staff for program
or upgrade existing positions, subject to the approval of the Department of
promotion, it cannot thereby be implied that he/she likewise has administrative
Budget and Management.
supervision over ESPs and SSPs. Such a construction has no basis in law and in fact.
Indeed, such a construction of the statute defeats the very purpose of the law.
e) Considering that a number of vacated district supervisor positions in
some divisions may have been converted to other positions and/or
otherwise phased out since 1991, appointments of district supervisors shall
be issued by regional directors only upon verification from the Department
of Budget and Management that the said position may be filled.

62
It is a basic precept that the intent of the legislature is the controlling factor in the Needless to say, Section 7, on Division Level, further provides that the School
interpretation of the statute. The particular words, clauses, and phrases should not Division Superintendent shall have authority, accountability and responsibility for,
be studied as detached and isolated expression, but the whole and every part of the among others, "(s)upervising the operation of all public and private elementary,
statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to secondary and integrated schools, and learning centers." To claim, therefore, that
produce a harmonious whole.39 the District Supervisor has administrative supervision over the ESPs would also
violate the above-quoted provision.41
Besides, Congress enumerated the duties and responsibilities of a district
supervisor. Congress would not have made specific enumerations in a statute if it The Court likewise declares that the last paragraph of Section 4.3 of the IRR, stating
had the intention not to restrict or limit its meaning and confine its terms only to that the regional director shall continue exercising disciplinary authority over the
those expressly enumerated. Courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge teaching personnel insofar as the latter are covered by specific and exclusive
the scope of a statute and include situations not provided nor intended by disciplinary provisions under R.A. No. 4670 ("Magna Carta for Public School
Congress.40 Teachers") does not contravene R.A. No. 9155. Indeed, the IRR merely reiterates
the DECS Rules of Procedure, DECS Order No. 33, issued on March 30, 1999 by the
The submission of the OSG, that the schools district supervisors have the DepEd Secretary, and R.A. No. 4670 which was approved on June 18, 1966, and
administrative supervision over school heads, is more in accord with the law, to wit: pursuant to Section 7, Chapter II, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code, which
provides that the DepEd Secretary is empowered to
Section 7 of RA 9155, on School District Level, pertinently provides that "a school
district shall have a school district supervisor and an office staff for program a. Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out department
promotion," and that the schools district supervisor shall be responsible for: (1) objectives, policies, functions, plans, programs, and projects; and
"(p)roviding professional and instructional advice and support to the school heads
and teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers in the district [or] cluster b. Promulgate administrative issuances necessary for the efficient
thereof;" (2) "(c)urricula supervision;" and, (3) "(p)erforming such other functions as administration of the offices under the Secretary and for execution of the
may be assigned by the proper authorities." laws relative thereto.

A perusal of Section 7 shows that the District Supervisor has limited responsibilities, Additionally, the IRR was issued by the DepEd Secretary pursuant to Section 7(A)(1)
and that the power to exercise administrative supervision over the ESPs is not of R.A. No. 9155, which mandates that the Secretary formulate national educational
covered by responsibility nos. 1 and 2. Neither is that power covered by the policies and enhance the employment status, professional competence, welfare,
directive that the District Supervisor shall have an office staff for program and working conditions of all the DepEd personnel.42
promotion. The only logical conclusion, therefore, that can be derived from the
aforesaid enumeration of responsibilities is that the District Supervisor may only We agree that R.A. No. 9155 does not provide who has disciplinary authority over
exercise administrative supervision over ESPs when such function is assigned by the teaching personnel of the DepEd. However, under Section 3, Chapter III of DECS
proper authorities. And, since the DepEd Secretary specifically declared through the Order No. 33, Series of 1999, otherwise known as the 1999 DECS Rules of
IRR of RA 9155, that the District Supervisor shall not exercise administrative Procedure, the disciplining authority in the DECS is the DepEd Secretary, with the
supervision over the ESPs, unless otherwise authorized, petitioners cannot complain regional directors acting as such in their respective regions except those appointed
against the said declaration. On this score, it is settled that the intent of the statute by the President.43
is the law (Philippine National Bank v. Office of the President, 252 SCRA 5 [1996]). In
the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a The officers and employees referred to in the Rules of Procedure include teachers
statute should be given their plain, ordinary and common usage meaning (Mustang who, under R.A. No. 4670, shall mean:
Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 430 [1996]).
x x x all persons engaged in classroom teaching, in any level of instruction, on full-
time basis, including guidance counselors, school librarians, industrial arts, or
63
vocational instructors, and all other persons performing supervisory and/or (11) Accepting donations, gifts, bequests, and grants for the purpose of upgrading
administrative functions in all schools, colleges and universities operated by the teachers’/learning facilitators’ competencies, improving and expanding school
Government or its political subdivisions; but shall not include school nurses, school facilities, and providing instructional materials and equipment. Such donations or
physicians, school dentists, and other school employees. grants must be reported to the appropriate district supervisors and division
superintendents. (emphasis supplied)
A division superintendent of schools is not a disciplining authority over teachers,
whether under R.A. No. 4670 or under the DECS Rules of Procedure. In fact, under However, Section 6.2(11), Rule VI of the IRR provides that:
Section 2, Chapter VII of such Rules of Procedure, a division superintendent is a
chairperson of the investigating committee over formal complaints filed against (11) Accepting donations, gifts, bequests, and grants in accordance with existing
such teachers: laws and policy of the Department for the purpose of upgrading teachers’/learning
facilitators’ competencies, improving and expanding school facilities, and providing
a) When the respondent is an elementary or secondary school teacher, head instructional materials and equipment. Such donations or grants must be reported
teacher, principal, district supervisor/chair/coordinator or Education Supervisor I – to the division superintendents. (emphasis supplied)

(1) The schools division superintendent or his or her duly authorized We agree with petitioners’ contention that, under the law, donations and grants
representative, as chairperson; must be reported to the appropriate district supervisors and not only to the division
superintendents. The use in the law of the word "must" is an expression of the
(2) The duly authorized representative of the school, district, or division mandatory nature of the reporting of donations and grants to district supervisors.
teacher’s organization, as member; and The reason for the provision is that such grants and donations which are intended
to upgrade teachings/learning facilitators’ competencies, improve and expand
(3) The division supervisor for elementary or secondary education where school facilities, and provide instructional materials and equipment will assist the
the respondent belongs, as member. school district supervisors in the performance of their duties and responsibilities
under Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155, and submit appropriate recommendations to
the proper administrative officers.
The foregoing rule is based on Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670 which reads:

On petitioner’s plaint of the failure of respondents to upgrade their salary grade

Sec. 9. Administrative Charges. Administrative charges against a teacher shall be
level to at most SG 21, and for the issuance of the writ of mandamus mandating
heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School
respondents to increase their salary grade from SG 19 to 24, the same is premature.
Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who should, at
least, have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as
chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or There is no showing in the petition that, before filing their petition, petitioners
national teacher’s organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be sought an adjustment of level of their salary grade from SG 19 to SG 21 before
designated by the Director of Public Schools. The committee shall submit its findings respondents or the Civil Service Commission. Section 17 of Presidential Decree No.
and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days from the 985, as amended by Section 14 of R.A. No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary
termination of the hearings: Provided, however, That where the school Standardization Law, provides:
superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of the
committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education. Sec. 17. Powers and Functions. – The Budget Commission (now Department of
Budget and Management), principally through the OCPC (now CPCB, Compensation
Anent the issue on reporting of acceptance of donations, Section 7(E)(11) of R.A. and Position Classification Board) shall, in addition to those provided under other
No. 9155 provides: Sections of this Decree, have the following powers and functions:

64
a. Administer the compensation and position classification system established a. The Teachers’ Preparation Pay Schedule shall be prepared by the
herein and revise it as necessary; Commission in consultation with the Department of Education and Culture.
Under this system, the teacher's academic or educational preparation,
xxxx teaching experience in both private and public schools, and extra-curricular
activities for professional growth, shall be considered in pursuance of the
f. Certify classification actions and changes in class or grade of positions whenever principle of 'equal pay for equal training and experience.'
the facts warrant, such certification to be binding on administrative, certifying,
payroll, disbursing, accounting and auditing officers of the national government and xxxx
government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions.
d. The Budget Commission, in coordination and consultation with the
Sections 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9155 provide: Department of Education and Culture and the Civil Service Commission
may, when future needs require, modify, change or otherwise improve on
SEC. 10. The Secretary of Education and the Secretary of Budget and Management the salary system herein established for the teaching and closely related
shall, within ninety (90) days from the approval of this Act, jointly promulgate the occupations, any change that may be made as provided herein shall
guidelines on the allocation, distribution, and utilization of resources provided by become part of the implementing rules of this Decree to be issued by the
the national government for the field offices, taking into consideration the Budget Commission upon prior approval by the President.
uniqueness of the working conditions of the teaching service.
Moreover, the issue of whether or not respondents should be compelled to adjust
The Secretary of the Department of Education shall ensure that resources upwards the salary grade of petitioners to SG 21 has become moot and academic,
appropriated for the field offices are adequate and that resources for school because, on November 3, 2003, the DepEd and the DBM issued Joint Circular No. 1,
personnel, school desks, and textbooks and other instructional materials intended Series of 2003 containing the guidelines in the implementation of the Salary
are allocated directly and released immediately by the Department of Budget and Upgrading for District and Education Supervisors, to wit:
Management to said offices.
4.0 GUIDELINES
SEC. 11. The Secretary of the Department of Education, subject to civil service laws
and regulations, shall issue appropriate personnel policy rules and regulations that 4.1 To maintain the previous salary grade relationships under RA No. 6758
will best meet the requirements of the teaching profession taking into among the PSDS and ES I, on the one hand, and Elementary School
consideration the uniqueness of the working conditions of the teaching service. Principal (ESP) IV and Secondary School Principal (SSP) II, on the other
hand, and to preserve the consistency in the salary grade relationships of
And insofar as the salary system for teaching positions is concerned, Section 14 said positions, the following are hereby authorized:
provides:
4.1.1 Upgrading of the PSDS and ES I positions from SG-19 to SG-
SEC. 14. The Salary System for Teaching Position. – The salary grade of a teacher 20 in July 2003 and to SG-21 in July 2004;
shall be determined in accordance with the following:
4.1.2 Upgrading of the ES II positions by two (2) salary grades from
SG-20 to SG-21 in July 2003 and to SG-22 in July 2004;

4.1.3 A one-step salary adjustment to incumbents of ES III

positions starting July 2003 and another one-step salary
adjustment starting July 2004;

65
 4.1.4 A one-step salary adjustment to incumbents of CES positions against the lump sum appropriation for the purpose that may be included in the
starting July 2003 and another one-step salary adjustment starting 2004 budget.
July 2004.
7.0 POST-AUDIT
4.2 Attached herewith is Annex A containing the summary of the guidelines
for the salary upgrading of positions authorized herein. Any salary adjustment paid under this Circular shall be subject to post-audit by the
DBM – ROs concerned. Any payments thereof which are not in accordance herewith
5.0 SALARY RULES shall be adjusted accordingly.

5.1 For purposes of the salary upgrading herein authorized, the basic salary 8.0 CONTRIBUTIONS
of the employee concerned shall be adjusted as follows:
The salary adjustments authorized herein are subject to the mandatory
5.1.1 Effective July 1, 2003 – at the same salary step of his requirements for life and retirement premiums, and health insurance premiums.
assigned salary grade as of June 30, 2003 (Illustrative Example A)
adopting the Salary Schedule prescribed under National Budget 9.0 SAVING CLAUSE
Circular (NBC) No. 474 (Annex B);
Conflicts arising from the implementation of the provisions of this Circular shall be
5.1.2 Effective July 1, 2004 – at the same salary step of his resolved by the Department of Education, upon prior consultation with the
assigned salary grade as of June 30, 2004 (Illustrative Example A) Department of Budget and Management.
adopting the Salary Schedule prescribed under National Budget
Circular (NBC) No. 474 (Annex B). 10.0 EFFECTIVITY

5.2 The transition allowance as defined in 3.2 being received by the PSDS This Circular Letter shall take effect on July 1, 2003.
and ES, if any, shall be considered as advance entitlement of the salary
increase herein authorized. (Illustrative Examples B and C)
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition for prohibition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2003 is declared valid, except Section
5.3 No step adjustment shall be granted to incumbents of positions whose 6.2(11), Rule VI thereof which provides that "donations or grants shall be reported
salary already falls at or exceeds the maximum step (eighth step) of the only to the division superintendents." Such donations or grants must also be
salary grade allocation of their positions. (Illustrative Example D) reported to the appropriate school district supervisors, as mandated by Republic
Act No. 9155. Petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is DENIED
5.4 The herein salary increases shall be effected through the issuance of a for lack of merit. No costs.
Notice of Salary Adjustment (NOSA) by the duly authorized official. (Annex
C) SO ORDERED.

6.0 FUNDING SOURCE Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
The amounts necessary to implement the salary adjustments authorized herein Manila
shall be charged against the Nationwide lump sum appropriation for the purpose
amounting to fifty million pesos (P50,000,000) in the DepEd’s budget in RA 9206, EN BANC
the CY 2003 General Appropriations Act. For CY 2004, the same shall be charged

66
G.R. No. 207145               July 28, 2015 Section 21. Hazard Allowance. - Public health workers in hospitals, sanitaria, rural
health units, main health centers, health infirmaries, barangay health stations,
GIL G. CAWAD, MARIO BENEDICT P. GALON, DOMINGO E. LUSAYA, JEAN V. clinics and other health-related establishments located in difficult areas, strife-torn
APOLINARES, MA. LUISA S. OREZCA, JULIO R. GARCIA, NESTOR M. INTIA, RUBEN C. or embattled areas, distressed or isolated stations, prisons camps, mental hospitals,
CALIWATAN, ADOLFO Q. ROSALES, MA. LUISA NAVARRO, and the PHILIPPINE radiation exposed clinics, laboratories or disease-infested areas or in areas declared
PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioners, under state of calamity or emergency for the duration thereof which expose them
vs. to great danger, contagion, radiation, volcanic activity/eruption, occupational risks
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and or perils to life as determined by the Secretary of Health or the Head of the unit
Management (DBM); ENRIQUE T. ONA, in his capacity as Secretary of the with the approval of the Secretary of Health, shall be compensated hazard
Department of Health (DOH); and FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, in his capacity as allowances equivalent to at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the monthly basic
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), Respondents. salary of health workers receiving salary grade 19 and below, and five percent
(5%) for health workers with<="" b="">
DECISION
Section 22. Subsistence Allowance. - Public health workers who are required to
PERALTA, J.: render service within the premises of hospitals, sanitaria, health infirmaries, main
health centers, rural health units and barangay health stations, or clinics, and other
health-related establishments in order to make their services available at any and
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
all times, shall be entitled to full subsistence allowance of three (3) meals which
Rules of Court filed by the officers and members of the Philippine Public Health
may be computed in accordance with prevailing circumstances as determined by
Association, Inc. (PPHAI) assailing the validity of Joint Circular No. 1 1 dated
the Secretary of Health in consultation with the Management-Health Worker's
November 29, 2012 of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and the
Consultative Councils, as established under Section 33 of this Act: Provided, That
Department of Health (DOH) as well as Item 6.5 of the Joint Circular 2 dated
representation and travel allowance shall be given to rural health physicians as
September 3, 2012 of the DBM and the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
enjoyed by municipal agriculturists, municipal planning and development officers
and budget officers.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Section 23. Longevity Pay.- A monthly longevity pay equivalent to five percent
On March 26, 1992, Republic Act (RA) No. 7305, otherwise known as The Magna (5%)of the monthly basic pay shall be paid to a health worker for every five (5)
Carta of Public Health Workers was signed into law in order to promote the social years of continuous, efficient and meritorious services rendered as certified by the
and economic well-being of health workers, their living and working conditions and chief of office concerned, commencing with the service after the approval of this
terms of employment, to develop their skills and capabilities to be better equipped Act.4
to deliver health projects and programs, and to encourage those with proper
qualifications and excellent abilities to join and remain in government
Pursuant to Section 355 of the Magna Carta, the Secretary of Health promulgated its
service.3 Accordingly, public health workers (PHWs) were granted the following
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) in July 1992. Thereafter, in November
allowances and benefits, among others:
1999, the DOH, in collaboration with various government agencies and health
workers' organizations, promulgated a Revised IRR consolidating all additional and
Section 20. Additional Compensation. - Notwithstanding Section 12 of Republic Act clarificatory rules issued by the former Secretaries of Health dating back from the
No. 6758, public health workers shall receive the following allowances: hazard effectivity of the Magna Carta. The pertinent provisions of said Revised IRR provide:
allowance, subsistence allowance, longevity pay, laundry allowance and remote
assignment allowance.
6.3. Longevity Pay.- A monthly longevity pay equivalent to five percent (5%)of the
present monthly basic pay shall be paid to public health workers for every five (5)
years of continuous, efficient and meritorious services rendered as certified by the
67
Head of Agency/Local Chief Executives commencing after the approval of the Act. d. Part-time public health workers/consultants are entitled to
(April 17, 1992) one-half (1/2)of the prescribed rates received by full-time public
health workers.6
xxxx
On July 28, 2008, the Fourteenth Congress issued Joint Resolution No. 4, entitled
7.1.1. Eligibility to Receive Hazard Pay.- All public health workers covered under RA Joint Resolution Authorizing the President of the Philippines to Modify the
7305 are eligible to receive hazard pay when the nature of their work exposes them Compensation and Position Classification System of Civilian Personnel and the Base
to high risk/low risk hazards for at least fifty percent (50%) of their working hours as Pay Schedule of Military and Uniformed Personnel in the Government, and for
determined and approved by the Secretary of Health or his authorized other Purposes, approved by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on June
representatives. 17,2009, which provided for certain amendments in the Magna Carta and its IRR.

xxxx On September 3, 2012, respondents DBM and CSC issued one of the two assailed
issuances, DBM-CSC Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012, to prescribe the rules on
7.2.1. Eligibility for Subsistence Allowance the grant of Step Increments due to meritorious performance and Step Increment
due to length of service.7 Specifically, it provided that "an official or employee
authorized to be granted Longevity Pay under an existing law is not eligible for the
a. All public health workers covered under RA 7305 are eligible to
grant of Step Increment due to length of service."8 Shortly thereafter, on
receive full subsistence allowance as long as they render actual
November29, 2012, respondents DBM and DOH then circulated the other assailed
duty.
issuance, DBM-DOH Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012, the relevant provisions of
which state:
b. Public Health Workers shall be entitled to full Subsistence
Allowance of three (3) meals which may be computed in
7.0. Hazard Pay. - Hazard pay is an additional compensation for performing
accordance with prevailing circumstances as determined by the
hazardous duties and for enduring physical hardships in the course of performance
Secretary of Health in consultation with the Management-Health
of duties.
Workers Consultative Council, as established under Section 33 of
the Act.
As a general compensation policy, and in line with Section 21 of R. A. No. 7305,
Hazard Pay may be granted to PHWs only if the nature of the duties and
c. Those public health workers who are out of station shall be
responsibilities of their positions, their actual services, and location of work expose
entitled to per diems in place of Subsistence Allowance.
them to great danger, occupational risks, perils of life, and physical hardships; and
Subsistence Allowance may also be commuted.
only during periods of actual exposure to hazards and hardships.
xxxx
xxxx
7.2.3 Rates of Subsistence Allowance
8.3 The Subsistence Allowance shall be ₱50for each day of actual full-time service,
or ₱25for each day of actual part-time service.
a. Subsistence allowance shall be implemented at not less than
Ph₱50.00 per day or Ph₱1,500.00 per month as certified by head
xxxx
of agency.

9.0 Longevity Pay (LP)

xxxx

68
9.1 Pursuant to Section 23 of R.A. No. 7305, a PHW may be granted LP at 5% of NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION ON DECEMBER 29, 2012,
his/her current monthly basic salary, in recognition of every 5 years of continuous, IN VIOLATION OF THE RULES ON PUBLICATION.
efficient, and meritorious services rendered as PHW. The grant thereof is based on
the following criteria: II.

9.1.1 The PHW holds a position in the agency plantilla of regular positions; and WHETHER RESPONDENTS FRANCISCO T. DUQUE AND FLORENCIO B. ABAD ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN THEY ISSUED DBM-CSC JOINT CIRCULAR
9.1.2 He/She has rendered at least satisfactory performance and has not been NO. 1, S. 2012 DATED SEPTEMBER 2, 2012 WHICH PROVIDED THAT AN OFFICIAL OR
found guilty of any administrative or criminal case within all rating periods covered EMPLOYEE ENTITLED TO LONGEVITY PAY UNDER EXISTING LAW SHALL NO LONGER
by the 5-year period. BE GRANTED STEP INCREMENT DUE TO LENGTH OF SERVICE.

In a letter9 dated January 23, 2013 addressed to respondents Secretary of Budget III.

and Management and Secretary of Health, petitioners expressed their opposition to
the Joint Circular cited above on the ground that the same diminishes the benefits WHETHER RESPONDENTS' ISSUANCE OF DBM-DOH JOINT CIRCULAR NO. 1, S. 2012
granted by the Magna Carta to PHWs. IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING AN UNDUE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY
ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES WHEN RESPONDENT ONA ALLOWED RESPONDENT ABAD
Unsatisfied, petitioners, on May 30, 2013, filed the instant petition raising the TOSIGNIFICANTLY SHARE THE POWER TO FORMULATE AND PREPARE THE
following issues: NECESSARY RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE PROVISIONS OF THE
MAGNA CARTA.
I.
IV.
WHETHER RESPONDENTS ENRIQUE T. ONA AND FLORENCIO B. ABAD ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND VIOLATED SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS WHEN WHETHER RESPONDENT ONA WAS REMISS IN IMPLEMENTING THE MANDATE OF
THEY ISSUED DBM-DOH JOINT CIRCULAR NO. 1, S. 2012 WHICH: THE MAGNA CARTA WHEN HE DID NOT INCLUDE THE MAGNA CARTA BENEFITS IN
THE DEPARTMENT'S YEARLY BUDGET.
A) MADE THE PAYMENT OF HAZARD PAY DEPENDENT ON THE
ACTUAL DAYS OF EXPOSURE TO THE RISK INVOLVED; V.

B) ALLOWED PAYMENT OF SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCE AT ₱50 FOR WHETHER RESPONDENTS' ISSUANCE OF DBM-DOH JOINT CIRCULAR NO. 1, S. 2012
EACH DAY OF ACTUAL FULL-TIME SERVICE OR ₱25 FOR EACH DAY IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING AN UNDUE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY
OF ACTUAL PART-TIME SERVICE WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES WHEN THE SAME WAS ISSUED SANS CONSULTATION
THE PREVAILING CIRCUMSTANCES AS DETERMINED BY THE WITH PROFESSIONAL AND HEALTH WORKERS' ORGANZATIONS AND UNIONS.
SECRETARY OF HEALTH IN CONSULTATION WITH THE
MANAGEMENT HEALTH WORKERS' CONSULTATIVE COUNCILS; Petitioners contend that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion when
they issued DBM-DOH Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012 and DBM-CSC Joint
C) REQUIRED THAT LONGEVITY PAY BE GRANTED ONLY TO PHWs Circular No. 1, Series of 2012 which prescribe certain requirements on the grant of
WHO HOLD PLANTILLA AND REGULAR POSITIONS; AND benefits that are not otherwise required by RA No. 7305. Specifically, petitioners
assert that the DBM-DOH Joint Circular grants the payment of Hazard Pay only if the
D) MADE THE JOINT CIRCULAR EFFECTIVE ON JANUARY 1, 2013, nature of the PHWs' duties expose them to danger when RA No. 7305 does not
BARELY THREE (3) DAYS AFTER IT WAS PUBLISHED IN A make any qualification. They likewise claim that said circular unduly fixes

69
Subsistence Allowance at ₱50 for each day of full-time service and ₱25 for part-time Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
service which are not in accordance with prevailing circumstances determined by board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
the Secretary of Health as required by RA No. 7305. Moreover, petitioners fault functions, are without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
respondents for the premature effectivity of the DBM-DOH Joint Circular which they discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any
believe should have been on January 29, 2012 and not on January 1, 2012. As to the other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
grant of Longevity Pay, petitioners posit that the same was wrongfully granted only aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
to PHWs holding regular plantilla positions. Petitioners likewise criticize the DBM- with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent
CSC Joint Circular insofar as it withheld the Step Increment due to length of service to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or
from those who are already being granted Longevity Pay. As a result, petitioners otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. 10
claim that the subject circulars are void for being an undue exercise of legislative
power by administrative bodies. Thus, on the one hand, certiorari as a special civil action is available only if: (1) it is
directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
In their Comment, respondents, through the Solicitor General, refute petitioners' functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
allegations in stating that the assailed circulars were issued within the scope of their or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3)
authority, and are therefore valid and binding. They also assert the authority of there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
Joint Resolution No. 4, Series of 2009, approved by the President, in accordance course of law.11
with the prescribed procedure. Moreover, respondents question the remedies of
Certiorari and Prohibition used by petitioners for the assailed circulars were done in On the other hand, prohibition is available only if: (1) it is directed against a
the exercise of their quasi-legislative, and not of their judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person exercising functions, judicial, quasi-
functions. judicial, or ministerial; (2) the tribunal, corporation, board or person acted without
or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
The petition is partly meritorious. excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.12 Based on the foregoing, this Court
At the outset, the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners is not has consistently reiterated that petitions for certiorari and prohibition may be
the appropriate remedy to assail the validity of respondents' circulars. Sections 1 invoked only against tribunals, corporations, boards, officers, or persons exercising
and 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provide: judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, and not against their exercise of
legislative or quasi-legislative functions. 13
RULE 65
CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS Judicial functions involve the power to determine what the law is and what the legal
rights of the parties are, and then undertaking to determine these questions and
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.14 Quasi judicial functions apply to the
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his actions and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies required to
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of investigate facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in official action, in their exercise of discretion of a judicial nature. 15 Ministerial
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in functions are those which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard to the exercise of his own
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. 16
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is
xxxx necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights under which
adverse claims are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before
70
a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with authority to determine the law and First, the qualification imposed by the DBM-DOH Joint Circular granting the
adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. 17 In this case, payment of Hazard Pay only if the nature of PHWs' duties expose them to danger
respondents did not act in any judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial capacity in their and depending on whether the risk involved is high or low was merely derived from
issuance of the assailed joint circulars. In issuing and implementing the subject Section 7.1.1 of the Revised IRR of RA No. 7305, duly promulgated by the DOH in
circulars, respondents were not called upon to adjudicate the rights of contending collaboration with various government health agencies and health workers'
parties to exercise, in any manner, discretion of a judicial nature. The issuance and organizations in November 1999, to wit:
enforcement by the Secretaries of the DBM, CSC and DOH of the questioned joint
circulars were done in the exercise of their quasi-legislative and administrative SECTION 7.1.1. Eligibility to Receive Hazard Pay. - All public health workers covered
functions. It was in the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated by them in under RA 7305 are eligible to receive hazard pay when the nature of their work
their exercise of delegated power. Quasi-legislative power is exercised by exposes them to high risk/low risk hazards for at least fifty percent (50%) of their
administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within working hours as determined and approved by the Secretary of Health or his
the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of powers authorized representatives.21
from the separation of the branches of the government. 18
Second, fixing the Subsistence Allowance at ₱50 for each day of full-time service
Based on the foregoing, certiorari and prohibition do not lie against herein and ₱25 for part-time service was also merely a reiteration of the limits prescribed
respondents' issuances. It is beyond the province of certiorari to declare the by the Revised IRR, validly issued by the Secretary of Health pursuant to Section
aforesaid administrative issuances illegal because petitions for certiorari seek solely 3522 of RA No. 7305, the pertinent portions of which states:
to correct defects in jurisdiction, and not to correct just any error committed by a
court, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions unless such Section 7.2.3 Rates of Subsistence Allowance
court, board, or officer thereby acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with such
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 19
a. Subsistence allowance shall be implemented at not less than Ph₱50.00 per day or
Ph₱1,500.00 per month as certified by head of agency.
It is likewise beyond the territory of a writ of prohibition since generally, the
purpose of the same is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in
xxxx
order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. It affords relief
against usurpation of jurisdiction by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of
d. Part-time public health workers/consultants are entitled to one-half (1/2)of the
jurisdiction, the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed by the law, or
prescribed rates received by full-time public health workers.
where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law. 20

Third, the condition imposed by the DBM-DOH Joint Circular granting longevity pay
Be that as it may, We proceed to discuss the substantive issues raised in the petition
only to those PHWs holding regular plantilla positions merely implements the
in order to finally resolve the doubt over the Joint Circulars' validity. For proper
qualification imposed by the Revised IRR which provides:
guidance, the pressing issue of whether or not the joint circulars regulating the
salaries and benefits relied upon by public health workers were tainted with grave
abuse of discretion rightly deserves its prompt resolution. With respect to the 6.3. Longevity Pay. - A monthly longevity pay equivalent to five percent (5%) of the
infirmities of the DBM-DOH Joint Circular raised in the petition, they cannot be said present monthly basic pay shall be paid to public health workers for every five (5)
to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion for not only are they reasonable, years of continuous, efficient and meritorious services rendered as certified by the
they were likewise issued well within the scope of authority granted to the Head of Agency/Local Chief Executives commencing after the approval of the Act.
respondents. In fact, as may be gathered from prior issuances on the matter, the (April 17, 1992)
circular did not make any substantial deviation therefrom, but actually remained
consistent with, and germane to, the purposes of the law. 6.3.1. Criteria for Efficient and Meritorious Service A Public Worker shall have:

71
a. At least a satisfactory performance rating within the rating period. exclude discounts since these are "not amounts paid or charged for the sale of
electricity, but are reductions in rates.
b. Not been found guilty of any administrative or criminal case within the rating
period. xxxx

As can be gleaned from the aforequoted provision, petitioners failed to show any Thus, the policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by
real inconsistency in granting longevity pay to PHWs holding regular plantilla power suppliers "give no real consequence more than what the law itself has
positions. Not only are they based on the same premise, but the intent of longevity already prescribed." Publication is not necessary for the effectivity of the policy
pay, which is paid to workers for every five (5) years of continuous, efficient and guidelines.
meritorious services, necessarily coincides with that of regularization. Thus, the
assailed circular cannot be invalidated for its issuance is consistent with, and As interpretative regulations, the policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of
germane to, the purposes of the law. discounts extended by power suppliers are also not required to be filed with the
U.P. Law Center in order to be effective. Section 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the
Anent petitioners' contention that the DBM-DOH Joint Circular is null and void for Administrative Code of 1987 requires every rule adopted by an agency to be filed
its failure to comply with Section 3523 of RA No. 7305 providing that its with the U.P. Law Center to be effective. However, in Board of Trustees of the
implementing rules shall take effect thirty (30) days after publication in a newspaper Government Service Insurance System v. Velasco, this Court pronounced that "not
of general circulation, as well as its failure to file a copy of the same with the all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency are to be filed with
University of the Philippines Law Center-Office of the National Administrative the UP Law Center." Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature
Register (UP Law Center-ONAR), jurisprudence as well as the circumstances of this are not required to be filed with the U.P. Law Center. Paragraph 9 (a) of the
case dictate otherwise. Guidelines for Receiving and Publication of Rules and Regulations Filed with the U.P.
Law Center states:
Indeed, publication, as a basic postulate of procedural due process, is required by
law in order for administrative rules and regulations to be effective. 24 There are, 9. Rules and Regulations which need not be filed with the U.P. Law Center, shall,
however, several exceptions, one of which are interpretative regulations which among others, include but not be limited to, the following:
"need nothing further than their bare issuance for they give no real consequence
more than what the law itself has already prescribed." 25 These regulations need not a. Those which are interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature,
be published for they add nothing to the law and do not affect substantial rights of that is, regulating only the personnel of the Administrative agency and not the
any person.26 public.

Thus, in Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives, et. al. v. Energy xxxx
Regulatory Commission (ERC), 27 wherein several orders issued by the ERC were
sought to be invalidated for lack of publication and non-submission of copies Furthermore, the policy guidelines of the ERC did not create a new obligation and
thereof to the UP Law Center - ONAR, it has been held that since they merely impose a new duty, nor did it attach a new disability. As previously discussed, the
interpret RA No. 7832 and its IRR, particularly on the computation of the cost of policy guidelines merely interpret R.A. No. 7832 and its IRR, particularly on the
purchased power, without modifying, amending or supplanting the same, they computation of the cost of purchased power. The policy guidelines did not
cannot be rendered ineffective, to wit: modify, amend or supplant the IRR.

When the policy guidelines of the ERC directed the exclusion of discounts extended Similarly, in Republic v. Drugmaker's Laboratories, Inc., 28 the validity of circulars
by power suppliers in the computation of the cost of purchased power, the issued by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) was upheld in spite of the non-
guidelines merely affirmed the plain and unambiguous meaning of "cost" in Section compliance with the publication, prior hearing, and consultation requirements for
5, Rule IX of the IRR of R.A. No. 7832."Cost" is an item of outlay, and must therefore
72
they merely implemented the provisions of Administrative Order No. 67, entitled regulations, such as the DBM-DOH circular herein, need not be published nor filed
"Revised Rules and Regulations on Registration of Pharmaceutical Products" issued with the UP Law Center - ONAR in order to be effective. Neither is prior hearing or
by the DOH, in the following wise: consultation mandatory.

A careful scrutiny of the foregoing issuances would reveal that AO 67, s. 1989 is Nevertheless, it bears stressing that in spite of the immateriality of the publication
actually the rule that originally introduced the BA/BE testing requirement as a requirement in this case, and even assuming the necessity of the same, its basic
component of applications for the issuance of CPRs covering certain objective in informing the public of the contents of the law was sufficiently
pharmaceutical products. As such, it is considered an administrative regulation - a accomplished when the DBM-DOH Joint Circular was published in the Philippine
legislative rule to be exact - issued by the Secretary of Health in consonance with Star, a newspaper of general circulation, on December 29, 2012. 29
the express authority granted to him by RA 3720 to implement the statutory
mandate that all drugs and devices should first be registered with the FDA prior to As to petitioners' allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
their manufacture and sale. Considering that neither party contested the validity of DOH Secretary in failing to include the Magna Carta benefits in his department's
its issuance, the Court deems that AO 67, s. 1989 complied with the requirements yearly budget, the same is belied by the fact that petitioners themselves specifically
of prior hearing, notice, and publication pursuant to the presumption of regularity provided in their petition an account of the amounts allocated for the same in the
accorded to the government in the exercise of its official duties.42 years 2012 and 2013.30

On the other hand, Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 cannot be considered as Based on the foregoing, it must be recalled that administrative regulations, such as
administrative regulations because they do not: (a) implement a primary the DBM-DOH Joint Circular herein, enacted by administrative agencies to
legislation by providing the details thereof; (b) interpret, clarify, or explain implement and interpret the law they are entrusted to enforce are entitled to great
existing statutory regulations under which the FDA operates; and/or (c) ascertain respect.31 They partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they
the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of RA 3720 have been written in the statute itself. As such, administrative regulations have the
depends. In fact, the only purpose of these circulars is for the FDA to administer force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of legality. Unless and until they
and supervise the implementation of the provisions of AO 67, s. 1989, including are overcome by sufficient evidence showing that they exceeded the bounds of the
those covering the BA/BE testing requirement, consistent with and pursuant to law,32 their validity and legality must be upheld.
RA 3720.43 Therefore, the FDA has sufficient authority to issue the said circulars
and since they would not affect the substantive rights of the parties that they seek Thus, notwithstanding the contention that the Joint Resolution No. 4 promulgated
to govern - as they are not, strictly speaking, administrative regulations in the first by Congress cannot be a proper source of delegated power, the subject Circular was
place - no prior hearing, consultation, and publication are needed for their nevertheless issued well within the scope of authority granted to the respondents.
validity. The issue in this case is not whether the Joint Resolution No. 4 can become law and,
consequently, authorize the issuance of the regulation in question, but whether the
In this case, the DBM-DOH Joint Circular in question gives no real consequence circular can be struck down as invalid for being tainted with grave abuse of
more than what the law itself had already prescribed. As previously discussed, the discretion. Regardless, therefore, of the validity or invalidity of Joint Resolution No.
qualification of actual exposure to danger for the PHW's entitlement to hazard pay, 4, the DBMDOH Joint Circular assailed herein cannot be said to have been arbitrarily
the rates of ₱50 and ₱25 subsistence allowance, and the entitlement to longevity or capriciously issued for being consistent with prior issuances duly promulgated
pay on the basis of PHW's status in the plantilla of regular positions were already pursuant to valid and binding law.
prescribed and authorized by pre-existing law. There is really no new obligation or
duty imposed by the subject circular for it merely reiterated those embodied in RA Distinction must be made, however, with respect to the DBM-CSC Joint Circular, the
No. 7305 and its Revised IRR. The Joint Circular did not modify, amend nor supplant contested provision of which states:
the Revised IRR, the validity of which is undisputed. Consequently, whether it was
duly published and filed with the UP Law Center - ONAR is necessarily immaterial to
6.5 An official or employee authorized to be granted Longevity Pay under an
its validity because in view of the pronouncements above, interpretative
existing law is not eligible for the grant of Step Increment Due to Length of Service.
73
A review of RA No. 7305 and its Revised IRR reveals that the law does not similarly workers receiving salary grade 19 and below, and five percent (5%) for health
impose such condition on the grant of longevity pay to PHWs in the government workers with salary grade 20 and above.
service. As such, the DBM-CSC Joint Circular effectively created a new imposition
which was not otherwise stipulated in the law it sought to interpret. Consequently, xxxx
the same exception granted to the DBM-DOH Joint Circular cannot be applied to the
DBM-CSC Joint Circular insofar as the requirements on publication and submission 7.1.5. Rates of Hazard Pay
with the UP Law Center - ONAR are concerned. Thus, while it was well within the
authority of the respondents to issue rules regulating the grant of step increments
a. Public health workers shall be compensated hazard allowances equivalent to at
as provided by RA No. 6758, otherwise known as the Compensation and Position
least twenty five (25%)of the monthly basic salary of health workers, receiving
Classification Act of 1989, which pertinently states:
salary grade 19 and below, and five percent (5%)for health workers with salary
grade 20 and above. This may be granted on a monthly, quarterly or annual basis.
Section 13. Pay Adjustments. - Paragraphs (b) and (c), Section 15 of Presidential
Decree No. 985 are hereby amended to read as follows:
It is evident from the foregoing provisions that the rates of hazard pay must be at
least25% of the basic monthly salary of PWHs receiving salary grade 19 and below,
xxxx and 5% receiving salary grade 20 and above. As such, RA No. 7305 and its
implementing rules noticeably prescribe the minimum rates of hazard pay due all
(c) Step Increments- Effective January 1, 1990 step increments shall be granted PHWs in the government, as is clear in the self-explanatory phrase "at least" used in
based on merit and/or length of service in accordance with rules and regulations both the law and the rules.36 Thus, the following rates embodied in Section 7.2 of
that will be promulgated jointly by the DBM and the Civil Service Commission, DBM-DOH Joint Circular must be struck down as invalid for being contrary to the
mandate of RA No. 7305 and its Revised IRR:
and while it was duly published in the Philippine Star, a newspaper of general
circulation, on September 15, 2012,33 the DBM-CSC Joint Circular remains 7.2.1 For PHWs whose positions are at SG-19 and below, Hazard Pay shall be based
unenforceable for the failure of respondents to file the same with the UP Law on the degree of exposure to high risk or low risk hazards, as specified in sub-items
Center - ONAR.34 Moreover, insofar as the DBM-DOH Joint Circular similarly 7 .1.1 and 7 .1.2 above, and the number of workdays of actual exposure over 22
withholds the Step Increment due to length of service from those who are already workdays in a month, at rates not to exceed 25% of monthly basic salary. In case of
being granted Longevity Pay, the same must likewise be declared unenforceable.[ 35 exposure to both high risk and low risk hazards, the Hazard Pay for the month shall
be based on only one risk level, whichever is more advantageous to the PHW.
Note also that the DBM-DOH Joint Circular must further be invalidated insofar as it
lowers the hazard pay at rates below the minimum prescribed by Section 21 of RA 7.2.2 PHWs whose positions are at SG-20 and above may be entitled to Hazard Pay
No. 7305 and Section 7.1.5 (a) of its Revised IRR as follows: at 5% of their monthly basic salaries for all days of exposure to high risk and/or low
risk hazards. However, those exposed to high risk hazards for 12 or more days in a
SEC. 21. Hazard Allowance. - Public health worker in hospitals, sanitaria, rural health month may be entitled to a fixed amount of ₱4,989.75 per month.
units, main centers, health infirmaries, barangay health stations, clinics and other
health-related establishments located in difficult areas, strife-torn or embattled Rates of Hazard Pay
areas, distresses or isolated stations, prisons camps, mental hospitals, radiation-
exposed clinics, laboratories or disease-infested areas or in areas declared under
state of calamity or emergency for the duration thereof which expose them to great Actual Exposure/ High Risk Low Risk
danger, contagion, radiation, volcanic activity/eruption occupational risks or perils Level of Risk
to life as determined by the Secretary of Health or the Head of the unit with the 12 or more days 25% of monthly basic salary 14% of monthly basic salary
approval of the Secretary of Health, shall be compensated hazard allowance
equivalent to at least twenty-five percent (25%)of the monthly basic salary of health 6 to 11 days 14% of monthly basic salary 8% of monthly basic salary
74
Less than 6 days 8% monthly basic salary 5% of monthly basic salary This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision dated 4 October 20011 and
Resolution dated 18 February 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61904.
The Decision denied petitioner's petition for certiorari while the Resolution denied
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The its Motion for Reconsideration.
DBM-DOH Joint Circular, insofar as it lowers the hazard pay at rates below the
minimum prescribed by Section 21 of RA No. 7305 and Section 7.1.5 (a) of its The Court of Appeals summarized the facts of this case in this wise:
Revised IRR, is declared INVALID. The DBM-CSC Joint Circular, insofar as it provides
that an official or employee authorized to be granted Longevity Pay under an
On September 16, 2000, Manny dela Rosa Razon, a native of Lemery,
existing law is not eligible for the grant of Step Increment Due to Length of Service,
Batangas and an overseas Filipino worker, died of acute cardiac arrest
is declared UNENFORCEABLE. The validity, however, of the DBM-DOH Joint Circular
while asleep at the dormitory of the Samsong Textile Processing Factory in
as to the qualification of actual exposure to danger for the PHW's entitlement to
South Korea. Informed thereof, the Philippine Overseas Labor Office
hazard pay, the rates of ₱50 and ₱25 subsistence allowance, and the entitlement to
(POLO) at South Korea immediately relayed the incident to the Philippine
longevity pay on the basis of the PHW' s status in the plantilla of regular positions, is
Embassy in South Korea. Forthwith, the [Labor] Attaché of the Philippine
UPHELD.
Embassy dispatched a letter to Eleuterio N. Gardiner, administrator of the
Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA). The letter reads:
SO ORDERED.
"VERY URGENT, POLO has recently received a report that OFW
Manny dela Rosa RAZON, an undocumented worker, died last
Saturday, 16 September, from an apparent pancreatic attack or
'bangungot.'

According to the verbal reports of Moises and Ronald Recarde,

Manny's co-workers, he was found already lifeless inside their
quarters at around 11:00 in the morning of the above date. They
rushed him to Uri Hospital where the Doctor declared him dead
FIRST DIVISION on arrival.

G.R. No. 152214             September 19, 2006 Per information gathered, the deceased is single, 29 years old,
from Bukal, Lemery, Batangas. His next-of-kins are Mrs. Rowena
EQUI-ASIA PLACEMENT, INC., petitioner, Razon (Auntie) and Mr. Razon (Uncle) with telephone number
vs. (043)411-2308.
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DFA) represented by the HON. DOMINGO L.
SIAZON, JR., SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE), POLO is awaiting signed statements from the aforementioned
represented by HON. BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA, respondents. workers who promised to send it by fax this afternoon.

DECISION We are also coordinating with the deceased's employer for

documentation requirements and financial assistance for the
CHICO-NAZARIO,  J.: repatriation of the remains.

75
 We will highly appreciate if Home Office could advise the next-of- 1. The deceased was deployed by our agency on April 3, 2000 to
kins of the urgent need to issue a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) Yeongjin Machine Company in South Korea;
to facilitate the repatriation requirements of the subject.
2. He violated his employment/training/dispatching contracts on
In anticipation of the next-of-kins' likely move to seek financial June 25, 2000 by unlawfully escaping/running away (TNT) from his
assistance from OWWA for the repatriation of their loved [one], company assignment without prior KFSMB authorization and
please be advised in advance that we will need about US$4,000.00 working/staying in unknown company/place;
to repatriate the cadaver (to include hospital and morgue costs)
to Manila. xxx" 3. He allegedly died of 'bangungot' thereafter;

In turn, the OWWA, through Atty. Cesar L. Chavez, indorsed the matter, for In view thereof, we cannot heed your requests as embodied in
appropriate action, to Director R. Casco of the Welfare Employment Office your telegram. However, his relatives can avail of the benefits
of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (WEO-POEA). provided for by OWWA in cases involving undocumented/illegal
Filipino workers abroad.
Upon verification by the WEO-POEA on its data base, it was discovered that
Manny Razon was recruited and deployed by petitioner Equi-Asia Trusting for your kind understanding"
Placement, Inc., and was sent to South Korea on April 3, 2000 to work-train
at Yeongjin Machinery, Inc. Thereupon, POEA addressed the herein first On the same date – September 26, 2000 – Director Ricardo R. Casco of the
assailed telegram-directive dated September 22, 2000 to the WEO-POEA sent to the petitioner the herein second assailed letter-
President/General Manager of the petitioner. We quote the telegram: directive, which pertinently reads:

"PLEASE PROVIDE PTA [Prepaid Ticket Advice] FOR THE "We have received a copy of your fax message dated 26
REPATRIATION OF REMAINS AND BELONGINGS OF OFW MANNY September 2000 as regards to your response to our request for
DELA ROSA RAZON AS PER REQUEST OF PHILIPPINE EMBASSY, PTA for aforesaid deceased OFW. Nevertheless, may we remind
KOREA, YOU CAN COORDINATE WITH YOUR FOREIGN EMPLOYER you that pursuant to Sections 52, 53, 54 and 55 of the
AND TO WAD/OWWA (MLA) AS REGARDS TO THIS MATTER. YOU Implementing Rules Governing RA 8042, otherwise known as the
ARE GIVEN TWO (2) DAYS FROM RECEIPT HEREOF WITHIN WHICH Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995, the
TO PROVIDE SAID TICKET AND ASSISTANCE, KINDLY SUBMIT YOUR repatriation of OFW, his/her remains and transport of his personal
REPORT TO ASSISTANCE AND WELFARE DIVISION (AWD), 2/F effects is the primary responsibility of the principal or agency and
POEA, FAILURE TO DO SO WILL CONSTRAIN US TO IMPOSE to immediately advance the cost of plane fare without prior
APPROPRIATE SANCTION UNDER OUR RULES" determination of the cause of worker's repatriation. The Rules
further provide for the procedure to be followed in cases when
Responding thereto, petitioner, thru its President Daniel Morga, Jr., faxed the foreign employer/agency fails to provide for the cost of the
on September 26, 2000 the following message to the Assistance and repatriation, compliance of which is punishable by suspension of
Welfare Division of the POEA: the license of the agency or such sanction as the Administration
shall deem proper. Hence, you are required to provide the PTA for
"In connection with your telegram, dated 09/22/2000, requiring the deceased OFW in compliance with the requirement in
us to report the circumstances surrounding the death of OFW accordance with R.A. 8042. You are given forty-eight (48) hours
MANNY DELA ROSA RAZON in Korea and requesting us to issue a upon receipt hereof within which to provide said ticket. Failure in
PTA, etc., for the repatriation of the remains of said OFW, this is this regard will constrain us to impose the appropriate sanction
to report to your good office the following: under our rules."
76
On September 27, 2000, petitioner wrote back Director Ricardo R. Casco, Nonetheless, and apprehensive of the adverse repercussions which may
thus: ensue on account of its non-compliance with the directive, petitioner, on
September 29, 2000, advanced under protest the costs for the repatriation
"In connection with your fax letter dated September 26, 2000, re: of the remains of the late Manny dela Rosa Razon.
the repatriation of the remains of the deceased, ex-trainee (OFW)
MANNY DELA ROSA RAZON, please be informed that the Thereafter, petitioner went to this Court via the instant petition for
provisions of Section 53 as well as, and in relation to, Section 55 of certiorari, posing, for Our consideration, the sole issue of –
the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 on the matters "WHETHER OR NOT SECTIONS 52, 53, 54 AND 55 OF THE
covering the following: OMNIBUS RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE
MIGRANT WORKERS AND OVERSEAS FILIPINOS ACT OF 1995 (R.A.
1. The responsibility of the agency to advance the cost of 8042), ISSUED BY DFA AND POEA, WHICH POEA SUMMARILY
plane fare without prior determination of the cause of ORDERED THE HEREIN PETITIONER TO COMPLY VIZ-A-VIZ THE
the deceased worker's termination. PAYMENT IN ADVANCE OF THE EXPENSES FOR THE REPATRIATION
OF THE REMAINS OF A DECEASED WORKER-TRAINEE WHO, AT
2. The recovery of the same costs from the estate of the THE TIME OF HIS DEATH, HAS NO EXISTING EMPLOYMENT
dead worker before the NLRC. (DISPATCHING) CONTRACT WITH EITHER SAID PETITIONER OR HIS
FOREIGN PRINCIPAL AND NO VALID VISA OR IS NOT WORKING
3. The action to be imposed by POEA for non-compliance WITH THE FOREIGN PRINCIPAL TO WHICH PETITIONER DEPLOYED
therewith within 48 hours are violative of due process HIM, IS ILLEGAL AND/OR VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS SUCH THAT
and/or the principle on due delegation of power. POEA ACTED WITHOUT [OR IN] EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION
AND/OR IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING SAID ORDER
TO PAY SAID EXPENSES."2
This is so because Sec. 15 of R.A. 8042 clearly contemplates prior
notice and hearing before responsibility thereunder could be
established against the agency that sets up the defense of sole On 4 October 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the Decision which is now the
fault – in avoidance of said responsibility -. Besides, the sections in subject of the present petition. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals'
question unduly grant the powers to require advance payment of Decision states:
the plane fare, to impose the corresponding penalty of suspension
in case of non-compliance therewith, within 48 hours and to WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DENIED and is
recover said advance payment from the dead worker's estate accordingly DISMISSED.3
upon the return of his remains to the country before the NLRC,
when the law itself does not expressly provide for the grant of In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals stated that petitioner
such powers. was mainly accusing the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) of
grave abuse of discretion when it ordered petitioner to pay, in advance, the costs
x x x x x x x x x. for the repatriation of the remains of the deceased Manny dela Rosa Razon.

Please provide us immediately with the death certificate/post The Court of Appeals ruled that the POEA did not commit any grave abuse of
mortem report/police report pertinent to above as proof of death discretion as its directives to petitioner were issued pursuant to existing laws and
and cause thereof." regulations.4 It likewise held that a petition for certiorari, which was the remedy
availed of by petitioner, is not the proper remedy as the same is only available
when "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
77
ordinary course of law."5 Section 62 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Section 52. Primary Responsibility for Repatriation. – The repatriation of
Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 or Republic the worker, or his/her remains, and the transport of his/her personal
Act 8042 ("Omnibus Rules") states that "the Labor Arbiters of NLRC shall have the effects shall be the primary responsibility of the principal or agency which
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all claims arising out of recruited or deployed him/her abroad. All costs attendant thereto shall be
employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving borne by the principal or the agency concerned.
Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral,
exemplary and other forms of damages, subject to the rules and procedures of the Section 53. Repatriation of Workers. – The primary responsibility to
NLRC." There is, therefore, an adequate remedy available to petitioner. repatriate entails the obligation on the part of principal or agency to
advance the cost of plane fare and to immediately repatriate the worker
Lastly, the Court of Appeals declared that it could not strike down as should the need for it arise, without a prior determination of the cause of
unconstitutional Sections 52, 53, 54, and 55 of the Omnibus Rules as the the termination of the worker's employment. However, after the worker
unconstitutionality of a statute or rules may not be passed upon unless the issue is has returned to the country, the principal or agency may recover the cost
directly raised in an appropriate proceeding.6 of repatriation from the worker if the termination of employment was due
solely to his/her fault.
In the present recourse, petitioner submits the following issues for our
consideration: Every contract for overseas employment shall provide for the primary
responsibility of agency to advance the cost of plane fare, and the
1. The Court of Appeals erred in the appreciation of the issue as it obligation of the worker to refund the cost thereof in case his/her fault is
mistakenly considered, in dismissing the petition before it, that petitioner determined by the Labor Arbiter.
is contesting the compliance and conformity of the POEA directives with
Sections 52, 53, 54, and 55 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Section 54. Repatriation Procedure. – When a need for repatriation arises
implementing in particular Section 15 of RA 8042; and the foreign employer fails to provide for it cost, the responsible
personnel at site shall simultaneously notify OWWA and the POEA of such
2. The Court of Appeals, in dismissing the petition, again erred in ruling need. The POEA shall notify the agency concerned of the need for
that constitutional questions cannot be passed upon and adjudged in a repatriation. The agency shall provide the plane ticket or the prepaid ticket
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil advice (PTA) to the Filipinos Resource Center or to the appropriate
Procedure; Philippine Embassy; and notify POEA of such compliance. The POEA shall
inform OWWA of the action of the agency.
3. The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that, under the facts of the
case that gave rise to the petition before it, the same sections of the said Section 55. Action on Non-Compliance. – If the employment agency fails to
rules and regulations are illegal, invalid and/or violative of the right of provide the ticket or PTA within 48 hours from receipt of the notice, the
petitioner to due process of law and, therefore, the POEA directives issued POEA shall suspend the license of the agency or impose such sanctions as it
pursuant thereto constitute acts committed without, or in excess of, may deem necessary. Upon notice from the POEA, OWWA shall advance
jurisdiction and/or in grave abuse of discretion. 7 the costs of repatriation with recourse to the agency or principal. The
administrative sanction shall not be lifted until the agency reimburses the
In Our Resolution of 20 November 2002, we gave due course to the present petition OWWA of the cost of repatriation with legal interest.
and directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 8 On 28 August
2006, we resolved to dispense with the memorandum of the estate/heirs of Said provisions, on the other hand, are supposed to implement Section 15 of
deceased Manny dela Rosa Razon. Republic Act No. 80429 which provides:

At the center of this petition are the following provisions of the omnibus rules:
78
 SEC. 15. Repatriation of Workers; Emergency Repatriation Fund. – The of advancing the payment for his or her plane fare, the omibus rules, as far as this
repatriation of the worker and the transport of his personal belongings section is concerned, is an invalid exercise of legislative power by an administrative
shall be the primary responsibility of the agency which, recruited or agency.
deployed the worker overseas. All costs attendant to repatriation shall be
borne by or charged to the agency concerned and/or its principal. Likewise, In addition, petitioner claims Section 53 of the Omnibus Rules violates the due
the repatriation of remains and transport of the personal belongings of a process clause of the constitution as it deprives the deploying agency of the right to
deceased worker and all costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the prior notice and hearing through which it can prove that it should not bear the
principal and/or the local agency. However, in cases where the termination burden of repatriating an OFW.
of employment is due solely to the fault of the worker, the
principal/employer or agency shall not in any manner be responsible for Finally, petitioner points out that it should be the Overseas Workers Welfare
the repatriation of the former and/or his belongings. Administration which should advance the costs of repatriation of the deceased
Razon with the resources coming out of the emergency repatriation fund of said
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals misappreciated the issue it presented agency.
in its petition for certiorari when, instead of resolving whether Sections 52, 53, 54,
and 55 of the Omnibus Rules are illegal and violative of due process, it merely The Solicitor General for its part counters that Sections 52, 53, 54, and 55 of the
confined itself to the question of whether or not the POEA committed grave abuse Omnibus Rules are valid quasi-legislative acts of respondents Department of Foreign
of discretion in issuing its directives of 22 September 2000 and 27 September 2000. Affairs and Department of Labor and Employment. 10 Because of this, the
requirements of prior notice and hearing are not essential. Besides, there are cases
Petitioner also contends that, contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, a where even in the exercise of quasi-judicial power, administrative agencies are
special civil action for certiorari is the appropriate remedy to raise constitutional allowed, sans prior notice and hearing, to effectuate measures affecting private
issues. property, such as:

Also, petitioner insists that the subject portions of the omnibus rules are invalid on 1) [F]or the summary abatement of nuisance per se which affects the
the ground that Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 does not impose on a immediate safety of persons and property, or 2) in summary proceedings
recruitment agency the primary responsibility for the repatriation of a deceased of distraint and levy upon the property of delinquent taxpayers in the
Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW), while Section 52 of the Omnibus Rules unduly collection of internal revenue taxes, fees or charges or any increment
imposes such burden on a placement agency. thereto, or 3) in the preventive suspension of a public officer pending
investigation. x x x.11
Moreover, petitioner argues that the word "likewise" at the start of the third
sentence of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 is used merely as a connective The Solicitor General also adds that since petitioner is engaged in the recruitment of
word indicating the similarity between a recruitment agency's financial obligation in Filipino workers for work abroad, the nature of its business calls for the exercise of
the repatriation of living and a deceased OFW. It does not, however, necessarily the state's police power in order to safeguard the rights and welfare of the Filipino
make a placement agency primarily responsible for the repatriation of a deceased laborers. One such measure is the primary responsibility imposed upon placement
OFW unlike in the case of an OFW who is alive. agencies with regard to the repatriation of an OFW or of his remains.

As for Section 53 of the Omnibus Rules, petitioner submits that the same is invalid The Solicitor General also argues that the wording of Section 15 of Republic Act No.
as Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 clearly states that a placement agency shall 8042 leaves no doubt that a recruitment agency shall bear the primary
not in any manner be responsible for the repatriation of the deceased OFW and his responsibility for the repatriation of an OFW whether the latter is dead or alive.
or her belongings should the termination of the OFW's employment be due to his or
her fault. However, as Section 53 of the Omnibus Rules stipulates that a placement Lastly, the Solicitor General insists that actions assailing the validity of implementing
agency or principal shall bear the primary responsibility of repatriating an OFW and rules and regulations are within the original jurisdiction of the regional trial courts.
79
We shall first address the procedural question involved in the present petition. by the law. The determination of facts and the applicable law, as basis for
official action and the exercise of judicial discretion, are essential for the
There is no denying that regular courts have jurisdiction over cases involving the performance of this function. On these considerations, it is elementary
validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by administrative agencies. that due process requirements, as enumerated in Ang Tibay, must be
Such jurisdiction, however, is not limited to the Court of Appeals or to this Court observed. These requirements include prior notice and hearing.
alone for even the regional trial courts can take cognizance of actions assailing a
specific rule or set of rules promulgated by administrative bodies. Indeed, the On the other hand, quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative
Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of
ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. 12 certain powers flowing from the separation of the great branches of the
government. Prior notice to and hearing of every affected party, as
Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: elements of due process, are not required since there is no determination
of past events or facts that have to be established or ascertained. As a
SECTION 1. Petition for Certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer general rule, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct.
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and In this case, petitioner assails certain provisions of the Omnibus Rules. However,
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved these rules were clearly promulgated by respondents Department of Foreign Affairs
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts and Department of Labor and Employment in the exercise of their quasi-legislative
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or powers or the authority to promulgate rules and regulations. Because of this,
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting petitioner was, thus, mistaken in availing himself of the remedy of an original action
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. for certiorari as obviously, only judicial or quasi-judicial acts are proper subjects
thereof. If only for these, the petition deserves outright dismissal. Be that as it may,
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, we shall proceed to resolve the substantive issues raised in this petition for review
order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents in order to finally remove the doubt over the validity of Sections 52, 53, 54, and 55
relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum of the Omnibus Rules.
shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
It is now well-settled that delegation of legislative power to various specialized
From this, it is clear that in order for a petition for certiorari to prosper, the administrative agencies is allowed in the face of increasing complexity of modern
following requisites must be present: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a life. Given the volume and variety of interactions involving the members of today's
board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws dealing with the
board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of minutiae aspects of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or bodies, as the principal agencies tasked to execute laws with respect to their
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. specialized fields, the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a
given statute and effectuate its policies.15 All that is required for the valid exercise of
this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation must be germane to the
It bears emphasizing that administrative bodies are vested with two basic powers,
objects and purposes of the law; and that the regulation be not in contradiction to,
the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial.13 In Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service
but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. 16 Under the first test or
Commission,14 we discussed the nature of these powers to be –
the so-called completeness test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the
In exercising its quasi-judicial function, an administrative body adjudicates
the rights of persons before it, in accordance with the standards laid down
80
Hy\bonly thing he will have to do is to enforce it.17 The second test or the sufficient proceeding. As such determination would most likely take some time, it is only
standard test, mandates that there should be adequate guidelines or limitations in proper that an OFW be brought back here in our country at the soonest possible
the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the time lest he remains stranded in a foreign land during the whole time that
delegation from running riot.18 recruitment agency contests its liability for repatriation. As aptly pointed out by the
Solicitor General –
We resolve that the questioned provisions of the Omnibus Rules meet these
requirements. Such a situation is unacceptable.

Basically, petitioner is impugning the subject provisions of the Omnibus Rules for 24. This is the same reason why repatriation is made by law an obligation
allegedly expanding the scope of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 by: first, of the agency and/or its principal without the need of first determining the
imposing upon it the primary obligation to repatriate the remains of the deceased cause of the termination of the worker's employment. Repatriation is in
Razon including the duty to advance the cost of the plane fare for the transport of effect an unconditional responsibility of the agency and/or its principal that
Razon's remains; and second, by ordering it to do so without prior determination of cannot be delayed by an investigation of why the worker was terminated
the existence of employer-employee relationship between itself and Razon. from employment. To be left stranded in a foreign land without the
financial means to return home and being at the mercy of unscrupulous
Petitioner's argument that Section 15 does not provide that it shall be primarily individuals is a violation of the OFW's dignity and his human rights. These
responsible for the repatriation of a deceased OFW is specious and plain nitpicking. are the same rights R.A. No. 8042 seeks to protect. 19
While Republic Act No. 8042 does not expressly state that petitioner shall be
primarily obligated to transport back here to the Philippines the remains of the As for the sufficiency of standard test, this Court had, in the past, accepted as
deceased Razon, nevertheless, such duty is imposed upon him as the statute clearly sufficient standards the following: "public interest," "justice and equity," "public
dictates that "the repatriation of remains and transport of the personal belongings convenience and welfare," and "simplicity, economy and welfare." 20
of a deceased worker and all costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the
principal and/or the local agency." The mandatory nature of said obligation is In this case, we hold that the legislature's pronouncements that Republic Act No.
characterized by the legislature's use of the word "shall." That the concerned 8042 was enacted with the thought of upholding the dignity of the Filipinos may
government agencies opted to demand the performance of said responsibility solely they be here or abroad and that the State shall at all times afford full protection to
upon petitioner does not make said directives invalid as the law plainly obliges a labor, both here and abroad, meet the requirement and provide enough guidance
local placement agency such as herein petitioner to bear the burden of repatriating for the formulation of the omnibus rules.
the remains of a deceased OFW with or without recourse to the principal abroad. In
this regard, we see no reason to invalidate Section 52 of the omnibus rules as WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' Decision
Republic Act No. 8042 itself permits the situation wherein a local recruitment dated 4 October 2001 and Resolution dated 18 February 2002 are
agency can be held exclusively responsible for the repatriation of a deceased OFW. hereby AFFIRMED. With costs.

Nor do we see any reason to stamp Section 53 of the Omnibus Rules as invalid for
allegedly contravening Section 15 of the law which states that a placement agency
shall not be responsible for a worker's repatriation should the termination of the
employer-employee relationship be due to the fault of the OFW. To our mind, the
statute merely states the general principle that in case the severance of the
employment was because of the OFW's own undoing, it is only fair that he or she
should shoulder the costs of his or her homecoming. Section 15 of Republic Act No.
8042, however, certainly does not preclude a placement agency from establishing
the circumstances surrounding an OFW's dismissal from service in an appropriate
81