DAVID YU KIMTENG ET AL., V. ATTY. WALTER T. YOUNG ET AL.

G.R. NO. 210554, AUGUST 05, 2015, SECOND DIVISION (LEONEN, J.)

DOCTRINE

A disbarred lawyer's name cannot be part of a firm's name. A lawyer who

appears under a firm name that contains a disbarred lawyer's name commits
indirect contempt of court.

FACTS:

Anastacio Revilla, Jr. was disbarred in December 2009. The Petitioners are the
majority stockholders of Ruby International Corporation (RIC). In the case of
Majority stockholders of Ruby International Corporation v. Lim, et al., the
Supreme Court ordered the liquidation of RIC and transferred the case to the
appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC) to supervise the liquidation. The case
was raffled to RTC presided by Judge Calo.

Atty. Young, Atty. Gambol and Atty. Magat are lawyers practicing under the
firm, Young Revilla Gambol & Magat. They entered their appearance as the
counsels for the liquidator. An opposition was filed against appearance on the
ground that Revilla was already disbarred.

Young Revilla Gambol and Magat filed their reply stating that the retention of
Revilla’s name serves as an act of charity.

Judge Calo overruled the opposition stating that Atty. Young could still appear
for the liquidator as long as his appearance was under the Young Law Firm and
not under Young Revilla Gambol & magat. The Young Law Firm is non existent.

The petitioners then filed a petition under rule 71 to cite atty. Young, Gambol,
Magat and Judge Calo in contempt. They cited US jurisprudence to support
their argument that using the name of disbarred lawyer in the firm is
tantamount to contempt of court

Respondents Atty. Young and Magat assert that the retention of Revilla’s name
in the firm was for sentimental reasons and that such name does not give
added value to the law firm nor does it enhances the standing of lawyers in the
firm.

Respondent Gambol filed a separate comment. He asserts that he is a junior

member of the firm and has no power or authority to decide who should be
removed from the firm’s name. He also asserts that in all cases he handled, he
omitted Revilla’s name from the firm in pleading he signed.

ISSUE:
 1. Are Atty. Young and Magat in contempt of court when they continued to
use the name of Atty. Revilla Jr. in the firm name even after the latter’s
disbarment?
2. Is Atty. Gambol in contempt of court?
3. Is judge Calo in contempt of court?

HELD:

1. Yes.

Rule 71, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.— After

charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the
court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his

official duties or in his official transactions;

Xxx

Contempt of court is a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In

its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or
orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by
disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to
disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its
restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the
authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is generic,
embracing within its legal signification a variety of different act.

In this case, respondents committed acts that are considered indirect contempt
under Section 3 of Rule 71.In addition, respondents disregarded the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) when they retained the name of respondent
Revilla in their firm name.

Canon 3, Rule 3.02:

In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed name

shall be used. The continued use of the name of a deceased partner is
permissible provided that the firm indicates in all its communications
that said partner is deceased.

The use of deceased partner’s name is allowed as long as there is an

indication that the partner is deceased. On the other hand, the retention of
a disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name may mislead the public into
believing that the lawyer is still authorized to practice law.

2. No.

Atty. Gambol's explanation is supported by the allegations in the Comment filed

by respondents Atty. Young and Atty. Magat stating:

In fact, when co-Private Respondent Gambol, initially cowed perhaps,

by the same intimidation worked upon him by the Complainants'
counsel in another case, asked permission to delete [Anastacio E.
Revilla's] name in the Young Law Firm's name in the pleadings that
he (i.e. Private Respondent Gambol) would subsequently file,
Respondent Young allowed him to do so.

This court recognizes respondent Atty. Gambol's effort to avoid misleading

the public by removing respondent Revilla's name in the pleadings he filed.
Thus, the Complaint against him is dismissed.

Respondents Atty. Walter T. Young and Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat are
found in contempt of court for using a disbarred lawyer's name in their firm
name and are meted a fine of P30,000.00 each. The Complaint against Atty.
Jovito Gambol is DISMISSED.
 INTESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE UY V. ATTY. PACIFICO M. MAGHARI III

A.C. NO. 10525, September 01,2015 (Leonen J.)

DOCTRINE

FACTS:

Lilia Hofilena (Hofilena) was initially designated by the court as the

administratix of the estate of Jose Uy, his common-law partner, deceased. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by Wilson Uy, one of Jose Uy’s children on
behalf of his siblings and mother. Thereafter Regional Trial Court (RTC)
designated Wilson Uy as administrator of Jose Uy’s estate.

Conflicts arose between Wilson Uy and other heirs of Jose Uy. In the course of
the proceedings, Wilson Uy prayed that a subpoena ad testificandum be issued
to Magdalena Uy as she was alleged to have been the treasurer of several
businesses owned by Jose Uy.  The RTC granted the motion.

Magdalena Uy was represented by Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III.

Thereafter, Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, filed a Motion to Quash Subpoena
ad Testificandum with Alternative Motion to Cite the Appearance of Johnny
K.H. Uy. Wilson Uy filed his Opposition to Magdalena Uy's Motion to Quash.
Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, filed her Reply to Wilson Uy's Opposition.The
Regional Trial Court subsequently denied Magdalena Uy's Motion to
Quash. Thereafter, Maghari filed for Magdalena Uy a Motion for
Reconsideration. As the Motion for Reconsideration was denied, Maghari filed
for Magdalena Uy a Motion to Recall Subpoena ad Testificandum.

Wilson Uy's counsel noticed that based on the details indicated in the
motion, Maghari appeared to have only recently passed the bar examinations.
Moreover, He learned that since 2010, Maghari had been changing the
professional details indicated in the pleadings he has signed and has been
copying the professional details of Atty. Natu-El.

Wilson Uy filed a motion to declare Magdalena Uy in contempt since she

had still not complied with the subpoena and to require Maghari to explain why
he had been usurping the professional details of another lawyer. RTC declined
the motion.

Wilson Uy then filed a disbarment case against Maghari for repeated acts
of changing and using another lawyer’s professional details. He asserts that
Maghari violated the Lawyer’s Oath and acted in deceitful manner
ISSUE:

1. Is Maghari liable for using another lawyer’s professional details?

2. Is Maghari in good faith when he overlooked the professional details?

HELD:

1. Yes.
The respondent does not deny the existence of errant entries indicated by
complainant but he insists that he did not incur disciplinary liability. He claims
that the entries were mere overlooked with errors. Moreover, he attempts to
diminish the significance of dubious entries and instead ascribes ill motive to
complainant.

Maghari’s avowals, protestations, and ad hominem attacks on

complainant fail to impress. He did not merely commit errors in good faith.
First, he violated clear legal requirements, and indicated patently false
information. Second, the way he did so demonstrates that he did so knowingly.
Third, he did so repeatedly. Fourth, the information he used was shown to have
been appropriated from another lawyer. Fifth, his act not only of usurping
another lawyer's details but also of his repeatedly changing information from
one pleading to another demonstrates the intent to mock and ridicule courts
and legal processes. 

No amount of feigned ignorance and ad hominem attacks on complainant

can negate the gravity of respondent's actions. His insolent and mocking
violation of statutory and regulatory requirements is a violation of his duties to
society and to courts. His swiping of another lawyer's information is a violation
of his duties to the legal profession.

2. No.

Respondent acted deliberately. It is impossible that the erroneous details he

indicated on his pleadings are products of mere inadvertence.

To begin with, details were copied from a pleading submitted by another lawyer.

These details somehow found their way into respondent's own pleadings.
Certainly, these details could not have written themselves, let alone transfer
themselves from a pleading prepared by one lawyer to those prepared by
another. Someone must have actually performed the act of copying and
transferring; that is, someone must have intended to copy and transfer them.
Moreover, the person responsible for this could have only been respondent or
someone acting under his instructions; the pleadings on which they were
transferred are, after all, respondent's pleadings.
Second, these details were not merely copied, they were modified. "B.C." was
added to the IBP official receipt and professional tax receipt numbers copied
from Atty. Natu-el. The facts of modification and addition show active human
intervention to make something more out of markings that could otherwise
have simply been reproduced.

Third, in subsequent pleadings, some details copied from Atty. Natu-el were
discarded while some were retained. The December 8, 2010 Reply still bore
Atty. Natu-el's Roll of Attorneys number and MCLE compliance number, but no
longer his IBP official receipt number and professional tax receipt number. The
July 15, 2011 Motion for Reconsideration only bore Atty. Natu-el's MCLE
compliance number. This gradual act of segregating information—discarding
some while retaining others, and retaining less over time—reveals that the
author of these markings must have engaged in a willful exercise that filtered
those that were to be discarded from those that were to be retained.