DISCUSSION PAPER

RESERVATIONS TO CEDAW:
AN ANALYSIS FOR UNICEF

MARSHA A. FREEMAN

POLICY AND PRACTICE

DECEMBER 2009
DISCUSSION PAPER

RESERVATIONS TO CEDAW:
AN ANALYSIS FOR UNICEF

Marsha A. Freeman
Senior Fellow and Director
International Women’s Rights Action Watch
Minnesota Law School

POLICY AND PRACTICE

DECEMBER 2009
Reservations to CEDAW: An Analysis for UNICEF
© United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Gender, Rights and Civic Engagement
Section, Division of Policy and Practice, New York, 2009

Gender, Rights and Civic Engagement Section, Division of Policy and Practice
UNICEF
3 UN Plaza, NY, NY 10017
December 2009
This is a working document. It has been prepared to facilitate the exchange of knowledge and to
stimulate discussion.

The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the policies or views of UNICEF

The text has not been edited to official publication standards and UNICEF accepts no
responsibility for errors.

The designations in this publication do not imply an opinion on legal status of any country or
territory, or of its authorities, or the delimitation of frontiers.
Acknowledgements

Warm thanks are due to Dr. Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, CEDAW Committee member from Israel
and (late) Dr. Hanna Beate Schoepp-Schilling from Germany, five-term member of the CEDAW
Committee member for their invaluable counsel and support.

This study greatly benefited from extensive technical guidance from the Gender and Rights and
Civic Engagement Section in the Division of Policy and Practice, in particular the inputs
provided by Daniel Seymour, Noreen Khan and Nadine Perrault from the Gender and Rights
Unit.

Sincere thanks to the author of this study Dr. Marsha A. Freeman, Senior Fellow and Director,
International Women’s Rights Action Watch, University of Minnesota Law School, for this
analytical piece of work.
Table of Contents

Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................... i

Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
1. Reservations to CEDAW: An Overview ................................................................................ 2
1.1. The Legal Regime ........................................................................................................... 2
1.2. The CEDAW Committee and Reservations to the Convention ...................................... 3
1.3. The Impact of Reservations on States Parties’ Reporting and CEDAW Reviews ......... 4
2. The Domestic Context of Reservations .................................................................................. 6
2.1. The Reservations Map .................................................................................................... 6
2.2. Relationship of Reservations to Status of Women ......................................................... 7
2.3. Impact of Reservations on Women’s Human Rights in Selected States ........................ 8
3. Lessons, Observations, and Recommendations .................................................................... 25
3.1. Support qualitative and quantitative research to provide credible information on both
the quantitative and qualitative consequences of discrimination (substantive inequality) that
is preserved under the reserved provisions. .......................................................................... 25
3.2. Support national NGOs and coalitions for continuous, programmatic CEDAW
monitoring, with a view to engaging government officials in discussion of reservations. ... 25
3.3. Support NGOs and engage directly with States to promote submission of State party
reports, with special attention to late reports. ....................................................................... 25
3.4. Remind States parties that have changed their laws or announced withdrawal of
reservations to withdraw them immediately. ........................................................................ 26
Executive Summary
This study is undertaken to provide UNICEF with recommendations for supporting the
withdrawal of reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW). While the problem of reservations is well documented as a legal
issue, the practical effect of reservations on the primary stakeholders—women, girls, families,
and communities—and the practical issues surrounding withdrawal of reservations have received
much less attention.

CEDAW has been ratified by 186 states, with many reservations. A considerable number of
those reservations arguably go to the heart of state accountability for the obligation to eliminate
discrimination against women, or, in the legal formulation, are “incompatible with the object and
purpose” of the treaty. While this is dismaying, both the legal framework and the practical
approach of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
(the CEDAW Committee) allow for dialogue on some of the most critical reserved provisions
during State Party reviews. Moreover, the nature and context of many reservations provide
opportunity for discussions in both international and domestic venues and, eventually, progress
towards eliminating them.

This paper provides an overview of the legal and practical implications of reservations; an
examination of the different domestic legal systems in which reservations are entered; a
“mapping” of the current reservations to CEDAW; and an exploration of the domestic legal and
political contexts in which some of the most critical reservations have been withdrawn.

It is apparent from the available literature as well as from the experience of NGOs and the
CEDAW Committee’s observations, that the entering of reservations is a legal action that rests in
a political and cultural context, and that their withdrawal requires a carefully designed approach
that acknowledges the legal, political, and cultural aspects of the issue.

Reservations are a serious issue throughout the international treaty system. Some of the
reservations to CEDAW are particularly problematic, going to the heart of fundamental issues
such as nationality, legal capacity, and equality in the family. The International Law Commission
has undertaken a multi-year expert study of reservations, and the human rights treaty bodies have
been as proactive as possible under the constraints of the treaty system. Maintaining polite
pressure on States parties can have an effect, but generally withdrawal of reservations appears to
result from a confluence of factors: well-organized (and sometimes endlessly patient) efforts by
civil society, internal political changes, and external events that have an impact on the parties in
power.

Since the mid-1990s the CEDAW Committee has consistently pressed States parties on the scope
of their reservations and their intentions with respect to withdrawal. While entering a reservation
would seem to preclude discussion of the reserved provision(s), as a practical matter the nature
of many reservations suggests that, while States parties are not yet unequivocally committed to
the international norms articulated in the Convention, they want to remain in the conversation.
The reservations discussion is essentially a negotiation around this fact. Indeed, in some cases
the existence of reservations can promote useful dialogue with the CEDAW Committee and civil
i
society by focusing on clearly identified issues and giving states the opportunity to burnish their
international standing by withdrawing them. This study suggests that, undesirable as they are,
the entry of reservations does not negate the value of ratification and can provide opportunities
for meaningful dialogue on key issues and, ultimately, increased implementation of the
Convention’s equality norms.

A number of States parties have withdrawn all or part of their reservations. Most of the
reservations are to all or parts of Article 2 (obligation to review and change constitutions, laws
and policies), Article 5 (abolition of discriminatory customs and traditions and of gender
stereotyping); Article 7 (participation in public life); Article 9 (nationality); Article 15 (legal
capacity, including choice of domicile); and Article 16 (equality in the family). The proffered
rationale for many of the reservations is conflict with religious law or with a State party’s
constitution that enshrines religious law. Several states have entered reservations based on more
general policies of leaving matters of personal status to their ethnic and religious communities.

This study outlines the practical impact of State parties’ refusal or inability to implement
CEDAW with respect to major issues such as nationality, participation in public life, legal
capacity, equality in the family, and child marriage. This inaction perpetuates discrimination and
hardship in the lives of women and girls, and the reservations would suggest an effort to avoid
any scrutiny of discriminatory policies. But closer examination of State parties’ actions with
respect to reservations suggest that, despite the alleged entrenchment of discriminatory ethnic,
religious, or other community-based practices, significant movement is possible. This study
examines the experience in selected states (Morocco, Egypt, Malaysia, Turkey) that have entered
relatively comprehensive reservations and ultimately withdrawn some or all of them. The
closing observations and recommendations are drawn from these experiences.

ii
Introduction
This study is undertaken to provide UNICEF with recommendations for supporting the
withdrawal of reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW). While the issue of reservations is the subject of considerable
discussion in both academic literature and United Nations meetings and documents, the practical
effect of reservations on the primary stakeholders—women, girls and the families and
communities whose wellbeing is negatively affected by discrimination against women and
girls—and the practical issues surrounding withdrawal of reservations have received much less
attention.

CEDAW has been ratified by186 states, with many reservations. A considerable number of those
reservations arguably go to the heart of state accountability for the obligation to eliminate
discrimination against women, or, in the legal formulation, are “incompatible with the object and
purpose” of the treaty. While this is dismaying, both the legal framework and the practical
approach of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
(the CEDAW Committee) allow for dialogue on some of the most critical reserved provisions
during State Party reviews. Moreover, the nature and context of many reservations provide
opportunity for discussions in both international and domestic venues and, eventually, progress
towards eliminating them.

This paper provides an overview of the legal and practical implications of reservations; an
examination of the different domestic legal contexts in which reservations are entered; a
“mapping” of the current reservations to CEDAW; and an exploration of the domestic legal and
political contexts in which some of the most critical reservations have been withdrawn. The
discussion of the domestic dynamic is by design representative rather than exhaustive, as the
terms of this study did not include field research and interviews. However, it is apparent from the
available literature as well as from the experience of NGOs and the CEDAW Committee’s
observations, that the entering of reservations is a legal action that rests in a political and cultural
context, and that their withdrawal requires a carefully designed approach that acknowledges all
aspects of the issue. Advocates’ efforts to evaluate the legal, political, and cultural context in any
given state and to address reservations on this basis can in itself be a positive and empowering
experience.

1
1. Reservations to CEDAW: An Overview

1.1. The Legal Regime

The history of reservations to international treaties is long and complex. In 1969 the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties was adopted to codify practice and provide legal guidance on
the meaning of reservations and a uniform procedure for entering them. The Vienna Convention
provides that reservations may not be made that are “incompatible with the object and purpose of
the treaty.”1 This provision raises as many questions as it answers, as the Vienna Convention
does not define “object and purpose,” nor does it indicate what body has the power to determine
validity.

The Vienna Convention also provides for States parties to object to a reservation within twelve
months of its entry. However, objections do not dispose of the question of validity, although
some states have objected to reservations to CEDAW on the ground of invalidity. The
significance of objections is discussed below in Section III.B.4.

In 1994, in response to the difficulties experienced by States parties in dealing with reservations
to all treaties, the International Law Commission (ILC) established a Special Rapporteur on
Reservations. The Special Rapporteur, M. Alain Pellet, has issued thirteen reports (the most
recent in 2008) addressing various aspects of the reservations issues. The most significant for
purposes of dealing with CEDAW and other human rights treaties is his discussion of
reservations to “normative” treaties. Normative treaties establish standards for government
behavior towards individuals (and, under some treaties, entities) under their jurisdiction, as
opposed to treaties that are agreements between states as to their behavior towards other states.

The international human rights treaties differ from most other treaties in that their
implementation is monitored by bodies that are established by the terms of the respective
treaties.2 The makeup of the treaty monitoring bodies also is unique in that they are “independent
experts” rather than appointed representatives of the States parties. As such they do not formally
take instruction from their governments. Each of the treaty bodies establishes its own procedures
and internal management structure, and develops its own jurisprudence through State party
reviews, adoption of General Comments/ Recommendations, and, under the provisions of or
protocols to some of the treaties, through reviewing individual complaints and holding inquiries.
The practices of the treaty bodies have evolved at different paces and in somewhat varying
directions since their inception.3 All, however, have struggled with the issue of reservations.

Largely because certain reservations are a particular threat to universality of human rights, the
human rights treaty monitoring bodies began to address the issue of reservations on their own
even before the ILC embarked on its detailed examination. In 1994 the Human Rights

1
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969), Entered into force 27 January 1980. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331.
2
With one exception: the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was established by ECOSOC. In most respects it operates in the
same manner as the other treaty monitoring bodies.
3
Since 2002, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has promoted harmonization of treaty body procedures. This is the subject
of a different discussion. See /http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/treaty/reform.htm (go to Treaty Reform topics on left column).
2
Committee, which monitors the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted a
General Comment on Reservations,4 indicating that the Committee has the power to determine
whether a reservation is “incompatible with the object and purpose” of the Covenant. Other
treaty bodies have not followed suit in adopting a formal statement.5 By 2007, however, the
human rights treaty monitoring bodies had concluded individually that they are competent to
determine the permissibility of reservations to their respective treaties, a position that parallels
that of the ILC Special Rapporteur. The human rights treaty bodies generally have developed a
practice of persuasion rather than legal confrontation, engaging in dialogue with the States
parties which is “extremely useful for understanding the political considerations underlying
reservations.”6 The CEDAW Committee’s practice is similar in this respect to that of the other
human rights treaty bodies.

1.2. The CEDAW Committee and Reservations to the Convention7

The CEDAW Committee was concerned from its inception about the scope of reservations to the
Convention but was not as assertive as the Human Rights Committee. It adopted General
Recommendations (interpretive statements) in 19878 and 19929 that referred to the problem of
reservations to the Convention, and its contribution to the 1993 World Conference on Human
Rights also expressed concern over the number and scope of reservations and encouraged States
parties to reexamine their reservations in view of their reservations to other treaties and to
consider withdrawing or narrowing them. With the adoption in 1994 of General
Recommendation No. 21, on Articles 9, 15, and 16,10 the Committee indicated that certain
interrelated Convention articles were clearly fundamental to the object and purpose of the
treaty.11 This position was reconfirmed in the Committee’s statement adopted for the Fiftieth
Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, stating that it considered Articles 212
and 16 “to be core provisions of the Convention,” “central to the objects [sic] and purpose of the
Convention,” and that reservations to Article 16 are impermissible.13 During its 13th Session, in

4
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24 on Reservations, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/dd.6 (November, 1994), republished as
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6.
5
The Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination does provide a mechanism in Article 20 for determining the permissibility of
reservations. CERD, adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX)
 of 21 December 1965, entry
into force 4 January 1969.
6
See International Law Commission, [Alain Pellet’s report of] Meeting with Human Right Bodies (15 and 16 May 2007), ILC(LIX)RT/CRP.1 (26
July 2007).
7
For a comprehensive history and analysis of the CEDAW Committee’s approach to reservations to 2004, see Hanna Beate Schoepp-Schilling,
“Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: An Unresolved Issue or (No) New
Developments?” in Ineda Ziemele, ed., Reservations to Human Rights Treaties and the Vienna Convention Regime: Conflict, Harmony or
Reconciliation (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004), pp. 3-39.
8
CEDAW General Recommendation No. 4, Reservations to the Convention (Sixth session, 1987), U.N. Doc. A/42/38 at 78 (1987), reprinted in
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at
231 (2003).
9
CEDAW General Recommendation No. 20, Reservations to the Convention (Eleventh session, 1992), U.N. Doc. A/47/38 at 2 (1993), reprinted
in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at
249 (2003).
10
Article 9 relates to nationality and women’s ability to transmit nationality to their children; Article 15 relates to full legal capacity and to choice
of residence and domicile; Article 16 relates to equality in marriage and divorce. The full Convention is attached as Appendix A.
11
Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (Thirteenth Session), A/49/38 (1994), pp. 1-9.
12
Article 2 refers to State parties’ general obligations, including conforming constitutional provisions, adopting statutes and policies to implement
the Convention, and taking “all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices
which constitute discrimination against women.”
13
Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Nineteenth Session, A/53/38/Rev.1 (1998), pp. 47-50.
3
1994, the Committee also made a number of requests and suggestions to the Division for the
Advancement of Women and the Centre for Human Rights for additional support on dealing with
reservations.14

Since 1997 States parties have been including in their periodic reports a discussion of their
reservations and the rationale for entering them. The Committee engages the States parties on the
subject of reservations during the constructive dialogue (review) and in its Concluding
Comments. A number of the Concluding Comments have included statements indicating the
Committee’s determination that certain reservations are contrary to the object and purpose of the
Convention or are on articles that are “central” to the Convention.15

In 2008 the Committee adopted new guidelines for State party reports. With respect to
reservations, the Committee specifically noted the requirement to explain reservations and that
their “continued maintenance [should be] clarified.” In addition, the Committee specified
Articles 2, 7, 9 and 16 as particularly significant:

States parties that have entered general reservations which do not refer to a
specific article, or which are directed at articles 2 and/or 7, 9 and 16 should
report on the interpretation and the effect of those reservations. States parties
should provide information on any reservations or declarations they may have
lodged with regard to similar obligations in other human rights treaties.16

The legal consequence of a reservation’s impermissibility is that the Committee may examine a
State party’s implementation of the reserved provision. The State party could refuse to discuss
that provision on the basis of its having reserved. However, as indicated in the 2008 reporting
guidelines, the Committee expects to have a dialogue about progress on the specific issues
reserved and whether and when the reservations could be withdrawn.

1.3. The Impact of Reservations on States Parties’ Reporting and CEDAW Reviews
Many reservations to CEDAW cite relatively technical matters such as descent of royal or
customary titles (Luxembourg, Cook Islands, Monaco, Spain) and jurisdictional issues (for
example, sovereignty over the Falkland Islands). The single most reserved provision is Article
29, relating to arbitration of disputes over the application of treaty provisions. Quite
understandably, scholars and treaty experts have primarily focused on the number and scope of
reservations to key provisions such as Articles 2, 9, 15, and 16.17 As a practical matter, however,
in terms of reviewing implementation, the most interesting aspect of these reservations is not
their existence, but the treatment of reserved provisions in the Committee’s dialogue with the
States parties.

14
See Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Thirteenth Session, A/49/38, at pp. 1-9.
15
Schoepp-Schilling, supra note 6, pp. 34-35.
16
Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Forty-first Session, A/63/38 Supp (2008), pp. 78-83.
17
Article 2 refers to State parties’ general obligations, including conforming constitutional provisions, adopting statutes and policies to
implement the Convention, and taking “all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs
and practices which constitute discrimination against women.” Articles 9, 15, and 16 are noted in footnote 6 above.
4
One of the earliest significant sets of reservations to CEDAW was entered by Bangladesh upon
its accession in 1984. Bangladesh reserved Articles 13(a),18 16 (1)(c) and (f),19 and Article 2,
which requires examination of constitutions, laws, and policies and the enactment of a legislative
and administrative framework to implement the Convention. However, the government of
Bangladesh proceeded to submit reports, including information required by Article 2, and to
nominate experts. The Committee proceeded to review those reports, and it did comment on the
remaining reservations in its 2004 State party review.20 While a reservation to Article 2 is clearly
contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention, neither the Committee nor the State party
has belabored the issue. Bangladesh withdrew the reservations to Articles 13(a) and 16 (1)(f) in
1997 but has not withdrawn the Article 2 or 16 (1)(c) reservation. The Committee continues to
press on the question of withdrawing the remaining reservations.

Similarly, many states have reserved all or part of Article 16. The Committee has clearly
declared such reservations to be contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention, and
therefore invalid, so reserving Article 16 would not allow a State party to avoid implementation.
The Committee’s constructive dialogues with States parties that have reserved all or part of
Article 16 refer to issues under that provision.

The pattern of reservations, withdrawals, and continuing dialogue on the reserved issues
suggests that factors in addition to incompatibility with State parties’ laws are involved in their
approach to reservations. Efforts to promote withdrawal of reservations must be based on the
political and cultural as well as the legal context.

18
Relating to equal family benefits (social security).
19
Relating specifically to “(c) same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution” and (f) same rights as to custody,
guardianship, adoption of children.
20
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding Comments: Bangladesh, A/59/38(SUPP) paras. 228-267 (Aug.
18, 2004).
5
2. The Domestic Context of Reservations
Generally speaking, the number of ratifications and accessions to CEDAW suggests that non-
discrimination against women has become a universal norm. Regardless of intent or motivation,
states seem compelled to engage with the Convention and its procedures.

But obstacles to equality between women and men also remain universal and persistent. The
nature of the reservations suggests that some states currently do not accept all aspects of non-
discrimination norms,21 but they do not wish to remove themselves entirely from the
conversation. The reservations discussion is essentially a negotiation around this fact. Indeed, in
some cases the existence of reservations can promote useful dialogue with the CEDAW
Committee and civil society by focusing on clearly identified issues and giving states the
opportunity to burnish their international standing by withdrawing them.

2.1. The Reservations Map

The greatest proportion of substantive reservations to CEDAW has been entered by States parties
that cite Sharia (a) as a basis of all state law;22 or (b) as regulating matters of personal status
(marriage, divorce, custody, guardianship and adoption, inheritance). Three states have entered
reservations to Article 16 (equality in marriage) on the more general ground that matters of
personal status are determined by the law of the various religious and ethnic communities in the
state. The effect of these reservations on women and girls is the same, regardless of how they
are stated: they relegate laws and practices that critically affect women’s human rights to a
system that is unreachable by and unaccountable to international norms.

The article with the greatest number of reservations, either to the entire provision or to individual
subsections, is Article 16 (34 states reserved). Thirteen states have reserved Article 15 (legal
capacity, residence and domicile), and most of the reservations are to 15(4), the subsection that
provides for freedom of movement and equality in choice of domicile. Nineteen states have
current reservations to Article 9, particularly to 9(2) providing for equality in the right to transmit
nationality to one’s children. A number of states that entered reservations to Article 9 upon
ratification or accession have since withdrawn them; two are discussed in Section III.C below.

Four states have remaining reservations to Article 7, relating to participation in public life. Each
of these reservations is limited to specific aspects of public life: service on religious courts;
inheritance of hereditary titles; voting.23

Ten states have entered general reservations, seven of them using language such as reserving “all
provisions of the Convention not in accordance with the provisions of the Islamic Sharia and
legislation in force in [name of state].” The effect of these reservations is the same as that of a

21
The travaux préparatoires (records of Convention drafting and adoption process) indicate the points of resistance and the resulting compromise
language of various provisions. The pattern of reservations echoes in many respects the discussion in the drafting sessions.
22
Pakistan requires its courts to follow Sharia; Bangladesh has made Islam the state religion.
23
Qatar reserved Article 2, citing “rules on transmission of hereditary authority” under the Constitution, which effectively reserves the right to
participate in public life.
6
more specific reservation, because the “conflict” with Sharia or constitutional provisions that
privilege Sharia, will be found primarily in Articles 9, 15, and 16.

Several states have reserved some aspect of Article 11 (employment), usually with reference to
disparities in pensions or to continuing protective laws.

Reservations to Article 2 are particularly problematic as that article lays out the fundamental
requirement to comply with all articles of the Convention in the State party’s constitution,
statutes, and policies. States are required to be proactive in adopting laws and policies to
eliminate discrimination against women and in attempting to modify or abolish discriminatory
“customs and practices.” Twenty-two states have reserved all or part of Article 2.

A number of State parties in which personal status matters are determined by the law or custom
of their religious and ethnic communities have not entered any reservations at all. Most of these
are sub-Saharan African states, in which ethnic custom is highly discriminatory and in some
cases relegates women to the status of minors—unable to own or inherit some or all forms of
property and entirely dismissed as potential custodial parents in the case of widowhood or
divorce.24 Some State parties with indigenous communities that regulate family and property
relations according to discriminatory community custom also have not entered reservations on
that basis.25 And a number of states in which religious law is a basic element of the social and
legal fabric have not reserved or have reserved only Article 29, a procedural provision.

2.2. Relationship of Reservations to Status of Women

The pattern of reservations described above in Section II.A does not yield a clear picture of State
parties’ motivations for reserving or deciding not to reserve. For example, none of the Latin
American states entered substantive reservations, but many have struggled with implementing
women’s human rights, particularly related to violence and reproductive rights. European states
entered no reservations or limited ones, but wage gaps and violence against women persist.
States may enter reservations to key articles to indicate the areas in which they acknowledge
falling short and intend to change, and a number of states have withdrawn such reservations as
their political and cultural contexts have changed.

This pattern—or lack of pattern—suggests that human rights commitments have political as well
as legal aspects. States may undertake human rights obligations for a variety of reasons that have
little to do with their commitment to their own citizens and everything to do with their status in
the international community. Some of these states enter no reservations; others enter reservations
that stake out large swaths of territory as off-limits to change and then withdraw them as their
political context changes.

24
Of sub-Saharan African States parties, only Lesotho, Malawi, and Niger entered reservations. Malawi’s reservation to Article 5, citing the
tenacity and importance of custom, was withdrawn in 1991. Lesotho’s reservation related only to succession to chieftainships and to the throne
and was withdrawn in 2004. Niger’s reservations are discussed below, Section III.C.
25
For example, many Central and South American states.
7
Regardless of motive, reservations indicate areas in which status of women is of concern to the
reserving State parties. They offer an opportunity for engagement by the CEDAW Committee
and by civil society in a dialogue with the state on both the rationale and the necessity of the
reservations.

Status of women may be measured in legal (formal) terms and in terms of indicators such as
health, literacy, per capita income, violence, and participation in public life (de facto status).
CEDAW requires State parties to pursue both formal and de facto equality. With the
preponderance of State parties now coming before it for periodic rather than initial reviews,
some of them with more than twenty years of post-ratification history, the CEDAW Committee
increasingly focuses on de facto equality. However, the Committee clearly indicates in all its
reviews that formal equality, as stated in constitutions, laws, and administrative regulations, is
fundamental to the achievement of de facto equality.

In its reviews, the CEDAW Committee regularly engages States parties in “constructive
dialogue”26 on the possibility of re-examining statutes, religious dictates, and customary practice
to determine whether reservations may be withdrawn. The experts focus on the consequences of
the reservations for women, families, and society. They encourage States parties to narrow
reservations if they cannot be completely withdrawn, and they remind States parties that have
changed their laws to withdraw the relevant reservations. Withdrawal of reservations is
important, well beyond a procedural and legal gesture. It provides affirmation to domestic civil
society advocates and inspiration to advocates in other countries, suggests to other State parties
that they could re-examine their reservations, signifies progress towards true universality of
women’s human rights, and—perhaps most important for women in that country—formalizes the
State party’s commitment to improving the status of women and increases state accountability.

2.3. Impact of Reservations on Women’s Human Rights in Selected States

The key substantive reservations are to CEDAW Articles 2, 5, 7, 9, 15, and 16. The content of
Article 2 is discussed in Section III.A. above. Article 2 reservations frequently are linked to other
reservations, as Article 2 refers to the basic constitutional, legal, and policy infrastructure that
must be examined and changed to implement CEDAW.

A reservation to Article 5 suggests that a State party does not wish to examine closely and
address the fundamental attitudinal issues that underlie sex discrimination. Implementation of
Article 5 requires a major effort to monitor public attitudes towards women, take measures to
eliminate customary practices that disadvantage or harm women, and promote fresh thinking
about gender roles. This is admittedly difficult, but it is not impossible. It goes to, for example,
evaluating educational materials and curricula and eliminating sex stereotyping and adopting
codes relating to portrayal of women in the media. States sometimes suggest that they act
minimally because of concern over freedom of expression or religion. However, it is a
fundamental premise of international human rights law that rights should not be seen as

26
The Committee uses this term consistently to describe its State party reviews.
8
conflicting with each other as all derive from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. States
have a duty to find the balance that supports all human rights equally and to target sex
discrimination through all permissible means.

Reservations to Article 7 usually relate to law or custom that prevents women from serving as
judges or as high-status representatives of their government. Women thereby are excluded from
making high-level policy or judicial decisions that have a major impact on women’s lives and the
enjoyment of their human rights. The specific reservations relating to women’s exclusion from
serving on religious courts must be examined in light of their individual religious freedom rights
rather than being readily accepted as a matter of the group’s “freedom to practice” religion.

Most of the Article 9 reservations are to 9(2), the right to transmit nationality to one’s children.
Women’s inability to transmit their nationality results in major hardship to children and families
as well as to the mothers. Lack of nationality may exclude a child from educational opportunity,
health care, mobility to be with other family members, and opportunities for military or national
service that are critical to career path. In many states women cannot travel out of the country
with the children unless she has proof that the father has given permission, even if they have
their own passports. Similarly, many states that limit women’s nationality in this manner do not
allow children to be endorsed to their mother’s passport. If the parents are divorced, this
becomes particularly problematic if the mother wishes to raise the children in another country,
even with the father’s agreement.

Article 15 reservations go to the heart of women’s legal capacity, the recognition of their right to
make and carry out decisions for themselves and their families and to inherit, own and manage
property. Within the family, lack of legal capacity renders women dependent on males and
subject to male authority with little bargaining power and no recourse outside the family. Article
15(4), which is reserved specifically by many states, provides for freedom of movement and
equality in choice of residence and domicile. In many states the choice of domicile is that of the
husband or male head of household. As a practical matter, this limits women’s educational and
employment opportunities as well as rendering them powerless in negotiating a fundamental
aspect of family life.

Article 16 comprehensively covers equality in marriage and dissolution of marriage. All its
provisions are critical to women’s ability to live as equal partners in the family and to care for
themselves and their children. Article 16(2), concerning child marriage, reconfirms principles
that have been internationally acknowledged as fundamental since the adoption of the
Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages
in 1964.27 An undifferentiated reservation to Article 16 therefore calls into question the State
party’s commitment to address child marriages, with all their negative consequences for women
and girls.

27
Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, 521 U.N.T.S. 231, entered into force Dec 9,
1964.
9
CEDAW Article 16(1) refers to basic measures of equality within marriage, presumably between
two adults who have freely consented. Reservations to any provision of Article 16 (1) indicate a
reluctance to recognize women’s full competence as adults within the family. Inequality in
marriage has a tremendous impact on children, as in most cultures—even those in which women
have negotiating space—women have great responsibility for the welfare of the children. If they
do not have equal access to the resources of the household and equal decision-making power, the
consequences usually are visited on the children (or, in polygamous households, her children). If
women do not have equal property and inheritance rights, they are hampered in decision-making
within marriage and can be left destitute upon divorce or death of the husband. And it should be
noted that the CEDAW Committee decided in 1994 that polygamy is a violation of women’s
human rights under Article 16.28

States with multiple legal systems

Most if not all sub-Saharan African states as well as a number of Asian and Pacific states have
multiple legal systems. In these systems, areas such as commerce and crime are governed by
modern legal codes, frequently held over or adapted from a colonial era, but personal status
matters (marriage, divorce, death of spouse, child custody, guardianship and adoption,
inheritance) are governed by religious and customary law.29 In some states, individuals may
choose between religious or customary law and civil (statutory) law; others do not have a civil
(statutory) code relating to personal status and require individuals to conduct all such matters
according to the religious or customary law of the community with which they identify (cross-
religious or cross-ethnic marriages create special issues in these settings).

Generally these states have a colonial history. Their independence and subsequent constitutions
include the usual provisions delineating state powers and establishing the institutions of the state,
and frequently they include a bill of rights or other provisions relating to equality and non-
discrimination. Because of their experience as colonies in which ethnic and religious identity was
tolerated or used for purposes of the colonial power rather than respected, they typically carve
out special constitutional protection for customary and religious practices that reaffirm identity:
marriage, divorce, custody, adoption, inheritance (personal status), indicating that these matters
are exempt from scrutiny as to discrimination.. These states may retain or adopt formal legal and
judicial systems on the model of their prior colonizers. They also may establish parallel or
subordinate customary dispute resolution systems and/or recognize the power of religious
tribunals to deal with family issues and minor or very local crimes or property disputes. The
details of these systems vary from state to state, as does the appealability of customary and
religious tribunal decisions to the formal courts. Frequently women cannot be appointed to the

28
General Recommendation No. 21, Equality in marriage and family relations (Thirteenth session, 1992), U.N. Doc. A/49/38 at 1 (1994),
reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 250 (2003), paragraph 14.
29
The term “customary law” is somewhat problematic. By its nature, custom is a living thing, “inherently negotiable” as described by Niger in its
reservation, changing with time and defying codification. However, the recognition of custom as normative frequently results in some form of
codification and/or recognition by the formal court system. Courts may determine the content of a custom and refer to it as law, that being the
language of the formal legal system, but it is really only a snapshot of the custom at the time of the determination. Scholars refer to this as
“lawyers’ customary law.” States may use the term to refer to codified, court-sanctioned, or evolving community-based custom and are rarely
clear about the distinctions.
10
customary and religious tribunals, compounding the discrimination inherent in the religious law
or ethnic custom.

Remarkably, only two sub-Saharan African states, Malawi (acceded 1987) and Niger (acceded
1999), entered reservations to CEDAW on the basis of customary law and practice. (Lesotho
entered a reservation relating only to chieftainships and male succession to the throne and
withdrew it in 2004.) Malawi withdrew its reservation in 1991. The basis for the withdrawal was
not stated.

Niger

Niger’s population is Muslim, but the reservations entered with its accession in 1999 allude more
to custom than to religion.

In its 2005 Combined Initial and Second Periodic Report, the government acknowledged the
complexities of women’s legal and de facto status that result from the intersection of customary
practice and Islamic principles taken together with the formal invalidity of any law that conflicts
with CEDAW.30

Under the country’s legal system, there are three categories of

norms including norms on individual human rights: The
Napoleonic Civil Code is applicable to the Niger; The Act of 16
March 1962 on the organization and jurisdiction of the courts
stipulates that the customary law of the parties shall apply
provided that they are not contrary to public policy and to the
free exercise of the rights of the individual and family; Islamic
law.
Owing to these three categories of norms, issues concerning
the family are surrounded by uncertainty because of the
inherently negotiable nature of custom.

In addition, the Combined Initial and Second Periodic Report noted that

The Government of the Niger has expressed reservations on

article 5 (a) with regard to the modification of social and
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women.
The Government considers that social and cultural patterns
of conduct that are deeply rooted in the collective consciousness
cannot be modified simply by enacting legislation.
Modifications can take place only gradually.

30
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Consideration of States Parties Reports: Niger, Combined Initial and Second
Periodic Report, CEDAW/C/NER/1-2 (2005).
11
The CEDAW Committee reviewed Niger in 2007. The state’s Responses to the list of
issues and questions 31 submitted in preparation for that review described adoption of a
new law, Act No. 2004-50 of 22 July 2004, applying to
cases involving the capacity of the parties to enter into
contracts and institute legal proceedings, personal status,
family, marriage, divorce, filiations, succession, donations
and wills . . .
The new article introduces a fundamental innovation in that,
to be applicable, customs must not only be consistent with
the laws and public order but also with the duly ratified
conventions.
No custom can interfere with article 130 of the Commercial
Code, providing a legislative guarantee that a married
woman does not need authorization to go into business.
The government indicated that this had the effect of “abrogating” the prior law that had
required courts to apply customary law in cases involving “family rights.”

The Committee pointedly noted its concern about Niger’s extensive reservations and
stated that the reservations to Articles 2 and 16 are “contrary to the object and purpose of
the Convention.” 32 The Committee noted with appreciation the state’s “various legal
reforms” but expressed concern about “continuing legal provisions and regulations that
discriminate against women.” It cited the continuing failure to draft a family code (in
process since 1976), the continuing application of “discriminatory customary laws and
practices against women” despite changes in the law, and the “adverse impact on women
caused by the application of three different sources of law, namely statutory, customary
and religious law.” 33 The Committee firmly directed the state to address the “patriarchal
ideology with firmly entrenched stereotypes regarding the roles and responsibilities of
women and men” and the “deep-rooted adverse cultural norms, customs and traditions”
that prevent women from enjoying their human rights. 34

Without specifying either custom or religion as the primary source of discrimination, the
Committee directed the state to “harmonize statutory, customary and religious law with the
provisions of the Convention.” 35

31
Responses to the list of issues and questions submitted in preparation for consideration of the initial and second periodic reports of Niger,
CEDAW/C/NER/Q/2/Add.1 (20 February 2007).
32
CEDAW, Concluding Comments: Niger, CEDAW/C/NER/CO/2 (11 June 2007), para. 9.
33
Ibid., para. 15.
34
Ibid., paras. 16,17.
35
Ibid., para. 16.
12
States that have reserved on the basis of Sharia

The largest number of reservations that have been entered and not withdrawn are those that refer
to the requirements and the supremacy of Sharia. A considerable literature has developed,
analyzing the relationship between Sharia and international human rights law, with particular
attention to the impact of Sharia on women’s human rights. This paper will not revisit the
arguments, nor will it recap the history of Islamic law and jurisprudence that has been so well
explicated by others.36

The fundamental issue with respect to the Sharia-based reservations to CEDAW is whether the
State party is willing to re-examine the premises of the reservation and modify or withdraw it.
Some reservations are stated in a manner that seems to preclude any flexibility in the
interpretation and application of Sharia. Yet the global variety of Islamic practice, the variations
between schools of Islamic law, and the conduct of some Islamic states (as described in this
section) all suggest that Islamic law is far from an inflexible monolith. The principle of ijtihad,
or independent legal reasoning, is also a very important technique for understanding the
application of Islamic law, according to Professor Shaheen Sardar Ali, former Minister of Health
in Peshawar, Pakistan, and internationally recognized scholar,37 and Ayesha Imam, a Nigerian
attorney whose successful defense of a young woman accused of adultery in northern Nigeria
was based on Muslim scholarship.38

Eleven Islamic states have reserved all or part of CEDAW Article 2, the requirement to examine
and change state laws, policies, and institutions to implement CEDAW. The CEDAW
Committee is particularly concerned about reservations to this article as they undermine the
totality of the Convention. Some State parties have noted that they entered an Article 2
reservation to indicate that they could not commit to the requirements to change laws and
policies on substantive issues to which they were reserving, such as nationality (Article 9),
domicile (Article 15(4)), and equality in marriage (Article 16). The CEDAW Committee uses the
Article 2 reservation to press on the general issue of reservations and to note for the State party’s
benefit that the reservation to any part of Article 2 is very problematic, regardless of the
motivation for it.

36
In addition to well-known experts such as Ali, Abdullahi Ahmed Al-Na’im, and Ann Elizabeth Mayer, the author suggests consulting
Ekaterina Yahyaoui Krivenko, Women, Islam and International Law within the Context of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against [sic] Women (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009). Dr. Krivenko provides a detailed description of the history
and framework of Islamic law and analyzes the Sharia-based reservations to CEDAW and the behavior of the reserving states with respect to
CEDAW implementation and reporting. Referred to in the text as Krivenko. For another balanced overview of Sharia and its impact on women’s
human rights, see Ayesha Imam, “”Women, Muslim Laws and Human Rights in Nigeria,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Africa Program, Occasional Papers No. 2 (February 2004), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Occasional_Paper_2.pdf.
37
“Shari’a, is may be argued, by its very definition has evolution built into its meaning and cannot be rigid. (The term Shari’a means a watering
place, a flowing stream . . .). Shaheen Sardar Ali, “Law Reform and Children’s Rights in Muslim Jurisdictions, Protecting the World’s Children:
Impact of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Diverse Legal Systems (New York: Cambridge University Press and UNICEF, 2007), p.
146.
38
Ayesha Imam, “”Women, Muslim Laws and Human Rights in Nigeria,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Africa Program,
Occasional Papers No. 2 (February 2004), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Occasional_Paper_2.pdf.

13
Egypt

Egypt’s reservations have been cited frequently as a textbook example of the issues raised by
invoking Sharia as justification for failure to address inequality. Egypt’s reservation to Article 2
is stated as a general reservation to the article and could be read as a general reservation to the
entire treaty as well as a refusal to consider reinterpretation:

General reservation on Article 2
 . The Arab Republic of Egypt is willing to

comply with the content of this article, provided that such compliance does
not run counter to the Islamic Sharia .


The only specific reservations, entered at the time of signature and confirmed upon ratification,
relate to Articles 9 (2), 16 and 29.

CEDAW Article 9 (2) states the equal right of women to transmit nationality to their children.
Egyptian law provided that children took the nationality only of their fathers. This provision had
a profound impact on women who married foreign nationals and on their children. If the family
resided in Egypt, the children, as noncitizens, were excluded from a number of state benefits and
were not allowed to serve in the Army, which is a classic route to career opportunities. If the
father of the children disappeared or died, the mother could not rely on any state support to
replace financial support the father had provided. If the family resided in the father’s country and
the father died or otherwise left the family, the mother would have to remain in that country
(with whatever nationality issues that may have presented for her) or abandon her children to
return to Egypt. Women’s advocates also noted that the law was particularly hard on less-
educated women, frequently from rural Egypt, who married foreigners and had no resources for
tracking the father or pursuing nationality claims for their children if the father abandoned the
family.

Egypt’s reservation to CEDAW Article 9(2) does not cite Sharia, and the justification for
limiting citizenship transmission to fathers is somewhat circular as well as patriarchal:

concerning the granting to women of equal rights with men with respect to
the nationality of their children, without prejudice to the acquisition by a
child born of a marriage of the nationality of his father. This is in order to
prevent a child's acquisition of two nationalities where his parents are of
different nationalities, since this may be prejudicial to his future. It is clear
that the child's acquisition of his father's nationality is the procedure most
suitable for the child and that this does not infringe upon the principle of
equality between men and women, since it is customary for a woman to
agree, upon marrying an alien, that her children shall be of the father's
nationality [emphasis added].

14
The citizenship law was changed in June, 2004, after a long campaign by Egyptian women’s
groups. The Association for Development and Enhancement of Women (ADEW) claims that it
was the first to raise public awareness of the citizenship issue.39 The NGOs that formed the
CEDAW Coalition to monitor Egypt’s implementation of the Convention were critically
important actors in the campaign. The campaign included field research in the provinces to
document the impact of the nationality restrictions on Egyptian women and children. The
campaign ultimately included collaboration with government entities and the National Council
for Women, chaired by Suzanne Mubarak. The Forum for Women in Development, a network of
Egyptian NGOs dealing with women's issues that was launched in 1997 by 15 civil society
organizations, is taking the lead in monitoring implementation of the nationality reform.40Egypt
withdrew its reservation to Article 9 (2) in January 2008.

The reservation to Article 16 (equality in marriage and divorce) cites Sharia and invokes the
principles of equivalence and complementarity,

whereby women are accorded rights equivalent to those of their spouses so

as to ensure a just balance between them. This is out of respect for the
sacrosanct nature of the firm religious beliefs which govern marital relations
in Egypt and which may not be called in question and in view of the fact
that one of the most important bases of these relations is an equivalency of
rights and duties so as to ensure complementary which guarantees true
equality between the spouses. The provisions of the Sharia lay down that
the husband shall pay bridal money to the wife and maintain her fully and
shall also make a payment to her upon divorce, whereas the wife retains
full rights over her property and is not obliged to spend anything on her
keep. The Sharia therefore restricts the wife's rights to divorce by making
it contingent on a judge's ruling, whereas no such restriction is laid down
in the case of the husband [emphasis added].

The rationale offered for the Article 16 reservation is more clearly grounded in Sharia than the
Article 9 (2) reservation. Notably, the reservation makes no reference to the family law of the
Coptic Christian minority.

Despite the apparently unshakeable rationale for the Article 16 reservation, one aspect of
Egyptian divorce law has changed since ratification. In 2000 a new law was adopted, nominally
to facilitate women’s initiation of divorce under the kuhl procedure. Kuhl is one of the very few
avenues for women to initiate divorce (while men have an unlimited right to unilateral divorce).
It allows women to seek a divorce from a court by agreeing to pay the husband a certain amount
of money and to forego all other financial rights such as post-divorce maintenance. Women

39
ADEW, “Advocacy,” http://www.adew.org/adew/?action=10000&sub=3.
40
See Women’s Learning Partnership for Rights, Development and Peace, Women’s Right to Nationality Campaign (a six-country network
which is organized under the umbrella of the Women’s Learning Partnership), http://wrn.crtda.org.lb/en/Country+Analysis:+Egypt; Reem Leila,
“Citizens at last,” Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line, 1-7 July 2004, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/697/eg10.htm; “One Step Closer to Creating
Equality in Egypt,” www.learningpartnership.org/citizenship/2006/09/egyptonestepcloser/.
15
without individual means could never afford to initiate a kuhl divorce. The new law provides
that women will not be required to pay more than the dower specified in the marriage contract
and that mothers who get custody of their children are entitled to support payments from the
husband. If he cannot or will not pay, the state will provide support payments through the Bank
Nasser, a government-owned bank that transacts, among other things, social security matters.
Such divorces are supposed to be granted within three months of a required reconciliation
attempt.

The number of women who have been able to obtain a divorce under this law is unclear. “Apart
from the stigmatization and blame faced by women requesting a divorce they also have to deal
with the reluctance on the part of judges to apply this law, as well as failure to implement the
most important aspect of this law, the provision of child alimony via Bank Nasser.”41

Perhaps because of the minimal nature of this change, Egypt has not modified its reservation to
Article 16 despite having informed the CEDAW Committee that the law was a “major step
forward towards withdrawal.”42 And, as Egyptian women and law expert Fatma Khafagy notes,
“family law remains untouched,” despite the social and economic changes that have, according
to Khafagy, made reinterpretation of Sharia law necessary. The responsibility of men to support
their households, on which traditional interpretations and the Article 16 reservation rest, has been
gradually replaced with shared financial contributions to the household as more and more
women work outside the home.43

Malaysia

Malaysia’s reservations present an unusual set of issues. The first is the scope of the
reservations, as the State party’s actions have been somewhat confusing. Upon accession in
1995 the State entered a general reservation referring to both Sharia law and the Federal
Constitution:

The Government of Malaysia declares that Malaysia's accession is subject to

the understanding that the provisions of the Convention do not conflict with
the provisions of the Islamic Sharia' law and the Federal Constitution of
Malaysia. With regards thereto, further, the Government of Malaysia does not
consider itself bound by the provisions of articles 2 (f), 5 (a), 7 (b), 9 and 16
of the aforesaid Convention.

Article 2(f) requires States parties to, “without delay, . . . take all appropriate measures, including
legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which
constitute discrimination against women.” This echoes the language of Article 5(a), requiring
States parties

41
Krivenko, p. 143. The summary of the law’s provisions are taken from Krivenko, p. 142.
42
Responses to the list of issues and questions for consideration of the third and combined fourth and fifth periodic reports: Egypt,
EDAW/PSWG/2001/1/CRP.2/Add.3 (23 October 2000), p.4.
43
Fatma Khafagy, “Egyptian women at crossroads,” Common ground News Service, 28 August 2008,
http://www.commongroundnews.org/print_article.php?artId=23824&dir=left&lan=en.
16
 To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a
view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either
of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.

The reservations to these two provisions clearly indicate refusal or inability to address the
traditions, customs, and stereotyping that underlie discrimination against women. In 1998,
however, the State withdrew its reservation to Article 2(f). As to Article 5(a), the State
“modified” the reservation, indicating that Article 5(a) was “subject to the division of inherited
property” under Sharia, thereby apparently agreeing to address custom, tradition, and
stereotyping, but leaving in place discriminatory inheritance law.

CEDAW Article 7(b) provides for women, on a basis of equality, “to participate in the
formulation of government policy and the implementation thereof and to hold public office and
perform all public functions at all levels of government.” In 1998 the State “modified” this
reservation to provide that Article 7(b) “shall not affect appointment to certain public offices like
the Mufti Syariah Court Judges, and the Imam which is in accordance with the provisions of the
Islamic Shariah law,” apparently limiting the reservation to apply only to appointment to
religious courts.

Upon accession Malaysia also reserved Article 9 (nationality). Reservations to the entire article
are rare, as they not only deny equality with respect to women’s transmission of nationality to
children (9(2)), but they also result in failure to guarantee women’s ability to retain their
nationality upon marriage to a foreigner (9(1)). This right has been enshrined in international law
since the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women was adopted in 1958,44 and
Malaysia acceded to it in 1959. In 1998 it withdrew the reservation to Article 9(1).

Malaysia also reexamined its reservation to Article 16 (equality in marriage and divorce).
Reserving the entire article was a devastating dismissal of any concern for equality in the family,
and the state quickly reevaluated. In 1998 the reservations to some parts of Article 16 were
withdrawn: 16(b) relating to free choice of spouse and consent to marriage; 16(d) relating to
equal rights and responsibilities with respect to children; 16(e) relating to family planning; 16(h)
on equal rights to ownership, disposition, and management of property. Apparently the concept
of equality with respect to property rights does not, in the eyes of the State party, extend to
inheritance, as the remaining reservation to Article 5 quite clearly indicates that equal inheritance
rights are not supported.

The procedural issues surrounding the Malaysian government’s entry of reservations, attempted
modification, and withdrawal of some, are the subject of some concern among legal scholars. As
a practical matter, however, “. . . the consensus seems to have been reached to consider
Malaysia’s reservations are those remaining after the partial withdrawal.”45

44
Opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 1040 (XI) of 29 January 1957, entered into force 11 August 1958.
45
Krivenko, p. 118 fn. 383.
17
The second overarching reservation issue relates to Malaysia’s religious and ethnic makeup and
the way in which its multiple legal systems apply to the different groups. While Islam is the
majority religion, and Malaysia is a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, that
majority is not overwhelming (60% in 2002). The population includes significant numbers of
Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, Confucians, and animists, whose freedom to follow their religion
is constitutionally protected. Marriage and divorce of Muslims is governed by Sharia. For non-
Muslims, the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act of 1976 applies to personal status. All
other matters are determined by federal law applied uniformly to all population groups.

The State party report alludes to customary as well as Islamic and statutory law and states that
“the concept of women’s equality in Malaysia is based on the culture and traditional beliefs of its
various ethnic groups with the influence of religious values.”46 However, neither the
reservations, the State report, nor the constructive dialogue with the Committee addresses the
status of customary and non-Muslim religious laws, or the status of women under any of them.
The NGO Shadow Report submitted by the National Council for Women’s Organisations47 states
that in East Malaysia (Borneo) native custom and the customary legal system apply where at
least one of the parties is a native. This issue remains a mystery. Given the considerable impact
of customary practices on women’s lives, study and clarification of this situation is warranted.

An additional source of confusion and sex discrimination is the variation of Islamic law from
state to state (13 states and the Federal Territories). Several states have enacted very conservative
versions of Islamic personal status laws. The role of Malay custom in the various state-level
understandings of Sharia also is unclear. Since the government’s obligations under CEDAW
include implementation at local levels, the impact of both conservative Islamic law and the
interplay of custom and religious practice at the more local levels should be examined.

Morocco

Morocco made headlines when, in 2004, it made major changes in the Family Code that
eliminated some of the most clearly discriminatory elements of traditionally applied Sharia. The
reservations and declaration entered upon accession in 1993 were:

With respect to Article 2, a declaration preserving the rules of succession

to the throne and indicating that Article 2 provisions would apply to the
extent that “they do not conflict with the provisions of the Islamic Shariah
. . . which strives, among its other objectives, to strike a balance between
the spouse in order to preserve the coherence of family life”;

With respect to Article 15 (4), a declaration preserving the Moroccan

Code of Persona Status provisions relating to women’s right to choose
residence and domicile;

46
CEDAW, Consideration of State Party Reports, Combined initial and second periodic report of Malaysia, CEDAW/C/MYS/1-2 (2005), para.
380.
47
http://www.iwraw-ap.org/resources/pdf/Malaysia_SR.pdf
18
 With respect to Article 9 (2), reserving in view of the Moroccan
Nationality law;

With respect to Article 16 in its entirety, citing incompatibility of the

equality provisions “with Islamic Shariah, which guarantees to each of the
spouses rights and responsibilities within a framework of equilibrium and
complementary [sic] in order to preserve the sacred bond of matrimony,”
followed by details of marital property arrangements;

Reservation to Article 29.

The new Family Code adopted in January, 2004, provides for an equal minimum age of marriage
(18); self-guardianship for women; limitations on polygamy, including requirement of judicial
permission; equalizing the divorce process by allowing the wife to petition more readily and
limiting talaq; providing for divorce by mutual consent; incorporating into the Family Code
“provisions of the relevant international agreements” relating to custody of children (and
eliminating male preference); providing for establishment of paternity in some out-of-wedlock
cases; allowing inheritance by granddaughters as well as grandsons.48

The adoption of the new Family Code (Moudawana) was the culmination of years of work by
many women’s groups in Morocco. The Family Code adopted at independence in 1957/58 was
highly patriarchal, with men designated as head of household and women designated as “adult
minors” who must be under the guardianship of a male family member.49 The Moudawana also
is the only area of law that is codified according to Islamic law; all other legislation is secular.

Women’s groups in Morocco organized for reform almost from the time the Moudawana was
originally adopted. In 1992 the Union de l’Action Feminine started a grassroots campaign to
obtain one million signatures on a petition for Moudawana reform. A very limited reform
resulted in 1993. Through the 1990s, women’s rights groups continued to organize, adopting the
discourse of human rights in addition to their focus on religious interpretation to support change.
To defuse backlash from religious leaders, they crafted arguments to the effect that Islam had
always been a religion of justice and equality, and had embodied equality long before it became
fashionable in the West.

At the same time, women in the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia) were organizing a
collective effort to promote equality in the legal systems of all three countries, taking the

48
“King of Morocco Calls for Fundamental Reform in Family Law (translation of the King’s announcement of the law’s provisions), MEMRI,
November 7, 2003, www.hvk.org/rticles/1103/76.html; “Morocco Adopts Landmark Family Law Supporting Women’s Equality,” Women’s
Learning Partnership for Rights, Development, and Peace, February 24, 2004, www.learningpartnership.org/en/advocacy/alerts/morocco0204. An
unofficial English translation of the law can be found at Women Living Under Muslim Laws, http://www.wluml.org/english/news/moudawana-
english.pdf.
49
For a comprehensive case study of the Family Code campaign, see Alexandra Pittman (with Rabea Naciri), Cultural Adaptations: the
Moroccan women’s Campaign to Change the Moudawana, United Kingdom: Institute of Development Studies, 2007,
www.ids.ac.uk.ids/Part/proj/pnp.html. The abbreviated history in this paper can barely do justice to the effort.
19
progressive aspects of the Tunisian family code as inspiration and example. The Collectif 95
Maghreb Egalité was created in 1992 to share strategies, ideas, and advocacy tools across the
sub-region. L’Association Democratique des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM) was the Morocco
coordinator for this network. In 1995 the Collectif issued a document, 100 Measures and Steps
for Egalitarian Legislation of Family Relations in Morocco, to convey the need for egalitarian
family law and demonstrate what it would look like.

The campaign began to see some success particularly after a change in political leadership and
the ascent of King Mohamed VI to the throne in 1999. The government adopted a Plan of Action
for the Integration of Women in Development, integrating measures from the Beijing Platform
for Action. As opposition to reforms crystallized, the women’s groups formed new networks,
adapting their methods to new developments. They framed their arguments to meet the cultural
context, targeted public awareness efforts to the general population in terms of everyday issues,
and offered a familiar religious and cultural context for the concepts of change and the principle
of ijtihad (living interpretation of Islamic law). The State acknowledged the impact of these
efforts in its Combined Third and Fourth Periodic Reports to CEDAW, which was reviewed in
2008.50

While the Family Code change was indeed a great civil society accomplishment (although far
from a complete reorganization of the Code to eliminate all discrimination against women), the
political context was significant. King Mohamed VI presented himself as a modern monarch who
supported equality for women. He also took the position that change could and should occur
within a Muslim framework. He appointed a Royal Commission in 2001 to examine changes in
the Moudawana. The Commission worked very slowly, holding open hearings for nine months
and spending three years in total on analysis of the Moudawana. In 2003 the King appointed a
new president of the Commission, and shortly thereafter it issued recommendations that became
legislation, adopted in 2004.

The Government of Morocco has presented the Family Code change as a major accomplishment
and announced in 2006 that it would withdraw the relevant reservations to CEDAW. The
Moroccan delegation that presented the State party report to the CEDAW Committee in 2008
stated that the government intended to withdraw its reservations.51 In a speech given on Human
Rights Day, December 10, 2008, that received global coverage, the King announced that
reservations had been withdrawn.52 However, as of November 5, 2009, the United Nations
Treaty Office has not received an instrument of withdrawal,53 and the formal record still is not
cleared.

50
CEDAW, Consideration of State Party Reports: Combined Third and Fourth Periodic Report of Morocco, CEDAW/C/MAR/4 (18 September
2006), para. 352, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/563/69/PDF/N0656369.pdf?OpenElement.
51
CEDAW, Consideration of State Party Reports: Combined Third and Fourth Periodic Report of Morocco, CEDAW/C/MAR/4 (18 September
2006), para. 352, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/563/69/PDF/N0656369.pdf?OpenElement.
52
Women Living Under Muslim Laws, “Morocco withdraws reservations to CEDAW,” December 10, 2008,
http://www.wluml.org/english/newsfulltxt.shtml?cmd[157]=x-157-563308.
53
Correspondence (e-mail) from Arturo Requesens, UN Treaty Office, April 13, 2009.
20
Morocco changed its nationality law in 2007 to allow Moroccan women to transmit their
nationality to their children. Women’s groups had also been fighting for this change for years. A
six-country Middle East-North Africa network, of which ADFM is the Moroccan partner,
provides significant support for nationality advocacy as well as information and inspiration for
partners outside the region.54 The reservation pertaining to Article 9 also has not been
withdrawn.

The King’s careful presentation of the Family Code reforms in the context of Islam55 can only
help in promoting other State parties’ reconsideration of Sharia-based limitations on equality in
the family. And the civil society efforts can serve as a model for concerned NGOs throughout the
globe.

Reservations on other bases

Turkey

Turkey presents a particularly interesting case because it is a determinedly secular state with a
majority Muslim population that entered and later withdrew reservations to several key
provisions of the CEDAW Convention.

Upon its accession to the Convention in 1985, Turkey entered reservations to Articles 15 (2),
providing for equal legal capacity and equal rights to manage property and 15(4), relating to
choice of residence and domicile. Article 16 (1)(c)(same rights during marriage and at
dissolution), (d) (same rights and responsibilities as parents), (f) (same rights as guardians,
trustees, adoptive parents), and (g) (rights to family name and to choice of profession) also were
reserved. In addition, the State reserved Article 29. It also entered a declaration that is somewhat
opaque but is in the nature of a reservation to Article 9 (1) (nationality of married women).56

While the Turkish Civil Code adopted in 1926 rejected Islamic law, it reflected an extremely
patriarchal culture, in which men were designated head of family. The reservations to CEDAW
were based on the limitations in the 1926 Civil Code.

Civil society action to address inequality dates to the 1980s, when the feminist movement
organized to target domestic violence. 57 The campaign succeeded in promoting a change in the
Penal Code relating to sentencing of rapists. During the 1990s, women’s human rights groups
became increasingly organized and sophisticated in pursuing the human rights agenda. The NGO
Women for Women’s Human Rights submitted a shadow report to the CEDAW Committee for

54
See “Claiming Equal Citizenship: The Campaign for Arab Women’s Right to Nationality,”
http://www.learningpartnerhsip.org/citizenship/about.
55
See MEMRI, supra fn. 11.
56
The Declaration reads: “Article 9, paragraph 1 of the Convention is not in conflict with the provisions of article 5, paragraph 1, and article 15
and 17 of the Turkish Law on Nationality, relating to the acquisition of citizenship, since the intent of those provisions regulating acquisition of
citizenship through marriage is to prevent statelessness."
57
For a complete account of NGO advocacy and the political context of changes in the Turkish Codes, see Pinar Ilkkaracan, Reforming the Penal
Code in turkey: The Campaign for the Reform of the Turkish Penal Code from a Gender Perspective, (Web version), United Kingdom, 2007,
www.ids.ac.uk/ids/Pat/proj/pnp.html.
21
its 1997 review of Turkey and became a leader in coalition building for advocacy. In 1998 the
Law on Protection of the Family was adopted to provide for orders for protection in domestic
violence cases. Turkey withdrew its reservations to Articles 15 and 16 in 1999, as various efforts
were under way to revise the Civil Code. However, major overhaul of the Civil Code was
consistently stalled until 2000, when a parliamentary coalition seemed to have enough votes to
adopt a new Code that included provisions for full equality. Then, with unexpected opposition
gathering in parliament, women’s groups formed a coalition of 120 organizations that mounted
an effective public awareness and media campaign. The new Civil Code was adopted in 2001.

Turkey’s drive to join the European Union was a significant factor in the context for change.
The EU effort gathered energy starting in 1999 when Turkey was named as a candidate for EU
accession. Advocates have firmly noted that “the struggle of the women’s movement for the
reform of the Turkish Civil Code, as well as other reforms for gender equality, started long
before the EU accession”58 talks. But the EU developments, together with a sizeable supportive
parliamentary coalition, made for a political moment that was ripe for progress.

In 2001 the Civil Code was amended to provide for equality in marriage and divorce, including
setting the age of marriage at 18 for both men and women, equal division of property upon
divorce, assigning an economic value to women’s nonfinancial contributions, and allowing
single parents to adopt children. The constitution was amended in 2001 to redefine the family as
“based on equality between the spouses.” Essentially the patriarchal family regime that had held
from the days of Kemal Ataturk was finally dissolved.

Following this success, the women’s movement dealt with another challenge as the Penal Code
was reviewed on the way to reform. Early versions of the revised Penal Code, drafted in view of
EU requirements for accession, made no reference to reforming the elements of the law that had,
since 1926, treated women as property rather than as individuals. The old Penal Code provided
for dropping rape charges if the rapist married the victim, justified “honor” crimes, and treated
sexual offenses as crimes against the state. Following a three-year campaign, major amendments
to the Penal Code in 2004 changed the classification of sexual offenses to crimes against the
person (instead of crimes against the state), eliminated concepts of chastity, honor, and public
morality from the Code, eliminated impunity for rape if the rapist married the victim,
criminalized sexual harassment and marital rape, and modernized definitions and penalties for
other sexual crimes.59

While this author hesitates to attribute direct causation without further investigation, which is
beyond the scope of this study, it is clear that the withdrawal of Turkey’s reservations coincided
with political developments as well as the growing strength of women’s advocacy. The
reservations to Articles 15 and 16 were withdrawn in 1999, and the remaining substantive
reservation (stated as a declaration), to Article 9 (1), was withdrawn in 2008.

Republic of Korea

58
Evre Kanak, Women for Women’s Human Rights-New Ways, private correspondence, 18 March 2009.
59
For a complete description of these laws, see Women for Women-New Ways, http://www.wwhr.org.
22
The Republic of Korea ratified the Convention in 1984, entering reservations (without
explanation) to Article 9 and Article 16(1)(c), (d), (f), and (g). In 1991 it withdrew the
reservation to Article 16(1) (c), (d), and (f), leaving in place the reservations to Article 9 and
Article 16(1)(g), the right to choose a family name and a profession. In 1999, the reservation to
Article 9 was withdrawn.

The official records offer no information on the context for the withdrawal of these reservations.
The remaining reservation, pertaining to the choice of family name, has been a major issue for
Korean women. According to the State Party’s Sixth Periodic Report to CEDAW, a new law
relating to this issue was due to take effect on January 1, 2008.60 However, as the Committee
noted in its Concluding Comments, the State offered no timetable for withdrawing its remaining
reservation—and as of November 2009 the reservation remains. The CEDAW Committee’s
review of the Republic of Korea in 2007 noted “with concern the persistence of patriarchal
attitudes and deep-rooted stereotypes regarding the roles and responsibilities of women and men
in the family” that are reflected in women’s career opportunities and choices, limited
participation in public life, and continuing violence against them.61

The “family name” issue is problematic in other states, notably Japan, which has no reservations
to the Convention.

Some additional observations: Objecting states

Several States parties to the CEDAW Convention have regularly entered objections to
reservations. Because objections have limited impact on the ultimate determination of validity,62
these objections are illuminating but have more political than legal impact. While the objecting
States have not entered reservations, the CEDAW Committee has taken several of them rather
severely to task for their failures in Convention implementation.

Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom are the most regularly engaged States parties with respect to objections.
Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Estonia, France, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Romania
and Spain have entered at least one but fewer than five objections.

The reasons for states’ entry of objections are not clear from the record. The objecting states’
respective records on Convention implementation do not indicate a consistent relationship
between domestic policy and the tendency to enter objections to reservations. For example,
Germany received a quite stern review after its most recent dialogue with the Committee, at its
43d Session in January 2009.63

60
CEDAW, Consideration of State Party Reports, Sixth Periodic Report of the Republic of Korea, CEDAW/C/KOR/6, para.16.2 (5March2007),
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/262/87/PDF/N0726287.pdf?OpenElement
61
CEDAW, Consideration of State Party Reports: Republic of Korea, CEDAW/C/KOR/6, para.25 (10August2007),
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/459/83/PDF/N0745983.pdf?OpenElement.
62
See discussion above, Section III.C(4).
63
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding Comments: Germany, CEDAW/C/DEU/CO/6 (10 Feb 2009).

23
While the legal effect of objections remains contested, the somewhat checkered pattern of States’
objections may provide additional leverage for both the Committee and civil society advocates in
their promotion of implementation.

24
3. Lessons, Observations, and Recommendations
This overview of issues and experiences relating to CEDAW Convention reservations indicates
that the reservations issue can only be addressed effectively by dealing with the entire context, in
which legal, political, and cultural issues are interrelated. This context provides opportunities for
UNICEF to work with States parties, NGOs, and international actors to promote withdrawal of
the reservations. States that have entered reservations offer a level of engagement with the
CEDAW process that non-reserving States, many with equal or greater limitations on their
commitment to equality, do not.

The following recommendations are offered with the understanding that they are subject to
further discussion within UNICEF as to the agency’s mandate and capacity.

Reservations are tied to law reform in many ways, but law reform is not the only avenue for
dealing with reservations. Recommendations A, F, and G relate to and support law reform as
well as other activities.

3.1. Support qualitative and quantitative research to provide credible information on both
the quantitative and qualitative consequences of discrimination (substantive inequality)
that is preserved under the reserved provisions.
Accurate, compelling information is important to making the case that laws should be changed or
that circumstances have changed, so reservations may be withdrawn. UNICEF offices could

(1) choose locally grounded and well-qualified experts (scholars, activists);

(2) offer technical assistance or funding, or both, to government agencies to establish

good information-gathering practices.

(3) develop strategies to use these data to promote withdrawal of reservations during the
interim periods, when government and NGOs are not scrambling to produce reports.

3.2. Support national NGOs and coalitions for continuous, programmatic CEDAW
monitoring, with a view to engaging government officials in discussion of reservations.
The strength of the Convention and the effectiveness of advocates lie in engagement with State
officials during all those years between reviews.

3.3. Support NGOs and engage directly with States to promote submission of State party
reports, with special attention to late reports.
The CEDAW Committee cannot be engaged on the subject of reservations unless it has a report
before it for review. Some States parties are years behind in the submission of reports.
Sometimes it truly is a matter of capacity. Offer technical assistance to States to keep the
reporting process moving. Require NGO participation as part of the report preparation process.
25
3.4. Remind States parties that have changed their laws or announced withdrawal of
reservations to withdraw them immediately.
The “good offices” of UNICEF would allow for gentle reminders (or queries) to encourage
clearing the record and inspiring other States.

3.5. Support NGOs and coalitions to promote ratification and use of the Optional Protocol
where possible, focusing on issues that are the subject of reservations.
Framing the complaint is an excellent platform for analyzing reservations with a view to
challenging their necessity. This exercise would do a great service in clarifying the scope of
reservations.

3.6. Support engagement at a high intellectual level with the religious and customary
objections to CEDAW that result in reservations.
Reservations citing religious law may be withdrawn if the State party is convinced either that the
rights do not contravene it or that the state’s laws may be changed on the basis of interpretation
of religious texts. Many advocates have found that demonstrating their respect for custom or
religious law is an important factor in making their case. The Moroccan experience is a prime
example. This effort would include

(a) scholarly analysis and interpretation and

(b) engagement with religious and customary authorities and support of NGOs to
engage.

3.7. Support intra-regional and international coalitions and resource centers that focus on
sex discrimination issues that are the subject of reservations.
The MENA Nationality Campaign is a very visible example of the power of well-organized (and
well-financed) coalitions. The Collectif 95 Maghreb was an extremely important resource for
advocacy in Morocco. It and other regional and international groups also serve as crucial
resources for information and technical assistance to support local activity and advocacy at
regional and international levels. This may require rethinking the organization of funding.

26
27
Table 1: Country Reservation by CEDAW Article

Article Article Article Article Article

General Reservations Article 2 Article 5 Article 7 Article 9 Article 10
1 3 4 6 8
Reservation: apply on
condition that is does not
Reservation: 9(2)
Algeria "conflict with the provisions
withdrawn 2009
of the Algerian Family
Code"

Argentina
Women in
Australia combat
withdrawn 2000

Austria

Reservation to
Bahamas Reservation on 2(a)
9(2)

Reservation "to ensure its

Reservation to
Bahrain implementation within the
9(2)
bounds of Sharia"

Reservation: conflict with

Bangladesh sharia law

Belarus
Women in
Belgium combat
withdrawn
Brazil
Reservation to what
Brunei contradicts the Constitution Reservation to
Darussalam and the beliefs and 9(2)
principles of Islam

Bulgaria

Canada

China
Reserve right not to apply
Cook Islands provisions where they Reservation to
Reservation to 2(f) with
contradict policy for 5(a) with respect
(listed under recruitment and service in
respect to inheritance of
to inheritance of
New Zealand) customary chief titles
armed force and law chief titles
enforcement

Cuba
Reservation
Cyprus
Withdrawn

Czechoslovakia

Democratic
People's
Reservation: 2(f) Reservation: 9(2)
Republic of
Korea

Reservation: comply as long

Reservation 9(2)
Egypt as it does not run counter
withdrawn 2008
to Islamic sharia

El Salvador

Ethiopia

Reservation
Fiji
Withdrawn

Reservation Reservation
France
Withdrawn Withdrawn

Reservation
Germany Declaration only
Withdrawn

Hungary

28
 Article Reservations Objected to
Article 11 Article 13 Article 14 Article 15 Article 16 Article 29
12 by:

Reservation: 15(4) not to Denmark, Germany,

Reservation: should not
Algeria be interpreted in Reservation Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
contradict code
contradition to Fam. Code Sweden

Argentina Reservation

Reservation:
Australia maternity leave
with pay

Austria Reservation

Bahamas Withdrawn Reservation: 16( 1)(h) Reservation

Austria, Denmark, Finland,

France, Germany, Greece,
Reservation: incompatible
Bahrain Reservation: 15(4) Reservation Netherlands, Sweden, United
with Sharia
Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland

Reservation Reservation: 16(1)(c); Germany, Mexico, Netherlands,

Bangladesh
Withdrawn 16(1)(f) withdrawn Sweden

Belarus Reservation Withdrawn

Belgium Res 15(3) withdrawn

Brazil Reservation Withdrawn Reservation Withdrawn Reservation

Brunei
Reservation
Darussalam

Bulgaria Reservation Withdrawn

Reservation
Canada
Withdrawn

China Reservation

Cook Islands
(listed under
New Zealand)

Cuba Reservation

Cyprus

Reservation
Czechoslovakia withdrawn

Austria, Denmark, Finland,

France, Germany, Ireland,
Democratic
Netherlands, Norway,
People's
Reservation Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Republic of
United Kingdom of Great
Korea
Britain and Northern
Ireland

Germany, Mexico, Netherlands,

Egypt Reservation: sharia Reservation
Sweden

El Salvador Reservation

Ethiopia Reservation

Fiji

France Reservation Withdrawn Reservation: 16(1)(g); Reservation

Declaration Others withdrawn

Germany

Hungary Reservation Withdrawn

29
Table 1: Country Reservation by CEDAW Article

Article Article Article Article Article

General Reservations Article 1 Article 2 Article 5 Article 7 Article 9
3 4 6 8 10
Reservation,
Declaration: will
abide so long as they
do not interfere with
India
the personal affairs
of any community
without its initiative
and consent

Indonesia

Reservation: Reservation: 9(1)

Iraq
2(f) and (g) and (2)

Ireland Reservation
Withdrawn

Reservation 7(b):
appointing women
Israel
to serve as judges
in religious courts

Reservation
Jamaica
Withdrawn

Jordan Reservation: 9(2)

Reservation
Withdrawal: On 9
December 2005 to
Kuwait Reservation: 9(2)
article 7(a) made
upon accession to
the Convention

Lebanon Reservation: 9(2)

Reservation Withdrawal:
On 25 August 2004, Reservation:
modified its reservation, succession to
Lesotho
resulting in the withdrawal the throne and
of aspects pertaining in chieftainship
general to the Convention

Reservation:
General reservation Sharia
Libyan Arab
modified 1995 preempts
Jamahiriya w/respect to
inheritance

Reservation:
reserves right to Reservation
Liechtenstein
apply article 3 of Withdrawn
Constitution

Reservation
withdrawn 2008:
Luxembourg hereditary
transmission of the
crown

Reservation
Malawi
Withdrawn

General: subject to the

understanding that the Reservation to Reservation 9(2);
Malaysia provisions of the Conv. do Art 2(f) Reservation: 5(a) Reservation 7(b) reservation 9(1)
not conflict w/the provisions withdrawn withdrawn
of Sharia and Fed. Const'n

Reservation 7(a)
Maldives
withdrawn 2010

Malta

"approves" Conv. To extent

Mauritania "not contrary to" Sharia or
Const.

30
 Article Article Reservations Objected to
Article 11 Article 13 Article 15 Article 16 Article 29
12 14 by:

Reservation, Declaration: will abide so long as they

do not interfere with the personal affairs of any
India community without its initiative and consent, also Reservation Netherlands
that compulsory registration of marriages is not
practical

Indonesia Reservation

Germany, Israel, Mexico,

Iraq Reservation Reservation
Netherlands, Sweden

Reservation: 16 (1)(d) and (f): the objectives of

Reserved;
Ireland the Conv." do not necessitate the extension to
Reservation to withdrew 13(a) Withdrawn:
men of rights identical to those accorded to
11(1): withdrawn 1986; withdrew 15(3),(4)
women with regard to guardianship, adoption,
13 (b)(c)2004
and custody of OW children"

Reservation: citing religious community personal

Israel Declaration
law

Jamaica Reservation

Reservation:
Jordan 15(4) Reservation: 16(1)(c ) (d) (g) Sweden
withdrawn

Austria, Belgium, Denmark,

Kuwait Reservation: 16(1)(f) "conflicts with Sharia" Reservation Finland, Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Swede

Austria, Denmark, Netherlands,

Lebanon Reservation: 16(1)(c )(d) (f) (g) Reservation
Sweden

Denmark, Finland, Germany,

Lesotho
Mexico, Netherlands, Norway

Reservation: 16(c),(d) "implementation . . . Shall Denmark, Finland, Germany,

Libyan Arab
be without prejudice to any of the rts guaranteed Mexico, Netherlands, Norway,
Jamahiriya to women by Sharia" Sweden

Liechtenstein

Reservation: right to choose family name of

Luxembourg children withdrawn

Reservation
Malawi
Withdrawn

Reservation:
"interpretation"
Res. withdrawn 16(1)(b)(d)(e)(h); retains res. Denmark, Finland, France,
Malaysia limited to discrim.
16(1)(a)©(f)(g), 16(2) Germany, Netherlands, Norway
Between men and
women only

Austria, Canada, Denmark,

Reservation: right to "apply" Article "without
Maldives Finland, Germany, Netherlands,
prejudice to" Sharia
Norway, Portugal, Sweden

Reservation; 16(1)(c ) AND rejects "any

Malta Reservation: 11(1) Reservation Reservation
interpretation" to require legal abortion

Austria, Denmark, Finland,

Germany, Netherlands,
(no full reservation, but general compliance with
Mauritania sharia)
Norway, Portugal, Sweden,
United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland

31
Table 1: Country Reservation by CEDAW Article

General Article Article Article Article Article

Article 1 Article 2 Article 5 Article 7 Article 9
Reservations 3 4 6 8 10

Mauritius

Micronesia
(Federated Reservation 2(f) Reservation
States of)

(general succession Reservation:

Monaco Reservation
reservation) 7(b)

Mongolia

Morocco Reservation Reservation

Myanmar

Netherlands Declaration only

General reservation Reservation:2(f)

New Zealand concerning armed forces inheritance of Cook Reservation: inheritance of titles
and law enforcement Islands titles
withdrawn
Cook Islands
Reservation
and Niue withdrawn

Cook Islands Reservation

withdrawn (titles) Reservation withdrawn (titles)

Reservation 2(d) and

Niger Reservation: 5(a)
(f)

General reservation: Reservation:

Oman
Islam and lesiglation 9(2)

General Reservation:
Pakistan
Constitution is superior

Poland

Declaration: "irrespective of
Res 2(a) "hereditary
marital status" not to encourage
Qatar (ratif. transmission of Reservation
other than marriage; "patterns"
2009) authority" under 9(2)
Art 5 not to encourage women to
Constitution
abandon their role as mothers

Republic of Reservation
Korea Withdrawn

Romania

Russian
Federation

General, "norms of
Saudi Arabia
Islamic law"

Reservationciting
mulit-racial, multi-
Must respect the
Singapore religious society,
freedom of minorities
reserves to preserve
personal law

Declaration: male
Spain succession to the throne

Reservation
Switzerland
Withdrawn

32
 Article Article Article Reservations Objected to
Article 11 Article 15 Article 16 Article 29
12 13 14 by:
Reservation
Mauritius Reservation Withdrawn Reservation
Withdrawn

Micronesia Finland, Portugal, Sweden,

Reservation:
(Federated 11(1)(d), 11(2)(b)
Reservation Reservation United Kingdom of Great
States of) Britain and Northern Ireland

Reservation 16(1)(g)(e); male head of

Monaco household for social security
Reservation

Reservation
Mongolia Withdrawn

Morocco Reservation: 15(4) Reservation Reservation Netherlands

Myanmar Reservation

Netherlands

New Zealand

Cook Islands Reservation

and Niue Withdrawn

Cook Islands Mexico, Sweden

Denmark, Finland, Norway,

Niger Reservation: 15(4) Reservation: 16(1)( c) (g) Reservation
Sweden

Reservation:"and in particular, 16(1)*e) and

Oman Reservation: 15(4)
(f)"
Reservation

Austria, Mexico, Finland,

Pakistan Reservation Germany, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal

Reservation
Poland
Withdrawn

Reservation: 15(1) Reservation: 16(1)(a) and( c) Islamic law;

Qatar (ratif. Islamic law; 15(4) family 16(1)(f) Islamic law and family law;
2009) law and "established declaration: all legislation "conducive to the
practice" promotion of social solidarity."

Republic of
Reservation: 16( 1)(g)
Korea
Reservation
Romania
Withdrawn

Russian Reservation
Federation Withdrawn

Austria, Denmark, Finland,

France, Germany, Ireland,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Saudi Arabia Reservation
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland

Reservation: in view
of article 4(2),may
Singapore Denmark, Finland, Netherlands,
prohibit employment Reservation: same as to Art 2 Reservation
Norway, Sweden
of women for
protective reasons
Spain

Switzerland Reservation: 15(2) Reservation: 16(g),(h) Switzerland

33
Table 1: Country Reservation by CEDAW Article

General
Article 1 Article 2 Article 3 Article 4 Article 5 Article 6 Article 7 Article 8 Article 9 Article 10
Reservations

Syrian Arab
Reservation Reservation
Republic

Reservation Reservation
Thailand Reservation Withdrawn
Withdrawn Withdrawn

Trinidad and
Tobago

shall not conflict with

Tunisia Reservation 9(2)
Constitution

Declaration: conflict with

Turkish Law on
Turkey
Nationality; withdrawn as
to 9(1) Jan 2008

Ukraine

United Arab
Reservation2(f) Reservation
Emirates

United Kingdom
: inter alia,
of Great Britain Reservation Reservation
excluding Reservation withdrawn
and Northern Withdrawn Withdrawn
royal titles
Ireland

British Virgin
Islands, the
Falkland Islands
(Malvinas), the Isle NOTE: China entered
of Man, South declarations upon Reservation Reservation Reservation
Georgia and the reversion of HK 1997
Sandwich Islands,
and the Turks and
Caicos Islands

Venezuela
(Bolvarian
Republic of)

Viet Nam

Yemen

34
 Article 11 Article 12 Article 13 Article 14 Article 15 Article 16 Article 29 Reservations Objected to by:

Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,

Reservation: Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands,
Syrian Arab
Republic
movement, residence, Reservation 16(1)(c)(d)(f)(g) Reservation Norway, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Spain,
and domicile Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland

Reservation Reservation
Thailand Reservation Reservation Germany, Mexico, Netherlands, Sweden
Withdrawn Withdrawn

Trinidad and
Reservation
Tobago

Declaration:15(4) shall
Tunisia not conflict with Reservation: 16(c) (d)(f)(g)(h) Reservation Germany, Netherlands, Sweden
Personal Status Code

Reservation
Turkey Reservation Withdrawn Reservation
Withdrawn

Reservation
Ukraine
Withdrawn

Austria, Denmark, Finland, France,

Germany, Greece, Latvia, Netherlands,
United Arab Reservation:"in conflict with the
Reservation: 15(2) Reservation Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Emirates principles of the Shariah"
United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland

United Kingdom
of Great Britain Reservation Reservation Understanding:discrim.
Reservation 16(1)(f) Argentina (to declarations)
and Northern withdrawn Withdrawn provisions severable
Ireland

British Virgin
Islands, the
Falkland Islands
(Malvinas), the
Isle of Man, South Reservation Reservation Reservation Reservation
Georgia and the
Sandwich Islands,
and the Turks and
Caicos Islands

Venezuela
(Bolvarian Reservation
Republic of)

Viet Nam Reservation

Yemen Reservation

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