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Argumentation Theory

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Argumentation Theory

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C.s. Prithi
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Argumentation theory

Argumentation theory, or argumentation, is the interdisciplinary study of how


conclusions can be reached through logical reasoning; that is, claims based, soundly or
not, on premises. It includes the arts and sciences of civil debate, dialogue,
conversation, and persuasion. It studies rules of inference, logic, and procedural rules
in both artificial and real world settings.

[1]Argumentation includes deliberation and negotiation which are concerned


with collaborative decision-making procedures.[2] It also encompasses eristic dialog,
the branch of social debate in which victory over an opponent is the primary goal.[3]
This art and science is often the means by which people protect their beliefs or self-
interests—or choose to change them—in rational dialogue, in common parlance, and
during the process of arguing.

Argumentation is used in law, for example in trials, in preparing an argument


to be presented to a court, and in testing the validity of certain kinds of evidence
Argumentation is one of four rhetorical modes (also known as modes of discourse),
along with exposition, description, and narration.

Key components of argumentation

Understanding and identifying arguments, either explicit or implied, and the


goals of the participants in the different types of dialogue.
Identifying the premises from which conclusions are derived
In a debate, fulfilment of the burden of proof creates a burden of rejoinder. One must
try to identify faulty reasoning in the opponent's argument, to attack the
reasons/premises of the argument, to provide counterexamples if possible, to identify
any fallacies, and to show why a valid conclusion cannot be derived from the reasons
provided for his/her argument.
Internal structure of arguments
Typically an argument has an internal structure, comprising the following

a set of assumptions or premises


a method of reasoning or deduction and
a conclusion or point.
An argument has one or more premises and one conclusion.

Often classical logic is used as the method of reasoning so that the conclusion follows
logically from the assumptions or support. One challenge is that if the set of
assumptions is inconsistent then anything can follow logically from inconsistency.
Therefore, it is common to insist that the set of assumptions be consistent. It is also
good practice to require the set of assumptions to be the minimal set, with respect to
set inclusion, necessary to infer the consequent. Such arguments are called MINCON
arguments, short for minimal consistent. Such argumentation has been applied to the
fields of law and medicine. A second school of argumentation investigates abstract
arguments, where 'argument' is considered a primitive term, so no internal structure of
arguments is taken on account.

In its most common form, argumentation involves an individual and an interlocutor or


opponent engaged in dialogue, each contending differing positions and trying to
persuade each other. Other types of dialogue in addition to persuasion are eristic,
information seeking, inquiry, negotiation, deliberation, and the dialectical method
(Douglas Walton). The dialectical method was made famous by Plato and his use of
Socrates critically questioning various characters and historical figures.

Argumentation and the grounds of knowledge


Argumentation theory had its origins in foundationalism, a theory of knowledge
(epistemology) in the field of philosophy. It sought to find the grounds for claims in
the forms (logic) and materials (factual laws) of a universal system of knowledge. But
argument scholars gradually rejected Aristotle's systematic philosophy and the
idealism in Plato and Kant. They questioned and ultimately discarded the idea that
argument premises take their soundness from formal philosophical systems. The field
thus broadened.[4]

Karl R. Wallace's seminal essay, "The Substance of Rhetoric: Good Reasons" in the
Quarterly Journal of Speech (1963) 44, led many scholars to study "marketplace
argumentation" – the ordinary arguments of ordinary people. The seminal essay on
marketplace argumentation is Ray Lynn Anderson and C. David Mortensen's "Logic
and Marketplace Argumentation" Quarterly Journal of Speech 53 (1967): 143–150.[5]
[6] This line of thinking led to a natural alliance with late developments in the
sociology of knowledge.[7] Some scholars drew connections with recent
developments in philosophy, namely the pragmatism of John Dewey and Richard
Rorty. Rorty has called this shift in emphasis "the linguistic turn".

In this new hybrid approach argumentation is used with or without empirical evidence
to establish convincing conclusions about issues which are moral, scientific,
epistemic, or of a nature in which science alone cannot answer. Out of pragmatism
and many intellectual developments in the humanities and social sciences, "non-
philosophical" argumentation theories grew which located the formal and material
grounds of arguments in particular intellectual fields. These theories include informal
logic, social epistemology, ethnomethodology, speech acts, the sociology of
knowledge, the sociology of science, and social psychology. These new theories are
not non-logical or anti-logical. They find logical coherence in most communities of
discourse. These theories are thus often labeled "sociological" in that they focus on the
social grounds of knowledge.

Approaches to argumentation in communication and informal logic


In general, the label "argumentation" is used by communication scholars such as (to
name only a few) Wayne E. Brockriede, Douglas Ehninger, Joseph W. Wenzel,
Richard Rieke, Gordon Mitchell, Carol Winkler, Eric Gander, Dennis S. Gouran,
Daniel J. O'Keefe, Mark Aakhus, Bruce Gronbeck, James Klumpp, G. Thomas
Goodnight, Robin Rowland, Dale Hample, C. Scott Jacobs, Sally Jackson, David
Zarefsky, and Charles Arthur Willard, while the term "informal logic" is preferred by
philosophers, stemming from University of Windsor philosophers Ralph H. Johnson
and J. Anthony Blair. Harald Wohlrapp developed a criterion for validness (Geltung,
Gültigkeit) as freedom of objections.

Trudy Govier, Douglas Walton, Michael Gilbert, Harvey Seigal, Michael Scriven, and
John Woods (to name only a few) are other prominent authors in this tradition. Over
the past thirty years, however, scholars from several disciplines have co-mingled at
international conferences such as that hosted by the University of Amsterdam (the
Netherlands) and the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA).
Other international conferences are the biannual conference held at Alta, Utah
sponsored by the (US) National Communication Association and American Forensics
Association and conferences sponsored by the Ontario Society for the Study of
Argumentation (OSSA).

Some scholars (such as Ralph H. Johnson) construe the term "argument" narrowly, as
exclusively written discourse or even discourse in which all premises are explicit.
Others (such as Michael Gilbert) construe the term "argument" broadly, to include
spoken and even nonverbal discourse, for instance the degree to which a war
memorial or propaganda poster can be said to argue or "make arguments". The
philosopher Stephen Toulmin has said that an argument is a claim on our attention and
belief, a view that would seem to authorize treating, say, propaganda posters as
arguments. The dispute between broad and narrow theorists is of long standing and is
unlikely to be settled. The views of the majority of argumentation theorists and
analysts fall somewhere between these two extremes.

Kinds of argumentation
Conversational argumentation
Main articles: Conversation analysis and Discourse analysis
The study of naturally occurring conversation arose from the field of sociolinguistics.
It is usually called conversation analysis. Inspired by ethnomethodology, it was
developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s principally by the sociologist Harvey
Sacks and, among others, his close associates Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson.
Sacks died early in his career, but his work was championed by others in his field, and
CA has now become an established force in sociology, anthropology, linguistics,
speech-communication and psychology.[8] It is particularly influential in interactional
sociolinguistics, discourse analysis and discursive psychology, as well as being a
coherent discipline in its own right. Recently CA techniques of sequential analysis
have been employed by phoneticians to explore the fine phonetic details of speech.

Empirical studies and theoretical formulations by Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs, and
several generations of their students, have described argumentation as a form of
managing conversational disagreement within communication contexts and systems
that naturally prefer agreement.

Mathematical argumentation
Main article: Philosophy of mathematics
The basis of mathematical truth has been the subject of long debate. Frege in
particular sought to demonstrate (see Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic,
1884, and Begriffsschrift, 1879) that arithmetical truths can be derived from purely
logical axioms and therefore are, in the end, logical truths.[9] The project was
developed by Russell and Whitehead in their Principia Mathematica. If an argument
can be cast in the form of sentences in Symbolic Logic, then it can be tested by the
application of accepted proof procedures. This has been carried out for Arithmetic
using Peano axioms. Be that as it may, an argument in Mathematics, as in any other
discipline, can be considered valid only if it can be shown that it cannot have true
premises and a false conclusion.

Scientific argumentation
Main articles: Philosophy of science and Rhetoric of science
Perhaps the most radical statement of the social grounds of scientific knowledge
appears in Alan G.Gross's The Rhetoric of Science (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1990). Gross holds that science is rhetorical "without remainder",[10] meaning
that scientific knowledge itself cannot be seen as an idealized ground of knowledge.
Scientific knowledge is produced rhetorically, meaning that it has special epistemic
authority only insofar as its communal methods of verification are trustworthy. This
thinking represents an almost complete rejection of the foundationalism on which
argumentation was first based.

Interpretive argumentation
Main article: Interpretive discussion
Interpretive argumentation is a dialogical process in which participants explore and/or
resolve interpretations often of a text of any medium containing significant ambiguity
in meaning.

Interpretive argumentation is pertinent to the humanities, hermeneutics, literary


theory, linguistics, semantics, pragmatics, semiotics, analytic philosophy and
aesthetics. Topics in conceptual interpretation include aesthetic, judicial, logical and
religious interpretation. Topics in scientific interpretation include scientific modeling.

Legal argumentation
Main articles: Oral argument and Closing argument
Legal arguments are spoken presentations to a judge or appellate court by a lawyer, or
parties when representing themselves of the legal reasons why they should prevail.
Oral argument at the appellate level accompanies written briefs, which also advance
the argument of each party in the legal dispute. A closing argument, or summation, is
the concluding statement of each party's counsel reiterating the important arguments
for the trier of fact, often the jury, in a court case. A closing argument occurs after the
presentation of evidence.

Political argumentation
Main article: Political argument
Political arguments are used by academics, media pundits, candidates for political
office and government officials. Political arguments are also used by citizens in
ordinary interactions to comment about and understand political events.[11] The
rationality of the public is a major question in this line of research. Political scientist
Samuel L. Popkin coined the expression "low information voters" to describe most
voters who know very little about politics or the world in general.

In practice, a "low information voter" may not be aware of legislation that their
representative has sponsored in Congress. A low-information voter may base their
ballot box decision on a media sound-bite, or a flier received in the mail. It is possible
for a media sound-bite or campaign flier to present a political position for the
incumbent candidate that completely contradicts the legislative action taken in the
Capitol on behalf of the constituents. It may only take a small percentage of the
overall voting group who base their decision on the inaccurate information, a voter
block of 10 to 12%, to swing an overall election result. When this happens, the
constituency at large may have been duped or fooled. Nevertheless, the election result
is legal and confirmed. Savvy Political consultants will take advantage of low-
information voters and sway their votes with disinformation because it can be easier
and sufficiently effective. Fact checkers have come about in recent years to help
counter the effects of such campaign tactics.

Psychological aspects
Psychology has long studied the non-logical aspects of argumentation. For example,
studies have shown that simple repetition of an idea is often a more effective method
of argumentation than appeals to reason. Propaganda often utilizes repetition.[12]
Nazi rhetoric has been studied extensively as, inter alia, a repetition campaign.

Empirical studies of communicator credibility and attractiveness, sometimes labeled


charisma, have also been tied closely to empirically-occurring arguments. Such
studies bring argumentation within the ambit of persuasion theory and practice.
Some psychologists such as William J. McGuire believe that the syllogism is the basic
unit of human reasoning. They have produced a large body of empirical work around
McGuire's famous title "A Syllogistic Analysis of Cognitive Relationships". A central
line of this way of thinking is that logic is contaminated by psychological variables
such as "wishful thinking", in which subjects confound the likelihood of predictions
with the desirability of the predictions. People hear what they want to hear and see
what they expect to see. If planners want something to happen they see it as likely to
happen. If they hope something will not happen, they see it as unlikely to happen.
Thus smokers think that they personally will avoid cancer, promiscuous people
practice unsafe sex, and teenagers drive recklessly.

Theories
Argument fields
Stephen Toulmin and Charles Arthur Willard have championed the idea of argument
fields, the former drawing upon Ludwig Wittgenstein's notion of language games,
(Sprachspiel) the latter drawing from communication and argumentation theory,
sociology, political science, and social epistemology. For Toulmin, the term "field"
designates discourses within which arguments and factual claims are grounded.[13]
For Willard, the term "field" is interchangeable with "community", "audience", or
"readership".[14] Along similar lines, G. Thomas Goodnight has studied "spheres" of
argument and sparked a large literature created by younger scholars responding to or
using his ideas.[15] The general tenor of these field theories is that the premises of
arguments take their meaning from social communities.[16]

Field studies might focus on social movements, issue-centered publics (for instance,
pro-life versus pro-choice in the abortion dispute), small activist groups, corporate
public relations campaigns and issue management, scientific communities and
disputes, political campaigns, and intellectual traditions.[17] In the manner of a
sociologist, ethnographer, anthropologist, participant-observer, and journalist, the field
theorist gathers and reports on real-world human discourses, gathering case studies
that might eventually be combined to produce high-order explanations of
argumentation processes. This is not a quest for some master language or master
theory covering all specifics of human activity. Field theorists are agnostic about the
possibility of a single grand theory and skeptical about the usefulness of such a theory.
Theirs is a more modest quest for "mid-range" theories that might permit
generalizations about families of discourses.

Stephen E. Toulmin's contributions


By far, the most influential theorist has been Stephen Toulmin, the Cambridge
educated philosopher and educator,[18] best known for his Toulmin model of
argument. What follows below is a sketch of his ideas.

An alternative to absolutism and relativism


Toulmin has argued that absolutism (represented by theoretical or analytic arguments)
has limited practical value. Absolutism is derived from Plato's idealized formal logic,
which advocates universal truth; thus absolutists believe that moral issues can be
resolved by adhering to a standard set of moral principles, regardless of context. By
contrast, Toulmin asserts that many of these so-called standard principles are
irrelevant to real situations encountered by human beings in daily life.

To describe his vision of daily life, Toulmin introduced the concept of argument
fields; in The Uses of Argument (1958), Toulmin states that some aspects of
arguments vary from field to field, and are hence called "field-dependent", while other
aspects of argument are the same throughout all fields, and are hence called "field-
invariant". The flaw of absolutism, Toulmin believes, lies in its unawareness of the
field-dependent aspect of argument; absolutism assumes that all aspects of argument
are field invariant.

Toulmin's theories resolve to avoid the defects of absolutism without resorting to


relativism: relativism, Toulmin asserted, provides no basis for distinguishing between
a moral or immoral argument. In Human Understanding (1972), Toulmin suggests that
anthropologists have been tempted to side with relativists because they have noticed
the influence of cultural variations on rational arguments; in other words, the
anthropologist or relativist overemphasizes the importance of the "field-dependent"
aspect of arguments, and becomes unaware of the "field-invariant" elements. In an
attempt to provide solutions to the problems of absolutism and relativism, Toulmin
attempts throughout his work to develop standards that are neither absolutist nor
relativist for assessing the worth of ideas.

Toulmin believes that a good argument can succeed in providing good justification to
a claim, which will stand up to criticism and earn a favourable verdict.

Toulmin Model of Argument


In The Uses of Argument (1958), Toulmin introduced what became known as the
Toulmin Model of Argument, which broke argument into six interrelated components:

Claim: Conclusions whose merit must be established. For example, if a person tries to
convince a listener that he is a British citizen, the claim would be "I am a British
citizen." (1)
Data: The facts we appeal to as a foundation for the claim. For example, the person
introduced in 1 can support his claim with the supporting data "I was born in
Bermuda." (2)
Warrant: The statement authorizing our movement from the data to the claim. In order
to move from the data established in 2, "I was born in Bermuda," to the claim in 1, "I
am a British citizen," the person must supply a warrant to bridge the gap between 1 &
2 with the statement "A man born in Bermuda will legally be a British Citizen." (3)
Backing: Credentials designed to certify the statement expressed in the warrant;
backing must be introduced when the warrant itself is not convincing enough to the
readers or the listeners. For example, if the listener does not deem the warrant in 3 as
credible, the speaker will supply the legal provisions as backing statement to show
that it is true that "A man born in Bermuda will legally be a British Citizen."
Rebuttal: Statements recognizing the restrictions to which the claim may legitimately
be applied. The rebuttal is exemplified as follows, "A man born in Bermuda will
legally be a British citizen, unless he has betrayed Britain and has become a spy of
another country."
Qualifier: Words or phrases expressing the speaker's degree of force or certainty
concerning the claim. Such words or phrases include "possible," "probably,"
"impossible," "certainly," "presumably," "as far as the evidence goes," or
"necessarily." The claim "I am definitely a British citizen" has a greater degree of
force than the claim "I am a British citizen, presumably."
The first three elements "claim", "data", and "warrant" are considered as the essential
components of practical arguments, while the second triad "qualifier", "backing", and
"rebuttal" may not be needed in some arguments.

When first proposed, this layout of argumentation is based on legal arguments and
intended to be used to analyze the rationality of arguments typically found in the
courtroom; in fact, Toulmin did not realize that this layout would be applicable to the
field of rhetoric and communication until his works were introduced to rhetoricians by
Wayne Brockriede and Douglas Ehninger. Their "Decision by Debate" (1963)
streamlined Toulmin's terminology and broadly introduced his model to the field of
debate.[19] Only after he published Introduction to Reasoning (1979) were the
rhetorical applications of this layout mentioned in his works.

The evolution of knowledge


Toulmin's Human Understanding (1972) asserts that conceptual change is
evolutionary. This book attacks Thomas Kuhn's explanation of conceptual change in
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn held that conceptual change is a
revolutionary (as opposed to an evolutionary) process in which mutually exclusive
paradigms compete to replace one another. Toulmin criticizes the relativist elements
in Kuhn's thesis, as he points out that the mutually exclusive paradigms provide no
ground for comparison; in other words, Kuhn's thesis has made the relativists' error of
overemphasizing the "field variant" while ignoring the "field invariant", or
commonality shared by all argumentation or scientific paradigms.
Toulmin proposes an evolutionary model of conceptual change comparable to
Darwin's model of biological evolution. On this reasoning, conceptual change
involves innovation and selection. Innovation accounts for the appearance of
conceptual variations, while selection accounts for the survival and perpetuation of the
soundest conceptions. Innovation occurs when the professionals of a particular
discipline come to view things differently from their predecessors; selection subjects
the innovative concepts to a process of debate and inquiry in what Toulmin considers
as a "forum of competitions". The soundest concepts will survive the forum of
competition as replacements or revisions of the traditional conceptions.

From the absolutists' point of view, concepts are either valid or invalid regardless of
contexts; from a relativists' perspective, one concept is neither better nor worse than a
rival concept from a different cultural context. From Toulmin's perspective, the
evaluation depends on a process of comparison, which determines whether or not one
concept will provide improvement to our explanatory power more so than its rival
concepts.

Rejection of certainty
In Cosmopolis (1990), Toulmin traces the quest for certainty back to Descartes and
Hobbes, and lauds Dewey, Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Rorty for abandoning that
tradition.

Pragma-dialectics
Main article: Pragma-dialectics
Scholars at the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands have pioneered a rigorous
modern version of dialectic under the name pragma-dialectics. The intuitive idea is to
formulate clearcut rules that, if followed, will yield rational discussion and sound
conclusions. Frans H. van Eemeren, the late Rob Grootendorst, and many of their
students have produced a large body of work expounding this idea.
The dialectical conception of reasonableness is given by ten rules for critical
discussion, all being instrumental for achieving a resolution of the difference of
opinion (from Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Snoeck Henkemans, 2002, p. 182-183).
The theory postulates this as an ideal model, and not something one expects to find as
an empirical fact. The model can however serve as an important heuristic and critical
tool for testing how reality approximates this ideal and point to where discourse goes
wrong, that is, when the rules are violated. Any such violation will constitute a fallacy.
Albeit not primarily focused on fallacies, pragma-dialectics provides a systematic
approach to deal with them in a coherent way.

Walton's logical argumentation method


Doug Walton developed a distinctive philosophical theory of logical argumentation
built around a set of practical methods to help a user identify, analyze and evaluate
arguments in everyday conversational discourse and in more structured areas such as
debate, law and scientific fields.[20] There are four main components: argumentation
schemes,[21] dialogue structures, argument mapping tools, and formal argumentation
systems. The method uses the notion of commitment in dialogue as the fundamental
tool for the analysis and evaluation of argumentation rather than the notion of belief.
[22] Commitments are statements that the agent has expressed or formulated, and has
pledged to carry out, or has publicly asserted. According to the commitment model,
agents interact with each other in a dialogue in which each takes its turn to contribute
speech acts. The dialogue framework uses critical questioning as a way of testing
plausible explanations and finding weak points in an argument that raise doubt
concerning the acceptability of the argument.

Walton's logical argumentation model takes a different view of proof and justification
from that taken in the dominant epistemology in analytical philosophy, which is based
on a justified true belief framework.[23] On the logical argumentation approach,
knowledge is seen as form of belief commitment firmly fixed by an argumentation
procedure that tests the evidence on both sides, and use standards of proof to
determine whether a proposition qualifies as knowledge. On this evidence-based
approach, scientific knowledge must be seen as defeasible.

Artificial intelligence
See also: Argument mapping and Argumentation framework
Efforts have been made within the field of artificial intelligence to perform and
analyze the act of argumentation with computers. Argumentation has been used to
provide a proof-theoretic semantics for non-monotonic logic, starting with the
influential work of Dung (1995). Computational argumentation systems have found
particular application in domains where formal logic and classical decision theory are
unable to capture the richness of reasoning, domains such as law and medicine. In
Elements of Argumentation, Philippe Besnard and Anthony Hunter show how
classical logic-based techniques can be used to capture key elements of practical
argumentation.[24][25]

Within computer science, the ArgMAS workshop series (Argumentation in Multi-


Agent Systems), the CMNA workshop series,[26] and now the COMMA Conference,
[27] are regular annual events attracting participants from every continent. The journal
Argument & Computation[28] is dedicated to exploring the intersection between
argumentation and computer science. ArgMining is a workshop series dedicated
specifically to the related argument mining task.[29]

See also
Psychology portal
A fortiori argument
Argument
Argumentation ethics
Criticism
Defeasible reasoning
Discourse ethics
Essentially contested concept
Forensics
Legal theory
Logic and dialectic
Logic of argumentation
Negotiation theory
Pars destruens/pars construens
Public sphere
Rationality
Rhetoric
Rogerian argument
Social engineering (political science)
Social psychology
Sophistry
Source criticism
Straight and Crooked Thinking
References
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Argumentation" (PDF). Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of
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Jory, Constanza Ihnen (May 2016). "Negotiation and deliberation: grasping the
difference". Argumentation. 30 (2): 145–165 [146]. doi:10.1007/s10503-014-9343-1.
van Eemeren, Frans H.; Garssen, Bart; Krabbe, Erik C. W.; Snoeck Henkemans, A.
Francisca; Verheij, Bart; Wagemans, Jean H. M. (2014). Handbook of argumentation
theory. New York: Springer Verlag. pp. 65–66. doi:10.1007/978-90-481-9473-5.
ISBN 9789048194728. OCLC 871004444. At the start of Topics VIII.5, Aristotle
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Bruce Gronbeck. "From Argument to Argumentation: Fifteen Years of Identity
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See Joseph W. Wenzel "Perspectives on Argument." Jack Rhodes and Sara Newell,
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David Zarefsky. "Product, Process, or Point of View? Jack Rhodes and Sara Newell,
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See Ray E. McKerrow. "Argument Communities: A Quest for Distinctions."
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Boolos, George (1999). "Chapter 9: Gottlob Frege and the Foundations of
Arithmetic". Logic, logic, and logic (2nd print. ed.). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
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978-0674768734.
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0394718743.
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ISBN 978-0521092302.
Charles Arthur Willard. "Some Questions About Toulmin's View of Argument
Fields." Jack Rhodes and Sara Newell, eds. Proceedings of the Summer Conference
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Second Summer Conference on Argumentation.
G. T. Goodnight, "The Personal, Technical, and Public Spheres of Argument."
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Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes, eds. Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the
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Toulmin's 1958 work is essential in the field of argumentation
"The most lasting legacy of the work is its break with formal, deductive logic and its
introduction of Stephen Toulmin's model of argument to undergraduate student
debaters, which, since then, has become a mainstay of what many have called the
Renaissance of argumentation studies. Without the work presented in Decision by
Debate, contemporary interdisciplinary views of argumentation that now dominate
many disciplines might have never have taken place or at least have been severely
delayed," Google Books review
Walton, Douglas (2013). Methods of Argumentation. Cambridge: Cambridge
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New York: Cambridge University Press.
Walton, Douglas; Krabbe, E. C. W. (1995). Commitment in Dialogue: Basic
Concepts of Interpersonal Reasoning. Albany: SUNY Press.
Walton, Douglas; Zhang, Nanning (2 October 2013). "The Epistemology of Scientific
Evidence". Artificial Intelligence and Law. Social Science Research Network. 21 (2):
1. SSRN 2335090. In place of the traditional epistemological view of knowledge as
justified true belief we argue that artificial intelligence and law needs an evidence
-based epistemology
P. Besnard & A. Hunter, "Elements of Argumentation." MIT Press, 2008. See also:
"Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2012-06-04. Retrieved 2012-02-05.
Lundström, Jenny Eriksson (11 September 2009). "Book Reviews: Elements of
Argumentation". Studia Logica. 93 (1): 97–103. doi:10.1007/s11225-009-9204-3.
Computational Models of Natural Argument
Computational Models of Argument
Journal of Argument & Computation Archived 2012-02-21 at the Wayback Machine
"5th Workshop on Argument Mining".
Further reading
J. Robert Cox and Charles Arthur Willard, eds. Advances in Argumentation Theory
and Research 1982.
Dung, P. M. "On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in
nonmonotonic reasoning, logic programming and n-person games." Artificial
Intelligence, 77: 321-357 (1995).
Bondarenko, A., Dung, P. M., Kowalski, R., and Toni, F., "An abstract,
argumentation-theoretic approach to default reasoning", Artificial Intelligence 93(1-2)
63-101 (1997).
Dung, P. M., Kowalski, R., and Toni, F. "Dialectic proof procedures for assumption-
based, admissible argumentation." Artificial Intelligence. 170(2), 114-159 (2006).
Frans van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst, Sally Jackson, and Scott Jacobs,
Reconstructing Argumentative Discourse 1993.
Frans Van Eemeren & Rob Grootendorst. A systematic theory of argumentation. The
pragma-dialected approach. 2004.
Eemeren, F.H. van, Grootendorst, R. & Snoeck Henkemans, F. et al. (1996).
Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory. A Handbook of Historical Backgrounds and
Contemporary Developments. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Richard H. Gaskins Burdens of Proof in Modern Discourse. Yale University Press.
1993.
Michael A. Gilbert Coalescent Argumentation 1997.
Trudy Govier, Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation. 1987.
Dale Hample. (1979). "Predicting belief and belief change using a cognitive theory of
argument and evidence." Communication Monographs. 46, 142-146.
Dale Hample. (1978). "Are attitudes arguable?" Journal of Value Inquiry. 12, 311-
312.
Dale Hample. (1978). "Predicting immediate belief change and adherence to argument
claims." Communication Monographs, 45, 219-228.
Dale Hample & Judy Hample. (1978). "Evidence credibility." Debate Issues. 12, 4-5.
Dale Hample. (1977). "Testing a model of value argument and evidence."
Communication Monographs. 14, 106-120.
Dale Hample. (1977). "The Toulmin model and the syllogism." Journal of the
American Forensic Association. 14, 1-9.
Trudy Govier, A Practical Study of Argument2nd ed. 1988.
Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs, "Structure of Conversational Argument: Pragmatic
Bases for the Enthymeme." The Quarterly Journal of Speech. LXVI, 251-265.
Ralph H. Johnson. Manifest Rationality: A Pragmatic Theory of Argument. Lawrence
Erlbaum, 2000.
Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair. "Logical Self-Defense", IDEA, 2006. First
published, McGraw Hill Ryerson, Toronto, ON, 1997, 1983, 1993. Reprinted,
McGraw Hill, New York, NY, 1994.
Ralph Johnson. and Blair, J. Anthony (1987), "The Current State of Informal Logic",
Informal Logic, 9(2–3), 147–151.
Ralph H. Johnson. H. (1996). The rise of informal logic. Newport News, VA: Vale
Press
Ralph H. Johnson. (1999). The relation between formal and informal logic.
Argumentation, 13(3) 265-74.
Ralph H. Johnson. & Blair, J. A. (1977). Logical self-defense. Toronto: McGraw-Hill
Ryerson. US Edition. (2006). New York: Idebate Press.
Ralph H. Johnson. & Blair, J. Anthony. (1987). The current state of informal logic.
Informal Logic 9, 147-51.
Ralph H. Johnson. & Blair, J. Anthony. (1996). Informal logic and critical thinking. In
F. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, & F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), Fundamentals of
Argumentation Theory. (pp. 383–86). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates
Ralph H. Johnson, Ralph. H. & Blair, J. Anthony. (2000). "Informal logic: An
overview." Informal Logic. 20(2): 93-99.
Ralph H. Johnson, Ralph. H. & Blair, J. Anthony. (2002). Informal logic and the
reconfiguration of logic. In D. Gabbay, R. H. Johnson, H.-J. Ohlbach and J. Woods
(Eds.). Handbook of the logic of argument and inference: The turn towards the
practical. (pp. 339–396). Elsivier: North Holland.
Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, Notre Dame, 1970.
Stephen Toulmin. The uses of argument. 1959.
Stephen Toulmin. The Place of Reason in Ethics. 1964.
Stephen Toulmin. Human Understanding: The Collective Use and Evolution of
Concepts. 1972.
Stephen Toulmin. Cosmopolis. 1993.
Douglas N. Walton, The Place of Emotion in Argument. 1992.
Joseph W. Wenzel 1990 Three perspectives on argumentation. In R Trapp and J
Scheutz, (Eds.), Perspectives on argumentation: Essays in honour of Wayne
Brockreide. 9-26 Waveland Press: Prospect Heights, IL
John Woods. (1980). What is informal logic? In J.A. Blair & R. H. Johnson (Eds.),
Informal Logic: The First International Symposium .(pp. 57–68). Point Reyes, CA:
Edgepress.
John Woods. (2000). How Philosophical is Informal Logic? Informal Logic. 20(2):
139-167. 2000
Charles Arthur Willard Liberalism and the Problem of Knowledge: A New Rhetoric
for Modern Democracy. University of Chicago Press. 1996.
Charles Arthur Willard, A Theory of Argumentation. University of Alabama Press.
1989.
Charles Arthur Willard, Argumentation and the Social Grounds of
KnowledgeUniversity of Alabama Press. 1982.
Harald Wohlrapp. Der Begriff des Arguments. Über die Beziehungen zwischen
Wissen, Forschen, Glaube, Subjektivität und Vernunft. Würzburg: Königshausen u.
Neumann, 2008 ISBN 978-3-8260-3820-4
Flagship journals
Argumentation
Informal Logic
Argumentation and Advocacy (formerly Journal of the American Forensic
Association)
Social Epistemology
Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology
Journal of Argument and Computation
External links

This article's use of external links may not follow Wikipedia's policies or guidelines.
Please improve this article by removing excessive or inappropriate external links, and
converting useful links where appropriate into footnote references. (May 2017) (Learn
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"Argumentation theory", Universiteit Utrecht (in Dutch)
"Argumentation Theory", Universiteit Twente (in Dutch)
L'Argumentation: Introduction à l'étude du discours (in French) Free on-line book by
Mariana Tutescu previously published in 1998 as ISBN 973-575-248-4
Argumentum.ch, E-course of Argumentation Theory for the Human and Social
Sciences
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