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Test Delay and Shift Change

The document summarizes the events leading up to the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. It describes how a planned test of the reactor's emergency core cooling system was delayed multiple times throughout the day and evening shifts on April 25, 1986. When the test was finally conducted in the early morning hours of April 26, unexpected issues arose that caused reactor power to drop dangerously low. Operators then manually removed control rods in an attempt to increase power and stabilize the reactor, but this led to an unstable core state and contributed to the disaster.

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Crisanto Coquia Yco
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72 views

Test Delay and Shift Change

The document summarizes the events leading up to the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. It describes how a planned test of the reactor's emergency core cooling system was delayed multiple times throughout the day and evening shifts on April 25, 1986. When the test was finally conducted in the early morning hours of April 26, unexpected issues arose that caused reactor power to drop dangerously low. Operators then manually removed control rods in an attempt to increase power and stabilize the reactor, but this led to an unstable core state and contributed to the disaster.

Uploaded by

Crisanto Coquia Yco
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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test delay and shift change

Process flow diagram of the reactor

The test was to be conducted during the day-shift of 25 April 1986 as part of a scheduled reactor
shut down. The day shift crew had been instructed in advance on the reactor operating conditions to
run the test and in addition, a special team of electrical engineers was present to conduct the one-
minute test of the new voltage regulating system once the correct conditions had been reached. [28] As
planned, a gradual reduction in the output of the power unit began at 01:06 on 25 April, and the
power level had reached 50% of its nominal 3,200 MW thermal level by the beginning of the day
shift.[4]:53

Comparative Generation II reactor vessels size comparison, a design classification of commercial reactors built


until the end of the 1990s.

The day shift performed many unrelated maintenance tasks, and was scheduled to perform the test
at 14:15[29]:3 and preparations for the test were carried out, including the disabling of the emergency
core cooling system.[4]:53 Meanwhile, another regional power station unexpectedly went offline and at
14:00[4]:53 the Kiev electrical grid controller requested that the further reduction of Chernobyl's output
be postponed, as power was needed to satisfy the peak evening demand. The Chernobyl plant
director[citation needed] agreed, and postponed the test.
Soon, the day shift was replaced by the evening shift.[29]:3 Despite the delay, the emergency core
cooling system was left disabled – it was disconnected by a manual isolating slide valve [4]:51 which in
practice meant that two or three people spent the whole shift manually turning sailboat-helm sized
valve wheels.[29]:4 The system would have no influence on the events that unfolded next. Allowing the
reactor to run for 11 hours outside of the test without emergency protection was indicative of a
general lack of safety culture.[4]:10,18
At 23:04, the Kiev grid controller allowed the reactor shutdown to resume. This delay had some
serious consequences: the day shift had long since departed, the evening shift was also preparing to
leave, and the night shift would not take over until midnight, well into the job. According to plan, the
test should have been finished during the day shift, and the night shift would only have had to
maintain decay heat cooling systems in an otherwise shut-down plant. [26]:36–38
The night shift had very limited time to prepare for and carry out the experiment. Anatoly Dyatlov,
deputy chief-engineer of the entire Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, was present to supervise and
direct the experiment; as he out-ranked all other supervisory personnel present, his orders and
instructions overrode any objections of other senior personnel present during the test and its
preparation. Serving under Dyatlov, Aleksandr Akimov was chief of the night shift, and Leonid
Toptunov was the operator responsible for the reactor's operational regimen, including the
movement of the control rods. Toptunov was a young engineer who had worked independently as a
senior engineer for approximately three months.[26]:36–38

Unexpected drop of the reactor power


The test plan called for a gradual decrease in power output from reactor No. 4 to a thermal level of
700–1000 MW[30] and an output of 720 MW was reached at 00:05 on 26 April. [4]:53 Due to the reactor's
production of a fission byproduct, xenon-135, which is a reaction-inhibiting neutron absorber, core
power continued to decrease in the absence of further operator action—a process known as reactor
poisoning. In steady-state operation, this is avoided because xenon-135 is "burned off" as quickly as
it is created from decaying iodine-135 by the absorption of neutrons from the ongoing chain reaction,
becoming highly stable xenon-136. With the reactor power reduced, previously produced high
quantities of iodine-135 were decaying into the neutron-absorbing xenon-135 faster than the now
reduced neutron flux could burn it off.[31]
When the reactor power dropped to approximately 500 MW, the reactor control had been switched
to a different mode in order to manually maintain the power level. [4]:11[32] Around that moment, the
power suddenly fell into an unintended near-shutdown state, with a power output of 30 MW thermal
or less. The exact circumstances that caused the power fall are unknown because Akimov died in
hospital on 10 May and Toptunov on 14 May; early reports attributed it to Toptunov's mistake, but it
has also been suggested it was due to an equipment failure. [4]:11
The reactor was now producing 5% of the minimum initial power level prescribed for the test. [4]:73 This
low reactivity inhibited the burn-off of xenon-135[4]:6 within the reactor core and hindered the rise of
reactor power. Control-room personnel had to raise power by disconnecting most of the reactor
control rods from the automatic control rod regulation system and manually extracted the majority of
rods to their upper limits in order to promote reactivity and counteract the effect of the poisoning.
[33]
 Several minutes elapsed between their extraction and the point at which the power output began
to increase and subsequently stabilized at 160–200 MW (thermal).
The operation of the reactor at the low power level (and high poisoning level) was accompanied by
unstable core temperatures and coolant flow, and possibly by instability of neutron flux, which
triggered alarms. The control room received repeated emergency signals regarding the levels in the
steam/water separator drums, and large excursions or variations in the flow rate of feed water, as
well as from relief valves opened to relieve excess steam into a turbine condenser, and from the
neutron power controller. Between 00:35 and 00:45, emergency alarm signals concerning thermal-
hydraulic parameters were ignored, apparently to preserve the reactor power level. [34][dubious  –  discuss]

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