Law Cases Termination
Law Cases Termination
Facts: Joselano Guevarra filed a Complaint for Disbarment before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel
M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated
violation of the lawyer's oath."
The complainant first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-
fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent Atty. Eala, a lawyer and a
sportscaster, to him as her friend who was married to Mary Ann Tantoco with whom he
had three children.
After his marriage to Irene, complainant noticed that Irene had been receiving from
respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I
miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall." He also noticed that Irene habitually went home
very late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go
home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at
her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work. More so,
complainant has seen Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the second
occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned theconjugal house.
Moreover, Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card
bearing the words "I Love You" on its face, which card when unfolded contained a
handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene. Also, it was
revealed that Irene gave birth to a girl in 2002 and Irene named respondent in the
Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father.
In his answer, Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous
relationship with Irene, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low profile
and known only to the immediate members of their respective families. He also said that
his special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalouscircumstances nor
tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment.
Issue: Whether the respondent be disbarred from the practice of Law.
Held: YES. The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a
married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out
discreetly.
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations
between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for
such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.
Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual
relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by
the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice
law. Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a
lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law."
FACTS: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was
dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.
The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the
ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of
PAL.
In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him to an extended vacation
until November 1985. He was allowed to return to work once he lost all the excess weight. But
the problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February
1989.
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained
overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain
grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. Again, he was
directed to report every two weeks for weight checks, which he failed to comply with.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight
check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates, which
he did not report to.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for
violation of company standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists that he is being
discriminated as those similarly situated were not treated the same.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his
ideal weight, “and considering the utmost leniency” extended to him “which spanned a period
covering a total of almost five (5) years,” his services were considered terminated “effective
immediately.”
LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature
of the job of petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be complied with under pain of
dismissal since his weight did not hamper the performance of his duties.
NLRC affirmed.
CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed because
he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. It is obvious that the issue of
discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal
for being overweight.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner’s claims that obesity is a
disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible
for him to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed,
during the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that “[t]he issue
is could I bring my weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it
now.”
Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the company
physician, per the advice of PAL.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight
attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his
dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As
the CA correctly puts it, “[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable
to the employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element
runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action
or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary
although it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).”
NOTES:
The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification defense.
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or
national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual
qualification for performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because
it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid “provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably
necessary for satisfactory job performance.”
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its
passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly
the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be
viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline upon its employees.
The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight
safety.
Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice
or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it
reflective of his moral character.