CASE 34: Respect for Dignity and Privacy

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 179736               June 26, 2013

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners, 

vs.
ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

"The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for one's personality
as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and non-interference demands respect." 1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the July 10, 2007
Decision3 and the September 11, 2007 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No.
01473.

Factual Antecedents

On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Mandaue City a Complaint5 for Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case MAN-5223 and raffled
to Branch 28, against respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.

Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B) covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu; 6 that
respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and
1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners; 7 that respondents constructed an auto-repair shop
building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed a case against petitioners
for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-
5125;8 that in that case, Aldo claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid permit
and that the said construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent to petitioners’
property;9 that the court, in that case, denied Aldo’s application for preliminary injunction for failure to
substantiate its allegations;10 that, in order to get evidence to support the said case, respondents on
June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video
surveillance cameras facing petitioners’ property; 11 that respondents, through their employees and
without the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners’ on-going construction; 12 and that
the acts of respondents violate petitioners’ right to privacy. 13 Thus, petitioners prayed that respondents
be ordered to remove the video surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal
surveillance.14

In their Answer with Counterclaim,15 respondents claimed that they did not install the video surveillance
cameras,16nor did they order their employees to take pictures of petitioners’ construction. 17 They also
clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders. 18

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order 19 granting the application for a TRO. The dispositive
portion of the said Order reads:

WHEREFORE, the application for a Temporary Restraining Order or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is
granted. Upon the filing and approval of a bond by petitioners, which the Court sets at ₱50,000.00, let a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction issue against the respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan
Choachuy. They are hereby directed to immediately remove the revolving camera that they installed at
the left side of their building overlooking the side of petitioners’ lot and to transfer and operate it
elsewhere at the back where petitioners’ property can no longer be viewed within a distance of about 2-
3 meters from the left corner of Aldo Servitec, facing the road.
IT IS SO ORDERED.20

Respondents moved for a reconsideration21 but the RTC denied the same in its Order 22 dated February 6,
2006.23Thus:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Issue a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction in consonance with the Order dated 18 October 2005.

IT IS SO ORDERED.24

Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari 25 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with application for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision 26 granting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled that the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion because petitioners failed to
show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive writ. 27 The CA explained that the right to privacy of
residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated since the property subject of the
controversy is not used as a residence.28 The CA alsosaid that since respondents are not the owners of
the building, they could not have installed video surveillance cameras. 29 They are mere stockholders of
Aldo, which has a separate juridical personality. 30 Thus, they are not the proper parties.31 The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING the
petition filed in this case. The assailed orders dated October 18, 2005 and February 6, 2006 issued by the
respondent judge are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.32

Issues

Hence, this recourse by petitioners arguing that:

I.

THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE THE ORDERS OF
THE RTC DATED 18 OCTOBER 2005 AND 6 FEBRUARY 2006 HOLDING THAT THEY WERE ISSUED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

II.

THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER SPOUSES HING ARE
NOT ENTITLED TO THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS NO
VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHT TO PRIVACY DESPITE THE FACTUAL FINDINGS
OF THE RTC, WHICH RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY FAILED TO REFUTE, THAT THE ILLEGALLY INSTALLED
SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS OF RESPONDENTS CHOACH[U]Y WOULD CAPTURE THE PRIVATE ACTIVITIES OF
PETITIONER SPOUSES HING, THEIR CHILDREN AND EMPLOYEES.

III.

THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT SINCE THE OWNER OF THE
BUILDING IS ALDO DEVELOPMENT AND RESOURCES, INC. THEN TO SUE RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY
CONSTITUTES A PURPORTEDLY UNWARRANTED PIERCING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL.

IV.

THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT IGNORED THE SERIOUS FORMAL DEFICIENCIES
OF BOTH THE PETITION AND THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED 15 MARCH 2006 OF
RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY AND GAVE X X X THEM DUE COURSE AND CONSIDERATION. 33
Essentially, the issues boil down to (1) whether there is a violation of petitioners’ right to privacy, and (2)
whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction because
respondents’ installation of a stationary camera directly facing petitioners’ property and a revolving
camera covering a significant portion of the same property constitutes a violation of petitioners’ right to
privacy.34 Petitioners cite Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, which enjoins persons from prying into the
private lives of others.35 Although the said provision pertains to the privacy of another’s residence,
petitioners opine that it includes business offices, citing Professor Arturo M. Tolentino. 36 Thus, even
assuming arguendo that petitioners’ property is used for business, it is still covered by the said
provision.37

As to whether respondents are the proper parties to implead in this case, petitioners claim that
respondents and Aldo are one and the same, and that respondents only want to hide behind Aldo’s
corporate fiction.38 They point out that if respondents are not the real owners of the building, where the
video surveillance cameras were installed, then they had no business consenting to the ocular inspection
conducted by the court.39

Respondents’ Arguments

Respondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA that petitioners cannot invoke their right to
privacy since the property involved is not used as a residence. 40 Respondents maintain that they had
nothing to do with the installation of the video surveillance cameras as these were installed by Aldo, the
registered owner of the building, 41as additional security for its building.42 Hence, they were wrongfully
impleaded in this case.43

Our Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.

The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution 44 and in our laws. It is defined as "the right to be free
from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a
way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities." 45 It is the right of an individual "to be
free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in
which the public is not necessarily concerned." 46 Simply put, the right to privacy is "the right to be let
alone."47

The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects them against the State’s abuse of
power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their houses. No one,
not even the State, except "in case of overriding social need and then only under the stringent
procedural safeguards," can disturb them in the privacy of their homes. 48

The right to privacy under Article 26(1)

of the Civil Code covers business offices

where the public are excluded

therefrom and only certain individuals

are allowed to enter.

Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individual’s right to privacy and provides a
legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals. It states:
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense,
shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;

xxxx

This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied or
even restricted by others. It includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the
residence of another without the consent of the latter." 49 The phrase "prying into the privacy of
another’s residence," however, does not mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy. As
elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:

Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of another’s residence." This does not mean,
however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also "similar acts." A
business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such
individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. x x x 50 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his
house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them
access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence," therefore, covers places, locations,
or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by
society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the
application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.

The "reasonable expectation of

privacy" test is used to determine
whether there is a violation of the right
to privacy.

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy and whether the expectation has been violated. 51 In Ople v. Torres,52 we enunciated that "the
reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his
conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that
society recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or
extend an individual’s "reasonable expectation of privacy." 53 Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s
expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual
circumstances surrounding the case.54

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection
and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places where there
is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would
be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of another’s
residence or business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under
Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction, ruled that:

After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary restraining order. The
operation by respondents of a revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their building, violated the
right of privacy of petitioners, who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The camera does not only focus
on respondents’ property or the roof of the factory at the back (Aldo Development and Resources, Inc.)
but it actually spans through a good portion of the land of petitioners.

Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why petitioner Hing was so unyielding in
asserting that the revolving camera was set up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going construction in his
property. The monitor showed only a portion of the roof of the factory of Aldo. If the purpose of
respondents in setting up a camera at the back is to secure the building and factory premises, then the
camera should revolve only towards their properties at the back. Respondents’ camera cannot be made
to extend the view to petitioners’ lot. To allow the respondents to do that over the objection of the
petitioners would violate the right of petitioners as property owners. "The owner of a thing cannot make
use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." 55

The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in their property,
whether they use it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of video surveillance
cameras directly facing petitioners’ property or covering a significant portion thereof, without their
consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the issuance of a preliminary
injunction was justified. We need not belabor that the issuance of a preliminary injunction is
discretionary on the part of the court taking cognizance of the case and should not be interfered with,
unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the court. 56 Here, there is no indication of any
grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred in finding that petitioners are not entitled to an injunctive
writ.

This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

A real party defendant is one who has a

correlative legal obligation to redress a
wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of
the defendant's act or omission which
had violated the legal right of the
former.

Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. — A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by
law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest.

A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the
plaintiff by reason of the defendant’s act or omission which had violated the legal right of the former." 57

In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that since they do not own the
building, they could not have installed the video surveillance cameras. 58 Such reasoning, however, is
erroneous. The fact that respondents are not the registered owners of the building does not
automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of the video surveillance cameras.

In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video surveillance cameras in
order to fish for evidence, which could be used against petitioners in another case. 59 During the hearing
of the application for Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that when respondents installed the
video surveillance cameras, he immediately broached his concerns but they did not seem to care, 60 and
thus, he reported the matter to the barangay for mediation, and eventually, filed a Complaint against
respondents before the RTC.61 He also admitted that as early as 1998 there has already been a dispute
between his family and the Choachuy family concerning the boundaries of their respective
properties.62 With these factual circumstances in mind, we believe that respondents are the proper
parties to be impleaded.

Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its stockholders, records
show that it is a family-owned corporation managed by the Choachuy family. 63

Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim that they are not owners of
the building, allowed the court to enter the compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection. The
counsel for respondents even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the building and answered all her
questions regarding the set-up and installation of the video surveillance cameras. 64 And when
respondents moved for reconsideration of the Order dated October 18, 2005 of the RTC, one of the
arguments they raised is that Aldo would suffer damages if the video surveillance cameras are removed
and transferred.65 Noticeably, in these instances, the personalities of respondents and Aldo seem to
merge.

All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents are merely using the
corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield to protect themselves from this suit. In view of the foregoing, we
find that respondents are the proper parties to this suit.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 10, 2007 and the Resolution
dated September 11, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 18,2005 and February 6, 200[6] of Branch 28 of the Regional
Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-5223 are hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 Morfe v. Mutuc, 130 Phil. 415,434 (1968).

2
 Rollo, pp. 10-33.

3
 CA rollo, pp. 111-116; penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and concurred in by
Associate Justices Antonio L. Villamor and Stephen C. Cruz.

4
 Id. at 128-129.

5
 Records, pp. 1-8.

6
 Id. at 2.

7
 Id. at 3.

8
 Id.
9
 Id.

10
 Id.

11
 Id.

12
 Id. at 4.

13
 Id. at 5.

14
 Id. at 8.

15
 Id. at 23-26.

16
 Id. at 24.

17
 Id. at 25.

18
 Id. at 24.

19
 Id. at 51-56; penned by Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap.

20
 Id. at 55-56.

21
 Id. at 75-79.

22
 Id. at 98-99.

23
 Erroneously dated as February 6, 2005.

24
 Records, p. 99.

25
 CA rollo, pp. 2-12.

26
 Id. at 111-116.

27
 Id. at 113-114.

28
 Id. at 114.

29
 Id.

30
 Id. at 115.

31
 Id.

32
 Id. at 116. Emphases in the original.

33
 Rollo, pp. 20-21.

34
 Id. at 173-176.

35
 Id. at 172.

36
 Id. at 174-175.

37
 Id.

38
 Id. at 27.

39
 Id.
40
 Id. at 153-154.

41
 Id. at 152.

42
 Id. at 154.

43
 Id. at 152.

44
 Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

45
 Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 & 161658,
November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 431.

46
 Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines,
1990 Edition, Volume I, p. 108.

47
 Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948, 970 (1998).

48
 Sony Music Entertainment (Phils.), Inc. v. Judge Español, 493 Phil. 507, 516 (2005), citing
Villanueva v. Querubin, 150-C Phil. 519, 525 (1972).

49
 Pineda, Ernesto L., Torts and Damages (Annotated), 2004 Edition, p. 279.

50
 Supra note 46 at 110.

51
 In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon,
535 Phil. 687, 715 (2006).

52
 Supra note 47 at 980.

53
 Id. at 981.

54
 Id. at 980.

55
 Records, p. 55.

56
 Overseas Workers Welfare Administration v. Chavez, G.R. No. 169802, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA
451, 471.

57
 Reyes v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 162956, April 10, 2008, 551 SCRA 86, 92.

58
 CA rollo, pp. 114-115.

59
 Records, p. 3

60
 Id. at 54.

61
 Id. at 52.

62
 Id. at 53-55.

63
 Id. at 80-91.

64
 Id. at 58-71.
 65
 Id. at 7

CASE 35: Respect for Dignity and Privacy

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285               September 11, 2013

UNICAPITAL, INC., UNICAPITAL REALTY, INC., and JAIME J. MARTINEZ, Petitioners, 

vs.
RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG
CITY, BRANCH 168, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 192073

RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., Petitioner, 

vs.
HON. MARISSA MACARAIG-GUILLEN, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 60 and UNICAPITAL, INC., Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari 1 assailing separate issuances of the
Court of Appeals (CA) as follows:

(a) The petitions in G.R. Nos. 175277 and 175285 filed by Unicapital, Inc., (Unicapital), Unicapital
Realty, Inc. (URI), and Unicapital Director and Treasurer Jaime J. Martirez (Martirez)assail the
CA’s Joint Decision2 dated October 20, 2005 and Resolution3 dated October 25, 2006 in CA-G.R.
SP Nos. 64019and 64451 which affirmed the Resolution 4 dated September 14,1999 and
Order5 dated February 15, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 68 (RTC-
Pasig City) in SCA No. 1759, upholding the denial of their motion to dismiss; and

(b) The petition in G.R. No. 192073 filed by Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. (Consing, Jr.) assails the CA’s
Decision6dated September 30, 2009 and Resolution 7 dated April 28, 2010 inCA-G.R. SP No.
101355 which affirmed the Orders dated July16, 2007 8 and September 4, 20079 of the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 60 (RTC-Makati City) in Civil Case No. 99-1418,upholding the denial of his
motion for consolidation.

The Facts

In 1997, Consing, Jr., an investment banker, and his mother, Cecilia Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), obtained an
₱18,000,000.00 loan from Unicapital,₱12,000,000.00 of which was acquired on July 24, 1997 and the
remaining₱6,000,000.00 on August 1, 1997. The said loan was secured by Promissory Notes 10 and a Real
Estate Mortgage11 over a 42,443 square meter-parcel of land located at Imus, Cavite, registered in the
name of Dela Cruz as per Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-687599 (subject property). 12 Prior to
these transactions, Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI), a real estate company, was already interested to develop the
subject property into a residential subdivision. 13 In this regard, PBI entered into a joint venture
agreement with Unicapital, through its real estate development arm, URI. In view of the foregoing, the
loan and mortgage over the subject property was later on modified into an Option to Buy Real
Property14 and, after further negotiations, Dela Cruz decided to sell the same to Unicapital and PBI. For
this purpose, Dela Cruz appointed Consing, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact. 15

Eventually, Unicapital, through URI, purchased one-half of the subject property for a consideration of
₱21,221,500.00 (against which Dela Cruz’s outstanding loan obligations were first offset), while PBI
bought the remaining half for the price of ₱21,047,000.00. 16 In this relation, Dela Cruz caused TCT No. T-
687599 to be divided into three separate titles as follows: (a) TCT No. T-851861 for URI; 17 (b) TCT No. T-
851862 for PBI;18 and (c)TCT No. T-51863 which was designated as a road lot. 19 However, even before
URI and PBI were able to have the titles transferred to their names, Juanito Tan Teng (Teng) and Po
Willie Yu (Yu) informed Unicapital that they are the lawful owners of the subject property as evidenced
by TCT No.T-114708;20 that they did not sell the subject property; and that Dela Cruz’s title, i.e., TCT No.
T-687599, thereto was a mere forgery.21 Prompted by Teng and Yu’s assertions, PBI conducted further
investigations on the subject property which later revealed that Dela Cruz's title was actually of dubious
origin. Based on this finding, PBI and Unicapital sent separate demand letters 22 to Dela Cruz and Consing,
Jr., seeking the return of the purchase price they had paid for the subject property.

From the above-stated incidents stemmed the present controversies as detailed hereunder.

The Proceedings Antecedent to G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285

On May 3, 1999, Consing, Jr. filed a complaint, denominated as a Complex Action for Declaratory
Relief23 and later amended to Complex Action for Injunctive Relief 24 (Consing, Jr.’s complaint) before the
RTC-Pasig City against Unicapital, URI, PBI, Martirez, PBI General Manager Mariano Martinez (Martinez),
Dela Cruz and Does 1-20, docketed as SCA No. 1759. In his complaint, Consing, Jr. claimed that the
incessant demands/recovery efforts made upon him by Unicapital and PBI to return to them the
purchase price they had paid for the subject property constituted harassment and oppression which
severely affected his personal and professional life. 25 He also averred that he was coerced to commit a
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 2226 as Unicapital and PBI, over threats of filing acase against him, kept
on forcing him to issue a post-dated check in the amount sought to be recovered, notwithstanding their
knowledge that he had no funds for the same. 27 He further alleged that Unicapital and URI required him
to sign blank deeds of sale and transfers without cancelling the old one sin violation of the laws on land
registration and real estate development. 28 Likewise, Consing, Jr. added that Unicapital and PBI’s
representatives were" speaking of him in a manner that was inappropriate and libelous," 29 and that
some John Does "deliberately engaged in a fraudulent scheme to compromise Consing, Jr.’s honor,
integrity and fortune x x x consisting of falsifying or causing to be falsified, or attempting to present as
falsified certain transfers of Land Titles and Deeds for profit," 30 classifying the foregoing as ultra vires
acts which should warrant sanctions under the corporation law, Revised Securities Act and related
laws.31 Accordingly, Consing, Jr. prayed that: (a) he be declared as a mere agent of Dela Cruz, and as
such, devoid of any obligation to Unicapital, URI, and PBI for the transactions entered into concerning
the subject property; (b) Unicapital, URI, and PBI be enjoined from harassing or coercing him, and from
speaking about him in a derogatory fashion; and (c) Unicapital, URI, and PBI pay him actual and
consequential damages in the amount of ₱2,000,000.00, moral damages of at least ₱1,000,000.00,
exemplary damages of ₱1,000,000.00, all per month, reckoned from May 1, 1999 and until the
controversy is resolved, and attorney's fees and costs of suit. 32

For their part, Unicapital, URI, and Martirez (Unicapital, et al.) filed separate Motions to
Dismiss33 Consing, Jr.’s complaint (Unicapital, et al.’s motion to dismiss) on the ground of failure to state
a cause of action, considering that: (a) no document was attached against which Consing, Jr. supposedly
derived his right and against which his rights may be as certained; (b) the demands to pay against
Consing, Jr. and for him to tender post-dated checks to cover the amount due were well within the
rights of Unicapital as an unpaid creditor, as Consing, Jr. had already admitted his dealings with them; (c)
the utterances purportedly constituting libel were not set out in the complaint; and (d) the laws
supposedly violated were not properly identified. Moreover, Unicapital, et al. posited that the RTC-
PasigCity did not acquire jurisdiction over the case given that Consing, Jr. failed to pay the proper
amount of docket fees. In the same vein, they maintained that the RTC-Pasig City had no jurisdiction
over their supposed violations of the Corporation Code and Revised Securities Act, which, discounting its
merits, should have been supposedly lodged with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Finally, they
pointed out that Consing, Jr.’s complaint suffers from a defective verification and, thus, dismissible. 34

Similar to Unicapital et al.’s course of action, PBI and its General Manager, Martinez (Unicapital and PBI,
et al.), sought the dismissal of Consing, Jr.’s complaint on the ground that it does not state a cause of
action. They also denied having singled out Consing, Jr. because their collection efforts were directed at
both Consing, Jr. and Dela Cruz, which should be deemed as valid and, therefore, should not be
restrained.35

On September 14, 1999, the RTC-Pasig City issued a Resolution 36 denying the above mentioned motions
to dismiss, holding that Consing, Jr.’s complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for tort and damages
pursuant to Article 19 of the Civil Code. It ruled that where there is abusive behavior, a complainant, like
Consing, Jr., has the right to seek refuge from the courts. It also noted that the elements of libel in a
criminal case are not the same as those for a civil action founded on the provisions of the Civil Code, and
therefore, necessitates a different treatment. It equally refused to dismiss the action on the ground of
non-payment of docket fees, despite Consing, Jr.’s escalated claims for damages therein, as jurisdiction
was already vested in it upon the filing of the original complaint. Moreover, it resolved to apply the
liberal construction rule as regards the subject complaint’s verification and certification, despite its
improper wording, considering further that such defect was not raised at the first opportunity.
Consequently, it ordered Unicapital and PBI, et al. to file their Answer and, in addition, to submit" any
Comment or Reaction within five (5) days from receipt hereof on the allegations of Consing, Jr. in his
rejoinder of September 9, 1999regarding the supposed filing of an identical case in Makati City," 37 i.e.,
Civil Case No. 99-1418. Unperturbed, Unicapital and PBI, et al. moved for reconsideration therefrom
which was, however, denied by the RTC-Pasig City in an Order 38 dated February 15, 2001 for lack of
merit. Aggrieved, they elevated the denial of their motions to dismiss before the CA via a petition for
certiorari and prohibition,39 docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 64019 and 64451.

On October 20, 2005, the CA rendered a Joint Decision 40 holding that no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the RTC-Pasig City in refusing to dismiss Consing, Jr.'s complaint.1âwphi1 At the outset, it
ruled that while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-
payment will not automatically cause the dismissal of the case. In this regard, it considered that should
there be any deficiency in the payment of such fees, the same shall constitute a lien on the judgment
award.41 It also refused to dismiss the complaint for lack of proper verification upon a finding that the
copy of the amended complaint submitted to the RTC-Pasig City was properly notarized. 42 Moreover, it
upheld the order of the RTC-Pasig City for Unicapital and PBI, et al. to submit their comment due to the
alleged existence of a similar case filed before the RTC-Makati City. 43

Anent the substantive issues of the case, the CA concurred with the RTC-Pasig City that Consing Jr.'s
complaint states a cause of action. It found that Unicapital and PBI, et al.’s purportedly abusive manner
in enforcing their claims against Consing, Jr. was properly constitutive of a cause of action as the same, if
sufficiently proven, would have subjected him to "defamation of his name in business circles, the threats
and coercion against him to reimburse the purchase price, fraud and falsification and breach of fiduciary
obligation." It also found that the fact that Consing Jr.'s complaint contains "nebulous" allegations will
not warrant its dismissal as any vagueness therein can be clarified through a motion for a bill of
particulars."44 Furthermore, it noted that Consing, Jr. does not seek to recover his claims against any
particular provision of the corporation code or the securities act but against the actions of Unicapital
and PBI, et al.; hence, Consing, Jr.’s complaint was principally one for damages over which the RTC has
jurisdiction, and, in turn, there lies no misjoinder of causes of action. 45

Dissatisfied, only Unicapital, et al. sought reconsideration therefrom but the same was denied by the CA
in a Resolution46 dated October 25,2006. Hence, the present petitions for review on certiorari in G.R.
Nos.175277 and 175285.

The Proceedings Antecedent to G.R. No. 192073

On the other hand, on August 4, 1999, Unicapital filed a complaint 47 for sum of money with damages
against Consing, Jr. and Dela Cruz before the RTC-Makati City, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-1418,
seeking to recover (a) the amount of ₱42,195,397.16, representing the value of their indebtedness
based on the Promissory Notes (subject promissory notes) plus interests; (b) ₱5,000,000.00 as
exemplary damages; (c) attorney's fees; and (d) costs of suit. 48

PBI also filed a complaint for damages and attachment against Consing, Jr. and Dela Cruz before the RTC
of Manila, Branch 12, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95381, also predicated on the same set of facts as
above narrated.49 In its complaint, PBI prayed that it be allowed to recover the following: (a)
₱13,369,641.79, representing the total amount of installment payments made as actual damages plus
interests; (b) ₱200,000.00 as exemplary damages; (c) ₱200,000.00 as moral damages; (d) attorney's fees;
and (e) costs of suit.50 Civil Case No. 99-95381 was subsequently consolidated with SCA No. 1759
pending before the RTC-Pasig City.51

For his part, Consing, Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 99-1418 which was, however, denied by
the RTC-Makati City in an Order52 dated November 16, 1999. Thereafter, he filed a Motion for
Consolidation53 (motion for consolidation) of Civil Case No. 99-1418 with his own initiated SCA No. 1759
pending before the RTC-Pasig City.

In an Order54 dated July 16, 2007, the RTC-Makati City dismissed Consing, Jr.’s motion for consolidation
and, in so doing, ruled that the cases sought to be consolidated had no identity of rights or causes of
action and the reliefs sought for by Consing, Jr. from the RTC-Pasig City will not bar Unicapital from
pursuing its money claims against him. Moreover, the RTC-Makati City noted that Consing, Jr. filed his
motion only as an after thought as it was made after the mediation proceedings between him and
Unicapital failed. Consing, Jr.'s motion for reconsideration therefrom was denied in an Order 55 dated
September 4, 2007. Hence, he filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
101355, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC-Makati City in refusing to consolidate
Civil Case No. 99-1418 with SCA No. 1759 in Pasig City.

On September 30, 2009, the CA rendered a Decision 56 sustaining the Orders dated July 16, 2007 and
September 4, 2007 of the RTC-Makati City which denied Consing, Jr.’s motion for consolidation. It held
that consolidation is a matter of sound discretion on the part of the trial court which could be gleaned
from the use of the word "may" in Section 1, Rule38 of the Rules of Court. Considering that preliminary
steps (such as mediation) have already been undertaken by the parties in Civil Case No.99-1418 pending
before the RTC-Makati City, its consolidation with SCA No. 1759 pending before the RTC-Pasig City
"would merely result in complications in the work of the latter court or squander the resources or
remedies already utilized in the Makati case." 57 Moreover, it noted that the records of the consolidated
Pasig and Manila cases, i.e., SCA No. 1759 and Civil Case No. 99-95381, respectively, had already been
elevated to the Court, that joint proceedings have been conducted in those cases and that the pre-trial
therein had been terminated as early as October 23, 2007.Therefore, due to these reasons, the
consolidation prayed for would be impracticable and would only cause a procedural faux pas.
Undaunted, Consing, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration therefrom but was denied by the CA in a
Resolution58 dated April 28, 2010. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No.
192073.

The Proceedings Before the Court

After the filing of the foregoing cases, the parties were required to file their respective comments and
replies. Further, considering that G.R. No.192073 (Makati case) involves the same parties and set of facts
with those in G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285 (Pasig case), these cases were ordered consolidated per the
Court's Resolution59 dated November 17, 2010. On March 9, 2011, the Court resolved to give due course
to the instant petitions and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 60

The Issues Before the Court

The essential issues in these cases are as follows: (a) in G.R. Nos.175277 and 175285, whether or not the
CA erred in upholding the RTC-Pasig City’s denial of Unicapital, et al.’s motion to dismiss; and (b) in G.R.
No. 192073, whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC-Makati City’s denial of Consing, Jr.’s
motion for consolidation.

The Court’s Ruling

A. Propriety of the denial of

Unicapital, et al.’s motion to
dismiss and ancillary issues.

A cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. 61 It is well-
settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. 62 In this
relation, a complaint is said to sufficiently assert a cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its
face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for. 63 Thus, if the allegations furnish
adequate basis by which the complaint can be maintained, then the same should not be dismissed,
regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants. 64 As edified in the case of Pioneer
Concrete Philippines, Inc. v. Todaro, 65 citing Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Limited. v.
Catalan66 (HSBC):

The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if
true would justify the relief demanded. Stated otherwise, may the court render a valid judgment upon
the facts alleged therein? The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations.
If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be
dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the defendants. 67 (Emphasis supplied)

Stated otherwise, the resolution on this matter should stem from an analysis on whether or not the
complaint is able to convey a cause of action; and not that the complainant has no cause of action. Lest
it be misunderstood, failure to state a cause of action is properly a ground for a motion to dismiss under
Section 1(g), Rule 1668 of the Rules of Court(Rules), while the latter is not a ground for dismissal under
the same rule.

In this case, the Court finds that Consing, Jr.’s complaint in SCA No.1759 properly states a cause of action
since the allegations there insufficiently bear out a case for damages under Articles 19 and 26 of the Civil
Code.

Records disclose that Consing, Jr.’s complaint contains allegations which aim to demonstrate the abusive
manner in which Unicapital and PBI, et al. enforced their demands against him. Among others, the
complaint states that Consing, Jr. "has constantly been harassed and bothered by Unicapital and PBI, et
al.; x x x besieged by phone calls from them; x x x has had constant meetings with them variously, and
on a continuing basis, such that he is unable to attend to his work as an investment banker." 69 In the
same pleading, he also alleged that Unicapital and PBI, et al.’s act of "demanding a postdated check
knowing fully well that he does not have the necessary funds to cover the same, nor is he expecting to
have them is equivalent to asking him to commit a crime under unlawful coercive force." 70 Accordingly,
these specific allegations, if hypothetically admitted, may result into the recovery of damages pursuant
to Article 19 of the Civil Code which states that "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith." As explained in the HSBC case:

When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19
and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must
beheld responsible. But a right, though by itself legal because it is recognized or granted by law as such,
may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A person should be protected only when he acts
in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith; but not
when he acts with negligence or abuse. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only
purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the
purpose for which it was established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no
intention to injure another. 71 (Emphasis supplied)

Likewise, Consing, Jr.’s complaint states a cause of action for damages under Article 26 of the Civil Code
which provides that:

Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense,
shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of
birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

The rationale therefor was explained in the case of Manaloto v. Veloso III, 72 citing Concepcion v. CA,73 to
wit:

The philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil law. The Code
Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personality must be exalted. The sacredness
of human personality is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human amelioration. The
touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civilization of every country, is how far it dignifies
man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human
personality is not exalted - then the laws are indeed defective. Thus, under this article, the rights of
persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a person's dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind.74

To add, a violation of Article 26 of the Civil Code may also lead to the payment of moral damages under
Article 2219(10)75 of the Civil Code.
Records reveal that Consing, Jr., in his complaint, alleged that "he has come to discover that Unicapital
and PBI, et al. are speaking of him in a manner that is inappropriate and libelous; and that they have
spread their virulent version of events in the business and financial community such that he has suffered
and continues to suffer injury upon his good name and reputation which, after all, is the most sacred
and valuable wealth he possesses - especially considering that he is an investment banker." 76 In similar
regard, the hypothetical admission of these allegations may result into the recovery of damages
pursuant to Article 26, and even Article2219(10), of the Civil Code.

Corollary thereto, Unicapital, et al.’s contention 77 that the case should be dismissed on the ground that it
failed to set out the actual libelous statements complained about cannot be given credence. These
incidents, as well as the specific circumstances surrounding the manner in which Unicapital and PBI, et
al. pursued their claims against Consing, Jr. may be better ventilated during trial. It is a standing rule that
issues that require the contravention of the allegations of the complaint, as well as the full ventilation, in
effect, of the main merits of the case, should not be within the province of a mere motion to
dismiss,78 as in this case. Hence, as what is only required is that the allegations furnish adequate basis by
which the complaint can be maintained, the Court – in view of the above-stated reasons – finds that the
RTC-Pasig City’s denial of Unicapital, et al.’s motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause
of action was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion which would necessitate the reversal of the CA’s
ruling. Verily, for grave abuse of discretion to exist, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross so
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law.79 This the Court does not perceive in the case at bar.

Further, so as to obviate any confusion on the matter, the Court equally finds that the causes of action in
SCA No. 1759 were not – as Unicapital, et al. claim – misjoined even if Consing, Jr. averred that
Unicapital and PBI, et al. violated certain provisions of the Corporation Law and the Revised Securities
Act.80

The rule is that a party’s failure to observe the following conditions under Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules
results in a misjoinder of causes of action: 81

SEC. 5. Joinder of causes of action . - A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise,
as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:

(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;

(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special rules;

(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or
jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes
of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and

(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money the
aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)

A careful perusal of his complaint discloses that Consing, Jr. did not seek to hold Unicapital and PBI, et al.
liable for any specific violation of the Corporation Code or the Revised Securities Act. Rather, he merely
sought damages for Unicapital and PBI, et al.’s alleged acts of making him sign numerous documents
and their use of the same against him. In this respect, Consing, Jr. actually advances an injunction and
damages case82 which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC-Pasig City. 83 Therefore, there was
no violation of Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules, particularly, paragraph (c) thereof. Besides, even on the
assumption that there was a misjoinder of causes of action, still, such defect should not result in the
dismissal of Consing, Jr.’s complaint. Section 6, Rule 2 of the Rules explicitly states that a "misjoinder of
causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action" and that "a misjoined cause of action may, on
motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately."

Neither should Consing, Jr.’s failure to pay the required docket fees lead to the dismissal of his
complaint.1âwphi1 It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of the filing of the
complaint does not automatically cause the dismissal of the complaint provided that the fees are paid
within a reasonable period.84 Consequently, Unicapital, et al.’s insistence that the stringent rule on non-
payment of docket fees enunciated in the case of Manchester Development Corporation v. CA 85 should
be applied in this case cannot be sustained in the absence of proof that Consing, Jr. intended to defraud
the government by his failure to pay the correct amount of filing fees. As pronounced in the case of
Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon. Melicor: 86

Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its

non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the
fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party involved
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment.

Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to
defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply. 87 (Emphasis and italics in the original)

Indeed, while the Court acknowledges Unicapital, et al.'s apprehension that Consing, Jr.'s "metered"
claim for damages to the tune of around ₱2,000,000.00 per month 88 may balloon to a rather huge
amount by the time that this case is finally disposed of, still, any amount that may by then fall due shall
be subject to assessment and any additional fees determined shall constitute as a lien against the
judgment as explicitly provided under Section 2, 89Rule 141 of the Rules.

Finally, on the question of whether or not Consing, Jr.'s complaint was properly verified, suffice it to
state that since the copy submitted to the trial court was duly notarized by one Atty. Allan B. Gepty and
that it was only Unicapital, et al.’s copy which lacks the notarization, then there was sufficient
compliance with the requirements of the rules on pleadings. 90

In fine, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the CA in sustaining the RTC-Pasig City’s denial
of Unicapital et al.’s motion to dismiss. As such, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 175277 and 175285 must be
denied.

B. Propriety of the denial of

Consing, Jr.’s motion for
consolidation.

The crux of G.R. No. 192073 is the propriety of the RTC-Makati City’s denial of Consing, Jr.’s motion for
the consolidation of the Pasig case, i.e., SCA No. 1759, and the Makati case, i.e., Civil Case No. 99-
1418.Records show that the CA upheld the RTC-Makati City’s denial of the foregoing motion, finding that
the consolidation of these cases was merely discretionary on the part of the trial court. It added that it
was "impracticable and would cause a procedural faux pas

"if it were to "allow the RTC-Pasig City to preside over the Makati case." 91

The CA’s ruling is proper.

It is hornbook principle that when or two or more cases involve the same parties and affect closely
related subject matters, the same must be consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the best
interest of the parties and to settle the issues between them promptly, thus, resulting in a speedy and
inexpensive determination of cases. In addition, consolidation serves the purpose of avoiding the
possibility of conflicting decisions rendered by the courts in two or more cases, which otherwise could
be disposed of in a single suit.92 The governing rule is Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules which provides:

SEC. 1. Consolidation. - When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the
court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all
the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to
avoid unnecessary costs or delay.

In the present case, the Court observes that the subject cases, i.e., SCA No. 1759 and Civil Case No. 99-
1418, although involving the same parties and proceeding from a similar factual milieu, should remain
unconsolidated since they proceed from different sources of obligations and, hence, would not yield
conflicting dispositions. SCA No. 1759 is an injunction and damages case based on the Civil Code
provisions on abuse of right and defamation, while Civil Case No. 99-1418 is a collection and damages
suit based on actionable documents, i.e., the subject promissory notes. In particular, SCA No. 1759 deals
with whether or not Unicapital and BPI, et al, abused the manner in which they demanded payment
from Consing, Jr., while Civil Case No. 99-1418 deals with whether or not Unicapital may demand
payment from Consing, Jr. based on the subject promissory notes. Clearly, a resolution in one case
would have no practical effect as the core issues and reliefs sought in each case are separate and distinct
from the other.

Likewise, as the CA correctly pointed out, the RTC-Makati City could not have been failured in retaining
Civil Case No. 99-1418 in its dockets since pre-trial procedures have already been undertaken therein
and, thus, its consolidation with SCA No. 1759 pending before the RTC-Pasig City would merely result in
complications on the part of the latter court or squander the resources or remedies already utilized in
Civil Case No. 99-1418.93 In this light, aside from the perceived improbability of having conflicting
decisions, the consolidation of SCA No. 1759 and Civil Case No. 99-1418 would, contrary to its objective,
only delay the proceedings and entail unnecessary costs.

All told, the Court finds the consolidation of SCA No. 1759 and Civil Case No. 99-1418 to be improper,
impelling the affirmance of the CA’s ruling. Consequently, the petition in G.R. No. 192073 must also be
denied.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 175277, 175285 and 192073 are DENIED. Accordingly, the Court
of Appeals’ Joint Decision dated October 20, 2005 and Resolution dated October 25, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP
Nos. 64019 and 64451 and the Decision dated September 30, 2009 and Resolution dated April 28, 2010
in CA-G.R. No. 101355 are hereby AFFIRMED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the cases
were assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the cases
were assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), pp. 35-76; rollo (G.R. No. 192073), pp. 10-34.
2
 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), pp. 9-29. Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes
(nowretired member of the Supreme Court), with Associate Justices Aurora Santiago Lagman
and Sesinando E. Villon, concurring.

3
 Id. at 31-32.

4
 Id. at 191-193. Penned by Judge Santiago G. Estrella.

5
 Id. at 279-281. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Florito S. Macalino.

6
 Rollo (G.R. No. 192073), pp. 38-49. Penned by Associate Justice Isaias Dicdican, with Associate
Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Romeo F. Barza, concurring.

7
 Id. at 70-71.

8
 Id. at 160-162. Penned by Judge Marissa Macaraig-Guillen.

9
 Id. at 177-178.

10
 Id. at 88-89.

11
 Id. at 90-93.

12
 Id. at 357-358.

13
 Id. at 83.

14
 Id. at 84-86.

15
 Id. at 87.

16
 Id. at 42.

17
 Id. at 345-346.

18
 Id. at. 347-348.

19
 Id. at 349-350.

20
 Id. at 354-356.

21
 Id. at 359-360. See Letter dated April 21, 1999.

22
 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), pp. 131-132 (Dated April 27, 1999 of PBI); and rollo (G.R.
No.192073), pp. 112-113 (Dated April 26, 1999 of Unicapital).

23
 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), pp. 114-123.

24
 Id. at 149-157. Dated June 16, 1999.

25
 Id. at 153.

26
 "AN ACT PENALIZING THE MAKING OR DRAWING AND ISSUANCE OF A CHECK WITHOUT
SUFFICIENT FUNDS OR CREDIT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, otherwise known as "The Anti-
Bouncing Check Law."

27
 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), pp. 153-154.

28
 Id. at 154-155.

29
 Id. at 120.
30
 Id.

31
 Ibid.

32
 Id. at 121-122.

33
 Id. at 124-127 (Dated May 24, 1999); and id. at 159-166 (Dated August 23, 1999).

34
 Id. at 187-188. See Reply dated September 7, 1999.

35
 Id. at 128-130 (Dated May 26, 1999); id. at 167-168 (Dated August 27, 1999).

36
 Id. at 191-193. See also id. at 86.

37
 Id. at 193.

38
 Id. at 279-281.

39
 Id. at 282-315. Dated March 28, 2001.

40
 Id. at 83-103.

41
 Id. at 92-95.

42
 Id. at 100-101.

43
 Id. at 101-102.

44
 Id. at 98-99.

45
 Id. at 99-100.

46
 Id. at 105-106.

47
 Rollo (G.R. No. 192073), pp. 124-135. Dated July 28, 1999.

48
 Id. at 133.

49
 Id. at 21-22, and 205.

50
 Id. at 207-209.

51
 Id. at 146-150. See Order in Civil Case No. 99-95381 dated October 8, 2001. Penned by Judge
(now Associate Justice of the CA) Rosmari D. Carandang.

52
 Id. at 403-407. Signed by Acting Presiding Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda.

53
 Id. at 153-159. Dated June 18, 2007.

54
 Id. at 160-162. Dated July 16, 2007.

55
 Id. at 177-178. Dated September 4, 2007.

56
 Id. at 38-49.

57
 Id. at 47.

58
 Id. at 70-71.

59
 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), p. 562; and rollo (G.R. No. 192073), p. 495.
60
 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), pp. 566-567; and rollo (G.R. No. 192073), pp. 530-531.
Court Resolution dated March 9, 2011.

61
 See Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.

62
 Peltan Dev., Inc. v. CA, 336 Phil. 824, 833 (1997).

63
 See Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Judge, Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Br. 8, G.R.
No.147058, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 272, 281.

64
 The Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. CA, 274 Phil. 947, 955 (1991).

65
 G.R. No. 154830, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 153.

66
 483 Phil. 525, 538 (2004).

67
 Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. v. Todaro, supra note 65, at 162.

68
 Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:

xxxx

(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;

x x xx

69
 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), p. 153.

70
 Id. at 153-a.

71
 Supra note 66, at 538-539. (Citation omitted)

72
 G.R. No. 171365, October 6, 2010, 632 SCRA 347.

73
 381 Phil. 90 (2000).

74
 Supra note 72, at 365-366.

75
 Article 2219.

Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

xxxx

(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

xxxx

76
 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), p 154.

77
 Id. at 61-64.

78
 NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, G.R.
No.175799, November 28, 2011, 661 SCRA 328, 347.

79
 De Vera v. De Vera, G.R. No. 172832, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 506, 514-515.

80
 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), pp. 64-68.

81
 See Perez v. Hermano, G.R. No. 147417, July 8, 2005, 463 SCRA 90, 104.
82
 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), p. 156. In his complaint, Consing, Jr. essentially seeks that
Unicapital, et al.: (a) "should be restrained from harassing plaintiff by threats of criminal
prosecution, or any other coercive demand, or any other threats by reason of the transactions
over the property in question"; (b) "should be forever barred from speaking about him in a
derogatory fashion in so far as the surrounding circumstances of the transfers of property in
question"; (c) pay him "x x x actual damages and consequential damages in the sum of
₱2,000,000.00 continuing at the same rate per month for the whole period from May 1, 1999
until the controversy is resolved"; (d) pay him "x x x moral damages in the amount of at least
₱1,000,000.00 per month from May 1, 1999 until the controversy is resolved"; (e) pay him "x x x
exemplary damages punitive in nature in the amount of atleast ₱1,000,000.00 per month from
May 1, 1999 until the controversy is resolved; and (f) pay him" x x x attorney’s fees, costs of suit
and any other reliefs that may be equitable in the premises."

83
 See Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129.

84
 See Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC-13) v. Alonzo-Legasto, G.R. No. 169108,
April18, 2006, 487 SCRA 339, 347.

85
 G.R. No. L-75919, May 7, 1987, 149 SCRA 562.

86
 495 Phil. 422 (2005).

87
 Id. at 436.

88
 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), p. 69.

89
 SEC. 2. Fees in lien. – Where the court in its final judgment awards a claim not alleged, or a
relief different from, or more than that claimed in the pleading, the party concerned shall pay
the additional fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The
clerk of court shall assess and collect the corresponding fees.

90
 See rollo (G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285), pp. 100-101.

91
 Rollo (G.R. No. 192073), pp. 47-48.

92
 See Steel Corporation of the Philippines v. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc., G.R. Nos. 190462 and
190538, November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA 403, 415-416.

93
 Rollo (G.R. No. 192073), p. 47.
CASE 36: Other Instances When Damages May Be Recovered (Art. 27-29)

THIRD DIVISION 

G.R. No. L-54598 April 15, 1988

JOSE B. LEDESMA, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses PACIFICO DELMO and SANCHA DELMO (as private
respondents), respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner. 

Luzel D. Demasu-ay for respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals which afirmed the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, adjudging the petitioner, who was then the President of
the West Visayas College liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for
failure to graduate a student with honors. 

The facts are not disputed. 

An organization named Student Leadership Club was formed by some students of the West Visayas
College. They elected the late Violets Delmo as the treasurer. In that capacity, Delmo extended loans
from the funds of the club to some of the students of the school. "the petitioner claims that the said act
of extending loans was against school rules and regulations. Thus, the petitioner, as President of the
School, sent a letter to Delmo informing her that she was being dropped from the membership of the
club and that she would not be a candidate for any award or citation from the school. 

Delmo asked for a reconsideration of the decision but the petitioner denied it. Delmo, thus, appealed to
the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools. 

The Director after due investigation, rendered a decison on April 13, 1966 which provided:

Records of the preliminary investigation conducted by one of the legal officers of this
Office disclosed the following: That Violeta Delmo was the treasurer of the Student
Leadership Club, an exclusive student organization; that pursuant to Article IX of the of
the Constitution and By-Laws of the club, it passed Resolution No. 2, authorizing the
treasurer to disburse funds of the Club to student for financial aid and other
humanitarian purposes; that in compliance with said resolution and as treasurer of the
Club, Violeta Delmo extended loans to some officers and members of the Club upon
proper application duly approved by the majority of the members of the Executive
Board; and that upon receiving the report from Mr. Jesse Dagoon, adviser of the funds
of the Club, that Office conducted an investigation on the matter and having been
convinced of the guilt of Violets Delmo and the other officers and members of the Club,
that Office rendered the order or decision in question. In justifying that Office's order or
decision, it is contended that approval by that Office of the Constitution and By-Laws of
the Club is necessary for its effectivity and validity and since it was never submitted to
that Office, the Club had no valid constitution and By-Laws and that as a consequence,
Resolution No. 2 which was passed based on the Constitution and By-Laws- is without
any force and effect and the treasurer, Violeta Delmo, who extended loans to some
 officers and members of the Club pursuant thereto are illegal (sic), hence, she and the
other students involved are deemed guilty of misappropriating the funds of the Club. On
the other hand, Raclito Castaneda, Nestor Golez and Violeta Delmo, President, Secretary
and Treasurer of the Club, respectively, testified that the Club had adopted its
Constitution and By-Laws in a meeting held last October 3, 1965, and that pursuant to
Article I of said Constitution and By-Laws, the majority of the members of the Executive
Board passed Resolution No. 2, which resolution became the basis for the extension on
of loans to some officers and members of the Club, that the Club honestly believed that
its Constitution and By-Laws has been approved by the superintendent because the
adviser of the Club, Mr. Jesse Dagoon, assured the President of the Club that he will
cause the approval of the Constitution and By-Laws by the Superintendent; the officers
of the Club have been inducted to office on October 9,1965 by the Superintendent and
that the Club had been likewise allowed to cosponsor the Education Week Celebration. 

After a careful study of the records, this Office sustains the action taken by the
Superintendent in penalizing the adviser of the Club as well as the officers and members
thereof by dropping them from membership therein. However, this Office is convinced
that Violets M. Delmo had acted in good faith, in her capacity as Club Treasurer, in
extending loans to the officers and members of the Student partnership Club.
Resolution No. 2 authorizing the Club treasurer to discharge finds to students in need of
financial assistance and other humanitarian purposes had been approved by the Club
adviser, Mr. Jesse Dagoon, with the notation that approval was given in his capacity as
adviser of the Club and extension of the Superintendent's personality. Aside from
misleading the officers and members of the Club, Mr. Dagoon, had unsatisfactorily
explained why he failed to give the Constitution and By-Laws of the Club to the
Superintendent for approval despite his assurance to the Club president that he would
do so. With this finding of negligence on the part of the Club adviser, not to mention
laxity in the performance of his duties as such, this Office considers as too severe and
unwarranted that portion of the questioned order stating that Violeta Delmo "shall not
be a candidate for any award or citation from this school or any organization in this
school." Violeta Delmo, it is noted, has been a consistent full scholar of the school and
she alone has maintained her scholarship. The decision in question would, therefore, set
at naught all her sacrifice and frustrate her dreams of graduating with honors in this
year's commencement exercises. 

In view of all the foregoing, this Office believes and so holds and hereby directs that
appellant Violeta. M. Delmo, and for that matter all other Club members or officers
involved in this case, be not deprived of any award, citation or honor from the school, if
they are otherwise entitled thereto. (Rollo, pp. 28-30) 

On April 27, 1966, the petitioner received by mail the decision of the Director and all the records of the
case. On the same day, petitioner received a telegram stating the following: 

"AIRMAIL RECORDS DELMO CASE MISSENT THAT OFFICE" 

The Director asked for the return only of the records but the petitioner allegedly mistook the telegram
as ordering him to also send the decision back. On the same day, he returned by mail all the records plus
the decision of the Director to the Bureau of Public Schools. 

The next day, the petitioner received another telegram from the Director order him to furnish Delmo
with a copy of the decision. The petitioner, in turn, sent a night letter to the Director informing the latter
that he had sent the decision back and that he had not retained a copy thereof.. 

On May 3, 1966, the day of the graduation, the petitioner received another telegram from the Director
ordering him not to deprive Delmo of any honors due her. As it was impossible by this time to include
Delmo's name in the program as one of the honor students, the petitioner let her graduate as a plain
student instead of being awarded the Latin honor of Magna Cum Laude.

To delay the matter further, the petitioner on May 5, 1966, wrote the Director for a reconsideration of
the latters" decision because he believed that Delmo should not be allowed to graduate with honors.
The Director denied the petitioner's request. 
On July 12, 1966, the petitioner finally instructed the Registrar of the school to enter into the scholastic
records of Delmo the honor, "Magna Cum Laude." 

On July 30, 1966, Delmo, then a minor, was joined by her parents in flag action for damages against the
petitioner. During the pendency of the action, however, Delmo passed away, and thus, an Amended and
Supplemental Complaint was filed by her parents as her sole and only heirs. 

The trial court after hearing rendered judgment against the petitioner and in favor of the spouses
Delmo. The court said: 

Let us go to specific badges of the defendants (now petitioners) bad faith. Per
investigation of Violeta Delmo's appeal to Director Vitaliano Bernardino of the Bureau of
Public Schools (Exhibit L it was the defendant who inducted the officers of the Student
Leadership Club on October 9, 1965. In fact the Club was allowed to cosponsor the
Education Week Celebration. (Exh. "L"). If the defendant he not approve of the
constitution and by-laws of the Club, why did he induct the officers into office and allow
the Club to sponsor the Education Week Celebration"? It was through his own act that
the students were misled to do as they did. Coupled with the defendants tacit
recognition of the Club was the assurance of Mr. Jemm Dagoon, Club Adviser, who
made the students believe that he was acting as an extension of Mr. Ledesma's
personality. (Exhibit "L").

Another badge of the defendan'ts want of good faith is the fact that, although, he kaew
as early as April 27,1966 that per on of r Bernardino, Exhibit "L," he was directed to give
honors to Miss Delmo, he kept Id information to . He told the Court that he knew that
the letter of Director Bernardino directed him not to deprive Miss Delmo the honors due
her, but she (sic) says that he has not finished reading the letter-decision, Exhibit "L," of
Director Bernardino 0, him to give honors to Miss Delmo. (Tsn, Feb. 5, 1974, testimony
of Mr. Ledesma, pp. .33-35). It could not be true that he has not finished reading the
letter-decision, Exh. "L," because said letter consisted of only three pages, and the
portion which directed that Miss Delmo "be not deprived of any award, citation or
honor from the school, if otherwise entitled thereto is found at the last paragraph of the
same. How did he know the last paragraph if he did not read the letter. 

Defendants actuations regarding Miss Delmo's cam had been one of bias and prejudice.
When his action would favor him, he was deliberate and aspect to the utter prejudice
and detriment of Miss Delmo. Thus, although, as early as April 27, 1966, he knew of the
exoneration of Miss Delino by Director Bernardino, he withheld the information from
Miss Delmo. This is eloquently dramatized by Exh. "11" and Exh. "13" On April 29,1966,
Director Bernardino cabled him to furnish Violeta Delmo copy of the Decision, Exh. "L,"
but instead of informing Miss Delmo about the decision, since he said he mailed back
the decision on April 28,1966, he sent a night letter on April 29,1966, to Director
Bernardino, informing the latter that he had returned the decision (Exh. "l3"), together
with the record. Why a night letter when the matter was of utmost urgency to the
parties in the case, because graduation day was only four days ahead? An examination
of the telegrams sent by the defendant shows that he had been sending ordinary
telegram and not night letters. (Exh. "5", Exhibit "7"). At least, if the defendant could not
furnish a copy of the decision, (Exh. "L"), to Miss Delmo, he should have told her about it
or that Miss Delmo's honors and citation in the commencement be announced or
indicated. But Mr. Ledesma is one who cannot admit a mistake. Very ungentlemanly this
is home out by his own testimony despite his knowledge that his decision to deprive
Miss Delmo of honors due to her was overturned by Director Bernardino, he on his
wrong belief. To quote the defendant,1 believed that she did not deserve those
honors(Tsn Feb. 5, 1974, p. 43,Empasized supplied). Despite the telegram of Director
Bernardino which the defendant received hours before the commencement executory
on May 3-4,1966, he did not obey Director Bernardino because he said in his testimony
that he would be embarrassment . Tan Feb 5,1974, P. 46). Evidently, he knew only his
embarrassment and not that of r Bernardino whose order was being flagrantly and
wantonly disregarded by bim And certainly, not the least of Miss Delmo's
embarrassment. His acts speak eloquently of ho bad faith and unjust of mindwarped by
his delicate sensitivity for having been challenged by Miss Delmo, a mere student.
 xxx xxx xxx

Finally the defendant's behaviour relative to Miss s case smacks of contemptuous

arrogance, oppression and abuse of power. Come to think of it. He refused to obey the
directive of Be o and instead, chose to feign ignorance of it." (Reward on Appeal, p. 72-
76). 

The trial court awarded P20,000.00 to the estate of Violeta Delmo and P10,000.00 to her parents for
moral damages; P5,000.00 for nominal damages to Violeta's estate; exemplary damages of P10,000.00
and P2,000.00 attorney's fees.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition. 

The issues raised in this petition can be reduced to the sole question of whether or not the respondent
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that petitioner is liable for damages under
Article 27 of the New Civil Code. 

We find no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate courts should be reversed. It cannot be
disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal which was brought about by the petitioner's
neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral damages are but proper. As we have affirmed in the case of
(Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440, 448): 

There is no argument that moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of defendant's wrongly act
or omission." (People v. Baylon, 129 SCRA 62 (1984). 

The Solicitor-General tries to cover-up the petitioner's deliberate omission to inform Miss Delmo by
stating that it was not the duty of the petitioner to furnish her a copy of the Director's decision. Granting
this to be true, it was nevertheless the petitioner's duty to enforce the said decision. He could have done
so considering that he received the decision on April 27, 1966 and even though he sent it back with the
records of the case, he undoubtedly read the whole of it which consisted of only three pages. Moreover,
the petitioner should have had the decency to meet with Mr. Delmo, the girl's father, and inform the
latter, at the very least of the decision. This, the petitioner likewise failed to do, and not without the
attendant bad faith which the appellate court correctly pointed out in its decision, to wit: 

Third, assuming that defendant could not furnish Miss Delmo of a copy of the decision,
he could have used his discretion and plain common sense by informing her about it or
he could have directed the inclusion of Miss Delmo's honor in the printed
commencement program or announced it during the commencement exercises. 

Fourth, defendant despite receipt of the telegram of Director Benardino hours before
the commencement exercises on May 3-4, 1966, disobeyed his superior by refusing to
give the honors due Miss Delmo with a lame excuse that he would be embarrassed if he
did so, to the prejudice of and in complete disregard of Miss Delmo's rights. 

Fifth, defendant did not even extend the courtesy of meeting Mr. Pacifico Delmo, father
of Miss Delmo, who tried several times to see defendant in his office thus Mr. Delmo
suffered extreme disappointment and humiliation.

xxx xxx xxx

Defendant, being a public officer should have acted with circumspection and due regard
to the rights of Miss Delmo. Inasmuch as he exceeded the scope of his authority by
defiantly disobeying the lawful directive of his superior, Director Bernardino, defendant
is liable for damages in his personal capacity. . . . (Rollo, pp- 57-58) 

Based on the undisputed facts, exemplary damages are also in order. In the same case of Prudenciado v.
Alliance Transport System, Inc.,  supra., at p. 450, we ruled: 
 The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to
provide an example or correction for the public good (Lopez, et al. v. Pan American
World Airways, 16 SCRA 431).

However, we do not deem it appropriate to award the spouses Delmo damages in the
amount of P10,000.00 in their individual capacity, separately from and in addition to
what they are already entitled to as sole heirs of the deceased Violeta Delmo. Thus, the
decision is modified insofar as moral damages are awarded to the spouses in their own
behalf. 

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with the slight modification as stated in the preceding paragraph. This decision is
immediately executory.

SO ORDERED. 

Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur. 

CASE 37: Independent Civil Actions/Rule 111, Rules of Court

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 122150            March 17, 2003

GEORGE (CULHI) HAMBON, petitioner, 

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND VALENTINO U. CARANTES, respondents.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Petitioner George (Culhi) Hambon filed herein petition for review on certiorari, raising the following
issues:

WHETHER OR NOT A CIVIL CASE FOR DAMAGES BASED ON AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION FALLING
UNDER ARTICLE 32, 33, 34 AND 2176 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE BE DULY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO
MAKE RESERVATION TO FILE A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION IN A CRIMINAL CASE FILED ARISING FROM THE
SAME ACT OR OMISSION OF THE ACCUSED PURSUANT TO RULE 111, SECTION 1 OF THE RULES OF
COURT, THE FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION BEING DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE CRIMINAL CASE WAS
DISMISSED BEFORE THE PROSECUTION STARTED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE FOR FAILURE OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT TO APPEAR DESPITE NOTICE

SHOULD A STRICT INTERPRETATION OF RULE 111, SECTION 1 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHICH
INFRINGES ON A RIGHT OF A PARTY BASED ON A SUBSTANTIVE LAW BE PERMITTED WHEN TO DO SO
WOULD DIMINISH, MODIFY AND/OR AMEND A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT CONTRARY TO LAW. 1

The factual background that led to the filing of the petition is as follows:

On June 6, 1989, the petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio (Branch 6), a complaint for
damages2for the injuries and expenses he sustained after the truck driven by the respondent bumped
him on the night of December 9, 1985. 3 In answer thereto, respondent contended that the criminal case
arising from the same incident, Criminal Case No. 2049 for Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence, earlier filed on January 8, 1986, 4had already been provisionally dismissed by the Municipal
Trial Court of Tuba, Benguet on March 23, 1987, due to petitioner’s lack of interest; 5 and that the
dismissal was with respect to both criminal and civil liabilities of respondent. 6

After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision, dated December 18, 1991, ruling that the civil
case was not barred by the dismissal of the criminal case, and that petitioner is entitled to damages. The
dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered, sentencing defendant Valentino Cerantes to pay

plaintiff George Hambon the sum of P60,000.00 for hospitalization and medical expenses and
P10,000.00 for native rituals, as Actual Damages; the sum of P10,000.00 as Moral Damages,
P5,000.00 as Exemplary Damages and P5,000.00 as Attorney’s fees and costs.

SO ORDERED.7

On appeal,8 the Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on March 8, 1995, 9 reversed and set aside
the decision of the trial court, and dismissed petitioner’s complaint for damages.

According to the appellate court, since the petitioner did not make any reservation to institute a
separate civil action for damages, it was impliedly instituted with the criminal case, and the dismissal of
the criminal case carried with it the dismissal of the suit for damages, notwithstanding the fact that the
dismissal was provisional as it amounted to an acquittal and had the effect of an adjudication on the
merits. 10

Hence, herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner argues that the ruling in the case of Abellana v. Marave11 should be observed, i.e., a civil
action for damages may be filed and proceed independently of the criminal action even without
reservation to file the same has been made; 12 and that the requirement of reservation, as provided in
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, practically diminished/amended/modified his substantial right. 13

The petition must be denied.

Petitioner filed the complaint for damages on June 6, 1989. Hence, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988,14 is the prevailing and governing law in this case, viz.:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act
or omission of the accused.

...

Under the foregoing rule, civil actions to recover liability arising from crime (ex delicto) and under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code (quasi-delict) are deemed impliedly instituted with the
criminal action unless waived, reserved or previously instituted.

Thus, in Maniago v. Court of Appeals,15 the Court ruled that the right to bring an action for damages
under the Civil Code must be reserved, as required by Section 1, Rule 111, otherwise it should be
dismissed;16 and that the reservation requirement does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights,
but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of orderly procedure. 17

In the Maniago case, petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of the bus driven by Herminio Andaya
that figured in a vehicular accident with the jeepney owned by respondent Alfredo Boado. The
petitioner therein initially sought for the suspension of the civil case for damages filed against him in
view of the pendency of the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and
multiple physical injuries filed against his driver. The respondent, in the criminal case, did not reserve
the right to bring the separate civil action against the petitioner or his driver. The criminal case was later
dismissed for the failure of the prosecution to prosecute its case. On appeal, the Court identified the
issues as (1) whether the respondent can file a civil action for damages despite the absence of
reservation; (2) whether the dismissal of the criminal case brought with it the dismissal of the civil
action; and (3) whether the reservation requirement is substantive in character and beyond the rule-
making power of the Court.18

The Court expounded:

. . . §1quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil
actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will de deemed to have been instituted
with the criminal case. … In other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the
recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi-delict under
Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will de deemed instituted with the
criminal action.

...

Contrary to private respondent’s contention, the requirement that before a separate civil action
may be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but
only regulates their exercise in the general interest of procedure. The requirement is merely
procedural in nature. For that matter the Revised Penal Code, by providing in Art. 100 that any
 person criminally liable is also civilly liable, gives the offended party the right to bring a separate
civil action, yet no one has ever questioned the rule that such action must be reserved before it
may be brought separately.19

While the Abellana case ruled that a reservation is not necessary, the 1988 amendment of the rule
explicitly requires reservation of the civil action. 

x x x Prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these independent civil actions
can be instituted and thereafter have a continuous determination apart from or simultaneous
with the criminal action. 

. . . Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the
words of the Court in "Caños v. Peralta":

‘. . . to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent

delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short, the
attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants.’ 20

Thus, herein petitioner Hambon should have reserved his right to separately institute the civil action for
damages in Criminal Case No. 2049. Having failed to do so, Civil Case No. 1761-R for damages
subsequently filed by him without prior reservation should be dismissed. With the dismissal of Criminal
Case No. 2049, whatever civil action for the recovery of civil liability that was impliedly instituted therein
was likewise dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 8, 1995, is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 10-11.

2
 Docketed as Civil Case No. 1761-R.

3
 Records, pp. 1-4.

4
 Id., Exhibit "2", p. 135.

5
 Id., Exhibit "3", pp. 136-137.

6
 Id. p. 14.

7
 Id. p. 181.

8
 Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 36991 entitled George (Culhi) Hambon, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus
Valentino U. Cerantes, Defendant-Appellant.

9
 CA Rollo, p. 88.

10
 Id., pp. 85-88.

11
 57 SCRA 106 (1974).

12
 Rollo, p. 14.
13
 Id., p. 15.

14
 Bar Matter No. 375, approved per SC Resolution dated June 17, 1988, and re-affirmed per SC
Resolution dated July 7, 1998 (effective October 1, 1988).

15
 324 Phil. 34 [1996].

16
 Id., at 41.

17
 Id., at 47.

18
 Id., at 38, 40-41.

19
 Id., at 41-42, 47.

20
 San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119771, April 24, 1998, 289 SCRA 568,
574, 578.
CASE 38: Prejudicial Questions

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14534             February 28, 1962

MERARDO L. ZAPANTA, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HON. AGUSTIN P. MONTESA, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

Pedro M. Santos and Jorge C. Salonga for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General, Romulo L. Chua and Dewey G. Soriano for respondents. 

DIZON, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition filed by Merardo L. Zapanta against the Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fernando A. Cruz, Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, and Olimpia A.
Yco, to enjoin the former from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 3405 pending the final
determination of Civil Case No. 1446 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. 

Upon complaint filed by respondent Olimpia A. Yco on May 20, 1958, an information for Bigamy was
filed by respondent Provincial Fiscal against petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Criminal
Case No. 3405), alleging that the latter, having previously married one Estrella Guarin, and without said
marriage having been dissolved, contracted a second marriage with said complainant. 

On June 16, 1958, petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga Civil Case No. 1446 against
respondent Olimpia A. Yco for the annulment of their marriage on the ground of duress, force and
intimidation. On the 30th of the same month respondent Yco, as defendant in said case, filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that it stated no cause of action, but the same was denied on
July 7 of the same year. 1äwphï1.ñët

On September 2, 1958, petitioner, in turn, filed a motion in Criminal Case No. 3405 to suspend
proceedings therein, on the ground that the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. 1446 of
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga was a prejudicial question. Respondent judge denied the motion
on September 20, 1958 as well as petitioner's motion for reconsideration, and ordered his arraignment.
After entering a plea of not guilty, petitioner filed the present action. 

We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which
is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal (People vs. Aragon, G.R. No. L-5930, February 17, 1954). The prejudicial question — we further
said — must be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be
lodged in another court (People vs. Aragon, supra). These requisites are present in the case at bar.
Should the question for annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga prosper on the ground that, according to the evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was
obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary and can
not be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan. Thus, the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the second marriage is
determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy. On the other hand, there can be
no question that the annulment of petitioner's marriage with respondent Yco on the grounds relied
upon in the complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga is within the jurisdiction of said
court. 

In the Aragon case already mentioned (supra) we held that if the defendant in a case for bigamy claims
that the first marriage is void and the right to decide such validity is vested in another court, the civil
action for annulment must first be decided before the action for bigamy can proceed. There is no reason
not to apply the same rule when the contention of the accused is that the second marriage is void on
the ground that he entered into it because of duress, force and intimidation. 

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in the petition is hereby granted. Without costs. 

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and De
Leon, JJ., concur.

CASE 39: Prejudicial Questions

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22579             February 23, 1968

ROLANDO LANDICHO, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. LORENZO RELOVA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I,
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Jose W. Diokno for petitioner. 

Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

          In this petition for certiorari  and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question before the
Court is whether or not the existence of a civil suit for the annulment of marriage at the instance of the
second wife against petitioner, with the latter in turn filing a third party complaint against the first
spouse for the annulment of the first marriage, constitutes a prejudicial question in a pending suit for
bigamy against him. Respondent, Judge Relova answered in the negative. We sustain him.

          The pertinent facts as set forth in the petition follow. On February 27, 1963, petitioner was
charged before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, presided over by respondent Judge,
with the offense, of bigamy. It was alleged in the information that petitioner "being then lawfully
married to Elvira Makatangay, which marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an
action was filed before the Court of First Instance ofBatangas, likewise presided plaintiff respondent
Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio  because
of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and because of its
allegedly bigamous character. On June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-party
complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his
marriage with the said third-party defendant be declared null and void, on the ground that by means of
threats, force and intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her before the
Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal.

          Thereafter, on October 7, 1963, petitioner moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal case
pending the decision on the question of the validity of the two marriages involved in the pending civil
suit. Respondent Judge on November 19, 1963 denied the motion for lack of merit. Then came a motion
for reconsideration to set aside the above order, which was likewise denied on March 2, 1964. Hence
this petition, filed on March 13, 1964.

          In a resolution of this Court of March 17, 1964, respondent Judge was required to answer within
ten (10) days, with a preliminary injunction being issued to restrain him from further proceeding with
the prosecution of the bigamy case. In the meanwhile, before the answer was filed there was an
amended petition for certiorari, the amendment consisting solely in the inclusion of the People of the
Philippines as another respondent. This Court admitted such amended petition in a resolution of April 3,
1964.

          Then came the answer to the amended petition on May 14 of that year where the statement of
facts as above detailed was admitted, with the qualifications that the bigamy charge was filed upon the
complaint of the first spouse Elvira Makatangay. It alleged as one of its special and affirmative defenses
that the mere fact that "there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a
bigamy case does not mean that 'prejudicial questions are automatically raised in said civil actions as to
warrant the suspension of the criminal case for bigamy."  1 The answer stressed that even on the
assumption that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would
not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. It continued, referring to Viada, that "parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore,
according to Viada, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage incurs the penalty provided for in this Article. . . ." 2 

          This defense is in accordance with the principle implicit in authoritative decisions of this Court.
In Merced v. Diez, 3 what was in issue was the validity of the second marriage, "which must be
determined before hand in the civil action before the criminal action can proceed." According to the
opinion of Justice Labrador: "We have a situation where the issue of the validity of the second marriage
can be determined or must first be determined in the civil action before the criminal action for bigamy
can be prosecuted. The question of the validity of the second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial
question because determination of the validity of the second marriage is determinable in the civil action
and must precede the criminal action for bigamy." It was the conclusion of this Court then that for
petitioner Merced to be found guilty of bigamy, the second marriage which he contracted "must first be
declared valid." Its validity having been questioned in the civil action, there must be a decision in such a
case "before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed."

          To the same effect is the doctrine announced in Zapanta v. Mendoza. 4 As explained in the opinion
of Justice Dizon: "We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. . . . The prejudicial question — we further said — must be determinative of
the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court. . . . These
requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the question for annulment of the second marriage
pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that, according to the
evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation, it is
obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy
with which he was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Thus the issue involved in the action
for the annulment of the second marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime
of bigamy. . . ."

          The situation in this case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy
on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be
indisputable. Then on March 15, 1963, it was the second spouse, not petitioner who filed an action for
nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. It was sometime later, on June 15, 1963, to be
precise, when petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first
spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force,
threats and intimidation. As was correctly stressed in the answer of respondent Judge relying on Viada,
parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts
having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond
question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.

          Such was the situation of petitioner. There is no occasion to indulge in the probability that the
third-party complaint against the first wife brought almost five months after the prosecution for bigamy
was started could have been inspired by the thought that he could thus give color to a defense based on
an alleged prejudicial question. The above judicial decisions as well as the opinion of Viada preclude a
finding that respondent Judge abused, much less gravely abused, his discretion in failing to suspend the
hearing as sought by petitioner.

          WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied and the writ of preliminary injunction issued
dissolved. With costs.1äwphï1.ñët

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles,
JJ., concur. 

Footnotes

1
Special and Affirmative Defenses, Answer, par. 1.
 2
Idem, citing 3 Viada, Penal Code, p. 275.

3
L-15315, August 26, 1960.

4
L-14534, February 28, 1962. 

CASE 40: Prejudicial Questions

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 111244 December 15, 1997

ARTURO ALANO, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ENRICO A. LANZANAS, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Manila, Branch 37, and ROBERTO CARLOS, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

Petitioner Arturo Alano has filed this petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 28150 which affirmed in toto the order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
372 denying petitioner's motion for the suspension of proceeding of Criminal Case No. 90-84933,
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Arturo Alano" as well as his motion for reconsideration.

Criminal Case No. 90-84933 is a prosecution for the crime of estafa. The information 3 alleges:

That on or about June 10, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Roberto S. Carlos in the
following manner, to wit: the said accused, pretending to be still the owner of a parcel
of land with an area of 1,172 square meters, more or less, located at Bicutan, Taguig,
Metro Manila, covered by Tax Declaration No. 120-004-00398, well knowing that he had
previously sold the same to the said Roberto S. Carlos for P30,000.00, sold the aforesaid
property for the second time to one Erlinda B. Dandoy for P87,900.00, thereby depriving
the said Roberto S. Carlos of his rightful ownership/possession of the said parcel of land,
to the damage and prejudice of the said Roberto S. Carlos in the aforesaid amount of
P30,000.00, Philippine currency.

Contrary to law.

Petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that there was a prejudicial
question pending resolution in another case being tried in the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Region, Pasig, Branch 68. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 55103 and entitled "Roberto Carlos and
Trinidad M. Carlos v. Arturo Alano, et. al.," concerns the nullity of the sale and recovery of possession
and damages. In the aforementioned Civil Case, private respondent filed a complaint against the
petitioner seeking the annulment of the second sale of said parcel of land made by the petitioner to a
certain Erlinda Dandoy on the premise that the said land was previously sold to them. In his answer,
petitioner contends that he never sold the property to the private respondents and that his signature
appearing in the deed of absolute sale in favor of the latter was a forgery, hence, the alleged sale was
fictitious and inexistent. At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that the civil case was filed on March 1,
1985, five years before June 19, 1990 when the criminal case for estafa was instituted.

On October 3, 1991, the trial court denied the petitioner's motion as well as a subsequent motion for
reconsideration.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari  and prohibition before the Court of Appeals seeking
the nullification of the assailed order.
On July 26, 1993,4 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit, the decretal portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding no merit to the petition, the same is hereby DISMISSED, with cost
against petitioner.

Hence, this petition.

The only issue in this petition is whether the pendency of Civil Case No. 55103, is a prejudicial question
justifying the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-84933 filed against the petitioner.

Petitioner alleges that his signature appearing in the first deed of absolute sale in favor of private
respondent was a forgery, such that there was no second sale covering the said parcel of land.
Otherwise stated, if the Court in the said Civil Case rules that the first sale to herein private respondent
was null and void, due to the forgery of petitioner's signature in the first deed of sale, it follows that the
criminal case for estafa would not prosper.

While at first blush there seems to be merit in petitioner's claim, we are compelled to affirm the Court of
Appeal's findings.

The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved
before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal action. 5 In other
words, if both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the
issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exists, provided the other element or
characteristic is satisfied.6

On the basis of the foregoing and a perusal of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, the disposition of
the issue raised need not unduly detain us. We have already ruled that a criminal action for estafa (for
alleged double sale of property) is a prejudicial question to a civil action for nullity of the alleged deed of
sale and the defense of the alleged vendor is the forgery of his signature in the deed. 7

Notwithstanding the apparent prejudicial question involved, the Court of Appeals still affirmed
the Order of the trial court denying petitioner's motion for the suspension of the proceeding on
the ground that petitioner, in the stipulation of facts, had already admitted during the pre-trial
order dated October 5, 1990 of the criminal case the validity of his signature in the first deed of
sale between him and the private respondent, as well as his subsequent acknowledgment of his
signature in twenty-three (23) cash vouchers evidencing the payments made by the private
respondent.8 Moreover, it was also noted by the Court of Appeals that petitioner even wrote to
the private respondent offering to refund whatever sum the latter had paid. 9

In this regard, the pre-trial provision on criminal procedure found in Rule 118 of the Rules of Court
provides:

Sec. 2. Pre-trial conference; subject. . . . The pre-trial conference shall consider the
following:

(a) Plea bargaining

(b) Stipulation of facts

From the foregoing, there is no question that a stipulation of facts by the parties in a criminal case is
recognized as declarations constituting judicial admissions, hence, binding upon the parties 10 and by
virtue of which the prosecution dispensed with the introduction of additional evidence and the defense
waived the right to contest or dispute the veracity of the statement contained in the exhibit. 11

Accordingly, the stipulation of facts stated in the pre-trial order amounts to an admission by the
petitioner resulting in the waiver of his right to present evidence on his behalf. While it is true that the
right to present evidence is guaranteed under the Constitution, 12 this right may be waived expressly or
impliedly.13
Since the suspension of the criminal case due to a prejudicial question is only a procedural matter, the
same is subject to a waiver by virtue of the prior acts of the accused. After all, the doctrine of waiver is
made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed
with and relinquished without infringing on any public right and without detriment to the community at
large.14

Accordingly, petitioner's admission in the stipulation of facts during the pre-trial of the criminal amounts
to a waiver of his defense of forgery in the civil case. Hence, we have no reason to nullify such waiver, it
being not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law. 15 Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the pre-trial order was
signed by the petitioner himself. As such, the rule that no proof need be offered as to any facts admitted
at a pre-trial hearing applies.16

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 26, 1993
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Penned by Justice Regina G. Ordoñez-Benitez and concurred in by Justice Manuel C.

Herrera and Bernardo P. Pardo.

2 Per Judge Angelina Gutierrez.

3 Rollo, p. 30.

4 Id., pp. 96-101.

5 Flordelis v. Castillo, 58 SCRA 301 (1974); Donato v. Luna, 160 SCRA 441 (1988).

6 Benitez v. Concepcion, Jr., 2 SCRA 178 (1961).

7 Ras v. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125 (1980).

8 Pre-trial Order, Rollo, pp. 134-140.

9 Decision, Rollo, p. 101.

10 People v. Hernandez, 260 SCRA 25 (1996).

11 People v. Bocar, 27 SCRA 512 (1969).

12 Sec. 14, Art. 3, 1987 Constitution.

13 People v. Dichose, 96 SCRA 957 (1980).

14 People v. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 (1991).

15 Article 6, Civil Code.

16 Afable, et al., v. Ruiz, et al., 56 O.G. 3767; Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. v.
Teodoro, 26 SCRA 339 (1969); Munasque v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 533 (1985).
CASE 41: Prejudicial Questions

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 137567               June 20, 2000

MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of the RTC,
Brach 139, Makati City, respondents.

BUENA, J.:

This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks to review and set
aside the Order dated January 28, 1999 issued by Judge Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 139 in Special Civil Case No. 98-3056, entitled "Meynardo Beltran vs. People
of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Alden Cervantes of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
61." The said Order denied petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin Judge Cervantes from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 236176, a concubinage case
against petitioner on the ground that the pending petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by
petitioner against his wife constitutes a prejudicial question.

The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:

Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the
Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City. 1 

On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children, 2 petitioner filed a petition
for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
before Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
97-30192.3 

In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who
abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. 4 Charmaine
subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage 5 under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code
against petitioner and his paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution
dated September 16, 1997, found probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information 6 against them.
The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 236176, was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 61.1awphi1

On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a
Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case.
Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a
prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied
the foregoing motion in the Order7 dated August 31, 1998. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
said Order of denial was likewise denied in an Order dated December 9, 1998.

In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the concubinage case, petitioner went to
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 on certiorari, questioning the Orders dated August
31, 1998 and December 9, 1998 issued by Judge Cervantes and praying for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.8 In an Order9 dated January 28, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Makati denied
the petition for certiorari. Said Court subsequently issued another Order 10 dated February 23, 1999,
denying his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.

Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage based on
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should merit
the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife.

Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting decisions might result from the
civil case for annulment of marriage and the criminal case for concubinage. In the civil case, the trial
court might declare the marriage as valid by dismissing petitioner's complaint but in the criminal case,
the trial court might acquit petitioner because the evidence shows that his marriage is void on ground of
psychological incapacity. Petitioner submits that the possible conflict of the courts' ruling regarding
petitioner's marriage can be avoided, if the criminal case will be suspended, until the court rules on the
validity of marriage; that if petitioner's marriage is declared void by reason of psychological incapacity
then by reason of the arguments submitted in the subject petition, his marriage has never existed; and
that, accordingly, petitioner could not be convicted in the criminal case because he was never before a
married man.

Petitioner's contentions are untenable.

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two
essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed. 11 

The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question
to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the
suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that
the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also
that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined.

Art. 40 of the Family Code provides:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, 12 this Court ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes
of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage,
other evidence is acceptable. The pertinent portions of said Decision read:

. . . Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an
action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile
spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their common children and the
delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity. These needs not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a
court declaring such previous marriage void.

So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a final
judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his
marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.

With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his
marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his
marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.

Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs.  Relova 1 cited in Donato vs.  Luna 14 where this Court held
that:
 . . . Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that
fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can
it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration
of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes.
Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not
erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil
action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 
Amended Complaint, Annex "E," Petition, Rollo, p. 61.

2 
Annex "E," Rollo, p. 61.

3 
Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 14.

4 
Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 14.

5 
Petition, Annex "F," Rollo, pp. 69-70.

6 
Petition, Annex "H," Rollo, pp. 80-81.

7 
Petition, Annex "I," Rollo, pp. 82-83.

8 
Petition, Annex "J," Rollo, pp. 84-100.

9 
Petition, Annex "A," Rollo, pp. 33-39.

10 
Petition, Annex "C," Rollo, pp. 52-54.

11 
Carlos vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 25 [1997].

12 
226 SCRA 572 [1993].

13 
22 SCRA 731 [1968].

14 
160 SCRA 441 [1988].
CASE 42: Prejudicial Questions

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 126746               November 29, 2000

ARTHUR TE, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of
Appeals Tenth Division, dated 31 August 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971 1 and CA-G.R. SP No. 261782 and
the Resolution dated October 18, 1996 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on September 14,
1988. They did not live together after the marriage although they would meet each other regularly. Not
long after private respondent gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner stopped visiting her. 3 

On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a
second marriage with a certain Julieta Santella (Santella). 4 

On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime in June 1990, when she
learned about petitioner’s marriage to Santella, an information charging petitioner with bigamy was
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on August 9, 1990. 5 This case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409.6 

Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the annulment of
his marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her. He alleged that
private respondent concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage and that she
was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. 7 

On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)
an administrative case against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their respective engineering
licenses on the ground that they committed acts of immorality by living together and subsequently
marrying each other despite their knowledge that at the time of their marriage, petitioner was already
married to private respondent. With respect to petitioner, private respondent added that he committed
an act of falsification by stating in his marriage contract with Santella that he was still single. 8 

After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner filed a demurrer to
evidence with leave of court and motion to inhibit the trial court judge for showing antagonism and
animosity towards petitioner’s counsel during the hearings of said case.

The trial court denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence in an Order dated November 28, 1990 which
stated that the same could not be granted because the prosecution had sufficiently established a prima
facie case against the accused.9 The RTC also denied petitioner’s motion to inhibit for lack of legal
basis.10 
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court judge, Judge Cezar C. Peralejo, for (1) exhibiting antagonism and animosity
towards petitioner’s counsel; (2) violating the requirements of due process by denying petitioner’s
[motion for reconsideration and] demurrer to evidence even before the filing of the same; (3)
disregarding and failing to comply with the appropriate guidelines for judges promulgated by the
Supreme Court; and (4) ruling that in a criminal case only "prima facie evidence" is sufficient for
conviction of an accused. This case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 23971. 11 

Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board), where the administrative
case for the revocation of his engineering license was pending, a motion to suspend the proceedings
therein in view of the pendency of the civil case for annulment of his marriage to private respondent
and criminal case for bigamy in Branches 106 and 98, respectively of the RTC of Quezon City. 12 When the
Board denied the said motion in its Order dated July 16, 1991, 13 petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals
another petition for certiorari, contending that the Board gravely abused its discretion in: (1) failing to
hold that the resolution of the annulment case is prejudicial to the outcome of the administrative case
pending before it; (2) not holding that the continuation of proceedings in the administrative case could
render nugatory petitioner’s right against self-incrimination in this criminal case for bigamy against him;
and (3) making an overly-sweeping interpretation that Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations
Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals does not allow the suspension of the
administrative proceeding before the PRC Board despite the pendency of criminal and/or administrative
proceedings against the same respondent involving the same set of facts in other courts or tribunals.
This petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 26178. 14 

The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they arose from the same set of facts.

On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, rendered the assailed decision in the
consolidated petitions. The appellate court upheld the RTC’s denial of the motion to inhibit due to
petitioner’s failure to show any concrete evidence that the trial court judge exhibited partiality and had
prejudged the case. It also ruled that the denial of petitioner’s motion to suspend the proceedings on
the ground of prejudicial question was in accord with law. 15 The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the
RTC’s denial of the demurrer to evidence filed by petitioner for his failure to set forth persuasive
grounds to support the same, considering that the prosecution was able to adduce evidence showing
the existence of the elements of bigamy. 16 

Neither did the appellate court find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Board’s Order denying
petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings in the administrative case on the ground of prejudicial
question. Respondent court held that no prejudicial question existed since the action sought to be
suspended is administrative in nature, and the other action involved is a civil case. 17 

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals but the
same was denied.18 

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUSPEND THE LEGAL

[CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE
FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.

II

PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW
IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE.

III

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL
JUDGE A QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF.19 

The petition has no merit.

While the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private
respondent has rendered the issue of the propriety of suspending both the criminal case for bigamy
before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98 and the administrative case for revocation of petitioner’s
engineering license before the PRC Board moot and academic, the Court shall discuss the issue of
prejudicial question to emphasize the guarding and controlling precepts and rules. 20 

A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but
so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.21 The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.22 

The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of
marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which would
necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at
the time the second marriage is contracted. 23 Petitioner’s argument that the nullity of his marriage to
private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the criminal proceedings could
continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio  would necessarily absolve him
from criminal liability, is untenable. The ruling in People vs. Mendoza24 and  People vs. Aragon25 cited by
petitioner that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab
initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was
already in effect at the time of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent in September 1988. Said
article states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of
remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a
marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding.26 In Landicho vs. Relova,27 we held that:

Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared
can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption of marriage exists. 28 

It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage
to private respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime,
their marriage was, under the law, still valid and subsisting.

Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the administrative
proceedings before the PRC Board. As discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question involves a
civil and a criminal case. We have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case is
administrative and the other is civil.29 

Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of
Professionals of the PRC Board expressly provides that the administrative proceedings before it shall not
be suspended notwithstanding the existence of a criminal and/or civil case against the respondent
involving the same facts as the administrative case:

The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an administrative case in another
judicial body against an examinee or registered professional involving the same facts as in the
administrative case filed or to be filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the proceeding of
the latter case. The Board shall proceed independently with the investigation of the case and shall
render therein its decision without awaiting for the final decision of the courts or quasi-judicial body.

It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint before the PRC Board are not
confined to the issue of the alleged bigamous marriage contracted by petitioner and Santella. Petitioner
is also charged with immoral conduct for continued failure to perform his obligations as husband to
private respondent and as father to their child, and for cohabiting with Santella without the benefit of
marriage.30 The existence of these other charges justified the continuation of the proceedings before the
PRC Board.

Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court’s denial of his
demurrer to evidence in the criminal case for bigamy, arguing that the prosecution failed to establish
the existence of both the first and second marriages beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner claims that
the original copy of marriage contract between him and private respondent was not presented, the
signatures therein were not properly identified and there was no showing that the requisites of a valid
marriage were complied with. He alleges further that the original copy of the marriage contract between
him and Santella was not presented, that no proof that he signed said contract was adduced, and that
there was no witness presented to show that a second marriage ceremony participated in by him ever
took place.31 

We are not persuaded. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of
the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such
discretion.32 In this case, the Court of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court, which based its denial of the demurrer on two grounds: first, the prosecution established
a prima facie  case for bigamy against the petitioner; and second, petitioner’s allegations in the demurrer
were insufficient to justify the grant of the same. It has been held that the appellate court will not
review in a special civil action for certiorari the prosecution’s evidence and decide in advance that such
evidence has or has not yet established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 33 In view of
the trial court’s finding that a prima facie case against petitioner exists, his proper recourse is to adduce
evidence in his defense.34 

The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioner’s misimpression that by denying his demurrer to
evidence in view of the existence of a prima facie case against him, the trial court was already making a
pronouncement that he is liable for the offense charged. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the
order of the RTC denying the demurrer was not an adjudication on the merits but merely an evaluation
of the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to determine whether or not a full-blown trial would be
necessary to resolve the case.35 The RTC’s observation that there was a prima facie  case against
petitioner only meant that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to sustain its proposition
that petitioner had committed the offense of bigamy, and unless petitioner presents evidence to rebut
the same, such would be the conclusion. 36 Said declaration by the RTC should not be construed as a
pronouncement of petitioner’s guilt. It was precisely because of such finding that the trial court denied
the demurrer, in order that petitioner may present evidence in his defense and allow said court to
resolve the case based on the evidence adduced by both parties.

Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo in Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409
should have been granted since said judge exhibited partiality and bias against him in several instances.
First, when petitioner manifested that he would file a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his
motion to suspend the proceedings in said case, the judge said such motion was dilatory and would be
denied even though the motion for reconsideration had not yet been filed. Second, when petitioner’s
counsel manifested that he had just recovered from an accident and was not physically fit for trial, the
judge commented that counsel was merely trying to delay the case and required said counsel to
produce a medical certificate to support his statement. Third, when petitioner manifested that he was
going to file a demurrer to evidence, the judge characterized the same as dilatory and declared that he
would deny the same. According to petitioner, the judge’s hostile attitude towards petitioner’s counsel
as shown in the foregoing instances justified the grant of his motion to inhibit.

We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner against Judge Peralejo did not
conclusively show that the latter was biased and had prejudged the case. 37 In People of the Philippines
vs. Court of Appeals,38 this Court held that while bias and prejudice have been recognized as valid
reasons for the voluntary inhibition of a judge under Section 1, Rule 137, the rudimentary rule is that the
mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to
prove the charge of bias and partiality. 39 

Furthermore, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit are not among those
expressly mentioned in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, the decision to inhibit himself
lay within the sound discretion of Judge Peralejo. Said provision of law states:

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his
wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to
either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator,
guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision
is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and
entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in the case, for just
and valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and deciding the case.

This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in denying petitioner’s motion to
inhibit. The test for determining the propriety of the denial of said motion is whether petitioner was
deprived a fair and impartial trial.40 The instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly exhibited antagonism
and partiality against petitioner and/or his counsel did not deprive him of a fair and impartial trial. As
discussed earlier, the denial by the judge of petitioner’s motion to suspend the criminal proceeding and
the demurrer to evidence are in accord with law and jurisprudence. Neither was there anything
unreasonable in the requirement that petitioner’s counsel submit a medical certificate to support his
claim that he suffered an accident which rendered him unprepared for trial. Such requirement was
evidently imposed upon petitioner’s counsel to ensure that the resolution of the case was not hampered
by unnecessary and unjustified delays, in keeping with the judge’s duty to disposing of the court’s
business promptly.41 

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 
Arthur Te, Petitioner, vs. Hon. Cesar C. Peralejo as Judge, RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98 and
People of the Philippines, Respondents.

2 
Arthur Te, Petitioner, vs. Board of Civil Engineering, Professional Regulation Commission and
Liliana Choa Te, Respondents.

3 
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1994, Rollo, p. 29.

4 
Ibid. 

5 
Id.,  at 29-30.

6 
Records, Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409, p.1.

7 
Rollo, pp.  29-30.

8 
Id.,  at 30.

9 
Records, Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409, p. 37.

10 
Id.,  at 33.

11 
Id., at 6-10.

12 
These cases were: (1) Arthur Te, vs. Liliana Choa-Te, Civil Case No. 90-6265 for Annulment of
Marriage, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106; and (2) People of the Philippines vs.
Arthur Te, Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409 for Bigamy, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
98.

13 
Records, CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, p. 15.

14 
Records, CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, pp. 6-10.

15 
Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, pp. 33-34, 36.

16 
Id.,  at 35.

17 
Id.,  at 36.

18 
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated October 18, 1996, Id., at 103.

19 
Petition, Id.,  at 18-24.

20 
Salonga vs. Cruz Pano,  134 SCRA 438, 463 (1985).

21 
Librado vs. Coscolluela, Jr., 116 SCRA 303, 309-310 (1982).

22 
Carlos vs. Court of Appeals,  268 SCRA 25, 33 (1997) citing  Tuanda vs. Sandiganbayan,  249
SCRA 342 (1995).

23 
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved; (3) the offender contracts a second or
subsequent marriage; and (4) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity. (REYES, LUIS B. THE REVISED PENAL CODE ANNOTATED, Vol. 2 , Thirteenth Edition, p.
828.)

24 
95 Phil. 843 (1954).

25 
100 Phil. 1033 (1957).

26 
Mercado vs. Tan,  G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000; Bobis vs. Bobis,  G.R. No. 138509, July 31,
2000; Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499, 501 (1986).

27 
22 SCRA 731(1968).

28 
Id.,  at 734, citing 3 VIADA, PENAL CODE 275.

29 
Ocampo vs. Buenaventura, 55 SCRA 267, 271 (1974).

30 
Records, CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, pp. 18-19.

31 
Petition, Rollo, pp. 21-23.

32 
People vs. Mercado, 159 SCRA 453, 459 (1988).

33 
People vs. Cruz, 144 SCRA 677, 681 (1986).

34 
Section 15, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Court.

35 
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971 and CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, Rollo,  pp.
35-36.

36 
People vs. Nuque, 58 O.G. 8445; Salonga vs Cruz Pano, supra  note 20 at 450.

37 
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971 and CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, Rollo,  p.
33.
 38 
309 SCRA 705 (1999).

39 
Id.,  at 709-710.

40 
Associacion de Agricultures de Talisay-Silay, Inc. vs. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc.,  88 SCRA 294.

41 
Rule 3.05, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct.

CASE 43: Prejudicial Questions

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 124498            October 5, 2001

EDDIE B. SABANDAL, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. FELIPE S. TONGCO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 42, and PHILIPPINES
TODAY, respondents.

PARDO, J.:

The Case

The case is a petition to suspend the criminal proceedings in the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch
42,1 where petitioner Eddie B. Sabandal is charged with eleven counts of violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22.2

The Facts

On February 18, 1989, Eddie B. Sabandal entered into a memorandum of agreement on dealership with
respondent Philippines Today, Inc. for the distribution of the newspaper Philippines Today, (now
Philippine Star) in Bacolod City and in designated towns in Negros Occidental. 3

Under the agreement, petitioner shall pay for an equivalent amount of one month of deliveries in
advance within the first seven days of the succeeding month. Petitioner's allowable percentage of return
shall be 10% and be entitled to a rebate of P0.15 per copy sold.

After execution of the agreement, respondent Philippines Today, Inc. made regular deliveries of the
agreed copies of the newspaper to petitioner.

In order to make partial payments for the deliveries, on December 18, 1990 to April 15, 1991, petitioner
issued to respondent several checks amounting to ninety thousand (P90,000.00) pesos.

When respondent presented petitioner's checks to the drawee banks for payment, the bank dishonored
the checks for insufficiency of funds and/or account closed. Consequently, respondent made oral and
written demands for petitioner to make good the checks. However, petitioner failed to pay despite
demands.

In December 1992, on the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by respondent Philippines Today, Inc.,
assistant city prosecutor of Manila Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila
eleven informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against petitioner. 4

Three years later, or on October 11, 1995, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Negros
Occidental at Himamaylan, a complaint against Philippines Today, Inc. for specific performance, recovery
of overpayment and damages.5
On October 11, 1995, petitioner also filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 42, a motion to
suspend trial in the criminal cases against him based on a prejudicial question. 6

On November 27, 1995, the trial court denied petitioner's motion to suspend trial based on a prejudicial
question.7

On December 20, 1995, petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the denial. 8

On January 9, 1996, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. 9

Hence, this petition.10

The Issue

The issue raised is whether a prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of the trial of the
criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against petitioner until after the resolution of
the civil action for specific performance, recovery of overpayment, and damages.

The Court's Ruling

The petition has no merit.

The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 11

"A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The
prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and
resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct
and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused."12

"For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the
criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil, the following requisites must be present: (1)
the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in
another tribunal."13

If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues
raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or
characteristic is satisfied.14 It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which
the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil
action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 15 If the resolution of
the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal
action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity "that the civil case be determined first before
taking up the criminal case," therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. 16 Neither is
there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other.17

In this case, the issue in the criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is whether the
accused knowingly issued worthless checks. The issue in the civil action for specific performance,
overpayment, and damages is whether complainant Sabandal overpaid his obligations to Philippines
Today, Inc. If, after trial in the civil case, petitioner is shown to have overpaid respondent, it does not
follow that he cannot be held liable for the bouncing checks he issued, for the mere issuance of
worthless checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is itself an offense. 18
The lower court, therefore, did not err in ruling that the pendency of a civil action for specific
performance, overpayment, and damages did not pose a prejudicial question in the criminal cases for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.

Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the filing of the civil case was a
ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal cases. Petitioner filed the civil case three years after the
institution of the criminal charges against him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an
afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal cases. 

Petitioner's claim of overpayment to respondent may be raised as a defense during the trial of the cases
for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 charged against him. The civil action for recovery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted with the filing of the criminal action. 19 Hence, petitioner may invoke all
defenses pertaining to his civil liability in the criminal action. 20

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit. The Court directs the Regional
Trial Court, Manila to proceed with the trial of the criminal cases against petitioner with all judicious
dispatch in accordance with the Speedy Trial Act of 1998. 21

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, J.,  on official leave.

Footnotes

1
 In Criminal Cases Nos. 92-113446-56, Judge Felipe S. Tongco, presiding.

2
 Otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.

3
 Petition, Annex "A", Rollo, p. 34.

4
 Petition, Annexes "B", "C", "D", "E", "F", "G", "H", "I", "J", "K", "L", Rollo, pp. 35-45.

5
 Peittion, Annex "M", Rollo, pp. 46-52.

6
 Petition, Annex "N", Rollo, pp. 54-56.

7
 Petition, Annex "P", Rollo, pp. 61-62.

8
 Petition, Annex "Q", Rollo, pp. 63-73.

9
 Petition, Annex "R", Rollo, p. 74.

10
 Filed on April 24, 1996, Rollo, pp. 17-32. On June 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the
petition (Rollo, pp. 176-177). The case was considered submitted for decision upon the filing of
petitioner's memorandum on October 12, 1999 (Rollo, pp. 271-280).

11
 Rule 111, Section 5, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure; Dichaves v. Apalit, 333 SCRA 54, 57
[2000]; Ching v. Court of Appeals, 331 SCRA 16, 27 [2000].

12
 Donato v. Luna, 160 SCRA 441 [1988]; Quiambao v. Osorio, 158 SCRA 674 [1988]; Ras v. Rasul,
100 SCRA 125, 127 [1980].

13
 Prado v. People, 218 Phil. 573, 577 [1984].
 14
 Alano v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 549, 553 [1997], citing Benitez v. Concepcion, Jr., 112 Phil.
105 [1961].

15
 Te v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 126746, November 29, 2000; Beltran v. People, 334 SCRA 106,
111 [2000].

16
 Isip v. Gonzales, 148-A Phil. 212 [1971].

17
 Rojas v. People, 156 Phil. 224, 229 [1974].

18
 Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 [1986].

19
 Rule 111, Section 1, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure; Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil.
621, 632 [1997]; Manuel v. Alfeche, Jr., 328 Phil. 832, 840-841 [1996].

20
 First Producers Holdings Corporation v. Co, 336 SCRA 551, 559 [2000]; Javier v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 171 SCRA 605 [1989]

CASE 44: Prejudicial Questions

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988

LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII
HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN, respondents.

Leopoldo P. Dela Rosa for petitioner. 

Emiterio C. Manibog for private respondent. 

City Fiscal of Manila for public respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question for the resolution
of the Court is whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Itance of
Manila should be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question.
The respondent judge ruled in the negative. We sustain him. 

The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila
acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor filed an information for bigamy against herein
petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No.
43554 and assigned to Branch XXXII of said court. The information was filed based on the complaint of
private respondent Paz B. Abayan. 

On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent filed with the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978, which action was docketed as Civil Case No. E-02627. Said
civil case was based on the ground that private respondent consented to entering into the marriage,
which was petitioner Donato's second one, since she had no previous knowledge that petitioner was
already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978. Petitioner Donato's answer in the
civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized
without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by
private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the
subsequent or second marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived together and deported
themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years as
evidenced by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978, for which reason, the requisite
marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code pertaining to
marriages of exceptional character. 

Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 43554, petitioner filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings of said case contending that Civil Case No. E-02627 seeking the annulment of
his second marriage filed by private respondent raises a prejudicial question which must first be
determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed. 

In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to suspend the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 43554 for bigamy. Respondent judge's basis for denial is the ruling laid down in the
case of Landicho vs. Relova. 1 The order further directed that the proceedings in the criminal case can
proceed as scheduled. 

A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru counsel citing as one of his grounds for
suspension of proceedings the ruling laid down by this Court in the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito 2 which
was a much later case than that cited by respondent judge in his order of denial. 

The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in an order dated April 14, 1980,
for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. 

A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which
question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains
to another tribunal.3 It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues
raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. 4A
prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action may
proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris
et de jure  of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case. 5

The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the issue
before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is
not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was
petitioner's second wife, the herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for
annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit. 

Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been declared null and
void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed against him by private
respondent only sometime later when he was required to answer the civil action for anulment of the
second marriage. The doctrine elucidated upon by the case of Landicho vs. Relova 6 may be applied to
the present case. Said case states that:

The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused
in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in
civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the case. In order that the case of
annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against
the accused, it must be shown that the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be
the one that was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his
act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction
for the crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the
time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two
marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the
second spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force,
threats and intimidation. And it was only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as defendant
in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his
marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation. Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged
by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the case. Parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must
be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the
 marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration
the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk
of being prosecuted for bigamy. The lower court therefore, has not abused much less
gravely abused, its discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.

In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second marriage has
been obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation. 

Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito is a later case
and as such it should be the one applied to the case at bar. We cannot agree. The situation in the case at
bar is markedly different. In the aforecited case it was accused Milagros dela Cruz who was charged with
bigamy for having contracted a second marriage while a previous one existed. Likewise, Milagros dela
Cruz was also the one who filed an action for annulment on the ground of duress, as contra-
distinguished from the present case wherein it was private respondent Paz B. Abayan, petitioner's
second wife, who filed a complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her
consent was obtained through deceit since she was not aware that petitioner's marriage was still
subsisting. Moreover, in De la Cruz, a judgment was already rendered in the civil case that the second
marriage of De la Cruz was null and void, thus determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in
the criminal case. In the present case, there is as yet no such judgment in the civil case. 

Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on
prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question
to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner's consent to such marriage
was obtained by means of duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the
subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the basis for conviction.
The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar. 

Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the
criminal case. The records reveal that prior to petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978, he
had been living with private respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for more than five years
without the benefit of marriage. Thus, petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained by private
respondent through force, violence, intimidation and undue influence in entering a subsequent marriage
is belled by the fact that both petitioner and private respondent executed an affidavit which stated that
they had lived together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for five years, one month and
one day until their marital union was formally ratified by the second marriage and that it was private
respondent who eventually filed the civil action for nullity. 

Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the fact hat it was only when Civil Case
No. E-02627 was filed on September 28, 1979, or more than the lapse of one year from the
solemnization of the second marriage that petitioner came up with the story that his consent to the
marriage was secured through the use of force, violence, intimidation and undue influence. Petitioner
also continued to live with private respondent until November 1978, when the latter left their abode
upon learning that Leonilo Donato was already previously married. 

In the light of the preceding factual circumstances, it can be seen that the respondent Judge did not err
in his earlier order. There is no pivotal issue that must be pre-emptively resolved in Civil Case No. E-
02627 before proceedings in the criminal action for bigamy can be undertaken. 

Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the
respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained. 

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We
make no pronouncement as to costs. 

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
 1 22 SCRA 731.

2 68 SCRA 1.

3 People va. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357; Isip vs. Gonzales, 39 SCRA 255; Rojas vs. People, 57
SCRA 243. 

4 Libra va. Coscolluela, Jr., 116 SCRA 303.

5 Ibid.

6 22 SCRA 73.

CASE 45: Prejudicial Questions

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 159218             March 30, 2004

SALVADOR S. ABUNADO and ZENAIDA BIÑAS ABUNADO, Petitioners, 

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Responden

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. 26135 which affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
77, San Mateo, Rizal in Criminal Case No. 2803 convicting petitioner Salvador S. Abunado of bigamy.

The records show that on September 18, 1967, Salvador married Narcisa Arceño at the Manila City Hall
before Rev. Pedro Tiangco.2 In 1988 Narcisa left for Japan to work but returned to the Philippines in
1992, when she learned that her husband was having an extra-marital affair and has left their conjugal
home. 

After earnest efforts, Narcisa found Salvador in Quezon City cohabiting with Fe Corazon Plato. She also
discovered that on January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second marriage with a certain Zenaida
Biñas before Judge Lilian Dinulos Panontongan in San Mateo, Rizal. 3

On January 19, 1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa. 4 On May 18, 1995, a case
for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida. 5

Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on December 24, 1955 before a municipal trial court
judge in Concepcion, Iloilo and has four children with her prior to their separation in 1966. It appeared
however that there was no evidence of their 1955 marriage so he and Zenaida remarried on January 10,
1989, upon the request of their son for the purpose of complying with the requirements for his
commission in the military. 

On May 18, 2001, the trial court convicted petitioner Salvador Abunado of bigamy and sentenced him to
suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day, as
maximum. Petitioner Zenaida Biñas was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. 6

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed but AFFIRMED
in all other respects. Appreciating the mitigating circumstance that accused is 76 years of age and
applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
Minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as Maximum. No costs.

SO ORDERED.7

Petitioner is now before us on petition for review. 

First,  he argues that the Information was defective as it stated that the bigamous marriage was
contracted in 1995 when in fact it should have been 1989. 

Indeed, an accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.8 It is required that the acts and omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be alleged
in the Information.9

The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in the Information and not by
the title or designation of the offense contained in the caption of the Information. It is fundamental that
every element of which the offense is comprised must be alleged in the Information. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be alleged in the Information must be determined by reference to the
definition and essential elements of the specific crimes. 10

The question, therefore, is whether petitioner has been sufficiently informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, namely, that he contracted a subsequent marriage with another woman
while his first marriage was subsisting. 

The information against petitioner alleges:

That in or about and sometime in the month of January, 1995 at the Municipality of San Mateo, Rizal
place (sic) within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having been legally
married to complainant Narcisa Abunado on September 16, 1967 which has not been legally dissolved,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Biñas
Abunado on January 10, 1989which has all the essential requisites of a valid marriage.

CONTRARY TO LAW.11

The statement in the information that the crime was committed "in or about and sometime in the
month of January, 1995," was an obvious typographical error, for the same information clearly states
that petitioner contracted a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Biñas Abunado on January 10, 1989.
Petitioner’s submission, therefore, that the information was defective is untenable.

The general rule is that a defective information cannot support a judgment of conviction unless the
defect was cured by evidence during the trial and no objection appears to have been raised. 12 It should
be remembered that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all its elements concur – two of
which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which possesses all the requisites for
validity.13 All of these have been sufficiently established by the prosecution during the trial. Notably,
petitioner failed to object to the alleged defect in the Information during the trial and only raised the
same for the first time on appeal before the Court of Appeals.

Second,  petitioner argues that Narcisa consented to his marriage to Zenaida, which had the effect of
absolving him of criminal liability.

In this regard, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled, thus:

x x x, while he claims that there was condonation on the part of complainant when he entered into a
bigamous marriage, the same was likewise not established by clear and convincing evidence. But then, a
pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal action considering that a crime is committed
against the State and the crime of Bigamy is a public offense which can be denounced not only by the
person affected thereby but even by a civic-spirited citizen who may come to know the same. 14

Third,  petitioner claims that his petition for annulment/declaration of nullity of marriage was a
prejudicial question, hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should have been suspended during the
pendency of the annulment case. Petitioner, in fact, eventually obtained a judicial declaration of nullity
of his marriage to Narcisa on October 29, 1999. 15
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but
so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions.16

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to
the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion
would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a
petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial
question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that. 17

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to Narcisa had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is
required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the
second marriage is contracted.18

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding.19 In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that
his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting
before the first marriage was annulled.

Finally, petitioner claims that the penalty imposed on him was improper. 

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor for bigamy. Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. The penalty next lower would be
based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying
circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is
left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty
next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying
circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence.20

In light of the fact that petitioner is more than 70 years of age, 21 which is a mitigating circumstance
under Article 13, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence should be taken from prision mayor in its minimum period which ranges from six (6) years and
one (1) day to eight (8) years, while the minimum term should be taken from prision correccional in any
of its periods which ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.

Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, i.e., two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum,
is proper.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26135,
finding petitioner Salvador S. Abunado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy, and
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is
AFFIRMED.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.
Concurring Opinion

CARPIO, J.:

I concur in the result of the ponencia of Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago finding appellant Salvador S.
Abunado guilty of bigamy. 

The material facts are not in dispute. On 18 September 1967, Abunado married Narcisa Arceno. While
his marriage with Arceno remained unannulled, Abunado married Zenaida Biñas on 10 January 1989.
Subsequently, on 29 October 1999, Abunado obtained from the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a
judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage with Arceno. On 18 May 2001, the Regional Trial Court of
San Mateo, Rizal rendered a decision convicting Abunado of bigamy. 

The sole issue is whether the second marriage of Abunado to Biñas on 10 January 1989 constitutes the
crime of bigamy under Article 3491 of the Revised Penal Code. More precisely, the issue turns on
whether Abunado’s first marriage to Arceno was still subsisting at the time Abunado married Biñas. 

Under the Family Code, before one can contract a second marriage on the ground of nullity of the first
marriage, one must first secure a final judgment declaring the first marriage void. Article 40 of the
Family Code provides:

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

The Family Code took effect on 3 August 1988, before the second marriage of Abunado on 10 January
1989.

Prior to the Family Code, one could contract a subsequent marriage on the ground of nullity of the
previous marriage without first securing a judicial annulment of the previous marriage. If subsequently
the previous marriage were judicially declared void, the subsequent marriage would not be deemed
bigamous. The nullity of the previous marriage could even be judicially declared in the criminal case for
bigamy,2 although the person remarrying "assume(d) the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy" 3 should
the court uphold the validity of the first marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code has changed this. 

Now, one must first secure a final judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage before he is
freed from the marital bond or vinculum of the previous marriage. If he fails to secure a judicial
declaration of nullity and contracts a second marriage, then the second marriage becomes bigamous. As
the Court stated in Domingo v. Court of Appeals 4 in explaining Article 40 of the Family Code: 

In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of
the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged
with bigamy. 

Conversely, if the person remarries without securing a judicial declaration of nullity of his previous
marriage, he is liable for bigamy. 

Article 40 of the Family Code considers the marital vinculum of the previous marriage to subsist for
purposes of remarriage, unless the previous marriage is judicially declared void by final judgment. Thus,
if the marital vinculum of the previous marriage subsists because of the absence of judicial declaration
of its nullity, the second marriage is contracted during the existence of the first marriage resulting in the
crime of bigamy. 

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the marital vinculum of a previous marriage that is void ab initio
subsists only for purposes of remarriage. For purposes other than remarriage, marriages that are void ab
initio, such as those falling under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code, are void even without a judicial
declaration of nullity. As the Court held in Cariño v. Cariño: 5

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes
other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. x x x .
(Emphasis supplied)

Cariño, penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago herself, contradicts the statement in her present
ponencia that "under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid
until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding." I believe the ruling in Cariño is correct and should not
be disturbed. As Justice Jose C. Vitug explained in his recent textbook on Civil Law (Volume I):

The phrase "for purposes of remarriage" is not at all insignificant. Void marriages, like void contracts, are
inexistent from the very beginning. It is only by way of exception that the Family Code requires a judicial
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage before a subsequent marriage is contracted; x x
x.6 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the general rule is if the marriage is void ab initio, it is ipso facto void without need of any judicial
declaration of nullity. The only recognized exception 7 under existing law is Article 40 of the Family Code
where a marriage void ab initio is deemed valid for purposes of remarriage, hence necessitating a
judicial declaration of nullity before one can contract a subsequent marriage. 

Article 40 of the Family Code applies only to a situation where the previous marriage suffers from nullity
while the second marriage does not. Under Article 40, what requires a judicial declaration of nullity is
the previous marriage, not the subsequent marriage. Article 40 does not apply to a situation where the
first marriage does not suffer from any defect while the second is void.

Accordingly, I vote to deny the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals finding appellant
Salvador S. Abunado guilty of the crime of bigamy. 

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
 Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and concurred in by Associate Justices
Marina L. Buzon and Danilo B. Pine.

2
 Exhibit "C", Records, p. 68.

3
 Exhibit "J", Records, p. 81.

4
 Records, p. 202.

5
 Records, p. 1.

6
 Penned by Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez; Rollo, pp. 33-42.

7
 Rollo, p. 53.

8
 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14(2).

9
 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 110, Sec. 6. 

10
 Garcia v. People, G.R. No. 144785, 11 September 2003.

11
 Rollo, p. 30; underscoring ours.

12
 People v. Villamor, G.R. No. 124441, 7 October 1998, 297 SCRA 262, 270.

13
 Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000, 336 SCRA 747, 752-753.
 14
 Rollo, p. 51.

15
 Annex "1", Records, p. 208

16
 Te v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126746, 29 November 2000, 346 SCRA 327, 335.

17
 Mercado v. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 122, 133.

18
 Te v. Court of Appeals, supra.

19
 Supra.

20
 Garcia v. People, supra.

21
 Exhibit "J", Records, p. 81.

CARPIO

1
 Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows: "Bigamy- The penalty of prision
mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings." 

2
 People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954); People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957).

3
 Landicho v. Relova, et al., 130 Phil. 745 (1968).

4
 G.R. No. 104818, 17 September 1993, 226 SCRA 572.

5
 G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001, 351 SCRA 127.

6
 Civil Law, Persons and Family Relations, Vol. I, (2003 Ed.)

7
 See also note 4.
CASE 46: Prejudicial Questions

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 184861               June 30, 2009

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner, 

vs.
CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the August 26, 2008 Decision 1 in SCA No.
08-0005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 253 in Las Piñas City. The Decision affirmed the Orders
dated October 16, 20072 and March 12, 20083 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 79 in Las Piñas City. 

The Facts

On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-President for
Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October 5, 2004 4 for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-2526-33.
Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent
with the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.

On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil complaint against
petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 2006 5 for the rescission of an alleged construction
agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in
Las Piñas City and docketed as Civil Case No. LP-06-0197. Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal
cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the construction agreement.

Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July 24,
20076 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues
similar or intimately related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In other words, private respondent claimed
that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases. 

Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in an undated
Comment/Opposition to Accused’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial Question 7 on
the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon
which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private
respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the
elements of a prejudicial question is that "the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action"; thus, this element is missing
in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case. 

Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007, granting the Motion to Suspend Proceedings,
and reasoned that:

Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the nullification of the checks issued as the
same are without consideration, then the instant criminal cases for alleged violation of BP 22 must be
dismissed. The belated filing of the civil case by the herein accused did not detract from the correctness
of her cause, since a motion for suspension of a criminal action may be filed at any time before the
prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court). 8

In an Order dated March 12, 2008,9 the MTC denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration dated
November 29, 2007.

Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition dated May 13, 2008. Thereafter, the RTC
issued the assailed decision dated August 26, 2008, denying the petition. On the issue of the existence of
a prejudicial question, the RTC ruled:

Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of a "previously" filed civil case is intended merely
to obviate delays in the conduct of the criminal proceedings. Incidentally, no clear evidence of any intent
to delay by private respondent was shown. The criminal proceedings are still in their initial stages when
the civil action was instituted. And, the fact that the civil action was filed after the criminal action was
instituted does not render the issues in the civil action any less prejudicial in character. 10

Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45. 

The Issue

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER RULED TO SUSPEND
PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF "PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" IN CIVIL CASE
NO. LP-06-0197.11

The Court’s Ruling

This petition must be granted.

The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the 

Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist

Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by Supreme Court Resolutions dated June 17,
1988 and July 7, 1988, the elements of a prejudicial question are contained in Rule 111, Sec. 5, which
states:

SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases 12 that the elements of a prejudicial question, as stated in the
above-quoted provision and in Beltran v. People, 13 are:

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two
essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed. 
On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, however, became effective and the above
provision was amended by Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which applies here and now provides: 

SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.—The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a prejudicial question and,
thus, suspend a criminal case, it must first be established that the civil case was filed previous to the
filing of the criminal case. This, petitioner argues, is specifically to guard against the situation wherein a
party would belatedly file a civil action that is related to a pending criminal action in order to delay the
proceedings in the latter.

On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted
or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and
which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Private respondent argues that the phrase "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may
proceed" must be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed
either before the institution of the criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action. Private
respondent concludes that there is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and the
Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the
criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.

We cannot agree with private respondent.

First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a "change in phraseology by amendment of a
provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it
originally had."14 In the instant case, the phrase, "previously instituted," was inserted to qualify the
nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This
interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of "subsequent" directly before the term criminal
action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship of
the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal action.

Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena 15 that:

Even if we ignored petitioners’ procedural lapse and resolved their petition on the merits, we hold that
Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying their
omnibus motion for the suspension of the proceedings pending final judgment in Civil Case No. 7160.
Section 6, Rule lll of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, reads:

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of the criminal action
based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the
prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been
filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time
before the prosecution rests.

Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.

Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the
criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal
action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the
institution of the criminal action. In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of
the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the State with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no
prejudicial question exists. (Emphasis supplied.)
Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that "a statute should be construed not only to be
consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a
complete, coherent and intelligible system." 16 This principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et
concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute must be so construed and
harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. 171 a vv p h i l

In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. It is only when
harmonization is impossible that resort must be made to choosing which law to apply.

In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible
of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase "previously instituted civil
action" in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The
clause "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" in Art. 36 of the Civil Code
may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the criminal action may be filed
during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or
during the trial with the court hearing the case. 

This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which provides for the situations when the
motion to suspend the criminal action during the preliminary investigation or during the trial may be
filed. Sec. 6 provides:

SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.—A petition for suspension of the criminal action
based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the
prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been
filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time
before the prosecution rests. 

Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code
that should govern in order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of law. 

It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case indicate that the filing of the civil
action and the subsequent move to suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of the presence of a
prejudicial question were a mere afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.

In Sabandal v. Tongco,18 we found no prejudicial question existed involving a civil action for specific
performance, overpayment, and damages, and a criminal complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of the
civil action would not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In resolving
the case, we said:

Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the filing of the civil case was a
ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal cases. Petitioner filed the civil case three years after the
institution of the criminal charges against him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an
afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal cases. 19

Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal complaint and from the
time that private respondent allegedly withdrew its equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting
that the civil case was instituted more than two and a half (2 ½) years from the time that private
respondent allegedly stopped construction of the proposed building for no valid reason. More
importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the construction agreement for lack of
consideration was filed more than three (3) years from the execution of the construction agreement. 

Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the cases involved here show that
the filing of the civil action was a mere afterthought on the part of private respondent and interposed
for delay. And as correctly argued by petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court seeks to prevent. Thus, private respondent’s positions cannot be left to stand.

The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not 

Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is, still, no
prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
case. 

To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are: (1)
the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.

Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of
the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot apply to the present controversy.

Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction agreement between the parties is
declared null and void for want of consideration, the checks issued in consideration of such contract
would become mere scraps of paper and cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution.

We find for petitioner.

It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable under BP 22 are as follows:

(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; 

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are no
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and 

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit,
or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank
to stop payment.20

Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance of the
check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable consideration does not make up the elements of the
crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line of cases 21 that the agreement surrounding the issuance of
dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22. In Mejia v. People, 22 we ruled:

It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad check. The
purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its issuance, or any
agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner. To
determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will
greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency
substitutes, and bring havoc in trade and in banking communities. The clear intention of the framers of
B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.

Lee v. Court of Appeals23 is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that the issue of lack of valuable
consideration for the issuance of checks which were later on dishonored for insufficient funds is
immaterial to the success of a prosecution for violation of BP 22, to wit:

Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for value.

Petitioner’s claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration. Valuable
consideration, in turn, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party
who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or
service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to do, or not to do in favor of
the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser.

In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks in blank, the subject check
included, in exchange for 2.5% interest from the proceeds of loans that will be made from said account.
This is a valuable consideration for which the check was issued. That there was neither a pre-existing
obligation nor an obligation incurred on the part of petitioner when the subject check was given by
Bautista to private complainant on July 24, 1993 because petitioner was no longer connected with Unlad
or Bautista starting July 1989, cannot be given merit since, as earlier discussed, petitioner failed to
adequately prove that he has severed his relationship with Bautista or Unlad.

At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not
the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This is because
the thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into
circulation.24 (Emphasis supplied.)

Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the
parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in
the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that private respondent indeed issued checks which were
subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP
22.lawphil.net

Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, that
the resolution of the issue in the civil action would determine whether the criminal action may proceed,
is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to
the case before us.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the August 26, 2008 Decision
in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC, Branch 253 in Las Piñas City and the Orders dated October 16, 2007 and
March 12, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 of the MTC, Branch 79 in Las Piñas City. We order the
MTC to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 with dispatch.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 88-90. Penned by Judge Salvador V. Timbang.

2
 Id. at 65-67.

3
 Id. at 75-76.

4
 Id. at 23-27. 

5
 Id. at 28-41.

6
 Id. at 42-45.

7
 Id. at 46-48.

8
 Id. at 67.

9
 Id. at 75-76.

10
 Id. at 90.

11
 Id. at 11.

12
 Carlos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109887, February 10, 1997, 268 SCRA 25, 33; Tuanda v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110544, October 17, 1995, 249 SCRA 342, 351; Apa v. Fernandez, G.R.
No. 112381, March 30, 1995, 242 SCRA 509, 512; Yap v. Paras, G.R. No.101236, January 30,
1994, 205 SCRA 625, 629; Umali v. IAC, G.R. No. 63198, June 21, 1990, 186 SCRA 680, 685. 

13
 G.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000, 334 SCRA 106, 110.

14
 R.E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction 97 (4th ed., 1998).

15
 G.R. No. 153666, December 27, 2002, 394 SCRA 494, 508-509.

16
 R.E. Agpalo, supra note 14, at 269-270.

17
 Algura v. The Local Government Unit of the City of Naga, G.R. No. 150135, October 30, 2006,
506 SCRA 81, 98; Valencia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122363, April 29, 2003, 401 SCRA 666,
680-81; Bañares v. Balising, G.R. No. 132624, March 13, 2000, 328 SCRA 36, 49; Cabada v.
Alunan III, G.R. No. 119645, August 22, 1996, 260 SCRA 838, 848; Republic v. Asuncion, G.R. No.
108208, March 11, 1994, 231 SCRA 211; Corona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97356, September
30, 1992, 214 SCRA 378, 392. 

18
 G.R. No. 124498, October 5, 2001, 366 SCRA 567.

19
 Id. at 572.

20
 Mejia v. People, G.R. No. 149937, June 21, 2007, 525 SCRA 209, 213-214.

21
 Rigor v. People, G.R. No. 144887, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 451, 461; Narte v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 132552, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 336, 341; Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
105461, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 723, 726-727, citing People v. Nitafan, G.R. No. 75954,
October 22, 1992, 215 SCRA 79, 84-85 and Que v. People, Nos. L-75217-18, September 21, 1987,
154 SCRA 161, 165.

22
 Supra note 20, at 214-215.
 23
 G.R. No. 145498, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 455.

24
 Id. at 474-475.

CASE 47: Prejudicial Questions

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 172060               September 13, 2010

JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner, 
vs.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review 1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on
20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

The Antecedent Facts

The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals’ decision: 

On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for
frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-
130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon
City).

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine
Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC
Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the
relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case
No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City. 

The Decision of the Trial Court

The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005 3 holding that the pendency of the case before
the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it.
The RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries sustained by
respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioner’s marriage with
respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground] of the
Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED.

SO ORDERED.4

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order, 5 the RTC Quezon City denied
the motion.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005
Orders of the RTC Quezon City.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled
that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the
commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the
issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage
between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide
had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge of
frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.

Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals’ decision.

The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against
petitioner.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Civil Case Must be Instituted

Before the Criminal Case

Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure 6 provides:

Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.

The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this
case, the Information7 for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon
City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC Quezon City set
Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served
summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005. 8 Respondent’s petition9 in Civil Case No. 04-
7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for
annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the
requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil
action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
 Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question
in Criminal Case for Parricide

Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension
of the criminal action.

There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there
exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may
proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. 10 A prejudicial question is defined as:

x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct
and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said
case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but
also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. 11

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, 12 which
punishes any person "who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any
of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse." 13 The relationship between the offender and the victim
distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder 14 or homicide.15 However, the issue in the annulment of
marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the
relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. 

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in
parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed
respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of petitioner’s will.16 At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case
No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the
subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged
crime, he was still married to respondent.1avvphi1

We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals17 that "the judicial declaration of
the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x." First, the
issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial
question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro  that "[t]here is x x x a recognition written into
the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences." 18 In
fact, the Court declared in that case that "a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are
concerned."19

In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial in Criminal
Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR: 

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.**

Associate Justice 

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated additional member per Special Order No. 886 dated 1 September 2010.

** Designated additional member per Raffle dated 8 September 2010.

1
 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2
  Rollo, pp. 27-34. Penned by Associate Justice Regalado E. Maambong with Associate Justices
Rodrigo V. Cosico and Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring.

3
 Id. at 50-51. Penned by Presiding Judge Ramon A. Cruz.

4
 Id. at 51.

5
 Id. at 53.

6
 Dated 1 December 2000.

7
 Rollo, p. 54.

8
 Id. at 56.

9
 Id. at 61-65.

10
 Jose v. Suarez, G.R. No. 176795, 30 June 2008, 556 SCRA 773.

11
 Go v. Sandiganbayan,  G.R. Nos. 150329-30, 11 September 2007, 532 SCRA 574, 577-578.
 12
 People v. Dalag, 450 Phil. 304 (2003).

13
 Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.

14
 Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

15
 Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

16
 See Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. 

17
 467 Phil. 723 (2004).

18
 Id. at 744. Italicization in the original.

19
 Id. at 742.

CASE 48: Prejudicial Questions

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 166836               September 4, 2013

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC., PETITIONER, 

vs.
SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ, ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, TEODORO B. ARCENAS, JR., MAXY S. ABAD, JAMES G.
BARBERS, STEPHEN N. SARINO, ENRIQUE N. ZALAMEA, JR., MARIANO M. MARTIN, ORLANDO O.
SAMSON, CATHERINE R. AGUIRRE, AND ANTONIO V. AGCAOILI, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the buyer of residential
subdivision lots in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to compel the seller to deliver
the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of the fully paid lots is properly considered a ground to suspend a
criminal prosecution for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 1 on the ground of a
prejudicial question. The administrative determination is a logical antecedent of the resolution of the
criminal charges based on non-delivery of the TCTs.

Antecedents

Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties), a domestic corporation engaged in the
real estate business, purchased in 1992, 1993 and April 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes), then
represented by Atty. Florencio B. Orendain (Orendain) as its duly authorized rehabilitation receiver
appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 2 130 residential lots situated in its
subdivision BF Homes Parañaque, containing a total area of 44,345 square meters for the aggregate
price of ₱106,248,000.00. The transactions were embodied in three separate deeds of sale. 3 The TCTs
covering the lots bought under the first and second deeds were fully delivered to San Miguel Properties,
but 20 TCTs covering 20 of the 41 parcels of land with a total area of 15,565 square meters purchased
under the third deed of sale, executed in April 1993 and for which San Miguel Properties paid the full
price of ₱39,122,627.00, were not delivered to San Miguel Properties.

On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels of land purchased
under the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the
time of the transactions after being meanwhile replaced as receiver by FBO Network Management, Inc.
on May 17, 1989 pursuant to an order from the SEC. 4
BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus, on August 15, 2000, San Miguel
Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City (OCP Las Piñas)
charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in violation of Section
25, in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree No. 957 (I.S. No. 00-2256). 5

At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB (HLURB
Case No. REM-082400-11183),6 praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor.

In their joint counter-affidavit submitted in I.S. No. 00-2256, 7 respondent directors and officers of BF
Homes refuted San Miguel Properties’ assertions by contending that: (a) San Miguel Properties’ claim
was not legally demandable because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to sell the 130 lots in
1992 and 1993 due to his having been replaced as BF Homes’ rehabilitation receiver by the SEC on May
17, 1989; (b) the deeds of sale conveying the lots were irregular for being undated and unnotarized; (c)
the claim should have been brought to the SEC because BF Homes was under receivership; (d) in
receivership cases, it was essential to suspend all claims against a distressed corporation in order to
enable the receiver to effectively exercise its powers free from judicial and extra-judicial interference
that could unduly hinder the rescue of the distressed company; and (e) the lots involved were under
custodia legis in view of the pending receivership proceedings, necessarily stripping the OCP Las Piñas of
the jurisdiction to proceed in the action.

On October 10, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the OCP Las
Piñas,8 citing the pendency of BF Homes’ receivership case in the SEC. In its comment/opposition, BF
Homes opposed the motion to suspend. In the meantime, however, the SEC terminated BF Homes’
receivership on September 12, 2000, prompting San Miguel Properties to file on October 27, 2000 a
reply to BF Homes’ comment/opposition coupled with a motion to withdraw the sought suspension of
proceedings due to the intervening termination of the receivership. 9

On October 23, 2000, the OCP Las Piñas rendered its resolution, 10 dismissing San Miguel Properties’
criminal complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground that no action could be
filed by or against a receiver without leave from the SEC that had appointed him; that the
implementation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957 exclusively pertained under the
jurisdiction of the HLURB; that there existed a prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of the
criminal action until after the issue on the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first determined by
the SEC en banc or by the HLURB; and that no prior resort to administrative jurisdiction had been made;
that there appeared to be no probable cause to indict respondents for not being the actual signatories
in the three deeds of sale.

On February 20, 2001, the OCP Las Piñas denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration filed
on November 28, 2000, holding that BF Homes’ directors and officers could not be held liable for the
non-delivery of the TCTs under Presidential Decree No. 957 without a definite ruling on the legality of
Atty. Orendain’s actions; and that the criminal liability would attach only after BF Homes did not comply
with a directive of the HLURB directing it to deliver the titles. 11

San Miguel Properties appealed the resolutions of the OCP Las Piñas to the Department of Justice (DOJ),
but the DOJ Secretary denied the appeal on October 15, 2001, holding:

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the
City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. Established jurisprudence supports the position taken by the City
Prosecutor concerned.

There is no dispute that aside from the instant complaint for violation of PD 957, there is still pending
with the Housing and Land Use Resulatory Board (HLURB, for short) a complaint for specific
performance where the HLURB is called upon to inquire into, and rule on, the validity of the sales
transactions involving the lots in question and entered into by Atty. Orendain for and in behalf of BF
Homes.

As early as in the case of Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, the Supreme Court had ruled that
the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving real estate business and practices under PD
957. This is reiterated in the subsequent cases of Union Bank of the Philippines versus HLURB, G.R. [No.]
953364, June 29, 1992 and C.T. Torres Enterprises vs. Hilionada, 191 SCRA 286.
The said ruling simply means that unless and until the HLURB rules on the validity of the transactions
involving the lands in question with specific reference to the capacity of Atty. Orendain to bind BF
Homes in the said transactions, there is as yet no basis to charge criminally respondents for non-delivery
of the subject land titles. In other words, complainant cannot invoke the penal provision of PD 957 until
such time that the HLURB shall have ruled and decided on the validity of the transactions involving the
lots in question.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)

The DOJ eventually denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration. 13

Ruling of the CA

Undaunted, San Miguel Properties elevated the DOJ’s resolutions to the CA on certiorari and mandamus
(C.A.-G.R. SP No. 73008), contending that respondent DOJ Secretary had acted with grave abuse in
denying their appeal and in refusing to charge the directors and officers of BF Homes with the violation
of Presidential Decree No. 957. San Miguel Properties submitted the issue of whether or not HLURB Case
No. REM-082400-11183 presented a prejudicial question that called for the suspension of the criminal
action for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957.

In its assailed decision promulgated on February 24, 2004 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 73008, 14 the CA dismissed
San Miguel Properties’ petition, holding and ruling as follows:

From the foregoing, the conclusion that may be drawn is that the rule on prejudicial question generally
applies to civil and criminal actions only.

However, an exception to this rule is provided in Quiambao vs. Osorio cited by the respondents. In this
case, an issue in an administrative case was considered a prejudicial question to the resolution of a civil
case which, consequently, warranted the suspension of the latter until after termination of the
administrative proceedings.

Quiambao vs. Osorio is not the only instance when the Supreme Court relaxed the application of the
rule on prejudicial question.

In Tamin vs. CA involving two (2) civil actions, the Highest Court similarly applied the rule on prejudicial
question when it directed petitioner therein to put up a bond for just compensation should the
demolition of private respondents’ building proved to be illegal as a result of a pending cadastral suit in
another tribunal.

City of Pasig vs. COMELEC is yet another exception where a civil action involving a boundary dispute was
considered a prejudicial question which must be resolved prior to an administrative proceeding for the
holding of a plebiscite on the affected areas.

In fact, in Vidad vs. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, it was ruled that in the interest of good order, courts
can suspend action in one case pending determination of another case closely interrelated or interlinked
with it.

It thus appears that public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion x x x when he applied
the rule on prejudicial question to the instant proceedings considering that the issue on the validity of
the sale transactions x x x by x x x Orendain in behalf of BF Homes, Inc., is closely intertwined with the
purported criminal culpability of private respondents, as officers/directors of BF Homes, Inc., arising
from their failure to deliver the titles of the parcels of land included in the questioned conveyance.

All told, to sustain the petitioner’s theory that the result of the HLURB proceedings is not determinative
of the criminal liability of private respondents under PD 957 would be to espouse an absurdity. If we
were to assume that the HLURB finds BFHI under no obligation to delve the subject titles, it would be
highly irregular and contrary to the ends of justice to pursue a criminal case against private respondents
for the non-delivery of certificates of title which they are not under any legal obligation to turn over in
the first place. (Bold emphasis supplied)
On a final note, absent grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutorial arm of the government
as represented by herein public respondent, courts will not interfere with the discretion of a public
prosecutor in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before him. A public prosecutor, by the nature
of his office, is under no compulsion to file a criminal information where no clear legal justification has
been shown, and no sufficient evidence of guilt nor prima facie case has been established by the
complaining party.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is hereby DENIED.
The Resolutions dated 15 October 2001 and 12 July 2002 of the Department of Justice are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 15

The CA denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration on January 18, 2005. 16

Issues

Aggrieved, San Miguel Properties is now on appeal, raising the following for consideration and
resolution, to wit:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE, SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERRORS WHEN IT DISMISSED
PETITIONER’S CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS PETITION TO ORDER AND DIRECT RESPONDENT SECRETARY
TO INDICT RESPONDENTS FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 25, PD. 957 IN THAT:

THE OBLIGATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO DELIVER TO PETITIONER THE TITLES TO 20 FULLY-PAID

LOTS IS MANDATED BY SECTION 25, PD 957. IN FACT, THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAD DULY
CONFIRMED THE SAME PER ITS DECISION DATED 27 JANUARY 2005 IN O.P. CASE NO. 03-E-203,
ENTITLED "SMPI V. BF HOMES, INC.".

A FORTIORI, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ FAILURE AND/OR REFUSAL TO DELIVER TO PETITIONER THE

SUBJECT TITLES CONSTITUTES CRIMINAL OFFENSE PER SECTIONS 25 AND 39, PD 957 FOR WHICH IT IS
THE MINISTERIAL DUTY OF RESPONDENT SECRETARY TO INDICT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THEREFOR.

IN ANY EVENT, THE HLURB CASE DOES NOT PRESENT A "PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" TO THE SUBJECT
CRIMINAL CASE SINCE THE FORMER INVOLVES AN ISSUE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE ISSUE
INVOLVED IN THE LATTER. CONSEQUENTLY, THE HLURB CASE HAS NO CORRELATION, TIE NOR LINKAGE
TO THE PRESENT CRIMINAL CASE WHICH CAN PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY THEREOF.

IN FACT, THE CRIMINAL CULPABILITY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS EMANATE FROM THEIR MALA
PROHIBITA NON-DELIVERY OF THE TITLES TO TWENTY (20) FULLY-PAID PARCELS OF LAND TO
PETITIONER, AND NOT FROM THEIR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE HLURB’S RULING IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE.

NONETHELESS, BY DECREEING THAT PETITIONER’S CRIMINAL COMPLAINT IS PREMATURE, BOTH THE

COURT OF APPEALS AND RESPONDENT SECRETARY HAD IMPLIEDLY ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF
SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR THE CRIME CHARGED. 17

It is relevant at this juncture to mention the outcome of the action for specific performance and
damages that San Miguel Properties instituted in the HLURB simultaneously with its filing of the
complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957. On January 25, 2002, the HLURB Arbiter ruled
that the HLURB was inclined to suspend the proceedings until the SEC resolved the issue of Atty.
Orendain’s authority to enter into the transactions in BF Homes’ behalf, because the final resolution by
the SEC was a logical antecedent to the determination of the issue involved in the complaint before the
HLURB. Upon appeal, the HLURB Board of Commissioners (HLURB Board), citing the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, affirmed the HLURB Arbiter’s decision, holding that although no prejudicial question could
arise, strictly speaking, if one case was civil and the other administrative, it nonetheless opted to
suspend its action on the cases pending the final outcome of the administrative proceeding in the
interest of good order.18

Not content with the outcome, San Miguel Properties appealed to the Office of the President (OP),
arguing that the HLURB erred in suspending the proceedings. On January 27, 2004, the OP reversed the
HLURB Board’s ruling, holding thusly:
The basic complaint in this case is one for specific performance under Section 25 of the Presidential
Decree (PD) 957 – "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective."

As early as August 1987, the Supreme Court already recognized the authority of the HLURB, as successor
agency of the National Housing Authority (NHA), to regulate, pursuant to PD 957, in relation to PD 1344,
the real estate trade, with exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases "involving specific
performance of contractual and statutory obligation filed by buyers of subdivision lots … against the
owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman," the HLURB, in the exercise of its adjudicatory powers
and functions, "must interpret and apply contracts, determine the rights of the parties under these
contracts and award[s] damages whenever appropriate."

Given its clear statutory mandate, the HLURB’s decision to await for some forum to decide – if ever one
is forthcoming – the issue on the authority of Orendain to dispose of subject lots before it peremptorily
resolves the basic complaint is unwarranted, the issues thereon having been joined and the respective
position papers and the evidence of the parties having been submitted. To us, it behooved the HLURB to
adjudicate, with the usual dispatch, the right and obligation of the parties in line with its own
appreciation of the obtaining facts and applicable law. To borrow from Mabubha Textile Mills
Corporation vs. Ongpin, it does not have to rely on the finding of others to discharge this adjudicatory
functions.19

After its motion for reconsideration was denied, BF Homes appealed to the CA (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 83631),
raising as issues: (a) whether or not the HLURB had the jurisdiction to decide with finality the question of
Atty. Orendain’s authority to enter into the transaction with San Miguel Properties in BF Homes’ behalf,
and rule on the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract; and (b) whether or not the HLURB
properly suspended the proceedings until the SEC resolved with finality the matter regarding such
authority of Atty. Orendain.

The CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 83631, 20 decreeing that the HLURB, not the SEC, had
jurisdiction over San Miguel Properties’ complaint. It affirmed the OP’s decision and ordered the remand
of the case to the HLURB for further proceedings on the ground that the case involved matters within
the HLURB’s competence and expertise pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, viz:

[T]he High Court has consistently ruled that the NHA or the HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints
arising from contracts between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at
compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations.

Hence, the HLURB should take jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint because it pertains to matters
within the HLURB’s competence and expertise. The proceedings before the HLURB should not be
suspended.

While We sustain the Office of the President, the case must be remanded to the HLURB. This is in
recognition of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The fairest and most equitable course to take under
the circumstances is to remand the case to the HLURB for the proper presentation of evidence. 21

Did the Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the dismissal of San Miguel
Properties’ criminal complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 for lack of probable cause and
for reason of a prejudicial question?

The question boils down to whether the HLURB administrative case brought to compel the delivery of
the TCTs could be a reason to suspend the proceedings on the criminal complaint for the violation of
Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question.

Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

1.

Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raises a
prejudicial question BF Homes’ posture that the administrative case for specific performance in the
HLURB posed a prejudicial question that must first be determined before the criminal case for violation
of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 could be resolved is correct.
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is
lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but is so
intimately connected with the crime that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. 22 The
rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions. 23 The essential
elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a)
the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.

The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to San
Miguel Properties’ submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of because no civil
action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specific performance in the
HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge for
the criminal violation of Section 2524of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is true simply because the
action for specific performance was an action civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere
except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original. 25

The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended because of a prejudicial question
rested on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the specific performance case were so
related with the issues raised in the criminal complaint for the violation of Presidential Decree No. 957,
such that the resolution of the issues in the former would be determinative of the question of guilt in
the criminal case. An examination of the nature of the two cases involved is thus necessary.

An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact performance of a contract in the
specific form in which it was made, or according to the precise terms agreed upon by a party bound to
fulfill it.26 Evidently, before the remedy of specific performance is availed of, there must first be a breach
of the contract.27 The remedy has its roots in Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which reads:

Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors
should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.

The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the
payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if
the latter should become impossible. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, the injured party may choose between specific performance or rescission with damages. As
presently worded, Article 1191 speaks of the remedy of rescission in reciprocal obligations within the
context of Article 1124 of the former Civil Code which used the term resolution. The remedy of
resolution applied only to reciprocal obligations, such that a party’s breach of the contract equated to a
tacit resolutory condition that entitled the injured party to rescission. The present article, as in the
former one, contemplates alternative remedies for the injured party who is granted the option to
pursue, as principal actions, either the rescission or the specific performance of the obligation, with
payment of damages in either case.28

On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 957 is a law that regulates the sale of subdivision lots and
condominiums in view of the increasing number of incidents wherein "real estate subdivision owners,
developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide
and maintain properly" the basic requirements and amenities, as well as of reports of alarming
magnitude of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers and operators,29 such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from
liens and encumbrances. Presidential Decree No. 957 authorizes the suspension and revocation of the
registration and license of the real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers in
certain instances, as well as provides the procedure to be observed in such instances; it prescribes
administrative fines and other penalties in case of violation of, or non-compliance with its provisions.

Conformably with the foregoing, the action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine
whether or not San Miguel Properties was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20
TCTs, while the criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes’ directors and officers were
criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must obviously precede that
of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the
20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his
receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the violation of
Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 would evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with
the criminal case.

Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need not conclusively resolve the guilt or
innocence of the accused. It is enough for the prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of the
allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party
who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential
elements of the crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the
Prosecution has not yet presented a single piece of evidence on the indictment or may not have rested
its case. A challenge to the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in
effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit. 30

2.

Doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable

That the action for specific performance was an administrative case pending in the HLURB, instead of in
a court of law, was of no consequence at all. As earlier mentioned, the action for specific performance,
although civil in nature, could be brought only in the HLURB. This situation conforms to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. There has been of late a proliferation of administrative agencies, mostly regulatory
in function. It is in favor of these agencies that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is frequently invoked,
not to defeat the resort to the judicial adjudication of controversies but to rely on the expertise,
specialized skills, and knowledge of such agencies in their resolution. The Court has observed that one
thrust of the proliferation is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights
under contracts are no longer a uniquely judicial function exercisable only by the regular courts. 31

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been increasingly called into play on matters demanding the
special competence of administrative agencies even if such matters are at the same time within the
jurisdiction of the courts. A case that requires for its determination the expertise, specialized skills, and
knowledge of some administrative board or commission because it involves technical matters or
intricate questions of fact, relief must first be obtained in an appropriate administrative proceeding
before a remedy will be supplied by the courts although the matter comes within the jurisdiction of the
courts. The application of the doctrine does not call for the dismissal of the case in the court but only for
its suspension until after the matters within the competence of the administrative body are threshed
out and determined.32

To accord with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot and will not determine a
controversy involving a question within the competence of an administrative tribunal, the controversy
having been so placed within the special competence of the administrative tribunal under a regulatory
scheme. In that instance, the judicial process is suspended pending referral to the administrative body
for its view on the matter in dispute. Consequently, if the courts cannot resolve a question that is within
the legal competence of an administrative body prior to the resolution of that question by the latter,
especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative agency to ascertain technical and
intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the
regulatory statute administered, suspension or dismissal of the action is proper. 33

3.

Other submissions of petitioner are unwarranted

It is not tenable for San Miguel Properties to argue that the character of a violation of Section 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 957 as malum prohibitum, by which criminal liability attached to BF Homes’
directors and officers by the mere failure to deliver the TCTs, already rendered the suspension
unsustainable.34 The mere fact that an act or omission was malum prohibitum did not do away with the
initiative inherent in every court to avoid an absurd result by means of rendering a reasonable
interpretation and application of the procedural law. Indeed, the procedural law must always be given a
reasonable construction to preclude absurdity in its application. 35 Hence, a literal application of the
principle governing prejudicial questions is to be eschewed if such application would produce unjust and
absurd results or unreasonable consequences.
San Miguel Properties further submits that respondents could not validly raise the prejudicial question
as a reason to suspend the criminal proceedings because respondents had not themselves initiated
either the action for specific performance or the criminal action.1âwphi1 It contends that the defense of
a prejudicial question arising from the filing of a related case could only be raised by the party who filed
or initiated said related case.

The submission is unfounded. The rule on prejudicial question makes no distinction as to who is allowed
to raise the defense. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no
distinction, we ought not to distinguish.36

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 24, 2004 by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP NO. 73008; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Vice Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, who is on official trip for the Court to
attend the Southeast Asia Regional Judicial Colloquium on Gender Equality Jurisprudence and
the Role of the Judiciary in Promoting Women’s Access to Justice, in Bangkok, Thailand, per
Special Order No. 1529 dated August 29, 2013.

1
 Entitled Regulating the Sale of Subdivision Lots and Condominiums, Providing Penalties for
Violation Thereof (July 12, 1976).

2
 Rollo p. 442.

3
 Id. at 137-172.

4
 Id. at 61.

5
 Id. at 123.

6
 Id. at 420-428.
7
 Id. at 178-181.

8
 Id. at 215-217.

9
 Id. at 253.

10
 Id. at 247-250.

11
 Id. at 272-273.

12
 Id. at 95-96.

13
 Id. at 98-99.

14
 Id. at 13-21; penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, with the concurrence of
Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner (later Presiding Justice/retired/deceased) and Associate
Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr.

15
 Id. at 19-20.

16
 Id. at 23-25.

17
 Id. at 37-38.

18
 Id. at 608.

19
 Id. at 609-610.

20
 Id. at 504-523.

21
 Id. at 522.

22
 People v. Consing, Jr., G.R. No. 148193, January 16, 2003, 395 SCRA 366, 369.

23
 Beltran v. People, G.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000, 334 SCRA 106, 110.

24
 Section 25. Issuance of Title. – The owner or developer shall deliver the title of the lot or unit
to the buyer upon full payment of the lot or unit. No fee, except those required for the
registration of the deed of sale in the Registry of Deeds, shall be collected for the issuance of
such title. In the event a mortgage over the lot or unit is outstanding at the time of the issuance
of the title to the buyer, the owner or developer shall redeem the mortgage or the
corresponding portion thereof within six months from such issuance in order that the title over
any fully paid lot or unit may be secured and delivered to the buyer in accordance herewith.

25
 Under Presidential Decree No. 1344 (entitled Empowering the National Housing Authority to
Issue Writ of Execution in the Enforcement of its Decision under Presidential Decree No. 957),
the National Housing Authority, the predecessor of the HLURB, was vested with original
jurisdiction, as follows:

Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business
and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National
Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the
following nature:

(a) Unsound real estate business practices;

(b) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium
unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
 (c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by
buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman. (Emphasis supplied)

26
 Black’s Law Dictionary.

27
 Ayala Life Assurance, Inc. v. Ray Burton Development Corporation, G.R. No. 163075, January
23, 2006, 479 SCRA 462, 469.

28
 Congregation of the Religious of the Virgin Mary v. Orola, G.R. No. 169790, April 30, 2008, 553
SCRA 578, 585.

29
 Co Chien v. Sta. Lucia Realty & Development Inc., G.R. No. 162090, January 31, 2007, 513 SCRA
570, 577-578.

30
 Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis. G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000, 336 SCRA 747, 752.

31
 Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing Authority, No. L-50444, August 31, 1987, 153
SCRA 399, 407.

32
 Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88550, April 18, 1990, 184 SCRA 426,
431-432.

33
 Provident Tree Farms, Inc. v. Batario, Jr., G.R. No. 92285, March 28, 1994, 231 SCRA 463, 469-
470; Saavedra, Jr. v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 93173, September 15, 1993, 226 SCRA 438,
442-443; Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña, No. L-77663, April 12, 1988,
159 SCRA 556, 567-568; Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil
932, 941 (1954).

34
 Rollo, p. 49

35
 Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 110524, July 29, 2002, 385 SCRA
306, 316.

36
 Yu v. Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, February 9, 2011, 642 SCRA 421, 428.
CASE 49: Natural Persons (How Personality is Extinguished)

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-60544 May 19, 1984

ARSENIO FLORENDO, JR., MILAGROS FLORENDO and BEATRIZ FLORENDO, petitioners, 

vs.
HON. PERPETUA D. COLOMA, Presiding Judge of Branch VII, City Court of Quezon City; GAUDENCIO
TOBIAS, General Manager, National Housing Authority; Registrar of Deeds for Quezon City; WILLIAM
R. VASQUEZ and ERLINDA NICOLAS, respondents.

Emilio A. de Peralta for petitioners. 

Byron S. Anastacio for respondent Vasquez.

Emilio Purunganan for respondent Nicolas. 

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

In this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, the petitioners seek the annulment of: (1) the
May 20, 1975 decision of the respondent court in Civil Case No. VII-17952 for ejectment entitled Adela
Salindon v. William Vasquez and Silverio Nicolas; (2) the August 3, 1981 writ of execution issued by the
respondent court; and (3) the March 1, 1982 order also issued by the respondent court directing the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City to annul Transfer Certificate of Title No. 138007 in the name of Adela
Salindon and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 239729 in the name of the petitioners. 

On July 11, 1969, Adela Salindon an awardee of a Philippine Homesite and Housing Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as PHHC) lot filed a complaint for ejectment against William Vasquez and
Silverio Nicolas with the respondent court. The disputed residential lot, located at Diliman, Quezon City,
is more particularly described as follows: 

Residential lot situated at Quezon City, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of

Title No. 138007, in the name of the herein plaintiff, containing an area of 915.00 square
meters. Designated as Lot No. 1, Block No. 101 Psd — 68808 Diliman Estate Subdivision.
Bounded on the SW-by Lot No. 2, Block 101; of the subdivision plan; on the NW-by Road
 Lot 8, Pcs-4564; on the NE by Road Lot 96; and on the SE by Lot No. 12, Block 101; both
of the subdivision plan. 

In her complaint, Salindon alleged that the defendants were squatters occupying her property. 

Defendant William Vasquez denied his being a squatter in the subject parcel of land. He alleged that he
had been in continuous, open, adverse and actual possession and occupation of the lot since 1950. He
also questioned the city court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action stating that the facts
alleged in the complaint involved questions of title or ownership of the lot, matters outside the
jurisdiction of the respondent court. He further questioned the qualifications of Salindon to purchase
the disputed lot from the PHHC, as she was the owner of several other registered real estate properties
and an outsider in so far as the lot was concerned. 

On March 12, 1971, defendant Silverio Nicolas died. He was substituted by his wife Erlinda who filed an
amended answer with third party complaint against PHHC. In his answer, Nicolas had denied that he was
a squatter on the lot. He alleged that lie had been a possessor and occupant of a piece of residential lot
located at Malaya Avenue, continuously, openly, publicly and adverse to any other claimant and under
concept of an owner for more than ten years. Like defendant Vasquez, he also questioned the
jurisdiction of the respondent court over the subject matter of the action and the qualifications of
Salindon to purchase the subject parcel of land.

Third-Party defendant PHHC admitted the sale of the disputed land to Adela Salindon. According to
PHHC, the award of the lot to Salindon was a valid exercise of the PHHCs powers and could not be
collaterally assailed the illegal acts of the defendants could not ripen into legal ones; the defendants
being squatters have not acquired any vested right over the property and that, since the subject lot is
not a relocation area intended for squatters, the defendants can not claim preference in the award of
the lot. The PHHC also questioned the jurisdiction of the city court over the third party complaint on the
following grounds: (1) cancellation of the deed of sale executed in favor of Salindon amounts to an
action for rescission of contract which falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance; and (2) the action involves title or possession of real property, hence the action against
PHHC should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

After trial on the merits, the respondent court issued a decision in favor of the defendants. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads: 

WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiff as follows:

(1) declaring the conditional and the absolute deeds of sale executed by the PHHC in
favor of the plaintiff Adela Salindon as null and void; and

(2) ordering the PHHC to award the lot in litigation to the defendant William Vasquez
and Erlinda Nicolas and, upon payment by said defendants of the total consideration
within 30 days from notice of this decision, to execute the corresponding deed of
absolute sale in their favor. 

On August 25, 1975 Adela Salindon appealed the aforequoted decision to the Court of Appeals.

On December 11, 1976, Salindon died. There was, however, no substitution of party, hence Salindon
continued to be the appellant in the appealed case. On March 21, 1977 the case was remanded to the
city court for the retaking of testimony which could not be considered because the stenographic notes
could not be transcribed. The deceased Salindon continued to be an adverse party. Meanwhile, after
Salindon's death, her heirs settled her estate and the subject lot was transferred with a new Transfer
Certificate of Title to the petitioners. 

On July 31, 1980 the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution ordering plaintiff-appellant Salindon to show
cause why her appeal should not be dismissed. 

On December 4, 1980, the Court of Appeals issued another Resolution dismissing the appeal for having
been abandoned. 

On August 3, 1981, respondent court issued a writ of execution to enforce the decision. 
On November 7, 1981, respondent General Manager Gaudencio Tobias of the National Housing
Authority (hereinafter referred as NHA), successor to the powers and functions of the PHHC, wrote a
letter to private respondents informing them that the NHA was ready to implement the decision and
suggesting that in order to avoid delay, they secure an order directing the Registrar of Deeds of Quezon
City to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 239729. 

On February 16, 1982 respondent William Vasquez filed a motion for the issuance of an order directing
the Quezon City Register of Deeds to cancel TCT No. 138007 in the name of Adela Salindon and TCT No.
239729, in the name of petitioners. A similar motion was filed by respondent Erlinda Nicolas. 

On March 19, 1982, petitioner Arsenio Florendo, Jr., filed a manifestation and opposition to the motions
for cancellation alleging that the court has no jurisdiction to order the cancellation of the titles 

Hence, the instant petition. 

Considering the circumstances of the case, a preliminary issue surfaces as to the status of the decision
vis-a-vis the petitioners. The petitioners challenge the proceeding in the Court of Appeals after the death
of the plaintiff-appellant Adela Salindon. They are of the opinion that since there was no legal
representative substituted for Salindon after her death, the appellate court lost its jurisdiction over the
case and consequently, the proceedings in the said court are null and void. This argument is without
merit. 

There is no dispute that an ejectment case survives the death of a party. The supervening death of
plaintiff-appellant Salindon did not extinguish her civil personality (Republic v. Bagtas, 6 SCRA 242; Vda.
de Haberes v. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 534). Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides: 

After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order upon
proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted
for the deceased within a period of thirty (30) days or within such time as may be
granted ... 

Section 16 of Rule 3 provides: 

Whenever a party to a pending case dies ... it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform
the court promptly of such death ... and to give the name and residence of the executor,
administrator, guardian or other legal representative of the deceased ... 

In the case at bar, Salindon's counsel after her death on December 11, 1976 failed to inform the court of
Salindon's death. The appellate court could not be expected to know or take judicial notice of the death
of Salindon without the proper manifestation from Salindon's counsel. In such a case and considering
that the supervening death of appellant did not extinguish her civil personality, the appellate court was
well within its jurisdiction to proceed as it did with the case. There is no showing that the appellate
court's proceedings in the case were tainted with irregularities.

It appears that the petitioners are heirs of Adela Salindon. In fact, it was because of this relationship that
the petitioners were able to transfer the title of Adela Salindon over the subject lot to their names. After
Salindon's death, the disputed lot was included as part of her estate. Salindon's counsel, whose acts bind
his client, failed to comply with his duty to the court and his deceased client. Considering all this, the
appellate decision is binding and enforceable against the petitioners as successors-in-interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action (Section 49 (b) Rule 39, Rules of Court). Furthermore,
"... judgment in an ejectment case may be enforced not only against defendants therein but also against
the members of their family, their relatives, or privies who derived their right of possession from the
defendants" (Ariem v. De los Angeles, 49 SCRA 343). Under the circumstances of this case, the same rule
should apply to the successors-in-interest if the decision should go against the original plaintiff. 

We note, however, that the petitioners challenge the decision on the ground that the respondent city
court had no jurisdiction in the first instance over the ejectment complaint. 

In this respect, the petitioners are correct. Adela Salindon filed an ejectment case to evict alleged
squatters who were in possession of a lot awarded to her by the PHHC. Instead of dealing with the case
as a simple one of ejectment and handling the issues within the confines of its limited jurisdiction, the
respondent city court went further into territory out of bounds to it and cancelled the administrative
determinations of the PHHC, rescinded the deeds of sale, usurped the powers of the administrative
agency by awarding the government lots to the defendants on the basis of evidence clearly inadequate
from the records and by the rules of the agency to sustain such awards, conclusively adjudicated on the
basis of irregular proceedings the ownership of the disputed lot, and ordered the cancellation of Torrens
titles already issued in the petitioners' names. 

May the petitioners take advantage of this lack of jurisdiction? 

As a rule, the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. The time honored principle is that
"... jurisdiction of a court is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the
parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal ...".(Calimlim v. Ramirez, 118 SCRA 399). This principle, however, is not absolute. There are cases
wherein we ruled that because of their exceptional and peculiar circumstances, a party is estopped from
invoking the lack of the court's jurisdiction. (Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29; Crisostomo v. Court of
Appeals, 32 SCRA 543). We always look into the attendant circumstances of the case so as not to subvert
public policy. (See Paro v. Court of Appeals, 111 SCRA 262). 

This is one such case where the successors-in- interest of the original plaintiff are estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the respondent court. Adela Salindon, the original plaintiff in the
ejectment case consistently maintained her stand that the respondent court had jurisdiction over the
ejectment complaint. She insisted on this jurisdiction over the opposition of the defendants, the private
respondents herein. Thus, she filed a lengthy memorandum against the dismissal of the complaint after
the trial on the merits of the case and made an emphatic justification of the jurisdiction of the
respondent court.

The following rule applies: 

... a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by
way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important
in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment
or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication but for the reason that
such a practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy. (Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy, supra) 

Equitable considerations cannot also help the petitioners. Their own deed of extra-judicial partition
dated March 31, 1977 shows that Adela Lucero Salindon left forty four (44) parcels of land, forty two
(42) of which were in Pangasinan, one (1) parcel in Natividad Street, Manila and the disputed parcel in
Quezon City. There is no showing in the records that the forty three (43) other parcels were either not
owned by Salindon when the PHHC lot was awarded to her or that ownership of these lots and of
706,684 shares of stock in such blue chip corporations as Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., Philippine
Overseas Drilling and Oil Development Corporation, etc. did not disqualify her from applying for a PHHC
lot. There is no showing from the records that the petitioners would suffer from a denial of substantial
justice if the foregoing rules are applied to them. 

The private respondents, however, stand on an entirely different footing. As defendants in the
ejectment case they vigorously questioned the jurisdiction of the city court. They cannot now take
advantage of a decision issued in excess of jurisdiction and in doing so abandon a principal averment in
their respective answers. The respondent court had no jurisdiction to take over the functions of the
PHHC and award ownership of the lot to them. 

Not only was the decision of the city court rendered without jurisdiction, it was also erroneously
irregular to the point of constituting grave abuse of discretion. 

The PHHC was correct when it stated that squatters and intruders who clandestinely enter into titled
government property cannot, by such act, acquire any legal right to said property. There is no showing in
the records that the entry of the private respondents into the lot was effected legally and properly. An
act which was illegal from the start cannot ripen into lawful ownership simply because the usurper has
occupied and possessed the government lot for more than ten (10) years, cleared it of cogon grass,
fenced it, and built a house on the premises. No vested rights should be allowed to arise from the social
blights and lawless acts of squatting and clandestine entrance. True, the government by an act of
magnanimity and in the interest of buying social peace through the quieting of mass unrest may declare
usurped property as a "relocation" area for the squatters. However, the records fall to show that there
has been such action insofar as the disputed lot is concerned or that the private respondents fall within
such a policy or that they have complied with the usual requirements before the benefits of relocation
may be given them. At any rate, this was for the PHHC, now the NHA, to decide and not the city court. 

Under the circumstances of this case, the ownership of the disputed lot remains with. the National
Housing Authority. The NHA may use the authority of this decision to evict the private respondents and
their successors-in-interest from the property and deal with the lot according to its present powers
vested by law and in the light of its current policies and programs. This decision, however, should not be
interpreted to preclude the private respondents from introducing evidence and presenting arguments
before the National Housing Authority to establish any right to which they may be entitled under the law
and the facts of the case. 

WHEREFORE, the decision dated May 20, 1975, the writ of execution dated August 3, 1981 and the
order to annul TCT Nos. 138007 and 239729 dated March 1, 1982, all issued by the respondent city
court are nullified and set aside for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion insofar as the private respondents are concerned. Considering our findings as regards the
petitioner, the Registrar of Deeds for Quezon City is hereby ordered to cancel TCT No. 239729 in the
names of the petitioners and TCT No. 138007 in the name of Adela Salindon. The National Housing
Authority is declared the owner of the disputed lot and is directed to take possession of the same and to
either hold or dispose of it according to law and this decision.

SO ORDERED. 

Teehankee, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

CASE 50: Natural Persons (How Personality is Extinguished)

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-27956 April 30, 1976

DIONISIO DUMLAO, in his own behalf and in his capacity as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the
late Pedro Oria; FAUSTA DUMLAO, AMADO DUMLAO, and BENJAMIN DUMLAO, plaintiffs-appellants, 
vs.
QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC., defendant-appellee.

Castillo & Castillo for appellants. 

Eugenio T. Estavillo for appellee. 

AQUINO, J.:p

On February 28, 1962 the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 
T-662 rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio,
Marcelino Sumalbag and Juana Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastic Products, Inc. the sum of
P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from November, 1958. The lower court directed that in case the
defendants failed to pay the said amount before its decision became final, then Quality Plastic Products,
Inc. "is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond, Exhibit A, in accordance with law, for the satisfaction of
the judgment". (Under that bond the four sureties bound themselves to answer solidarity for the
obligations of the principal, Vicente Soliven and certain real properties of the sureties were "given as
security for" their undertaking). 

Upon defendants' failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after the decision had become final,
the lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic Products, Inc., ordered the "foreclosure" of the surety bond
and the sale at public auction of the land of Pedro Oria which he had given as security under the bond.
Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and six-
tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962. The
sale was confirmed by the lower court in its order of November 20, 1962. 

It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 when the action was filed.
Oria's death was not known to Quality Plastic Products, Inc. Nor were the representatives of Quality
Plastic Products, Inc. aware that in the same Tayug court Special Proceeding No. T-212, Testate Estate of
the deceased Pedro Oria, was pending. 

The summons and copies of the complaint for the five defendants in Civil Case No. 
T-662 had been personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff on Soliven, the principal in the
bond, who acknowledged such service by signing on the back of the original summons in his own behalf
and again signing for his co-defendants. 

On March 1, 1963 Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary
heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc., also in the Tayug court for the
annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land. (Dionisio Dumlao also sued
in his capacity as administrator of Oria's testate estate). 

The ground for annulment was lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased Oria (Civil Case No. T-
873). It was only when Quality Plastic Products, Inc. received the summons in Civil Case No. T-873 that it
learned that Oria was already dead at the time the prior case, Civil Case No. T-662, was filed. 

Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in its answer alleged that Oria's heirs were aware of the suit against Soliven
and his sureties and that the said heirs were estopped to question the court's jurisdiction over Oria. 

After hearing the lower court held that it acquired jurisdiction over Soliven and the other defendants in
Civil Case No. T-662 by reason of their voluntary appearance. It reasoned out that Soliven acted in bad
faith because he did not apprise the court that Oria was dead. It specifically ruled that "it had acquired
jurisdiction over the person" of Oria and that the judgment was valid as to him. From that decision the
plaintiffs appealed. 

The four assignments of error of appellants Dumlao may be boiled down to the issue as to the validity of
the lower court's judgment against the deceased Pedro Oria who, being already in the other world, was
never served with summons. 

There is no difficulty in resolving that issue. Since no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, the judgment
against him is a patent nullity (Ang Lam vs. Rosillosa and Santiago, 86 Phil. 447; Asuncion vs. Nieto, 4
Phil. 97; Gorostiaga vs. Sarte, 68 Phil. 4). 

As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in Civil Case No. T-662 is void for
lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been, validly served with
summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject
of legal relations, was lost through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code). 

The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's counsel also appeared as counsel for Oria, there was
a voluntary appearance which enabled the court to acquire jurisdiction over Oria, as contemplated in
section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Soliven's counsel could not have validly appeared for a
dead co-defendant. Estoppel has no application to this case. 

But from the fact that appellants Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in order to annul the
judgment against Oria, it does not follow that they are entitled to claim attorney's fees against that
corporation. The parties herein agreed in their stipulation of facts that Quality Plastic Products, Inc. was
unaware of Oria's death. Appellants Dumlao in effect conceded that the appellee acted in good faith in
joining Oria as a co-defendant. 

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No. T-662
against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land covered by
OCT No. 28732 is also void. No costs. 

SO ORDERED. 

Fernando, Barredo, Antonio and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.