VOL.

271, APRIL 18, 1997 633

People vs. Derilo

*
G.R. No. 117818. April 18, 1997.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMAN

DERILO, ISIDORO BALDIMO y QUILLO, alias “Sido,” LUCAS
DOÑOS, ALEJANDRO COFUENTES, and John Doe, accused.
ISIDORO BALDIMO y QUILLO, alias “Sido,” accused-appellant.

Criminal Law; Murder; Evident Premeditation; Autopsy report shows

the deliberate employment by the accused of a reliable and unfailing means
to ensure the killing without giving the victim an opportunity to defend
herself.—We agree with the finding of the court below that appellant
participated in the treacherous killing of Perpetua C. Adalim. Appellant’s
presence in the locus criminis and his identification were positively supplied
by the prosecution’s eyewitness. The unwavering and unequivocal
testimony of Lupido, corroborated by that of Dr. Eduardo S. Evardone who
conducted the postmortem examination on the corpse of the victim and
submitted his corresponding autopsy report, indubitably shows the
deliberate employment by the accused of a reliable and unfailing means to
ensure the killing without giving the victim an opportunity to defend herself.
Same; Same; Same; To establish evident premeditation, there must be
proof of (1) the time when the offender determined to commit

_________________

* EN BANC.

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People vs. Derilo

the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his
determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination
and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and
to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will had he desired
to hearken to its warnings.—The trial court should not have concluded that
evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime of murder on
the bases of its findings regarding the admission of guilt by appellant and
the existence of conspiracy with his co-accused. As earlier stated, appellant
entered his plea of guilty after the prosecution had presented its evidence.
Thereafter, no further evidence whatsoever was adduced by it to prove the
supposed evident premeditation. The records and the transcripts of
stenographic notes are barren of any proof tending to show any prior
reflection on, followed after some time by persistence in, the criminal
resolution of the five accused. It is elementary law that to establish evident
premeditation, there must be proof of (1) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that the
culprit has clung to his determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time
between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the
resolution of his will had he desired to hearken to its warnings.
Same; Same; Same; The circumstances specifying an offense or
aggravating the penalty thereof must be proved as conclusively as the act
itself, mere suppositions or presumptions being insufficient to establish their
presence.—As there is no proof, direct or circumstantial, offered by the
prosecution to show when appellant and his co-accused meditated and
reflected upon their decision to kill the victim and the intervening time that
elapsed before this plan was carried out, the circumstance of evident
premeditation cannot be presumed against appellant. As early as 1905, we
laid down the rule that the circumstances specifying an offense as
aggravating the penalty thereof must be proved as conclusively as the act
itself, mere suppositions or presumptions being insufficient to establish their
presence. No matter how truthful these suppositions or presumptions may
seem, they must not and cannot produce the effect of aggravating the
liability of the accused.
Same; Same; Same; Qualifying and aggravating circumstance before
being taken into consideration for the purpose of increasing the degree of
the penalty to be imposed must be proved with equal certainty and clearness
as that which establishes the commission of the act charged as the criminal
offense.—It is an ancient but revered doctrine that qualifying and
aggravating circumstance before being taken into consideration for the
purpose of increasing the degree of the penalty to

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People vs. Derilo

be imposed must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as that which
establishes the commission of the act charged as the criminal offense. It is
not only the central fact of a killing that must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt; every qualifying or aggravating circumstance alleged to have been
present and to have attended such killing, must similarly be shown by the
same degree of proof.
 Criminal Procedure; Plea of Guilty to Capital Offense: There is no
need to prove the presence of aggravating circumstances alleged in an
information or complaint when the accused pleads guilty to the charge.—
The foregoing doctrines consequently point to the need of reconciling them
with the old rule that a plea of guilty admits not only the crime but also its
attendant circumstances which is relied upon and invoked by the lower court
in this case to justify its conclusion of evident premeditation to aggravate
the liability of appellant. Over the years and through numerous cases, this
Court has adopted an exception to the erstwhile rule enunciating that there is
no need to prove the presence of aggravating circumstances alleged in an
information or complaint when the accused pleads guilty to the charge. Our
rulings regarding this principle were expressed more or less in this wise:
Having pleaded guilty to the information, these aggravating circumstances
were deemed fully established, for the plea of guilty to the information
covers both the crime as well as its attendant circumstances qualifying
and/or aggravating the crime.
Same; Same.—With the foregoing presentation, the trial court must
have believed that it had acted correctly in presuming the existence of
evident premeditation based on appellant’s plea of guilty without any proof
being presented to establish such aggravating circumstance. However, the
developmental growth of our procedural rules did not stop there. With the
advent of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, a
new rule, specifically mandating the course that trial courts should follow in
capital cases where the accused pleads guilty was introduced into our
remedial law with this provision: SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense;
reception of evidence.—When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense,
the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution
to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may
also present evidence in his behalf.
Same; Same; The presentation of evidence is required in order to
preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial court, or the
Supreme Court on review.—The presentation of evidence is re-

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People vs. Derilo

quired in order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the mind of the
trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as to the possibility that there
might have been some misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the
nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the
circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime which justify or
require the exercise of a greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition
of the prescribed penalty.
Same; Same; The Court has now made it mandatory on the part of the
lower courts to compel the presentation of evidence and make sure that the
accused fully comprehends the nature and consequences of his plea of
guilty.—To emphasize its importance this Court held in People vs. Dayot
that the rule in Section 3, Rule 116 is mandatory, and issued the warning
that any judge who fails to observe its command commits a grave abuse of
discretion. This Court has come a long way in adopting a mandatory rule
with regard to the presentation of evidence in capital cases where the
accused pleads guilty to the criminal charge. From granting trial courts in
the earlier Rules of Court sufficient discretion in requiring evidence
whenever guilt is admitted by the accused, the Court has now made it
mandatory on the part of the lower courts to compel the presentation of
evidence and make sure that the accused fully comprehends the nature and
consequences of his plea of guilty.
Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstances; The consequences of
aggravating circumstances alleged in the information must be explained to
the accused when he pleads guilty to a crime imputed against him.—There
is another reason why we have to reject the aforesaid conclusion reached by
the lower court in this case. Under settled jurisprudence, the consequences
of aggravating circumstances alleged in the information must be explained
to the accused when he pleads guilty to a crime imputed against him. A
reading of the questions directed at appellant during his rearraignment
reveals a shortcoming on the part of the trial court to fully explain to
appellant the consequences of his plea.
Same; Same; Same; A plea of guilty is improvidently accepted where
no effort was even made to explain to the accused that a plea of guilty to an
information for a capital offense, attended by an aggravating circumstance,
may result in the imposition of the death penalty.—A plea of guilty is
improvidently accepted where no effort was even made to explain to the
accused that a plea of guilty to an information for a capital offense, attended
by an aggravating circumstance, may result in the imposition of the death
penalty. We cannot declare with reasonable certainty that when appellant
pleaded guilty to the crime charged

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People vs. Derilo

in the information he knew that he was at the same time admitting the
presence and serious effects of the aggravating circumstances alleged
therein. We are more inclined to believe, as a matter of judicial experience,
that when he admitted his role in the killing of the deceased, he only
intended to limit such admission to the crime charged and not to the
aggravating circumstances.
Same; Same; Same; Trial judge should try to convey to appellant, in
ordinary language that appellant would be assumed to understand, the
meaning of evident premeditation and treachery as circumstances that
would qualify the killing to murder.—The trial judge did not himself try to
inform or advise appellant regarding the consequences of pleading guilty to
having killed the victim with both circumstances of evident premeditation
and treachery. More particularly, the trial judge did not himself try to convey
to appellant, in ordinary language that appellant would be assumed to
understand, the meaning of evident premeditation and treachery as
circumstances that would qualify the killing to murder and to aggravate the
penalty as to call for the maximum penalty of death.
Same; Same; Same; Conspiracy, treachery, evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength are terms so technical and the layman, especially
an unschooled one like the accused in the said case, cannot possibly
understand without proper elucidation.—In People vs. Alamada, this Court
found the trial court to have failed in observing that quantum of care which
it had prescribed for the valid admission of a plea of guilty by an accused,
especially in capital cases, when it did not explain to the accused the nature
of the charges against him, particularly the allegations regarding conspiracy,
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, which are
terms so technical that the layman, especially an unschooled one like the
accused in the said case, cannot possibly understand without proper
elucidation. It is neither just nor reasonable to assume that an uneducated
person understands the allegation that “the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and premeditation were present in the commission of the crime,”
inasmuch as “treachery” and “premeditation” are highly technical terms the
juridical meaning of which is beyond the understanding not of the illiterates
alone but even of those who, being educated, are not lawyers.
Same; Same; Same.—If many members of the Bar are unable to call to
mind the technical requisites of “treachery” and “evident premeditation” as
qualifying and aggravating circumstances, there is no reason for supposing
that the accused, who is a farmer by occupation, understood such elements
and requisites after a few minutes of whis-

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People vs. Derilo

pered advice from a counsel de oficio in open court.

Same; Same; Same; A plea of guilty to an information alleging
aggravating circumstances will not be considered an admission of such
circumstances if the evidence presented by the prosecution fails to establish
them.—Another reason why we cannot agree with the lower court’s posture
on this issue is the consistent holding in several cases that a plea of guilty to
an information alleging aggravating circumstances will not be considered an
admission of such circumstances if the evidence presented by the
prosecution fails to establish them. Even the case of People vs. Boyles, cited
by the trial court disallowed the appreciation of the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime when the Supreme Court found out that other
than the time of the commission of the crime, nothing else suggested the
circumstance of nocturnidad as understood in criminal law.
 Same; Same; Same; Where the aggravating circumstances listed in the
information were not supported by the evidence adduced, a plea of guilty to
a capital offense cannot constitute an admission of the aggravating
circumstances set forth in the information.—On the same ratiocination,
although herein appellant pleaded guilty to the charge as alleged in the
information, evident premeditation may not be taken against him since the
evidence presented by the People does not adequately disclose the existence
of the same. Where the aggravating circumstances listed in the information
were not supported by the evidence adduced, a plea of guilty to a capital
offense cannot constitute an admission of the aggravating circumstances set
forth in the information.
Same; Same; Same; The plea of guilty of an accused cannot stand in
place of the evidence that must be presented and is called for by said
Section 3 of Rule 116.—In view of the present requirement of Section 3,
Rule 116 for the presentation of evidence but with due explanation to
appellant of the significance of the aggravating circumstances alleged in an
information, and considering the insufficiency of the People’s evidence
showing evident premeditation in this case, we cannot consider appellant’s
plea of guilty as an admission of the existence of that aggravating
circumstance. As the pertinent principle lays down a rule of procedure, the
plea of guilty of an accused cannot stand in place of the evidence that must
be presented and is called for by said Section 3 of Rule 116. Trial courts
should no longer assume that a plea of guilty includes an admission of the
attending circumstances alleged in the information as they are now required
to demand that the prosecution should prove the exact liability of the
accused. The requirements of Section 3 would become idle and fruitless if
we were to allow conclu-

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People vs. Derilo

sions of criminal liability and aggravating circumstances on the dubious

strength of a presumptive rule.
Same; Same; Same; This Court has set aside convictions based on
pleas of guilty in capital offenses because of improvidence thereof and when
such plea is the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment.—While it may be
argued that appellant entered an improvident plea of guilty when re-
arraigned, we find no need, however, to remand the case to the lower court
for further reception of evidence. As a rule, this Court has set aside
convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital offenses because of
improvidence thereof and when such plea is the sole basis of the
condemnatory judgment. However, where the trial court receives evidence
to determine precisely whether or not the accused has erred in admitting his
guilt, the manner in which the plea of guilty is made (improvidently or not)
loses legal significance, for the simple reason that the conviction is based on
the evidence proving the commission by the accused of the offense charged.
Thus, even without considering the plea of guilty of appellant, he may still
be convicted if there is adequate evidence on record on which to predicate
his conviction. As already observed, the prosecution had already rested
when appellant decided to change his plea. The prosecution then had all the
opportunity to verify the material allegations in the information. Despite
such opportunity, it only successfully established treachery but failed to
present any evidence tending to prove evident premeditation.
Same; Same; Same; While the court below did not equate conspiracy
with evident premeditation, the latter cannot be deduced from the former as
the elements of conspiracy and evident premeditation are completely
different.—There is no doubt that conspiracy was shown in the instant case
from the concerted actions of the accused. The existence of this mode in the
commission of a felony can be inferred from the sudden shooting of the
victim by Derilo and the successive stabbing of her person by appellant and
his unidentified companion. However, to claim that evident premeditation
can be inferred from conspiracy violates the fundamental principle that
aggravating circumstances should also be proved beyond reasonable doubt
as the crime alleged to have been committed. While the court below did not
equate conspiracy with evident premeditation, the latter cannot be deduced
from the former as the elements of conspiracy and evident premeditation are
completely different.
Same; Same; Same; Unlike evident premeditation where a sufficient
period of time must elapse to afford full opportunity for meditation and
reflection and for the perpetrator to deliberate on the conse-

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People vs. Derilo

quences on his intended deed, conspiracy arises at the very instant the
plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith
decide to pursue it.—There is conspiracy when two or more persons come
to an agreement, the agreement concerned the commission of a felony, and
the execution of the felony is decided upon. However, unlike evident
premeditation, where a sufficient period of time must elapse to afford full
opportunity for meditation and reflection and for the perpetrator to
deliberate on the consequences on his intended deed, conspiracy arises on
the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the
felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. Once this assent is established,
each and everyone of the conspirators is made criminally liable for the
crime committed by anyone of them.
Same; Same; Same; It can be said that evident premeditation can only
be deduced from conspiracy if in the course of directly proving conspiracy,
the elements of evident premeditation were likewise presented and proven.—
To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to the
previous agreement and decision to commit the crime, it being sufficient
that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same
objective. To end any doubt on this matter, we quote our ruling in People vs.
Rizal: There is no proof, aside from conspiracy, that the accused and his
companions had sufficient time to plan the killing, reflect on it and after
reflection decided to commit the evil deed. Under ordinary circumstances
where conspiracy is present with proof of attendant deliberation and
selection of the method, times and means of executing the crime, the
existence of evident premeditation is taken for granted. But when conspiracy
is merely inferred from the acts of the accused and his companions in the
perpetration of the crime and there is no showing that characterizes evident
premeditation, such aggravating circumstance cannot be taken for granted
but must be proved like any other of its kind. (Emphasis supplied). It can
thus be said that evident premeditation can only be deduced from conspiracy
if in the course of directly proving conspiracy, the elements of evident
premeditation were likewise presented and proven. But then, in such a case,
evident premeditation would not merely be presumed but actually
established. Hence, it follows that there is really a need for the presentation
of evidence indicating the existence of premeditacion conocida, which was
not done in this case.
Constitutional Law; Statutes; Penal Laws; Prospective Effect; The
presumption is that laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary clearly
appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocally expressed or necessarily
implied.—Being a penal law, such provision of Republic Act No. 7659 may
not be applied to the crime of murder committed in 1982

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People vs. Derilo

by appellant, based on the principle of prospectivity of penal laws. Further,

the presumption is that laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary
clearly appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocally expressed or
necessarily implied. In every case of doubt, the doubt will be resolved
against the retroactive operation of laws. Nor can the prospective
application of Republic Act No. 7659 be doubted just because of the
constitutional provision leaving to Congress the matter of the death penalty
in cases of heinous crimes, since Congress did not otherwise provide.
Same; Same; Same; Same; One of the universally accepted
characteristics of a penal law is prospectivity.—One of the universally
accepted characteristics of a penal law is prospectivity. This general
principle of criminal law is embodied in Article 21 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides that “no felony shall be punishable by any penalty not
prescribed by law prior to its commission,” and was applied by the Supreme
Court in two early cases to mean that no act or omission shall be held to be a
crime, nor its author punished, except by virtue of a law in force at the time
the act was committed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A penal law may have retroactive effect
only when it is favorable to the accused.—It is settled that a penal law may
have retroactive effect only when it is favorable to the accused. Obviously,
with a penalty more onerous than that provided by the Revised Penal Code
for murder, the pertinent amendment thereof by Republic Act No. 7659
cannot fall within the exception to the general rule on prospectivity of penal
laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The fundamental principle of constitutional
construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law
and of the people adopting it.—The fundamental principle of constitutional
construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law
and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is
that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions
themselves. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. A law
should be interpreted with a view to upholding rather than destroying it. The
fact that no proclamation or grant of commutation was officially issued by
the President will not prevent the implementation and operation of Section
19 to appellant. To argue otherwise would be subordinating the command of
the Constitution to the will of the President. The framers of the Constitution
never intended that the non-imposition or non-execution of the death
sentence under those constitutional provisions would be dependent on the
act or omission of the Chief Executive.

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People vs. Derilo

Same; Same; Same; Same; With or without an official executive

issuance on commutation, the death penalty prescribed in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code and imposed on appellant by the lower court in 1986
cannot be carried out even though the case was brought to the Supreme
Court only in 1994 after Republic Act No. 7659 had taken effect.—From the
foregoing, it is apparent that no presidential action is necessary in order that
any accused sentenced to the death penalty under the same circumstances as
herein appellant may avail of the benefit of Section 19. The accused, ipso
jure, is entitled to a reduction of his sentence. As the Constitution is not
primarily a lawyer’s document, its language should be understood in the
sense that it may have in common use. Its words should be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. While “to
commute” necessitates presidential initiative, “to reduce” does not.
Therefore, with or without an official executive issuance on commutation,
the death penalty prescribed in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
imposed on appellant by the lower court in 1986 cannot be carried out even
though the case was brought to the Supreme Court only in 1994 after
Republic Act No. 7659 had taken effect. Nor can this law be deemed to have
revived the death penalty in the case of appellant, for reasons stated earlier.
By February 2, 1987, that penalty had already been automatically reduced to
reclusion perpetua, not by the grace of the President or of the courts, but by
the mandate of the fundamental law of the land.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan,
Eastern Samar, Br. 1.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
          Camilo Libanan and Celestino B. Sabate for accused-
appellant.

REGALADO, J.:

Roman Derilo, Isidoro Baldimo y Quillo, Lucas Doños, Alejandro

Cofuentes and one John Doe were charged with the socalled crime
of murder committed by a band before the First Branch of 1
the
former Court of First Instance of Borongan, Eastern Samar. The
information filed therefor alleges—

_________________

1 Presided over by Executive Judge Sixto T. Balanquit, Jr. who penned the
decision under review.

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People vs. Derilo

That on January 1, 1982 at about 6:00 o’clock P.M. at sitio Palaspas, Taft,
Eastern Samar, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with treachery and evident premeditation,
with intent to kill, with the use of firearm and bolos, confederating and
mutually helping one another did then and there shot (sic) and stabbed (sic)
one Perpetua Adalim thus inflicting injuries which caused her death.
2
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Of the five accused, only accused-appellant Isidoro Q. Baldimo was

apprehended and brought within the trial court’s jurisdiction. At his
arraignment on March 18, 1985, and after the information was
translated in the Waray dialect with which he is well versed,
3
appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits was conducted
thereafter.
However, by the time the People had formally finished presenting
its evidence on August 6, 1986, appellant, through his counsel de
parte, manifested to the court a quo that he wanted to withdraw his
earlier plea of not guilty and substitute the same with one of guilty.
Consequently, a re-arraignment was ordered by the lower court and, 4
this time, appellant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of murder.
A series of questions was then propounded by the trial court to
test appellant’s voluntariness and comprehension of the
consequences in making his new plea of guilty. Satisfied with the
answers of appellant, the trial court convicted him of the crime of
murder 5
defined and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code.
 A detailed account of the killing was furnished by prosecution
6
eyewitness Cresencio Lupido. According to him, Perpetua C.
Adalim went to his house at Sitio Palaspas, Barangay Polangi in
Taft, Eastern Samar in the early evening of January 1, 1982 to look
for farmlands willing and desiring to work in her

________________

2 Original Record, 2.
3 Ibid., 15.
4 TSN, August 6, 1986, 51-56.
5 Original Record, 116; Decision, 10.
6 His surname is spelled “Lopido” in the transcripts.

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644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Derilo

ricefields. Lupido was an agricultural tenant of Perpetua and lived

on one of the properties owned by the latter. Upon her arrival,
Perpetua instructed Lupido’s wife to get food from her house in the
poblacion as she had decided to spend the night at Sitio Palaspas.
While Perpetua was waiting and standing in the yard of the
house, five armed men arrived and confronted Perpetua. Lupido
recognized two of the men as Roman Derilo and appellant Isidoro
Baldimo, as these two frequently passed by his house at Sitio
Palaspas. He did not know the other three men but he claimed that
he could identity them if brought before him.
Roman Derilo talked momentarily with Perpetua. Then, without
any warning, Derilo shot Perpetua three times with the pistol he was
carrying. After she fell to the ground, appellant, who was standing at
the right side of Derilo, approached Perpetua and stabbed her several
times with a knife that looked like either a Batangas knife or a bolo
known locally as “depang.” A third member of the group, with a
short and stout physique, followed suit in stabbing Perpetua. After
the repeated stabbings, the gang walked around the yard for some
time and left, walking in the direction of the mountains. All of them
carried long firearms.
As soon as the group had left the scene of the crime, Lupido
hurriedly went to Perpetua’s house in the poblacion of Taft
7
where he
informed the family of the deceased about the incident.

Appellant does not deny his participation in the commission of the

crime. Rather, in his brief pitifully consisting of two pages, he
merely asks for the modification 8of the death penalty imposed by the
lower court to life imprisonment. Although ap-

_________________
 7 TSN, September 23, 1985, 14-23.
8 Brief for Appellant, 2; Rollo, 56-57. Appellant is erroneously using the term of
life imprisonment instead of the penalty of reclusion perpetua. This error arose from
this Court’s imposition of “life imprisonment” as the penalty for robbery with
homicide in People

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People vs. Derilo

pellant is aware that he has made his plea of guilty after the
prosecution had presented its evidence, thus foreclosing the9
application of paragraph 7, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code,
he contends that his untimely acknowledgment of culpability may
still be treated by analogy as a mitigating circumstance under
paragraph 10 of10 the same article, invoking therefor the aforesaid
case of Coronel.
Unfortunately, that decision relied upon by appellant is
inapplicable
11
to his case. The death penalty in People vs. Coronel, et
al. was modified to “life imprisonment” not in consideration of
paragraph 10, Article 13 of the code but because the number of
votes12then required to affirm a sentence of death imposed by a lower
court was not secured by this Court in its automatic review of the
judgment. Apparently, the required number for concurrence was not
obtained because some members of the Court treated the belated
confession of the accused therein as an indication on his part to
reform, and they felt that he should only suffer the same penalty
imposed on some of his co-conspirators.
The late plea of guilty entered by herein appellant cannot be
considered mitigating because the plea made is not “of a similar
nature and analogous” to the plea of guilty contemplated in

__________________

vs. Coronel, et al. (G.R. No. L-19091, June 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 509) cited by
appellant.
9 Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances.—The following are mitigating circumstances:

7. That the offender x x x had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the
presentation of the evidence for the prosecution.

10 Rollo, 56-57; Appellant’s Brief, 1-2.

11 Supra, Fn. 8.
12 Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. No. 296), as amended, provided
that:

xxx
Whenever the judgment of the lower court imposes the death penalty, the case shall be
determined by eight Justices of the Court. When eight Justices fail to reach a decision as to the
propriety of the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty lower in degree shall be imposed
(R.A. No. 5440).
 646

646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Derilo

paragraph 7 of Article 13. A plea of guilty is considered mitigating

on the rationale that an accused spontaneously and willingly admits
his guilt at the first opportunity as an act of repentance. An accused
should not be allowed to speculate on the outcome of the
proceedings by pleading not guilty on arraignment, only to later
substitute the same with a plea of guilty after discovering that the
People has a strong case against him. Withal, all is not lost for
appellant.
The killing of the victim, Perpetua C. Adalim, was found by the
lower court to have been qualified to murder by treachery. Although
not alleged in the information, the circumstances of superior strength
and cuadrilla were taken note of by the court a quo based on the
evidence presented by the prosecution, but the same were correctly
regarded by said court as absorbed in alevosia. However, it found
that the generic aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
likewise attended the commission of the crime. Hence, with no
mitigating circumstance to offset this aggravating circumstance, the
trial court sentenced appellant to suffer the supreme penalty of death
and to indemnify and pay damages to the heirs of the victim. 13
It will be observed from a reading of the lower court’s decision
that its judgment was obviously based not only on the evidence
presented by the prosecution but also on appellant’s belated
admission of guilt, together with some inconclusive pronouncements
of this Court on conspiracy. The former apparently proved the
circumstances of treachery, superior strength and cuadrilla, while
the latter supposedly supplied the ground for the finding of evident
premeditation.
We agree with the finding of the court below that appellant
participated in the treacherous killing of Perpetua C. Adalim.
Appellant’s presence in the locus criminis and his identification were
positively supplied by the prosecution’s eyewitness. The unwavering
and unequivocal testimony of Lupido, corroborated by that of Dr.
Eduardo S. Evardone who conducted the post-

________________

13 Dated August 26, 1986, but judgment was promulgated on October 14, 1986.

647

VOL. 271, APRIL 18, 1997 647

People vs. Derilo

14
mortem examination on the corpse
15
of the victim and submitted his
corresponding autopsy report, indubitably show the deliberate
employment by the accused of a reliable and unfailing means to
ensure the killing without giving the victim an opportunity to defend
herself.
However, we cannot give the same stamp of approval to the
finding on premeditacion conocida declared by the trial court. The
disturbing conclusions of said court thereon need to be clarified to
obviate misconceptions that may affect the stability of our present
rules on evidence and criminal procedure. Said the lower court on
this aspect:

The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation is likewise present

in the commission of the offense of murder as the existence of the
conspiracy among the accused Baldimo and his co-accused having been
duly proven also beyond peradventure of doubt, presupposes evident
premeditation (People vs. Belen, L-13895, Sept. 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 39)
which the said accused himself supplied the evidence on this score by virtue
of his plea of guilty, which circumstance is not the least disproven by the
evidence on record. Thus, its appreciation as an aggravating circumstance in
this case.
A plea of guilty constitute(s) an admission of all material facts alleged in
the information, including the aggravating circumstances alleged, although
the offense charged be capital. (People vs. Boyles, L-15308, May 29, 1964,
11 SCRA 88; People vs. Mongado, L-24877, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 642;
People vs. Tilos, L-27151, Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 734).
A plea of guilty is mitigating and at the same time it constitutes an
admission of all the material facts alleged in the information, including the
aggravating circumstances, and it matters not that the offense is capital.
Because of the aforesaid legal effect of Pineda’s plea of guilty, it was not
incumbent upon the trial court to receive his evidence, much less require his
presence in court. (People vs. Jose, 37 SCRA 450; People vs. Estebia, 40
16
SCRA 90).

The trial court should not have concluded that evident premeditation
attended the commission of the crime of murder on

__________________

14 TSN, July 19, 1985, 7-13.

15 Exhibit B, Exhibits for the Prosecution, 2.
16 Decision, 9-10; Original Record, 115-116.

648

648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Derilo

the bases of its findings regarding the admission of guilt by appellant

and the existence of conspiracy with his co-accused. As earlier
stated, appellant entered his plea of guilty after the prosecution had
presented its evidence. Thereafter, no further evidence whatsoever
was adduced by it to prove the supposed evident premeditation. The
records and the transcripts of stenographic notes are barren of any
proof tending to show any prior reflection on, followed after some
time by persistence in, the criminal resolution of the five accused.
It is elementary law that to establish evident premeditation, there
must be proof of (1) the time when the offender determined to
commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit
has clung to his determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time
between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to
overcome17the resolution of his will had he desired to hearken to its
warnings.
The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal
act was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution
to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to
18
arrive at a calm judgment. When it is not shown as to how and
when the plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before it
was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered.
Evident premeditation must be based on external acts and must be
evident, not merely suspected, indicating deliberate planning.
Otherwise stated, there must be a demonstration by outward acts of a
19
criminal intent that is notorious and manifest.
As there is no proof, direct or circumstantial, offered by the
prosecution to show when appellant and his co-accused meditated
and reflected upon their decision to kill the victim and the

________________

17 People vs. Gravino, G.R. Nos. L-31327-29, May 16, 1983, 122 SCRA 123.
18 People vs. Ariola, G.R. No. L-38457, October 29, 1980, 100 SCRA 523.
19 People vs. Narit, G.R. No. 77087, May 23, 1991, 197 SCRA 334.

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VOL. 271, APRIL 18, 1997 649

People vs. Derilo

intervening time that elapsed before this plan was carried out, the
circumstance of evident premeditation cannot be presumed against
appellant. As early as 1905, we laid down the rule that the
circumstances specifying an offense as aggravating the penalty
thereof must be proved as conclusively as the act itself, mere
suppositions or presumptions being insufficient to establish their
presence. No matter how truthful these suppositions or presumptions
may seem, they must not and cannot 20
produce the effect of
aggravating the liability of the accused.
It is an ancient but revered doctrine that qualifying and
aggravating circumstance before being taken into consideration for
the purpose of increasing the degree of the penalty to be imposed
must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as that which
establishes
21
the commission of the act charged as the criminal
offense. It is not only the central fact of a killing that must be
shown beyond reasonable doubt; every qualifying or aggravating
circumstance alleged to have been present and to have attended22
such
killing, must similarly be shown by the same degree of proof.

II

The foregoing doctrines consequently point to the need of

reconciling them with the old rule that a plea of guilty admits not
only the crime but also its attendant circumstances which is relied
upon and invoked by the lower court in this case to justify its
conclusion of evident premeditation to aggravate the liability of
appellant.
Over the years and through numerous cases, this Court has
adopted an exception to the erstwhile rule enunciating that there is
no need to prove the presence of aggravating circumstances alleged
in an information or complaint when the accused pleads guilty to the
charge. Our rulings regarding this principle were expressed more or
less in this wise:

___________________

20 U.S. vs. Perdon, 4 Phil. 141 (1905).

21 U.S. vs. Ulat, 7 Phil. 559 (1907); U.S. vs. Navarro, 7 Phil. 713 (1907).
22 People vs. De Guia, G.R. No. 59876, August 31, 1989, 177 SCRA 112.

650

650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Derilo

Having pleaded guilty to the information, these aggravating circumstances

were deemed fully established, for the plea of guilty to the information
covers both the crime as well as its attendant circumstances qualifying
23
and/or aggravating the crime.

We are not, however, concerned here merely with the doctrine itself
but more specifically with the consequences thereof. Thus, in People
24
vs. Rapirap, it was formerly explained that the subject doctrine has
the following effects:

A plea of guilty does not merely join the issues of the complaint or
information, but amounts to an admission of guilt and of the material facts
alleged in the complaint or information and in this sense takes the place of
the trial itself. Such plea removes the necessity of presenting further
evidence and for all intents and purposes the case is deemed tried on its
merits and submitted for decision. It leaves the court with no alternative but
to impose the penalty prescribed by law.
25
Then, in People vs. Lambino, we prevented the accused in criminal
actions from contradicting the outcome of his admission, with our
holding that by the plea of guilty, the accused admits all the facts
alleged in the information and, by that plea, he is precluded from
showing that he has not committed them.
26
 26
People vs. Yamson, et al. thereafter expanded the application of
the doctrine to both capital and non-capital cases:

A plea of guilty is an admission of all the material facts alleged in the

complaint or information. A plea of guilty when formally entered in
arraignment is sufficient to sustain a conviction for any offense charged in
the information, without the necessity of requiring additional evidence,
since by so pleading, the defendant himself has supplied the necessary
proof. It matters not even if the offense is capital for the admission (plea of
guilty) covers both the crime as well as its attendant circumstances.

_________________

23 People vs. Yu, G.R. No. L-13780, January 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 199; People vs.
Arpa, G.R. No. L-26789, April 25, 1969, 27 SCRA 1037; People vs. Alicia, G.R. No.
L-38176, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 227.
24 102 Phil. 863 (1958).
25 103 Phil. 504 (1958).
26 109 Phil. 793 (1960).

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People vs. Derilo

27
Finally, People vs. Apduhan, Jr. cited by some of the cases relied
upon by the lower court, declared that—

While an unqualified plea of guilty is mitigating, it at the same time

constitutes an admission of all material facts alleged in the information,
including the aggravating circumstance therein recited. x x x The
prosecution does not need to prove the three aggravating circumstances (all
alleged in the second amended information) since the accused by his plea of
guilty, has supplied the requisite proof.

With the foregoing presentation, the trial court must have believed
that it had acted correctly in presuming the existence of evident
premeditation based on appellant’s plea of guilty without any proof
being presented to establish such aggravating circumstance.
However, the developmental growth of our procedural rules did not
stop there. With the advent of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure on January 1, 1985, a new rule, specifically mandating the
course that trial courts should follow in capital cases where the
accused pleads guilty was introduced into our remedial law with this
provision:

SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.—When the

accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and
the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in
28
his behalf.
29
 29
We expounded on this in People vs. Camay with this explanation:

Under the new formulation, three (3) things are enjoined of the trial court
after a plea of guilty to a capital offense has been entered by the accused: 1.
The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea; 2. The court must require
the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability; and 3. The court must ask the accused if he
desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.

________________

27 G.R. No. L-9491, August 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 798.

28 Sec. 3, Rule 116, Rules of Court.
29 G.R. No. 51306, July 29, 1987, 152 SCRA 401.

652

652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Derilo

The amended rule is a capsulization of the provisions of the old rule and
pertinent jurisprudence. We had several occasions to issue the caveat that
even if the trial court is satisfied that the plea of guilty was entered with full
knowledge of its meaning and consequences, the Court must still require the
introduction of evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt and degree
of culpability of the defendant. This is the proper norm to be followed not
only to satisfy the trial judge but also to aid the Court in determining
whether or not the accused really and truly comprehended the meaning, full
significance and consequences of his plea.

The presentation of evidence is required in order to preclude any

room for reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial court, or the
Supreme Court on review, as to the possibility that there might have
been some misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the
nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the
circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime which
justify or require the exercise of a greater or
30
lesser degree of severity
in the imposition of the prescribed penalty. 31
To emphasize its importance this Court held in People vs. Dayot
that the rule in Section 3, Rule 116 is mandatory, and issued the
warning that any judge who fails to observe its command commits a
grave abuse of discretion.
This Court has come a long way in adopting a mandatory rule
with regard to the presentation of evidence in capital cases where the
accused pleads guilty to the criminal charge. From granting trial
32
courts in the earlier Rules of Court sufficient discretion in requiring
evidence whenever guilt is admitted by the accused, the Court has
now made it mandatory on the part

__________________
 30 People vs. De Luna, G.R. No. 77969, June 22, 1989, 174 SCRA 204.
31 G.R. No. 88281, July 20, 1990, 187 SCRA 637.
32 Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1940 Rules of Court and Section 5, Rule 118 of the
1964 Rules of Court similarly provide that:

Sec. 5. Plea of guilty; determination of punishment.—Where the defendant pleads guilty to a

complaint or information, punishment for the offense, it may hear witnesses to determine what
punishment shall be imposed.

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VOL. 271, APRIL 18, 1997 653

People vs. Derilo

of the lower courts to compel the presentation of evidence and make

sure that the accused fully comprehends the nature and
consequences of his plea of guilty.

III

There is another reason why we have to reject the aforesaid

conclusion reached by the lower court in this case. Under settled
jurisprudence, the consequences of aggravating circumstances
alleged in the information must be explained to the accused when he
pleads guilty to a crime imputed against him.
A reading of the questions directed at appellant during his
rearraignment reveals a shortcoming on the part of the33 trial court to
fully explain to appellant the consequences of his plea.

COURT:
  All right, please come forward, Mr. Baldimo. Your lawyer, Atty.
Camilo Libanan manifested to the court that you intimated to
him your desire to withdraw your plea of not guilty when
arraigned in this case and to substitute the same with a plea of
guilty after the prosecution has already presented evidence and
in fact closed its evidence this morning. What have you to say
about the manifestation of your lawyer, Atty. Libanan?
ACCUSED:
  Yes, your honor.
COURT:
  All right, re-arraign the accused. Did you understand the
information charging you with the crime of murder along with
some other persons?
A Yes, your honor.
Q All right, what will your plea be?
ACCUSED:
  Guilty.
COURT:
  When you withdraw your plea of not guilty to the information
 when arraigned the first time and substitute the same with a plea
of guilty this morning, did you do so of your free and voluntary
will?

__________________

33 TSN, August 6, 1986, 54-56.

654

654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Derilo

A Yes, sir.
Q Were you not forced, threatened, coerced or intimidated to
change your plea of not guilty and substitute the same with a
plea of guilty?
A I was not.
Q Were you not under influence by any person or persons who
exercises legal authority over you which may have been the
consideration why you are now pleading guilty to the offense
charged?
A None.
Q Do you realize the consequences of a plea, of your plea of
guilty?
A Yes, your honor.
Q You are therefore aware that by your plea of guilty you will be
penalized by the court and ordered to indemnify your victim as
well as other accessory penalties provided for by law?
A Yes, your honor.
Q And this notwithstanding your realization of what a plea of
guilty entail, will you still insist on your plea of guilty to the
information charging you with the crime of murder committed
by a band?
A Yes, your honor.
Q Was it your realization that you actually committed the crime
charged and the prodding of your conscience that you now enter
the plea of guilty?
A Yes, your honor.
Q Are you now repentant?
A I am not repentant.
Q You are not repentant for what you have done?
A Yes, sir, I am repentant.
Q In other words, you regret having committed the acts, having
committed the crime charged?
A Yes, your honor.
COURT:
  All right, promulgation is set on August 18. All right, September
1.

A plea of guilty is improvidently accepted where no effort was even

made to explain to the accused that a plea of guilty to an information
for a capital offense, attended by an aggravating circumstance, may
result in the imposition of the death pen-

655

VOL. 271, APRIL 18, 1997 655

People vs. Derilo

34
alty. We cannot declare with reasonable certainty that when
appellant pleaded guilty to the crime charged in the information he
knew that he was at the same time admitting the presence and
serious effects of the aggravating circumstances alleged therein. We
are more inclined to believe, as a matter of judicial experience, that
when he admitted his role in the killing of the deceased, he only
intended to limit such admission to the crime charged and not to the
aggravating circumstances.
The trial judge did not himself try to inform or advise appellant
regarding the consequences of pleading guilty to having killed the
victim with both circumstances of evident premeditation and
treachery. More particularly, the trial judge did not himself try to
convey to appellant, in ordinary language that appellant would be
assumed to understand, the meaning of evident premeditation and
treachery as circumstances that would qualify the killing to murder
and to35aggravate the penalty as to call for the maximum penalty of
death.
We quote from the old but instructive and still authoritative case
36
of U.S. vs. Jamad.

If the accused does not clearly and fully understand the nature of the offense
charged, if he is not advised as to the meaning and effect of the technical
language so often used in formal complaints and informations in qualifying
the acts constituting the offense, or if he does not clearly understand the
consequences by way of a heavy and even a capital penalty flowing from his
admission of his guilt of the crime in the precise technical manner and form
in which it is charged, his plea of guilty should not be held to be sufficient to
sustain a conviction.
Our experience has taught us that it not infrequently happens that, upon
arraignment, accused persons plead “guilty” to the commission of the
gravest offenses, qualified by marked aggravating circumstances, when in
truth and in fact they intend merely to admit that they committed the act or
acts charged in the complaint, and have no thought of admitting the
technical charges of aggravating circum-
__________________

34 People vs. Espiña, G.R. No. L-33028, June 25, 1973, 57 SCRA 317.
35 See People vs. De Guia, G.R. No. 59876, August 31, 1989, 177 SCRA 112.
36 37 Phil. 305 (1917).

656

656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Derilo

stances. It not infrequently happens that after a formal plea of “guilty” it

develops under the probe of the trial judge, or in the course of the statement
of the accused made at the time of the entry of his plea, or upon the witness
stand, that the accused, while admitting the commission of the acts charged
in the information, believes or pretends to believe that these acts were
committed under such circumstances as to exempt him in whole or in part
from criminal liability. Clearly a formal plea of guilty entered under such
circumstances is not sufficient to sustain a conviction of the aggravated
crime charged in the information.
37
In People vs. Alamada, this Court found the trial court to have
failed in observing that quantum of care which it had prescribed for
the valid admission of a plea of guilty by an accused, especially in
capital cases, when it did not explain to the accused the nature of the
charges against him, particularly the allegations regarding
conspiracy, treachery, evident premedita-tion and abuse of superior
strength, which are terms so technical that the layman, especially an
unschooled one like the accused in the said case, cannot possibly
understand without proper elucidation.
It is neither just nor reasonable to assume that an uneducated
person understands the allegation that “the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and premeditation were present in the
commission of the crime,” inasmuch as “treachery” and
“premeditation” are highly technical terms the juridical meaning of
which is beyond the understanding not of the illiterates alone but
38
even of those who, being educated, are not lawyers.
If many members of the Bar are unable to call to mind the
technical requisites of “treachery” and “evident premeditation” as
qualifying and aggravating circumstances, there is no reason for
supposing that the accused, who is a farmer by occupation,
understood such elements and requisites after a few 39minutes of
whispered advice from a counsel de oficio in open court.
Another reason why we cannot agree with the lower court’s
posture on this issue is the consistent holding in several cases

__________________

37 G.R. Nos. L-34594-95, July 13, 1973, 52 SCRA 103.

38 People vs. Gungab, 64 Phil. 779 (1937).
39 People vs. De Guia, supra, Fn. 35.

657
 VOL. 271, APRIL 18, 1997 657
People vs. Derilo

that a plea of guilty to an information alleging aggravating

circumstances will not be considered an admission of such
circumstances if the evidence presented by the prosecution fails to
establish them.
40
Even the case of People vs. Boyles, cited by the trial court
disallowed the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of
nighttime when the Supreme Court found out that other than the
time of the commission of the crime, nothing else suggested the
circumstance of nocturnidad as understood in criminal law, to wit:

Not one of the prosecution evidence, oral or documentary, makes the

slightest indication that the protection of the night’s darkness was
deliberately availed of by the appellants. In view of this deficiency in the
case for the Government, we are constrained to disallow the said
circumstance even as, technically, it may have been accepted by them when
they pleaded guilty on arraignment.

On the same ratiocination, although herein appellant pleaded guilty

to the charge as alleged in the information, evident premeditation
may not be taken against him since the evidence presented by the
41
People does not adequately disclose the existence of the same.
Where the aggravating circumstances listed in the information were
not supported by the evidence adduced, a plea of guilty to a capital
offense cannot constitute an admission 42
of the aggravating
circumstances set forth in the information. 43
The above rulings drew from People vs. Corachea
44
which, in
turn, reiterated the dictum in People vs. Galapia that even under
the old rule on judicial confession of guilt, to be appreciated the
aggravating circumstances must further be duly proved.

__________________

40 G.R. No. L-15308, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 88.

41 People vs. Gravino, G.R. Nos. L-31327-29, May 16, 1983, 122 SCRA 123;
People vs. Logarto, G.R. No. 65833, May 6, 1991, 196 SCRA 611.
42 People vs. Comendador, G.R. No. 38000, September 19, 1980, 100 SCRA 155.
43 G.R. No. L-30101, July 16, 1979, 91 SCRA 422.
44 G.R. Nos. L-39303-05, August 1, 1978, 84 SCRA 526.

658

658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Derilo

The rule is that a judicial confession of guilt admits all the material facts
alleged in the information including the aggravating circumstances listed
therein. But, where such circumstances are disproven by the evidence, it
should be disallowed in the judgment. Thus, in People vs. Gungab (64 Phil.
779), the Court ruled “that when an accused who lacks instruction, pleads
guilty to the crime of parricide described in the information as having been
committed with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation and his testimony given under oath before the trial court,
upon his petition fails to show the existence of such aggravating
circumstances, his plea of guilty shall be understood as being limited to the
admission of having committed the crime of parricide, not having done so
with treachery and evident premeditation.”

In view of the present requirement of Section 3, Rule 116 for the

presentation of evidence but with due explanation to appel-lant of
the significance of the aggravating circumstances alleged in an
information, and considering the insufficiency of the People’s
evidence showing evident premeditation in this case, we cannot
consider appellant’s plea of guilty as an admission of the existence
of that aggravating circumstance.
As the pertinent principle lays down a rule of procedure, the plea
of guilty of an accused cannot stand in place of the evidence that
must be presented and is called for by said Section 3 of Rule 116.
Trial courts should no longer assume that a plea of guilty includes an
admission of the attending circumstances alleged in the information
as they are now required to demand that the prosecution should
prove the exact liability of the accused. The requirements of Section
3 would become idle and fruitless if we were to allow conclusions of
criminal liability and aggravating circumstances on the dubious
strength of a presumptive rule.
While it may be argued that appellant entered an improvident
plea of guilty when re-arraigned, we find no need, however, to
remand the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence.
As a rule, this Court has set aside convictions based on pleas of
guilty in capital offenses because of improvidence thereof and when
such plea is the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment. However,
where the trial court receives evidence to determine precisely
whether or not the accused has

659

VOL. 271, APRIL 18, 1997 659

People vs. Derilo

erred in admitting his guilt, the manner in which the plea of guilty is
made (improvidently or not) loses legal significance, for the simple
reason that the conviction is based on the evidence proving the
45
commission by the accused of the offense charged.
Thus, even without considering the plea of guilty of appellant, he
may still be convicted if there is adequate
46
evidence on record on
which to predicate his conviction. As already observed, the
prosecution had already rested when appellant decided to change his
plea. The prosecution then had all the opportunity to verify the
material allegations in the information. Despite such opportunity, it
only successfully established treachery but failed to present any
evidence tending to prove evident premeditation.
We also doubt the applicability to the case at bar of People vs.
47
Belen, cited by the lower court, to the effect that conspiracy
presupposes evident premeditation. A reading of People vs.
48
Timbang, et al. upon which Belen is based, does not state, either
categorically or impliedly, that evident premeditation exists where
conspiracy is proven.
There is no doubt that conspiracy was shown in the instant case
from the concerted actions of the accused. The existence of this
mode in the commission of a felony can be inferred from the sudden
shooting of the victim by Derilo and the successive stabbing of her
person by appellant and his unidentified companion.
However, to claim that evident premeditation can be inferred
from conspiracy violates the fundamental principle that aggravating
circumstances should also be proved beyond reasonable doubt as the
crime alleged to have been committed. While the court below did
not equate conspiracy with evident premeditation, the latter cannot
be deduced from the former as the ele-

_________________

45 People vs. Nismal, G.R. No. 51257, June 25, 1982, 114 SCRA 487.
46 See People vs. Petalcorin, G.R. No. 65376, December 29, 1989, 180 SCRA 685.
47 G.R. No. L-13895, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 39.
48 74 Phil. 295 (1943).

660

660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Derilo

ments of conspiracy and evident premeditation are completely

different.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an
agreement, the agreement concerned the commission of a felony,
and the execution of the felony is decided upon. However, unlike
evident premeditation, where a sufficient period of time must elapse
to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection and for the
perpetrator to deliberate on the consequences on his intended deed,
conspiracy arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or
impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it.
Once this assent is established, each and everyone of the
conspirators is made
49
criminally liable for the crime committed by
anyone of them.
To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to
the previous agreement and decision to commit the crime, it being
sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to
50
the same objective. To end any doubt on this matter, we quote our
51
ruling in People vs. Rizal:
There is no proof, aside from conspiracy, that the accused and his
companions had sufficient time to plan the killing, reflect on it and after
reflection decided to commit the evil deed. Under ordinary circumstances
where conspiracy is present with proof of attendant deliberation and
selection of the method, times and means of executing the crime, the
existence of evident premeditation is taken for granted. But when conspiracy
is merely inferred from the acts of the accused and his companions in the
perpetration of the crime and there is no showing that characterizes evident
premeditation, such aggravating circumstance cannot be taken for granted
but must be proved like any other of its kind. (Emphasis supplied).

It can thus be said that evident premeditation can only be deduced

from conspiracy if in the course of directly proving conspiracy, the
elements of evident premeditation were likewise presented and
proven. But then, in such a case, evident pre-

_________________

49 People vs. Monroy, et al., 104 Phil. 759 (1958).

50 People vs. Sazon, G.R. No. 89684, September 18, 1990, 189 SCRA 713.
51 G.R. Nos. L-43487-89, February 26, 1981, 103 SCRA 282.

661

VOL. 271, APRIL 18, 1997 661

People vs. Derilo

meditation would not merely be presumed but actually established.

Hence, it follows that there is really a need for the presentation of
evidence indicating the existence of premeditacion conocida, which
was not done in this case.

IV

We could stop at this juncture, with the vital points against the death
penalty having been made, but there are certain facets of this case
which necessitate elucidation. Indeed, the peculiar antecedents and
chronological milieu of the instant case confront us now with what
appear to be the problematical application of two penal laws.
At the time of the commission of the crime on January 1, 1982
and the conviction of the accused on October 12, 1986, the
substantive law in force dealing with the crime of murder was
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which took effect way back
on January 1, 1932. Said provision provided that any person guilty
of murder shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death.
Then on February 2, 1987, a new Constitution came into force
after its ratification on that date by the people. The 1987
Constitution, regarded by some as progressive since it contains new
provisions not covered by our earlier two Constitutions, proscribed
in Section 19, Article III (Bill of Rights) thereof the imposition of
the death penalty, as follows:
Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed,
unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua. (Italics supplied).
xxx

Responding to the alarming increase of horrible crimes being

committed in the country, Congress passed a law imposing the death
penalty on certain heinous offenses and further amending for that
purpose the Revised Penal Code and other special penal laws. Said
law was officially enacted as Republic Act No. 7659 and took effect
on December 31, 1993. This is now the governing penal law at the
time of this review of the case at bar.

662

662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Derilo

Although the elements and circumstances which qualify a killing to

murder were maintained, Republic Act No. 7659 amended Article
248 of the Code by imposing a heavier penalty for murder than that
originally prescribed, the new penalty provided in Section 6 of said
amendatory statute being reclusion perpetua to death.
Being a penal law, such provision of Republic Act No. 7659 may
not be applied to the crime of murder committed in 1982 by
appellant, based on the principle of prospectivity of penal laws.
Further, the presumption is that laws operate prospectively, unless
the contrary clearly appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocally
52
expressed or necessarily implied. In every case of doubt, the doubt
53
will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws. Nor can
the prospective application of Republic Act No. 7659 be doubted
just because of the constitutional provision leaving to Congress the
matter of the death penalty in cases of heinous crimes, since
Congress did not otherwise provide.
The interpellations in the Constitutional Commission tasked to
draw up the present Constitution is enlightening in our
determination of the non-retroactivity of said law, thus:

MR. BENGZON. And then, supposing Congress passes a law

imposing the death penalty on those very same crimes committed
by those that were convicted of the death penalty which penalty
has been commuted to reclusion perpetua, will they go back?
MR. MONSOD. No.
MR. BENGZON. Not anymore?
MR. MONSOD. Any new law passed 54
by the National Assembly
would be prospective in character.

One of the universally accepted characteristics of a penal law is

prospectivity. This general principle of criminal law is embodied in
Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code which provides
__________________

52 People vs. Zeta, 98 Phil. 143 (1955).

53 Cebu Portland Cement vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-20563, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA
789 (1968).
54 I Record of the Constitutional Commission 748.

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People vs. Derilo

that “no felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by

law prior to its commission,” and was applied by the Supreme Court
in two early cases to mean that no act or omission shall be held to be
a crime, nor its author punished,55except by virtue of a law in force at
the time the act was committed.
Besides, to give retroactive effect to the pertinent provision of
Republic Act No. 7659 would be violative 56
of the constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws. Among others, an ex post
facto law has been defined as one which changes the punishment
and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime
57
when it was committed.
It is settled that a penal law may have retroactive effect only
58
when it is favorable to the accused. Obviously, with a penalty more
onerous than that provided by the Revised Penal Code for murder,
the pertinent amendment thereof by Republic Act No. 7659 cannot
fall within the exception to the general rule on prospectivity of penal
laws.
Lastly, observance of juridical uniformity in the decisions of this
Court requires that we refrain from applying Republic Act No. 7659
to the case at bar. The present case is not the first and only instance
where the Court has had to review a sentence for death after this
amendatory law came into force. To give retroactive effect to said
law in this case will disturb the numerous decisions of the Court
imposing reclusion perpetua on the accused who committed capital
offenses prior to the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution and were
convicted after its effectivity but before that of Republic Act No.
7659, even though the penalty imposable would have been death.
Having eliminated the possibility of applying the death penalty
under Republic Act No. 7659 in the present case, we now

_________________

55 U.S. vs. Macasaet, 11 Phil. 447 (1908); People vs. Moran, 44 Phil. 387 (1923).
56 Sec. 22, Art. III, 1987 Constitution.
57 Bernas, J. G., The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A
Commentary, Vol. I, 1st ed., 488.
58 Art. 22, Revised Penal Code; Escalante vs. Santos, 56 Phil. 483 (1932).

664
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Derilo

examine the applicability of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,

prior to its aforesaid amendment. On May 20, 1987, this Court
issued Circular No. 9 regarding the imposition of the death penalty,
under the circumstances therein defined. In the said circular, all
courts were enjoined to impose only the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, even in those cases wherein our penal laws provide for the
imposition of the death penalty, until Congress shall have provided
by law for the definition of the heinous crimes contemplated in the
1987 Constitution.
Prior thereto, in an en banc resolution dated April 30, 1987
issued in Administrative Matter No. 87-5-3173-0, the Court took
cognizance of the Cabinet Meeting held on April 8, 1987 wherein,
among others, the President agreed to issue a statement officially
commuting to life imprisonment the death sentence theretofore
imposed on some convicts, in accordance with the letter and spirit of
the 1987 Constitution. However, a verification with the Executive
Department, through the Department of Justice, reveals that the
projected presidential commutation never materialized.
It will further be noted that said circular referred only to those
cases then “under automatic review by the Court,” and the
aforestated resolution quoted therein likewise contemplated
“pending cases before the Court,” that is, as of May 20, 1987. Those
issuances could not therefore apply to the present case since, as
hereinafter explained, the case at bar was brought on appeal to this
Court only on July 20, 1994.
Be that as it may, however, whether or not evident premeditation
was present in this case and regardless of the inapplicability thereto
of the aforementioned circular and resolution, the Court is
reasonably convinced that it cannot validly impose the capital
punishment on appellant. The words of the Constitution are clear:
Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua. Appellant, it will be recalled, was sentenced in 1986 to
suffer the death penalty as then provided under the Revised Penal
Code. With the ratification of the Constitution in 1987, that sentence
should have been reduced to reclusion perpetua under such
constitutional fiat.

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People vs. Derilo

The fact that this Court will have the opportunity to review
appellant’s case only now does not detract from the force of such
directive of the Constitution. Neither will the fact that Circular No. 9
was not yet issued when appellant was tried and convicted prevent
the application to him of that Constitutional provision. It is not the
action of the courts which, under the circumstances, convert his
sentence of death to reclusion perpetua. Such reduction is directed
and effected by the explicit words of the fundamental charter; the
courts merely apply this express and self-executing provision of the
Constitution when they impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua
rather than the imposable penalty of death in appropriate cases.
Again, the following proceedings in the Constitutional
Commission yield light on the foregoing proposition:

MR. DE CASTRO. The proponent’s amendment is a comma (,) after

“inflicted” on line 29 to be followed by the clause “UNLESS
FOR COMPELLING REASONS INVOLVING HEINOUS
CRIMES THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PROVIDES FOR THE
DEATH PENALTY.” In this proposed amendment, there will still
be a need for the National Assembly to pass a law providing for
the death penalty. Is this correct?
MR. MONSOD. Yes.
MR. DE CASTRO. What happens to those awaiting execution,
having already the death penalty on their heads, but there is no
law yet passed by the National Assembly?
MR. MONSOD. Then the next sentence will apply: “Death penalty
59
already imposed shall be commuted to reclusion perpetua.”

It can be readily seen that the reduction of the penalty is not and was
not made dependent on a law, decree, condition, or period before the
aforementioned Section 19 can be applied by the courts. It cannot be
inferred, either from the wordings of the subject provision or from
the intention of the framers of the Constitution, that a death sentence
should be brought to the Supreme Court for review within a certain
time frame in order that it can be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

________________

59 I Record of the Constitutional Commission 747.

666

666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Derilo

The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give

effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that
which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions
60
themselves. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam
pereat. A law should be interpreted with a view to upholding rather
than destroying it.
The fact that no proclamation or grant of commutation was
officially issued by the President will not prevent the
implementation and operation of Section 19 to appellant. To argue
otherwise would be subordinating the command of the Constitution
to the will of the President. The framers of the Constitution never
intended that the non-imposition or non-execution of the death
sentence under those constitutional provisions would be dependent
on the act or omission of the Chief Executive.
Resort to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission will
justify this conclusion:

MR. REGALADO. May I ask Commissioner Monsod about this

second sentence. “Death penalty already imposed shall be
commuted to reclusion perpetua.”
When we say commuted to reclusion perpetua, I think we refer to
the power of the President to effect commutations because only
the President can commute sentences already final and imposed
by the courts. Is that correct?
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I am not the proponent of that
sentence. Perhaps the Committee should answer that.
MR. REGALADO. That was the answer of the Gentleman in
response to the inquiry of Commissioner Bengzon.
MR. MONSOD. My answer is reflective of what the Committee had
answered before. And since that has not been changed, I suppose
the answer would be the same. But if the Committee would like
to answer it in more detail, perhaps it should be the one to answer
that.
FR. BERNAS. The intention of the provision here is, upon
ratification of this Constitution, the death penalty already
imposed is automatically—without need for any action by the
President—commuted.

________________

60 Gold Creek Mining Corp. vs. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259 (1938).

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People vs. Derilo

MR. REGALADO. Yes, because the wording here is: “Death

penalty already imposed shall be commuted to reclusion
perpetua.” The power of commutation is a presidential
prerogative.
FR. BERNAS. Or we can say “ARE HEREBY commuted,” if that is
clearer. But that is the intention.
MR. REGALADO. Does the Commission mean “are hereby
reduced?”
FR. BERNAS. Commuted to the death penalty.
MR. REGALADO. It “shall be REDUCED to reclusion perpetua?”
FR. BERNAS. To reclusion perpetua, yes.
MR. REGALADO. Maybe the Commissioner should eliminate the
word “commute” because we are invading the presidential
prerogative.
THE PRESIDENT.61Is the Gentleman proposing an amendment to
the amendment?
Although Commissioner Regalado was not able to formally propose
an amendment because of an intervening question by another
commissioner, his observation was correspondingly accepted by the
Commission as shown by the use of the word “reduced” in the
present provision of the Constitution, instead of “commute” as
originally proposed. The fact is that he did not have to propose an
amendment as Commissioner Bernas, who was representing the
committee concerned, had already taken note thereof and acceded
thereto.
Thus, in his work on the 1987 Constitution, Commissioner
Bernas had this to say on the matter:

“x x x. But since “commutation” is technically an executive prerogative, the

Commission, in order to make the effect automatic without having to wait
for presidential action, deliberately avoided the use of the word “commuted”
and, on the suggestion of Commissioner Regalado, used instead “reduced.”
Thus the provision reads: “Any death penalty already imposed shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua.” The phrase “shall be reduced” is not a
description of some future act but a command that is immediately effective.
(Nevertheless, President

___________________

61 I Record of the Constitutional Commission 748.

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668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Derilo

Aquino issued an Executive Order, perhaps ad cautelam, commuting death

62
sentences already imposed.)

From the foregoing, it is apparent that no presidential action is

necessary in order that any accused sentenced to the death penalty
under the same circumstances as herein appellant may avail of the
benefit of Section 19. The accused, ipso jure, is entitled to a
reduction of his sentence. As the Constitution is not primarily a
lawyer’s document, its language should be understood in the sense
that it may have in common use. Its words should be given their 63
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
While “to commute” necessitates presidential initiative, “to reduce”
does not.
Therefore, with or without an official executive issuance on
commutation, the death penalty prescribed in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code and imposed on appellant by the lower court in
1986 cannot be carried out even though the case was brought to the
Supreme Court only in 1994 after Republic Act No. 7659 had taken
effect. Nor can this law be deemed to have revived the death penalty
in the case of appellant, for reasons stated earlier. By February 2,
1987, that penalty had already been automatically reduced to
reclusion perpetua, not by the grace of the President or of the courts,
but by the mandate of the fundamental law of the land.
Before we end, we note the extremely protracted delay in
bringing appellant’s conviction to the attention of this Court.
Although the judgment of the lower court was promulgated on
October 12, 1986, the records64
of this case were elevated to this
Court only on July 20, 1994. Even by this date, the records

__________________

62 Bernas, op cit;, 444, Fr. Bernas, however, did not cite the specific Executive
Order he was referring to, and we are not aware of any.
63 J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. L-21064,
February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413 (1970).
64 Rollo, 23. The postmark on the envelope containing the records forwarded to
this Court is dated July 20, 1994. This is because the records were prepared for
transmittal only on July 18, 1994 as

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People vs. Derilo

were not yet complete as some of the transcripts of stenographic

notes taken during the trial were not included in the records
forwarded to this Court.
We can only blame the court of origin for this improbable and
unexplained delay of almost eight years. It is the express and
specific duty of the clerk thereof to transmit to this Court, within the
periods allowed therefor, the complete records of the case where the
death penalty is imposed for automatic review. Paragraph 5, Section
L (Appeal), Chapter VI (Duties in Criminal Cases) of the Manual for
Clerks of Court, which is a verbatim reproduction of Section 10,
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, provides:

5. Transmission of Records in Case of Death Penalty.—In all cases where

the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be
forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment, within
twenty (20) days but not earlier than fifteen (15) days after promulgation of
the judgment or notice of denial of any motion for new trial or
reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days
after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter.

The Office of the Court Administrator is accordingly directed to

investigate this matter and submit the corresponding evaluation,
report and recommendation to this Court within ninety (90) days
from notice hereof.
All clerks of court are hereby ordered to scrupulously comply
with their duty and responsibility of seasonably transmitting to this
Court the complete records of cases where the death penalty was
imposed, especially now that the trial courts have imposed the death
penalty in many cases involving heinous crimes.
 With respect to the case at bar, in justice to appellant this
appellate proceeding shall be treated as an automatic review because
there is no showing in the records that he was advised that the death
penalty imposed upon him has been reduced to reclusion perpetua
pursuant to the pertinent provisions of the

_________________

indicated on page 2 of the Rollo when these should have been done as early as
1986.

670

670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mabeza vs. National Labor Relations Commission

1987 Constitution; and that his case is no longer subject to automatic

review, as provided and required in Circular No. 9 of this Court,
hence a notice of appeal should have been filed.
WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and by virtue of
the command of the 1987 Constitution, the judgment of the court a
quo is accordingly MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Isidoro Q.
Baldimo is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P50,000.00 in consonance with our current case law and policy on
death indemnity.
SO ORDERED.

          Narvasa (C.J.), Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo,

Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Panganiban and
Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
     Hermosisima, Jr., J., On leave.

Judgment modified.

Note.—View that it is an elementary principle in procedural law

and statutory construction that the repeal of a penal law deprives the
court of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of
the old law prior to its repeal. (State Prosecutors vs. Muro, 236
SCRA 505 [1994])

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