FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 119205.  April 15, 1998]

SIME DARBY PILIPINAS, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION (2ND DIVISION) and SIME DARBY
SALARIED EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (ALU-
TUCP), respondents.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

Is the act of management in revising the work schedule of its employees and
discarding their paid lunch break constitutive of unfair labor practice?
Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc., petitioner, is engaged in the manufacture of automotive
tires, tubes and other rubber products.  Sime Darby Salaried Employees Association
(ALU-TUCP), private respondent, is an association of monthly salaried employees of
petitioner at its Marikina factory.  Prior to the present controversy, all company factory
workers in Marikina including members of private respondent union worked from 7:45
a.m. to 3:45 p.m. with a 30 minute paid “on call” lunch break.
On 14 August 1992 petitioner issued a memorandum to all factory-based
employees advising all its monthly salaried employees in its Marikina Tire Plant, except
those in the Warehouse and Quality Assurance Department working on shifts, a change
in work schedule effective 14 September 1992 thus –

TO: ALL FACTORY-BASED EMPLOYEES

RE: NEW WORK SCHEDULE

Effective Monday, September 14, 1992, the new work schedule factory
office will be as follows:

7:45 A.M. – 4:45 P.M. (Monday to Friday)

7:45 A.M. – 11:45 P.M. (Saturday).

Coffee break time will be ten minutes only anytime between:

9:30 A.M. –10:30 A.M. and

2:30 P.M. –3:30 P.M.

Lunch break will be between:

12:00 NN –1:00 P.M. (Monday to Friday).

Excluded from the above schedule are the Warehouse and QA

employees who are on shifting.  Their work and break time schedules
will be maintained as it is now.[1]
Since private respondent felt affected adversely by the change in the work schedule
and discontinuance of the 30-minute paid “on call” lunch break, it filed on behalf of its
members a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for unfair labor practice, discrimination and
evasion of liability pursuant to the resolution of this Court in Sime Darby International
Tire Co., Inc. v. NLRC.[2] However, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the
ground that the change in the work schedule and the elimination of the 30-minute paid
lunch break of the factory workers constituted a valid exercise of management
prerogative and that the new work schedule, break time and one-hour lunch break did
not have the effect of diminishing the benefits granted to factory workers as the working
time did not exceed eight (8) hours.
The Labor Arbiter further held that the factory workers would be justly enriched if
they continued to be paid during their lunch break even if they were no longer “on call”
or required to work during the break.  He also ruled that the decision in the earlier Sime
Darby case[3] was not applicable to the instant case because the former involved
discrimination of certain employees who were not paid for their 30-minute lunch break
while the rest of the factory workers were paid; hence, this Court ordered that the
discriminated employees be similarly paid the additional compensation for their lunch
break.
Private respondent appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) which sustained the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the appeal. [4] However, upon
motion for reconsideration by private respondent, the NLRC, this time with two (2) new
commissioners replacing those who earlier retired, reversed its arlier decision of 20 April
1994 as well as the decision of the Labor Arbiter. [5] The NLRC considered the decision
of this Court in the Sime Darby case of 1990 as the law of the case wherein petitioner
was ordered to pay “the money value of these covered employees deprived of lunch
and/or working time breaks.”  The public respondent declared that the new work
schedule deprived the employees of the benefits of time-honored company practice of
providing its employees a 30-minute paid lunch break resulting in an unjust diminution
of company privileges prohibited by Art. 100 of the Labor Code, as amended.   Hence,
this petition alleging that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction:  (a) in ruling that petitioner committed unfair
labor practice in the implementation of the change in the work schedule of its
employees from 7:45 a.m. – 3:45 p.m. to 7:45 a.m. – 4:45 p.m. with one-hour lunch
break from 12:00 nn to 1:00 p.m.; (b) in holding that there was diminution of benefits
when the 30-minute paid lunch break was eliminated; (c) in failing to consider that in the
earlier Sime Darby case affirming the decision of the NLRC, petitioner was authorized to
discontinue the practice of having a 30-minute paid lunch break should it decide to do
so; and (d) in ignoring petitioner’s inherent management prerogative of determining and
fixing the work schedule of its employees which is expressly recognized in the collective
bargaining agreement between petitioner and private respondent.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed in lieu of comment a manifestation and
motion recommending that the petition be granted, alleging that the 14 August 1992
memorandum which contained the new work schedule was not discriminatory of the
union members nor did it constitute unfair labor practice on the part of petitioner.
We agree, hence, we sustain petitioner.  The right to fix the work schedules of the
employees rests principally on their employer.  In the instant case petitioner, as the
employer, cites as reason for the adjustment the efficient conduct of its business
operations and its improved production.[6] It rationalizes that while the old work schedule
included a 30-minute paid lunch break, the employees could be called upon to do jobs
during that period as they were “on call.”  Even if denominated as lunch break, this
period could very well be considered as working time because the factory employees
were required to work if necessary and were paid accordingly for working.  With the new
work schedule, the employees are now given a one-hour lunch break without any
interruption from their employer.  For a full one-hour undisturbed lunch break, the
employees can freely and effectively use this hour not only for eating but also for their
rest and comfort which are conducive to more efficiency and better performance in their
work.  Since the employees are no longer required to work during this one-hour lunch
break, there is no more need for them to be compensated for this period.  We agree
with the Labor Arbiter that the new work schedule fully complies with the daily work
period of eight (8) hours without violating the Labor Code. [7] Besides, the new schedule
applies to all employees in the factory similarly situated whether they are union
members or not.[8]
Consequently, it was grave abuse of discretion for public respondent to equate the
earlier Sime Darby case[9] with the facts obtaining in this case.  That ruling in the former
case is not applicable here.  The issue in that case involved the matter of granting lunch
breaks to certain employees while depriving the other employees of such breaks.  This
Court affirmed in that case the NLRC’s finding that such act of management was
discriminatory and constituted unfair labor practice.
The case before us does not pertain to any controversy involving discrimination of
employees but only the issue of whether the change of work schedule, which
management deems necessary to increase production, constitutes unfair labor
practice.  As shown by the records, the change effected by management  with regard to
working time is made to apply to all factory employees engaged in the same line of work
whether or not they are members of private respondent union.  Hence, it cannot be said
that the new scheme adopted by management prejudices the right of private respondent
to self-organization.
Every business enterprise endeavors to increase its profits.  In the process, it may
devise means to attain that goal.  Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of the
employees, it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly
management prerogatives.[10] Thus, management is free to regulate, according to its
own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work
assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, processes to be
followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work
supervision, lay off of workers and discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. [11] Further,
management retains the prerogative, whenever exigencies of the service so require, to
change the working hours of its employees.  So long as such prerogative is exercised in
good faith for the advancement of the employer’s interest and not for the purpose of
defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid
agreements, this Court will uphold such exercise. [12]
While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection
of the working class, it should not be supposed that every dispute will be automatically
decided in favor of labor.  Management also has right which, as such, are entitled to
respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play.  Although this Court has
inclined more often than not toward the worker and has upheld his cause in his conflicts
with the employer, such as favoritism has not blinded the Court to the rule that justice is
in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and
the applicable law and doctrine.[13]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.  The Resolution of the National Labor
Relations Commission dated 29 November 1994 is SET ASIDE and the decision of the
Labor Arbiter dated 26 November 1993 dismissing the complaint against petitioner for
unfair labor practice is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.