Interface

A journal for and about social movements

Vol 12 Issue 1 interfacejournal.net
Interface: a journal for and about social movements Contents
Volume 21 (1): i – viii (July 2020)

Interface volume 12 issue 1

Organizing amidst Covid-19

Interface: a journal for and about social movements

Volume 12 issue 1 (July 2020)
ISSN 2009 – 2431

Table of contents (pp. i – viii)

Editorial
Organizing amidst Covid-19
Sutapa Chattopadhyay, Lesley Wood and Laurence Cox (pp. 1 – 9)

Call for papers

Call for papers volume 13 issue 1
Rising up against institutional racism in the Americas and beyond (pp. 10 - 14)

Organizing amidst Covid-19: sharing stories of struggle

Overviews of movement struggles in specific places
Miguel Martinez
Mutating mobilisations during the pandemic crisis in Spain
(movement report, pp. 15 – 21)
Laurence Cox
Forms of social movement in the crisis: a view from Ireland
(movement report, pp. 22 – 33)
Lesley Wood
We’re not all in this together
(movement report, pp. 34 – 38)
Angela Chukunzira
Organising under curfew: perspectives from Kenya
(movement report, pp. 39 – 42)
Federico Venturini
Social movements’ powerlessness at the time of covid-19: a personal account
(movement report, pp. 43 – 46)

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Volume 21 (1): i – viii (July 2020)

Sobhi Mohanty
From communal violence to lockdown hunger: emergency responses by civil
society networks in Delhi, India
(movement report, pp. 47 – 52)

Feminist and LGBTQ+ activism

Hongwei Bao
“Anti-domestic violence little vaccine”: a Wuhan-based feminist activist
campaign during COVID-19
(movement report, pp. 53 – 63)
Ayaz Ahmed Siddiqui
Aurat march, a threat to mainstream tribalism in Pakistan
(movement report, pp. 64 – 71)
Lynn Ng Yu Ling
What does the COVID-19 pandemic mean for PinkDot Singapore?
(movement report, pp. 72 – 81)
María José Ventura Alfaro
Feminist solidarity networks have multiplied since the COVID-19 outbreak in
Mexico
(movement report, pp. 82 – 87)
Ben Trott
Queer Berlin and the Covid-19 crisis: a politics of contact and ethics of care
(movement report, pp. 88 – 108)

Reproductive struggles
Non Una Di Meno Roma
Life beyond the pandemic
(movement report, pp. 109 – 114)

Labour organising
Ben Duke
The effects of the COVID-19 crisis on the gig economy and zero hour contracts
(movement report, pp. 115 – 120)
Louisa Acciari
Domestic workers’ struggles in times of pandemic crisis
(movement report, pp. 121 – 127)
Arianna Tassinari, Riccardo Emilia Chesta and Lorenzo Cini
Labour conflicts over health and safety in the Italian Covid19 crisis
(movement report, pp. 128 – 138)

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Volume 21 (1): i – viii (July 2020)

T Sharkawi and N Ali

Acts of whistleblowing: the case of collective claim making by healthcare
workers in Egypt
(movement report, pp. 139 – 163)
Mallige Sirimane and Nisha Thapliyal
Migrant labourers, Covid19 and working-class struggle in the time of
pandemic: a report from Karnataka, India
(movement report, pp. 164 – 181)

Migrant and refugee struggles

Johanna May Black, Sutapa Chattopadhyay and Riley Chisholm
Solidarity in times of social distancing: migrants, mutual aid, and COVID-19
(movement report, pp. 182 – 193)
Anitta Kynsilehto
Doing migrant solidarity at the time of Covid-19
(movement report, pp. 194 – 198)
Susan Thieme and Eda Elif Tibet
New political upheavals and women alliances in solidarity beyond “lock down”
in Switzerland at times of a global pandemic
(movement report, pp. 199 – 207)
Chiara Milan
Refugee solidarity along the Western Balkans route: new challenges and a
change of strategy in times of COVID-19
(movement report, pp. 208 – 212)
Marco Perolini
Abolish all camps in times of corona: the struggle against shared
accommodation for refugees* in Berlin
(movement report, pp. 213 – 224)

Ecological activism
Clara Thompson
#FightEveryCrisis: Re-framing the climate movement in times of a pandemic
(movement report, pp. 225 – 231)
Susan Paulson
Degrowth and feminisms ally to forge care-full paths beyond pandemic
(movement report, pp. 232 – 246)
Peterson Derolus [FR]
Coronavirus, mouvements sociaux populaires anti-exploitation minier en Haïti
(movement report, pp. 247 – 249)

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Silpa Satheesh
The pandemic does not stop the pollution in River Periyar
(movement report, pp. 250 – 257)
Ashish Kothari
Corona can’t save the planet, but we can, if we listen to ordinary people
(movement report, pp. 258 – 265)

Food sovereignty organising

Dagmar Diesner
Self-governance food system before and during the Covid-crisis on the example
of CampiAperti, Bologna
(movement report, pp. 266 – 273)
URGENCI
Community Supported Agriculture is a safe and resilient alternative to
industrial agriculture in the time of Covid-19
(movement report, pp. 274 – 279)
Jenny Gkougki
Corona-crisis affects small Greek farmers who counterstrike with a
nationwide social media campaign to unite producers and consumers on local
level!
(movement report, pp. 280 – 283)
John Foran
Eco Vista in the quintuple crisis
(movement report, pp. 284 – 291)

Solidarity and mutual aid

Michael Zeller
Karlsruhe’s “giving fences”: mobilisation for the needy in times of COVID-19
(movement report, pp. 292 – 303)
Sergio Ruiz Cayuela
Organising a solidarity kitchen: reflections from Cooperation Birmingham
(movement report, pp. 304 – 309)
Clinton Nichols
On lockdown and locked out of the prison classroom: the prospects of post-
secondary education for incarcerated persons during pandemic
(movement report, pp. 310 – 316)
Micha Fiedlschuster and Leon Rosa Reichle
Solidarity forever? Performing mutual aid in Leipzig, Germany
(movement report, pp. 317 – 325)

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Artistic and digital resistance

Kerman Calvo and Ester Bejarano
Music, solidarities and balconies in Spain
(movement report, pp. 326 – 332)
Neto Holanda and Valesca Lima [PT]
Movimentos e ações político-culturais do Brasil em tempos de pandemia do
Covid-19
(movement report, pp. 333 – 338)
Margherita Massarenti
How Covid-19 led to a #Rentstrike and what it can teach us about online
organizing
(movement report, pp. 339 – 346)
Dounya
Knowledge is power: virtual forms of everyday resistance and grassroots
broadcasting in Iran
(movement report, pp. 347 – 354)

Imagining a new world

Donatella della Porta
How progressive social movements can save democracy in pandemic times
(movement report, pp. 355 – 358)
Jackie Smith
Responding to coronavirus pandemic: human rights movement-building to
transform global capitalism
(movement report, pp. 359 – 366)
Yariv Mohar
Human rights amid Covid-19: from struggle to orchestration of tradeoffs
(movement report, pp. 367 – 370)
Julien Landry, Ann Marie Smith, Patience Agwenjang, Patricia Blankson
Akakpo, Jagat Basnet, Bhumiraj Chapagain, Aklilu Gebremichael, Barbara
Maigari and Namadi Saka,
Social justice snapshots: governance adaptations, innovations and practitioner
learning in a time of COVID-19
(movement report, pp. 371 – 382)
Roger Spear, Gulcin Erdi, Marla A. Parker and Maria Anastasia
Innovations in citizen response to crises: volunteerism and social mobilization
during COVID-19
(movement report, pp. 383 – 391)
Breno Bringel
Covid-19 and the new global chaos
(movement report, pp. 392 – 399)

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Volume 21 (1): i – viii (July 2020)

General pieces
Luke Beesley
The social and the subjective: defining disablement at the birth of the disabled
people’s movement in Britain
(peer-reviewed article, pp. 400 - 419)
Doris Murphy,
Repealed the 8th: what motivated activists to get involved in the campaign,
how did they sustain their activism, and how did they experience the aftermath
(peer-reviewed article, pp. 420 - 436)
Poyraz Kolluoglu,
A 21st century repertoire: affective and urban mobilization dynamics of the
Gezi commune
(peer-reviewed article, pp. 437 - 463)
Dimitris Papanikolopoulos,
Protest dynamics and new political cleavages in Greece of crisis, 2010-2015
(peer-reviewed article, pp. 464 - 491)
Noah Krigel,
“We are not the party to bitch and whine: exploring US democracy through the
lens of a college Republican club
(peer-reviewed article, pp. 492 - 514)
Rohan Davis,
Looking to “Bern” for inspiration: the future of the pro-Palestinian movement
in Australia
(article, pp. 515 - 526)
Michael C. Zeller,
Rethinking demobilisation: concepts, causal logic, and the case of Russia’s For
Fair Elections movement
(peer-reviewed article, pp. 527 - 558)
Charla Burnett and Karen Ross,
Scaling up nonviolence
(peer-reviewed article, pp. 559 - 590)
Kyle Matthews,
Social movements and the (mis)use of research: XR and the 3.5% rule
(peer-reviewed article, pp. 591 - 615)
Levi Gahman, Filiberto Penados, Adaeze Greenidge, Seferina Miss, Roberto
Kus, Donna Makin, Florenio Xuc, Rosita Kan and Elodio Rash,
Dignity, dreaming, and desire-based research in the face of slow violence:
indigenous youth organising as (counter)development
(peer-reviewed article, pp. 616 - 651)

Reviews [single PDF] (pp. 652 - 683)

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Volume 21 (1): i – viii (July 2020)

Yasser Munif, 2020, The Syrian Revolution: Between the Politics of Life and
the Geopolitics of Death. Review author: Isaac K. Oommen
Masao Sugiura, 2019, Against the Storm: How Japanese Print workers
Resisted the Military Regime, 1935-1945. Review author: Alexander James
Brown.
Samir Gandesha (ed.), 2019, Spectres of Fascism: Historical, Theoretical and
International Perspectives. Review author: Rogelio Regalado Mujica [SP]
Daniel Ozarow, 2019, The Mobilization and Demobilization of Middle-Class
Revolt: Comparative Insights from Argentina. Review author: Agnes Gagyi.
Andy Blunden, 2019, Hegel for Social Movements. Review author: Cameron
Shingleton
Cas Mudde, 2019, The Far Right Today. Review author: Patrick Sawyer
Alyshia Gálvez, 2018, Eating NAFTA: Trade, Food Policies and the Destruction
of Mexico. Review author: Dawn Maria Paley

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Cover art
Cover and photo by Ana Vilenica.

About Interface
Interface: a journal for and about social movements is a peer-reviewed journal
of practitioner research produced by movement participants and engaged
academics. Interface is globally organised in a series of different regional
collectives, and is produced as a multilingual journal. Peer-reviewed articles
have been subject to double-blind review by one researcher and one movement
practitioner.
The views expressed in any contributions to Interface: a journal for and about
social movements are those of the authors and contributors, and do not
necessarily represent those of Interface, the editors, the editorial collective, or
the organizations to which the authors are affiliated. Interface is committed to
the free exchange of ideas in the best tradition of intellectual and activist
inquiry.
The Interface website is hosted by the Department of Sociology, National
University of Ireland Maynooth.

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Organizing amidst Covid-19

Sutapa Chattopadhyay, Lesley Wood, Laurence Cox

The world is on fire, with both fever and flame. After a few months of lockdown,
things are erupting in new ways. The movement for Black Lives is demanding an
end to anti-Black racism and conversations about abolishing the police are on
late night television. In North America, a new world appears to be dawning, one
that didn’t seem possible even a month ago. Meanwhile, in the new centre of
global capitalism, the long-standing Hong Kong movement seems to be on the
point of succumbing to a new wave of repression.
Around the world, movements are strategizing about how to ensure that no one
is left behind. In April we put out a call for short pieces on this theme. We could
see that the imminent arrival of the virus had generated many different
struggles - initially pressure to force some states to take action in the first place,
resistance to cuts and demanding benefits. Then came struggles characterized
by mutual aid, efforts to protect essential workers, and the most vulnerable,
such as the homeless, prisoners, the elderly and the undocumented.
We were overwhelmed with contributions that reflected the gradual
mobilization of the organized left, feminists and LGBTQ+activists, the self-
organisation of migrants and precarious workers, resistance to curfews and the
expansion of the surveillance state, the reorganisation of ecological and food
sovereignty movements, artistic and online struggles. These movements
achieved significant successes, in many different contexts. In the end we
published thirty-eight pieces, from every continent except Antarctica.
And right as we stopped at the end of May, US police killed George Floyd and a
new chapter of movements during Covid began. This new wave of protest, with
protests in over 2000 cities (as of June 13th) is particularly visible in North
America and in parts of Europe and Africa and builds on the experiences of
organizing under Covid-19 as well as on longer Black Lives Matter struggles,
practices of mutual aid and dialogues between movements. It is one that is
expanding the range of the possible, with powerful demands for the defunding
of police departments, charges laid against violent officers and promises of new
Black hires in a range of institutions, new programs and resources for Black
communities.
In Hong Kong, “the other superpower” also experienced a new upsurge in
resistance as the Chinese state, too, sought to use the pandemic to wrap the flag
around state leadership and assert its power in a very different context. As we go
to press, the new security legislation has just come into effect and many activists
and organisations are going at least partly below the radar. It is too early to tell
whether Goliath will win, or if Hong Kong will prove indigestible together with
China’s many other struggles – of Tibetans and Uyghurs, migrant workers and
peasants, women and LGBTQ+ people.

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Movements in both countries escape the facile violence vs non-violence

description: both states have the physical capacity to destroy their opponents,
but struggle to construct the political capacity to do so. In this context, activists -
staying far below the level of violence deployed against them - resist physically
as well as in many other ways.
This is also a moment of internationalism. Many have noted that the past dozen
years (since the global crash of 2007-8) have seen a rise of nationalism, after a
period of globalization. Borders are tightening and xenophobic formations are
accelerating. But now, during a period of parallel closures - which have worked
very differently in different countries - activists around the world are
experiencing something that both unites and divides.
In this spirit, we want to state our solidarity both with Black Lives Matter
protesters and with the Hong Kong movement, and to reject the claim that all
that matters is which superpower you support. Interface stands, ultimately, for
the development of popular power from below – for social movements as
substantive democracy – and rejects the cynicism that sees ordinary people’s
struggles as pawns on some imaginary chessboard.

In this issue
This issue has 55 pieces, covering movements in Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Egypt,
France, Germany, Greece, Haiti, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya,
Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland,
Syria, Turkey, the UK, the US and globally and written in English, French,
Portuguese and Spanish.
The special section of this issue contains almost all of the short pieces originally
written for our rolling coverage of movements in the virus, as well as a few
pieces written especially for this special issue. We’ve included dates in these
articles because of how quickly the situation has evolved in different countries:
these pieces represent reflective activists and engaged researchers trying to
grasp what their movements were doing, and what they should do, in an
unprecedented situation.
Together they show just how thoughtful, creative, brave and radical our
movements actually are - in the teeth of hostile or trivialising media, attempts at
commodification and conspiracy theories. If there is hope for the future, it is to
be found here, and not in state or corporate leaderships who have been found as
desperately wanting as have the dominant social groups they represent. A world
we can live in will be a world built “from below and on the left”, in many forms.
In a period when many conventional academic journals have reported a falling-
off in submissions from women due to increased care responsibilities in the
crisis, and when commercially-oriented activist media have often gone to their
usual white male commentators, it is striking what a difference it makes to just

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do things differently. We did not commission these pieces; and we deliberately

lowered the bar in seeking short, non-peer review pieces. As a result, the
gender, geographical and ethnic distribution is considerably broader - while
much remains to be done, particularly on redressing the balance between
majority world voices and experiences and those of the global North.
We had called for contributions that reflected on: a) movements already going
on prior to the outbreak of the coronavirus; b) collective actions that informed
the involvements of activists, who at various capacities responded to the crisis;
c) struggles of the civil society that made their states take action; d) specific
needs campaign, solidarity economy and mutual aid initiatives that have catered
to very specific to general needs of people from particular social backgrounds,
and lastly e) longer-term perspectives of what might the crisis mean for
movements and what are the possibilities of a better world in post-pandemic
times.
These contributions have all grappled with at least one of these themes. We
attempted to thematise them further so as to bring out not only the differences
but also the similarities in the depth, types and creativity of autonomous
initiatives during the ongoing global crisis. This new wave is not a return to
normal. What this issue – and today’s movements – illustrate is an expansion of
movements that place the most vulnerable at the centre, and demand systemic
solutions to systemic problems – perhaps providing possibilities for a better
world.

Overviews of movement struggles in specific places

We begin with a series of articles that attempt to grasp the complexity and
diversity of movements within a single space: Spain (Martinez), Ireland (Cox),
Toronto / Canada (Wood), Kenya (Chukunizira), Udine / Italy (Venturini) and
Delhi / India (Mohanty).
Wearing the lens of an activist researcher, Miguel Martinez explores the
enhanced meanings of solidarity that emerged during the corona virus crisis.
Laurence Cox’s intervention explores current and post-pandemic struggles with
a particular focus on how movements contest and force state action as well as
exploring movement pressures for systemic transformation.
Lesley Wood shows how extra-legal procedures and actions have created a wall
between care givers and civic society actors with the homeless, disabled,
incarcerated, migrants, elderly, sexualised and marginalised. Her analysis is
intersectional, connecting to social justice. Angela Chukunzira presents an array
of movements that emerged to tackle the war on the poor.
Federico Venturini’s personal experiences organizing during the pandemic
inform his reflections around time lapse, digital bottlenecks, and the rise of
alternative platforms for protests. Lastly, Sobhi Mohanty narrates communal
violence and Muslim apartheid in times of Covid-19.

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Our blog also included a link to John Krinsky and Hillary Caldwell’s overview of
movement networks in New York City during the virus.

Feminist and LGBTQ+ activism

Hongwei Bao writes about the Wuhan-based feminist movement “Anti-domestic
violence little vaccine”. Bao sees the pandemic as a window to experiment
new/flexible modes of activism. Ayaz Ahmed Siddiqui details the Aurat march
in Karachi, Pakistan – that ingeniously connects the pandemic with on-
going/historic movements against misogyny, domestic/sexual violence, honor
killings and homophobia.
Similarly Lynn Ng Yu Ling shows the exponential growth of the PinkDot
Movement in Singapore and how the pandemic has created a virtual space that
paints the city state pink progressing non-discriminatory and non-identitarian
aspirations. María José Ventura Alfaro details autonomous Feminist collectives
that cater to local food and medicine shortages besides raising awareness to
multi-level violence/s in Mexico.
Finally, Ben Trott explores the politics of distance and the ethics of care in the
struggle to preserve the movement infrastructure of Queer Berlin.

Reproductive struggles
For over half a decade, Non Una di Meno Roma, a trans-feminist and feminist
Italian movement has countered violence against classed, sexualized, racialized
people while challenging traditional understanding of (re)productivity and body
politics. Their fantastic piece, translated into English here for the first time,
seeks to grasp the complexity of the current moment in a perspective grounded
in materialist and feminist struggles around work both paid and unpaid.

Labour organising
Ben Duke observes how the pandemic provides a platform of collective change
in the employment/welfare landscape for the precarious. Another brilliant study
on precarity and il/legality around the migrant laborforce in Brazil is forwarded
by Louisa Acciari.
Moving on, Arianna Tassinari, Riccardo Emilia Chesta and Lorenzo Cini report
on the re-politicisation of precarious work, occupational security and health
safety of workers in Italy. Tass Sharkawi and N. Ali’s piece discusses how
Egyptian health care workers used whistleblowing as a form of contentious
mobilisation under authoritarianism.
Mallige Sirimane and Nisha Thapliyal takes us to India giving a close
perspective on statist policies that toppled the lives of day laborers during
Covid-19 lockdown in Karnataka, India.

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Finally, our blog included a link to Jeremy Brecher’s piece about precarious
strikes across the United States.

Migrant and refugee struggles

Johanna May Black, Sutapa Chattopadhyay and Riley Chisholm explore
migrant-specific mutual-aid alliances across the globe. Anitta Kynsilehto
focusses on the specific challenges of migrant solidarity in Morocco, where
solidarity groups were already under fire.
Susan Thieme and Eda Elif Tibet discuss how Swiss women and unions
organised together before and during lockdown around issues including the
situation of migrant women and care workers. Chiara Milan runs an analysis on
refugee comradeship along the highly porous Western Balkans frontier zone.
Marco Perolini complements these entries as he writes on the struggles of
refugees and others in Germany against housing refugees in camps, subjected to
curfew and forced quarantine under the virus.

Amidst a sea of stories about inhumane procedures and interventions against

stateless and paperless migrants, it was a joy to read about these progressive
strategies of resistance during the most difficult global crisis.

Ecological activism
Clara Thompson discusses how Fridays for Future were already on the back foot
before lockdown, while challenging media myths in social media has its limits:
what can activists do now? Susan Paulson carries out a twofold analysis of the
relationship between degrowth, crisis and finding a politics to move through
and beyond the pandemic.
Peterson Derolus’ French-language piece explores the Haitian mining resistance
during the pandemic. While Silpa Satheesh discusses Earth day protests by
masked activists in Kerala, India challenging toxic wastes in the Periyar river.
Lastly, Ashish Kothari discusses indigenous and Dalit “territories of life” and the
possibility of radical ecological democracy grounded in popular struggles.
Our blog also included a link to Jeremy Brecher’s fascinating piece about how
the struggles of workers and communities around the virus hold the germs of an
emergency Green New Deal.

Food sovereignty organising

Dagmar Diesner holds a unique example of CampiAperti which is a food
producing collective providing food sufficiency during the pandemic in Bologna,
Italy. Similarly URGENCI is a community supported agriculture collective that

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provides a safe and resilient alternative to -chemical-induced/industrial food

production.
Jenny Gkougki takes us to small-scale Greek farmers who led a nationwide
social media campaign to merge producers and consumers. John Foran writes
about a student-based organization Eco Vista that makes unique efforts to
create sustainable living. All these entries show how such movements –
necessarily grounded in the longer-term - connect the pre-crisis world with the
virus-dominated situation and possible futures.

Solidarity and mutual aid

Michael Zeller explores the strain on homeless and impoverished people due to
protective measures and institutionalisation of social service, during the
pandemic, in Karlsruhe, Germany. Some of our contributions fit in more than
one theme, like Sergio Ruiz Cayuela’s article on solidarity soup kitchen in
Birmingham, which could equally fit in the previous section.
Clinton Nichols delves into the prospects of post-secondary education for the
incarcerated during the pandemic. Finally, Micha Fiedlschuster and Leon Rosa
Reichle use the case of Leipzig, Germany to explore the variety of practical and
analytical approaches mutual aid.

Artistic and digital resistance

Kerman Calvo and Ester Bejarano write on the social spaces of protest and
extraordinary relevance of music promoting bonds to cope with the nostalgia
and crisis of the virus. Neto Holanda and Valesca Lima’s Portuguese-language
piece discusses the struggles and challenges faced by artists and cultural actors
in Brazil during the crisis , particularly in the state of Ceará.
Margherita Massarenti informs us about the practical realities of the online
organizing around a #Rentstrike that developed out during the pandemic. A
fascinating entry was forwarded by Dounya on virtual forms of everyday
resistance and grassroots broadcasting in Iran – in a new wave of global
authoritarianism, it is important to see that even in states which have
experienced decades of authoritarian rule there is resistance.

Imagining a new world

Donatella della Porta details how crucially new and change in strategies of social
movements can create spaces for reflection about a post-pandemic world. Jackie
Smith similarly connects systemic capitalism and human rights movements.
Yariv Mohar expands the discussion of human right and social justice issues
amid Covid-19.
The piece by Julien Landry, Ann Marie Smith, Patience Agwenjang, Patricia
Blankson Akakpo, Jagat Basnet, Bhumiraj Chapagain, Aklilu Gebremichael,

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Barbara Maigari and Namadi Saka follows on from governance theme to civic
society participation. Roger Spear, Gulcin Erdi, Marla A. Parker and Maria
Anastasia write how Covid-19 has created a range of responses to alleviate direct
and indirect impacts on people, institutions, systems, cultures.
Breno Bringel brilliantly ties this special issue with a note on moving on from
cataclysmic capitalism to a pluriverse one through new forms of protests, new
articulation of change, and new modes of connection across people and places.
We started the issue with similar calls for change (see Cox, Khothari and della
Porta)

Non-themed articles
As in every issue of Interface, we also present general (non-themed) pieces.
Luke Beesley’s article explores the birth of the “social model of disability” in
Britain. Using newly-available material, he explores the activist debates within
the Disabled People’s Movement and shows the centrality of democratic self-
organisation in the dynamics that surrounded the emergence of a social
definition of disability. Doris Murphy’s piece draws on oral history interviews
with participants in Ireland’s successful campaign for abortion rights. She
shows that despite widespread awareness of the need for activist self-care, the
pressures of the situation and lack of resources often undercut participants’
ability to put this into practice, and calls for a move from individual self-care to
collective care.
Poyraz Kolluoglu’s ethnography of the 2013 Gezi Park protests in Istanbul
highlights how – despite scholarly assimilation to the “Arab Spring” or “Occupy”
- participants were more likely to frame the events in relation to the 1871 Paris
Commune, “conjuring up the spirits of the past to their service” as Marx
observed of another uprising. Dimitris Papanikolopoulos’ article explores the
reorganisation of Greek movements and politics in the 2010s around resistance
or opposition to the Troika. He looks at the intense cognitive work done by
movement participants in deconstructing traditional political boundaries and
constructing new ones: what outside accounts understand as populism turns out
to be an active construction from below.
Noah Krigel’s article attempts to understand the current shift to the right in
global politics through an ethnography of a college Republican club in the US.
He identifies the narratives of victimhood, exclusionary mechanisms and gender
politics involved among these students, who are increasingly being supported by
elites as the future of hard-right politics. Rohan Davis’ short piece, on the pro
Palestinian movement in Australia, notes the marginalisation of Palestine
solidarity in Australian politics, notes the impact of the Bernie Sanders
candidature on the expansion of pro-Palestine views in the US and calls for
charismatic leadership of this kind in Australia. Michael Zeller’s article argues
for a more systematic approach to theorising the demobilisation of social
movements, presenting a complex logic of causal factors. It uses the case of

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Russia’s 2011-12 For Fair Elections movement to show how this analysis works
in practice.
Two articles look at the relationship between movement activists and
researchers around nonviolence. Charla Burnett and Karen Ross’ article carries
out a meta-analysis of movement training manuals and scholarly research,
contrasting how they discuss scaling up. The authors note how research on
campaigns diverges substantially from what activists prioritise when trying to
increase the size and impact of non-violent action. Kyle Matthews’ article on
how movements use research discusses Extinction Rebellion’s use of Chenoweth
and Stephan’s research to argue that if 3.5% of a population engages in civil
disobedience success is inevitable. He shows that this is based on
misunderstanding the context of the research. Both papers argue for better
dialogue between researchers and movements – a key concern for Interface.
We are delighted to finish with a paper that does just that. A team of academic
researchers and Indigenous youth - Levi Gahman, Filiberto Penados, Adaeze
Greenidge, Seferina Miss, Roberto Kus, Donna Makin, Florenio Xuc, Rosita Kan
and Elodio Rash – co-authored this article about dignity-anchored, dream-
driven and desire-based research coming out of Maya youth organising that is
redefining development in southern Belize, from the perspective of an
Indigenous movement which has won historic gains on land rights.

Book reviews
Finally, we have a bumper crop of book reviews. Isaac K. Oommen reviews
Yasser Munif’s The Syrian Revolution: Between the Politics of Life and the
Geopolitics of Death. Masao Sugiura’s Against the Storm: How Japanese Print
workers Resisted the Military Regime, 1935-1945 is reviewed by Alexander
James Brown.
Rogelio Regalado Mujica offers a Spanish-language review of Samir Gandesha
(ed.), Spectres of Fascism: Historical, Theoretical and International
Perspectives. Daniel Ozarow’s The Mobilization and Demobilization of Middle-
Class Revolt: Comparative Insights from Argentina is reviewed by Agnes
Gagyi.
Cameron Shingleton reviews Andy Blunden’s Hegel for Social Movements. Cas
Mudde’s The Far Right Today is reviewed by Patrick Sawyer. Lastly, Dawn
Marie Paley reviews Alyshia Gálvez’ Eating NAFTA: Trade, Food Policies and
the Destruction of Mexico.

Writing for Interface

A call for papers for future issues of Interface follows. Interface seeks to share
learning between different social movement struggles and movements in
different places and to develop dialogue between activist and academic
understandings and between different political and intellectual traditions. That

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Interface: A journal for and about social movements
Volume 12 (1): pp 1 – 9 (July 2020) Editorial

means we publish pieces by activist thinkers as well as academic researchers

(and many people who are both), and in many different formats.
Because of this, Interface doesn’t have a “line” - or rather, the line is that we
want to hear from movement participants who are thinking about strategy,
tactics, movement theory, history etc. and from researchers on movements who
are committed to working with activists rather than for purely academic goals. It
is movements “from below” - movements of the poor, the powerless and those at
the bottom of cultural hierarchies - who most need this reflection. Conversely
we are opposed to racism, fascism, casteism, and religious fundamentalism.
This dialogue and audience should also shape writing for Interface.
Please, please don’t write us pieces aimed at convincing a general public to
support your cause! Most of our readers are already very heavily engaged in
their own movements: if you have a good piece for a general public, why not
publish it somewhere that public will actually see it? Similarly, please don’t send
us pieces which are all about the theoretical analysis of social structures,
economics, culture, biopolitics or whatever. Again, Interface readers get it: but
what they are interested in is what people actually do to resist and / or change
these structures, what happens when they resist and how they can struggle
better. Lastly, some academic and political styles of writing are all about
showing that you’re part of the in-group: using a vocabulary that people in other
movements /traditions/disciplines can’t make sense of is fine if you’re writing
for that kind of journal, but it isn’t Interface.
What do we want? Clearly-written pieces that don’t assume your readers know
your country / movement / academic discipline / theoretical tradition but focus
on what readers can learn from the movement you’re writing about, including
from its mistakes, dilemmas, challenges and conflicts. Something you would
find interesting and useful if you were reading it about a different movement, in
a different country! Have a look at our past issues to get a better sense of who
our readers and writers are – and try writing for them. Our guidelines for
contributors and “About Interface ” pages have more details.

Interface editors – leaving, arriving, needed!

With this issue we welcome Ana Vilenica as a new East and Central European
editor. Ana also did the covers for this issue and the last one, and is
inaugurating a visuals working team. We also say farewell to Ana Margarida
Esteves, Cristina Flesher Fominaya, Helge Hiram Jensen, David Landy and
Anna Szolucha. Our thanks go out to them for all the work they’ve done over the
years in developing the journal, keeping it going in hard times and making
connections with new generations of activists and movements.
We’re also looking for a new editor with IT skills to join the IT / website working
group. We publish on Wordpress.org, using files created in Word and social
media outlets on Twitter and Facebook. Like all our editorial work, this is
voluntary and collective. If you’re interested in activist media, please contact
Laurence Cox at laurence.cox AT mu.ie.

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Interface: a journal for and about social movements Call for papers
Volume 12 (1): 10 - 14 (July 2020) Vol 13 issue 1: Rising up against institutional racism

Call for papers volume 13 issue 1 (May-June 2021)

Rising up against institutional racism
in the Americas and beyond
Elisabet Rasch, Heike Schaumberg and Sara C. Motta

The May-June 2021 issue of the open-access, online, copy left academic/activist
journal Interface: a Journal for and about Social Movements
(http://www.interfacejournal.net/) will focus on themes relevant to
understanding and registering the popular responses and uprisings to racism.
The geographical scope will be focused on the Americas, but we also encourage
relevant submissions from other geographical regions with significant ant-racist
movements. We also welcome contributions that critically analyse the deeper
social constructions of racism and the absence of, or barriers to the
development of, protest movements. Contributions on other themes, as always,
are also welcome.
The Volume 12, issue 2 (November-December 2020) issue will be a general
issue, open to all contributions relevant to the journal.

Rising up against institutional racism in the Americas and

beyond
The Covid-19 pandemic has put a spotlight on racism as a structural and
institutional ill of capitalism. The vicious police killing of George Floyd on 25
May ignited uprisings and protests against the institutional racism not only in
the US but across much of the ‘Global North’. This happened just at a time when
most of the world was in lockdown and activists wondered how the Covid-19
pandemic and, in particular, the quarantine would affect our ability to organise
collectively against injustice and discrimination and fight for a better world.
The past decades, the Americas have witnessed growing radicalisation and
movements of indigenous peoples that has raised awareness of structural racism
across these continents. Yet, with Latin America as the new pandemic’s hotspot
at the time of writing, energies in this region are still focused on Covid-19 itself
and the social and economic consequences; we are yet to see whether the ant-
racist movements in the north will reverberate more strongly in the south.
There is a plethora of structural, political and historical reasons for anti-racism
to crystallize countless issues of contention and articulate as a movement. For
instance, there have been allegations and reports of racially motivated police
abuses in several countries in the region, where poverty is also racialized (see for
example: Grimson and Grimson 2017; Mondon and Winter 2019; Sears 2014;
Hale 2005; Guano 2003; Gordillo 2016). Indeed, the rage underpinning the
rising against racism is fuelled also by the connected economic injustices. The
pandemic also highlights this: poorer sectors pay with disproportionately more
lives for a pandemic that they have not helped to spread across the globe, but for

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Interface: a journal for and about social movements Call for papers
Volume 12 (1): 10 - 14 (July 2020) Vol 13 issue 1: Rising up against institutional racism

which they have fewer means for protective measures and treatment.
Institutional racism, police brutality and racial profiling are well-known and
documented issues right across the Americas, in many countries steeped in a
history of state terror and/ or exploitative, and frequently violent, Latifundista
social relations.
Today, political conditions are both combined and, characteristically of a
general crisis, jarringly uneven across the Americas. With Trump only being
trumped by Bolsonaro in Brazil, Chile’s popular uprising halted by the
pandemic was countered by Bolivia’s right-wing coup, which now faces
uncertainty due to elections and popular pressure, to name just a handful of
examples. In a historical move, the recently elected Argentine government has
taken legal action against the superpowers of the police in Salta province for
recurrent abuses of powers, including unlawful detentions (El Portal de Salta
2020). It is the first time for the national government to recognize the
institutional nature of police violence targeted at the poor, indigenous peoples,
and political adversaries such as Human Rights, social movements and trade
union actors.
The Black Lives Matter uprising in the ‘North’ has put the struggle against
institutional racism onto the global agendas, which prompts a variety of
questions. Will the Black Lives Matter Movement inspire forms of collective
action against institutional racism in Latin America? In what ways would such
movements re-shape the region’s political landscape and could they re-
invigorate the leftist social movements’ agendas? Indeed, does the ‘Black Lives
Matter’ movement offer an opportunity to unearth the institutional racism from
the various origin myths and its historical legacies of slavery (Shilliam 2009)?
In what ways have these legacies shaped national and ethnic identities across
the Americas? How does the imaginary of a ‘white’ European colonial past still
obscure and/or marginalise non-white collective identities? How has this been
resisted? Have the nature and content of anti-racist resistance, or the conditions
for such resistance changed? How does the racialisation of working-class poor
articulate during the Covid-19 pandemic? What does this tell us about social,
cultural and political conditions for confronting the ills of capitalism today?
This issue aims to explore the diversity of historical and political articulations of
institutional racism and their antagonists in the Americas, and why it is now,
under the difficult circumstances of lockdown during the Covid-19 pandemic,
the anti-racism movements have erupted into the public sphere in the North.
How does the Covid 19 pandemic shape anti-racist and indigenous rights
struggles? We invite in-depth empirical, historical and theoretical analyses, case
studies and regional explorations, reports, opinion pieces, relevant interviews
and other significant material, short contributions centred on ‘events’ of
collective action against racism primarily in the Americas. Reflections on racism
and anti-racism from other parts of the world that do not relate to the Americas
will be covered by the ‘open section’ of this issue.
Some general questions seem to be particularly important, but this is not an
exhaustive list:

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Interface: a journal for and about social movements Call for papers
Volume 12 (1): 10 - 14 (July 2020) Vol 13 issue 1: Rising up against institutional racism

1. What are particular and general constructions of racism in the

Americas?
2. How is contemporary racism, and resistance towards it, rooted in the
colonial history of the continent and how is it confronted or
challenged?
3. How did anti-racist protests emerge during the pandemic and what is
its meaning?
4. How does the COVID19 pandemic shape the work of anti-racist and
indigenous movements?
5. What is the composition of the anti-racist and indigenous movements
and why?
6. What are the (local) historical legacies of racism in ideological
constructs and identity and cultural politics?
7. How do anti-racist movements in the North articulate with non-white
and indigenous groups in Latin America?
8. How do indigenous movements (and their indigenous rights’ agenda)
articulate with other anti-racist agenda’s in the Americas?
9. What are racism’s ‘hidden transcripts’ and how do they shape collective
subjectivities?
10. How do social (indigenous) movements, trade unions and left-wing
parties construct and frame anti-racism?
11. How is the operational space of anti-racist and indigenous movements
limited by governments, the private sector, armed actors, and others?
12. How are poverty, violence and class racialised and how does this shape
resistance and protest?
13. How is racism gendered within the home, the family, in public spaces
and at work?
In this issue, we would particularly encourage in-depth ethnographic, historical
and political analyses, comparative approaches, activist accounts as well as
event and practice analyses.

Principles for contributions

Interface is a journal of practitioner research, meaning that we welcome work
by movement activists as well as activist scholars, and work in a variety of
formats which suit these different kinds of writing as well as our very varied
readership – which includes activists and researchers across the world,
connected to many different movements and working within very different
intellectual, theoretical and political traditions.

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Interface: a journal for and about social movements Call for papers
Volume 12 (1): 10 - 14 (July 2020) Vol 13 issue 1: Rising up against institutional racism

We are interested in pieces in many formats – peer-reviewed articles and

interviews with movement activists, research and teaching notes, book reviews
and key documents and other formats that work well for their purposes – that
tackle some of the questions raised above.
All contributions (including those for the special issue and the special section)
should go to the appropriate regional editors by the deadline of May 1, 2018.
Please see the editorial contacts page
(http://www.interfacejournal.net/submissions/editorial-contact/) – and use
the appropriate template. Please see the guidelines for contributors
(http://www.interfacejournal.net/submissions/guidelines-for-contributors/)
for more indications on content and style.

General contributions
As always, this issue will also include non-theme related pieces. We are happy to
consider submissions on any aspect of social movement research and practice
that fit within the journal’s mission statement
(http://www.interfacejournal.net/who-we-are/mission-statement/). Pieces for
Interface should contribute to the journal’s mission as a tool to help our
movements learn from each other’s struggles, by developing analyses from
specific movement processes and experiences that can be translated into a form
useful for other movements.
In this context, we welcome contributions by movement participants and
academics who are developing movement-relevant theory and research. In
addition to studies of contemporary experiences and practices, we encourage
analysis of historical social movements as a means of learning from the past and
better understanding contemporary struggles.
Our goal is to include material that can be used in a range of ways by
movements — in terms of its content, its language, its purpose and its form. We
thus seek work in a range of different formats, such as conventional (refereed)
articles, review essays, facilitated discussions and interviews, action notes,
teaching notes, key documents and analysis, book reviews — and beyond. Both
activist and academic peers review research contributions, and other material is
sympathetically edited by peers. The editorial process generally is geared
towards assisting authors to find ways of expressing their understanding, so that
we all can be heard across geographical, social and political distances.
We can accept material in Bengali, Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, Czech, Danish,
Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Hindi, Italian, Mandarin Chinese,
Norwegian, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, Slovak, Spanish and Swedish. Please
see our editorial contacts page (https://www.interfacejournal.net/contact-us/)
for details of who to send submissions to.

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Interface: a journal for and about social movements Call for papers
Volume 12 (1): 10 - 14 (July 2020) Vol 13 issue 1: Rising up against institutional racism

Deadline and contact details

The deadline for initial submissions to this issue, to be published in May-June
2021, is 15 October 2020. For details of how to submit pieces to Interface,
please see the “Guidelines for contributors” on our website. All manuscripts
should be sent to the appropriate regional editor, listed on our contacts page.
Submission templates are available online via the guidelines page
(http://www.interfacejournal.net/submissions/guidelines-for-contributors/)
and should be used to ensure correct formatting. Interface is a completely
voluntary effort, without the resources of commercial journals, so we have to do
all the layout and typesetting ourselves. The only way we can manage this is to
ask authors to use these templates when preparing submissions. Thanks!

References
El Portal de Salta. 2020, 3 July. ‘Nación presentó un recurso contra los
superpoderes de la Policía de la Provincia’. El Portal de Salta (blog). .
https://elportaldesalta.com.ar/nacion-presento-un-recurso-contra-los-
superpoderes-de-la-policia-de-la-provincia/.
Gordillo, Gastón. 2016. ‘The Savage Outside of White Argentina’. In Rethinking
Race in Modern Argentina, edited by Paulina Alberto and Eduardo Elena, 241–
67. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Grimson, Alejandro, and Alejandro Grimson. 2017. ‘Raza y Clase En Los
Orígenes Del Peronismo: Argentina, 1945’. Desacatos, no. 55 (December): 110–
27.
Guano, Emanuela. 2003. ‘A Color for the Modern Nation: The Discourse on
Class, Race, and Education in the Porteño Middle Class’. Journal of Latin
American Anthropology 8 (1): 148–71.
Hale, Charles R. 2005. ‘Neoliberal Multiculturalism: The Remaking of Cultural
Rights and Racial Dominance in Central America’. Political and Legal
Anthropology Review 28 (1): 10–28.
Mondon, Aurelien, and Aaron Winter. 2019. ‘Whiteness, Populism and the
Racialisation of the Working Class in the United Kingdom and the United
States’. Identities 26 (5): 510–28.
https://doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.2018.1552440.
Sears, Alan. 2014. The Next New Left: A History of the Future. Nova Scotia:
Fernwood Publishers Company Ltd.
Shilliam, Robbie. 2009. ‘The Atlantic as a Vector of Uneven and Combined
Development’. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22 (1): 69–88.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09557570802683904.

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Interface: a journal for and about social movements Movement report
Volume 12 (1): 15 – 21 (July 2020) Martínez, Mutating mobilisations in Spain

Mutating mobilisations during the

pandemic crisis in Spain
Miguel A. Martínez (April 27th)

For a social movement and urban scholar, these are not the best days for
conducting fieldwork on the streets. Off-line demonstrations, protests with
gathering bodies and banners, deliberative assemblies and the like have been on
hold for a long period in countries such as Spain. The coronavirus pandemic and
the stringent measures taken by the government have set an unprecedented
situation in terms of social life and politics, especially for the generations who
did not live under the Francoist dictatorship (1939–1978), where surveillance
and repression determined daily routines and anti-regime mobilisations. The
current ruling coalition between the social democratic party, PSOE, and the
more leftist Unidas Podemos, had opened up a promising term for, at least,
some progressive policies since they took office in January 2020. However, the
sudden economic crisis that the pandemic is unfolding has abruptly
undermined even the least optimistic prospects.
As a regular online observer of bottom-up organisations, campaigns, and
collective actions, as well as a follower of the debates that stir and flood the
political sphere in Spain, I was surprised by some of the innovative ways of
continuing to protest during these difficult times of home confinement, starting
March 15, 2020, when the government declared a state of emergency.
Obviously, online protests are not new at all but, in this short period of time,
activists explored appealing forms of articulating discourse and campaigns.
Grassroots mobilisations for social justice have included practices and
challenges to the authorities previously unforeseen. In particular, the following
selection of experiences resembles the context of the 2008 global financial
crisis, although some dimensions have changed too. Hence, this preliminary
analysis aims at understanding what seems like the first stage of an emerging
cycle of mutating mobilisations.

Solidarity and mutual aid

From the first days of the lockdown, most grassroots politics focused on
discussing how the most vulnerable people, those without a home, could be
sheltered, how those with casual jobs would face their contracts being
terminated immediately, and how those in overcrowded prisons and migrant
detention centres would cope with the new risks and rules. This was the
beginning of a powerful campaign of solidarity that was increasingly widening
its range in order to include concerns for the elderly, disabled, and people
otherwise at risk; concerns over domestic gender violence, and the situation of
workers on various fronts, as well as children. An enhanced meaning of the term
solidarity has thus entered the mainstream public discourse: “mutual aid”. In
addition, “support and care networks” organised by many grassroots

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Volume 12 (1): 15 – 21 (July 2020) Martínez, Mutating mobilisations in Spain

organisations and neighbours who were not involved in politics before, added
practices of reconstructing urban communities in a very different way from
charities and NGOs, although many of these have also been involved
(sometimes also in alliance with local governments, as showcased by the
platform “Frena la Curva” [Halt the Curve]). Furthermore, long-term
campaigns of solidarity towards migrants and refugees continue to focus on the
extreme vulnerability, racism, and criminalisation that these groups experience,
aggravated by their irregular administrative situation.
Examples of the above are:
• Networks for care and mutual aid in order to help with daily errands and
shopping, to call an ambulance, company for hospital visits, doing
homework with children, providing basic supplies, taking care of pets,
etc. [link] [link] [link] [link] [link]
• Food banks, especially for those without formal jobs. [link] [link]
• Psychological assistance over the phone or via radio programmes. [link]
• Hand-clapping every day at 8pm from windows and balconies to express
support and gratitude towards key workers, especially those in the public
health system, subject to increased risks and pressures during the
pandemic. [link] [link]
• Racialised street vendors and women (such as the Sindicatos de
Manteros and the Xarxa de Dones Cosidores) produced masks and other
textile equipment to be donated to health workers. [link] [link]
• Hackers and makers from autonomous and squatted social centres
produced medical equipment. [link]
• A campaign asking for an extraordinary regularisation of all
undocumented migrants and asylum seekers (estimated to be around
600,000 people) was widely supported with more than 1,000 Civil
Society Organisations co-signing the campaign. [link]
• Demands to shut down all the migrant detention centres (CIEs),
successful in many cases with the release of most inmates. [link] [link]
[link]

A “white” tide 2.0

Very early on too, this solidarity was translated into a renewed focus on the
public health system. Due to the privatisations and the severe cuts to this system
in many regions of Spain (a policy that was mainly but not only led by Madrid
and Catalonia), the pandemic revealed the shortcomings of the available
resources and triggered a widespread cry to recover this essential pillar of the
welfare state, if there is still time. Even right-wing politicians, who accelerated
and benefitted from the privatisations of hospitals, changed their public
discourse to pretend they were the first supporters of the public health system.

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Volume 12 (1): 15 – 21 (July 2020) Martínez, Mutating mobilisations in Spain

Like a reminder of the so-called “white tide” that took to the streets around the
uprisings of 2011 (the 15M movement), calling for a defence of public health
services and infrastructures, the pandemic has once more united large sectors of
the population under the same banner. This time, its main manifestation is the
regular applause heard every night at 8pm from the balconies of most cities
across the country. This repertoire of protests is new, and the scope of the
supporters is even broader than during “the white tide” one decade ago, but the
anti-neoliberal content of the mobilisation is not that different. The massive
staging or ritual performance of hand-clapping addresses all the workers of the
health system trying to save lives and handle the serious medical consequences
of the pandemic.

Rent strikes
A third strand of mobilisations, symbolising an important shift from previous
militant trajectories, covers all the ongoing rent strikes. An estimated 16,000
tenants have joined the strike that began on April 1 [link], although it is
expected to widen on May 1 in line with similar international calls. To date,
around 80 “strike committees” have been established in different
neighbourhoods and municipalities across Spain. Rent strikes by tenants are not
historically new, but the last one that took place in Spain was in 1931. The
present ones are a consequence of the previously strong housing movement led
by the PAH (Platform for People Affected by Mortgages) as a response to the
2008 global financial crisis and the wave of housing dispossessions that led to
the eviction of more than half a million households. Tenants unions were also
set up some years later in a number of major cities, especially following the
recovery of the speculative housing bubble around 2015, when many
international investment funds and short-term platforms such as Airbnb led to
unbearable rises in rents and massive displacements from gentrified urban
areas. Tenants unions and other housing organisations had been pressing for
the central government to change the rental laws and implement rent controls
measures.
However, the coronavirus crisis deepened and worsened an already strenuous
housing situation. During the pandemic, the government has ruled that home
evictions are forbidden and the payment of rents and mortgage can be
postponed, but not cancelled. Moreover, energy and water supplies cannot be
cut if the bills are not paid during the same period (six months after the state of
emergency). Unauthorised occupations (squats) are not covered by the decree
though. These measures are considered insufficient by activists and not help
alleviate the hardship of those who have become unemployed and impoverished
over the last weeks. If they pay rents later or apply for loans now, they may even
increase their levels of debt and their financial default in the aftermath of the
pandemic.

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Volume 12 (1): 15 – 21 (July 2020) Martínez, Mutating mobilisations in Spain

Who will pay for this crisis?

Many predictions estimate that unemployment will escalate to 30%. A similar
proportion is expected in terms of the average decrease of household income.
This adds to the already 12 million people living under the poverty threshold,
including the International Labour Organization’s accounts of 15% “poor
workers”, as well as the 3.2 million unemployed people [link]. Another recession
is going to devastate the living conditions of the working class even more. This
economic shock indicates that labour mobilisations will rise at higher rates than
the ones observed over the last six weeks, once the appeasing policies are no
longer viable (in the absence of any unconditional rescue by European
powerholders, which is unlikely to occur). Although the following list hints
towards the nascent labour protests:
• Workers’ strike in the Nissan factory because the company is using the
crisis as an opportunity to fire workers. [link]
• Workers’ strike in the Airbus factory due to the controversial decision
made by the government regarding the license for non-essential
productive activities to reopen operations. [link]
• A similar motivation behind another strike at the Aernnova factory. [link]
• Workers forced the Mercedes company to halt production due to the lack
of safety measures during the pandemic. [link]
• Threat of workers’ strike in Glovo, Deliveroo, and UberEats due to the
worsening conditions and payments during the pandemic. [link] [link]
• Also, as a reaction to highly precarious labour conditions, waged and self-
employed workers in the culture and arts sector called to various strikes
because of the lack of support from the government, and the cancellation
of events sine die. [link]
The reaction of the government has consisted in subsidies to the temporary
regulations of unemployment (ERTEs) that have the immediate effect of a 30%
income loss for workers affected in the short-term, but there is no certainty
around how long these subsidies will last. Domestic and care workers, especially
those with no formal contract (around 200,000 people, mostly racialised and
migrant women), will experience higher losses, ending up with wages of no
more than 500 Euros per month.
In this context, campaigns for a universal and unconditional basic income have
resurged [link] [link]. They have been alive for many decades, but hardly
reached the ears of the authorities. Once a key promise of political party
Podemos, at its birth in 2014, universal basic income programmes became later
replaced by less ambitious plans. However, the pandemic crisis has brought it
back to the table, despite the initial reluctance of the PSOE. The negotiations
between both parties concluded with an agreement of a conditional “minimum
income” that will alleviate only the poorest households with no less than a 500
Euros subsidy, although yet to be rolled out.

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Volume 12 (1): 15 – 21 (July 2020) Martínez, Mutating mobilisations in Spain

In fact, a universal basic income was one of the starring demands of the Plan de
Choque Social [Social Emergency Plan] [link] [link], a comprehensive list of
demands called for by more than 200 civic organisations (many trade unions
included) in order to press the government. Among them, activists demanded a
state takeover of private hospitals without compensation, special resources to
protect workers who are “sustaining life” (in elderly homes, social services,
transport, cleaning, food supply chain, pharmacies, and so on), and the
promotion of medical supply production. They also suggested higher taxes to
capital and the funds of bailed-out banks during the 2008 crisis should be used
to pay for the new expenses [link]. The alternative is to fall into the same
nightmare of austerity and financialisation that the troika (EC, ECB, and IMF)
imposed ten years ago.

No time to lose
To conclude, a few preliminary lessons may be learned.
First of all, the above-mentioned mutating mobilisations show the often long-
term effects of social movements. A range of movements – 15M, housing,
feminist, antiracist, and migrant movements, to name a few – created the social
connections, the practical knowledge, and the discursive frames that made
many of the present mobilisations possible. Many of the previous activist
networks, despite their weakness and fragmentation since 2014, are now linked
to new ones. There is an ongoing and renewed wave of activist recruitment.
Different grassroots platforms are converging with one another, and sometimes
also with more institutional organisations and public authorities. On the other
hand, the current urgency and political momentum might be temporarily
relegating other areas of concern, such as the environmental movement. The
success of some grassroots organisations and protests may be seen as poor at
the short-run. Arrested migrants and impoverished tenants, however, would
think otherwise. Anyhow, the persistence of so many initiatives from below,
striving for social justice, continues to show their ability to mobilise large parts
of society and, albeit perhaps too slowly, erode the pillars of the main
hegemonic powers.
Secondly, another round of anti-neoliberal movements and campaigns are a
sign that it is not just about asking for “more state”. This would be an overly
simplistic conclusion, in my view. On the contrary, I read these expressions as a
direct opposition to the key operations of the neoliberal alliance between global
corporations and political elites. This is the case with the privatisation of health
systems, with devastating and tremendous consequences to life and societies, as
this pandemic is showing. On the one hand, the for-profit health industry had
neither the interest nor the means to assist the high number of people affected
by the pandemic. This realisation paved the ground for more positive views of
financially-strong, state-owned health systems of a universal and non-profit
nature. Hence, this second “wide tide” is an emergent movement that questions,
above all, the commodification of health and the segregated benefits it offers

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those who can afford it. On the other hand, the emerging defence of the public
health system is claiming state accountability for previous privatisations, cuts
offs, plans, and mismanagement. In my view, it goes beyond the replacement of
the market by the state, although it stems from a general cry to defend and
improve essential state services. Capitalism and public health have proven to be
quite conflicting during the past weeks.
A third observation is that radical actions like rent strikes are possible in
exceptional situations, such as the prohibition of off-line demonstrations,
pickets, boycotts, and other forms of contentious and embodied actions.
Compared to workers’ strikes, the right to rent strike is not legally
acknowledged in Spain. If tenants do not pay their rents, they may be swiftly
evicted, and it is difficult to find affordable housing in a market that has been so
overheated due to the intervention of global investors such as Blackstone and
other vulture firms such as Airbnb. The timid moves of the government,
however, opened up the opportunity for the housing organisations to take the
risk of calling for a strike. In particular, the fact that home evictions are officially
forbidden during six months after the state of emergency leaves enough time for
the strike committees to organise and negotiate favourable agreements. All of
this is done online, which is significantly novel compared to other virtual
campaigns not so performative in terms of producing true radical practice.
Furthermore, more mobilisations are expected because a deeper economic
recession is in fact taking place, with higher unemployment rates to come. New
alliances between labour and social (and urban/housing) syndicalism are being
forged, as the Plan de Choque Social [Social Emergency Plan] suggests. The
notion of solidarity, usually an exclusive label for established NGOs, has been
broadened and replaced by the vibrant, self-organised and fully bottom-up
“networks of care and mutual aid”.
Finally, right-wing agitators are investing more and more in online mobilising.
This has not been in the scope of this account, although there are many
indicators that the extreme right is also on the rise. Their fake news campaigns,
their rampant stigmatisation and dehumanisation of vulnerable people and
leftist organisations, and their vicious attacks on any progressive measure taken
by the government, are above all, very robust financially speaking. Less clear is
how their legitimacy can last and how they can effectively counter their
opponents without winning elections. Once they achieve this, however, as we
recently saw in Poland and Hungary, for example, their dismissal of
parliamentary control is the first step towards implementing their authoritarian
and exclusionary political agenda. In this regard, it is worth noting that the
social support that the far-right was not able to garner during the 2008 crisis in
Spain has shifted towards a different scenario during the time of the pandemic,
because one of such parties (Vox) won 15% of the parliamentary seats in the last
general elections and is actively poisoning the political debates in many social
and mass media networks.

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About the author

Miguel A. Martínez is professor of housing and urban sociology at the University
of Uppsala (Sweden). He is interested in social movements, housing, migration,
and activist research. He is the author of Squatters in the Capitalist City.
Housing, Justice, and Urban Politics (New York: Routledge). Most of his works
are available at www.miguelangelmartinez.net

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Forms of social movement in the crisis:

a view from Ireland
Laurence Cox (13th April 2020)

Media coverage and public discussion of the coronavirus crisis has focussed
primarily on what states and governments do and what they should do about it:
about the relationship between epidemiology and policies. Within the global
North at least, public health is seen as being ultimately the responsibility of the
state, despite neoliberal strategies aiming to dodge this responsibility and a
legacy of hollowing out and privatising public health.
This arises from a history of state responsibility for public health going back (in
Europe) a century and a half, itself in part the product of the appalling results of
poverty and pollution in the new industrial towns, incarnated in the provision of
sewers and drinking water. If public drinking fountains are now mostly shut to
facilitate the selling of bottled water, the wider legacy is not easily shifted,
despite decades of attempts to place the responsibility onto individuals as
“consumers” (most commonly, of privatised health care that benefits from
various forms of public subsidy).
Writing this on the Easter weekend, traditionally a period for family holidays in
much of Europe, the latest iteration of European neoliberalism is the attempt to
weaponise finger-wagging about individual behaviour, to convert handling the
crisis into a matter of policing one another; but even here the finger-wagging is
mostly shaped in terms of pressurising your neighbours to do what the
government has told them to do. The first and easiest form of social movement
action, then, has been to pressure the state to take on its own responsibilities.

Forcing states to act

In many countries, civil society has been crucial in forcing states to actually bite
the bullet and do something – challenging deep-seated tendencies of drawing a
veil over embarrassing failures, of fear of “panic”, of concern for the national
image, of boosting investor and consumer confidence of keeping the economy
going at all costs, of not wanting to spend money… All the instinctual reactions
of PR-oriented managers came into play at governmental level, and needed to
be overcome.
While liberals like the easy and reassuring story of “science speaks and
governments (should) listen”, a more accurate account of the last few months
would be “civil society shouts, states decide they have to do something and then
turn to scientists of their choosing”. In China, medics had to become
whistleblowers for the state to admit there was a problem. States like Iran and
Myanmar similarly denied the facts until it was impossible to continue doing so.
In Britain (according to a Nov 2019 WEF report the world’s second-best
prepared country for a pandemic, after the USA), it took a public outcry for the

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government to admit that its “scientific advice” was wrong – while court
reporters now deny that “herd immunity” was ever part of its thinking. In this
bizarre model, 60% (in fact herd immunity can require 70 or 80% of a
population to be infected, and relies on immunity being acquired – which was
not certain at the time) of the population of the UK (perhaps 42 million people)
would catch the virus. On the death rates then reported from China or Italy, this
could have meant half a million deaths in a matter of months – something
which the official scientists failed to notice because they used mortality rates for
viral pneumonia instead. It took a lot of pressure for the government and its
scientists to take on board what the rest of the world was telling them.
In Ireland – which remains at the mercy of the control experiment being
conducted next door – the state took a fortnight to catch up with civil society in
terms of public demands for action. A weak caretaker government, badly
defeated in an election, eventually put itself at the head of the parade. Unable to
act without popular consensus, it nevertheless benefitted strongly from this
feeling of a national community of feeling – while making exceptions for the
building industry (construction sites were only closed very belatedly) and their
rich and well-connected friends who returned from the Cheltenham races in the
middle of the crisis.
As states now move to restore “normality” – with varying mixes of actual
success in tackling the virus as against pressure from economic interests –
movements can be expected to do what they can to contest unsafe processes of
capitalist restoration where the health response has been thoroughly
inadequate.

Contesting how the state acts

A second way that movements act on this crisis – having helped to push the
state into action – is around the specifics of what it does. The state naturally
takes a “bird’s eye” perspective that misses the local rationalities that people
actually live by and in – even before we talk about the state in capitalism, the
interests it routinely takes into account (those of the wealthy, the powerful and
the culturally privileged) and the needs it routinely ignores.
Renters are a classic example here. But this is also true for people in precarious
work (often overlooked by state rescue packages), prisoners, refugees, homeless
people, students in campus accommodation - and groups like people with
disabilities, health workers, people in care homes and others who a top-down
medical view really should see but often ... doesn't.
As has become clear, care homes have been in effect treated as waiting rooms
for death by governments in several countries – and in some not even included
in national statistics of coronavirus deaths. People with disabilities have
particularly complex and constrained lives which are often ignored in general
rules for what people are allowed to do in a crisis, and fall foul of the arbitrary
policing that has been widespread in “lockdowns”.

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This policing more generally has exposed those who are normally shielded from
it to the banal stupidity of everyday policing, and led to a certain degree of
backlash, in some cases successful, against police forces rewriting the law – or at
times even government recommendations – into forms that make sense to local
police culture.
In many countries, we have seen increasing agitation and whistleblowing by
health workers who are offered national cheerleading support but often
deprived of PPE (personal protective equipment) and in extreme cases even
disciplined for using their own. In Italy, the closure of workplaces was forced by
workers in non-essential factories repeatedly going on strike; in Dublin, bus
drivers refused to accept fares after management disciplined a driver for
allowing passengers on through the side doors.
In Ireland, a particular battle has been around asylum seekers in “direct
provision” (at the mercy of private landlords paid by the state) who have been
left in over-crowded accommodation, sharing rooms with strangers and
notionally “self-isolating” in rows of beds. Despite massive numbers of empty
hotel rooms and the collapse of Airbnb, the government has refused to do more
than move a cosmetic number from one shared accommodation to another. Led
by MASI, the Movement of Asylum Seekers in Ireland, activists have been
pushing the government hard on this issue.
Social movements, then, have often been central in pushing the state to take
action at all – and have then had to push again to get it to act in ways that take
social realities other than those of the wealthy, powerful and culturally
privileged into account. This experience has been shaped differently in different
countries, with social media, unions, NGOs, left politicians and individual
activists all involved.
Of course they are not the only actors involved: they find allies among academic
and media voices, people aware of the situation in other countries, sections of
the public that have become increasingly worried by governments unwilling to
act, acting ineptly or acting cruelly are all part of the picture, and some fractions
of capital that are thinking beyond the short term.

Solidarity economy and mutual aid

And then … we have countries where the state is doing its very best not to act,
for whatever reason: ideological blinkers, debts owed to very short-term capital
interests for buying elections, sheer incompetence and so on, where the general
strategy can be summed up as “bail out the banks and call out the army”. The
incapacity of the American federal government to respond coherently to the
crisis speaks volumes about its declining hegemony within its own borders as
well as internationally; Sweden is a more surprising case.
In majority world countries, the state lacks this capacity for other reasons, while
the scale of the informal economy, the nature of the shanty-town environment,
the weakness of health systems etc. mean that the kinds of responses to the

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virus explored in most of the global North are either not feasible or not effective.
In both kinds of context, we are seeing a huge upsurge in various forms of
solidarity economy and mutual aid, people coming together to look after each
other directly, beyond what the state can or will do.
On the fringes of popular self-organising we also see acts of responsibility by
some employers, some universities, a handful of landlords etc. going above and
beyond what the state mandates in different countries; but it is above all those
who are on the edge, who are more used to giving and asking for help as part of
their daily survival, who are helping to keep everyone afloat.
This is only partly a response to “objective circumstances” or the needs of “bare
life”, which do not automatically translate into collective solidarity but can be
shaped in other and much more damaging ways (clientelism, communalism,
gang structures etc.) The contrast between the disaster that is the Indian
situation and the level of popular self-organising visible in South Africa is one
obvious indicator of this: self-organising traditions do not always survive over
time to be re-activated in times of crisis.
South African poors (and US communities in struggle) have a long and recent
history of acting collectively around basic needs which is not universal: people
can of course rediscover what is after all an ordinary way of being human, but it
is not always easy to do so at short notice. Many majority world and southern
European countries have effective traditions of solidarity economy constructed
in the long recession from 2007-8 as the welfare or developmentalist state has
withdrawn even further from people’s lives.
In a sense the growth of solidarity economy reverses the historical development
of welfare states in the global North, where the new urban proletariat initially
looked for ways of supporting each other - unions, mutual insurance against
injury or sickness etc., credit unions, self-organised education etc. - and states
often took over these tasks.
In Ireland, although the state is far more effective (doing significantly better
than the UK, for example), there are powerful cultures of active communities
that range from the recent experiences of struggle around abortion, gay
marriage and water commodification to less contentious forms of a nonetheless
powerful imagined community. Long popular traditions of self-organising on a
charity model have developed in the crisis, ranging from “checking in on
neighbours” to ensuring supplies are available for marginalised groups (e.g.
masks for asylum-seekers in “direct provision”). The net effect is that mutual aid
groups of many different kinds – overtly politicised and “normalised” alike –
have flourished as an unremarkable response to immediate suffering.
These processes develop new kinds of “local rationality” – ways of coping that
people come to rely on – or extend existing ones. These local rationalities can
readily come into conflict with state interventions, landlords’ or employers’
demands, etc., or indeed be perceived as challenges. They also create new bases
for organising around longer-term needs and broader demands.

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New forms of struggle

As always, new situations give rise to new forms of struggle. Italy like other
countries has seen prisoner revolts against overcrowded prisons in times of
virus, and there have been some innovative forms of outside support (involving
driving around the prisons in cars, hence physically distancing) in the US. Italy
(again) saw the first (contested) public funeral, of lifelong activist Salvatore
Ricciardi, followed by a memorial wall slogan being painted – in the teeth of the
police.
Amazon and other logistics workers suddenly find themselves working in very
unsafe situations, which were already extremely oppressive and poorly paid, but
now are life-threatening and simultaneously absolutely necessary for everyone
else, meaning that workers have more power. Union organising and strikes will
tend to develop in these key industries, initially around virus-related issues but
no doubt over time around pay, conditions and managerial power.
Calls for rent strikes have been spreading, particularly but not only in the US
where moratoria on evictions have been patchy, unemployed workers are even
less likely to find adequate support than in other Northern countries – and the
lack of state intervention means that the crisis is particularly severe in other
ways.
In Ireland, the older struggle – before the virus – was around soaring rental
prices in particular, brought on by a failure of social housing provision, vulture
fund investment in short-term (e.g. student) housing, Airbnb, and more
generally the financialisation of housing markets. While this had failed to
produce a mass movement (in part because of the huge range of people’s
housing relationships) it nonetheless produced mass anger which expressed
itself in historically high votes for left parties in the last general election and
difficulties in government formation. However there are good chances that the
virus in itself will burst the housing bubble and defuse at least some of this
pressure; and that the “next big movement” in Ireland will be something
currently unexpected.
We will see many, many more struggles before this is through.

The possibility of a better world?

Putting all this in the terms Alf and I outlined in We Make Our Own History:
Marxism and Social Movements in the Twilight of Neoliberalism, social
movements start from human needs and our everyday praxis, which already
exists but is massively variable. People find themselves in specific situations
shaped by inequality, power and cultural hierarchies, and (collectively,
culturally) develop ways of trying to cope - "local rationalities".
When (as with the virus) these are disrupted, threatened or undermined, people
mobilise through and to defend them in quite specific ways - what Raymond
Williams called "militant particularisms". These are different for renters,
prisoners, refugees, precarious workers, healthcare workers and so on – and

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different in different countries. However if multiple such particularisms come

together (for example, in demands on the state from similar groups across a
country, or from multiple groups around related issues like housing or pay) you
can get a campaign.
Of course people were already in many cases mobilised before the virus - and
those groups will be among those most active in developing new forms of
mutual aid, new kinds of struggle, making links, pushing the state etc. Bring
enough "campaigns" around specific issues together - and we start to see the
embryo of a "social movement project", the vision of an alternative kind of
society which is shaped around the needs of the powerless, the poor and the
culturally despised.
And sometimes, when the dominant strategy for accumulating capital was
already struggling to keep the show on the road, this kind of "movement of
movements" can create an organic crisis. After all, we have been in the “twilight
of neoliberalism” for some time…

Against magical thinking

There is a big “but” here, though. A lot of writing currently popular on the left
seeks to move from the virus to a better world without going through the messy
business of popular struggles and collective debates: to resolve on paper (in the
form of a saleable intellectual commodity) what actually needs to be resolved in
contentious human practice.
Thus, for example, it is patently not true that things getting worse in itself
creates a crisis that is likely to have a better outcome, however “objective” the
need might seem. Anyone who paid attention in 2007-8 will have noticed this.
Similarly, just because the utopia conjured up on paper seems compelling to its
author (or well-grounded in “the literature”, or whatever else), this is no
guarantee that it will actually happen.
Reality perpetually refuses to allow individuals, or small self-selected publics, to
inscribe their own self-image or wished-for future on the map of the world:
between the idea and the outcome falls the shadow of power, underpinned by
organised interests and buttressed by ideology (or, put another way, consent
armoured by coercion). Unless these social relationships change, they can be
relied on to reassert “normality” with incredible force at the end of any given
crisis, just as the beautiful visions of the European anti-fascist resistance were
largely squeezed out under the pressures of Cold War and the restoration of
capitalism in the west and Soviet power in the East.
“We need”, “we must”, “we are finally realising” and all these rhetorical phrases
are good for selling text by the yard to people who want to consume sermons;
unless they are effective agitation – speaking directly to the needs, struggles
and questions of large numbers of people – they are condemned to act as
substitutes for the actual process of change.
So what is the relationship between crisis and transformation?

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Rethinking the war metaphor

One particularly powerful form of magical thinking is the belief that there is
some hidden historical logic that will automatically and necessarily produce
good effects. Gramsci felt that this kind of fatalism – “I have been defeated for
the moment, but the tide of history is working for me in the long term” – was
suited to giving movements strength in periods of defeat when they did not have
the initiative, but became a real danger in moments of crisis when subaltern
groups develop an active subjectivity and become leading actors.
The contemporary form of this fatalism lies in a lazy reading of history which
sees wars as somehow automatically producing positive effects – British
examples are the granting of votes for women after WWI and the development
of the welfare state after WWII. Akin to theories of wars as engines of technical
progress, this account erases the agency of first-wave feminists and inter-war
socialist and trade union organising – in part because those who repeat it have
known far more elite agency than they have effective, organised popular
struggle.
The metaphor of war for societies’ responses to the coronavirus has been
widespread, and justly criticised for its inappropriateness to the actual measures
involved and its centring of (male) leader figures in a story which (following not
actual wars but recent war movies) the performance of masculinity is somehow
what brings victory against all the odds – a theory which was mown down by
machine guns on the Western Front over a hundred years ago but is oddly
appealing to certain people.
However (as with the “war brings good things” theory) there is a half-truth
partly obscured by the verbiage. Like wars, the virus has combined non-routine
forms of state action with significant degrees of popular mobilisation: while
most attention has gone (as always) to the state, historical experience suggests
that it is the popular mobilisation that is most important. Lenin – who knew
what he was talking about in this respect – had some interesting things to say
on the subject, in 1915:

To the Marxist it is indisputable that a revolution is impossible without a

revolutionary situation; furthermore, it is not every revolutionary situation that
leads to revolution. What, generally speaking, are the symptoms of a
revolutionary situation? We shall certainly not be mistaken if we indicate the
following three major symptoms: (1) when it is impossible for the ruling classes to
maintain their rule without any change; when there is a crisis, in one form or
another, among the “upper classes”, a crisis in the policy of the ruling class,
leading to a fissure through which the discontent and indignation of the
oppressed classes burst forth. For a revolution to take place, it is usually
insufficient for “the lower classes not to want” to live in the old way; it is also
necessary that “the upper classes should be unable” to live in the old way; (2)
when the suffering and want of the oppressed classes have grown more acute than
usual; (3) when, as a consequence of the above causes, there is a considerable
increase in the activity of the masses, who uncomplainingly allow themselves to

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be robbed in “peace time”, but, in turbulent times, are drawn both by all the
circumstances of the crisis and by the “upper classes” themselves into
independent historical action.

Failures of rule
Taken on its own terms, this describes the conditions for a revolutionary
situation, which is no guarantee of a revolutionary outcome. The late Colin
Barker, as a leading scholar of revolutions, was fond of this analysis. Its first
element, in Colin’s gloss, is the rulers no longer being able to carry on ruling as
they had done.
Lenin was thinking ahead in the context of WWI, but also of the Russian defeat
in the Russo-Japanese war, which helped lead to the 1905 revolution, and
probably above all of the Paris Commune. In 1870 the French empire had
manifestly failed at the basic business of empiring, by starting and badly losing a
war with the Prussians. Paris had suffered a siege and the Versaillais added
insult to injury by seeking to remove cannons paid for by popular subscription.
So one element of this is the ruling classes failing in something that is core to
the business of “ruling” – as we have seen, public health is historically this, and
doubly so once the state takes on the role of leading the “war” on the virus. The
central issue will be how far people actually feel that states (and employers,
landlords, private health care systems etc.) are looking after them or not in this
crisis.
Any fool can make a sonorous speech; but can they actually carry out the tasks
that follow from the pontificating? Johnson and Trump have clearly failed (to
our eyes); but will this be clear to their voters?
Centrists, by contrast, are oddly happy to have this kind of crisis, because they
like managing things. In Ireland, as noted, Varadkar has found himself – and
his party – a new lease of life in the face of the crisis.
The difficulty for centrists is that tackling the virus involves large-scale
investment, and health care systems which have been often systematically run
down for decades. Will they be up to the task?
So far, the indications are that despite their very different systems, the states in
China, South Korea and Italy are largely receiving popular support, well into the
crisis. Iran, perhaps not. How England / Wales and the US fare may be a
different question again.

A crisis of local rationalities

Clearly states that fail in their front-line response to the virus, in whatever way,
will be made to pay for it. But I suspect greater weaknesses will show
everywhere else, as the (necessary) response disrupts everyday life massively
and people's needs aren't seen or met. The social dimension of life under
extended curfew, rationing, isolation etc. with loss of jobs, housing, family

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connections etc.... not all states will see this, or deal with it well. And what's the
betting that the reconstruction will pay far more attention to the needs of
business and banking than to the "heroes" and "heroines" who have been
praised by official rhetoric and made the real sacrifices?
Lenin’s second dimension is that the local rationalities of the “oppressed
classes” are under even more pressure than usual – or, as Colin put it, people
are no longer willing to go on being governed as they have been.
Resistance to WWI started (with India’s Ghadar and Ireland’s Easter Rising) in
1915 and 1916 in an effective way, but by the end of the war armies and navies
were mutinying across Europe, strikes were building and peasants were
occupying the land. The Russian Revolution comes at the midpoint of this
process.
The end of the war - with bitter winters, Spanish flu, food shortages,
unemployment etc. - saw revolutionary waves develop even further. Four
empires (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Russia) fell in these years, and the
British Empire lost much of Ireland. This was the period in which the nation-
state became the wave of the future; but there is nothing automatic about the
process. Starting in Italy, fascism rolled back most of those revolutions.

“Independent historical action”

A key part of all this is Lenin's third point, about "independent historical
action". States mobilised people into war - not just into militaries, but in the
fields and factories, through rationing and a thousand other transformations of
daily life. People had been told "we are in this together against the common
enemy", "you must make these sacrifices for the common goal", and "you are an
actor on the stage of history". Many people took this rhetoric seriously at first
(as today’s liberal pundits still do).
But the most important thing is that people had learned to become public
actors, initially mobilised and transforming daily life behind someone else's
leadership. The more the war went on, the more their own and their families’
needs went unmet, the more critical people were of the leadership – and the
more they started to mobilise on their own behalf.
This is the critical moment: in 1916-23 as in 1870-1, top-down mobilisation for
the state's goals gave way to bottom-up mobilisation for ordinary people's own
needs. Workers seized factories. Peasants seized the land. Soldiers and sailors
mutinied for an end to the war and to go back home. Oppressed nationalities
sought independence.
Of course we aren't in 1914, or 1870, and right now the crisis is immediate.
Unlike 1914, no sane person would want to stop states responding to the crisis -
mostly we have wanted them firstly to step in and secondly to do it well. But that
doesn't mean all those other issues are gone - they can't be avoided. States are
choosing who to support and how - as landlords or renters, as businesses or

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workers, and in a million other ways. They will take our needs more or less on
board in different countries.
And there are already so many pieces of unfinished business.
Now that people have seen how much can be done - how many things we were
told were impossible but are actually entirely doable with the political will - they
may not be happy to wait for ever. They may see some other things as also being
important enough to act on even if it doesn't fit the economists' theologies.
However it takes time to get to this point, because the crisis is largely
constituted by what millions, and today tens of millions, of people do and think.
Lenin continued (and remember, this is only 1915):

It was generally known, seen and admitted that a European war would be more
severe than any war in the past. This is being borne out in ever greater measure
by the experience of the war. The conflagration is spreading; the political
foundations of Europe are being shaken more and more; the sufferings of the
masses are appalling, the efforts of governments, the bourgeoisie and the
opportunists to hush up these sufferings proving ever more futile. The war profits
being obtained by certain groups of capitalists are monstrously high, and
contradictions are growing extremely acute. The smouldering indignation of the
masses, the vague yearning of society’s downtrodden and ignorant strata for a
kindly (“democratic”) peace, the beginning of discontent among the “lower
classes"—all thesc are facts. The longer the war drags on and the more acute it
becomes, the more the governments themselves foster—and must foster—the
activity of the masses, whom they call upon to make extraordinary effort
and self-sacrifice. The experience of the war, like the experience of any crisis in
history, of any great calamity and any sudden turn in human life, stuns and
breaks some people, but enlighten and tempers others. Taken by and large, and
considering the history of the world as a whole, the number and strength of the
second kind of people have—with the exception of individual cases of the decline
and fall of one state or another—proved greater than those of the former kind.
Far from “immediately” ending all these sufferings and all this enhancement of
contradictions, the conclusion of peace will, in many respects, make those
sufferings more keenly and immediately felt by the most backward masses of the
population.

When I posted the first version of this, on March 18th, I wrote:

“For now, many ppl are still in shock, esp those who haven't had to face these
kinds of threats and uncertainties before - but also some who are being
retraumatised.
Most are struggling to reorganise their ‘local rationalities’ to cope with how their
specific situation is changing, and to try and meet everyone's needs in that
situation.

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Vol 12 (1): 22 – 33 (July 2020) Cox, Forms of social movement in the crisis

And watching what their ‘leaders’ are doing in their name, measuring it in
different ways.”

And they may decide that having all pulled together, they want to carry on
pulling together on their own behalf. Meanwhile states and corporations will
come to make themselves at home in the new normal, and try to use the crisis
for their own interests, in a thousand different ways.
However, as people adjust and have time to think - or find themselves in new
and unresolvable crises - their reactions will change too. Already many, many
people are going from "object" to "subject", taking action in all sorts of creative
and unexpected ways for themselves and others.
It’s also worth remembering that for many, their contribution is driven not by
fear for themselves, or even for elderly / sick / disabled relatives, but for
unknown others. That's ... a different and powerful kind of mobilisation.

Finally
If we used this formula to predict possible outcomes, we would expect to see the
greatest movement surges come in those countries where (1) the government
has initially refused to act, and then acted in ways that are widely seen to be
ineffective and that privilege the interests of capital, of the security state and of
culturally dominant groups against those of the vast majority; (2) where the
local rationalities of the majority – as renters and shanty-town dwellers,
employees and workers in the informal economy, welfare recipients and
incarcerated people, and a thousand other situations – have been pushed to
breaking point by the virus and the lockdown; and (3) where “independent
historical action” – bottom-up self-organisation, social movements – have been
strongest, before and during the crisis.
Many societies were shot through with collective struggle before the virus. In the
current crisis, people have been pushing states to act, and to act better; they
have been developing new forms of solidarity and trying to change impossible
situations.
They won't stop there. Because people don't.
This future is yet to be written - if the wars of 1870 and 1914 ended in
revolutions, not every war does. But that history is worth remembering, and
today's movements are worth supporting, participating in, developing.
Do we want to go back to the old world just as it was?

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About the author

Laurence Cox is co-editor of Interface and associate professor of sociology at the
National University of Ireland Maynooth. His most recent book is The Irish
Buddhist: the Forgotten Monk who Faced Down the British Empire (Oxford
2020).

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Volume 12 (1): 34 – 38 (July 2020) Wood, We’re not all in this together

We’re not all in this together

Lesley Wood (14th April 2020)

As CoVid19 cases in shelters and Long Term Care facilities soar, the police in
Ontario are ramping up their enforcement of physical distancing bylaws. They
ticket those gathering in groups, people standing closer than 2 metres apart,
and those using closed park facilities. They can be fined $1000. In addition,
police have the right now to ask anyone to show identification with their name,
address and date of birth. Those who don’t comply can be fined up to $750.
The goal is to limit the spread of CoVid19, but the choice to provide the
resources for police enforcement (not to say bailing out the oil and gas sector),
while neglecting the most vulnerable reveals the ways that state strategies
reflect longstanding inequalities. Our identities and networks offer different
pandemic experiences. The virus hits institutionalized, immigrant, poorer,
indigenous and racialized communities harder. Neighbourhoods where there
are more longstanding health problems, more crowded housing and
transportation spread the virus. Shutting things down, or forcing people to
separate when some people lack access to clean water or medical help or harm
reduction services, means some are sacrificed for the greater good.1 In this way,
decisions like that of Toronto Public Health’s CoVid closure of the city’s largest
supervised injection service, led to a massive spike in overdoses. 2
In her new blog post, Alexis Shotwell cites Ruth Wilson Gilmore in her
discussion of these effects of state logics. Wilson Gilmore defines the operation
as racism as “The state-sanctioned and/or extra-legal production and
exploitation of group- differentiated vulnerabilities to premature death.” Such
operations shape the distribution of sickness and death from COVID-19.”3 4 As
Shiri Pasternak and Robert Houle note, such inequities compound disaster.

1Shiri Pasternak and Robert Houle. 2020. “No Such Thing As Natural Disasters: Infrastructure
And The First Nation Fight Against COVID-19,” Yellowhead Institute 9/4/2020
https://yellowheadinstitute.org/2020/04/09/no-such-thing-as-natural-disasters-
infrastructure-and-the-first-nation-fight-against-covid-19/,
2 Jason Altenberg. 2020. “CITY“Since Covid began, we’ve seen the highest number of overdoses
since 2017”: What happens when the opioid epidemic meets a global pandemic?” Toronto Life
https://torontolife.com/city/since-covid-began-weve-seen-the-highest-number-of-overdoses-
since-2017-what-happens-when-the-opioid-epidemic-meets-a-global-
pandemic/?fbclid=IwAR3MVGpGFOqWHoQH3zmWrDEFBfyFEObL0rW2UGlViXesdTeQxrTe
G3QcSdc
3
Alexis Shotwell. 2020. “Survival will always be insufficient but it’s a good place to start,” March
25, 2020 https://alexisshotwell.com/2020/03/25/survival-will-always-be-insufficient-but-its-
a-good-place-to-start/?fbclid=IwAR1wKibb77LHOsuUzoteDxEGe_lXAMuvMMaz-
oAKIT7KakYywp2rOShsvfc
4
Ruth Wilson Gilmore. 2007. Golden Gulag (University of California Press), p. 28

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Dr. Nanky Rai, a Toronto based family physician working closely with people
experiencing homelessness and people who use drugs explains how prioritizing
enforcement over care is hitting her clients. She says, "The clients I work with
are already disproportionately impacted by policing and are already starting to
experience heightened racial profiling by police under COVID19… Increasing
police and punitive enforcement will not protect public health but it will
threaten the health and safety of people, especially Indigenous, Black and other
racialized people, those with precarious immigration status, sex workers, drug
users and those experiencing homelessness. If these measures go through, it will
be made very clear who the government does and doesn't consider as part of the
"public" in public health."
Governments vary in their definition of the ‘relevant public, as well as their
capacity to take coordinated action. Wealthy, powerful countries have more
ability to protect their populations. But they choose to protect only parts of the
whole, and then unequally.5 Most authorities develop policies that favour those
like them, the wealthiest and most powerful. Prisoners, the homeless, disabled
people, non-status folks or indigenous communities are simply left out of the
conversation, unless there is a ruckus. When powerholders pass laws, and
policies that don’t recognize the vulnerability of these excluded populations,
they are likely to harm them, they are likely to distort our understanding of
social life, and push us towards police enforcement; transformations that will, if
unchecked, harm prospects for a more just society.
So what do we do? Most of us want to do the right thing. And we want others to
do the right thing. There is a real sense of a shared challenge right now.
However, our individualist moral framework can make our belief in distancing
and enforcement tactics evangelical and fundamentalist. Like the Protestant
Ethic that infuses capitalism, we evaluate our moral worth on our commitment
to physical distancing. Our fervour is justified by stories of Frisbee players and
picnickers, just hanging out. Now, feel free to give me the emails of these
scofflaws and I’ll shame them. But they aren’t the only ones still outside. And
they definitely aren’t going to be the ones most affected by new police powers.
That burden will be borne by those who law enforcement traditionally see as
risky – people of colour, particularly Black and indigenous folks and youth.
Those without identification and options will be hit hardest, such as
undocumented and homeless people.
The virus version of our social lives makes it harder for many of us to see the
larger social implications of these policies. Physical distancing limits our
connection to those we do not know. In the lockdown, most people rely most on
their more homogenous strong ties of close family, friends and co-workers.
Middle class people connect with other middle class people. Often, the media
reflects those stories. Even more so than in ‘regular time’, people become siloed
by class and race. This fortification amplifies those who are more resourced.
Other voices are not heard. This social distortion is buttressed by journalists,

5
Charles Tilly. 2007. Democracy. Cambridge University Press

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Volume 12 (1): 34 – 38 (July 2020) Wood, We’re not all in this together

who are using fewer sources, as many work from home. They reprint wire
services, government updates and police information. We tune in to the news
from the front lines – but the voices we hear are fewer. Hunkering down at
home isn’t enough. We must address this imbalance, in ways that tip the scales.

Creating a Ruckus with the Excluded

Social movements challenge the status quo, but they too, often reflect larger
inequalities. Those with the most resources or relations to those in power may
be most likely to gain traction. As Piven and Cloward noted in their classic book
Poor Peoples Movements, those outside of that circle gain their power through
disruption, most often through visible disruptions of physical space.6 We march
and rally, we send delegations and occupy roads, offices and squares. This is all
a smidge difficult right now. We must use the all the creativity we can muster, to
ensure that no one is left behind.
Prisoners and detainees are often excluded from political and social life. They
are easily ignored by those in power. Nonetheless, it was these same folks who
engaged in some of the first CoVid-era protests. Around the world, prisoners
have used hunger strikes, engaged in civil disobedience or rioted. They demand
release or at minimum, safety.7 Many have succeeded, but some, like those in
Iran, have been killed. 8 Supporters of those locked inside have used email
campaigns, phone campaigns and creative car and bike protests to amplify the
struggle. In Australia, detainee advocates drove honking and bedecked cars and
bikes through the streets in protest. Although they posed no viral threat to each
other or to the broader public, the main organizer was arrested and taken into
custody, while 26 individuals were fined $1,652 each for breaching physical-
distancing orders, with a total of $42,952. Such absurd charges will likely be
challenged.
Homeless folks are, almost by definition neglected by the government. Shelters
are crowded and don’t have the needed protective equipment. As a result, in this
CoVid-risky moment, many refuse to go inside. Allies have tried to get the word
out and are pressing governments for hotel beds, more space, and better
facilities. In Surrey BC, 50 homeless people and advocates occupied a
community recreation centre. 9 In Toronto, anti-poverty activists risked tickets
to hold a carefully spaced out rally at City Hall, using Facebook live to amplify

6
Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward. 1977. Poor People’s Movements.
7
https://www.wsj.com/articles/prisoners-riot-as-coronavirus-tensions-rise-11586469284
8https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/04/iran-prisoners-killed-by-security-forces-
during-covid19-pandemic-protests/
9CBC 2020. Activists occupy Surrey rec centre, demand safe places for homeless to live during
COVID-19 crisis. CBC 2 April 2020. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-
columbia/homeless-activists-surrey-bc-covid-19-coronavirus-1.5518500

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their message to journalists and the wider public. San Francisco activists used a
car protest to demand that the city move more quickly to protect the homeless. 10
Non-status people have been excluded from the state benefits provided to other
workers. In a context of economic shutdown, non-status people haven’t been
able to access the supports they need. So migrant justice advocates have
organized press conferences, sign on letters, and days for intense phone
campaigns. The Caregiver Action Centre and groups like Butterfly, the Toronto-
based Asian and migrant sex worker support network worked with legal allies to
organize Know Your Rights in the CoVid era webinars. In places where state
lockdowns are more intense, migrant workers are taking to the streets in order
to draw attention – in India they rallied at train stations, demanding a way to
return home, after trains and busses were cancelled. 11
Institutions for older people or people with disabilities are often forgotten about
– but with nearly half of the Canadian CoVid19 deaths are people inside such
facilities, they hold the attention of many. 12 Care workers demanding Personal
Protective Equipment and increased wages, and are walking off the job in
Canada, and Mexico.13 They are wearing buttons of protest, and their unions
are lobbying and petitioning. Groups like the Accessibility for Ontarians with
Disabilities Act Alliance are petitioning against a leaked draft of a government
document that rationalized denying medical care to people with particular
disabilities.14
This is not yet a new normal. It is both a crisis and an opportunity. It is time to
remake the relationship between the powerful and the people. Places and
peoples long neglected now pose a threat. This brings attention and possibility.

10Dan Kerman. Kron4.com 13 April 2020. “Protesters call on San Francisco to move quicker to
protect the homeless from COVID-19” https://www.kron4.com/news/bay-area/protesters-call-
on-san-francisco-to-move-quicker-to-protect-the-homeless-from-covid-19/
11Sanjeev Miglani, Rupam Jain. 2020. “India extends world's biggest lockdown, ignites protest
by migrant workers,” Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-
southasia/india-extends-worlds-biggest-lockdown-ignites-protest-by-migrant-workers-
idUSKCN21W0HI
12Emerald Bensadoun 2020. “Nearly half of Canada’s COVID-19 deaths linked to long-term care
facilities: Tam,” Global News 13 April 2020 https://globalnews.ca/news/6811726/coronavirus-
long-term-care-deaths-canada/
13Global News. Coronavirus outbreak at Markham home for adults with disabilities causes staff
to walk off job. Newmarket Today. 10 April 2020
https://www.newmarkettoday.ca/coronavirus-covid-19-local-news/coronavirus-outbreak-at-
markham-home-for-adults-with-disabilities-causes-staff-to-walk-off-job-2245434
14AODA Alliance “Major Disability Organizations Unite to Voice Serious Fears About
Supposedly “Draft” Ontario Protocol for Rationing Critical Medical Care – A Patient’s Disability
Should Never Be Used as a Reason to Deny Medical Care,” 6 April 2020.
https://www.aodaalliance.org/whats-new/major-disability-organizations-unite-to-voice-
serious-fears-about-supposedly-draft-ontario-protocol-for-rationing-critical-medical-care-a-
patients-disability-should-never-be-used-as-a-reason-t/

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It should remind us that an injury to one is an injury to all. The most vulnerable
must be at the centre of our solidarity moving forward.

About the author

Lesley Wood is an editor of Interface, an Associate Professor of Sociology at
York University, and an activist in the anti-poverty movement.

38
Interface: A journal for and about social movements Movement report
Volume 12 (1): 39 - 42 (July 2020) Chukunzira, Organising under curfew

Organising under curfew: perspectives from Kenya

Angela Chukunzira (9th June 2020)

The Covid-19 pandemic has at best exposed the sham of neoliberal capitalism.
All the inequalities that existed before the pandemic have actually been
exacerbated. The Kenyan state, as is, has inherited the colonial legacies of
marginalization and exclusion and this has been highlighted in several ways in
the midst of the pandemic. Governments across the globe have restricted
movements in forms of curfews and lockdowns and this has had varying effects.
In Kenya, there is a curfew that was imposed on 27th March 2020 from dusk to
dawn to contain the spread of the virus. In practice, it means that from 7pm to 5
am all public spaces are off limits. On the 6th of June, the curfew hours were
shifted from 9pm to 4am.
Social movements have then emerged as an essential service. The hunger and
the devastation that is experienced more so by the poor has called for mutual
solidarity and aid amongst communities. Social movements have then in turn
broadened their communicative practices and new and old ways of organising
have merged. And although this brings in new challenges such as the immediacy
of the issues being faced versus the importance of ideological change that is
required for systemic transformation, the new social movements that are
emerging and the relevance of the existing ones is being reinforced by the
pandemic.

The intensified war on the poor

The curfew was unfortunately accompanied by atrocities in its reinforcement.
The brutality of the state once again reared its ugly head. Mostly the poor
working class were the ones caught up while trying to rush home to beat the
hours. In the counties of Nairobi and Mombasa specifically the violence meted
out on the people saw crowds being teargassed, and beatings for being outside
during curfew hours. For most, it was unrealistic to leave work and walk home
without being outside the bounds of the curfew. Furthermore, there were even
deaths reported such as the 13-year-old boy, Yassin Moyo, who was standing
outside the balcony of their home in Kiamaiko, Nairobi when a stray bullet
ended his life. This underpinned the call for justice of social movements that
advocate against police brutality.
In at least two other incidents, residents of Nairobi have been left homeless the
midst of the pandemic. On the 4th May 2020, at least 5000 people were
rendered homeless in Kariobangi. There were demolitions which were justified
on the basis that the land on which the houses were built is public land and
went ahead despite there being a court order on the contrary. In a similarly
devastating incident, on 16th May 2020, at least 200 people were left homeless
in Ruai, yet again and these demolitions took place in the dead of night leaving
the victims with no place to shelter. The victims of the tragedy were mostly

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Internally Displaced Persons from the post-election violence that took place in
2007/8, a double tragedy for the victims. They were allocated that land on
which they had settled after the violence and that have been there for the past 12
years. All these demolitions are taking place not only in the midst of the Covid-
19 pandemic, but also in the middle of the rainy season in Kenya when the
infrastructure and hygiene in informal settlements become even more
deplorable.

Communication practices of social movements

Movements have been at the core in ensuring that social justice prevails despite
the novelty of Covid-19. Old and newer innovative methods have (e)merged in
organising practices and communication repertoires and this has allowed
movements to be producers of information that is consumed and take a more
pro-active role in the narration of their own narratives. The bigger question of
digital inequality has obviously emerged. While this has seen hierarchies being
replicated in the online space in terms of which types of movements are visible
and arguably what type of activists are on the online public sphere, the Covid-19
pandemic has presented a unique situation. This is because of the physical
distancing that is required, movements and activists have been compelled at
least in ways that are possible to them, to engage in the online public sphere.
This has of course been extremely unequal but in some ways has broadened the
communicative practices of some social movements. In the case of the extreme
brutality by the police, a lot of the discussions that were led by social
movements were on social media. Hashtags, along with photographs and videos
that were taken on smart phones were being used for information. This was also
an opportunity for public education and more importantly, give a deeper
understanding on the systemic issue over the immediacy of the problem at
hand. What was remarkably outstanding was a picture that was shared on social
media that compared the brutality of the colonial state to the current police
brutality and how the two were parallel to each other.
On the other hand, there was a vigil held in Kiamako, Nairobi for the young boy
who fell victim to the stray bullet while maintaining physical distancing. In
Kariobangi where the demolitions had taken place, a protest followed. The
protest did not necessarily adhere to physical distancing and neither were the
protesters in protective gear. The protest was characterized by a blocked road
and burning of barricades. Police used teargas and water cannons on the
protesters and disrupted the protests. Protestors used the only means at their
disposal to express their discontent at the brutality of the state. The reasons
given for the disruption of the protests were allegedly being disruptive and they
should use the correct channels to air their grievances. This tactic is often used
to delegitimize community struggles. However, even within the protest, some
video footage taken on smartphones that was shared on social media platforms
showing the hybridity of communication repertoires.

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Volume 12 (1): 39 - 42 (July 2020) Chukunzira, Organising under curfew

In terms of public education around Covid-19 one of the more creative ways in
which movements are engaging the public has been the use of graffiti on the
walls and the spoken word artistes have also been using poetry. Musicians have
also composed songs.

Gradual progressive change

It has been remarkable the solidarity that has been experienced by activists
coming together. The neoliberal crisis has further pushed the poor and the
vulnerable communities to the brink of mere survival. The pre-occupation of
social movements with overcoming daily challenges because of the immediacy
of the issues at hand such as distributing food and mutual aid and solidarity for
the evicted families may, in some ways obscure the vision for radical
transformation in the process. This is to say, the crisis within the crisis is a
hinderance for a vision of radical transformation. It remains difficult for social
movements to answer because they must practically deal with the immediate
problems of communities.
More optimistically however, is how the crisis has also shown that all the crises
that are being faced today are intersecting: Patriarchy, climate change, racism
among others have been highlighted more deeply with the spread of the virus.
This makes the voices of social movements to be even more amplified and giving
them more relevance. Although the pandemic may not see the death of
capitalism, more people will be convinced of more human-centric models of
production furthering the call for change.

Hope for the future

Crises always allow room for new social movements to emerge. In the pandemic
era, new ideas are already being formulated. What makes me hopeful is that
most of the people calling for transformation are young. This is in part because
they are more affected by the neoliberal order, having experienced the deceit of
meritocracy and aspiration that they have been taught to believe over the years
as a way of escaping the pangs of poverty, rather than eliminating it.
The immediate hunger that is experienced by many, exacerbated by the covid-19
pandemic has then made budding movements in Kenya be able to link it directly
to the climate catastrophe in which we find ourselves. A movement that is
budding around issues of ecological justice has made a radical approach to plant
their own food. Using indigenous seeds that are banked by other small peasant
farmers as a way to escape the modern agricultural model that is built on multi-
national corporations destroying the planet and biodiversity. They draw their
inspiration from the Arusha Declaration, as articulated by Nyerere. Self-reliance
then is seen as an alternative to capitalism. Food directly informs our
consciousness and if people can produce and consume their own food, and the
social movements that are emerging globally as a direct result of the pandemic
can be a source of hope, then not all is bleak. We shall rebuild. We shall restore.

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About the author

Angela Chukunzira is a scholar-activist from Nairobi. She is currently based at
the Centre for Social Change, University of Johannesburg. Her research
examines the link between technology and communication practices of social
movements.

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Interface: A journal for and about social movements Movement report
Volume 12 (1): 43 – 46 (July 2020) Venturini, Social movements’
powerlessness

Social movements' powerlessness at the time of

covid-19: a personal account
Federico Venturini (24th June 2020)

This is a story about my experience as activist-researcher during the Covid-19

crisis in Udine, a small city in the North-East of Italy1. This is not a happy story
of actions and results but a narration of frustration and feelings of impotence .
At the end of February, Italy had the first red zones in lockdown in some
Northern regions . The period coincided with the Carnival holidays so schools
and universities were closed for an extra week. They did not open again
afterwards as the number of Covid-19 cases spiked, and the Friuli Venezia
Giulia regional and national governments took a series of draconian (but
necessary) decisions to restrict movement and work. On the 24th of February,
the regional government decided to prohibit all gatherings of people in public
places. The same decision was adopted on a national level on the 11th of March.
The only commercial activities left open were food shops, pharmacies and
newspaper/tobacco shops alongside a strategic selection of factories. On the
22nd of March a new national ordinance was adopted which prohibited all
personal movements in a municipality except those for proven work needs, or of
absolutely urgent health reasons. Moreover, a further tightening of activities,
dividing them between unnecessary and necessary/strategic. In the beginning,
these measures were intended until the 3rd of April but then they were extended
several times until the 3rd of May.
On the top of that, the local regional government prohibited any physical or
sports activities, as well as going for walks or entertaining oneself in areas
frequented by several people. Moreover, they made disposable gloves and masks
(or in any case a protection to cover the nose and mouth) mandatory in food
shops. It seems impossible to believe that on the night of the 24th of February I
had participated in a panel on the Kurdish revolution in a public event with one
hundred participants. I still remember that night as if it was yesterday, with the
freedom to stay out with friends and comrades and to debate and to propose
new ideas. After that, a blanket of silence befell on the communications with the
outside world. As a teacher and researcher, I had to switch to smart working and
I started spending all my days in front of the computer (even more than before).
In my family, we are three, I, Margherita and Francesco, our four-month old
baby, who is super happy to have both parents at home all the time. We had to
change our routine and adapt to isolation at home.
I started to feel miserable, only concentrating on teaching or tedious online
research work. I even had some health issues, maybe somatizing the difficulties
of being isolated. Despite the severity of the crisis, I could not organise anything

1 I would like to thank Giovanni Lupieri and Margherita Ciani for their comments and advice
relating to earlier versions of this piece.

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Volume 12 (1): 43 – 46 (July 2020) Venturini, Social movements’
powerlessness

effective to help people, a very disempowering feeling. The only action that I was
able to perform (with other comrades) was to challenge the fake news on social
media regarding the pandemic, often spread by right-wing or populist websites.
Then a comrade abroad asked me to join an online conversation to share the
experience in Italy. From then I understood the necessity of internal
communication, eased by the flexibility of online communication. That call
refreshed me and I started to coordinate various efforts with groups where I was
previously involved.
At this point, I would like to clarify the maybe unique situation of social
movements in Italy during the pandemic. Any movement or action is forbidden,
and there is almost zero possibility of doing anything. There are few relevant
exceptions, for example in big cities like Milan, Rome, Turin, Naples and
Bologna, social movements based in social centers managed to organise a
response, developing various forms of support, especially for the delivery of
basic necessities (Merli 2020). In Milano local social movements organised the
Brigate 'Volontarie per l'Emergenza' - 'Crisis Volunteer Brigades'2 (Redazione
Milano 2020). Crucially these had the recognition and support of Emergency, a
humanitarian NGO that provides free medical treatment in conflict areas.
Having the support of legal entity, activists were able to organise different nine
neighbourhood based brigades that delivered food and medicine to people in
need.
However the situation in few big cities is very unusual. In most of Italy very
little has been organised because of the strict lockdown laws. Breaking them is a
penal offence and you receive a fine, something very unique worldwide where
forms of different solidarity were effectively organised. Compared to mutual aid
efforts, social movements in this phase managed more easily to concentrate
their efforts for generating content for alternative media, especially for online
publications and radios. Unlike other crises where social movements have
quickly managed to organize themselves, and generate empathy and
mobilisation in society, this time they find themselves in a cul-de-sac: on one
side respecting the health requirements to end the pandemic and therefore, the
impossibility of taking any actions.
National and local police renewed their efforts to enforce the new regulations,
using many checkpoints and patrols, using multiple modes of surveillance,
using boats and helicopters, even drones are allowed to monitor, bypassing the
strict regulations that were in place before the crisis.
The control is not limited to the police surveillance of the territory but it has
expanded to electronic surveillance. An application to monitor mobiles called
'Immuni' - 'Immune people' has been developed by a private company and
licensed to the Italian government without cost (Redazione ANSA 2020). The
aim of this application is to track the people in order to trace the possible
contacts of infected people. At the moment it is under test in some regions and

2 More info at: https://www.facebook.com/brigatevolontarieMilano/

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the use is voluntary although the government is expecting a massive use of it.
Furthermore, when we started to organise online communication between
activists, two critical issues emerged: questions of technological literacy and the
flaws of alternative online platforms. On one side, activists from all age groups
often are not familiar with effective online communications or platforms and
they need training. On the other, alternative online platforms showed many
limits, like not being user friendly or poor performance intimes of internet
overload. On the top of this, many activists and groups started to useThe current
pandemic highlighted both a fundamental weakness, the lack of solid
infrastructures for social change that can be activated for a medical emergency,
and the State power that can effectively shut down any possible form of dissent.
and understand the importance of alternative online services only during the
crisis. In a time of dire need, the demand for these services has suddenly
skyrocketed , putting even more pressure on autonomous resources and
highlighting critical issues of learning. However, the advantages of these
platforms in terms of communication self-management and digital security are
enormous, both in the short and long term.
Since the beginning of the crisis, unions denounced the way that the General
Confederation of Italian Industry (the Italian employers' federation and
national chamber of commerce) put pressure on the government to delay the
establishment of containment zones, and to weaken health guidelines in order
to keep production going. From the 4 of May onwards the government is
planning the Phase 2, the phase after the lockdown, with openings various
health measures. However the employers are eager to open their businesses,
even at the risk of the health of their employees.
Social movements were caught by surprise by this pandemic, like everyone else,
and they have been very slow in organising a response, because of the gravity of
the crisis and the structural issues previously highlighted. Building lasting and
effective infrastructures for social change have for long been a problem that
needs to be seriously addressed, now more than ever. What we are trying to do
now is to discuss online what will happen next. We are all too aware that a phase
of lockdown with an acute number of infections will be followed by many
months of uncertainty before a vaccine or a cure will definitively solve this
pandemic. What will happen during this period and the magnitude of the
economic breakdown that is ahead of us remain question marks. What is certain
is that with this crisis the capitalist system has demonstrated for the umpteenth
time its inability to live on the planet in harmony with nature (Bookchin 2005).

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References
Redazione ANSA. 2020. Coronavirus: Arcuri firma ordinanza per app italiana.
ANSA,17 April. [Online]. [Accessed 14 April 2020]. Available at:
https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/tecnologia/2020/04/17/coronavirus-arcuri-
firma-ordinanza-per-app-italiana_fc3d527f-75e3-49ee-a36c-c85ec47bffd5.html
Bookchin, M. 2005a. The Ecology of Freedom. Oakland: AK Press.
Merli, G. 2020. Cibo, medicine, aiuti: la solidarietà auto-organizzata. Il
Manifesto, 24 March [Online]. [Accessed 14 April 2020]. Available at:
https://ilmanifesto.it/cibo-medicine-aiuti-la-solidarieta-auto-organizzata-ai-
tempi-del-covid-19/
Redazione Milano 2020. Coronavirus, l’attivismo non si è fermato. 4- Mattia
Rigodanza, Collettivo Fuori Luogo e Brigate Volontarie per l’Emergenza.
Pressenza, 7 April [Online]. [Accessed 14 April 2020]. Available at:
https://www.pressenza.com/it/2020/04/coronavirus-lattivismo-non-si-e-
fermato-4-mattia-rigodanza-collettivo-fuori-luogo-e-brigate-volontarie-per-
lemergenza/

About the author

Federico Venturini is an Research Associate at the University of Udine (Italy).
His current research focuses on Zero Waste and sustainable tourism. In 2016,
he earned his PhD at the University of Leeds. Focusing on the experiences in
Rio de Janeiro between 2013-2014, in his research he explored the relations
between contemporary cities and urban social movements, utilizing
participatory/militant research approaches and through the lens of social
ecology. He is been a member of the Advisory Board of the Transnational
Institute of Social Ecology, and the International İmralı Peace Delegation,
organized by the EU Turkey Civic Commission. He co-edited with Thomas
Jeffrey Miley the book Your Freedom and Mine: Abdullah Ocalan and the
Kurdish Question in Erdogan's Turkey and with Emet Degirmenci and Inés
Morales the volume Social Ecology and the Right to the City: Towards
Ecological and Democratic Cities. He can be contacted at federico.venturini AT
uniud.it

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From communal violence to lockdown hunger –

Emergency responses by civil society networks,
Delhi, India
Sobhi Mohanty (22 May 2020)

The Covid-19 story in India has rapidly become one about the equivalence of a
public health crisis caused by the pandemic on the one hand, and a near
humanitarian crisis precipitated by government measures to control the
pandemic on the other. Within less than a month of lockdown, extensive loss of
livelihoods combined with inaction by central and state governments around
provision of food, emergency welfare, and economic reassurances, had resulted
in the prolonged starvation of millions of urban and rural poor families, a
nationwide crisis around mass attempts by rural-urban migrant workers to walk
back home under physically precarious conditions, and devastating economic
consequences for the one-fifth of Indians who live below the official poverty line
and for the millions who work in the informal sector. Each of these
consequences has grown in severity over the course of the two month lockdown,
with extensive media reports and policy analysis around these issues also having
emerged.
Within the media and policy discussion of these multiple crises however, two
points have remained relatively less discussed. First, the critical role played by
India’s civil society in ensuring that the human cost of managing the pandemic
has not been even higher and second, ways in which social movements prior to
the coronavirus crisis have been intersecting with the current scenario. In this
article I highlight one such intersection, by using the case of civil society
response to the event of extreme communal violence in Delhi that immediately
preceded the events of the coronavirus pandemic. The case illustrates how the
networks, knowledge and tools developed by civil society actors in one crisis
scenario allowed them to act with immediacy in the next. The discussion is
informed by media reports and public discourse on social media, but also by
direct involvement with civil society actors and their efforts.
Delhi and its surrounding areas are the hub of one of the densest industrial
regions in India. Announcement of the lockdown without advance notice, and
shutdown of transportation and of inter-state borders quickly resulted in NGOs
and social workers being faced with an overwhelming scale of distress. From
migrant workers who lived in temporary makeshift shelters and lacked domicile
documents, to the tens of thousands of families living in Delhi’s slum
settlements who typically get by on marginal daily or weekly wages, a large
section of the region’s population started running out of food, running out of
savings to purchase supplies from private or even government stores, and
frequently lacking the paperwork needed to access food from public distribution
systems.

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Civil society actors, themselves in physical lockdown, responded along two lines.
First, they focused on creating a system of local network/s for relief provision -
to ensure coordination with public officials – district and municipal authorities,
police officials, and elected state representatives – to make relief work more
efficient and in line with social distancing rules. The work on ground comprised
drawing up lists of individuals and families who were in critical need of food or
any form of emergency support on the basis of incoming messages for help,
verifying these messages through an extensive volunteer network, roughly
mapping areas that needed help, and then working on either fundraising,
procurement and distribution of food supplies, or setting up of community
kitchens at strategic locations. Indeed, it was not only in Delhi that civil society
organisations (henceforth CSOs) organised so effectively despite severe logistic
constraints: a news report suggest that in at least thirteen states of India, it was
CSOs and not government authorities, who ensured that people had food.1
A second line of work done by CSOs was to meticulously document ground
realities and gather information. The Delhi Relief Collective for example – a
loose association of NGOs and individual volunteers that had come together to
respond to a prior crisis, as will be discussed subsequently – used WhatsApp,
Facebook, and other social media platforms to collate and communicate
information about relief work, and continuously worked to build a database of
target beneficiaries on the one hand, and policy responses, changes in
government rules around lockdown, and the broader on-ground context of the
growing food (and migrant) crisis. Unlike the Facebook group ‘Caremongers
India’ for example – a nationwide network that by now includes at least 40,000
members – which predominantly comprises middle and upper class volunteers
privately helping with individual requests for food and emergency assistance
across the country, those working with low income groups used this knowledge
to build a rights-based discourse around the fallouts of the lockdown for
informal and migrant worker, focus media and political attention on the
situation, and advocate for targeted governance and emergency welfare
measures.
Against this context, it is significant that in the case of Delhi, a large section of
the civil society network leading current relief and advocacy efforts actually
mobilised in response to a very different sort of crisis – communal violence.
This violence followed an intense nationwide political movement that was in
process at the time that the coronavirus pandemic hit. The movement itself had
started as a protest against the CAA/NRC2 legislations that were widely

1‘Coronavirus in India: In 13 states, NGOs fed more people than govt did during lockdown’. By
Mukesh Rawat. In India Today, 9th April 2020. Article can be accessed online at:
https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/in-13-states-ngos-fed-more-people-than-govt-during-
coronavirus-lockdown-1665111-2020-04-09
2Citizen Amendment Act (CAA) and National Register of Citizens (NRC). The former is an Act
by the Indian national government from 2019 purportedly to provide citizenship status to non-
Muslim victims of religious persecution in the neighbouring countries of Pakistan, Afghanistan,

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perceived as a strategic intervention by the right-wing government to

undermine the legal and social citizenship of Muslims within the country3. Its
focus soon broadened from a display of solidarity with the Muslim community,
to dialogues around the secular principles underlying India’s constitution, and
broad opposition to the national ruling party’s authoritarian and communal
politics. It took the form of both online activism, and a continuous series of
physical demonstrations across the country. The most iconic of these was a sit-
in organised by Muslim women in the east Delhi neighbourhood of Shaheen
Bagh. The sit-in started around 11th December 2019 and continued unbroken
over the next many weeks. By the end of February 2020, it was being extensively
covered by international media as the longest running peaceful protest in India.
Despite incidents of police-aided violence on university campuses in Delhi and
at protest sites in other parts of the country, protestors at Shaheen Bagh and at
these other sites remained non-violent. On the night of 23rd February 2020
however, there was a sudden eruption of extreme violence across multiple east
Delhi residential neighbourhoods, a predominantly Muslim part of the city. The
government declared a curfew in these parts of Delhi on the next day, but the
curfew primarily served to intensify the violence in these areas. Over the next
week, at least fifty people were reported brutally killed in these riots, many more
dead bodies started emerging in sewers, and the extensive arson in these areas
left thousands homeless, including both Hindus and Muslims, and the many
families that lived in the numerous slum communities nearby.
On the night of 24th February, a well-known national human rights activist –
Harsh Mander – started organising emergency rescue operations in the curfew
neighbourhoods in response to emerging reports of violence. Meanwhile, both
private residents of these areas and a few independent news media reporters
started using Twitter to disseminate live coverage of mobs carrying out
lynching, setting mosques, shops, and homes on fire, and police complicity in
these ongoing events. Soon, multiple leading activists joined in these efforts to
coordinate emergency rescue and relief operations by setting up private
WhatsApp groups comprising NGOs, researchers, lawyers, journalists, and
other private citizens across Delhi; the Delhi Relief Collective was one of them.
As civil society came together however, police and government authorities
began a crackdown by tightly cordoning off these neighbourhoods, preventing
entry of ambulances, doctors, aid workers, and journalists into the affected
areas, and speeding up legal action against activists who had criticised
government actions during the CAA/NRC protests. Even as riots continued, the
solicitor general of India filed a complaint in the Supreme Court against Harsh
Mander, claiming that hate speech by him and other activists had incited the

and Bangladesh. The latter is a legislation to carry out a countrywide census and taking count of
legal and illegal migrants.
3These legislations have had a significantly different meaning and public reaction in the north
eastern state of Assam, where agitation against these Acts was extensive and violent, but ran
contrary to the Muslim-solidarity focused public response in other parts of the country. This is
not discussed here.

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violence. As a result, Mander and his group had to curtail their operations.
Given these repressive measures by the government, volunteer operations had
to be rapidly configured so as to circumvent government authorities and yet
effectively reach emergency medical assistance and funds to those in urgent
need.
The complete lack of cooperation by formal government institutions, from the
police to elected representatives, necessitated enormous online coordination
using WhatsApp groups, Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram, in order to track
and verify distress messages, connect with residents within the affected
neighbourhoods in order to collect detailed information about the violence as it
happened in real time, start campaigns to raise public awareness, and put
pressure on political representatives once reports had been verified. As the
curfew eased, the information compiled over these few days became the basis of
further investigations by civil society actors and the media, and also helped
ensure that victims of this violence could seek legal redress and rehabilitation
support from the government. It was only under public pressure that the
government started judicial inquiries and set up relief camps for the thousands
of people in these areas who were rendered homeless. The work did not stop
here however. There were large gaps in provision of food, medical supplies, and
legal assistance to these camps, which continued to be filled by civil society
volunteers and their network of doctors, lawyers, journalists, and private
donors. The coordination of supplies, fundraising, and on-ground assistance in
these camps and neighbourhoods continued well after the violence itself had
occurred.
It was under these circumstances that news broke of the WHO declaring the
coronavirus outbreak to be a pandemic. As with the migrant crisis, there was
little pre-emptive planning regarding the many hundreds of homeless families
in east Delhi who had just been the victims of horrific communal violence, lost
their homes, and were now living in crowded relief camps. When the Delhi
government discussed shutting down these camps, volunteers who had been
involved with rescue efforts made urgent attempts to help these families find a
temporary home with relatives or volunteers. The pandemic also provided the
perfect opportunity for many government supported news outlets to extensively
brand public protestors, such as those at Shaheen Bagh, as irresponsible for
endangering public health. On 25th March – while hundreds of migrant workers
were crowding the streets of Delhi, and hundreds of poor and homeless families
were gathering en masse at community kitchens and shelters as a consequence
of government lockdown measures – the Shaheen Bagh site was cleared by the
Delhi police in the interest of social isolation.
The communal violence events described here, and the pandemic lockdown
measures, have provided a similar context for civil society actors to navigate.
Both violence related curfew and social isolation related curfew restricted
physical entry into areas, prevented access to information about ground
realities, made delivery of emergency support difficult, and required personal
risks to civil society volunteers. Both necessitated helping those on the margins

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of citizenship in urban India. Some of the areas in Delhi that have been worst
affected by the lockdown for example, are those same east Delhi areas that were
affected by the communal violence. This is not surprising given that they are
largely poor Muslim neighbourhoods, are located at the outskirts of the city, and
have numerous migrant worker settlements, all factors contributing to their
being relatively sidelined when it comes to government welfare provision.
Finally, extensive documentation and creation of a knowledge base of on-
ground realities in each case not only allowed relief work in both cases to be
efficient despite minimal resources, but also allowed CSOs to publicly
demonstrate how already marginalised groups were being systematically
targeted with physical and economic violence through the complicity of formal
government institutions. Thus long term strategies of advocacy and civil society
support for these groups could (and continue to) be built atop the layer of
emergency relief provision.
Yet it is not only identity politics and civil society strategy that links these events
of resistance, violence, and pandemic. Acts of government repression also link
them. Thus, even as the food and migrant worker crises grew during lockdown,
the central government issued orders to the police to continue arresting those
involved in anti-CAA/NRC protests in Delhi during lockdown. Prominent
Muslim activists and a number of university students who had been the target of
police violence during the protests in Delhi were served legal notice under the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), and arrests of many of these
individuals began midway into the lockdown. At a time when access to legal
support was limited because of the lockdown, this put further pressure
particularly on Muslim civil society volunteers, who feared being arrested under
a variety of pretexts as occurred during the time of the protests earlier this year
while out conducting their relief activities.
Discussions about a post-lockdown and post-Covid world have been ongoing in
many circles across the world throughout this pandemic crisis. There are
questions about whether countries will see this as an opportunity to invest in
governance and public health infrastructure, whether political elites will see this
as an opportunity to seize greater control of government institutions, and so on.
It is too early to conclusively answer questions such as these for India –
although the recent labour and economic reforms announced by the national
government suggest that privatization will (be made to) play a prominent role –
since the country continues to grapple with the public health aspects of the crisis
as case numbers rise. It is undeniable however, that it has been Indian civil
society that has allowed for a humanitarian crisis in the making to be swiftly
identified and at least partially addressed. Using the lockdown as an
opportunity to target this same civil society with repressive measures has
perhaps been one of the worst uses of the Indian government’s resources at this
time, providing a not unclear indication of the democratic struggles that lie
ahead.

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About the author

Sobhi Mohanty is currently a PhD student in Political Science at the Graduate
Institute of International & Development Studies (IHEID) in Geneva,
Switzerland. Her dissertation focuses on the links between electoral
participation and social mobilisation in urban slums in India. During her
masters, Sobhi studied as a research scholar with the late Dr. Elinor Ostrom at
Indiana University Bloomington. This served as her introduction to the study of
collaborative and community-led governance approaches to development. Prior
to starting her PhD, Sobhi worked for several years on sustainable livelihoods
projects in India, both in slums, and in rural communities.

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‘Anti-domestic violence little vaccine’:

A Wuhan-based feminist activist campaign
during COVID-19
Hongwei Bao (28th April 2020)

First reported in Wuhan in late 2019, COVID-19 has now spread around the
world and become a global pandemic. In this historical moment when many
governments are doing their best to tackle the public health emergency, many
social issues are neglected, and the negligence can lead to great social costs. One
of the issues that have surfaced in the quarantine is a rise in domestic violence
against women. Life under lockdown has been difficult for many women who
live in abusive relationships or who suffer from domestic violence (Taub 2020).
These victims often have nowhere to go because of the strict quarantine
measures imposed on them. Necessary police intervention as well as legal and
social help may not be readily available during this period, either. It is therefore
crucial to raise public awareness of domestic violence, offer support to victims,
and issue warnings and even mete out punishments to perpetrators.
From January to April, many Chinese cities including Wuhan were locked down
in a state of emergency. The lockdowns triggered and exacerbated some social
problems including domestic violence against women. Under the Blue Sky, an
anti-domestic-violence NGO (non-governmental organisation) based in Hubei’s
Lijian County, received 175 reports of domestic violence in February, three times
the number of such complaints during the same month in 2019 (Feng 2020). To
address the issue of the rising domestic violence, some feminist activists in
China connected with each other and formed support groups for women online.
One such group was led by Guo Jing, a feminist activist and social worker based
in Wuhan.1 They launched an activist campaign called ‘Anti-Domestic Violence
Little Vaccine’ to raise public awareness of the issue of domestic violence and
women’s rights.
In this short essay, I introduce the ‘Anti-Domestic Violence Little Vaccine’
campaign in China during the COVID-19. After a brief introduction of the
campaign by using first-person accounts from the organiser Guo Jing, I will
then sum up some of the activist strategies used in the campaign.2 I will also

1I use the hanyu pinyin type of romanisation and the Chinese convention to present Chinese-
language names: family names usually appear before given names. For example, in the case of
the name Guo Jing, Guo is the surname and Jing is the given name.
2 Guo’s accounts have been taken from her published diary. The diary was first published online
on Guo’s social media and on the Chinese-language news media Matters. It was later published
in print, titled Wuhan Lockdown Diary (Guo 2020), by Taipei-based Linking Publishing.
Although nominally a diary, Guo’s writing can be more appropriately understood as a blog,
publicly shared with friends and followers and widely circulated online and offline. Guo uses
public circulation of her writing as a form to engage with feminism and connect with other

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discuss how the campaign engages with the quarantined public space. I hope
that these strategies can inspire activists around the world to find strength and
solidarity, and also to seek solutions to tackle the global pandemic. I also
suggest that rather than seeing the pandemic as an obstacle to social
movements, we can use the pandemic as a good opportunity to experiment with
flexible and creative modes of social and political activism.

‘Anti-Domestic Violence Little Vaccine’

Guo Jing, a resident of Wuhan, is a 29-year-old feminist activist and social
worker. In 2014, she was involved in China’s first lawsuit regarding gender
discrimination in employment and subsequently won the lawsuit against the
employer (Legal Information Institute 2014). Inspired by the success, Guo set
up a legal aid helpline for women facing gender discrimination in the workplace.
On her social media sites, she frequently advertises the helpline (Figure 1).
During the Wuhan lockdown, Guo was in quarantine in a small flat for seventy-
seven days from 23 January to 8 April 2020, when she communicated regularly
with her feminist friends online. At the same time, she kept a diary on her social
media and shared her diary with friends and social media followers; she also ran
the legal aid helpline and answered questions from callers every evening during
the Wuhan lockdown.

people. The public nature and the realist and activist style of the diary makes it an important
document for the pandemic and the social movements during the pandemic.

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Figure 1. Guo Jing’s business card, on which the helpline information is

displayed.

At the beginning, Guo and her feminist friends all felt vulnerable and helpless,
as the infection rate and death toll rose dramatically, and as the situation in
Wuhan got out of control. However, after a while, they decided to act together to
overcome the sense of helplessness. They set up a feminist activist WeChat (a
Chinese-language social media) support group and talked to each other through
voice and video chat for a couple of hours every evening, encouraging and
supporting each other along the way. In these chats, the group examined the
lockdown from feminist perspectives, discussed ways of engaging with social
issues, and explored possible strategies to ‘help individuals overcome a sense of
vulnerability’, especially for young women like themselves (Guo 26 January
2020).3
In their discussion, they realised that the epidemic was having a gendered effect.
Indeed, in comparing fighting the coronavirus to fighting a war, public health

3All the dated quotes are taken from Guo’s diary (Guo 2020). The dates refer to the time when
these entries were first published online.

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intervention often prioritises a masculinist perspective by valorising men’s role

in combatting the virus. It neglects women’s lives and their needs by relegating
women to the domestic and private sphere. In doing so, it reinforces the
traditionally men/women and the public/private dichotomies characterising a
patriarchal and heteronormative society. At the same time, the epidemic
condition has exacerbated sexual discrimination and domestic violence against
women. Trapped in a confined physical space for an extended period of time,
many men use their family members to vent out their pent-up frustrations.
Women who live in abusive relationships are particularly vulnerable. When
domestic violence occurs, women usually have no escape because of the
quarantine situation. Guo reports in her diary: ‘The lockdown increased the
difficulty for victims to get help and support; it also increased the practical
difficulty for us in being able to offer our own intervention.’ (Guo 28 February
2020)
To raise public awareness of the issue, Guo organised an online workshop. In
the workshop, feminist activist Feng Yuan shared her experience of and gave the
audience advice on how to deal with domestic violence. The live broadcast and
its recording attracted 1,200 viewings on that day, with positive feedback from
participants and viewers (Guo 29 February 2020).

Figure 2. ‘Anti-Domestic Violence Little Vaccine’ social media account

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Figure 3. An activist posted a hand-written ‘anti-domestic violence open letter’

on the door of a lift.

Building on the success of the workshop and in collaboration with the Rural
Women Development Foundation Guangdong, the anti-domestic violence
workgroup led by Guo launched an ‘Anti-Domestic Violence Little Vaccine’
activist campaign (Figure 2). The campaign called on women to act up and raise
public awareness of domestic violence. The group published an open letter
online, calling to the public for an end to domestic violence. It then encouraged
people to copy or print out the open letter and post them in public spaces
(Figure 3). The response was overwhelmingly positive: ‘In just a few hours,
several thousand people volunteered to become “little vaccines” [meaning
volunteers].’ (Guo 2 March 2020) Many people also came up with creative ways
for public advocacy:

Since the start of the campaign, many people have posted the open letter in their
own neighbourhoods. Some have even redesigned the open letter and made it
into a beautiful poster. Some dialled the telephone number of the Women’s
Rights Hotline run by the All-China Women’s Federation to make sure that the
hotline is in operation. Others shared their own experience of falling victim to
domestic violence.
The aim of the campaign is to make domestic violence visible and make its
victims feel supported. Now thousands of people have volunteered to become

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‘anti-domestic violence little vaccines. I hope that many people can get involved
in this and the number can reach ten thousand, so that ‘anti-domestic violence
little vaccines’ can be spread in more neighbourhoods. (Guo 4 March 2020)

Designing campaign strategies

The strategies used in the ‘Anti-Domestic Violence Little Vaccine’ activist
campaign are well worth noting. The first question that the group encountered
is how to ensure the safety of a campaign and its participants. Feminist activism
is a politically sensitive issue in the PRC (People’s Republic of China) since the
arrest of the ‘Feminist Five’ – five young feminist activists who planned to
distribute anti-sexual harassment leaflets on public transport on the
International Women’s Day in 2015 (Fincher 2018). Despite this, the language
of ‘anti-domestic violence’ has its own legitimacy in the PRC’s public discourse.
China’s legislative body passed its own anti-domestic violence law in 2015 (Mak
2020). China’s national organisation representing women, the All-China
Women’s Federation, also runs a helpline for women, advising callers on how to
deal with domestic violence. It is, therefore, possible to address the issue of
domestic violence without explicitly talking about ‘feminist activism’. In other
words, a campaign should be carried out in a non-explicitly political, non-
aggressive, and non-confrontational way. This would require some rethinking of
activist strategies based on the social context of the quarantine and the cultural
specificity of the PRC. Although China’s feminist activism constitutes an integral
part of the international #metoo movement, copying activist experiences
directly from their Western counterparts without localising activist strategies is
not an option for Chinese feminists.

Figure 4. ‘Anti-Domestic Violence Little Vaccine’ campaign logo

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The design of the campaign logo and slogan has effectively considered the social
context of the epidemic and the geographical location of China in East Asia. It
therefore speaks effectively to a target audience – primarily young people in
urban China – without making the campaign sound explicitly political. At the
centre of the campaign logo is the standing cartoon figure of a green-coloured
cat dressed in a short skirt, wearing a surgical mask, holding a huge syringe with
one hand/paw, and pushing the top of the syringe with the other (Figure 4). A
gentle shot of green liquid, resembling a green grass shoot in shape, appears on
the tip of the needle. The image manifests an aesthetics of kawaii (‘cuteness’ in
Japanese) and xiaoqingxin (‘little freshness’ in Mandarin Chinese) popular
among urban youths in East Asia. The cat image is characterised by a fresh,
pleasant and dynamic visual style and at the same time appears non-militant
and non-threatening. The words on the left-hand side of the picture read: ‘anti-
domestic violence little vaccine’; and on the right hand-side, ‘caring for each
other in the lockdown’. This slogan taps into a culture of solidarity and mutual
care in the epidemic. The term ‘little vaccine’ also speaks to the epidemic
condition in which ‘vaccines’ are welcome and needed. Also, by calling the
volunteers who participated in this campaign ‘little vaccines’, the campaign also
bypasses politically sensitive terms such as feminist activists and reduces
potential risks for participants.
Being veteran feminist activists, Guo and her friends are aware of the
importance of participation; they also recognise ordinary people’s agency in
making decisions and taking actions to change their own lives and society. The
campaign strategies are designed in such a way that people are encouraged to
‘act up’, because one’s confidence and agency can be effectively boosted in the
process of ‘acting up’. But this ‘acting up’ should not be prescriptive, that is,
following strict guidelines and rules. Instead, they should be open and flexible
enough so that individuals can decide their own ways of participation and devise
their own activist strategies. Different individuals may have their own perceived
places in the movement; a movement should be able to help these individuals
negotiate the grey zone between finding and challenging their own comfort
zones. Flexibility in ‘acting up’ also helps to protect new participants and give
them time and space to try out new things and gain confidence at their own
pace.
An activist strategy should recognise participants’ agency and help them
exercise their own agency. How to mobilise the participants’ agency is therefore
crucial to a movement, and this process usually involves embodied
participation, which is obviously under constraint in a quarantine environment
but is not impossible. A well-designed activist strategy can mobilise participants
physically, psychologically and emotionally. For example, the major action point
of this campaign is for participants to make an ‘anti-domestic violence open
letter’ public. This is a good task because it is easy, doable, and flexible; it also
leaves ample space for individual creativity. Participants can post the open letter
online and on social media. If they are brave enough, they can post the letter in

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the public spaces of their neighbourhoods. Most people disseminate an e-

version or a print version of this pre-drafted open letter. Those who are
determined enough or those who do not have a printer at home can choose to
hand copy the letter. Those who are artistically gifted can even redesign the
poster. In other words, the task of ‘posting an open letter’ can activate people’s
agency and creativity; in doing so, it boosts participants’ confidence and gives
them a sense of accomplishment. After sharing their experiences online with
others, participants develop a sense of belonging in an activist community –
although their relationship to and position within the community may differ –
and feel that they are contributing to an ongoing social movement, or a social
cause they feel that they can support. The constant shifts of a campaign from
online to offline and then back online, aided by the active involvement of one’s
embodied and affective participation, are therefore crucial for the success and
sustainability of a social movement.
Most importantly, the campaign organisers have not called themselves and the
participants ‘feminists’ or ‘activists’. This is an example of a type of politics
based on specific social issues (i.e. anti-domestic violence) instead of political
identities. The campaign has therefore attracted some male participants and
even garnered support from some participants’ parents. By focusing on specific
issues, activist campaigns become more inclusive and therefore have a greater
social impact.

Engagement with the public space

The lockdown condition offers ample opportunities for activist campaigns
because many people – mostly the ‘non-essential’ workers in the public policy
discourse – now have more time and enthusiasm for social participation. Also,
the pent-up energy and emotional intensity during the lockdown can be released
through social participation. During a pandemic, most people are eager to do
something useful to help others and to contribute to society, but many cannot
find a suitable way. The public health discourse during the pandemic often
centres on the notion of an individual who stays at home and takes care of
themselves and their families. This highly individualised and home-centred
narrative neglects people’s need for social interaction and their social
responsibilities. Forging a collective subjectivity and shaping a form of
publicness is therefore crucial for a social movement.
The quarantine condition poses unprecedented challenges to bring out a sense
of publicness – both in terms of people’s concern for political and social issues
and in terms of bringing issues from the private sphere to the public sphere.
Offline gatherings become difficult, although this experience can to a certain
extent be remedied by using digital media and technologies. In order to bring a
movement from the private and domestic sphere to a public space – understood
in both physical and virtual terms, a movement needs to adjust its conventional
activist strategies by taking into account the cultural specificity of the public
space in China.

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The notion of ‘public space’ has a vexed history in China, because of the
conflation of the public and the private in the Mao era and its aftermath. Public
spaces in a city are often controlled with surveillance by authorities, and the use
of these spaces are often politicised and even commercialised. A bulletin board
in a residential compound is often occupied by political posters and commercial
advertisements, and the residents’ use of these spaces is often forbidden or
strictly scrutinised. The act of posting an open letter in these public spaces
therefore marks an act of transgression and the reclaiming of the ordinary
people’s entitlement to these spaces. Guo reflected in her diary, aware that
many participants of the campaign were among her readers:

Many people said they were very nervous when they posted the open letter in
public spaces, as if they were doing something wrong. In contrast, many
perpetrators of domestic violence did not feel any unease at all when they
committed physical violence in public. They would not tone down their voice. The
victims were usually more worried about being seen and humiliated by others.
Such a public space tolerates and encourages violence against women.
To whom do public spaces belong? Today, our urban spaces are overwhelmingly
occupied by homogenous propaganda slogans and commercial advertisements.
[...]
It is thus easy to understand people’s nervousness. We seldom use public spaces,
and do not claim ownership to these public spaces. The campaign of posting anti-
domestic violence open letters in fact has two objectives: firstly, to raise public
awareness of domestic violence and to offer support to victims; secondly, to
exercise our right to use public spaces, and to improve the social environment
where such practices exist, and to send a warning message to the perpetrators.
(Guo 6 March 2020)

Guo believes in the power of individual and collective action in empowering

marginalised people in society; she also sees the potential of ordinary people’s
agency once they feel that they can do something to change their lives and to
change society. She wrote on 8 March, the International Women’s Day, also the
fifth anniversary of the arrest of the ‘Feminist Five’ (Fincher 2018; Wu, Yuan
and Lansdowne 2018): ‘Many people have been looking for light and
connections in darkness and lockdown. They have never given up their desire
for social change. This can release tremendous strength and power.’ (Guo 8
March 2020)

Conclusion
The ‘Anti-Domestic Violence Little Vaccine’ activist campaign offers a good
example for social movements in a time of crisis and a ‘state of emergency’.
COVID-19 brings unprecedented opportunities and challenges to contemporary
social movements across the world. The pandemic has exposed and magnified
existing problems such as structural equality, government inefficiency and weak

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social welfare systems. Many people are suffering from illness, death and
poverty as a result of these problems. But this situation has also raised the
public’s awareness of these problems and issued an urgent call for these
problems to be addressed. Social movements addressing these problems are
therefore more likely to garner support from people and invite wide
participation in society. Although the quarantine measures have made public
gatherings and physical contacts between people difficult, the Internet and
social media have facilitated social mobilisation and political activism in
significant ways. For example, a large part of the ‘Anti-Domestic Violence Little
Vaccine’ activist campaign took place online and on social media. Physical
isolation, therefore, does not bring an end to social movements. The collective
spirit and emotional intensity generated in a time of crisis can be mobilised for
activist purposes, and their impacts are likely to be greater now than in ordinary
times.
This case study has also helped us to imagine social movements in non-Western
contexts. Social movements studies have for a long time primarily drawn on and
theorised Western experiences. People sometimes assume that activists from all
over the world actively learn from their Western counterparts. The practice of
how Chinese feminists have devised innovative activist strategies to engage with
the issues of domestic violence and women’s rights during the pandemic
preceded many similar pandemic activist practices in the West. This, on the one
hand, can be attributed to the fact that China was the first country that had to
cope with the epidemic, and this pushed Chinese activists to the forefront of the
pandemic activism. On the other, it is yet another example which shows that
activists in non-Western parts of the world have always been experimenting
with innovative activist strategies, perhaps more than what they have been given
credit for. There is no denying that Chinese feminist activists also draw on
experiences from other countries, and all of this contribute to transnational
feminist movements. There is, however, an urgent need for activist experiences
in non-Western parts of the world to be documented, reflected upon, and
theorised. In this sense, we are contributing to the de-Westernisation of activist
knowledge and social movement studies by taking the experiences from the
Global South seriously.

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References
Feng, Jiayun. 2020. ‘COVID-19 Fuels Domestic Violence in China.’ SupChina
https://supchina.com/2020/03/24/covid-19-fuels-domestic-violence-in-
china/ . (accessed 25 April 2020).
Fincher, Leta Hon. 2018. Betraying Big Brother: The Feminist Awakening in
China. London: Verso.
Guo, Jing. 2020. Wuhan Fengcheng Riji (Wuhan Lockdown Diary). Taipei:
Linking Publishing.
Legal Information Institute. 2014. ‘Guo Jing v. East Cooking Vocational Skills
Training School’ Women and Justice https://www.law.cornell.edu/women-and-
justice/resource/guo_jing_v_east_cooking_vocational_skills_training_school.
(accessed 25 April 2020).
Mak, Sophie. 2020. ‘China’s Hidden Epidemic: Domestic Violence’ The
Diplomat https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/chinas-hidden-epidemic-
domestic-violence/. (accessed 25 April 2020).
Taube, Amanda. 2020. ‘A New Covid-19 Crisis: Domestic Abuse Rises
Worldwide.’ New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/world/coronavirus-domestic-
violence.html?auth=login-google. (accessed 25 April 2020).

About the author

Hongwei Bao is an Associate Professor in Media Studies at the University of
Nottingham, UK. He primarily studies feminist and queer cultures in
contemporary China, with a focus on media and cultural activism. He is the
author of Queer Comrades: Gay Identity and Tongzhi Activism in Postsocialist
China (NIAS Press, 2018) and Queer China: Lesbian and Gay Literature and
Visual Culture under Postsocialism (Routledge, 2020)

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Aurat March, a threat to mainstream tribalism

in Pakistan
Ayaz Ahmed Siddiqui (25th April 2020)

Since 2018, civil society across the class spectrum has mobilized in major cities
of Pakistan on International Women's day under the banner of Aurat March.
Aurat, means ‘woman’ in Urdu. A radical appropriation of the global #metoo
movement these demonstrations were first organized by a group of feminists in
my hometown Karachi, one of the largest metropolises of the world. Much
controversy is generated on local mainstream and social media by posters
displayed at these demonstrations.
Pakistan’s fledgling public sphere appears divided on women empowerment.
One side believes that the artistic expression on these posters raises the specter
of immorality and all the ‘degeneracy of the West’ that entails in a movement
organized by foreign funded women. In the words of New York Times columnist
Muhammad Hanif, the prospect that women might get together in large
numbers in public spaces with stencils and placards and not invite a man as
their chief guest has got grown (Pakistani) men asking, frothing at their mouth,
what do these women want?1
The organizers of the March say that their campaign highlights grave injustices
that are an everyday reality of historically vulnerable social groups in a society
struggling to cope with modernity.
Thus, while participants appear to be mostly women, the substantive message of
basic human dignity resonates equally with students, rural citizens, non-binary
genders like Khawaja Siras and yes, even many angry men who are often victim
of the same tribal values of toxic masculinity.
But the artistic expression generated around Aurat March is remarkable in
bringing the conversation on women empowerment from an abstract public
domain of a developing state to ‘the kitchen and bedroom’ of its citizens.
This success doesn’t just lie in the way they irk mainstream sensibilities on the
place of women in a traditional Muslim society. It also lies in effectively
translating universal values of social justice, equality and human rights in
Pakistan’s unique cultural lexicon.
This year’s demonstrations occurred amidst a heated national debate over
Government of Pakistan’s COVID-19 response. This was reflected in the
vibrancy of contentious performances. In this essay I describe the logic behind
some of these posters, what they mean for Pakistan’s changing political context
and ultimately hopefully what such activist repertoires can reveal about Muslim
women contention elsewhere.

1 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/07/opinion/international-womens-day-pakistan.html

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Anatomy of political slogans

Figure 1.0
As of writing, reported COVID19 deaths in
Pakistan are 265 and the state is
implementing a comprehensive response.
However:
- Each year more than 1000 women are
reportedly murdered in the name of
‘honour’.
- 90% of women have faced some form
of domestic violence at the hands of
their husbands or families. 47% of
married women have experienced
sexual abuse, particularly domestic
rape.
- The government has done little to
address cultural norms at the root of
domestic violence.

Figure 2.0
Through clever wordplay a link between misogynist behavior and a deadly pandemic is
made in this poster. In English it reads Khalil Ur Rehman, Shut Your Nonsense
Already. It calls out a local celebrity writer of a popular television soap for his
misogynist views. The controversy was generated due to a popular Aurat March slogan
My Body My Consent. Mr Rehman verbally abused a female human rights activist
during a live TV program few days before the demonstrations for repeatedly uttering

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the slogan. Video clips of the altercation went viral on social media and created a
national outrage.

Slogans like Mera Jism Meri Marzi, which roughly translates as My Body My
Consent in English, are protest tactics that leverage the power of media to create
a cultural resonance between the activist demands for justice and the
constituency whose interest they claim to represent.
Cultural resonance means reframing campaign messages so the public in a
particular socio-political and cultural milieu can relate with the activist
demands. Kitabi batien (English for, seemingly abstract concepts) like
feminism, marital rape, consent, dignity, decency, get a life of their own when
expressed in popular language.
This entails more than just their lexical usage. Norms, world view, rituals,
practices and ways of thinking provide a tool chest for the activist to create
preferred frames beyond simple English to Urdu translation.

Figure 3.0
Check Your Internet Search History Before Preaching
Modesty, is a loose English translation of this poster. Sex
education is a difficult subject in some advanced
democracies. But it is a special challenge in Muslim
Pakistan where it is considered a taboo and the state
prefers to ban porn websites. Of course, many still find
ways to access exotic content.
Meanwhile, Slut Shaming is a pervasive practice. It starts
with the girl’s male relatives and ends with her husband.
Public life is no different. This poster expresses the double
standards for Muslim men and women in the popular
language of morality. It does that in a way perhaps no
presentation of statistic on ‘honour’ killing and sexual
harassment could.
Through media the impact of these frames is magnified for
outgroups mobilizing grassroot support in a system that
violently resists class politics.

Such witty sloganeering should also resonate with Muslim communities

elsewhere. It may allow them to go beyond petty squabbles over what feminism
means to why Muslim women are so angry and against whom.

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Figure 4.0
Trans folks in Pakistan endure allegations of
inauthenticity and fraud, as well as invasive
tests and procedures to determine their gender.
This activist has appropriated the surgical mask
for protection against COVID19 but also as an
added layer of anonymity.
The Aurat March advocates that every trans and
non-binary person is included in educational
institutes, workplaces, voting and healthcare
facilities. So Pakistanis wouldn’t need masks to
express their thoughts in public life.
This binary, that binary, no binary!

The choice for a particular frame also depends on a handful of previously tried
and tested material the activist knows works.
Observers of issue advocacy can describe how Aurat March slogans of today are
a modification on those used in earlier feminist waves. Such as during the
dictatorship of General Zia Ul Haq when women protested against
discriminatory laws.
For this reason, some frames are more powerful than others because they
resonate with even larger segments of society. Any social cause in Pakistan
framed as Ghadar (Traitor), Corrupt, Bay Haya (Immodest), Ghair Islami
(Against Islam), for instance has the time-tested impact of threatening its very
survival.
Historically, a weak state has used these tactics to govern and suppress dissent.
They are handy for any political actor with national aspirations.
Although, I would argue that progressive movements elsewhere are engaged in
similar discursive battles with far-right populist groups.

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Figure 5.0 Aurat March 2020 participants in Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital city.

A sign of changing political context

But Aurat March may be a sign of changing times in Pakistan.
Through their posters Marchers are creating a vocabulary to describe the world
beyond a ‘good Muslim Right Wing’ and ‘bad Muslim Western Liberal’
dichotomy.
That is why these demonstrations resonate beyond the perceived feminist
stereotype and even transcend counter-frames of Ghadar and Bay Haya lodged
by opportunistic politicians. The state tolerance of the Aurat March is a
testament to this.
In a recent paper, Katherine Adeney, a scholar of democratization in South Asia,
shows that the biggest challenge to Pakistani democracy comes from a lack of
civil liberties i.e. freedom of the press and assembly and rule of law, rather than
reserved domains of power i.e. defence, security, public policy, and
competitiveness of elections that are usually the focus of analysts 2.
The large illiterate population and a budding middle-class that is as illiberal as
the elites it despises adds weight to her findings. They suggest that civic causes
such as accountability for all, community education, women empowerment and
information literacy must be prioritized to build governance capacity.
Substantive issues as opposed to inane discussions among political elites on

2Adeney, K. (2017). How to understand Pakistan’s hybrid regime: the importance of a

multidimensional continuum. Democratization, 24(1), 119–137.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1110574

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many mainstream TV talk shows. Or, even more pointless discussion on Sharia
Law, an issue Pakistanis always reject at the ballot.
The steady increase in number of cities that participate in Aurat March
demonstrations each year indicates a rise in civic consciousness. Activists such
as Ammar Ali Jan, who also teaches at Forman Christian College in Lahore, see
these demonstrations, together with the recent student solidarity and climate
change rallies in Pakistan, as a new opposition in the making. One where the
electorate will not spread red carpet for the elected. Instead it will mobilize to
demand rights as citizens of Pakistan3.
The current progressive wave in Naya Pakistan4 may have more to do with
international pressure. But the discerning activist pounces on any political
advantage that presents itself. While the millennial among them multiplies the
advantage through technology. Let’s not forget that a massive social media
campaign of Tabdeeli helped push the PTI from the fringes to the mainstream.

Muslim women challenging the status quo

Since women make up nearly half of Pakistani population, many believe that
women empowerment is a sorely needed development program. One that will
have profound ripple effects in other sectors. This is almost certain because at
present the country ranks 151st out of 153 countries on the World Economic
Forum’s global gender parity index. Faring only better than war torn Iraq and
Yemen5.
As in activism world over those who feel threatened are often beneficiaries of
status quo. Their level of offence at mere words on a placard is proportional to
their position of privilege. This partly explain why there are supporters who are
women and men on both sides of Aurat March.
Many in Pakistan are not prepared to lose their privilege. Participants in
Islamabad were pelted with stones by hardline religious groups who happened
to be hosting their own Modesty March. In the event, riot police stepped in to
contain the frenzied mob but not before several women sustained injuries6.
The new generation of Pakistani activists, unlike the traditional ‘leftists’, are not
necessarily preoccupied with the security establishment. They are concerned
with civic rights. Indeed, civic rights for citizens are difficult to provide by states
lacking the capacity to enforce rule of law.

3Najam Sethi Official. January 4, 2020. Muqaddimah |Episode 5| New decade new opposition?
[Video]. Youtube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v4D04g8kGBU.
4Naya Pakistan or New Pakistan, and Tabdeeli or Change, are campaign slogan of Imran Khan
the current prime minister of Pakistan. Khan’s party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) was an
underdog that is well regarded for mobilizing a previously apolitical young vote bank.
5 https://www.dawn.com/news/1522778
6 https://www.dawn.com/news/1539954

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A similar line of reasoning was made recently by the political scientists Francis
Fukuyama in The Atlantic7. He observes that effective response to global
challenges, such as the Coronavirus Pandemic, will be determined less by the
binary between democracy and autocracy, and more by the trust between
citizens and the state, as well as the state’s capacity to govern.
Those questioning Aurat March poster’s morality are forced to reckon with the
deafening silence every time 'Islamic slogans' are used in the name of free
speech to coerce Muslim women. More broadly, what pragmatic solutions these
critics have for Pakistan’s chronic social problems, and by extension, the Arab
world.

Poster references

Figure 1.0
Source: author.
Facts:
http://hbv-awareness.com.
https://images.dawn.com/news/1184767.
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. (2018). State of Human Rights in
2018. Lahore.

Figure 2.0
Source: public.
[@divamagazinepakistan]. (March 8, 2020). #DivaExclusive:
#auratmarch2020. [Instagram photograph]. Retrieved from
https://www.instagram.com/p/B9eMgUtpF9f/.

Figure 3.0
Source: public.
https://www.facebook.com/Hoodbhoyist/photos/a.910930622352458/25898400277948
34/?type=3&theater .

Figure 4.0
Source: author.

7https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/thing-determines-how-well-countries-
respond-coronavirus/609025/

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Facts: see Figure 1.0 facts 2 and 3.

Figure 5.0
Source: public.
https://www.facebook.com/Hoodbhoyist/photos/a.910930622352458/258983
9964461507/?type=3&theater .

For a detailed list of Aurat March demands kindly visit only verified
social media accounts:
Facebook handle: @AuratMarchKarachi
Twitter handles: @AuratMarchKHI, @AuratMarch, @AuratAzadiMarch

About the author

Ayaz Ahmed Siddiqui is a PhD candidate at the School of Communication in
Hong Kong Baptist University. He is researching on campaign messages of
mainstream opposition groups and media liberalization in emerging media
contexts such as Pakistan.

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Volume 12 (1): 72 – 81 (July 2020) Ng, PinkDot Singapore

What does the COVID-19 pandemic mean for

PinkDot Singapore?
Lynn Ng Yu Ling (June 23)

As one of Singapore’s most prominent LGBTQ social movements, PinkDot Singapore

has grown exponentially over the years. At the inaugural 2009 event, 2500
participants showed up. In 2011 this had multiplied to cross by 10.000 people. By
2014 a turnout of 26,000 people had overflowed the confines of Hong Lim Park, also
the state-sanctioned Speakers’ Corner. Since 2015 turnouts have increased to 28,000
people. In 2019 PinkDot 11 released a video to mark the movement’s tenth
anniversary. The video charted PinkDot’s humble beginnings and the persistent
efforts of local activists in garnering wider support from community members,
making international headlines and inspiring secondary movements in other cities
worldwide. As COVID-19 takes away the sheer power of a steady crowd. The
movement has drawn public attention to inter-relational work at the community
level.

PinkDot SG 2009

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PinkDot SG 2011

A sense of solidarity beyond nationalized identitarian politics

In recent years PinkDot has faced obstacles in expanding movement inclusivity with
the 2016 amendments to the Public Order Act.

“It is with profound regret for us, the organisers of PinkDot 2017, to announce that as per
recent changes to the Public Order Act rules on general assembly, only Singapore Citizens and
Permanent Residents are permitted to assemble at the Speakers’ Corner.” (PinkDot SG, 2017).

The revised legislations implemented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) were
under the premise that foreign entities should not interfere with domestic issues,
especially socio-politically controversial and sensitive ones (Tan, 2016). Until 2016
PinkDot supporters without citizenship or Permanent Residency (PR) were allowed
in the assembly square to observe the PinkDot formation, but could not be involved
in holding up placards which would count as active participation. The latest
modifications meant that the law no longer distinguished between observers and
participants, instead considered all supporters present to be part of a cause-related
assembly. The presence of any foreigners was deemed as unlawful participation, and
could result in the legal prosecution of both event organizers and participants (Ng,
2018).

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PinkDot SG 2014

Being blackmailed into choosing between complying with the rules or not having the
movement at all, for the first time ever PinkDot organizers made the painful decision
to barricade the Speakers’ Corner and conduct identity checks at the entrance, which
quadrupled the event’s operation costs. Furthermore, as per the revisions foreign
entities whose shareholder board did not comprise Singaporean citizens as a
majority were required to apply for sponsor permits (Han, 2018). Out of the thirteen
multinational conglomerate sponsors, the ten applicantswere rejected. Thankfully,
organizers scrambled to puttogether well over 100 local sponsors whose combined
contributions of more than $250 000 skyrocketed past the initial fundraising target
(Jerusalem, 2018). The impromptu responses to alleviate the ban on non-citizen
presence went further than the event itself. In a harrowing span of time, informal
networks were mobilized that drew numerous fringe events to include supporters
who could not physically be in the rally. These developments led to the PinkFest, a
series of twenty casual gatherings held over the prior two weekends. Events were
hosted not by Speakers’ Corner organizers but by individual volunteers in venues
outside Hong Lim Park, so they did not fall under the same regulations (Aw, 2018).
These get-togethers enabled many migrant laborers and Migrant Domestic Workers
(MDWs) to be involved in carnival-style hangouts and picnic gatherings among
others. Organizers themed the event of that year as “Against All Odds” (PinkDot SG,
2017).

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PinkDot SG 2017

PinkDot has been carving significant inroads in collaborating with migrant worker
collectives as a way to articulate its broader conceptualization of queerness. The
movement proclaims in loudly subtle ways that heteronormativity is not simply an
identitarian issue but a developmental one. Crucially, the state makes strange both
co-national LGBTQs and non-national migrant workers who are denied a position in
the vision of reproductive futurism, which must be upheld by the ‘basic building
block’ of a “proper family nucleus”: one man, one woman, and their offspring or
dependents (Oswin, 2014: 421). This recognition is also an attempt to move PinkDot
beyond simply advocating for LGBTQ equality in a nationalized sense, which in
Singapore usually means acknowledging non-normative sexualities for their
economic contributions, i.e. ‘pink dollars’. The almost one million work permit
holders who form the backbone of social reproductive labor for this highly successful
developmental state must be put at the centre – is argued by the PinkDot activists.
The growing number of grassroots initiatives in support of PinkDot testify to an
increasing awareness that LGBTQ and migrant worker equality cannot be reduced to
judgements of economic disposability at the expense of the humanitarian side of the
equation. PinkDot and broader queer activism cannot reduce rights campaigns to
issues of domestic economic contributions, for these are about looking at those
beside us as rightful claimants to the privileges citizens enjoy, i.e. as equal human
beings with full status.
COVID-19 has more starkly brought to the fore the unfortunate reality of “two
Singapores” - one for citizens, one for the transient labor force who perform the
back-breaking labor shunned by locals (Han, 2020). PinkDot has been making
incremental efforts to disrupt the citizen-noncitizen dichotomy at the centre of the
ruling People’s Action Party (PAP), which is proving hard to sustain in the face of
rising anti-immigrant backlash amidst this pandemic. Among numerous other
smaller groups, the more prominent ones include conservative Christian factions like
the Anglican Pentecostals headed by Dr Thio Su Mien, former Dean of Law at the
National University of Singapore (NUS). Members make it a point to show up to
every year’s PinkDot with a counter ‘Wear White’ campaign to announce their
explicitly condemnatory stance on non-heteronormative family models (Luger,
2018). They are also known patrollers of the Speakers’ Corner who loiter around its
premises, observe PinkDot’s activities and look out for the presence of non-
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citizen/PR participants, basically salvaging for any sign of violation of public

assembly rules that can be reported to state authorities. Other opposing groups
include ‘LoveSingapore’ and the ‘Singapore for Singaporeans’ campaign against
increasing immigration. Their most notable presence was in the 2013 occupation of
Hong Lim Park following the White Paper on loosening immigration policies. As the
number of COVID-19 cases in Singapore spikes unprecedentedly, public discourse on
the part of citizen netizens on official forums and social media channels reveal that
xenophobic prejudices are not uncommon, and indeed have obtained a certain
degree of social legitimacy for many.
PinkDot is non-discriminatory and non-identitarian aspirations of solidarity have
spread slowly, yet these types of relationship-building remain largely confined at the
intra-network level of activists, allies and supporters. A broad swathe of ‘Not In My
Backyard’ (NIMBY) advocates persist in airing racially motivated justifications. A
chinese forum letter received by Lianhe Zaobao, which has since been translated into
English and put online, endorses a ‘civilized citizen’ versus ‘uncivilized foreigner’
dichotomy. This author urged readers not to ascribe unnecessary blame on the
Singapore government for the outbreaks in migrant worker dormitories. The author
argues that local authorities have achieved satisfactory standards in providing decent
living conditions. But migrant workers from “backward countries” who grew up in
living environments rife with “bad personal hygiene habits'' bring these with them
wherever they go (Lee, 2020). Lianhe Zaobao’s Facebook page has garnered floods of
supportive comments and voices echoing agreement. If PinkDot has in mind a
politics of care that goes beyond identity debates, it is not enough if citizen
supporters advocate LGBTQ equality yet endorse a ‘co-national only’ agenda. The
nation-state’s developmental history of economic nationalism (Oswin, 2014), as an
offshoot of the colonial fait accompli of modern state institutions bequeathed by the
British at formal independence, is not interrogated for its legal but unjust
employment relationships with the transient labor force.

“So when we look at the situation in Singapore, I think it is important to realise and recognise
that we are dealing with two separate infections - there is one happening in the foreign worker
dormitories, where the numbers are rising sharply, and there is another one in the general
population where the numbers are more stable for now”.
(Lawrence Wong, Minister of National Development, 2020)

As media coverage of COVID-19 begins to envelop local news channels, traditional

mainstream media blames migrant workers residing in dormitories account for an
overwhelming proportion of new cases (Han, 2020). PinkDot 2020 sees this
indefinite period of physical silence as a time to quietly endorse its broader agenda of
migrant worker inclusivity. Ironically, being forced to migrate online presents some
opportunities as activist pathways are altered. The Public Order Act is preoccupied
with the use of public spaces, but does not refer to digital spaces and non-traditional
media sources, which includes social media platforms (Chua, 2014). While PinkDot
has long been aware of social media as indispensable to its emergence, given the
impossibility of uttering explicit denunciations of the state regime in open spaces, the
pertinence of this loophole has never been so poignant. Indeed, for its inaugural
event eleven years ago, PinkDot planners found that “going on social media was our

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only option” at promoting the event, for censorship regulations would never approve
it on public media platforms (Wang, 2016: 9).

Silver linings in the clouds of COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic has brought this loophole to the forefront yet again, as
social media extends to activists a virtual space with far less iron-clad rules that dress
the material world. PinkDot’s social media channels at the moment are advertising
fundraising campaigns for LGBTQ members of the migrant worker community and
calling out structural inequities of the nation-state. Most recently PinkDot promotes
Migrant Matters, a ground-up initiative which organizes COVID-19 collection drives
to deliver care packages to twenty locations. The online promotion materials
consistently hint at the unfair treatment levied onto “our migrant brothers”. PinkDot
and its grassroots allies, regardless of the categories of human rights mobilization
each organization uses, hope that these campaigns will ignite conversations that
challenge the status-quo affairs regarding migrant justice as “we collectively
contemplate and work towards the post-pandemic Singapore we want to see”. These
are hardly calls that can be announced in the Speakers’ Corner in Hong Lim Park.
Despite the alarming surge of COVID-19 infections among dormitories, the number
of discharged and recovered cases have outnumbered new cases consistently as the
effectiveness of the dormitory taskforce has begun to show. As of 29 May 2020,
Singapore has reported 33 622 cases out of which 18 294 have recovered. More than
15 000 are currently housed in isolation facilities. The death toll stands at 23 and
consists of mainly elderly patients above the age of 65 who had succumbed to
complications of the virus. At the current time of writing, Singapore’s healthcare and
treatment facilities continue to operate with spare capacity. Testing regimes in both
the dormitory and non-dormitory population have continuously demonstrated a
capacity well above OECD averages, while hospitals still have vacant Intensive Care
Unit (ICU) places reserved for the most critical cases. These are feats of
exceptionality that point to the Singapore government’s extraordinary capacity for
enforcing the rule of law, to the extent that there is the will to do so.
International observers including WHO officers have rightly pointed out that
Singapore possesses the medical capacity to handle exponential surges. Yet the surge
among migrant workers reminds us that we have a long way to go when it comes to
recognizing them as not machines or robots but human beings with the same basic
needs that we do. That Singapore displays a remarkably low death rate despite being
the most infected Asian nation outside of China and India does not exempt us from
the humanistic side of the equation. When asked by a nominated member of
parliament whether the government would apologise to migrant workers, the
minister of Manpower answered that she had come across “not one single migrant
worker himself that has demanded an apology”.
Local sociologists like Daniel Goh (2019) have pointed out long ago that the
asymmetrical power relationship between employers of work permit holders and
employees means that often the latter does not find it in their interests to voice out
concerns about working rights violations, that is if they were even made aware of
them in the first place. The Employment Sponsorship system that governs the inflow
of ‘unskilled’ workers effectively ties the residential conditions in the host destination
to the generosity of the employer, who is able to repatriate workers anytime during

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the duration of the contract. Given that most workers are indebted to placement
agencies who charge hefty fees, while some have taken numerous loans from family
and friends, demanding an apology from the state and the employers it protects is
surely not in their favor as they risk unemployment which only exacerbates the
situation of financial precarity for their own families.
PinkDot Singapore has had in mind for a long time the inequities in the work permit
regime that have suddenly received attention from the Singaporean public, even if for
mainly economic reasons. Some immigrant-heavy industries have asked the
government to reconsider its plan of reducing imported labor flows, because
Singapore’s employment composition has taken on a certain irreversible degree of
reliance on foreign labor to perform the manual aspects of value creation. Employers
acknowledge the need for industrial restructuring by making “3D” (dirty, dangerous,
degrading) sectors employable and attractive for local graduates, however this shift
cannot happen overnight. Indeed, local taskforces are devoting an unprecedented
amount of resources, time and effort into the migrant worker population which have
until now been on the peripheries, out of sight and out of mind. The demand for safe
social distancing has resulted in the crowding out of purpose-built dormitories, and
the rehousing of workers into the heartlands of the city including hotel rooms, public
housing blocks, empty carparks, cruise ships and Expo Halls with more to come. The
suggestion of offshore dormitories, as some online commentators have proposed, not
only assumes that the interests of migrant workers and the general community can
be separated, but also do not reflect well on the spirit of national treatment.
To a certain degree, PinkDot and its allies might be grateful that COVID-19 has
forced these adjustments to migrant worker accommodation and brought them into
the spotlight of heated debate. The challenge for community solidarity then is
learning how to decouple the actions we take for migrant workers from questions of
economic disposability, such that we learn to see these long-term adjustments not as
a question of “For how long will this inconvenience us?”

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PinkDot SG 2019

This year on 27 June, PinkDot 12 invites members of the community to light up in

pink their homes and workplaces, as well as share pictures of small gatherings with
close ones (PinkDot SG, 2020). Livestreams of performances and interactive
discussions will be held in absence of the human PinkDot. For an indefinite period of
time PinkDot and other social movements worldwide will not be able to enjoy the
comfort of close physical proximity with familiar allies. But on an individual level,
PinkDot and its allies will soldier on with the much needed community work behind
the scenes that the preoccupation with organizing massive assemblies has not left
much energy for. This includes starting difficult conversations with close
acquaintances, community members and even within our households. In the words
of one ambassador: “We are ready to start difficult conversations even with people
who don’t agree with the values that we stand for. We need to keep sharing our
stories and keep the conversation going!”

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References
Aw, C. W. (2018). Pink Dot-related events two weeks prior to July 21 rally open to all
to attend, including foreigners. Last accessed 15 April 2020:
https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/pink-dot-related-events-two-weeks-prior-
to-july-21-rally-open-to-all-to-attend-including
Chua, L. (2014). Mobilizing Gay Singapore. USA: Temple University Press.
Goh, D. P. (2019). Super-diversity and the bio-politics of migrant worker exclusion in
Singapore. Identities, 26(3), 356-373.
Han, K. (2018). Keep Calm And Carry On: How Singapore's leaders use the gospel of
business to stifle dissent. World Policy Journal, 35(1), 84-90.
Han, K. (2020). Singapore’s new covid-19 cases reveal the country’s two very
different realities. Last accessed 16 April 2020:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/16/singapores-new-covid-19-
cases-reveal-countrys-two-very-different-realities/#comments-wrapper
Jerusalem, P. (2018). Why the Pink Dot and LGBTIQ Movement in Singapore is
Ready. Last accessed 19 April 2020: https://outrightinternational.org/content/why-
pink-dot-and-lgbtiq-movement-singapore-ready
Lee, J. (2020). Covid-19 outbreak in dorms due to migrant workers' poor hygiene &
bad habits: Zaobao forum letter. Last accessed 16 April 2020:
https://mothership.sg/2020/04/migrant-workers-zaobao-
letter/?fbclid=IwAR3KA9CgONgsC47-
CdhV7GQOwdWURPy9xGAattcmsRF8OKe324ehZR2hFsk
Ng, E. (2018). LGBT Advocacy and Transnational Funding in Singapore and
Malaysia. Development and Change, 49(4), 1093-1114.
Obendorf, S. (2013). A few respectable steps behind the world? Gay and lesbian
rights in contemporary Singapore. In: Lennox, C. and Waites, M. Human rights,
sexual orientation and gender identity in the commonwealth: Struggles for
decriminalisation and change. London: Institute of Historical Research. Pp. 231-
260.
Oswin, N. (2014). Queer time in global city Singapore: Neoliberal futures and the
‘freedom to love’. Sexualities, 17(4), 412-433.
Pink Dot SG. (2017). ANNOUNCEMENT ON SPEAKERS’ CORNER RESTRICTIONS
FOR PINK DOT SG 2017. Last accessed 15 April 2020:
https://pinkdot.sg/2017/05/announcement-on-speakers-corner-restrictions-for-
pink-dot-sg-2017/
Pink Dot SG. (2019). [Video] Pink Dot 11: Standing Together Against Discrimination.
Last accessed 20 April 2020: https://pinkdot.sg/2019/06/video-pink-dot-11-
standing-together-against-discrimination/
Pink Dot SG. (2020). Pink Dot 12: Covid-19 update. Last accessed 20 April 2020:
https://pinkdot.sg/2020/03/pink-dot-12-covid-19-update/
Tan, C. (2016). A ‘Great Affective Divide’: How Gay Singaporeans Overcome Their
Double Alienation. Anthropological Forum. 26(1), 17-36.

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Wong, L. (2020). Remarks by Minister Lawrence Wong, Co-chair of the Multi-

Ministry Taskforce on COVID-19, at Press Conference on COVID-19 at National
Press Centre on 9 April 2020. Last accessed 20 April 2020:
https://www.sgpc.gov.sg/sgpcmedia/media_releases/mnd/speech/S-20200409-
1/attachment/Remarks%20by%20Minister%20Lawrence%20Wong%20at%209%20
Apr%20Press%20Conference%20on%20COVID-19%20final.pdf

About the author

Lynn Ng Yu Ling is an international graduate student from Singapore doing a PhD in
Political Science at the University of Victoria (UVic). Her main interests are around
Migrant Domestic Worker (MDW) rights advocacy, but also how these cannot be
separated from other movements that use different words for their activism.

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Vol 12 (1): 82 – 87 (July 2020) Ventura Alfaro, Feminist solidarity in Mexico

Feminist solidarity networks have multiplied

since the COVID-19 outbreak in Mexico
María José Ventura Alfaro (18th May 2020)

Abstract
Prior to COVID-19, the feminist movement in Mexico was at its strongest. On
the 8th of March for international women's day, tens of thousands of women
in the capital alone went out onto the streets to protest against the daily
violence, harassment, and abuse that they have suffered for decades on end.
Then the COVID-19 pandemic broke out. This essay explores how women’s
collectives have not only continued their struggles by use of the virtual world
but they have expanded their reach within the community. Independent
feminist collectives have created solidarity networks across the country to
attempt to tackle the gravest socioeconomic consequences of the virus at the
local level: food, medicine, and other essential product shortages, amidst the
rise in domestic and family violence.

Keywords:
COVID-19; Mexico; Feminism; Social Movement; Violence Against Women

Introduction
“Women, welcome to your revolution” read one of the thousands of signs on the
International Women’s Day protest in the Mexican capital. There, the women’s
movement like those in Chile, Argentina, and many other Latin American
countries, has been building up momentum during this past year leading up to
mass demonstrations on the 8th March 2020. Tens of thousands of women
went out onto the streets not only to celebrate International Women’s Day but
to protest against the violence, harassment, and abuse that have become part of
their reality1. Mexican women took back the streets, reclaiming public space as
their own and feeling safe for once in each other’s company. They organised
workshops, seminars, reading groups, and often simply gatherings to build
community amongst women. Women’s collectives grew exponentially in the last
year, with the capital alone hosting over 100 feminist organisations. And just
when the movement was at its strongest, the coronavirus outbreak hit. Already
on International Women’s Day, the government warned against massive public
gatherings, and yet this did not dissuade the activists to cancel or postpone the

1Mary Beth Sheridan, "Tens of thousands of Mexican women protest ‘femicide,’ gender-based
violence", The Washington Post, 9 March 2020.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/mexico-international-womens-day-
march-femicide-strike/2020/03/08/1ca6167c-6153-11ea-8a8e-5c5336b32760_story.html

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march. Only two weeks later, the pandemic could no longer be ignored.
Businesses closed down. Restaurants emptied out. Companies commenced
implementing home office strategies. People avoided going out onto the streets.
Marches and protests eventually died out. The health crisis was rampant.
Coronavirus took precedent on the national agenda, and social issues were put
aside. Some would assume this translated into the breakage or dissipation of the
feminist movement. This was not the case. The fight continues, indoors.
In this short essay I explore both the increasing domestic and feminicide
violence Mexican women face as a result of the global pandemic contingency
strategies, as well as the everyday resistance embodied by feminist collectives in
the shape of solidarity networks across the country. I suggest that not only
women’s movements have continued mobilising ‘virtually’ but they have in fact
expanded, capitalising on the new emergencies brought about by the outbreak
of Covid-19.

Coronavirus in Mexico: A quick overview

As of mid-May 2020, Mexico has almost 50,000 confirmed cases of COVID-19
with over 5,000 deaths. The figures are relatively low in comparison with other
countries. Testing, however, continues to be scarce and there is wide
contestation to the accuracy of official statistics. The government response to
the coronavirus pandemic has been highly criticised as the MORENA party
president, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (popularly known as AMLO),
continued to underestimate the fast approaching health crisis in the early days
of the outbreak, dissuading people from adhering to social distancing rules
suggested by health officials and, in the subsequent weeks, offering slow and
disparate government action. Coronavirus lockdown measures commenced on
the 23rd of March known as “Phase 2” which was originally meant to be in place
until April 30th. These have now been extended until at least the end of May
with schools and businesses aiming to reopen shortly before June 1.

The other growing pandemic:

Feminicide and domestic violence
Prior to the coronavirus outbreak, gender and domestic violence as well as
feminicide rates were already on the rise in Mexico. 63 percent of Mexican
women over the age of 15 report having experienced violence (physical,
psychological, sexual or economic) during their lifetime2. Official statistics show
how, in the past decade, female murder rates have almost doubled3 with 3,142

2Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI). 2013. “Panorama de violencia contra las
mujeres en México”. Aguascalientes: INEGI.
http://internet.contenidos.inegi.org.mx/contenidos/productos/prod_serv/contenidos/espanol/
bvinegi/productos/estudios/sociodemografico/mujeresrural/2011/702825048327.pdf
3SEGOB, INMUJERES, UN Women. 2016. “La Violencia Feminicida en México:
Aproximaciones y Tendencias 1985-2014”, México: UN Women. https://www2.unwomen.org/-

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women and girls killed in 2019 alone. As it is the case in much of the world,
contingency and self-isolating measures to stop the spread of the coronavirus
have resulted in a rise of domestic violence reports and feminicide rates.
On a press release, feminist civil society Equis Justicia as well as Amnesty
International and the National Shelter Network highlight the increasing
violence Mexican women are facing as a result of the imposed quarantine and
call on the governement to put in place preventative and protective strategies to
aid this parallel human rights crisis4. Since the start of quarantine, there have
been a total of 163 feminicides reported5. The National Shelter Network reports
that, from the 23rd March, when ‘Phase 2’ officially commenced, domestic
violence helpline calls grew by 60% (40,910 calls) with their 69 shelters being
between 80-110% of their capacity nationwide6. Feminicide and domestic
violence rates grow exponentially as the quarantine prevails. Contingency
measures reveal to the public eye how some women are at their most vulnerable
in their own houses, unable to escape their abuser. For victims of domestic
violence, having to adhere to social distancing measures translates into a lack of
access to their usual support network. Domestic violence has never been seen
more clearly as a public health issue, calling out for a strong policy response and
action from the government. However, government action to combat this
growing crisis has been lacking and almost non-existent, with many Public
Ministries refusing to record reports of domestic violence as services and
employees stop working due to the quarantine. No clear policy guidelines has
yet been published on how this rise in domestic violence will be addressed by
the government, with officials merely urging women to call 911 if an incident
occurs. This refusal to acknowledge the aggravating consequences lockdown
measures have on gender violence makes evident a much larger problem of
patriarchal violence within the very establishment. The coronavirus outbreak
becomes in this instance a reflector and aggravator of the pre-existing social,
economic and political gendered violence. In a country where violence against
women is systemic and institutionalised, activist groups become the main safety
network for many women.

/media/field%20office%20mexico/documentos/publicaciones/2016/02/violencia%20feminicid
a%20en%20m%C3%A9xico%20aproximaciones%20y%20tendencias%201985_2014.pdf?la=es
&vs=4527
4Monserrat Aguirre. "Ni la pandemia detiene los feminicidios en Mexico". Reporte Indigo, 11
April 2020. https://www.reporteindigo.com/reporte/ni-la-pandemia-detiene-los-feminicidios-
en-mexico/
5TelesurTV. "Reportan 163 feminicidios en México durante cuarentena". 24 April 2020.
https://www.telesurtv.net/news/mexico-aumento-feminicidios-durante-cuarentena-
coronavirus-20200424-0003.html
6 Oscar Lopez and Christine Murray. "Murders of women in Mexico rise amid fears of lockdown
violence". Reuters, 27 April 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-women-
violence-trfn/murders-of-women-in-mexico-rise-amid-fears-of-lockdown-violence-
idUSKCN22930V

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The resilience of the feminist movement

In the face of the COVID-19 self-isolation restrictions and embodying one of the
most characteristic elements of the 4th feminist wave, women’s collectives and
civil societies have adapted their fight to the virtual world. Online workshops,
reading groups, and seminars are hosted weekly by different organisations to
continue the ongoing discussions around violence, sexual harassment, job
conditions, gender stereotypes, reproductive rights, and many other issues that
affect women in their everyday lives. Feminist collectives, such as the hacktivist
group Luchadoras, coordinate discussions and debates on how the measures
implemented to control the pandemic simultaneously reflect and aggravate
socio-economic, political, geographic and gender inequalities. Notwithstanding
the social distancing experience, emotional bonds are re-created by sharing life
stories, testimonies of violence, emotions, and feelings about the quarantine,
building community in the shape of new collective digital memory. The
collectives’ work, however, does not limit itself to the virtual, academic or
modern world, it also utilises the net as an organisational tool. Feminist
collectives have made used of social media platforms during the pandemic to
help provide basic rights to vulnerable women by tackling two main aspects of
the social crisis: domestic violence and economic insecurity.

Domestic violence networks

Mexican feminist collectives have focussed on holding the government
accountable for their refusal to acknowledge the deepening issue of domestic
and feminicide violence during quarantine7. This is crucial in a setting where the
country’s president denies and refutes the accuracy of reports and statistics
brought forward by civic societies and is endemic of a much larger issue: a
violent patriarchal state. As a response to the last president’s assertion that
domestic violence rates have not gone up during quarantine, the hashtags
#nosotrastenemosotrosdatos (In spanish, “we have other data”) became viral.
Feminist collectives called out for a recognision of the issue and the need for
action. As a way to denounce this violence and hold the government
accountable, the feminist collective CruzesxRojas created a video to visibilise the
violence experienced by Mexican women as a result of the quarantine 8.
The government’s inactivity has shown how violence against women is
reproduced by the very State responsible for protecting them. Mexican women
have resolved to become their own protectors. Feminist organisations have
created support networks for victims of domestic violence whose situation
worsens by contingency restrictions. "From the very start of the pandemic

7 Infobae. "Organizaciones, activistas y legisladoras refutaron comentario de AMLO sobre

“llamadas falsas" por violencia de género". 16 May 2020.
https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2020/05/16/organizaciones-activistas-y-
legisladoras-refutaron-comentario-de-amlo-sobre-llamadas-falsas-por-violencia-de-genero/
8 Crucesxrosas. https://www.crucesxrosas.com/

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women started creating solidarity networks. From day one" comments

Monserrat Ibarra, a feminist activist who volunteers as part of the informal
domestic violence helpline network. These networks are not organised by
governmental bodies or NGOs, but by small feminist collectives who come
together through social media. They keep close contact with victims of domestic
violence, often calling them on a daily basis. For example, Las del aquelarre
feminista, a Mexico City-based feminist collective have opened their own
emotional support phone line for victims of domestic violence. Professional
therapists have volunteered to be part of this network pro bono9. Many feminist
collective have put forward “secret codes” that can be used by victims of
domestic violence were they unable to contact 911 directly. In which case, one of
the volunteers will make the call instead.

Food security networks

Much of Mexico's informal labour force is made out of female domestic workers,
home carers, and street food vendors. In a country where most people produce
just enough to feed their family on a day-to-day basis, quarantine and
contingency measures have disastrous socio-economic consequences. The
Government has suggested some form of economic relief may take place in the
near future for banks and corporations, but the informal worker is forgotten in
this scheme. As a response to growing economic insecurity, feminist collectives
commenced organising soup kitchens as well as food and basic products supply
networks for those most affected by the crisis. These activities are organised via
social media where feminist colectives advertise the need for donating food,
medicine and other basic products for vulnerable citizens in precarious work
conditions. The activists are often community members who offer their own
private house to operate and distribute these goods. Therefore, although these
operations occur country wide, they are often at a local, small scale.
In Toluca, for example, already with the 2009 H1N1, the feminist collective
Mujeres Trans Famosas began providing meals to trans sex workers whose
income and livelihoods became most affected by contingency measures such as
the closure of hotels10. The collective have now expanded their reach and, during
the COVID-19 outbreak, supply over 70 meals on a daily basis to those citizens
who are often forgotten and invisibilised but most affected by the pandemic: sex
workers, illegal or informal workers, homeless people, drug addicts. Crianza
feminista, another collective based in Mexico City, has also been providing over
40 daily meals to female workers either unemployed or in precarious

9Las del Aquelarre. “Apoyo telefónico para mujeres en crisis” 11 April 2020.
https://www.instagram.com/p/B-
1VVFODt2F/?igshid=166er7u0ipzal&fbclid=IwAR3qCE4j12IeZ6U7bgl6exmELvYXfbeSF04TUz
4JD25DfpSz3fRlbpOlC0I
10Rodrigo Estrada. "Las Famosas y su comedor sin discriminación". 23 April 2020.
https://www.am.com.mx/hidalgo/opinion/Las-Famosas-y-su-comedor-sin-discriminacion-
20200423-0044.html

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conditions, and have stocked up food cupboards for 22 families that should last
them a full month. Their operation has now stopped as the government imposed
quarantine is to end. Another popular activity that is taking place as a way to
supply within the community was suggested by the feminist collective Brujas
Feministas who encourage barter-trading, or as they call it “feminist trading”11,
in social media platforms. Through the platform, women can exchange services
and products they wish to supply. For instance, therapists can provide a consult
and in return receive some clothes, food or artisanal goods. The focus of this
trade is on building community and sorority, helping those most vulnerable in
the face of the pandemic, as opposed to making profit. The collective is based in
Mexico City but the operation is taking place country-wide.

Conclusion
The feminist movement in Mexico appears not only to be resilient to the Covid-
19 outbreak but also thrives through solidarity. The movement presents the two
most iconic charcateristics of the 4th Feminist wave: it is underlied by an
inclusive, intersectional feminist epistemology and it utilises social media
platforms and the web as their main organisational tool, now accentuated by the
quarantine. Despite having to deal with ongoing health, economic, emotional
and social adversities, the Mexican feminist collectives are continuing
expanding their work. Their means have changed, but their message continues
to be the same: we are stronger together.

About the author

María José Ventura Alfaro is an ESRC-funded PhD candidate in the field of
Development Studies in the Department of Social and Policy Sciences, at the
University of Bath. Her research offers a feminist and decolonial critique of
violence against women and social movements’ action in contemporary Mexico.

Mercedes Matz. "Trueque Feminista: Mujeres se organizan para generar red de apoyo ante
11

Covid-19". 30 April 2020. https://www.somoselmedio.com/2020/04/30/trueque-feminista-

mujeres-se-organizan-para-generar-red-de-apoyo-ante-covid-19/

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Queer Berlin and the Covid-19 crisis:

a politics of contact and ethics of care
Ben Trott (16th June 2020)

In his 1989 essay “Mourning and Militancy”, the critic and curator Douglas
Crimp (1989, 11) wrote about how, with the onset of the AIDS crisis, gay men
not only came to mourn the loss of friends and lovers but also the loss of
pleasures, specifically of “uninhibited and unprotected sex”. He noted that to
state this openly would “hardly solicit solidarity, even tolerance”; with tolerance
itself, he argued, just another albeit more refined form of condemnation, and
“[o]ur pleasures were never tolerated anyway; we took them. And now we must
mourn them” (Crimp 1989, 11). The current Covid-19 pandemic is not an
equivalent to HIV/AIDS, not least, as João Florêncio (2020) reminds us, in
terms of the social stigma attached nor the time it has taken governments and
scientific bodies to respond. But for many queer and LGBT people, mixed up
with a mourning of lives lost to Covid-19 – and a fearful anticipation of those
that may still yet be lost to the virus – there is once more a kind of sadness at
the loss of certain queer forms of sociality; and a growing anxiety about when,
perhaps even whether, they might return. This is not necessarily related to the
loss of queer sexual pleasures (at least, not exclusively), but rather to the
looming threat of losing ways of encountering others that emerged out of how
intolerable their absence was.
Contemporary queer socialities – including the friendship networks and the
alternative modes of community and kin-making that can form in and around
bars, clubs and other spaces – are partly the product of histories of banishment
from the family (and from the social and political institution of the family),
shared experiences of sexual stigma, a need to escape from the policing of
gender, and a desire for sanctuary from threats of homo- and trans-phobic
violence.1 (These are the “safe spaces” that it is so fashionable to mock today,
particularly among those who have never needed them.) For those who have
never needed a gay bar, a queer club, a community of drag and other artists, it is
– I imagine – easy to underestimate what it means to lose these things
(temporarily, hopefully); and to lose them in a moment of real crisis. My focus
in this paper is on queer Berlin, but the fear of permanently losing queer
institutions and infrastructure feels well-founded, given the closure already of
San Francisco’s oldest gay bar, The Stud (founded in 1966), as a result of
revenues lost in the current pandemic (CBS News 2020).

1I am drawing here on Donna J. Haraway’s (2016, 102-103) discussion of “making-kin” which

attempts “to make ‘kin’ mean something other/more than entities tied by ancestry or
genealogy.” She writes: “I was moved in college by Shakespeare’s punning between kin and kind
– the kindest were not necessarily kin as family; making kin and making kind (as category, care,
relatives without ties by birth, lateral ties, lots of other echoes) stretch the imagination and can
change the story” (Haraway 2016: 103).

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To be sure, just as it is not only gay men who have suffered, mourned, and died
in the ongoing AIDS epidemic – and it is very much ongoing: 770,000 lives
were lost to AIDS-related illnesses worldwide in 2018 (UN AIDS 2019) – it is
clearly not queer and LGBT people alone whose lives are currently missing
important forms of community and conviviality. Moreover, degrees of isolation
from networks of mutual care and kin-making, not to mention levels of
exposure to risk of infection, illness and death, are very unevenly distributed;
both within and beyond these milieus. Yet there are aspects of the Covid-19
crisis that pose particular challenges and threats to queer and LGBT people.
I will address some of these challenges and threats here, and particularly those
posed to queer infrastructures and the forms of encounter and unforeseen
contact that they can facilitate (among a number of other important material,
political and aesthetic functions). I will then turn to some of the forms of care
that have been developed by queer and LGBT (sub-)cultures, institutions and
communities in Berlin amidst the current pandemic, before making a case for
embedding the urgently needed defence of queer spaces and socialities within
broader social movements and struggles for the right to the (queer) city.

Gay stigma
Despite important differences, the effects and consequences of the coronavirus
cannot be entirely separated from those of earlier (and ongoing) epidemics. If it
had not been the Trompete nightclub in Berlin’s Mitte district, for instance, but
rather one of the many dark rooms and cruising spaces found in the city’s gay
clubs that had become one of the early infection “hotspots”, it is very easy to
imagine how queer people could quickly have been again cast as particularly
dangerous vectors of transmission – and in ways that did not happen with, say,
the police after the Berliner Zeitung reported several officers had been infected
while on a night out at the club (Schütze 2020).2
Berlin has a deserved reputation for sexual tolerance but, as in the country as a
whole, forms of stigma are easy to find, particularly where health is concerned.
Germany’s comparatively soft lockdown, imposed incrementally throughout the
course of mid- to late-March, saw the shutting of schools and other public
buildings often used for blood donation, followed by social distancing measures
and an encouragement to stay at home. Hospitals quickly expressed concern
about blood shortages and by mid-May reserves in Berlin and the surrounding
state of Brandenburg had fallen to less than that required for the average day
(Kögel 2020 and DPA 2020a). And yet the country’s ruling coalition of Social
and Christian Democrats (the SPD and the CDU/CSU) have reaffirmed their
commitment to regulations preventing men who have sex with men (MSM)

2 A spokesperson for the Ministry of Health in South Korea has described the “criticism and
hatred” that was directed toward some of those who became infected at gay clubs in Seoul’s
Itaewon neighborhood after the easing of social distancing regulations in the city in early-May,
and following attention to the cluster of infections by conservative and religious media (Ryall
2020).

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from donating blood (unless they have abstained from sex for at least 12
months) (Warnecke 2020). Gay sex continues to be defined as risky, then; even
when it takes place within monogamous state-sanctioned marriage, and despite
the ability to effectively test for HIV and other sexually transmitted infections.

Paradoxes of queer liberalism

Recent years have seen a significant growth in LGBT cultural visibility and
representation in Germany, with 2019 seeing the launch of television shows
from Queens of Drag (inspired by RuPaul’s Drag Race), Prince Charming (a
gay version of The Bachelor), and Queer 4 You (based on Queer Eye). Greater
legal equality has also been achieved, with both adoption and marriage rights
granted to same-sex couples in 2017. And yet, as has been the case elsewhere in
world, increased visibility and more formal equality have coincided with a rise
in homo- and trans-phobic violence (or at least in their reporting), including in
Berlin (DPA 2020b). It has also coincided with an international rise of far-right
groups and parties like the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD).3
The shutting down of much public and commercial life in response to Covid-19
had the desired (and in many ways desirable) effect of drastically reducing the
number of people out and about in the city, particularly in late-March and April.
However, even before the streets temporarily emptied of many of those who
might be able to help deter or prevent homo- and trans-phobic violence and
harassment, a survey by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights
(FRA) (2020, 50) had found that in Germany, 24% of respondents “often” or
“always” “avoid certain places or locations for fear of being assaulted,
threatened or harassed due to being LGBTI”. 36% reported having been
harassed in the previous 12-months (European Union Agency for Fundamental
Rights 2020, 44). The streets and public life can be more dangerous for queer
and trans people, then. But not everyone has the “luxury” of being able to stay
safe at home either. This is most obviously the case, first, for those working in
essential jobs (namely, those professions suddenly recognized as
“systemrelevant”, even if they are often highly precarious and poorly paid) and
second, the homeless, of whom there were at least 1,976 in Berlin as of January
2020 (ZEIT ONLINE 2020a). Official statistics about queer and trans
homelessness are not gathered in Germany, but it seems safe to assume that, as
in those places like the UK where data is collected, they are over-represented
among this group.4 The safety of staying at home is also contingent for queer
and trans people living in shared accommodation, as well as those too young or
without the financial means to leave their family homes. There are accounts of
LGBTI refugees in shared accommodation being subjected to homo- and trans-

3For a critique of forms of “queer liberalism” which merge increased legal protections for gay
and lesbian domesticity with (mediatic celebrations of) depoliticised queer consumer lifestyles,
and of the related phenomenon of “homo-normativity” in a context of ascendant nationalism,
see David Eng with Jack Halberstam and José Esteban Muñoz (2005, 10-15).
4 On LGBT homelessness in the UK, see the Albert Kennedy Trust: www.akt.org.uk

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phobic violence, including by those employed there; as well as suggestions that,

amidst the Covid-19 pandemic, it has become more difficult to access non-Covid
related medication and medical treatment (LSVD 2020). While schools and
other environments can often be inhospitable to young queer and trans people,
so can the family home. Across the EU, among those who understand
themselves as LGBTI, only 5% of 15- to 17-year-olds describe themselves as
being “very open” (and only 12% of 18- to 24-year-olds) (European Union
Agency for Fundamental Rights 2020, 23).
Even many of those living in stable and secure housing, and free from
immediate threats of violence and harassment, have found themselves more cut
off from important forms of support, solidarity and sociality. While many
organisations have made very impressive efforts to continue providing
counselling, advice and other services amidst the pandemic, some of these have
had to be restricted.5 And accessing some in-person support has become more
difficult, particularly for those especially at risk from Covid-19, including older
people, the immunocompromised, and the chronically ill. In Berlin, a number of
queer and LGBT initiatives have formed to support those unable to easily leave
their homes. By 19 March, only 17 days after the first known coronavirus case in
Berlin, 800 people had already signed up to support “an ad hoc relief line for
queers, womxn and otherwise marginalized people in Berlin” established by
Karada House, a queer art space.6 It’s aim has been to run errands and
shopping trips, pre-cook and deliver meals, offer financial support, and match
people with others to talk with. A neighbourhood support project for older
lesbians, lesbians with disabilities, those living alone, and others in need of
support has also been set up by Rad und Tat (RuT), an organisation based in the
city’s Neukölln district.7
The home itself is also in the process of undergoing a series of transformations
amidst the pandemic, as Paul B. Preciado (2020) has recently argued. Isolation,
alienation, and processes of de-collectivization are all at stake when the home is
not just turned into a space of confinement, as Michel Foucault showed was the
case with the plague of the 18th century, but also when it becomes – as is
increasingly the case for many – a site of “tele-consumption and tele-

5To cite just two examples of projects that have continued to deliver important services:
Checkpoint BLN (https://checkpoint-bln.de/) has been providing sexual health support for gay
and bisexual men as well as for trans and intersex people and GLADT (www.gladt.de), an
LGBTIQ black, indigenous and person of color organisation, has been providing counselling and
other services via telephone, online chat and video.
6See the Karda House website: https://karada-house.de/2020/03/28/queer-relief-for-corvid-
19/
7The 16 April, 2020, the Queerspiegel e-newsletter published by the daily Tagesspiegel
newspaper included an interview by Nadine Lange interview with Gabriele Michalak of RuT. For
more, see: https://rut-berlin.de/nachbarschaftshilfe/

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production” as well as a “surveillance pod” (Preciado 2020).8 Just as Preciado

(2020) suggests, some social and political forces will no doubt attempt to
instrumentalise Covid-19 as a means of intensifying individualization, refining
techniques for the distance management of immaterial forms of labour, and
continuing to distribute vulnerability to premature death along racialized,
gendered and class lines. As such, he is surely right to argue that our times of
(relative) confinement could be well-spent learning “to de-alienate ourselves”,
not least by studying “the tradition of struggle and resistance among racial and
sexual minority cultures that have helped us survive until now” (Preciado
2020). It is also crucial, of course, to study and invest ourselves in those forms
of collectivity and de-individualisation that persist, or which are emerging from
within the current crisis.

Caring about queer infrastructure

The sadness and anxiety around the threatened loss of queer socialities relates
in large part to the danger currently posed to queer infrastructure. Berlin is
famous for its nightlife; a nightlife that can famously spill over into daylight, or
sprawl out across a whole weekend. But for years now – and despite the
significant, well-documented contribution it makes to the city’s economy – it
has been placed at risk by gentrification, a housing boom, and property
development.9 In a 2019 report, the city’s Club Commission (2019, 26), which
brings together club, party and event organisers and their supporters, showed
that what their members most wanted from politicians – even more than
greater financial support and fewer regulations – was protection from the very
real threat of being forced to move. Around 100 clubs have had to close in the
last 10 years, with 25 more currently under threat (Connolly 2020); many of
them hosts to LGBT and queer events. In January of this year, hundreds joined
a demonstration after the electronic music club Griessmühle, home to the cult
queer CockTail d’Amore party, lost its tenancy in a venue next to the Neukölln
Ship Canal (it will be replaced by an office block). Several bars have recently
faced the threat of eviction too: from Hafen, an almost 30-year-old institution in
the city’s traditional gay neighbourhood of Schöneberg, through to the much
newer queer café and beer garden, Südblock at Kottbusser Tor in Kreuzberg
(Siegessäule 2019 and Joswig 2020). What was thus already a very precarious
situation has been significantly exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic. In an
international survey carried out by the Gay Romeo dating website, it was users

8 In describing the shifts in biopolitical techniques addressed to the domestic sphere in the
Covid-19 crisis, Preciado (20202) writes: “The domestic space henceforth exists as a point in a
zone of cybersurveillance, an identifiable place on a Google map, an image that is recognized by
a drone.”
9According to research carried out by the Berlin Club Commission, in 2017 the estimated gross
turnover of the city’s club and event scene was €168 million, with an additional €48 million
estimated to be generated indirectly, through advertising, gastronomy, the music industry, etc.
(Club Commission 2019, 28).

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in Germany who expressed most concern (46% of respondents) about the

economic impact of Covid-19 on the gay scene.10 In Berlin, bars are currently
reopening, but with – albeit understandable – restrictions that will not only
challenge their economic viability but also their capacity to function as spaces of
encounter and unforeseen connection and contact.11 Clubs look likely to remain
largely closed, at least for much of the rest of the year.
Queer and LGBT bars, clubs and other social spaces serve numerous functions,
including but not limited to the facilitation of queer socialities and forms of
“contact” (my primary focus here). First, they provide income for queer and
LGBT people in a world where many still experience homo- and trans-phobic
discrimination at work.12 The Neukölln-based club SchwuZ (short for
Schwulenzentrum, or Gay Centre) employs around 100 people as well as 300
freelancers: DJs, technicians, and others.13 ://about blank, a club located in
Friedrichshain, and which hosts various queer, feminist, anti-racist and anti-
fascist events, also employs around 100 people; with event organisers, artists,
performers and others also reliant on the venue for an income. It is a collectively
organised co-operative with what it describes as a “solidary economic and
feminist self-conception”.14 SchwuZ is a registered association (eingetragener
Verein), rather than a profit-making company owned by a private individual. In
total, around 9,000 people are employed by clubs in Berlin (not all of them
queer or LGBT of course) (Club Commission 2019, 30).
Second, established queer and LGBT institutions – SchwuZ was set up in 1977 –
serve as sites for political debate and for practical solidarity with contemporary
social movements, but they can also provide a connection to histories of social
and political struggle. The club is Germany’s oldest existing queer cultural
institution, set up by those surrounding Homosexuellen Aktion West Berlin
(HAW), a gay liberation group. It was created not just as a nightlife space, but as
a community and activist centre: it established a “pink telephone” support
service, provided space for a gay choir and a youth organisation, and a meeting
space for campaigning groups – including, later, those organizing a response to
the AIDS crisis (Kraushaar 2017). For several years, it shared a building with the

10For details of the survey, see: https://www.planetromeo.com/en/blog/romeos-in-lockdown-

survey-results/
11Bars will only be permitted to serve customers seated at tables, rather than standing or sat at
the bar.
1223% of survey respondents in Germany reported having felt discriminated against at work in
the previous 12 months (2% above the EU average), and 11% felt discriminated against during
this period while looking for work (1% above the EU average) (European Union Agency for
Fundamental Rights 2020, 32-33).
13 This information is taken from the SchwuZ website. See: www.schwuz.de
14This information is taken from the page raising funds for ://about blank. See:
https://www.startnext.com/whatever-you-take?fbclid=IwAR3Lhrm_mQy1Wwmltv2-
Z7hNYH2fBaUcdv3NIdC4zLz2UDdliRFRm4x8HGQ For more about ://about blank, see:
http://aboutparty.net

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city’s Schwules Museum* (Gay Museum) and it was the place where in 1984 the
city’s free gay (now explicitly queer) magazine Siegessäule was born.15 Like
other such publications, Siegessäule includes an event listing, featuring
everything from support group meetings, theatre, dance and opera
programming, over political discussions and demonstrations, through to club
nights, drag shows and sex parties. The quality and scope of its queer cultural
and political commentary and debate marks it out from many other free LGBT
city magazines, however. For instance, the April 2020 issue not only included
coverage of Covid-19 but also: the “LGBT free zones” being created in Poland;
restrictions on blood donation by MSM in Germany; the attitude of gay and
lesbian members of the CDU toward the party’s current leadership candidates;
the 75th anniversary of the liberation of the Ravensbrück concentration camp,
and a project remembering and commemorating the lesbian women imprisoned
and murdered there; the Queer Asia network providing a platform for artistic,
intellectual and political work in Berlin; debates around the ownership of the
history and symbols of lesbian activism; the history and meaning of leather sub-
cultures in the gay scene; transphobia within the queer community; and the
Georgian-Swedish film, And Then We Danced, about love between two male
dancers in Tbilisi’s National Georgian Ensemble. Just like many of the venues
whose events it lists, the magazine was plunged into crisis by the Covid-19
pandemic, temporarily losing access to many of its distribution points and much
of its advertising revenue amidst the lockdown. (A campaign saw over 1,700
people donate almost €150,000, with further funds raised by the 2020
Solidarity campaign, launched by the artist Wolfgang Tillmans and his
Between Bridges Foundation. Tillmans and other artists donated limited
edition works for sale.) 16
Cultural institutions like the regular Gayhane party (the name is partly a play on
the Turkish and Arabic word for “house”, “hane”) can also serve as a connection
to decades of struggle, not only by but also within queer and LGBT movements.
Gayhane has been held at SO36 for over 20 years, a club and concert hall named
after the former postcode of the area of Kreuzberg it is based. The
neighbourhood has long been home to multiple generations of migrants from
Turkey and elsewhere, to punks, squatters (and now former squatters), queers,
and those who, before the fall of the Berlin Wall, had moved to the demilitarised
West Berlin as a way of avoiding national service. In an interview marking
Gayhane’s 20th anniversary, the organisers explained its origins in the regular
Salon Oriental event – a broadly Turkish LGBTQI cabaret that took up
questions of racism and migration, sexism, homo- and trans-phobia.17 In her
book, European Others: Queering Ethnicity in Postnational Europe, Fatima El-

15 See: www.siegessaeule.de
16On the fundraising campaign, see: https://www.startnext.com/your-siegessaeule-needs-you
On the 2020 Solidarity campaign, see: https://www.siegessaeule.de/magazin/2020solidarity-
kuenstlerinnen-fuer-siegessäule/
17See Andreas Hartmann’s (2019) interview with three of the Gayhane organisers, Frieda,
Sabuha, and DJ Ipek.

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Tayeb (2011, 143) argues that Salon Oriental introduced “a minoritarian voice,
disrespectful of dominant hierarchies of representation with regard to
nationality and ethnicity as well as gender and sexuality” and thus “did not only
center the experience of queer minorities but allowed other segments of the
audience to relate to and identify with this usually discarded perspective, letting
the performances work as a kind of testimonial through interpellation”.
The Gayhane organisers remain invested in addressing questions of queerness,
nation, migration and racism, including through donations to social and
political projects included in the entrance fee. This is the third key function of
many queer and LGBT bars and clubs, then: as fundraising spaces supporting
political and other initiatives. For instance, on the first Monday of every month,
a different social, political and community group takes over Möbel Olfe, a queer
bar located around the corner from SO36, for an event called Solidarität vom
Fass (or Solidarity on Tap). Regular “solidarity parties” and fundraising events
are held at SchwuZ, Südblock, and ://about blank too, as well as at many other
queer venues. In Neukölln, the Silver Future bar plays host to the regular
Queerberg party, featuring and raising money to support refugee queer
performance artists.
This is the fourth function of LGBT and queer venues and events: showcasing
queer and trans performers, artists and musicians. For years now, every
Tuesday night at Monster Ronson’s karaoke bar on Warschauerbrücke between
Kreuzberg and Friedrichshain, Pansy’s House of Presents has provided a stage
for drag, queer and trans performance artists from around the world.18 The
show is immediately preceded by Gieza’s Pokehouse, with Gieza Poke – a drag
queen who describes herself as “Berlin’s only power-top pan-sexual former-
Scottish-daytime-TV-fitness-sensation” – hosting a show that features “new and
upcoming drag and drag-adjacent performers.”19 At its best, queer performance
art, including and perhaps especially drag, can serve as a form of cultural
critique, a means of interrogating racism and misogyny (including within LGBT
milieus), and a mode of producing community and collectivity. This can have
effects that ripple out into the world at large. José Esteban Muñoz’s
Disidentifications: Queers of Color and the Performance of Politics, published
in 1999, remains one of the most compelling scholarly works in this field. And
much of the book would no doubt be of use in any analysis of many of the
performances at events like Queerberg at Silver Future – which describes itself
as a place for “kings, queens and criminal queers” – at the House of Presents
and Gieza’s Pokehouse, as well as at events like Queer*Syria (a series featuring
performers from Iraq as well as Syria), Queens Against Borders (which often
takes place at SO36 and describes itself as aiming “to build a bridge between
drag, trans and queer performance artists who are refugees and those
performers who have already established spaces in the city”), and in

18 See: https://www.facebook.com/pansypresents/
19 See: https://www.giezapoke.com/bio

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performances and events hosted by the House of Living Colors (a queer and
trans of colour drag house).20
Part of what Muñoz (1999, 147) explores is how what he calls “performances of
counterpublicity” can challenge the discourses of a majoritarian public sphere,
as well as the reproduction of these discourses. The construction of
“counterpublics”, he points out, can be particularly important for subordinate
and subaltern groups – including women, queers, people of colour, and others –
and they can serve as a means of contesting the purported universality of the
public sphere, its exclusionary and discriminatory norms (Muñoz 1999, 147-
149). Counterpublic performances by drag and other queer (and particularly
queer of colour) performers can articulate forms of cultural critique which allow
new models of social relations to be imagined – those, for instance, that might
escape the “interpellating call of heteronormativity” (Muñoz 1999, 33). The
performers that he engages with, like (the now Berlin-based) Vaginal Davis,
make use of humour and parody while waging cultural battles to “transform the
popular ‘mentality’” and “unsettle the hegemonic order” (Muñoz 1999, 110-
111).21 And it is in this sense that, for Muñoz, performers like Davis can be
understood as organic intellectuals and philosophers in the Gramscian sense of
these terms. Moreover, queer and minoritarian performance is shown to
contain a capacity for “worldmaking”, or the making of “worlds of
transformative politics and possibilities.” (Muñoz 1999, 195). He writes:

“Oppositional counterpublics are enabled by visions, ‘worldviews,’ that reshape as

they deconstruct reality. Such counterpublics are the aftermath of minoritarian
performance. Such performances transport the performer and the spectator to a
vantage point where transformation and politics are imaginable. Worldmaking
performances produce these vantage points by slicing into the facade of the real
that is the majoritarian public sphere. Disidentificatory performances opt to do
more than simply tear down the majoritarian public sphere. They disassemble
that sphere of publicity and use its parts to build an alternative reality.
Disidentification uses the majoritarian culture as raw material to make a new
world.” (Muñoz 1999, 196)

A politics of contact
And here we arrive at the final function served by queer and LGBT bars, clubs
and other spaces, namely, the facilitation of forms of sociality that can be
generative of community and kin-making. It is crucial to point out, however,

20On Queer*Syria, see Eva Tempest’s (2018) interview with one member, Katy. On the House of
Living Colors, see (Wiedemann 2019) and: https://www.facebook.com/houseoflivingcolors/.
On Queens Against Borders, see: www.facebook.com/queensagainstborders
21El-Tayeb (2011, 141) argues that the “mixture of classic drag show, physical comedy, and
agitprop” that characterised Salon Oriental’s shows resembled Muñoz’s description of Vaginal
Davis’ “queer drag”, “at odds with conventions of academic queer theory as well as those of an
increasingly commercialized gay scene.”

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that at times such spaces can and do themselves reproduce and reinforce
hegemonic norms, existing social hierarchies, and modes of exclusion –
including those of race, nation, class, disability, and gender (performance).
Many queer and LGBT spaces in Berlin, including some of those discussed here,
have long been subject to criticism for doing just that. At the same time, these
spaces can – albeit often imperfectly – also serve as sites that enable the kinds
of “contact” that Samuel R. Delany (1999) distinguishes from “networking” in
his work on the social relations, institutions and functions displaced by the
development of New York City’s Times Square. Here, “networking” can be
understood as relatively instrumental and as rarely facilitating, say, cross-class
interactions. “Contact”, in contrast, “tends to be more broadly social and
appears random”, often involving the kind of “interclass encounters” that tend
to take place only outside of the domestic sphere (Delany 1999, 129).22 In his
book, One-Dimensional Queer, Roderick A. Ferguson (2019) draws on Delany’s
account of “contact” to describe a multi-dimensional vision of the urban that
queer spaces have often facilitated. This is where the city comes to involve
“much more than the fulfillment of jobs and wealth”, providing “the possibility
to satisfy desires for self-invention and for the invention of new types of
community” (Ferguson 2019, 84).
In other words, where the city provides such a function, this is often facilitated
by queer spaces that have historically enabled “encounters between
communities typically kept apart” (Ferguson 2019, 83). Delany and a number of
others, such as Tim Dean (2009), have shown how cruising spaces in particular,
and queer spaces of public sex, can facilitate this sort of contact between
otherwise relatively separate communities.23 Although there have also long been
those within Queer Studies, like Leo Bersani (1987, 206), who have cautioned
against any naïve understanding of these sites as entailing a kind of
“Whitmanesque democracy”, emphasizing instead how they tend to be marked
by hierarchy, status, and competition.
Contra some sexual liberation discourses, however, sex itself is not necessarily
particularly central to the production of queer socialities. Nor in fact to queer
contestations of social norms or queer efforts towards the reinvention of the
self. (Although this is certainly not to say that sex cannot or does not have a role
to play here.) Queer and LGBT bars and clubs do indeed facilitate the (often
unforeseen) forms of contact that Delany (1999, 111) argues can be generative of
some of the most “rewarding, productive, pleasant” aspects of life, and they do
frequently provide sanctuary (“safe spaces”, if you like) from forms of anti-gay
prohibition. (This is just one reason why the defence of these spaces must be a

22Delany (1999, 111) opens the second of the two essays in his book, Times Square Red, Times
Square Blue by explaining: “The primary thesis underlying my several arguments here is that,
given the mode of capitalism under which we live, life is at its most rewarding, productive, and
pleasant when large numbers of people understand, appreciate, and seek out interclass contact
and communication conducted in a mode of good will.”
23Delany (1999, 124-125) also describes non-sexual forms of “contact”, such as those established
in queues at supermarkets or in copy shops.

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cornerstone of anti-gentrification struggles; as Ferguson (2019, 108) points out,

“[t]he story of neoliberal redevelopment is one in which city planners have
attempted to gain power over the city’s inhabitants to shape the ‘character’ of
urban space.”) But, just as Foucault argued in the 1970s, such forms of
prohibition are not necessarily targeted primarily at sexual acts themselves
(although again: sex can become a target). Rather, they generally tend to be
directed towards broader “economies of pleasures”, including those of simply
“being together” and the affective and relational development of specifically gay
(or queer) modes of life (Foucualt, cited in Eribon 2004, 307). In Insult and the
Making of the Gay Self, Didier Eribon (2004, 308), addresses at some length
the development of Foucault’s thoughts on the “gay mode of life” and “gay
culture”, including his repeated insistence that it was the different ways of
relating to one another, the forms of public affection among gay men –
including the simple holding of hands – that appeared more intolerable for
many than the fact of sex among men. For instance, despite its continued
stigmatisation and association with risk (described above), there certainly
seems to be little appetite in liberal societies today for a recriminalization of gay
sex. And yet precisely the kinds of affection that Foucault described do still
appear to be intolerable for many; with 45% of same-sex couples in Germany
“always” or “often” avoiding holding hands in public “for fear of being assaulted,
threatened or harassed” (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights
2020, 26). A crucial function of queer and LGBT spaces, then, is facilitating
affection, not just among same-sex couples but also as a means of developing
new ways of relating, alternative queer modes of life rooted, as Foucault (1997
[1981], 136) put it, in “tenderness, friendship, fidelity, camaraderie, and
companionship”. Indeed, for Foucault, it was the cultivation of these new
relational systems (rather than sex itself) that best allowed for the reinvention of
oneself and for escape from subjugating social norms.24

An ethics of care
Part of what has emerged in response to the Covid-19 crisis is what the moral
and feminist philosopher Joan C. Tronto describes as an ethic of care. Care,
understood by Tronto (2009, 104) as “a practice” as well as “a disposition”, is
made up of several elements: “caring about” (requiring attentiveness;
recognizing the need for a particular kind of care, and understanding and that
this should be met), “taking care of” (implying the assumption of a degree of
responsibility for this care), “care-giving” (the meeting of a care need, and the
capacity and competence to do so), and “care-receiving” (or responsiveness on
the part of those who, or that which, is cared for) (Tronto 2009, 106-117 and
127). The response to the Covid-19 pandemic by much – although certainly not
all – of Berlin’s queer and LGBT (sub-)cultures, institutions, and activist
communities could be well understood through this framework: from attention

24I am drawing here on Eribon’s (2004, 303-309) discussion of Foucault’s reflections on

questions of homosexuality, sexual liberation and friendship from around 1976 onwards.

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to the needs of those particularly at risk from the virus and the assumption of
responsibility for addressing (“taking care of”) these needs, through to the
development and deployment of skills and capacities that can help both sustain
queer and LGBT infrastructure as well as the affective connections and forms of
sociality and “contact” that they can (re-)produce.
In addition to the crowd-funding in support of Siegessäule magazine, funds
have also been collected by and for SchwuZ. First to help secure the jobs of
those who work there, then to contribute to the income of precarious artists;
with a pledge to donate surplus funds to a solidarity campaign in support of
LGBTIQ+ refugees on the Greek island of Lesbos.25 A similar online fundraising
drive was launched by ://about blank and has received considerable support.26
A Berlin Collective Action Nightlife Emergency Fund has been set up, supported
by a number of clubs, party collectives and artists – including Cocktail d’Amore,
House of Living Colors, and Lecken (a queer rave collective whose parties are
“womxn-to-the-front space[s]” that are open to all)27 – working together with
various projects and organisations including Gladt e.V. (an LGBTIQ Black and
PoC organization working on questions of intersectionality and multiple
discrimination), the Berlin Strippers Collective, and Olga (a project providing
support for women who use drugs). The Fund raises money for “those most
impacted by risk and violence in Berlin during Covid-19”, and particularly
“[w]here state support fails”.28 “The fund aims to prioritise those most impacted
by COVID-19. Due to the realities of systemic oppression, this generally means
womxn, queer, trans and non-binary people, low-income gig workers, people
with migratory backgrounds, BIPOC, sex workers, the immunocompromised,
the disabled and those who are unsafe in quarantine.”29 The campaign has
established “a diverse rotating committee” that distributes the funds it raises to
applicants.30 Many of the clubs and venues discussed here have also
participated in the United We Stream project that, since the closure of Berlin’s
nightlife on 13 March, has livestreamed dozens of live music events,
performances, and DJ sets from clubs in the city, with income generated going
to support venues and event organisers (8% of funds raised are donated to the
Foundation Fund for Civilian Sea Rescue).31

25 SchwuZ explain how they will use funds raised here: https://www.schwuz.de/?lang=en
26 See: https://www.startnext.com/whatever-you-take
27 On Lecken, see: https://lecken.berlin/about
28On the Berlin Collective Action Nightlife Emergency Fund and for a fuller list of supporters,
see: https://www.betterplace.me/berlin-collective-action-nightlife-emergency-fund16
Donations to the Fund can also be made via this link.
29 See: https://www.betterplace.me/berlin-collective-action-nightlife-emergency-fund16
30 See: https://www.betterplace.me/berlin-collective-action-nightlife-emergency-fund16
31 On United We Stream, see: https://en.unitedwestream.berlin/info/

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Some of the most politically, aesthetically, and affectively innovative approaches

to digital queer performance in the pandemic have been developed by Berlin’s
drag world. As nightlife was shut down, regular drag events – including Gieza’s
Pokehouse and Pansy’s House of Presents – almost immediately took to
streaming drag shows via Twitch.tv, a platform otherwise primarily used for
video game streaming.32 Performers and hosts quickly adapted, incorporating
elements that would not necessarily have worked in a live stage show, such as
animation. In one show, Gieza Poke used greenscreen technology to transform
herself into a puppet, with her own head atop a cardboard body made by the
visual artist Rory Midhani. The hosts cut to mostly live but occasionally pre-
recorded shows (at times featuring music videos that again incorporate effects
that would be difficult to simulate live or in-person) by drag and “drag-adjacent”
artists, most of them performing in their homes. In early-April, queer
performance artists Prens Emrah, The Darvish, Wizzy, and Pansy presented
Queerantina, a show featuring drag, belly dancing, song and other performances
by the Queer*Syria, Queens Against Borders, and Queerberg collectives. In late-
May, the Venus Boys, who describe themselves as “a collective of Berlin based
drag performers who paint from the palette of performative masculinity”, put on
a König: Digital Girls night, with drag kings performing as queens for one night
only.33 In all these shows, tips and donations are collected to support queer and
trans performers, many of whom have lost income amidst the lockdown. Many
performances, and many of the hosts of these shows, have explicitly addressed
the challenges that the Covid-19 pandemic is posing to queer and LGBT
individuals and subcultures, as well as many of the ways in which the
coronavirus crisis intersects with questions of movement and migration,
economic precarity and racism (including in terms of the ways that this is being
contested by the Black Lives Matter movement). With a surprising degree of
success, many of the shows’ hosts have encouraged audiences to use Twitch’s
chat function to cheer on and support performers, simulating something similar
to the feeling of being in a crowd at a live show.
Of course, watching a show streamed online is not the same as attending a live
show. The possibilities for the production of “counterpublicity”, and particularly
for the kinds of “worldmaking”, that Muñoz theorises are, I think it is safe to
say, more limited. And there are certainly few opportunities for the forms of
encounter and unforeseen “contact” that Delany describes. Notwithstanding
Preciado’s critique of digital surveillance technologies and the new technologies
of (bio-)power that they are caught up with, digital cultures have now long
played a role in the development of new relational systems and in sustaining gay
and queer cultures and modes of life. But these are also heavily dependent on
the physical spaces provided by queer infrastructure. Queer care-giving will,
then, need to continue developing a capacity not only (as Tronto might put it) to
care about, but also to take care of and give care to, the spaces that sustain

32 See: https://www.twitch.tv/giezapoke and: https://www.twitch.tv/pansypresents

33On Venus Boys, see: https://www.facebook.com/Venus-Boys-433107937467307/ and:
https://www.twitch.tv/venusboys/

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these modes of life. The forms of solidarity economy that have been developed
by queer and LGBT subcultures and communities will certainly have an
important role to play. But it will also be crucial that the defence of queer
socialities and infrastructures both inform, and become one focus of, broader
social movements and struggles to shape the city and urban social life within
and beyond the pandemic.

The right to the queer city

Berlin is a city animated by creative industries including its sizable club scene
(and the numerous services that support and sustain its nightlife), a fashion
industry characterized by “vibrant networks of independent designers”
(McRobbie, Strutt and Bandineii 2019: 134), and a rapidly growing start-up tech
sector.34 Of the €4.6 billion invested in start-ups in Germany in 2018, €2.6
billion were invested in Berlin (Stokel-Walker 2019). Even before the
development of “the full-blown creative economy”, however, Berlin had long
attracted a young workforce interested in “the arts, and in culture in the
broadest sense”, with many employed in “the not-for-profit sector” and in forms
of project work that rarely pay high salaries, as Angela McRobbie, Dan Strutt
and Carolina Bandinelli (2019, 135) have shown in their recent work on Berlin’s
fashion “microenterprises”. Many creative and cultural industries rely on the
kinds of labour and the forms of production that increasingly characterize post-
Fordism as a whole: with flexible, largely horizontal networks involved in
temporary, often small-scale projects requiring specialist skills. In their account
of what they call “post-Fordist placemaking” – in relation to city beaches in
Berlin and a number of other European cities – Quentin Stevens and Mhairi
Ambler (2010, 534) describe how such spaces, like many of the nightlife spaces
described here, blur production and consumption; events, parties and venues
rely on the contributions and participation of those who attend, so that they co-
produce the experiences they consume. (The ways in which many drag
performers rely on interactions with their audiences is just one particularly clear
example of this.)
There have of course long been efforts – like those famously advanced by
Richard Florida (2012 [2002], e.g. 237-239) in his work on “the creative class” –
to transform queerness into “a mode of difference that can promote capital’s
well-being” while displacing “the forms of queer creativity that [have] exceeded
and critiqued market capitalism”, as Roderick A. Ferguson (2019, 101)
persuasively puts it.35 In many ways, the increased need, amidst the current

34The city’s economy is described as follows on the state of Berlin’s official website: “The city
has long developed from an industrial location to a modern service centre and international
motor of innovation” (my translation). See: https://www.berlin.de/berlin-im-
ueberblick/wirtschaft/
35In Florida’s (2012 [2002], 238) work on the creative class, the very presence of gay people in a
neighbourhood is in some ways taken as an indication that it would also be welcoming of others

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pandemic, to defend the infrastructures that facilitate queer socialities (many of

which have long been at threat of displacement, as I have argued) is perhaps
best understood as caught up with long-standing demands and discourses
around the right to the city; a city oriented around the needs of those who
(under post-Fordist conditions) produce, shape and live within it.36 I will close
this paper, then, by pointing towards three sets of political demands and
initiatives that have already been widely discussed, debated and at times
advanced by social and political movements – including those well beyond
Berlin – which could be of particular use in establishing the right to a city
capable of sustaining the sorts of infrastructure required for queer socialities
and queer forms of life (broadly conceived).
The first is the demand for a guaranteed basic income, an enduring proposal
that has gained substantial support amidst the Covid-19 crisis.37 400,000
people in Germany recently signed a petition demanding it be instated amidst
the pandemic and Spain has already seen its accelerated introduction in
response to the coronavirus (ZEIT ONLINE 2020b).38 Michael Hardt and
Antonio Negri (2009, 309-310) have been among those to have long made the
case for a basic income, in part “on the basis of economic justice (wealth is
produced across a widely dispersed social network, and therefore the wage that
compensates it should be equally social) and social welfare (since nothing close
to full employment can be achieved in the current economy, income must be
provided for those without work).”39 The global Covid-19 pandemic has of

that are often “the source of new ideas”: “egg heads, eccentrics”, “immigrants and ethnic
minorities”. (As Ferguson (2019, 104) points out, in Florida’s account, these “migrants and
ethnic minorities” represent a separate category to “gays”. In other words, the two do not
overlap.)
36 Since the publication of Henri Lefebvre’s influential 1967 essay, The Right to the City, the
formulation has been taken up by social movements and initiatives around the world (including
in Germany). In his own engagement with the notion of the right to the city, the geographer
David Harvey (2012, x) describes Lefebvre’s original formulation as “both a cry and a demand.
The cry was a response to the existential paid on a withering crisis of everyday life in the city.
The demand was really a command to look that crisis clearly in the eye and to create an
alternative urban life that is less alienated, more meaningful and playful but, as always with
Lefebvre, conflictual and dialectical, open to becoming, to encounters (both fearful and
pleasurable), and to the perpetual pursuit of unknowable novelty.”
37In April 2020, the German network for a basic income, Netzwerk Grundeinkommen, was
made up of 134 organisations and 5,391 individuals. See:
https://www.grundeinkommen.de/netzwerk/mitglieder On the ethics as well as the economics
of the basic income, see Widerquist et al. (2005).
38 A basic income had been one of the key pledges in the electoral campaign fought by Unidas
Podemos in the autumn of 2019, a party with its roots in the ‘15M’ movement that, a few years
after the global economic crisis began in 2008, saw millions occupy squares across the country.
Unidas Podemos formed a coalition government with the centre-left Socialist Workers’ party
(PSOE) in January 2020.
39Hardt and Negri (2009, 310) also point out that “we need to recognize how ensuring that the
entire population has a basic minimum for life is in the interests of capital. Granting the

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course only increased unemployment. The demand for a guaranteed basic

income, or for a “social wage”, would certainly help support those cultural
workers and artistic forms of production that sustain and help animate queer
and LGBT subcultures. It also represents a means of contesting the precarity
that post-Fordism imposes, but without recourse to nostalgia for the Fordist
“family wage”, “that fundamental weapon of the sexual division of labor” (Hardt
and Negri 2000, 403) and institution of heteronormativity, or of “compulsory
heterosexuality”. The basic income demand can also serve as “a provocation”,
pointing “toward the future” as Kathi Weeks (2011, 145) argues in The Problem
with Work. “As a mode of provocation, the collective practice of demanding
should be understood also as a constitutive event, the performative force of
which inevitably exceeds the scope of the specific reform” (Weeks 2011, 145).
This particular demand can function, she argues, as “a provocation to freedom”
understood “as the time and space for invention”; creating room for lives less
dependent on work (Weeks 2011, 145). The primary goal of any defence of queer
forms of sociality, and of the infrastructures that support them, should not be a
return to “normal” when the pandemic passes. Instead, the rupture with
“normality”, and the forms of care and solidarity that have been developed in
the pandemic, can serve as an opportunity to imagine, demand and build
different, better, queerer futures.
Many of the queer projects and collectives discussed here – from Salon Oriental
and Gayhane through to events like Queerantina (in April of this year) – have
been among those to articulate, in various ways, a second key set of demands,
namely, for freedom of movement, the right to remain, and the right to
citizenship. For many queer and LGBT people, the need and desire to move (to
new neighbourhoods, to cities, or across borders) is a familiar experience; even
while these experiences vary widely. And those who make up queer socialities in
Berlin arrive from many places. The right to the queer city will, then, always
need to be the right to a city that is open, where one can remain, and without
hierarchies of citizenship. Campaigns like the Seebrücke ‘Cities of Safe
Harbours’ initiative play an important role in this regard, demanding that cities
and municipalities declare their willingness to welcome greater numbers of
refugees. As does the #LeaveNoOneBehind campaign which, amidst the Covid-
19 crisis, is demanding the urgent evacuation and granting of asylum to refugees
being held at Moria camp on Lesbos.40 In recent years, queer and LGBT
organisations, projects and networks have also played a role in anti-racist
protests and in protests against the far-right. Siegessäule and its sister
publication L-Mag organized a sizable queer block on the 240,000-strong
Unteilbar (or, Indivisible) demonstration in October 2019, along with SchwuZ,

multitude autonomy and control over time is essential to foster productivity in the biopolitical
economy.”
40On the Seebrücke Cities of Safe Habour campaign, see: https://seebruecke.org/en/startpage-
2/safe-harbours/ On the #LeaveNoOneBehdind campaign, see:
https://leavenoonebehind2020.org

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Adefra e.V. – Schwarze Frauen in Deutschland (or, Adefra – Black Women in

German), RuT, the Berlin Leather and Fetish Society (BLF), Lesben gegen
Rechts (or, Lesbians Against the Right) and others (Woopen 2018).41 In May
2018, queer clubs, bars and party collectives including ://about blank, CockTail
d’Amore, SO36, Südblock, and Möbel Olfe were among those to take part in a
mass Reclaim Club Culture mobilization against a far-right demonstration
through the centre of Berlin.42
Finally, defences of (already highly precarious) queer infrastructure amidst the
current crisis should be understood as caught up with broader demands in
Berlin and beyond for affordable housing, for accommodation that is under
public or common ownership and for protection from displacement
(particularly through gentrification and urban development projects). One of
the most innovative and dynamic efforts to make visible, accessible and
concrete the “needs of the many, of the Other, of the marginalized” (Tajeri 2019)
in relation to social housing, rents and urban development in particular is the
Kotti & Co initiative and their “Gecekondu” protest hut which has been located
right next to Südblock at Kottbusser Tor in Kreuzberg since May 2012. Writing
for the The Funambulist, Niloufar Tajeri (2019) has explained that, “Kotti & Co
understood that change has to be systematic, large-scale and needs to intervene
in the legal structures of tenancy and social housing laws.”43 And recent years
have seen various attempts to do just that; with urgency added by rents in the
city beginning to increase faster than anywhere else in the world (by 21% from
2017 to 2018) and apartments becoming increasingly unaffordable for those
with an average income in the city (Knight 2019). Following a campaign that
successfully collected the required number of signatures to initiate a city-wide
referendum, the Berlin senate administration are currently evaluating the
legality of a potential poll that, if successful, would result in a form of
expropriation: legally transferring the ownership of properties belonging to
companies that rent more than 3,000 apartments in the city to a new public
body (Schönball 2020). Demands for rent control and affordable living also led
to the 2019 introduction of a five-year rent freeze; a move greeted by many
campaigners as a step in the right direction, but as insufficient nevertheless
(Tagesspiegel 2019). To demand the right to the queer city is certainly to
demand it be affordable for all those who live there, and for all those who have
yet to arrive. But it could also be made to imply the right to develop and to
experiment with new models of common ownership, including those that can

41For a full list of participating organisations, see:

https://www.facebook.com/events/unteilbarqueer-queer-block-auf-der-unteilbar-
demo/682490362127753/
42For the full list of participating clubs, bars and collectives, see:
https://www.facebook.com/events/187723188713308/
43On Kotti & Co, see: www.kottiundco.net and the film Miete Essen Seele Auf. Der Kampf um
das Recht auf Stadt (or, Rent Eats the Soul: The Fight for the Right to the City), available with
English subtitles here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=101&v=qS6KrhBcvVU&feature=emb_title

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accommodate various forms of kin-making. However, no matter how affordable,

accommodating and secure, the domestic sphere and the space of the home can
never be sufficient in terms of the production of queer socialities. Queer futures
are unthinkable without the infrastructures – including but not limited to bars
and clubs – that facilitate unforeseeable encounters and those forms of contact
that can help produce new types of community.

Note
My thanks to Jan Simon Hutta and Andrea Bohlman for very helpful feedback
on an earlier draft of this paper, and to Gieza Poke for taking the time to speak
to me about digital drag. Donations to support some of the projects and
organisations described here can be made via many of the links contained in
this article’s footnotes.

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About the author

Ben Trott is a Visiting Scholar at the Institute for Philosophy and Art Theory
within the Faculty of Cultural Studies at Leuphana University of Lüneburg,
Germany. He lives in Berlin.

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Life Beyond the Pandemic

Non Una di Meno – Roma (29th April 2020)
(Translated by Emma Gainsforth and Miriam Tola)

This collective text, by the feminist and transfeminist assembly Non Una di
Meno Roma, part of the larger Italian movement Non Una di Meno, was
circulated in late April, during the phase-1 of the Covid-19 lockdown imposed
nationwide by the Italian government. Over the past four years, Non Una di
Meno has been campaigning to end male violence against women and
connecting it to the violence of heteronormativity, precarious labour, racism
and the European regimes of border control. A key tool of struggle has been
the feminist strike from reproductive and productive labour, organised at the
transnational level on March 8th since 2017.

Something is moving in the ruins of the pandemic. We are still physically

distanced and yet, now more than ever, the desire to transform everything is
bringing us together. An event as devastating as Covid-19 calls for powerful
responses and unbridled ambition. The pandemic has made clear that the
reproduction of life is incompatible with the neoliberal project to apply the
market rationale to every aspect of our existence. In order to orient ourselves,
we turn to feminist and transfeminist knowledge and practices that have
focused on social reproduction as the key battle field. We build on a collective,
situated self, one that shifts through transversal alliances, always taking on new
shapes. In fact, if the present is catastrophic, the future is unwritten and our
struggles have the potential to create new modes of living together after the
pandemic.

To stir up a powerful response to devastating events, we turn to the

“arcane of reproduction”, that is, all those activities that regenerate human
life in a given historical and social formation. These include not only the
reproduction of generations, the affective and bodily care of everyone, including
adults, children and the elderly, but also the care of spaces and the household,
education, access to culture, services, leisure and social relations. Feminist
movements have unveiled the centrality of reproductive labour and defined it as
the condition of existence of the whole of society, its persistence in time.
In the 1970s, the campaign Wages for Housework demonstrated that the
transition to capitalism, starting from the dawn of modernity, was made
possible by the invisibilisation, naturalisation and devaluation of reproductive
labour. Without the domestic and care work that allowed the subsistence of
(male) workers, there would have been no labour force. Without labour force
there would have been neither factories nor profit. And yet, reproduction has
never been acknowledged as work. On the contrary, it has been ascribed to the

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sphere of natural resources available to appropriation. This has served the

purpose to legitimise an immense extortion of wealth. This is the thread linking
women’s unpaid work in the household to the expropriation of the planet’s
resources.
As Black and anti-racist feminists have emphasised, domestic labour,
reproductive labour and resource expropriation have always been divided along
the colour line. Today, migrant and racialised women continue to bear to brunt
of exhausting care work inside and outside the family. Indigenous land and
populations continue to be plundered by capitalist predatory violence. These are
the afterlives of slavery and coloniality.

To stir up a powerful response to devastating events, we look at the

reorganisation of reproduction in neoliberal societies before and
after Covid-19. The neoliberal model is rooted in the celebration of the market
and social competition, in individual responsibilities in adapting to risk. It has
demanded the privatisation and erosion of the public institutions and programs
that contributed to partially redistribute reproductive and care work in the 20th
century. Additionally, over the last fifty years, the dismantling of the welfare
state has gone hand in hand with a radical reconfiguration of labour, known as
“feminisation of work.” By this we mean flexibility, total availability and the
exploitation and valorisation of relational, linguistic and care capacities. If, on
the one hand, reproduction has become immediately productive, on the other
hand, value chains feed on the exploitation of gendered, racialised and queer
subjectivities, thus rendering the lives of entire generations precarious.
With the outbreak of the pandemic, the fragility of the reproductive and care
structures, starting from the healthcare system, has become evident. In Italy,
the last decade of austerity and neoliberal policies have meant the
disappearance of 70,000 hospital beds, 359 wards and entire hospitals. The
most brutal, ruinous effects of these measures is now visible to all. The
pandemic has highlighted the centrality of social reproduction but also its
profound crisis. As some say, the virus does not discriminate between social
classes. But class, race, ability and age discriminations manifest themselves in
the impossibility of accessing healthcare. Some lives enjoy the right to
assistance and care, others do not. There is no such a thing as “bare life” – there
are lives marked and stigmatised by class, gender, sexuality, geographical
positioning, disability and age. There are bodies suffering from isolation, and
others that have made the quarantine possible, because they have never stopped
working, inside and outside the household. These are health workers, janitors,
domestic and care workers, mothers who care for their children and daughters
who care for elderly parents.

To stir up a powerful response to devastating events, we start from

the home, the main place of exploitation of women, but also the first space of
feminist conflict. We have stayed in for weeks, but not all in the same way.

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There are those who don’t even have a home. Homes reflect a series of
inequalities. For some, the home is no refuge from a pandemic, but a place of
oppression, threat, violence, even femicide. For many domestic and care
workers, (the) homes (of others) are still the place of exploited and
unrecognised work. This was confirmed, once again, by the institutions: the
“Cura Italia” decree left out care workers who were not able to benefit from
mechanism of income guarantee and measures for health protection. 80% of the
care workers in Italy are migrant – they amount to more than one million. For
these people losing their job has also meant losing a place to live, and being held
hostage by an exploitation system that links the possibility to accept or refuse a
job to one’s residence permit.
We start from homes as a battleground, as a place to shape new (but also old)
alliances, seditious and intersectional coalitions. Time dedicated to care is a
time of conflict and imagination. We take advantage of the difficulties we are
experiencing: homes, which are now also offices, school and university
classrooms, an area where production and reproduction can no longer be
distinguished, will have to change radically.

To stir up a powerful response to devastating events, we look to

education and knowledge networks. For years neoliberalism has starved
schools and universities. Since the beginning of the pandemic, teaching has
been carried out online, which has, on the one hand, provided “platform
capitalism” with new opportunities to appropriate knowledge – always
produced in a cooperative way –, on the other, it has accentuated social
differences and discrimination based on ability. Decision-makers, both experts
and politicians, have no regard for education as relationship and care, they
celebrate agile and smart working. But as teachers have been denouncing, smart
working is yet another form of exploitation, as well as a profound discrimination
against those who carry the burden of caring for children, the elderly, the
disabled.
Children, teenagers and kids are paying a very high price. The transmission of
knowledge cannot be separated from proximity to peers and teachers, which
plays a fundamental role in building autonomous relationships, away from the
family. The impossibility of proximity will have serious consequences, from an
emotional and social point of view, but also from a political one: schools and
universities are places where the young discover and nourish both erotic and
political passions.
Right from the start the issue of schools led to the organisation of many
territorial solidarity networks, from those working to bridge the digital divide, to
those helping to meet primary needs. Practises of mutualism cannot replace
institutional interventions, but they indicate the way towards the construction
of a new common space, beyond the State, but also beyond the family, which
can no longer be viewed as reference point for the distribution of income and
resources.

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To stir up a powerful response to devastating events, we claim that

freedom of movement must be at the centre of the reflection on
social reproduction. During the very first days of the emergency it became
clear that the food supply chain depends on migrant workers, who are employed
in agriculture, logistics, distribution, services. Many refused to work due to a
lack of safety conditions, while others were blocked by the restrictions on
movement between states imposed to contain the pandemic. That same border
system, which causes daily deaths among migrant women and men, forces us to
consider the link between freedom of movement and the conditions that make
the reproduction of life possible.
In migrant detention centres, from Ponte Galeria to Gradisca d’Isonzo, in the
reception created for the containment of asylum seekers, in the slums and
informal occupations, which compensate for the absence of reception and
housing, the restrictions on movement imposed during the social and political
emergency Covid-19, are not measures that block the pandemic, rather, they
multiply the obstacles to freedom to save oneself. The same can be said of the
shameful decree that declared Italy is an “unsafe port”, or of agreements that
block migrants in Libya or on Greek islands. In addition to numerous non-
essential factories, it was precisely the detention centres as well as the prisons,
that remained in full operation, places whose function it is to reproduce bodies
intended for exploitation.
The massacres taking place in the Mediterranean, for which the pandemic has
provided a new excuse, show us that policies against freedom of movement are
policies of death. To stir up a powerful response it is necessary to put freedom of
movement at the centre of our battles and around this claim work for a new and
universal access to rights, welfare and income.

To stir up a powerful response to devastating events, we look at the

socio-ecological dimensions of reproduction. The nexus between social
and ecological reproduction is not new. Together with women’s work, industrial
capitalism has appropriated the biosphere as a source of matter and energy.
Reproductive activities and the biosphere have been reduced to free resources to
fuel a mode of production driven by the imperatives of profit and growth.
Today, the collapse of healthcare systems follows that of ecosystems. These
processes have created the conditions for the pandemic and its devastating
consequences. The out-of-control expansion of deforestation, intensive
agriculture, industrial farming and urbanisation have created opportunities for
zoonotic spillovers. After finding a new host species, the Sars-Covid-2 virus has
travelled across the circuits of the globalised economy. The coronavirus, as some
studies suggest, drifts through particles of air pollution and is more easily
transmitted in highly polluted, densely populated areas such as Wuhan and the
flat plain of the Po Valley. In Italy, the infection spread in workplaces that were
shut down too late or reopened too early. Contagion worsened in a healthcare
system weakened by budget cuts and privatisations. The pandemic has
confirmed what feminist and socio-ecological conflicts have been saying for a

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while: the connections between social and ecological reproduction can no longer
be ignored or dismissed as secondary. Our wager is to extend care from singular
bodies to that which allows them to persist: relations, ecosystems, the
biosphere, the planet itself. This is the ground of encounter, and possible
convergence, between feminist, transfeminist and ecological movements.

To stir up a powerful response to devastating events a radical

redistribution of wealth is needed. While in Europe and at a global level
decision-makers clash over the tools needed to manage a massive economic and
health crisis, what is starting to emerge is that States and economic-financial
institutions will inevitably have to start re-investing in social spending. The
point is how. How consistent will public funding be, and who will benefit from
it? Will this investment continue to be based on the mechanism of debt?
Emergency measures are not enough. Many are now arguing in favour of a basic
income, a care or a quarantine income. Similarly, we are convinced that a
structural and redistributive measure is needed. For years, in fact, we have been
claiming an income of self-determination: universal and unconditional,
addressed to individuals and not to the family, not connected to work,
citizenship and conditions of residence, which must guarantee economic
autonomy, an instrument to escape from gender violence, from exploitation, of
labour and of the ecosystem. We claim a self-determination income together
with the European minimum wage, to prevent the former from becoming a tool
in the hands of companies and employers aiming at reducing wages, to combat
ridiculously low wages, and wage disparities between women and men, natives
and migrants.
We want welfare institutions to be structurally refinanced and rendered
universal, we want free and supportive institutions to which everyone may have
access: a public and laic healthcare system, more territorial clinics, continuous
hiring and permanent contracts for staff; investment in school, training and
research; childcare services; support and care for the most vulnerable;
guarantee of the right to housing; social security.
It is important to stress that struggles for welfare, other than being struggles for
the redistribution of wealth, are struggles for democracy, for the democratic
reappropriation of social infrastructures. To defend the public means to imagine
common institutions and freedom beyond the State.

To stir up a potent response to devastating events, it is crucial to

create new alliances of care in common. “Flatten the curve, increase the
care” is the slogan of the art and activist collective Pirate Care. In our view, it
conveys the meaning of the feminist wager: containing the contagion is not
enough, we need struggles for reconfiguring the infrastructures of care, taking
control away from market forces. This is how the bodies that today are more
exposed to the pandemic’s deadly effects will enjoy the protection that has been
a privilege for few.

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The mutual-aid networks operating in many Italian cities point in that

directions: they have developed modes of caring from below that draw attention
beyond individuals and towards communities. Consider, for example, the
solidarity networks among and for sex workers that have been able to overcome
the barriers of stigmatisation and criminalisation, standing with those who are
more exposed to contagion and exploitation. Or think about how, in Rome as
well as other urban centres, domestic violence shelters have continued to
operate remotely to support women who are quarantined with abusive partners.
In the same vein, radical unions and other organisations have provided legal
support and facilitated access to social programs to precarious, migrant and
informal workers and the unemployed. Solidarity brigades linked to squats and
neighbourhood initiatives have mobilised for home delivery and distribution of
groceries to those in need.
Care has thus become an experimental field. Moving beyond the enclosed space
of the hospital, which, to be sure, is essential at the time of such a sanitary
emergency, care has become a matter of diffuse and promiscuous relations,
nurtured by networks of intimacy that do not coincide with biological kinship.
We need to rethink the forms and the institutions of care beyond
heteronormative and patriarchal models that view the individual and the family
as the basic units of society. We need to rethink our life in common, bringing
down once and for all the violence of the neoliberal model.
The rising struggles demand strength, determination and creativity. In the past
few years we opened new paths with the resignification of the strike as a tool of
struggle. This process is still ongoing and points in a direction that needs further
exploration. Workers’ strikes, as well as the riots that broke out in prison at the
peak of the Covid-19 emergency, have shown just that.
Now more than ever it is time to struggle for the redistribution of that same
wealth that for centuries has been expropriated from women. Inspired by the
Argentinean feminists who marched before the pandemic hit the country, this is
the time to collectively shout “The debt is owed to us!” and “We want to be alive,
free, debt free!”.

About the authors:

Non Una di Meno Roma is a feminist assembly based in Rome. Part of the larger
network Non Una di Meno, the assembly has been meeting since 2016. It brings
together a large, shifting group of feminist and transfeminist activists and
collectives, including domestic violence shelters, students, researchers, feminist
attorneys, precarious workers, cultural agitators, radical union activists and
indomitable spirits. You can contact us on Facebook
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The effects of the COVID-19 crisis on the

gig economy and zero hour contracts
Benjamin Duke (13th April 2020)

Abstract
In most Western liberal democracies, state economic responses to COVID-19
have done little to protect the incomes of self-employed individuals. The
COVID-19 global pandemic has helped provide renewed focus upon the social
need, for a minimum income guarantee indemnified by the state. The UK
Government’s response highlights how large corporations and the financial
institutions were prioritised first, followed by established profitable businesses
with three years accounts. Self-employed people working in the gig economy,
alongside others managing zero hour contracts, finding themselves at the back
of the queue. Such people have been largely abandoned by the state, being left
to their own devices, having to fend for themselves. Employed people who
qualified for ‘furlough’ schemes found they had little bargaining power, having
to take what they were given. Employment Tribunals were largely unable to
sit. COVID-19 has provided an impetus for changing solidarity and collective
action, providing a foothold for multidisciplinary worker cooperatives
movements. COVID-19 will herald fundamental changes in the employment
and welfare landscape of many countries globally. Large employers will no
longer accept responsibility to provide for as many salaried workers as
present. The state’s pivotal role of being the guarantor of last resort has
become ever more critical.

Keywords:
COVID-19; gig economy; collective action; zero hour contracts; social
movements;

Introduction
The COVID-19 global pandemic has had a profound effect upon the social and
economic wellbeing of millions of people the world over (International Crisis
Group, 24 March 2020, p8; OECD, 2020). The paper discusses the United
Kingdom’s (UK) government’s response to the COVID-19 crisis, through a
critical lens of UK social movement and collective action. The paper focusses
upon various responses by social movements, to protect employment and
welfare rights in the UK (Unison, 2019, p28). The COVID-19 crisis has
underscored the societal danger of zero hour contracts, highlighting why a
minimum income guarantee is required (HRW, 2020; IMF, 2020). The paper
also discusses the rebirth of the mutual aid social movement, delivered by local
volunteers at the micro level (Blagburn, Change Incorporated, 26 March 2020).
It is clear that COVID-19 will present overhanging societal challenges after the

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crisis has receded. The effects of COVID-19 on the UK’s social welfare and
economic landscape can be described as a contemporary form of interregnum.
The societal challenges are manifest as ‘...morbid phenomena of the most varied
kind coming to pass’ (Gramsci, ‘Prison Notebook 3’, 2011, [orig. 1930], p33).

COVID-19: mutual aid social movement reborn

Draconian measures have been introduced by the UK government’s lockdown
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, closing many work opportunities. As a
result people who were working in the gig economy and/or on zero hour
contracts, have seen their incomes dramatically reduced (ILO(a), 2020, p14).
People in such insecure precarious work, often didn’t qualify for any of the
state’s choice of economic tools, e.g. the ‘furlough’ scheme1 (Bogg and Ford, UK
Labour Law, 23 March 2020). Many of these people fell through the social
protection cracks, finding themselves unable to pay for essentials e.g.
accommodation, heating and food (National Code, 6 April 2020; Citizens
Advice, June 2018). Bogg and Ford (March 2020) alert us to another concern
which may affect furloughed workers. They argue that recent changes in
employment legislation in response to the COVID-19 crisis, may enable
employers to reduce the rights of salaried workers. The strain on people’s social
welfare and economic wellbeing has been reinforced by the UK Judiciary. By
Presidential Direction we have been informed that in–person Employment
Tribunals were suspended from 23 March 2020 (Brodies Law Practice, 7 April
2020). In addition Employment Appeal Tribunal Hearings were not scheduled
to recommence until 16 April 2020 (The Honorary Mr Justice Choudhury, 9
April 2020).
The COVID-19 crisis lengthened from a few weeks to several in the UK,
providing a hotbed from where the mutual aid social movement was reborn
(Ashford, The Week, 24 March 2020). There were many vulnerable people
under the age of 70 not living in a care or nursing home, who found themselves
really struggling to live. The state COVID-19 lockdown, necessitated the need for
local community support groups at the micro level, to perform basic tasks for
people (Volunteer Edinburgh, 10 April 2020). Mutual aid groups were vital in
collecting people’s medical prescriptions, their shopping and keeping claimant’s
welfare benefit entitlements in payment. The hitherto small incidence of period
poverty became more prolific, when advice was given leading to an increase in
welfare claims for this purpose (Macartney, The Combination, 17 March 2020).
COVID-19 saw an escalation in telephone befriending by mutual aid volunteer
groups, required as more people became socially isolated due to the lockdown.
Here collective action delivered a sense of wellbeing in pragmatic terms,
providing a social glue acting to cement community bonds. Peter Kropotkin
(1842-1921) was a decentralising community activist, with a vision of a social

1
This UK Labour Law article is a blog which critically analyses various benefits
and limitations of the UK Government’s ‘furlough’ scheme announced 20 March
2020.

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landscape of worker cooperatives and self-governing voluntary associations.

Kropotkin’s (1902) work Mutual Aid – A Factor of Evolution, describes how
mutual aid can metamorphose into a social movement taking collective action to
protect communities. The COVID-19 crisis can be described as an exogenous
shock requiring a societal response at the macro and micro community level.
The quote from Mutual Aid below encapsulates the social movement, which
embodies collective action in the face of adversity when responding to a crisis.
The presence of social glue, is indicated by the implied reference to the necessity
of bonds being reconnected. The emphasis on collective action, in shaping both
the purpose and direction of mutual aid in building for the future, is perhaps
more nuanced. Kropotkin (1902) clearly indicates there must be mutual aid for
communities afterwards, from the state’s response to an exogenous shock. For
our purposes, shock is contemporised as the COVID-19 crisis.

...these bonds are at once reconstituted notwithstanding the difficulties, political,

economic and social, which are many, and in such forms as to best answer to the
requirements of production. They indicate in which direction and in which form
further progress must be expected (Kropotkin, 1902, p135).

COVID-19: societal rejection of zero hour contracts

COVID-19 has delivered a new normal. Previously united workers found
themselves on opposite sides of the food supply divide. On the one hand, people
who worked in pub, clubs and restaurants, were unable to work. Whilst on the
other hand, agricultural workers fruit and vegetable pickers, or piece workers in
food production factories remained in situ.
It is clearly essential for workers in the health and social care sector to keep
working. (The sporadic availability of PPE (personal protective equipment)
clothing in some regions, providing an ongoing acute concern) (Hugh Pym, BBC
News, 11 April 2020). There has been widespread political recognition that all
such staff are underpaid. Zero hour contracts in areas of societal importance e.g.
the health and social care sector are seen to be unsafe. The COVID-19 crisis
helped increase recognition that support workers and cleaners, are equally as
valuable in our society as other workers.
There have been changing solidarities as new stakeholders have developed.
Unusual alliances have formed e.g. food suppliers for conferences and one off
events, found themselves in the same boat as make-up artists and hairdressers.
Piece workers in the textile industry or wedding sector were similarly aligned,
being self-employed individuals working in the gig economy. COVID-19
reignited the formation of multidisciplinary worker alliances and cooperatives2
(ILO(b), 30 March 2020, p2).

2This is an ILO template for Employer and Business Membership Organisations (EBMO).
EBMOs fill this template in to demonstrate support of the ILO’s statement and response to the
COVID-19 crisis.

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Self-employed people in media and marketing sector, formed action groups with
piece workers from the carpentry and metalworker sectors. These
multidisciplinary action groups have been able to lobby governments for
unemployment support, manifest as disbursement of non-returnable grants and
cheap loans during COVID-19. Worker action groups, cooperatives and alliances
which pre-COVID-19 didn’t exist, have coordinated collective action digitally on
social network platforms, promoting campaign messages.

Conclusions
An unintended consequence of COVID-19 crisis, is that it paved the way to help
forge various multidisciplinary worker cooperatives in the UK. Collective action
from social movement alliances, which would have been considered virtually
unthinkable during the pre-COVID-19 crisis period took place. Another possible
outcome of COVID-19, is that a national unity government, agreeing to work
together collaboratively on some key issues could be formed. Given how the vast
majority of UK population pulled together during the COVID-19 crisis; another
outcome could be, UK Brexit proceeds as intended, but with the same
employment and welfare rights which apply at present, being retained by people
after the UK leaves the EU.
These realistic possibilities demonstrate; social movements, people coming
together for a common cause then taking agreed collective action will continue
apace, after the COVID-19 global pandemic has faded.

References
Ashford, James. 2020. Coronavirus: none ways to help the most vulnerable. The
Week, 24 March 2020. [Online]. Available at:
https://www.theweek.co.uk/coronavirus/106324/coronavirus-nine-ways-to-
help- the-most-vulnerable [Accessed 12 April 2020]
Blagburn, Francis. 2020. Inside the Rise of COVID-19 Mutual Aid. Change
Incorporated, 26 March 2020. [Online]. Available at:
https://uk.changeincorporated.com/possibilities/inside-the-rise-of-covid-19-
mutual-aid [Accessed 11 April 2020]
Bogg Alan and Michael Ford. 2020. Legislating in Times of Crisis: The Corona
Virus Job Retention Scheme. UK Labour Law Blog. [Online]. Available at:
https://uklabourlawblog.com/blog-
description/?blogsub=confirming#blog_subscription-7 [Accessed 11 April
2020]
Brodies LLP Law Partnership. 2020. Legal Updates – COVID-19 FAQs for
Employers. [Online]. Available at: https://brodies.com/binformed/legal-
updates/covid-19-faqs-for-employers [Accessed 11 April 2020]
Citizens Advice. 2018. Get a hardship payment if you’ve been sanctioned.
London: Citizens Advice. [Online]. Available at:

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https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/wales/benefits/universal-
credit/sanctions/hardship-payment/ [Accessed 11 April 2020]
Gramsci, Antonio. 2011 [orig. 1930]. Prison Notebooks Volume II. Edited and
translated by Joseph A Buttigieg. New York and Chichester: Columbia
University Press.
Human Rights Watch. 2020. Human Rights Dimensions of COVID-19
Response. New York: Human Rights Watch. [Online]. Available at:
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/19/human-rights-dimensions-covid-19-
response [Accessed 11 April 2020]
International Crisis Group. 2020. “COVID-19 and Conflict: Seven Trends to
Watch.” Crisis Group Special Briefing No 4. [Online]. Available at:
https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/B004-covid-19-seven-trends_0.pdf
[Accessed 12 April 2020]
International Labour Organisation(a), 2020. Global Employment Trends for
Youth
2020: Technology and the future of jobs. Geneva: ILO. [Online]. Available at:
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---
publ/documents/publication/wcms_737648.pdf [Accessed 11 April 2020]
International Labour Organisation(b), 2020. Statement by [NAME OF
EBMO]:the COVID-19 crisis and how we as a nation can collectively respond.
Geneva: ILO. [Online]. Available at:
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/-
--act_emp/documents/publication/wcms_740218.pdf [Accessed 11 April 2020]
International Monetary Fund. 2020. Policy Responses to COVID-19.
Washington:
International Monetary Fund. [Online]. Available at:
https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-
19 [Accessed 11 April 2020]
Macartney, Maurice. 2020. This is what an emergency looks like. The
Combination, 17 March 2020, updated 11 April 2020. [Online]. Available at:
http://thecombination.org.uk/2020/03/17/emergency/ [Accessed 12 April
2020]
Kropotkin, Peter. 1902. Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution. London: McClure,
Philips & Company. [Online]. Available at:
http://dl27.zlibcdn.com/dtoken/937eb2e58ede437fd96631767cd85902
[Accessed 12 April 2020]
National Code. 2020. Information and Advice on Coronavirus in Student
Accommodation for Housing Suppliers. Leeds: National Code. [Online].
Available at: https://www.nationalcode.org/news/information-and-advice-on-
coronavirus-in-student-accommodation-for-housing-suppliers [Accessed 11
April 2020]

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OECD. 2020. Tackling coronavirus (COVID-19): Contributing to a global effort.

Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. [Online].
Available at: https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/en/ [Accessed 11 April 2020]
Pym Hugh. BBC News article. Coronavirus: NHS workers’ lives at risk over PPE
shortages, says BMA. London: British Broadcasting Corporation. [Online].
Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-52252470 [Accessed 11 April
2020]
The Honorary Mr Justice Choudhury. 2020. Employment Appeal Tribunal:
Hearing Arrangements from 16 April 2020. [Online]. Available at:
https://www.trinitychambers.co.uk/media/2660/2020_04_09_eat-covid-19-
announcement-002.pdf [Accessed 11 April 2020]
UNISON. 2019. Bargaining on working hours. London: Unison. [Online].
Available at:
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hours-web1.pdf [Accessed 11 April 2020]
Volunteer Edinburgh. 2020. COVID-19/Coronavirus. [Online]. Available at:
https://www.volunteeredinburgh.org.uk/volunteer/covid-19/ [Accessed 12
April 2020]

About the author

Ben Duke has worked as a research fellow for the University of Nottingham in the
UK. When not conducting research on the policy reasons behind social injustice,
he does voluntary work for a number of charity organisations who help to
alleviate inequality.

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Care for those who care for you!

Domestic workers’ struggles in times of
pandemic crisis
Louisa Acciari (24th June 2020)

“Cleonice Gonçalves, present!” became the new slogan on the WhatsApp groups
of domestic workers in Brazil.1 Not by coincidence, one of the first deaths
confirmed by COVID-19 in the country (March 17th) was that of a domestic
worker: Cleonice Gonçalves, a black woman, aged 63, diabetic, leaving in the
city of Miguel Pereira in the state of Rio de Janeiro. Her employer, a resident of
the upper-class area of Leblon, had just returned from a trip to Italy and did not
inform her employee that she had been contaminated. One survived, the other
did not.
The new coronavirus was initially seen as a disease affecting more the
cosmopolitan middle and upper classes, with the financial conditions to travel
abroad and organise fancy parties. However, the virus soon started to reach the
popular classes, having a more critical effect on them. Since Cleonice Gonçalves
died, Brazil has registered more than 50,000 deaths, but many specialists alert
that the actual number could be 10 times higher, since the government has a
policy of not testing and not reporting adequately the causes of death. While the
middle and upper classes can easily protect themselves in spacious houses, with
the option of home office, social isolation is much more complex for the popular
classes who are forced to stay in work, and face precarious living and housing
conditions.
Domestic workers are the typical example of this precarious working class,
exposed to high risks of contamination and without adequate social protection:
they are black women, poor, with an average income below the minimum wage,
often heads of their households, and located in the informal sector. Of the 6.3
million domestic workers in Brazil, only 41% contribute to social security, 70%
do not have a formal contract and 47% are day labourers (IPEA, 2019). This
means that although there is a law that guarantees labour rights to them
(Complementary Law n. 150 of 2015), the majority of domestic workers fall
outside of the scope of the legislation. If this sector of activity has always been
marked by high rates of informality, precariousness is felt more violently in
times of pandemic crisis. The leaders of the National Federation of Domestic
Workers (FENATRAD) conducted a partial assessment of the situation of their
affiliates over the phone, and found three types of cases: day labourers (with no

1There is a tradition to say out loud the name of activists who passed away to show that their
memory is still alive; for instance, in women’s movements, it became common to scream
“Marielle Franco, presente!” in honour of the council officer of Rio de Janeiro, murdered on 15
March 2018. Cleonice Gonçalves was not an activist, but her death became a symbol of the
precarious situation of domestic workers.

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formal contracts), full-time domestic workers with a formal contract, and

caregivers.

Day labourers
According to union leaders, 90% to 95% of the day labourers (diaristas) with
whom they spoke over the phone are being fired without pay. A study published
by the Institute Locomotiva, made with employers, suggests that this number
would be closer to 40%, and that 23% of the day labourers would still be
working normally.2 The actual proportion is probably in between, as we can
expect that employers would under-report dismissals because of the Covid-19,
while the union leaders are quite likely to have been contacted only by those
who were fired. This mass dismissal is not illegal; day labourers are considered
“self-employed” by law, which means that they do not have access to the
unemployment benefit, and the employer owes them no notice period or
financial compensation. They are totally unprotected. There are about 2.5
million day labourers in Brazil. If they all get dismissed, there will be millions of
families without income or with a significant drop of income during the
pandemic crisis. Although the government has announced an emergency
financial support ($115 per month) for informal and unemployed workers,
which includes the day labourers, workers are facing difficulties in claiming this
benefit and the process is rather slow.
As explained by Valdelice de Jesus Almeida, President of the union of
Maranhão, and elected officer of the FENATRAD:

“Those who have a contract can stay home, and the day labourers, like myself, get
fired. Staying at home means not getting paid. As most of the domestic workers
are the breadwinners for their households, how will they pay for their bills? My
family, for example, depends on my salary, since my husband cannot afford to
pay for everything on his own. I don’t know how I am going to pay for the share of
the expenses I am usually responsible for. I haven’t been receiving money for
weeks. Most of the daily workers, diaristas, will go through this same situation.”

The FENATRAD has been contesting the unfair condition of the diaristas since
the approval of the law 150/2015. Although day labourers already existed
before, this legislation institutionalizes the distinction between full-time
formalised workers (who work for at least 3 days a week for the same employer),
and day labourers (who work up to 2 days a week for the same employer). A
difference that contradicts ILO Convention 189 on decent work for domestic

2See study published on 23 April: https://www.ilocomotiva.com.br/single-

post/2020/04/23/G1-39-dos-patr%C3%B5es-dispensaram-diaristas-sem-pagamento-
durante-pandemia-aponta-pesquisa

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workers, ratified by Brazil in 2018, which does not recognize any criteria of days
worked for the good application of equal labour rights.

Domestic workers with a formal contract

There is a minority of domestic workers with a formal contract. Some are
managing to negotiate a paid quarantine or anticipated vacations to maintain
their salary. The union of the city of São Paulo, where there have been collective
agreements with employers since 2017, estimates that about 70% of domestic
workers with a formal contract are in paid quarantine. But that only takes into
account the workers and employers with whom the union has been able to speak
in recent weeks, and it probably does not reflect the reality of the rest of the
country where such agreements do not exist. According to the Institute
Locomotiva (cited above), only 48% of the full-time formalised domestic
workers would benefit from a paid quarantine. Put in other words, more than
half of the domestic workers who hold a contract are being either dismissed or
kept in work.
In fact, many domestic workers reported to their unions that they have no
choice but work to survive. Some are being picked-up at home by their
employers, others have to face crowded public transports. One even shared that
her employer had raised her pay so that she keeps cleaning and cooking for the
household and their two student daughters (all working from home). These kind
of cases cause a certain discomfort; first, why is having someone else doing your
cleaning so vital during a pandemic crisis, and second, why not pay more the
employee under normal circumstances, if the employers can afford it? On the
bright side, when domestic workers have a formal contract, cases of abuse or
unfair dismissal are likely to be brought to a labour court by their unions.

Caregivers
The third case is that of the caregivers, who have been declared an essential
sector by the government. According to the unions, the absolute majority of
caregivers are, in fact, working. In many cases, patients could not stay without
this service, and their own families are often not trained to do the work of the
caregiver. However, there have been many reports of abuse, showing that the
rights of this category are not respected. Many caregivers continue to use public
transport on a daily basis, the employers do not always provide the appropriate
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), and unions have exposed several
instances of what they call “private imprisonment”. Some employing families
forced their caregiver to remain in quarantine with them, while others demand
double or triple shifts without offering the worker any financial compensation
or sufficient resting time.
Several feminist authors have discussed the precarious conditions of domestic
workers and caregivers, revealing the tension between the need for social
reproduction and the devaluation of the women who perform those tasks

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(Duffy, 2007; Hirata, Guimarães, 2012; Parreñas, 2001; Sorj, 2014). In the
context of the current crisis, this tension becomes particularly visible, and even
shocking. The cases of abuse reported by the domestic workers’ unions are
disconcerting: families aware of having a contaminated person who do not
inform the worker, threats of dismissal or just dismissal without pay, forced
quarantines, non-remunerated extra shifts. Domestic work is rooted in the
colonial legacy that has established a gender and race division of labour in
Brazil, and in fact, in most countries. The Covid-19 crisis shows only a new
expression of these persistent social inequalities, within which the labour and
the life of domestic workers are considered to worth less than that of the other
workers. In the collective imagination, certain tasks cannot be performed by the
“qualified”, white, middle-class, even in a situation of pandemic crisis.

Care for those who care for you!

But domestic workers are resisting. They are simultaneously fighting against the
Covid-19 and the exploitation from their employers. The FENATRAD launched
a national campaign, with the same slogan as their sister organisations in Latin
America affiliated to the International Domestic Workers’ Federation (IDWF),
called “Care for those who care for you” (in Portuguese: “cuida de quem te
cuida”).3 They require that employers provide the adequate level of protection
to those who have to work, such as the caregivers, while demanding the right to
a paid quarantine for the professional category. Their allied Congresswoman,
Benedita Silva, from the Workers’ Party, proposed a bill relaying domestic
workers’ demands. As argued by Creuza Maria de Oliveira, General Secretary of
FENATRAD: “the domestic worker is also a human being, she has a family and
needs to preserve her health”,4 while Luiza Batista, President of the Federation,
emphasizes: “We have to end this idea that quarantine in Brazil has become a
class privilege.”5
The FENATRAD also published guidelines for domestic workers, offering advice
on how to protect themselves and suggesting ways of negotiating the best
possible working conditions with their employers. Furthermore, local unions
are informing and representing their members via phone and WhatsApp even
though their doors are closed. As the crisis progressed, the Brazilian
government took some measures that impact the sector: the announcement of
an emergency financial support, and the possibility for employers to suspend

3See FENATRAD’s website : https://fenatrad.org.br/2020/03/18/cuida-de-quem-te-cuida-

proteja-sua-trabalhadora-domestica/
4Video published on 25 March: https://fenatrad.org.br/2020/03/25/veja-video-creuza-
oliveira-faz-apelo-aos-empregadores-para-a-liberacao-das-trabalhadoras-domesticas-durante-
a-pandemia/
5Interview published on 29 March : https://noticias.uol.com.br/saude/ultimas-
noticias/redacao/2020/03/29/domesticas-defendem-direito-a-quarentena-remunerada-e-
dividem-patroes.htm?cmpid=copiaecola&cmpid=copiaecola

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contracts or reduce wages and working hours for a period of 3 months. The
unions are helping domestic workers to claim their benefit, as many struggle
with the website, and they offer mediation with employers to those who have a
contract that is being revised.
Last but not least, union leaders are indeed taking care of domestic workers. In
most cities, they have been asking for donations and distributing food baskets to
those who lost their job. For most leaders, this is the first experience of
fundraising, and they have had to learn quickly how to handle new online
technologies. With homemade face masks, a bit of alcohol in gel 70% in their
bag, and an infinite amount of compassion, union leaders are facing the virus to
support the most vulnerable workers. Valdelice, President of the union of
Maranhão in Brazil, explains that taking care of domestic workers has become
one of her most important tasks:

“I also spend part of the day calling my affiliates and comrades to check in on
them, to know how they are coping. I speak to at least 20 domestic workers every
day, by WhatsApp, and I call another 5 who don’t have the application, every
Saturday, on their landlines. I ask them how they are doing, if they are taking care
of themselves, and offer my support. I let them know that I am here if they need
me. I know the situation is difficult for all of them and it can be nice to have
someone to talk to, we all want someone to tell us everything is going to be fine.”

Luiza Batista (with the red mask), President of the FENATRAD and of the
union of Pernambuco, distributing food baskets to domestic workers.

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All over Latin America, the unions affiliated to IDWF are adopting very similar
strategies: legal mobilisations, information, and humanitarian aid. In Chile, for
instance, the National Federation of Unions of Home Workers
(FESINTRACAP), sent a bill to the Congress demanding the right to a paid
quarantine. In Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, the unions are providing
information to their members via WhatsApp, Facebook, online conferences, and
they produced guidelines on how to avoid contamination. In El Salvador,
Guatemala and Paraguay, the leaders are distributing food and hygiene baskets
to domestic workers who lost their jobs.6 At the global level, IDWF is raising an
emergency fund to support its affiliates, if you can, please donate!7 With very
limited resources, and under an incredibly adverse context, domestic workers’
organisations are showing us the way forward: more rights, more collective
action, more solidarity.

References
Duffy, M. (2007). Doing the dirty work: Gender, race, and reproductive labor in
historical perspective. Gender and Society, 21(3), 313-336
Hirata, H., & Guimarães, N. A. (2012). Cuidado e Cuidadoras, as Várias Faces
do Trabalho do Care. São Paulo: Atlas.
IPEA (2019) report on domestic work:
http://ipea.gov.br/portal/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=35
231:td-2528-os-desafios-do-passado-no-trabalho-domestico-do-seculo-xxi-
reflexoes-para-o-caso-brasileiro-a-partir-dos-dados-da-pnad-
continual&catid=419:2019&directory=1
Parreñas, R. S. (2001). Transgressing the Nation-State: The Partial Citizenship
and "Imagined (Global) Community" of Migrant Filipina Domestic Workers.
Signs, 26(4), 1129-1154
Sorj, B. (2014). Socialização do cuidado e desigualdades sociais. Tempo Social,
26(1), 123-128.

6See more actions on IDWF website: https://idwfed.org/en/covid-19/the-idwf/rapid-

responses-by-the-idwf-affiliates/every-action-counts
7Link for donations: https://idwfed.org/en/covid-19/the-idwf/solidarity-fund/idwf-solidarity-
fund

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Vol 12 (1): 121 – 127 (July 2020) Acciari, Care for those who care for you!

About the author

Louisa Acciari is a Post-doctoral Researcher in the Department of Sociology
at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), and Research Associate of
the Department of Gender Studies at the London School of Economics (LSE).
She also works as a Programme Officer (Latin America) for the International
Domestic Workers’ Federation. A first version of this paper has been published
in Portuguese in the journal Dilemas.8

8 https://www.reflexpandemia.org/texto-5

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Labour conflicts over health and safety in the

Italian Covid19 crisis
Arianna Tassinari, Riccardo Emilio Chesta, Lorenzo Cini
(21st May)

Introduction
The current Covid19 crisis has raised new issues regarding health and work in
Italy. Far from being new, the pandemics rehabilitate a debate dating back to
the 1970s, which brought to the establishment of the national healthcare
system. Italy has a longstanding problem with health & safety at work. In 2019
alone, according to the estimates of workplace safety agency INAIL, more than
600,000 workplace accidents were reported, of which 1,089 deadly - roughly
three per day; to which many more unreported ones must be added. This
problem, particularly stark in Italy when compared to other European
countries, has many roots: widespread labour informality, unregulated
outsourcing practices, inadequate resources for workplace inspections and
upholding of legislation, and the quantitative predominance of micro- and small
workplaces in the Italian productive system where unions presence is low and
the flouting of regulations commonplace. For long, the issue of workplace
accidents and insecurity remained an invisible hemorrhage, which did not
attract neither headlines nor public attention. However, the Covid19 pandemic
has contributed to a sudden re-politicisation of this issue, putting it at the very
centre of public debate and labour conflict in Italy. In this contribution, we
outline the major points of contention on this issue which have emerged during
the Italian Covid19 pandemic, and the responses and strategies enacted by
labour movement actors.
In Maussian terms, pandemics have the characteristics of a «total social fact»,
with generally no borders, involving the totality of a population. Consequently,
the response of worker organizations and unions needed to overcome the
fragmentation of localized disputes, usually limited to specific plants or working
sectors. The problem of health and safety emerged in all its sharpness as an
issue of general interest when, due to the risk of biological contagion from
Coronavirus, the simple act of physically going to work suddenly became a
potentially deadly source of risk for the whole workforce, and not just for those
usually unseen minorities working in particularly dangerous occupations.
However, the potential universality of contagion from Covid19 was not matched
by an effective universality of protections against it. The management of the
Covid19 pandemic in Italy has rather been characterised by a persisting tension
between two contending imperatives: the protection of public health on the one
hand, and the push – especially from business organisations and political forces
mainly from the centre-right of the political spectrum -- to safeguard economic
growth. Or, to put it differently from the workers’ side, the tension between the
right to work and the right to health. This tension has manifested in various

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forms of more or less overt class conflict which have unfolded around the issue
of the safeguarding of health and safety since the onset of the Coronavirus crisis.
In the first phase of the Italian Covid19 emergency, between late February and
late March, the main issue of contention regarded the timings and
extensiveness of limitations on productive activities, and the granting of
adequate protections to essential workers who continued operating.
Since February 21, the Italian government has issued a series of decrees to
manage the worsening of the outbreak; some have confirmed that the protection
of workers in Italy is rather fragile. Indeed, it is now well-established that in the
first weeks of the Italian Covid19 crisis, delays in implementing widespread
closures of productive and commercial activities in the areas worst affected by
the outbreak in Northern Italy were decisively shaped by the lobbying of the
employers’ organisations (Confindustria) – both in industry and in the service
sector. When this stance became untenable from a public health perspective, the
government decided to tow a middle ground and shut down most commercial
outlets whilst recommending that all employers that could do so should
introduce working from home. But in line with the requests of the
manufacturing employers’ confederation Confindustria and its powerful
regional chapters in Lombardy, Assolombarda, most industrial activities and
factories remained initially operational – alongside supermarkets & local food
and drink shops, logistics and delivery services, construction sites, many call
centres, and many public services.
So, for these weeks Italy was in a situation in which, whilst the population as a
whole was being asked to stay home, at least 6 million people were still going to
work every day. Whilst some of these productive activities were, arguably,
‘essential’, many were not. This policy of selective and partial closures made
evident a sharp inequality, in terms of exposure to health risks, between workers
who were able to work from home (around 30% of the workforce, two thirds of
whom in highly qualified, well paid occupations), or stay home with some form
of income replacement, and those who could not and still had to work in
presence, often to carry out activities far from ‘essential’ in a crisis juncture, and
frequently without appropriate protections such as basic personal protective
equipment.

Concertation under the contagion:

labour conflict by other means
Different actors in the Italian labour movement responded differently to this
emerging tension, highlighting long-standing differences in their strategic
orientation. On the one hand, the major trade union confederations – CGIL,
CISL and UIL – initially moved slowly and cautiously on this issue, fearful of
not appearing too confrontational at a time of national crisis and seemingly
sharing into the narrative that production could not stop altogether, otherwise
the country would risk economic collapse. Same for the main centre-left party,
the PD (Democratic Party). On the other hand, some smaller rank-and-file

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unions like USB and S.I. COBAS opted for a more contentious approach, and
issued calls for the immediate closure of non-essential activities and also for a
general strike on 26 March. The relatively small membership of the rank-and-
file unions meant that these initiatives remained circumscribed in their reach.
At the same time, restrictions to public demonstrations and assemblies brought
indeed the Italian Commission of Guarantee of Law 146/90 to severely control
strikes and particularly those regarding essential productions and services.
However, workers in many sectors that stayed operational took the initiative in
their own hands to exercise their right to safeguarding their health at work. In
the second and third week of March, wildcat strikes broke out in many factories
and logistics warehouses around the country, with workers walking out to
demand the immediate implementation of health and safety measures that
could guarantee safe working conditions . In some factories with high
unionisation and strong trade union presence, these mobilisations resulted in
the temporary suspension of production, or at least prompted management to
re-organise production process drastically to guarantee safe working conditions.
But in most workplaces, especially small ones without any trade union presence,
this did not happen.
In mid-March, the government chose to respond to these emerging tensions
from below by choosing the avenue of social concertation and negotiating with
the main trade unions and employers’ confederation a ‘protocol’ outlining the
necessary measures that employers could and should implement to prevent
contagion in workplaces. This was a small step forward, celebrated by the
government and the ‘social partners’ alike as an exemplary instance of
negotiated crisis management1. The implementation of these measures
remained however voluntaristic, up only to the employers’ will. In workplaces
without trade union presence, this essentially made them toothless. In the
meanwhile, the numbers of infected people continued spiralling up, especially in
the most industrialised regions of Northern Italy, and the silence and lack of
strong intervention on part of the major unions persisted.
In face of emerging mobilisations from below and threats of a general strike
leveraged by the rank-and-file union movement, the major unions also came
round to calling for the closure of all non-essential productive activities. In the
late hours of March 21st, as the numbers of infections and deaths still did not
give a sign of slowing down, the government finally announced the closure of all
‘non-essential’ production activities. Heated negotiations with the main
employer confederations and the confederal unions ensued over the definition
of the list of the sectors and sub-sectors that should be designated as ‘essential’,
with the unions even threatening a general strike if the list remained too ample.
Again, the confederal unions claimed their intervention, which resulted in a
more restrictive list of essential activities, as an important victory.

http://www.filctemcgil.it/images/stories/flexicontent/news/panorama_sindacale/Protocollo_c
ondiviso_SSL_emergenza_Covid-19.pdf

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Class struggles or classification struggles?

The tripartite negotiations over the operational management of the economic
lockdown did not fully succeed in achieving the social pacification that the
government clearly hoped concertation would deliver. Rather, they inaugurated
a second and more dispersed phase of conflict, where the focus of contention on
the terrain of health and safety moved on to two other issues: i.e. the effective
extent of the closure of ‘non-essential’ activities, and the actual implementation
in workplaces of the health and safety norms for the prevention of contagion
outlined in the tripartite protocol. Borrowing Pierre Bourdieu’s famous
expression (1978), classification struggle became the terrain of a class struggle
under contagion.
Following the pressures of employer confederation Confindustria, the
formulation of the norms on compulsory closures left indeed ample space for
manufacturing firms to continue operating, even if they did not fall in the
original list of ‘essential’ sectors. All that firms had to do was to send a self-
declaration to the local governmental authorities (“Prefetto”), outlining the
reasons why they had to continue producing . The lack of any local
administrative capacity to check on the veracity of these declarations meant that
virtually all firms that declared themselves essential were able to stay open.
Meanwhile, in many ‘essential’ services - from food delivery to logistics and even
in healthcare - the implementation of even the most basic health and safety
norms - such as the provision of adequate protective devices and the adjustment
of working times and work organisation to prevent overcrowding - remained
often very loose.
Since May 4th, Italy has then entered the so-called ‘phase 2’, with staged re-
openings and progressive easing of the lockdown. This has come earlier than
many would have expected, largely due to the pressures leveraged on the
government by business groups and regional authorities in the northern
manufacturing regions. Contention has continued to emerge in several sectors
and workplaces over the application of health and safety norms during the
return to work. Whilst in some unionised and well-organised workplaces unions
have been in a position to negotiate at firm level local agreements on the re-
organisation of working time and operational procedures, in many other
contexts - especially in micro- and small workplaces with no union presence -
employer unilateralism has affirmed itself forcefully. Many episodes have been
reported of managerial counter-action and acts of retribution by employers
against workers who publicly denounced unsafe working conditions on social
media or demanded more stringent rules or the provision of PPE. Employers
organisations have also been launching a national offensive through political
lobbying channels, again supported by political forces on the centre and centre-
right, aimed at loosening the stringency of the guidelines originally issued by the
national institute for workplace safety INAIL governing the return to work, and
to eschew any potential penal responsibility in cases of workers becoming
infected.

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The unfolding of the Covid19 pandemic has therefore put the issue of health and
safety at the coalface of labour-capital conflict, and shown some of the limits of
the ‘concerted’ approach privileged thus far by the confederal unions. Indeed,
the national agreements on health & safety norms have shown all their limits
when it came to concrete implementation on the ground. This has remained
highly uneven across sectors and types of firms, strongly dependent on the local
relationships of power between labour and management, and on the extant
levels of organisation in workplaces. This fragmentation and disconnection
between peak-level agreements and practices on the ground reflects many of the
long-standing weaknesses of Italian industrial relations, and makes evident the
importance of workers’ agency and organising practices in effectively putting
into practice the rights and norms set on paper and move beyond employer
voluntarism - which often equates with widespread laxism. The Italian
government is tackling the crisis by building a labor regime based on the
exploitation of weaker workers, such as those employed in logistics or
agriculture where the migrant workforce is dominant.
So, considering these flashpoints of tension, how have “essential” workers
responded on the ground? We now discuss some of the most relevant examples
across different sectors.

The mobilizations in the food delivery and the logistics

The main contentious issue in the “essential” sectors of food delivery and
logistics throughout the most dramatic period of the Italian pandemic (“the
phase 1”) has been the implementation in workplaces of the health and safety
norms for the prevention of contagion outlined in the tripartite protocol. Since
the start of the lockdown, this issue has been the main target of protests and of
an increasing process of politicization, especially in sectors such as the gig
economy where the lack of adequate legal protections has exposed workers to
undergo an actual blackmail, forcing them to choose between the safeguarding
of their own health, on the one hand, and the access to an income and,
therefore, the possibility of survival, on the other.
Reporting the dynamics of work conflict in these sectors seems particularly
interesting, as none of these conflicts has been organized or fostered by the
presence of trade union confederations, namely, those actors signing the
protocol on the workers' behalf. In both sectors, the initiative has been
spontaneously triggered by the workers themselves and, only at a later time,
various kinds of grassroots organizations have played a role.
For what concerns delivery platforms, unlike other “essential” workers, because
of their legal status as self-employed, 'riders' have neither access to social safety
nets designed for dependent work, nor the possibility to temporarily abstain
from work, nor, in the majority of cases, access to sick leave in case of contagion
or compulsory quarantine. The decision whether to continue working or not
during the pandemic, carrying out a high risky activity that entails constant
physical contact with the client, is therefore seen by the workers as a forced

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choice between to keep the only source of income and the safeguarding of their
own health.
Since the beginning of the Covid19 emergency, riders have encountered great
difficulties in obtaining adequate forms of prevention against contagion from
delivery platforms during the execution of their working activities. Several
platforms have initially sought to escape from the obligation to provide them
with proper devices of individual protections, such as gloves, maskes, and
sanitizing gel, adducing the reason that riders were not their employees but only
partners with whom they occasionally collaborated. The responsibility for
adopting behaviors to prevent contagion during deliveries was also initially left
to the initiative of individual workers. And given the lack of implementation in
the safety procedures by the platforms and restaurants, riders often found
themselves having to face risky gathering situations when picking up food
deliveries from restaurants, unable to maintain the right safety distances.
Since mid-March, riders from all over Italy have thus begun a protest campaign
aimed at safeguarding their own health and their physical integrity during their
working time. The campaign consisted in sending video testimonies and taking
photos of themselves holding signs with a batch of hashtags:
#PeopleBeforeProfits, #NotForUsButForAll, #StopDelivering. The initiative was
launched by an alliance of different grassroots riders’ organizations such as
Deliverance Milano, Riders Union Bologna, Riders Union Roma, Riders per
Napoli – Pirate Union, and the Turin-based network Deliverance Project.
Addressing the government, the riders demanded the interruption of the food
delivery service, access to a social security cushion, actual distribution of
personal protective equipment by companies, and the suspension of tax
obligations for the whole of 2020.
In Milan and Turin, Deliveroo has been forced to guarantee two weeks of sick
pay for workers who were sick or subject to quarantine. In Bologna, faced with
delays on the part of many platforms in providing protections, it was the riders
themselves who took directly into their own hands, through the organizational
network of their union Riders Union, the responsibility to promote and
implement the anti - contagion, first by obtaining 500 masks from the
Municipality and then distributing them among the workers in a self-organized
way. Although the riders were not able to shut down the delivery service, they
have managed to get some intermediate objectives: creating more awareness
among people, extending the contact network among riders, and also
communicating to other workers that protection devices must be provided by
companies.
Logistics workers faced similar challenges and risky situations during the
pandemic. The hyper-diffusion of the virus in the areas with the highest
production intensity (Bergamo-Brescia) and logistics (Piacenza) is clearly linked
to the non-adoption of measures suspending the productive activities or forcing
the employers to provide workers with individual protection equipment. In this
sense, the perception of being "slaughter meat" was very strong among workers,
who since early March have spontaneously staged wildcat strikes in Northern

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Italy to demand the closure of their companies or the access to the individual
protection devices.
Facing the inertia of many companies, the first protest events have been spread
in a scattered way, initially self-organized by workers, especially in the logistics
hub of Piacenza. Since the second week of March, the grassroots union, S.I.
Cobas, which has in the logistics sector the main site of political intervention
since the first mobilizations of 2011, took the lead of the strikes. The wave of
mobilizations that has taken place in the logistics sector across Italy since mid-
March has been addressing frontally the issue of safety in the workplace. The
main concern that workers have raised in their protests concerned the issue of
those who were supposed to monitor the implementation of the security
measures in the workplace. As reported by Carlo Pallavicini, S.I. Cobas
spokesperson in Piacenza, in his account of the strikes in the logistics sector in
March: “There was an initial phase in which we supported the strikes that were
organized more or less spontaneously, whose culmination was around March
12-13 for the issue of safety in the workplace, with almost 100% of workers
participation in some warehouses where we are present.”
In the second half of March, several other mobilizations have continued
occurring in the Piacenza logistics interport , where, on March 17, also the
Amazon workers in the warehouse of Castel SanGiovanni (placed in the
Piacenza area) staged a strike, with the support of the union confederations of
CGIL, CISL and UIL, to force the company to take the necessary safety
precautions for its 1,600 employees. The strike ended the following week, with
an agreement between the unions and the company for the establishment of an
internal committee, composed of management and union delegates and aimed
at monitoring the application of the safety measures in the workplace. At the
moment, however, the workers report, the company would be hindering the
control activities by the delegates.

The epicenter of conflict:

worker mobilizations in the healthcare sector
“Before, we were invisible. Now we are heroes. Stop hypocrisy, we are just
workers”. This slogan appeared on 1st May 2020 over a banner out of the
hospital in Vercelli, in the Piedmont region in Italy. Workers and confederal
unions contested the rethorics emerged during the Covid19 crisis and which
emphasized the heroic status of workers while at the same time ignoring their
social and economic conditions.
The Covid19 crisis stressed the importance of the public health system as well as
the rights of health workers, from doctors to nurses. Visible in the dramatic
state of hospitals, the most direct effects of the Covid19 was indeed the
extraordinary need for doctors, nurses, assistants which brought the State to

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urgently open a new call for workforce2. On 9 March 2020, the Italian
government ratified an extraordinary decree which extended the recruitment of
health professionals and workers to young doctors and nurses which were close
to the completion of routinary qualifications - e.g. young doctors completing
their «specializzazione», similar to a specific PhD. degree. Moreover, part of the
personnel was recruited among retired doctors and specialists.
These measures were clearly extending to a broader public opinion the negatives
of decades of neoliberal reforms which progressively transferred public
resources to private clinics. If the marketization of health was previously an
aspect restrained to individual grievances or to specific movement
organizations, the Covid19 crisis triggered a phase of symbolic and real protests
which tried to establish new links among doctors, health workers, a variety of
workers claiming for a safe working environment as well as citizens, which were
directly and indirectly concerned as potential patients. In this sense, the slogan
“health is not a commodity”3 used during the online demonstration called
“White Sheets” launched on the World Health Day on 7 April 2020, reactivated
frames that characterized the worker struggles for health on the workplace
during the 1970s and that brought Italy to approve the Statuto dei Lavoratori in
1974 and the National Healthcare System (SSN) in 1978. The online
demonstration was indeed organized by «Medicina Democratica», an historical
expert movement organization which, born in the Northern factories,
contributed to create the first groups of occupational medicine which later on
became institutionalized. In this sense, the scientific activism of Medicina
Democratica has been a resource that at different phases contributed to
mobilizations on the right to health, be it in terms of health in the workplace,
environmental health or universal access to public healthcare.
In terms of claims of protests, the pandemics have opened new windows of
opportunities for health movement organizations, which became therefore one
of the central actors in a variety of issues regarding the link between politics of
health, prevention and anti-contagion measures, and particularly the link
between expertise and democracy. But at the same time, traditional forms of
activism were severely constrained by the lockdown and the rigid protocols
regarding public gatherings.
For these reasons, workers and activists elaborate new forms of demonstration.
As an example, the so called “White Sheets” mobilization mostly happened
through “clickactivism”, with citizens and activists posting online photos of
banners and messages exposed out of their balcony. Participants politicized
their domestic space and especially their balconies which were previously used
for other forms of expressive solidarity, like the diffusion of the national anthem
2

http://www.salute.gov.it/portale/nuovocoronavirus/dettaglioNotizieNuovoCoronavirus.jsp?lin
gua=italiano&id=4188
3

https://www.medicinademocratica.org/wp/?p=9914&fbclid=IwAR1SOmVpWCMGwYg6xz6Bnr
4_tl2QEyM6KGhPCYuMl50R_siaBgg_NGTHZaw

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in solidarity with health workers and as a sign of national cohesion. In this case,
health movements used the same setting to raise a critical voice which
emphasized the importance of the public health system and the health worker
rights.
Another change in the movement repertoire was visible in the general strike
launched by the USB Cobas4 which the Commission for Guarantee 146/90
obliged to convert into a symbolic “one-minute strike” at the end of daily shifts
of health workers, policemen involved in security controls, care workers, fire
brigades, workers in sectors of the environmental hygiene, gas and energy
distribution. Opportunities to mobilize increased with the transition to the so-
called “phase 2” which brought many other workers to strikes, from taxi
drivers, artisans, to dealers and street vendors and restaurateurs. Overcoming
the peak in deaths and contagions, the war rhetoric against the virus which
called for a national unity ceased and trust in Governmental decreased.
Opportunities to organize safe and distanced rallies increased as well, so that
traditional repertoire of action like street demonstrations became more popular
among various categories of workers affected by the economic consequences of
the lockdown.
If media narratives regarding the responsibility of the spread of contagion still
targeted runners and sport activities, health movements reframed new critical
claims like “Spread solidarity not the contagion”. The slogan emphasized the
need to consider the social and economic aspects characterizing Covid19 crisis,
where the availability of a domestic comfort zone equipped with large spaces
and ICT were privileged elements limited to specific social classes. Moreover,
the health crisis put on the table the condition of farm workers and especially
the need for a regularization of their status. Several strikes were organized in
the south of Italy - where most of the migrant workers are concentrated - and
out of the Parliament to claim for an extension of a recognition as worker and
citizen. Mostly, grassroots unions led the protests which contributed to a
governmental decree that approved the regularization of previously invisible
workers employed through black and informal work especially in the care sector
and in agriculture. In this sense a mobilization called “the strike of the
invisibles” took place on 21 May 20205, adding an important voice to the social
and political changes triggered by the pandemics. In this regard, the
mobilizations of migrant farm workers and health workers used a similar slogan
to describe the removal of work and worker rights that can be defined as one of
the key aspects of neoliberalism, which contradictions were clearly manifested
during the pandemics.

4https://www.usb.it/leggi-notizia/usb-conferma-lo-sciopero-generale-di-mercoledi-25-quanti-
morti-ancora-perche-il-governo-capisca-che-occorre-chiudere-tutto-diventi-lo-sciopero-di-
tutti-1014.html
5https://www.radiopopolare.it/sciopero-degli-invisibili-21-maggio-intervista-a-aboubakar-
soumahoro/

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Conclusions: on the link between labour and health

mobilizations
The Covid-19 crisis has contributed to putting the issue of health and safety at
work back at the centre of labour conflict in Italy. The selectivity of lockdown
measures has shown in naked light the tension between narrowly-defined
business interests for the preservation of economic activity, and the broader
public interest for the safeguarding of health. Furthermore, the evident
mismatch between the content of tripartite agreements concluded by peak-level
actors and their actual implementation on the ground have made evident the
long-standing blindspots in the application and exercise of the legal rights to the
safeguarding of health at work on the ground. The dynamics of worker
mobilisation in ‘essential’ sectors, such as food delivery, logistics, and
healthcare, have made clear that those rights which exist on paper have to be
enacted and reclaimed by workers through their active agency, overcoming the
limits of employer voluntarism which, in most cases, translates in passivity if
not blatant disregard for workers’ interests. These issues have deep roots, but
have now received renewed attention. The Covid19 pandemic is thus reigniting
and giving new urgency to an old debate among unions, worker organizations
and social movements regarding the centrality of health as a public good. This
could bring to new alliances among unions, grassroot worker groups, health
activists, and expert organizations for new mobilizations claiming the universal
right to public healthcare and health at work, and highlighting the necessary
connections between the two.

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About the authors

Arianna Tassinari is a comparative political economist specialised in labour
relations and labour movements. She is currently a Max Weber Postdoctoral
Fellow in the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the European
University Institute in Florence, Italy. She received her PhD in Industrial
Relations from the University of Warwick, with a thesis on the resilience of
corporatism in the governance of austerity during the Great Recession in
Europe. Her work has appeared in international outlets such as Work,
Employment and Society, Socio-Economic Review, Transfer and Italian
Politics, as well as in several edited volumes.
Riccardo Emilio Chesta is a comparative sociologist, currently post-doctoral
research fellow at the Scuola Normale Superiore and the Carlo Azeglio Ciampi
Institute for Advanced Studies in Florence. His work regards the democratic
dilemmas of expertise for environmental action and technological innovation,
and his current researches are on the social aspects of digital capitalism and
industry 4.0. His research interests cover sociological theory, sociology of
knowledge and expertise, political economy, labor and environmental politics.
Lorenzo Cini is a political sociologist in the Faculty of Political and Social
Sciences of the Scuola Normale Superiore of Pisa. He has published articles and
chapter contributions in edited volumes (for Brill and Routledge) and journals
(Critical Sociology, Current Sociology, Social Movement Studies, Italian
Review of Political Science, Anthropological Theory and PACO). His last
publication is a monograph (The Contentious Politics of Higher Education.
Struggles and Power Relations within Italian and English Universities) in
Routledge’s Mobilization Series.

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Acts of whistleblowing: the case of collective

claim making by healthcare workers in Egypt
T. Sharkawi & N. Ali (28th June 2020)

Abstract
After a brief interlude of democratization ushered in by the Arab uprisings in
2011, Egypt has taken a sharp turn towards authoritarianism. While political
repression has disintegrated social movements and demobilized seasoned
activists, the outbreak of the coronavirus has afforded an opening for new
voices, such as those of healthcare workers who took to social media to expose
mismanagement and malpractice within the healthcare sector. The article
examines acts of whistleblowing performed by Egypt’s healthcare workers
during a public health crisis, drawing on qualitive research materials collected
from social media, trade union press releases, and interviews conducted with a
small group of doctors and pharmacists. The article contends that individual
acts of whistleblowing can produce unconventional practices towards collective
claim-making prompting multiple forms of contentious mobilization. The
findings highlight main features that facilitate diffusing and sustaining
mobilization under prohibitive authoritarian settings.

Keywords: acts of whistleblowing, social movements, authoritarianism,

COVID-19, Egypt.

Introduction
Since the removal of the democratically-elected President Mohamed Morsi in
2013, Egypt has taken a sharp turn towards authoritarianism. The new
leadership has taken great pains to consolidate its rule, curbing in the process
dissent and curtailing freedom of speech. Various political and legislative
measures have been introduced to clamp down on unions, civil society and any
form of grassroots organizing. Nevertheless, the outbreak of the coronavirus has
encouraged many healthcare workers to speak out, taking to social media to
expose mismanagement and malpractice within the healthcare sector.
Participants in this series of whistleblowing videos and posts publicly express
grievances about adverse working conditions and make claims using their real
identities. Whilst there is no dearth of anonymous leaks or incidents of
extraterritorial whistleblowing by members of the Egyptian diaspora, acts
similar to those undertaken by healthcare workers have been extremely rare in
post-2013 Egypt.
This article engages with social movement scholarship to argue that the
coronavirus pandemic has provided an opportunity for the emergence of novel
acts of dissent and mobilization among members of the healthcare community
operating under highly prohibitive authoritarian conditions in Egypt. While

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political repression in Egypt has disintegrated social movements and

demobilized seasoned activists, forcing many into exile, the pandemic has
afforded an opening for new voices, such as those of healthcare workers, who
have deployed different implicit and explicit forms of renegotiating their social
contract. The article further contends that individual acts of whistleblowing,
which take a public and interactive nature, can produce unconventional
practices towards collective claim-making prompting contentious mobilization.
The main questions the article attempts to address are how and why this wave
of contention has started and is sustained in a ruthlessly repressive
authoritarian setting. The article is organized into three sections. It begins with
a review of Egypt’s militarized authoritarianism under President Abdelfattah El-
Sisi to contextualize the repercussions of the prohibitive conditions created by
this brand of authoritarianism on social mobilization and dissent. This section
then turns to surveying the state of the healthcare sector in Egypt and its
connections with the military institution. Drawing on analytic categories
developed within social movement theory, the article then moves to examine
empirical research materials collected from social media, trade unions press
releases and statements, and interviews conducted with a small group of doctors
and clinical pharmacists in Egypt. More specifically, it analyzes acts of
whistleblowing performed by Egypt’s healthcare workers during a public health
crisis, focusing on how collective claim making escalated into instances of direct
action. This section looks closely at the relevant changing opportunity structures
and threat levels, the social networks involved and the framing of the collective
claims of healthcare workers. The analysis concludes that deviation from
conventional forms of collective claim making under repressive rule and in
times of crisis was crucial in diffusing and sustaining mobilization within the
healthcare sector. Building on these findings, the article calls for reconsidering
predominant modes of collective claim-making under repressive
authoritarianism. Finally, the article considers the impact of the swelling of
collective claim making by healthcare workers on future popular mobilization,
sustaining political and social dissent, and engendering the formation of new
social and political grassroots networks that can escape authoritarian state
surveillance.

Legislating authoritarianism
The history of authoritarianism in Egypt dates back to the popularly-backed
military coup of 1952 placing the country into the hands of successive military
rulers who stifled political life. The Arab uprisings in 2011 ushered in a brief
interlude of democratization, popular mobilization and civic participation.
However, following the popularly-backed putsch in 2013, Egypt has reverted to
a harsher authoritarianism which expanded the role of the military in politics
and civil domains in ways unseen before (Sayigh, 2012; 2019; Rutherford,
2018). The new leadership has taken great pains to consolidate its rule, curbing
in the process dissent and curtailing freedom of speech (Abrams, 2015; Cook,
2017; Hawthorne & Miller, 2019). A body of legislation introduced in the past

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few years helped “legalizing authoritarianism” (Hamzawy, 2016) in Egypt,

namely, the Protest Law (107/2013) – and its 2017 amendment – which
restricted demonstrations and gatherings (Hamzawy, 2016). This law has
effectively put an end to all forms of public manifestation and organizing. This
was followed by the Cybercrime Law (175/2018) which legalized internet
censorship (Hassan, 2018; Mada Masr, 2018; RSF, 2018), and “provide(d)
authorities with further leeway to conduct comprehensive surveillance of
communications…forcing broad collection of data...not provided for in the law”
through five major surveillance actors including the General Intelligence,
Military Intelligence and the National Security Agency (Privacy International,
2019). Egypt’s early adoption1 of a ‘networked authoritarianism’ (MacKinnon,
2011)2 facilitated the enforcement of the Cybercrime Law with the aim of
targeting political dissidents and non-dissidents who could be seen as a threat
to the monopoly of the state over communication and information. Through its
significant investment in technologically advanced methods of social control
and networked repression such as communication surveillance (FIDH, 2018;
Privacy International, 2019), the Egyptian regime demonstrated its evolving
dynamics of ‘tactical adaptation against dissidents’ (Karagiannopoulos, 2012;
Lynch, 2011). The latest measure in this run towards ‘legalizing
authoritarianism’ is the amendment of the Emergency Law (162/1958) in May
2020 which exploited the COVID-19 public health crisis to further undermine
judicial independence by “permanently introduc(ing) military personnel to the
panel of the Emergency High State Security Court and expanding the
jurisdiction of the military judicial system over civilians” (EFHR, 2020).
The introduction of this series of laws cemented the legal enforcement of
authoritarianism and legitimized the militarization of civil life in Egypt. This
stands in sharp juxtaposition to a legislative vacuum in relation to
whistleblowing as seen in the absence of any laws that can protect
whistleblowers in Egypt (Birch et al., 2015). This has had catastrophic
consequences for Hesham Genena, the former head of the Accountability State
Authority, Egypt’s central auditing agency. Genena was fired and then arrested
in 2016 after releasing a report that reveals the involvement of the state in
corruption transactions that cost Egypt’s budget around $68 billion over four
years (Aboughabal, 2018). To further suppress political life, the government
also declared the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s most influential opposition
party, a terrorist group, in addition to arresting at least 60,000 people on
political grounds from 2013 to 2019 (HRW, 2019). Meanwhile, the crackdown
on civil society organizations has escalated, leaving most inoperative or

1The President’s Men? Inside the Technical Research Department, the secret player in Egypt’s
intelligence infrastructure. (2016) Medium https://medium.com/privacy-international/the-
president-s-men-9a1d0e0e1e62 Accessed 29 May 2020
2 In her research on how China uses the internet to suppress dissent, Mackinnon (2001) argues
that the internet has globalized the reach of state security apparatuses and their agents and
informers, placing dissidents and critics inside and outside on the radar of authoritarian
regimes which has created a ‘networked’ form of authoritarianism.

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ineffective (Amnesty International, 2016; Austin Holmes, 2017, HRW, 2016). In

tandem, privately-owned satellite channels, which have played a crucial role in
the run-up to the uprising in 2011, have toed the line of the state, whether by
means of intimidation or direct acquisition (AFTE, 2018). This unprecedented
clampdown on political life has coincided with the military leveraging its
influence to advance its economic expansion (Abul-Magd, 2016; Noll, 2017).

The healthcare sector in Egypt

Decades of systemic mismanagement and underfunding have left Egypt’s public
healthcare system in shambles, disproportionately ill-equipped to cope with a
lethal pandemic. Egypt has 1.6 bed hospitals for every 1,000 people,
significantly lower than the WHO recommendation of 5 beds per 1,000
population (World Bank, 2014). In the past few decades, economic migration
attracted scores of doctors and nurses fleeing low pay and poor working
conditions3 in Egypt. The Egyptian Medical Syndicate (EMS) estimates that
more than 50% of its membership of 220,000 registered doctors work outside
Egypt (Abd El-Galil, 2019). Public hospitals are also understaffed by around
55,000 nurses (Abdo, 2020). An EMS board member estimated that around
1,800 Egyptian villages do not have doctors (Debes, 2015). This grim picture of
the healthcare sector in Egypt is the background against which systemic efforts
have been directed towards militarizing the Ministry of Health (MoH). Several
plans were adopted in 2018 to ensure that the Egyptian Armed Forces are
involved in: 1) the procurement and importing of medical equipment and baby
formulas; 2) the construction of new hospitals; and 3) the militarization of the
organizational structure of the MoH through appointing members of the Armed
Forces to fill managerial positions in the ministry and at public hospitals
(Hamdy, 2019). The military seems to be also keen on discursively and visually
asserting their involvement in the MoH. This is evident in the countless pictures
and footage of the Minister of Health, Hala Zayed, in Egyptian media where she
is seen accompanied by army generals in field trips, press conferences, and
official visits to other countries. A picture from a pro-government newspaper of
Zayed on a podium closely surrounded by army generals was turned into a
meme trending on Egyptian social media.4 The text accompanying the picture
added by the author of the meme read: “I would like to reveal the actual figures
of coronavirus infections but I can’t.”
Against this backdrop, and bearing the brunt of the fight against a deadly virus,
many healthcare workers have made noise in order to highlight shortcomings,

3Doctors’ infection allowance is 19 Egyptian pounds (slightly over $1) a month, while judges, a
mainstay of the regime, receive 3,000 pounds (about $187) per month.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200402-proposed-covid-19-pay-rise-insufficient-say-
egypts-doctors/ (accessed 22 May 2020)
4The picture of the minister of health: Elbalad (2020) ‘The minister of health welcomes families
and children repatriated from China’, 17 February. Available at:
https://www.elbalad.news/4177956.

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assert rights and put forth demands. The current authoritarian environment of
Egypt which brought back political fear to public life (Khalifa, 2017) makes it
difficult to dismiss these acts of whistleblowing as merely workplace grievances.
The return of large-scale state surveillance after 2013, which Egyptians
experienced under Mubarak (Asad, 2012), forced many to self-censor and
eventually withdraw from engaging with politics (Matthies-Boon, 2017). In a
prevailing culture of a “silencing fear planted from above” (Pearlman, 2016, p.
30)5, speaking out becomes an act of dissent, and individual discursive acts of
opposition (on social media) become public expressions of disagreement and
non-compliance through which collective political agency is exercised. In
Egypt’s muted public sphere, and amidst the quiet of an eerie lockdown, the
voices of healthcare workers broke the silence and fear, turning their individual
grievances into collective claims.

Social movements and acts of whistleblowing

Social movement scholarship posits that opportunities for contentious
mobilization are oftentimes met with the threat of suppression (Tilly and
Tarrow, 2007). Mobilization can often begin in response to changing political
opportunities (Meyer, 2004), when actors involved in “contentious politics
combine response to threat with seizing opportunities” (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007,
p. 58). These opportunities are often engendered in connection to shifting
regime characteristics (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007, pp. 58-59). Accordingly,
changes in political opportunity structures are of particular relevance to
understanding the conditions under which actors can mobilize (Tarrow, 1994)
in spite of the threat of repression from a consolidated authoritarian regime like
that of Egypt. A combination of opportunity and threat can, therefore, explain
why and how healthcare workers in Egypt have recently engaged in defiant acts
of whistleblowing which they then escalated, at a great risk, into collective claim
making against a repressive and authoritarian regime.
A number of factors have arguably opened a window of opportunity for
healthcare workers in Egypt to engage in contentious mobilization under harsh
authoritarianism. While no substantial changes in the Egyptian regime can be
tangibly identified, and forms of militarized policing of dissenters and non-
dissenters are still widely employed, the pandemic and the ensuing public
health crisis have unquestionably overwhelmed the state’s struggling economy
and public health services at a staggering scale. Consequently, opportunity
structures during the peak of a global pandemic have been more favorable to

5 Pearlman’s work describes Syria’s legacy of political fear and repression. Her perspective can
also be extended to Egypt as the two countries entered a political union from 1958 to 1961 led by
the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser’s reign is said to have paved the way for a
legacy of state violence, political suppression and fear, transforming Egypt from a constitutional
monarchy to an authoritarian police state. See Cook (2011), Joesten (1974), Kandil (2012), and
Podeh (2004).

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mobilization by healthcare workers in Egypt precisely because, paradoxically, it

was not anticipated.
Despite vast scale unionization and the prominent role played by the Egyptian
Medical Syndicate (EMS)6 in modern Egyptian politics (Abou Omar, 2013), the
majority of doctors and other middle-class healthcare workers7 in Egypt are
generally perceived not to be as politically engaged as other groups in Egyptian
society. Because of the arduous admission requirements to schools of medicine
and pharmaceutical sciences in Egypt and the difficulty of graduating from
these schools, doctors and pharmacists are largely viewed by many Egyptians as
hardworking and career-focused albeit somewhat socially isolated.8 This social
perception may have made many doctors less heavily monitored9 by Egyptian
security agencies. Fighting the pandemic under excruciatingly difficult
conditions, Egyptian healthcare workers, like their peers around the world, have
been working very hard, showing resilience and resourcefulness despite
substantial government mismanagement. This prompted state officials and the
main stream media10 to hail healthcare workers as ‘Egypt’s white army’11
commanding their ‘courage, heroism and sacrifice’. Songs have been composed
in praise of doctors and many Egyptians have used the phrase ‘Egypt’s White
Army’ on social media in appreciation of doctors and nurses on the frontline.
This newly found national appreciation for underpaid and overworked

6 The Egyptian Medical Syndicate is an independent organization that was established in 1920
under the name of the Egyptian Medical Society which was later changed to syndicate in 1926.
The leadership and the administrative organizational structure of the Syndicate run like a trade
union and some of the objectives of the EMS stated on their website are those typical of a union.
The wider mission statement of the Syndicate ranges from providing medical education and
training, medical ethics, primary and preventive medical care, to engaging with national causes
and building bridges with regional medical unions and syndicates. For more background on the
recent struggles of members of the Syndicate, see (Hodaib, 2016) and (El-Mahdawy, 2018).
7See Kandil (2012) for an analysis of how the middle class was perceived to be an ally of the
Mubarak regime, yet was first to take to the streets in2011 demanding the fall of the regime.
8This remark draws on findings from telephone interviews conducted (in Arabic) by T.
Sharkawi with doctors and pharmacists at the National Cancer Institute in Cairo, Egypt during
the first week of June 2020.
9State surveillance in Egypt has (historically) targeted those who are affiliated to or have
connections with the Muslim Brotherhood.
10The private main stream media in Egypt are informally controlled by the state security
apparatus.
11The subtext of this description is comparing the “courage, heroism and sacrifice” of Egyptian
healthcare workers to that of the Egyptian armed forces who have been engaged in a ‘war on
terror’ in Sinai in the north east of Egypt for the past seven years. In these years, the incumbent
regime used the media and educational institutions to engender a neonationalist discourse
which glorifies the armed forces as an organization, and individuals who belong to the military.
This is exemplified in songs valorizing the army sung by public school pupils during their
morning assembly, films and TV drama shows produced by the Ministry of Defense and similar
prescriptive displays of national solidarity with the army.

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professionals of the public healthcare sector12 coalesced with staunch support

from the EMS for doctors.
As the registered trade union and professional association for doctors in Egypt
and one of the oldest unions in the region, EMS played an actively prominent
role during this public health crisis, holding online press conferences and
publishing regular press releases; criticizing and demanding revisions of
protocols adopted by the Ministry of Health (MoH); issuing statements of
support for doctors on the frontline underlining the conditions they are facing;
and successfully negotiating on behalf of the families of doctors who die from
Covid-19 infections to receive the same pension and compensation provided to
families of soldiers who are killed in combat. Following several acts of
whistleblowing, which exposed cases of infected doctors who have died due to
the unavailability of beds in the hospitals specializing in treating the
coronavirus, the EMS demanded that the MoH designate hospitals exclusively
for the treatment of infected healthcare workers across the country. With the
spike in infections and deaths among healthcare workers, the EMS adopted a
more vocal stance in advancing the rights of doctors. Its elected general-
secretary, who is also the head of the Egyptian Medical Syndicates Union,
coordinated with other medical syndicates to release a strongly worded
statement13 addressed to the Egyptian President General Abdelfattah El-Sisi.
The statement published on May 24 accused the MoH of negligence and failure
to protect medical doctors, stressing that the MoH “has an obligation towards
doctors and all medics,” and emphasizing the “imperative to provide them with
the necessary protection and rapid medical intervention for those who contract
the disease.” The statement goes on to stress that the Syndicate “holds the
health ministry responsible for the mounting deaths and infections among
doctors due to its negligence … that is tantamount to death through a dereliction
of duty” (AFP, 2020).
These dynamics combined have carved an opportunity for contentious
mobilization among healthcare workers in Egypt – an opening that is less
available to other groups in the country at present. This shifting in opportunity
structure becomes more evident when contrasted to the fate of the social media
campaign ‘Egypt’s Scholars are Angry,’ which was launched in August 2019 to
demand the reform of salaries and pensions at public universities. The
campaign managed to mobilize thousands of faculty members to engage in
collective claim making but stressed that this was not a call for strike action. 14
Despite the growing number of supporters, the campaign failed to gain wider
traction among Egyptians inside and outside academia. On August 31, the

12Egypt has an extremely underserviced and impoverished public health sector, and a growing
private sector for health services that are deemed beyond affordability for many Egyptians. See
Youngman (2015).
13The text of the statement published on the website of the Egyptian Union of Medical
Syndicates: https://emu-eg.org/?p=1245
Technically, it would have been complicated to organize a strike given that universities in
14

Egypt are banned by law from unionizing.

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National Security Agency (NSA) arrested law professor and co-founder of the
campaign, Tarek El Sheikh (AFTE, 2020A). Further arrests of several
prominent political science professors and junior faculty members took place in
the following week; some of whom still remain in custody without trial (AFTE,
2020B).15 Juxtaposing these two instances of collective claim making reveals the
conditions under which mobilization interacts with the dynamics of a pandemic,
national solidarity and a strong union, to mediate changes in opportunity
structures. Thus, “the ‘when’ of social movement mobilization – when political
opportunities are opening up – goes a long way towards explaining its ‘why’”
(Tarrow, 1994, p. 17). To further explore the changing opportunity structure and
the dynamics involved, the article focuses on two of the early cases of
whistleblowing that took place at two university hospitals in Cairo: the National
Cancer Institute and Al-Zahraa Hospital.
As is the case with most forms of dissent, it is not a simple task to account for
the onset of contention. It is, however, believed16 that the National Cancer
Institute (NCI)17 in Cairo is the site where the first acts of whistleblowing were
performed by healthcare workers. The earliest documented incident started
when a nurse exhibited symptoms of COVID-19 on March 21, motivating staff to
ask the dean of the NCI to adopt strict preventive measures in order to ensure
the safety of vulnerable patients and medical staff.18 The dean’s response was
sending instructions to resume business as usual, and warning against
disclosing any work-related information on social media (Abdelwahab, 2020).
When the NCI head of anesthesia revealed on Facebook that two staff members
had tested positive, she was forced to delete the post, and was later suspended
by the dean.19 By early April, 17 doctors and nurses working in the hospital had
contracted the virus (Alaa El-Din, 2020). This coincided with recurring
statements by the EMS calling on the government and the MoH to provide

15 Egypt arrests prominent critics of Sisi with 1,400 detained since Friday protests
https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-arrests-prominent-political-scientists-critical-sisi
(accessed 29 May 2020)
16This conclusion is based on research materials collected from 1) social media, 2) independent
digital news media platforms during the period from the second half of March to end of May
2020, in addition to 3) interviews conducted with doctors and pharmacists at the NCI during
the first week of June 2020.
17The National Cancer Institute is Egypt’s largest oncology hospital and research institute
operating several pediatric and adult departments, outpatient units and pharmacies serviced by
thousands of doctors, pharmacists, nurses and medical technicians. The NCI is affiliated to and
funded by Cairo University and its medical staff are academic faculty members. Medical services
at NCI are offered to patients free of charge.
18Testimony of a clinical pharmacist at the NCI on the breakout of the virus at the Institute and
the response of the dean. These details were verified by two of the research participants
interviewed in June 2020. https://www.cairo24.com/2020/04/04/-‫حذرت‬-‫صيدالنية‬-‫بالفصل‬-‫هددوها‬
‫مع‬-‫تحول‬-‫من‬/
19Testimonies of two colleagues of the NCI head of anesthesia
https://www.facebook.com/611353599/posts/10157516780293600/?d=n; and
https://www.facebook.com/100000228084062/posts/4263075767043317/?d=n.

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testing and personal protective equipment (PPE) to medical staff country wide,
and expressing strong support for doctors across Egypt.20
As the NCI dean continued to deny confirmed cases of Covid-19 among staff or
patients, several staff members claimed that they were threatened to be
terminated if they speak out about any Covid-19 cases (Abdelwahab, 2020).21 It
could be argued that this escalation by the NCI dean together with the attention
the situation has received from independent news media impacted opportunity
structures perceived by healthcare workers in Cairo and elsewhere in the
country. Enraged by the inaction of the NCI senior management, several
doctors, pharmacists and nurses resorted to social media to expose the
situation. One pharmacist revealed the details of a closed meeting the medical
staff had with the dean. She claimed in a Facebook post that the dean said: “If
you are afraid of the Coronavirus, then submit your resignation and don’t come
again” in response to her pointing out that failure to act swiftly could cause
harm to doctors and patients alike. She also accused him of outright lying in his
public statements to the media (Ahmed, 2020).
If the National Cancer Institute was the first hit by the virus, then Al-Zahraa
Hospital in Cairo, affiliated to Al-Azhar University, has probably been one of the
hardest-hit hospitals in Egypt, with at least 135 reported infections among staff
(EG24 News, 2020). Following in the footsteps of their NCI colleagues, several
doctors took to social media to criticize the hospital management and expose
the gravity of the situation. In a Facebook post dated May 13, an intern doctor
called out “the injustice” she and her colleagues had faced. She explained that
she was assigned to work five 12-hour shifts in one week during which the
senior management of the hospital “was covering-up on the real number of
infections” and refusing to perform Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) tests on
workers who had come in direct contact with suspected Coronavirus patients. 22
Another doctor posted on Facebook demanding the provision of isolation beds
and treatment for medical staff saying: “our most basic right is to offer us and
our families a place for isolation and treatment,” and urging his followers to
help in exposing the situation by sharing his post.23 The story was picked up by
the media after similar whistleblowing posts started circulating (EG24, 2020).
An incomprehensive number of PCR tests were performed only after the media

The EMS has published daily statements since the outbreak of the virus on its website:
20

www.ems.or.eg
21Testimony of a pharmacist on the response of the NCI senior management and the
intimidation of staff. The alleged intimidation was also reported by several of the doctors and
pharmacists interviewed in June:
https://www.facebook.com/HagarAshmawy/posts/10219645233774823; and
https://www.cairo24.com/2020/04/04/‫مع‬-‫تحول‬-‫من‬-‫حذرت‬-‫صيدالنية‬-‫بالفصل‬-‫هددوها‬/
22 https://www.facebook.com/100002897158832/posts/2669106193195926/?d=n
23 https://www.facebook.com/100026009796852/posts/536160857260903/?d=n.

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had reported the outbreak, yet the MoH failed to provide isolation beds for
medical doctors who tested positive.24
The recurring acts of whistleblowing by NCI and Al-Zahraa staff garnered
support from many Egyptians on social media who shared and retweeted
whistleblowing posts using the Arabic hashtag ‘solidarity with Egypt’s doctors.’
These acts of whistleblowing interacted with national and EMS solidarity which
were critical for animating and sustaining further mobilization and drawing
recruitment from other groups in the healthcare sector. Similar acts of
whistleblowing soon started to swell across Egypt. This was reflected in the
larger numbers of nurses, pharmacists, medical technicians and paramedics
posting on Facebook to expose wrongdoing at their workplace, as well as
sending complaints to the EMS to report malpractice. In a whistleblowing post,
a doctor at Al-Matareya Hospital warned that the situation was “catastrophic”
and had “gotten out of control.” Whistleblowing escalated into harsh criticism
from healthcare workers levelled at the health minister, her senior advisors, and
the state at large for the inefficient and unmethodical handling of the crisis. The
same doctor laments the terrible working conditions endured by staff saying:
“The state and the ministry (of health) have sold us out.”25 Another doctor
responded to the ministry’s decision to modify the testing protocol for COVID-
19 in ways that could ultimately increase the risk of infection by saying: “They
are killing the medical teams.”26 Objecting to the same infamous protocol, an
intensive care physician stated: “Enough with the monkey business, health
ministry.”27 A third doctor exposed in detail the grave conditions of public
hospitals leading to her decision to quit working for the MoH explaining that
she is “not ready to bear the guilt for all those who will perish due to poor
capabilities and mismanagement.” Then, hinting at her intention to move
overseas, she said: “You are not safe in Egypt. It is impossible for me to raise my
children in a country where I might not be able to save their lives if they fell
ill.”28
Growing acts of whistleblowing on social media continued to focus on collective
claim making through discursively framing demands to reflect a unified voice of
the healthcare community at large. For instance, a doctor at Al-Hussein
University Hospital stated: “We want the same social protection and financial
rights that the army and officials have. Believe me, doctors do not want songs or
titles29 – we just want to be able to do our job safely” (Michaelson, 2020).30 The

24 https://www.facebook.com/100002897158832/posts/2669106193195926/?d=n.
25 https://www.facebook.com/815525496/posts/10163983410605497/?d=n.
26 https://www.facebook.com/815525496/posts/10163980298145497/?d=n.
27 https://www.facebook.com/815525496/posts/10163798416020497/?d=n.
28 https://www.facebook.com/100003927702950/posts/1668382463302661/?d=n.
29 This is an allusion to the description ‘Egypt’s white army’
30“Egyptian authorities have forced (Michaelson, the Cairo-based Guardian journalist) to leave
the country after she reported on a scientific study that said Egypt was likely to have many more
coronavirus cases than have been officially confirmed. Ruth Michaelson, who…reported from

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rise in acts of whistleblowing31 on social media alongside the increasing

solidarity statements and press releases by the EMS seem to have prompted
contentious mobilization on a wider scale. This is evident in how whistleblowing
escalated into growing calls for collective disobedience in the form of refusal to
work until testing and PPE are provided. Following the disclosure of the full
extent of the virus outbreak at NCI, a number of nurses assembled in front of
the main entrance32 of the hospital. Addressing senior management, one of the
nurses said rebukingly: “If you are not concerned about our safety, then (at
least) be concerned about the patients” (Basha, 2020). In the same vein,
individual acts of whistleblowing at Al-Zahraa Hospital took on a collective
character. Frustrated at being deprived of their basic rights, the hospital doctors
issued a public statement on May 20 outlining their struggle with senior
managers to ensure that health and safety procedures are put in place. The
statement lists the various demands they made since early April to protect the
hospital staff from contracting the virus, adding that the hospital’s managers
flouted their demands and even failed to provide them with basic PPE.33 In
response to mounting pressure, the director of the hospital was forced to submit
his resignation.
By extension, mobilization among doctors and clinical pharmacists in Cairo
affected opportunity structures perceived by healthcare workers elsewhere in
the country. This is apparent in the rise of whistleblowing acts taking place in
rural cities and the recurrence of incidents of small-scale contention, such as
short strike action and assembly. This shift in scale (McAdam et al., 2001) also
made diffusion of further contention and collective claim making possible
among less visible groups within the healthcare sector such as nurses, first
responders, and medical technicians. In the small town of Al-Bagour, located in
the northern governorate of Al-Minufiyah, nurses went on strike in protest of
insufficient testing and shortages of PPE and medical supplies in an isolation
hospital designated for COVID-19 patients. One nurse is seen in a video
documenting the incident saying emphatically: “We will not work … We are only
asking for our rights, just our rights.” Another healthcare worker protested their
mistreatment by MoH senior officials explaining: “The two representatives of

Egypt since 2014, was advised last week by western diplomats that the country’s security
services wanted her to leave immediately after her press accreditation was revoked and she was
asked to attend a meeting with authorities about her visa status.” See Safi (2020).
31The increase in acts of whistleblowing was met with a campaign by some pro-government
supporters on social media and MSM to delegitimize the demands and calls for disobedience by
doctors. The campaign claims that healthcare workers who make these demands belong to the
banned Muslim brotherhood, and “deserve to be killed like traitors who abandon the
battlefield.” This campaign, however, did not find much support among the majority of
Egyptians on social media who continued to express their solidarity with doctors.
32NCI main entrance is centrally located in the heart of Egypt’s capital city, very close to Tahrir
Square and in close proximity to a number of government offices. The main entrance is also at
the crossroads of the motorway connecting the north and the south of Cairo.
33Text of the doctors’ statement and demands:
https://twitter.com/Mohamme03693409/status/1263200320081010689.

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the ministry’s undersecretary talked to us as if we were chess pieces. They did

not give any of us the chance to talk. When our doctors attempted to discuss
matters, they said: ‘We know how the protocol works, but you don’t.’ Aren’t we
human beings (like them)? … The two representatives talked to us with
arrogance and snobbishness” (Protests of Nurses, 2020). The same kind of
collective claim making that defies the government and the state, and the
recurring use of a language of rights is seen in the footage of a similar strike by
nurses in the socioeconomically disenfranchised Karmus district in Alexandria.
The video shows a female nurse shouting assertively in the face of the hospital’s
manager: “We want CPR tests to be performed on all nurses. This is our right.
The state is leaving us high and dry … We are no less than other people; we
should be treated equally and granted our rights.” The manager promised to
take care of it, asking her to resume work, but she went on: “None of us -
doctors, nurses and workers - will resume working before all our needs are met
… Detain us, throw us in police stations (if you want); at least, we will not die
then” (Karmus Nurses, 2020).
Despite the considerable risks associated with collective direct action in an
authoritarian context, digital acts of whistleblowing have coalesced into
traditional forms of dissent involving collective claim making on the ground.
Contentious activities that require some level of organizing, such as strikes and
sit-ins, took place in at least three hospitals in the period from April 28 to May 9
alone. Remarkably, many of these public displays of dissent occurred outside
Cairo, traditionally Egypt’s historic hub of social and political dissent, as well as
the epicenter of surveillance and policing of dissenters. Noticeably, some
healthcare workers in some of these strikes played the game with caution,
insisting that they were not striking even when explicitly stating they are not
going to work until their demands are addressed. Most videos of strikes were
shot from a distance and in some cases only showed the torsos of the people
assembled. The reporter who covered the nurses’ protest at the main entrance of
the NCI mentioned that they refused to reveal their names (Basha, 2020).
Caution also extended to the framing of claim making. In most of the social
media posts and videos by healthcare workers, whistleblowers and instigators of
collective disobedience framed their claims explicitly in professional terms,
evoking notions of ethical responsibility towards patients and society to explain
their rage about negligence and malpractice. Footage of some of the small-scale
demonstrations that surfaced on social media were in many cases staged as staff
meetings or gatherings.
These strategies can be understood in light of the intensification of political
repression and the ruthless crackdown on dissent in Egypt since 2013.
Individual whistleblowers are not any safer in the absence of whistleblowing
protection laws in Egypt (Birch et al., 2015), and like all social media users
around the country, they are, too, subject to the Cybercrime Law. This already
repressive environment is further compounded by the fact that doctors and
clinical pharmacists at university hospitals in Egypt are academic faculty who

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answer to the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MoHE).34

This is additionally problematized by the direct intervention of state security in
matters of higher education in Egypt (Ashour35, 2013; Geer, 2013; Scholars at
Risk, 2015). The encroachment on the academe is reflected in the processes of
appointing university presidents and faculty deans which are sanctioned by the
National Security Agency (NSA) (AFTE, 2016; Scholars at Risk, 2016). Similarly,
academic staff, including doctors and clinical pharmacists at university
hospitals, is required to obtain clearance from the NSA before they are hired36
(AFTE, 2016). Staff is also required to apply for NSA approval before travelling
to academic conferences, or receiving international research grants,
scholarships or funding (AFTE, 2019). This political environment heightened
the awareness among doctors of the risks associated with their acts of
whistleblowing.37 A case in point is a Facebook post of an anesthetist at NCI: “I
write this and I know all the consequences … I was threatened in various ways,
directly and indirectly, that I would be fired because I talk a lot and object to
mistakes. I know all this, but I still write these words because what’s going on
jeopardizes my life and those of my colleagues and patients. This situation
should not be tolerated.” He goes on to describe at length the malpractice and
intimidation committed by the senior management, and highlights how the lack
of protective gear for frontline workers could have disastrous consequences
(Egypt Fans Club, 2020). Shortly before this post, his supervisor was suspended
by the dean for disclosing that colleagues have contracted COVID-19.38 Other
doctors and clinical pharmacists experienced more serious consequences for
their whistleblowing acts as they ended up getting arrested, or worse, were
forcibly disappeared (Amnesty International, 2020; Reuters, 2020). A 26-year-
old junior doctor in Al-Shatby University Hospital in Alexandria contacted the
MoH hotline to report a patient who had visible symptoms of COVID-19 and
needs immediate care. Allegedly, the head of the department then informed the
dean of the school of medicine at Alexandria University, about what she had
done. According to human rights organizations, the dean then requested that
she go to his office. Once at his office, she was arrested by the NSA. She is
currently held in pre-trial detention on charges of “membership in a terrorist

34This issue was raised by doctors and clinical pharmacists interviewed in June, as well as on
earlier field research on academic freedom in higher education in Egypt conducted by T.
Sharkawi in 2015.
35Radwa Ashour was a professor of comparative literature at Ain Shams University in Cairo. She
was one of the co-founders of the ‘9 March movement for the Autonomy of the University’. In
her autobiographical book, she documented the daily experiences of the intervention of the
police in university and academic matters, as well as incidents of police violence against
protesting professors and students on campus.
36We draw here on findings from earlier field research on academic freedom in higher
education in Egypt in 2015. This was also confirmed by NCI doctors in June 2020.
37The issue of fear and awareness of risk was raised in the interviews conducted with doctors
and pharmacists at the National Cancer Institute in Cairo during the first week of June 2020.
38https://www.facebook.com/611353599/posts/10157516780293600/?d=n; and
https://www.facebook.com/100000228084062/posts/4263075767043317/?d=n.

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group,” “spreading false news,” and “mis-using social media” (Amnesty

International, 2020; EFHR, 2020B). Over the past two months, a number of
journalists and a researcher, who published and posted about the pandemic
situation in Egypt, were arrested (EFHR, 2020B; Safi, 2020).
Despite the threats and arrests, acts of whistleblowing continued and spread.
Confronted by a situation where the cost of inaction came to outweigh the
jeopardies of speaking out, many doctors and other healthcare workers
continued to engage in various forms of defiant collective claim making. This
reveals how changes in perceived opportunity structures and threat levels can
have significant explanatory value for understanding why mobilization by
healthcare workers started and swelled across Egypt.

Social networks of the healthcare community in Egypt

As changing opportunity structures and threat levels might not fully address
questions of how mobilization can transform into collective action (Goodwin &
Jasper, 1999), we draw on the work of a number of social movement scholars
who underline the analytic value of social networks in understanding
mobilization (Diani, 2003; McAdam et al., 2001) despite practical impediments
to collective action as in the case of highly authoritarian contexts (Shock, 2005;
Gamson, 1990; Denoeux, 1993; Pfaff, 1996). We examine the role of networks
between individuals and groups among the healthcare community to explain
movement recruitment and swelling within established social settings (Diani,
2003). The healthcare community in Egypt is characterized by dense and
interconnected social networks which seem to have informed perceptions of
opportunities, facilitated recruitment, and enabled mobilization to start in
Cairo, and then diffuse to other cities. Our findings from several interviews with
a small group of doctors and clinical pharmacists at the NCI reveal how these
dense and interlaced social ties extend beyond common professional interests
and identities as they appear to impact the socio-economic, academic and
political life of healthcare workers. The economic interdependency in these
formal social networks is most apparent in individual and group professional
ties between the medical and the pharmaceutical sectors in Egypt. These links
typically include incentivizing large-scale prescriptions both in public hospitals
and private practice – particularly in the field of oncology, sponsoring academic
conferences and opportunities for career development, kitting out new private-
practice clinics, sponsoring lavish social gatherings for star academics in the
medical profession, doctors and pharmacists, and similar reciprocities. Similar
interdependent ties also exist among doctors, and testing and imaging
laboratories and physiotherapy clinics, to name a few examples. Dense informal
socio-economic links between and among doctors, pharmacists and nurses exist
in parallel through social gatherings and parties, group holidays, informal
networks of chain lending39, and organizing group community gifting during

This is a fairly common practice among the working and lower middle classes in Egypt
39

whereby a group of people agree to pay an equal share each month. Then each participant

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religious festivals. Interviewed doctors and pharmacists note that these informal
networks have provided a safe space for members of the healthcare community
to share problems, brainstorm solutions and discuss the politics of healthcare in
Egypt. “It was only natural to resort to these networks as a platform for a more
candid discussion around the coronavirus crisis away from the constraints of
the workplace and censorship by senior management.”40 Worth noting is that
the characteristically leaderless and dispersed nature of this type of informal
social networks contributes to their opacity41 to authorities and are hence in
some way shielded from state surveillance.
A key figure who animated both formal and informal social networks of the
healthcare community in Egypt over the past decades is Dr. Mona Mina, the
former EMS secretary-general.42 Mina, who was elected in 2013, is widely
respected among Egypt’s healthcare community for her staunch advocacy for
the rights of doctors, universal healthcare, and an autonomous role of the EMS
in healthcare policy making.43 She resigned her role as assistant secretary-
general in 2018 “in protest of low ceiling for union freedoms” in Egypt.44 She is
one of the co-founders of the group ‘Doctors without Rights’, formed during the
Mubarak era, which grew into the biggest independent healthcare activist
movement in Egypt (El-Mahdawy, 2018; Hodaib, 2016). The group fought for
EMS reform and succeeded in ending the hegemony of members of the Muslim
Brotherhood over EMS elections (Dyer, 2016; Hodaib, 2016). She has also
supported the 2011 uprising and took part in the 18-day sit-in in Tahrir Square
which culminated into the ousting of President Mubarak. She repeatedly
expressed her disagreement with controversial policies introduced by successive
governments since Mubarak. Through her Facebook page, Mina played a crucial
role during the pandemic crisis by exposing negligence and mismanagement,

receives the cumulative total amount paid at a pre-agreed time. This practice is called ‘gamiya’
in Egyptian Arabic which roughly translates to organization.
40This was iterated by one of the doctors in an interview conducted in June 2020. Words to this
effect were echoed by other healthcare workers interviewed.
41 See Scott (1990) for more on network opacity.
42Profile: Mona Mina, new sec-gen of the Doctors Syndicate
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/89596/Egypt/Politics-/PROFILE-Mona-
Mina,-new-secgen-of-the-Doctors-Syndi.aspx (accessed 1 June 2020); and
https://egyptindependent.com/profile-mona-mina-revolutionary-sage-who-subdued-ministry/
(accessed 1 June 2020)
43Egypt’s Doctors Take on Mubarak
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/crossing_continents/7301476.stm
(accessed 1 June 2020); and Doctors Without Rights Protest Against New Accreditation Body
https://wwww.dailynewssegypt.com/2010/08/01/doctors-without-rights-protest-against-new-
accreditation-body/ (accessed 1 June 2020)
44Doctors’ Syndicate General Secretary and Assistant Resign in Protest of Low Ceiling for Union
Freedoms https://madamasr.com/en/2018/05/22/news/u/doctors-syndicate-general-
secretary-and-assistant-resign-in-protest-of-low-ceiling-for-union-freedoms/ (accessed 1 June
2020)

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offering support and solidarity with doctors, and advocating for the rights of
protection and treatment for healthcare workers. The doctors and pharmacists
we interviewed referenced Mina’s past of healthcare activism as the reason
behind many doctors around the country trusting her with first-hand accounts
of the malpractice and negligence they witnessed in managing the outbreak of
COVID-19. Mina has been remarkably active on social media, sharing stories of
negligence and mismanagement sent by doctors, sharing whistleblowing posts,
and publishing op-ed pieces in newspapers. Her videos, posts and published
articles criticize the way the government and the MoH handled the crisis and
make suggestions to address the issues raised by healthcare workers,
demanding that the MoH act swiftly. Her ceaseless activity turned her Facebook
page into a site of collective claim making which seems to have brokered
mobilization as apparent in the level of engagement with her live videos and
posts. Many of the public comments left by doctors and other healthcare
workers reveal their deep appreciation for her solidarity and advocacy.
A third intensely dense and overlapping network involves the Egyptian Medical
Syndicate (EMS) which has arguably been the primary hub of closely interlinked
formal and informal social networks among the healthcare community
nationally and regionally.45 As a trade union and a professional association, the
EMS sponsors numerous projects that look after the professional, economic and
social interests of members.46 These projects continue to provide countless
opportunities for growing informal social networks among doctors across the
country.47 Under Mubarak, the Syndicate played a significant role in opposing
the application of neoliberal policies to healthcare provision and medical
education (Abou Omar, 2013), largely through networks of leftist groups among
its membership and the ‘Doctors without Rights’ movement.48 The Syndicate
took on a more prominent role in the political struggles after the 2011 uprising,
especially after the election of Mona Mina and her mostly leftist successors
(Abou Omar, 2013; Hodaib, 2016; Kiley, 2016). These struggles produced
resources, skills, social relations, and a social space engendered in its networks.
In many ways, these informal social networks acted as social and political sites
where activist learning took place, and resistance and grievances took shape and
were articulated in an environment that was fairly guarded from state
surveillance. Over the years, the social networks that were involved in (and
emerged from) these struggles provided a key source of solidarity, a strong
sense of identity and camaraderie, and a much-needed resource for socio-

45Based on findings from interviews conducted with doctors and pharmacists at the National
Cancer during the first week of June 2020.
46 EMS website http://www.ems.org.eg/menu/index/‫( خدمات_النقابة‬accessed 2 June 2020)
47Based on findings from interviews conducted with doctors and pharmacists at the National
Cancer Institute in Cairo, Egypt during the first week of June 2020.
48Doctors’ Syndicate General Secretary and Assistant Resign in Protest of Low Ceiling for Union
Freedoms https://madamasr.com/en/2018/05/22/news/u/doctors-syndicate-general-
secretary-and-assistant-resign-in-protest-of-low-ceiling-for-union-freedoms/ (accessed 1 June
2020)

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economic coping. More importantly, these networks generated a wealth of

contentious repertoires for successful collective claim making and sustainable
mobilization under prohibitive conditions.
Since the outbreak of the pandemic crisis in Egypt, the EMS and its formal
networks have continued to provide unwavering solidarity for doctors, exhibited
in a series of powerful statements, relentless criticism of the government, and
collective claim making addressed directly to the president.49 This solidarity
seems to have provided the backdrop against which acts of whistleblowing and
associated collective claim making, and recruitment took place. Drawing on an
established legacy of social and political organizing, the EMS informal networks
adapted some of the inherited repertoires for claim making and mobilization
during the pandemic crisis. This is manifested in the framing of claims made on
the government both by individual whistleblowers and in the formal statements
and open letters published by the EMS. Grievances articulated and demands
made stressed the professional rather than political nature of claim making and
avoided direct criticism of the president, hiding behind phrases like ‘the state’
and ‘leadership’. Another salient tactic in framing claims is the discursive
deployment of the carrot and stick metaphor by offering some limited praise of
the government or head of state while alluding subtly to the indispensability or
the social and economic weight of the healthcare community and its networks.
The EMS has further capitalized on its dense and overlapping social networks to
rally national and transnational support for the healthcare community. This
stance was more vocal in response to claims made by government officials and
the state-run media that doctors who call for strike or resignation due to lack of
protection or testing are conspirators who belong to the banned Muslim
Brotherhood group50, as well as claims by the prime minister that the spike in
infections is due to doctors’ absence from work.51 The same social networks also
mobilized support for Mina when a complaint was submitted to the Attorney
General accusing her of “communicating with Brotherhood channels to question
the health system and the measures taken by the state to confront the
coronavirus, and intentionally publishing false news.”52

49The EMS website is updated several times each day, publishing statements, open letters,
demands, op-ed pieces by its members, and reporting cases of malpractice. It also includes a
new section which commemorates doctors who died from COVID-19 while treating infected
patients. These updates have also been widely circulated by doctors on social media and by
Mona Mina.
50Resignations of Doctors: A Muslim Brotherhood Conspiracy or Legitimate Demands?
Available in Arabic at: https://www.bbc.com/arabic/trending-52811178 (accessed 2 July)
51Rage among Egyptian Doctors as the Government levels Accusations of Causing a Spike in
Infections. Available in Arabic at: https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast-53169582 (accessed
24 June 2020)
52 A Notice Accuses Mona Mina of Doubting the Health System
https://nwafez.com/en/a-notice-accuses-dr-mona-mina-of-doubting-the-health-system/
(accessed 3 July)

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Conclusion
By exploring the various acts of whistleblowing performed by Egypt’s healthcare
workers during the COVID-19 pandemic, the article has attempted to highlight
three main features of dissent in authoritarian settings. First, unusual times
impose risks, but they also open opportunities for novel acts of mobilization and
claim-making. Second, sporadic and individual incidents of whistleblowing have
the capacity to translate over a brief time into more direct forms of contentious
mobilization even under the reign of the most repressive political regimes.
Third, the role of informal, and hence, more opaque social networks in the
diffusion and sustainability of mobilization carry the potential of engendering
new social and political grassroots networks that can mobilize at short notice in
the future. The article therefore calls for revisiting predominant forms and
modes of collective claim-making in the literature on social movements in
relation to highly authoritarian settings, wherein public organizing is
suppressed and an open public sphere has been eradicated.

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Acknowledgements
The authors express the greatest possible gratitude to all the respondents in
Cairo who participated in this research. Listening to your accounts of this
difficult time was a truly humbling experience. We hope that this article does
some justice to your struggle. The authors also wish to extend thanks to the
editor of Interface for the very useful comments. Finally, deep thanks go to A.
for her help with access to first-hand accounts of the world of informal social
networks of the healthcare community in Egypt.

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About the authors

T. Sharkawi is a doctoral researcher at Lancaster University whose research
focuses on refugee and diaspora politics, social movements, authoritarianism,
and the Middle East and North Africa.
N. Ali is a political scholar who has a special interest in the politics and society
of the Middle East, particularly Egypt and the Levant. He has published on
state-society relations, identity politics and Islamist movements.

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Volume 12 (1): 164 - 181 (July 2020) Sirimane & Thapliyal, Migrants, Covid-19, Struggle

Migrant labourers, Covid-19 and working-class

struggle in the time of pandemic: a report from
Karnataka, India
Mallige Sirimane and Nisha Thapliyal (11th June 2020)

Abstract
Since the imposition of the unplanned lockdown in India, Karnataka Jan Shakti
has worked with stranded migrant labourers to respond to a range of issues
including starvation, transportation to return home, sexual violence,
Islamophobia and labour rights. Karnataka Jan Shakti (KJS, Karnataka
People’s Power) is a coalition of Left-leaning activist groups and individuals. For
the last decade, it has mobilised historically oppressed groups on issues of
economic and cultural justice including Dalit sanitation workers, Dalit
university students, slumdwellers, peasants, nomadic tribes, and survivors of
sexual violence. Our approach to collective struggle is shaped by the social
analysis tools of Karl Marx, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and Shankar Guha Niyogi. In
this article, we document and analyse our struggle against situated forms of
precarity in migrant lives shaped by class, caste, gender, age, and rural/urban
geography which have been exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic. We also
reflect on lessons for movement-building in a political milieu dominated by a
hyper surveillant fascist state, communal media apparatus and accelerated,
unregulated privatisation under the latest national slogan of Self-Reliant India
(AtmaNirbhar Bharat).

Keywords: Migrant labourers, Covid-19 pandemic, India, learning in the

struggle

Introduction
On March 24 2020, Prime Minister Narendra Modi (BJP, Bharatiya Janata
Party) announced a three-week national lockdown to stop the spread of the
coronavirus. Drawing on his usual blend of Hindu mythology, advertising jingo
speak, and martial rhetoric, Modi announced a war against corona. He said,
“The Mahabharata war was won in 18 days… Our aim is to win this [corona] war
in 21 days” (Times of India, 2020). He gave the country a total of four hours’
notice to prepare for the cessation of life as we knew it.
At the time of the unplanned lockdown, the state of Karnataka hosted an
estimated 10.9 million migrant labourers1 (Government of India 2011) out of

1
Data on internal migration remains scarce. The most reliable data available is the 2011 Census
which was only released for public consumption in 2019 (Ahamed 2020). According to this
Census, there were 455 million internal migrants in 2011. However, Ahamad (2020) reminds us
that this data does not include child and female migrant workers or district-level data. The state

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which an estimated 4 million work in the construction industry alone (Deepika

2020). These women, men and children provide the labour that fuels
construction, factories and small units, coffee plantations, food service industry,
domestic work, waste collection, the taxi industry, the restaurant industry, care
industry and other informal and organised economic sectors. Many migrants
circulate annually for seasonal work while others have become more or less
permanent residents in their adopted state/s. A minority are fortunate to have
fixed work while the majority are compelled to look for temporary work and
migrate from place to place in search of short-term employment (Mazumdar,
Neetha and Agnihotri 2013). Most importantly, these labourers are
predominantly from impoverished Dalit, Adivasi and Muslim communities from
the most economically backward regions in the country and across the border in
Nepal and Bangladesh (Samaddar 2020). They are the muscle, blood and bones
that power the prosperity of Karnataka, and indeed the entire nation. Yet within
India, they represent the invisible 99% whose exploitation is intrinsic to the
enrichment of the 1%, Indian Dollar Billionaires (Oxfam, 2019).
When lockdown was imposed, the vast majority of them became unemployed
overnight.2 Shortly thereafter, they ran out of food and money to pay rent. Local
authorities declared the high-density slums which most of them called home
‘containment zones’ and placed severe and overnight restrictions on movement.
Migrants living on construction sites were abandoned by their employers and
forced to venture outside for food and water when they often encountered anti-
Muslim, anti-Chinese3 and anti-outsider abuse (Dalasanoor 2020). In solidarity
with Prime Minister Modi, upper class Indians rang bells, banged thalis, and lit
diyas (oil lamps) from the safety and comfort of their socially distanced, well-
supplied homes at regular intervals through the lockdown. However, migrant
workers remained invisible to the official gaze until they decided to walk
thousands of kilometres home. They had neither money nor food but they
refused to allow their precarious lives to descend further into indignity and
abuse. This powerful act of resistance led to a steady stream of news reports
which documented callous and inhumane treatment by police, officials, and
countless others seeking to exploit their desperation.
The death toll from these long marches during the height of the Indian summer
got the attention of media and social workers. However, this was a problematic

of Kerala (again) leads the way in terms of keep records, implemented welfare programs and
changing the deficit discourse – guests of the state – which enabled the state to take relatively
better care of its migrant workers during the lockdown.
2A recent survey by Azim Premji University found that 8 out 10 urban workers and 6 out of 10
rural workers have experienced job loss since the imposition of lockdown (Center for
Sustainable Employment, 2020). Available at https://cse.azimpremjiuniversity.edu.in/
3 Residents of north-east India and Nepal have long been subject to racialised, gendered and
sexualised forms of discrimination. During the lockdown and even before the flare up of the
conflict on the Indo-Chinese border in Ladakh, rightwing social media was hard at work
circulating fake news about China’s role in the pandemic and advocating boycott of Chinese
goods.

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form of visibility. Official and media discourse became dominated by

problematic, gendered representations of migrants as carriers of disease, objects
of charity and even superheroes capable of superhuman feats of endurance
(Thapliyal 2020). It would take the Modi administration another four weeks to
come up with a national plan to transport these workers home by rail and bus.
The plan to arrange special trains and buses were given another catchy name,
Shramik (Worker) Specials, but incommensurate resources to respond to the
magnitude of need.4

The situation in Karnataka

Karnataka, home to India’s Silicon Valley and approximately 53 million people,
has historically been one of the better performing Indian states based on the
economic and social development indicators. However, the Karnataka Human
Development Report reveals that the benefits of the hi-tech development boom
are yet to reach poor women, Scheduled Castes (16% of the state population),
and Scheduled Tribes (7%). The gap between these three groups and the rest of
the population only continues to grow in relation to education and income
attainment (Government of Karnataka 2006:312-313).
The ruling nexus in Karnataka today consists of entrenched elites consisting of
Hindu upper-caste and class, urban, English-speakers and the relatively new
elites from landed peasants - the Vokkaligas and the Lingayats who are
officially classified as Backward Classes.5 These two lower caste groups
successfully mobilised against the Brahminical caste system which dominated
the British colonial state apparatus. However, their social reformist critique and
victories never extended to include Dalits. This historical reality provides a
partial explanation for why Dalit and Adivasi populations continue to live in
extreme poverty and exclusion in a state with 200 years of reservation policies
and state subsidies that have benefitted other historically marginalised groups
(Manasa, 2000).
Since the late nineties, state-led development has been overtly oriented towards
the rhetoric of economic globalisation through a discourse of IT-led growth,
privatisation, efficiency, and competitiveness (Sarangapani and Vasavi 2003).
Karnataka was one of the first states to secure large loans from the World Bank
in return for structural adjustment reforms; and, one of the first states to pilot
the World-Bank funded District Primary Education Program (DPEP) in 1994.
Since then successive state governments, rightwing and centrist, have promoted

4 Senior Counsel Prashant Bhushan filed a public interest litigation (PIL) in the Supreme Court
demanding proper food and shelter arrangements for all stranded workers and poor across the
country . While the Supreme Court initially declined to intervene on behalf of migrants, similar
PILS filed at the state level were treated with more compassion by judges of the High Courts
including Tamil Nadu, Gujarat and Karnataka.
5
Readers should note that Caste groups classified as ‘backward’ are distinct from those
classified as Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe but they also benefit from affirmative action
policies - also known as reservations - some of which were introduced in colonial India.

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the neoliberal development model by slashing public sector spending and

borrowing money to meet their social obligations (Sarangapani and Vasavi
2003:3406).
Karnataka is currently governed by the BJP under the Chief Ministership of B.S
Yediyurappa who came to power after the ruling Congress-JDS coalition
collapsed following the defection of 15 elected politicians to the BJP.6 Since the
Ayodhya movement in the nineties, Karnataka has provided fertile ground for
the mobilisation of rightwing Hindu nationalist forces in southern India. This
movement has systematically fueled existing divides around language, religion,
caste, regional identity in a region historically characterised by every form of
cultural diversity.7 They were aided in these efforts by Kannada language media
which has a long history of casteism and communalism (Haligeri 2020).
At the same time, Karnataka has a long history of grassroots social reform
movements dating back to the 12th century anti-caste and anti-patriarchy
Vacchana movement. The region has been a site for mobilisations for cultural
recognition, economic redistribution and environmental conservation
including: anticolonial struggle, promotion of Kannada language and cultural
identity, recognition of Backward Classes, land rights (of farmers, Adivasis,
slum dwellers and squatters), workers’ rights, Dalit rights, LGBTQI rights and
violence against women.
However, migrant labour largely remain unorganised and unmobilised in the
state not in small part due to differences of language, regional identity. These
forms of difference continue to divide Dalit and Adivasi groups along with
cumulative effects of three decades of rightwing outreach to these communities
(Sundar 2002). In Karnataka, key current sites of mobilisation include urban
slum evictions in Bengaluru8 and the coffee plantations in Kodagu, Chikmagulur
and Hasan districts which account for 70% of the coffee production in the
country.

Karnataka Jan Shakti (Karnataka People Power)

Karnataka Jan Shakti (KJS, Karnataka People’s Power) is an umbrella
organisation of Left-leaning activist groups and individuals. For the last decade,
it has mobilised communities on issues of economic and cultural justice

6 The entire process was engineered by BJP master strategist and Home Minister Amit Shah
from his headquarters in New Delhi which then proceeded to repeat the process to bring down
elected governments in other non-BJP states (Moudgal 2019).
7 The erasure of Muslim histories in this region has been a key strategy. For example, in 2019,
Hindutva activists campaigned to remove 18th century Muslim ruler of Mysuru Tipu Sultan from
history textbooks. Sultan died fighting the British and subsequently became an almost mythical
figure in British colonial discourse as well as postcolonial official and popular histories.
8 In 2019, the forcible evictions were attempted in Turubarahalli near Kunadalahalli gate which
is home to more than 2000 migrants from West Bengal, northeastern states and Bangladesh.
The Alternative Law Forum has filed a court case for the land rights of slumdwellers.

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including Dalit sanitation workers and university students, urban slum dwellers,
rural landless people, nomadic tribes, and survivors of sexual violence
(Thapliyal 2014).
The KJS approach to mobilisation is shaped by anti-caste thinkers and activists
including Jyotiba and Savitri Bai Phule (1855) and Dalit leader Dr B.R
Ambedkar (1936) for whom caste and untouchability were and remain deep
rooted problems in Indian society. We also draw on the teachings of Marxist
thinkers including socialist trade union leader Shankar Guha Niyogi who
organised the Chhattisgarh Mukti Morcha (Chhattisgarh Liberation Front, or
CMM), a movement of miners, industrial workers, and farmers and gatherers
from local Adivasi communities. From the CMM and Niyogi9, we have learned
that movements of poor people cannot sustain the struggle if their lives are not
stable. Hence along with rights, economic stability or rather livelihood and life
are important. We have also learned the importance of knowledge produced
through indigenous culture, history and the experience of collective struggle
(Sadgopal and Namra 1993).
At the time of the lockdown, KJS was part of the nation-wide civil society
collective called ‘We The People’ that had formed to resist a series of anti-
Constitutional law and policy reforms introduced by the Modi administration in
December 2019, namely the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), National
Registration of Citizens (NRC), and National Population Register.10 It was a key
member of the Karnataka organising committee, Naavu Bharateeyaru (which
means We The People in Kannada) along with Muslim community activists,
student activists, and other pro-Constitution civil society groups. Our organising
efforts received a significant boost after thousands of citizens spontaneously
gathered outside the Townhall on December 19, 2019, to prevent the police from
arresting anti-CAA activists. Since then, the coalition has worked to support the
occupation of Bilal Bagh by women from the Muslim community as well as
other forms of collective protest in Bengaluru and across the state. Over two
months, we had formed district-level Save the Constitution Committees in
preparation for the next phase of mobilisation against the 2020 Census data
collection. The imposition of the unplanned lockdown conveniently ended this
growing movement even though activists were willing to comply with physical
distancing and other rules.

9 Niyogi was able to organize these groups into a Green-Red coalition by linking questions about
development, growth, technology and labour rights to issues of environment and cultural
identity (see also Krishnan 2016). Its achievements and imagination for a different world
continue to inspire workers struggles in India (see e.g. Scandrett 2019; See also
http://sanhati.com/shankar-guha-niyogi-archives/)
10The cumulative effects of these reforms would be to downgrade Muslims from their status of
second class citizens to deprive them of citizenship all together (see e.g. Mishra and Waheed
2020). These exclusionary reforms did not apply to any other religious or cultural minority in
the nation. These protests are considered historical in part because of the large numbers of
Muslim women who participated in non-violent occupations of public spaces such as Shaheen
Bagh in Delhi and Bilal Bagh in Bengaluru (see also Mohanty 2020 in this journal).

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Activism during pandemic

In the early weeks of the lockdown, Karnataka was lauded for its Covid-19
response. In keeping with its image of being home to India’s Silicon Valley, the
state government deployed technology-based surveillance to trace contacts and
ensure strict quarantine akin to the Kerala model (Belagere 2020). Unlike
Kerala, it turned a blind eye towards the vast population of migrant labourers
stranded by the lockdown. For instance, the Public Distribution System (PDS)
which provides free rations to the poor excluded people without ration cards,
who were disproportionately interstate migrant labourers This was one of the
first issues highlighted by KJS activists which received favourable media
coverage and resulted in a change in government policy.11 Since then KJS has
worked with migrant labourers to respond to a range of issues including
starvation, homelessness, and transportation to return home, sexual violence,
labour rights and Islamophobia.
Hunger and Starvation: The joint action committee which was formed during
the anti-CAA movement became a spontaneous common platform for corona
relief work in Bangalore city. The network grew around community kitchens
established by Muslim youth and enabled civil society groups to distribute
cooked food to thousands of people on a daily basis under the name of Mercy
Mission. In addition, approximately one hundred KJS cadre located across the
state12 identified gaps in the public food distribution system and delivered dry
ration kits to communities living in precarity in rural areas including slum
dwellers, nomadic tribes and migrant labourers for four weeks. (The ration kits
contained rice, dal, edible oil, sugar, onions, cereal, flour, spices, detergent and
soap.)

11In fact, even existing food subsidization programs like the Indira Canteens (modelled on
similar programmes in Tamil Nadu) were underutilized. The provision of free food packets to
the poor and homeless through the canteens was reversed on the grounds that people were not
observing physical distancing and misusing the programme.
KJS covered eleven districts including North Canara, Coorg, Mandya, Bangalore, Thumkur,
12

Davanagere, Bellary, Koppal, Raichur, Bijapur, and Shivamogga.

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Figure 1: Poster created for online Workers Rights Campaign13. Designed by

Pavitra, KJS affiliated student activist.

Migrant worker helpline and survey

After the central government required states to provide transportation for
migrants to return home, we began additional strands of work. We formed
coordination teams to liaise and support migrant travelers as part of the
nationwide Stranded Workers Action Network (SWAN)14. One of the earliest
issues we raised was the fact that domestic migrants (residents of Karnataka)
were being charged more than twice as much they would normally pay for a bus
ticket home. We carried out agitations with our allies including trade unions
and other people’s organisations. Again, these protests received support from
Kannada and English media as well as opposition political parties led by the
Congress. Within days, the Karnataka government announced fully free travel
for all migrant workers on May 5, 2020. However, the true priorities of the state
were revealed when the state government suspended all train and bus travel

13 On the occasion of May 1 (2020) Labour Day, KJS started an online campaign through
Facebook and Whatsapp called ‘Shramika Hakku Abhiyana’ (Workers Rights campaign as part
of a national campaign for labour rights. The poster shows Ms. Savitramma, a resident of
Davanagere district, a pensioner who works as a street vegetable vendor since government
rations are not sufficient for an entire month. Lockdown put an end to her only means of
livelihood. The poster text states, ‘if you are hungry, if your family is affected by the lockdown
and the apathy of the government, please join the campaign. Take the photo of you and the
family with empty vessels and send it across the Chief Minister of Karnataka through Watsapp
to this number.”
14On 1 May 2020, the group released a report — 32 Days and Counting: COVID-19 Lockdown,
Migrant Workers, and the Inadequacy of Welfare Measures in India based on a national
survey of approximately 17000 workers on issues of food supply, wage payment, and post-
lockdown decisions. The report can be downloaded at
https://covid19socialsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/32-days-and-counting_swan.pdf

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three short days later. This decision was made to appease powerful lobbies of
real estate developers and builders who did not want migrant construction
workers to leave Bengaluru. The All India Central Council of Trade Unions
(AICCTU) described the decision as a violation of the fundamental right of the
freedom of movement and one that promoted forced labour.15 This decision was
also reversed within a couple of days due to a national public outcry.
As part of this liaison work, KJS established a migrant worker telephone
helpline for 24 hours and 7 days a week. The helpline was managed by nine
volunteers who variously spoke Kannada, Telugu, Bengali, Oriya, Hindi and
English. Unlike government helplines which limited themselves to
dissemination of information, our helpline responded to all requests for aid.
These included funds for travel and transportation to the nearest railway
station, provision of funds and medicine to family members of workers stuck
outside Karnataka, and emotional support. What we learned from callers in the
early days of the helpline prompted us to carry out a systematic survey of
conditions in working communities living in precarity.
KJS activists in all 30 districts of the state carried out phone or household
surveys with migrant labourers16, small farmers, and sex workers. A total of
1500 individuals answered questions on issues including access to food and
contract wages, government officials and facilities, Covid19 testing, and the state
government’s decision to lift the prohibition on the sale of alcohol (See Figure 2
below) (KJS 2020). In the survey, we also asked farmers about the sale of their
harvested crops, government support for planting new crops in the approaching
rainy season; and whether the national rural employment scheme needed to be
expanded (Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme,
MGNREGS).

15 The Wire India. May 7, 2020. https://thewire.in/labour/karnataka-migrants-builders-trains

16The Kannada language version of the study was released on 4 June 2020 in the company of
migrant labouruers who live in Channahalli Hakkipikki Colony. The Hakkipikki are members of
a historically nomadic tribe which remains one of the most economically and socially oppressed
communities in the state. Despite sustained government neglect, they have not faltered in their
struggle for land and housing rights.

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Figure 2: Cover page of Migrant Worker Survey Report (KJS 2020). Designed
by Chandrashekhar (KJS activist).

In particular, our survey provided gendered insights into people’s lives under
lockdown. Our respondents included a total of 284 women labourers, sex
workers, transgendered peoples and devadasis (female servants of God).17
Women shared their concerns about domestic violence during the lockdown
which increased when the alcohol prohibition was lifted. More than 60% of this
group reported that they were unable to access any treatment for the routine
ailments including those that accompany sex work (Karnataka Jan Shakti 2020:
47). They shared their worries about not being able to get adequate quantities of
food. The lack of income for the last two months also jeopardised the education
of their children since this is time for school admissions, payment of fees and
purchase of textbooks and uniforms.

Gendered violence
Through the helpline, we learned about the trafficking of two Adivasi women
from Jharkhand who were forced into bonded labour in an incense factory near
Bengaluru. For more than a year they were illegally confined and raped when
they attempted to escape. The women only spoke Santhali and had two young

17An estimated 50-100,00 girls and women across continue to be sexually exploited by upper-
and dominant caste men through the devadasi system which was legally abolished in 1982.

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children with them. KJS arranged for the women to be placed in a shelter and
pressured the police to take action against the rapists and factory owner. 18
These gendered encounters align with what we know about the gendered forms
of oppression and precarity experienced by women migrant labourers from
historically oppressed groups. 19 According to Mazumdar, Neetha et al (2013),
women comprise at least 15% of the migrant labour force. They are more
concentrated in short-term and circular migration and perform dangerous and
exploitative work alongside men on farms, construction sites, brick kilns, textile
and other small factory units and so forth. However, they are typically paid far
less and rarely on time (Dutta 2019). They are more likely to be subject to sexual
harassment and violence from contractors, supervisors and employers
(Mazumdar, Neetha et al. 2013). However, official data on the numbers and
experiences of female migrant labourers, particularly from Dalit and Adivasi
backgrounds, continues to be highly limited by gender- and caste-insensitive
concepts (Krishnan 2020; Mazumdar, Neetha et al. 2013).

Islamophobia
On March 28, India learned that a Muslim community known as Tablighi
Jamaat had convened a meeting of thousands of followers in Nizammudin
Markaz in New Delhi in early March to commemorate the founding of their
religious sect. Despite the fact that religious communities of all denominations
had held similar meetings up till and even during the early days of lockdown,
rightwing media embarked on a furious nationwide campaign about the
‘Tablighi Virus’ and ‘Markaz disease’. Anti-Muslim rhetoric dominated Kannada
news media coverage as well accompanied by calls to boycott Muslim businesses
and traders (Nagaraj 2020). A halfhearted warning from the BJP Chief Minister
did little to stem the deluge of new reports and talk shows which recycled
conspiracy theories about corona jihadis in India and Pakistan, sometimes in
league with Chinese communists.
At the national level, this mediatized campaign of hate was countered by online
media outlets such as The Wire and The Quint. In Karnataka , Varthabharathi
(Kannada, print and online), Naanu Gauri (Kannada, online) and Gauri Media
(English, online) aworked systematically to counter hateful and fake news. KJS
has a close working relationship with the latter two media outlets which were
established in memory of progressive Kannada journalist Gauri Lankesh who
was assassinated by a Hindutva activist on September 5, 2017. Through these
Internet media outlets and related social medi, our activists actively countered
the Islamophobic and fake news discourse circulating in mainstream news
media (see e.g. Mutturaju 2020).

18See also https://gaurilankeshnews.com/bangalore-shocking-tale-of-human-trafficking-

sexual-assault-and-bonded-labour-of-migrant-adivasi-woman/
See also the Special Issue on Gender, Violence and the Neoliberal State in India edited by
19

Kalpana Wilson, Jennifer Ung Loh and Navtej Purewal (2018).

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Activism during pandemic: lessons learned

In this report, we have documented recent struggles against situated forms of
precarity in the lives of migrant labour shaped by class, caste, gender, age, and
rural/urban geography. In the previous section, we discussed how our current
areas of work are oriented to both forcing the state to act as well as contesting
how the state acts (Cox 2020).
Our experience over the last ten weeks has reconfirmed the lack of respect for
the dignity of the working poor and instead the sheer disposability of their
bodies. We say reconfirmed because this knowledge should come as no surprise.
Overwhelmingly, these are the people whose lives have been systemically
impoverished, whose communities have been historically destroyed by colonial
extraction and capitalist dispossession by accumulation (Kapoor 2013). These
are the same bodies unceasingly subject to state-sanctioned, gendered forms of
coercion and violence, increasingly directly at the hands of the state, as evinced
by Kashmir, Chattisgarh, and the northeast of India (Sundar 2018).20 In his
seminal book, ‘Everyone Loves a Good Drought’, journalist P. Sainath21 (1996)
refers to these communities as development refugees. This term is inappropriate
because these migrants are not homeless. Rather, they appear to have been
permanently designated collateral damage, a metaphor that fits with current
dominant masculinist discourse about the war against the pandemic.
In our endeavors to help migrant workers reach home safely with dignity, we
have had multiple opportunities to rethink the relationship between crisis and
transformation (Cox 2020). We have learned that Covid-19 pandemic is not the
great equalizer in stratified societies. The protections of the neoliberal,
neocolonial, and now fascist Indian state are only available to those with
historical privileges of caste, gender, race/ethnicity, class and purchasing power.
Perhaps this is why the corporations that are laying ruin to India have donated
so generously to the PMCares Fund.22
The BJP administration is using the pandemic as an opportunity to accelerate
privatisation in India. This objective has been made unapologetically clear in
the so-called Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan (Self Reliant India) relief package
recently announced by the Central government. The package contains no

20 In her blog piece, Sundar (2018) argues that democracy functions in three ways in relation to
precarity and violence: “it is a casualty of violence; it is an enabler of violence and precarity
(including the slow violence of starvation); and it is a resource for oppressed groups.”
21Sainath is a Magsaysay Award winning journalist and founder-editor of the People’s Archive
of Rural India (PARI) news network. He also reported on India’s agrarian crisis in the 2010
documentary film ‘Nero’s Guests’.
22
India’s largest construction and engineering company Larsen & Toubro donated Rs 150 crores
to the Fund while its predominantly migrant construction workers were kept unpaid and
virtually captive on locked down construction sites. Protests by thousands of workers on sites in
Hyderabad and Kattupili were met by police violence and cessation of water and food supplies
(https://www.newsclick.in/Tamil-Nadu-COVID-19-Lockdown-Migrant-Workers-Denied-
Wages-Forced-to-Work).

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provisions to support the working class and poor recover from the economic
ravages of the unplanned lockdown (Jha 2020). In evoking atmanirbharta or
self reliance, Modi23 is drawing on a concept which resonates with his faith-
based audience who can trace it back to a distant but divine Vedic and
Brahminical past (Srinivasaraju 2020). The same concept of self reliance
underpinned anticolonial struggles but with very different meanings. For
liberation thinkers like Phule, Ambedkar and Gandhi, the meaning of self
reliance was intrinsically connected to the struggle for freedom and dignity for
historically exploited and enslaved groups such as Dalits, Adivasis, bonded
labourers and other workers.
Instead, the Modi administration has pushed states to undermine hard won
labour rights secured through 135 years of struggle by urban and rural workers
(Oomen 2009). Six states tried to increase the working hours for all workers
and employees from 8 to 12 hours per day. The Karnataka government also tried
to bring an ordinance connected to working hours, Provident Fund and other
worker protections without presenting it before the Cabinet. Our mobilisations
along with trade unions and civil society allies were able to put a stop to these
proceedings. However, the government succeeded in passing an amendment to
the Farmers Cooperatives Act which would allow farmers to sell their produce to
anyone to the benefit of agrobusiness and multinational corporations (Deccan
Herald 202024). In addition to privatisation, the Indian state has sought out
more opportunities to expand surveillance and silence dissent. It is no longer
mandatory to install the corona tracking app, Aarogya Setu, which has been
found lacking on grounds of both security and privacy. However, employers,
housing societies, airlines and railways have expanded the reach of the
surveillance state by making this track compulsory on behalf of the Modi
administration. Furthermore, as lockdown restrictions have eased, the
surveillance state has banned all protests, even those which followed physical
distancing, group size and other rules. After abdicating responsibility for the
wellbeing of migrant labourers to civil society, the state apparatus has continued
its persecution of anti-CAA student activists (most recently Safoora Zargar,
Devangana Kalita, and Natasha Narwal) and lifelong civil rights activists like
Anand Teltumbde, Gautam Navlakha, and Dr. Varavara Rao. These activists
have been dragged into the prison industrial complex even as the state is freeing
thousands of prisoners in admission of the fact that the virus is spreading
rapidly within overcrowded inmate populations.
So where to from here? P. Sainath (1996) reminds us that states welcome crises
like droughts and pandemics because they can do anything, they want during

23For that matter, not once in two months did Prime Minister Modi mention migrant workers in
his weekly televised and radio addresses to the nation. In Week 10 of lockdown he wrote a
Letter to the Nation to celebrate completion of one year in office in his second term as Prime
Minister where he acknowledged the suffering of migrants (NDTV 2020).
24https://www.deccanherald.com/state/karnataka-politics/kumaraswamy-warns-karnataka-
govt-against-ordinance-to-amend-labour-laws-and-apmc-836853.html

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these crises25. On the other hand, activists (and anyone with a shred of
humanity) can be completely overwhelmed by the sheer magnitude of human
suffering and need amongst the poor and working classes. We have to honestly
say that there was a palpable sense of panic and fear in movement spaces in
Karnataka at the onset of the pandemic. Activists are no exception in this
respect. In addition, there have been too many moments during the last three
months when we have felt ineffective in all areas of our work. The systematic
silencing of rationalist, scientific, ‘sane’ voices about responses to the pandemic
have compounded these feelings. For example, instead of using the lockdown to
broadcast scientific education about the coronavirus, the Modi administration
chose to rebroadcast Ramayana26 television drama from the 1980s.
Yet even in this time of extreme oppression, we draw inspiration from the
resistance and self-respect of migrant workers who have resisted the
authoritarian state with unrestricted powers. Migrant workers have resisted in
myriad ways: by choosing to walk home; by demanding that they be released
from construction sites where they have been kept all but captive; by protesting
in large numbers at train stations and so forth.27 These voices of resistance also
emerged in our survey (KJS 2020):

“Jaan hai tho kuch dhang ka apne gaon mein kar lenge, yahan nahi ayenge”
(If we survive, we shall do something respectable in our place, but we won’t
return to this place) (Chotu Sahani who travelled from Coorg to Bengaluru in
order to return to his village in Bihar) .

“Am I a terrorist? Why am I being treated like one?” (Arabindo from Assam who
was denied travel on Shramik train because of lack of Aadhar identification
card).

While we cannot be certain as to what the future will bring, we are clear that the
issue of informal labour sits at the heart of a structural and logistical
reorientation of the economy (Samaddar 2020). Our current demands for
immediate relief are the doorway to politicise claims for the rights and dignity of
migrant labourers (Della Porta 2020). Looking to the future we see this as an
opportunity to revitalize campaigns for sustainable jobs, stability in rural
economy, and respect and protection of human rights.

25 Sainath attributes the title to a peasant activist from Jharkhand who noted that drought
reliefs are a like a teesri fasal (third crop) for people in power who stand to make even more
money in the name of relief work.
Readers may also recall the 2011 rightwing campaigns to erase ‘Many Ramayanas’ from
26

University curriculum.
27The Migrant Workers Solidarity Network has documented migrant workers’ resistance across
India in an interactive map which can be experienced at https://www.mwsn.in/resistancemap/

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But we have to start from where we are today. As Laurence Cox (2020: 5) writes,
social movements “start from human needs and everyday praxis”. All though
collective struggle is not new to us, we find ourselves in a place where we are
taking stock and trying to cope with these extreme forms of oppression and
injustice shaped by our deeply unequal society.
Shankar Guha Niyogi taught us that working people are the ones to bring
change in this world. At the same time many workers filled with the
hierarchical and discriminatory ideas and beliefs which shape how the ruling
classes view social relations e.g. hierarchies of class, caste, gender and so forth.
In Kannada, we say “Dudiyuva janaru eshtu dina thamma samajika
samskrutika moulyagalalli aaluvavara baala hididirutharo, alliyavarege
aarthika abhivrudhdhige arthavilla” (As long as the working people are
holding the tail of the ruling class (in their social and cultural values and
relationships), economic upliftment and stability means nothing). Therefore,
the challenge for us in order to move forward is to facilitate the kinds of learning
that enable workers to see that they are the people who generates the wealth for
the nation. Many of the migrants that we have had direct interaction with
appear broken and their suffering is not yet at an end.28
What is more workable are the familiar tensions and contradictions that
accompany movement-building amongst the Left. There are always potential
divides based on ideology and practice that cannot be bridged overnight. During
the anti-CAA organising, we were able to overcome challenges of sectarianism
which threatened to splinter the movement. For example, some Left groups
wanted their individual flags and banners to be displayed prominently but we
were all eventually able to agree to demonstrate a common Indian identity. The
rightwing media had us under tight surveillance and did not miss any
opportunities to accuse us of unpatriotic, anti-national behaviour.
All this is to say that movement-building is undoubtedly messy work. Building
collective identities and networks of dissent is an incremental and situated
process in a political context characterized by the scale of socio-cultural
diversity that is India. What we have learned over time is that to act collectively,
there has to be a centre which can hold all other forces in mutual faith and
cooperation. In this we are reminded the Marxist feminist August Bebel (1904)
who urged activists to march separately but strike a united blow. The last six
months have taught us that relationships which have been strained and broken
can be reconstituted and redeployed in struggles for justice (Della Porta 2020).
We have found a new sense of solidarity and a belief that we can rely on each
other rather than leave marginalised people to fend for themselves.

28As readers may know, those who have reached home are being placed in unsanitary and
unsafe quarantine centres. In the last week alone, news media have regularly reported the
deaths of men, women and children due to food poisoning, snake bites, untreated health
conditions and alleged suicide.

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Ambedkar, Bhim Rao. 1936. Annihilation of Caste. Mumbai: Samyak
Prakashan.
Ahamed, Sabir. 2020. “ Counting and Accounting for Those on the Long Walk
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edited by Ranabir Samaddar. Kolkata: Calcutta Research Group. Retrieved
from http://www.mcrg.ac.in/RLS_Migration_2020/COVID-19.pdf
Bebel, August. 1904. Women Under Socialism. Translated by Daniel DeLeon.
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Belagere, Chetana. 2020. “Karnataka Fares Better than High-Prevalence States
in Covid 19 Fight.” The New Indian Express. May 31 2020. Retrieved from
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a-fares-better-than-high-prevalence-states-in-covid-19-fight-2150298.html
Cox, Lawrence. 2020. “Forms of Social Movement in the Crisis: A View from
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Dalasanoor, Sameer. 2020. “Nillada Valasiga Karmikara Kanneeru-
Bengalooru bittu bandaroo ooru serilla (The Unstoppable Tears of Migrant
Workers: They left Bangalore But Could Not Reach their Villages). Vartha
Bharathi.May 4th 2020.Retrieved from
http://www.varthabharati.in/article/vishesha-varadigalu/242471
Deepika, K.S. 2020. “In Karnataka, Government Relief Brings Little Cheer to
Most Migrant Workers.” The Hindu. May 7 2020.
Retrieved from . https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/karnataka/in-
karnataka-government-relief-brings-little-cheer-to-most-
migrants/article31529974.ece
Della Porta, Donatella (2020). “How Progressive Social Movements can Save
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content/uploads/2020/05/Della-Porta.pdf
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Gender Wage Gaps.” Pp. 14-40. In Mind the Gap: State of Employment in India
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Jha, Premshankar. 2020. “Modi’s Stimulus Packages is a Gigantic Confidence

Trick Played on the People of India.” The Wire. May 18 2020. Retrieved from
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confidence-trick-played-on-the-people-of-india
Haligeri, Hanumanta. 2020. “Patrikā dharma haḷḷahiḍisiruva yud'dhōnmādi
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without press ethics). Naanu Gauri News. April 21 2020. Retrieved from
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ಧರ್ಮವಿಲ್ಲದ/

Kapoor, Dip. 2013. “Trans-local Rural Solidarity and an Anticolonial Politics of

Place: Contesting Colonial Capital and the Neoliberal State in India.” Interface:
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(Lockdown of Working People: A Social Study ).” 4th June 2020. Kannada
version can be obtained by writing to [email protected].
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India Private Limited.
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the Death of India’s Liberal Self-Image.” The Wire India. January 5 2020.
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kashmir-caa-india
Mohanty, Sobhi. 2020. “From Communal Violence to Lockdown Hunger:
Emergency Responses by Civil Society Networks in Delhi, India.” Interface: A
Journal for and about Social Movements 23 April 2020. Retrieved from
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Moudgal, Sandeep. 2020. ‘BJP’s Operation Lotus: First Centre, then …” The
Times of India. 21st May 2019. Retrieved from
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ontentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
Mutturaju. 2020. “Maṅgaḷūru bomb prakaraṇa: Mādhyamagaḷa
islāmaphōbiya mattu polīsara pakṣapāta” (The Mangaluru Bombcase:
Islamophobia in the Media and Police). Naanugauri.com, 22 January 2020.

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Retrieved from http://naanugauri.com/mangalore-bomb-incident-aditya-rao-

media-and-police-ರ್ಂಗಳೂರು-ಬಾಂಬ್-ಪಿಕ/

Oommen, Tharailath Koshi. 2009. “Indian Labour Movement: Colonial Era to

the Global Age.” Economic and Political Weekly 44(52): 81-89.
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Inequality Report. Retrieved from
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Blood.” The Wire April 21 2020. Retrieved from
https://thewire.in/media/covid-19-kannada-electronic-media-tablighi-jamaat
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NDTV. May 30th 2020. Retrieved from https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/pm-
narendra-modi-letter-to-nation-tremendous-suffering-says-pm-referring-to-
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Thapliyal, Nisha. 2014. “The Struggle for Public Education: Activist Narratives
from India.” Postcolonial Directions in Education 3(1): 122-159. Retrieved
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Coronavirus will take 21 Days: PM Modi.” March 24 2020. Retrieved from
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modi/articleshow/74813107.cms
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Violence and the Neoliberal State in India." Feminist Review 119(1): 1-6.

About the authors

Mallige Sirimane is a senior activist in Karnataka Jan Shakti. She was born in
a small town in the heart of the Western Ghats region which has a rich social
movement heritage. She became an activist in college and has participated in
struggles for womens’ rights, unorganised workers rights and communal
harmony for the last two decades. She has been part of KJS since inception.
Email: malligesmv AT gmail.com
Nisha Thapliyal is an activist-scholar who has worked in solidarity with KJS
since 2013. She grew up in the eastern city of Kolkata in the state of West Bengal
also with a proud history of social revolution. She is currently a Senior Lecturer
in Comparative Education at the University of Newcastle, Australia. Her
research and teaching centres on social movements for education and womens’
rights in Brazil, USA and India . Email: nisha.thapliyal AT newcastle.edu.au

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Solidarity in times of social distancing:

migrants, mutual aid, and COVID-19
Johannah May Black, Sutapa Chattopadhyay, Riley Chisholm
(20th May 2020)

Stories on communing prompted us to write this manuscript. As we ventured

into emerging reports, articles, and other readings about organizations and
grassroots community groups on the forefront of the ‘fight’1 against the
pandemic, bringing support to people in need, we felt provoked to explore the
strategies and networks that are working with, for, and amongst migrants.

The necessity of solidarity in addressing the COVID-19 crisis:

“Mutual aid” has become a mantra across the globe. Despite pressures to adopt
a neoliberal, individualistic and protectionist worldview, with the rapid spread
of the virus, ordinary people all over the world have begun to recognise the
practical necessity of mutual assistance and cooperation. Government and
industry pressure to re-establish the flow and exchange of goods and capital has
reified the figure of the autonomous ‘worker’ as fundamental to the global
recovery project—one oriented principally toward the health of the ‘economy’
Particularly for those at the bottom of the socio-economic scale, the irony here is
profound: as we are writing this today, the novel-Coronavirus has affected 4.66
million people, with hundreds of millions of job losses and layoffs in formal
sectors, as well as devastating impacts on the informal economy. COVID-19 has
produced the rapid aggravation of inequities, trapping untold millions in many
layers of marginalization and exploitation2. These desperate circumstances have
not gone without a progressive response. Around the world, activists and
grassroots community members are demonstrating that COVID-19 has not
prevented them from forming alliances and reaching out to those in need,
crossing the boundaries of quarantine, lockdown, administrative bottlenecks,
and, in some cases, rigid exceptionalism (see pp.2).
Informal, local, community initiatives and alliances often emerge at times of
crisis, emergency and natural calamity. As we have seen both historically and in
the present moment, ordinary people—those without activist or clearly
articulated cooperative political backgrounds and experiences—have shown an
empathic response to the suffering of others during the crisis. In such cases,
people are motivated to act without having connection to a formal institutional
or organisational body. In many cases, involvement begins as simply responding

14The discursive frame through which ‘war’ is invoked as the dominant orientation to COVID,
simultaneously reinforces patriarchy and the power of the state. As we shall discuss, radical and
feminist alternatives are available through a language of mutuality and cooperation.
25.https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_743036/lang--

en/index.htm Last Accessed May 17, 2020

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to expressions of need by running errands, empathic listening over the phone or

via online connections, or helping to shovel a driveway3. In the case of migrants,
the homeless, those struggling with mental illness, disability and/or domestic
violence, the range and extent of daily needs is compounded by their relative
dispossession before the virus emerged. For these populations, needs can
include having access to appliances, clothing, or critical infrastructure including
a reliable internet connection, making connections with supportive people who
can offer words of care and encouragement from a distance, or help organising
resources such as transportation or access to medical help when pre-existing
challenges become acutely magnified. Where clinically trained NGOs, such as
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) have obeyed border restrictions implemented
during COVID-19, there has been a withdrawal of the organizational support
systems that were in place before the arrival of the virus. For migrants, this has
proved disastrous in terms of cutting off critical medical care to those crossing
borders by land and sea. Instead, mutual aid support for migrants has been
provided to those managing such things as chronic heart or pulmonary disease,
cancer, heart disease, diabetes or immune disorders, through social media,
phones, and other online supports.
The tragedy of Flint Michigan and Hurricane Katrina are readily pointed to as
evidence of the ways that disaster capitalism seeks opportunity in catastrophe,
both in terms of profiteering and fortifying the mechanisms of state repression
and capitalist exploitation. But, at the same time, the resistance notable across
time and space to such aggravations of structural violence, oppression,
economic exploitation and bureaucratic disciplining, testifies to the strength of
ordinary people, to engage deeply and collectively in moments of deep crisis.
Especially for these reasons, both MSF and SOS Mediterranee have partnered
in the past, to address the vital needs of migrants crossing the dangerous
Mediterranean Sea. In the face of COVID-19, these groups are no longer in
cooperation as they have taken on different approaches to the crisis. Where SOS
Mediterranee has lobbied for more solidified legal and political assurances by
receiving countries that they would, for instance, commit to having fully-
equipped search and rescue ships in ports to assist - these efforts have been
slow-moving in a context where the political apparatus for making such
decisions is presently difficult to access. Contrarily for MSF, the humanitarian
imperative to act was immediate. MSF has taken the position that its work is
vital as people continue to flee severe dangers in countries such as Libya and
face the risk of drowning. Since European states have placed extreme
restrictions on NGOs doing work with migrant populations, the search and
rescue operations have been severely hampered. Accordingly, these
organizations are demanding that individual governments take full
responsibility for the humanitarian catastrophe at sea that they are enabling
through their closed border policies. Specifically, pro-migrant organizations are

3As we write from Nova Scotia, Canada, the issue of accessibility in the snow which continued
well into the month of May, was of a challenge to accessibility for persons with disabilities and
older people.

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insisting that the EU take immediate measures to stop the further loss of life
and suffering of so many by reinstating search and rescue capacities, and by
ending the flow of state-sanctioned resources to the Libyan coastguard which
actively terrorizes border-crossers through forcible interdiction and return of
refugees.
Times of prolonged and profound crisis, like the current pandemic, engender
the discovery of a variety of alternative arrangements of protest, mutual aid,
solidarity, self-management, self-mobilization and self-organization. The
pandemic has introduced a plethora of new technologies for online
mobilizations by ordinary people, workers, unions, alliances, and NGOs.
Strategies have included but are not limited to e-petitions and other forms of
mass-appeals that have forced governments and institutions to, for instance,
suspend rents for students and low-income wage-earners, as well as to push for
emergency student benefits and grants. To highlight a specific example, in mid-
April the Malawi high court backed a petition by the Malawi Human Rights
Defenders Coalition (HRDC) seeking to block a 21-day lockdown by the
government. With no clear protocols or clarity on how the social and economic
impacts would be mitigated for the most vulnerable, the HRDC were successful
in convincing Justice Kenyatta Nyirenda that more consultation was needed to
prevent disproportionate harm to the poor. Strikingly, the success of the HRDC
was followed by satellite protests in other cities, led largely by small-scale
traders and young people concerned about access to employment and relatedly,
food resources should a lockdown be implemented 4.
While the Kenyan government adopted draconian measures to enforce the
quarantine measures of coronavirus patients5, in Nigeria, patients suffering
from the virus forced their way out of isolation to object improper care and their
worsening health conditions6. In Rwanda, relocated refugees from Libya living
in overcrowded camps also rose in dissent,7 while in Israel, hundreds of cars
raising black flags headed to Jerusalem in opposition of the government’s
restrictions on movement and its authorization of the cyber-tracking of
civilians. Such protests are not the expression of entitlement but rather expose
the possibilities8 in terms of collective interference in state-sanctioned, anti-
democratic measures and the authoritarian suppression of resistance. Around
one hundred parents disputed in Karachi, Pakistan demanding that the
government assist in the return of their children who had been studying in the

4 Malawi high court blocks coronavirus lockdown Last Accessed May 15, 2020
5Kenyans held for weeks in quarantine were then told to pay to get out Last Accessed May 15,
2020.
6 Nigeria: COVID-19 patients protest over 'ill treatment Last Accessed May 15, 2020.
7
https://www.voanews.com/covid-19-pandemic/refugees-protest-under-
coronavirus-lockdown-rwanda Last Accessed May 15, 2020.
8 Bauder, Harald.2016. Migration Borders Freedom. London: Routledge.

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Chinese province of Hubei, and due to the lockdown, were now stranded there9
Grassroots feminist organizers have set up support funds for sex worker and
survivors of the sex trade in Hawaii10. In countries like Finland, public
transportation drivers declined to monitor tickets. And right across Europe and
Asia, collective messages of contestation and solidarity have been swapped from
balconies, windows, and rooftops. In Iraq, activists voiced their resistance to
gender relations of power in terms of state led violence towards women11. Here
in Canada, at the Saskatchewan Penitentiary resistance has emerged around
newly implemented practices in which inmates have been placed in cells for
more than 20 hours a day. In India, protests were provoked by Prime Minister
Modi when he officially extended the lockdown in a live television address, this
extension was understood by many to be a threat to the lives of temporary,
migrant, gig workers12 and small and local entrepreneurs. These examples offer
just a small window into the various issues, strategies and techniques through
which collective action has brought pressure to bear on governments around the
world.
All of this said, in the face of the glaring necessity for radical and complex social
transformation, movements often include protests without being limited by
them. First, social movements create and reinforce alliances, while building
upon existing social and community networks. But also, in practice, movements
are about making connections, reinforcing pre-existing associations and
solidarities, and reproducing what has already been established as a
community’s strength in the face of adversity/ies. Confronted and challenged by
the manufactured inequalities of nationalized state systems and, even more, the
capitalist market, social movements often find their legitimacy in justice-based
values that flourish and multiply in contexts that support political innovation
and creativity. We can see how this is so in terms of contemporary mutual-aid
responses to the pandemic where the organic emergence of devoted support
groups have begun to promote direct social action to assist those left behind by
government. Moreover, movements produce resilience by resisting in
imaginative and inspired ways that flow from the ‘bottom-up’, rather than the
typical imposition of ‘top-down’ policies familiar to state and business
organizational settings. This ‘movement’ from the bottom is in fact a metaphor

9https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-health-pakistan-idUSKBN20A0J9 Last Accessed

May 15, 2020.
10 https://ca.gofundme.com/f/supportsurvival Last Accessed May 15, 2020.
11The Iraq Report: Protest movement revives as coronavirus lockdown eased Last Accessed May
15, 2020.
12India's migrant workers protest against lockdown extension | India News Last Accessed May
15, 2020.

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for the structural prerequisite for the emergence of broad coalitions of collective
solidarity (Della Porta 2020)13.
Crisis also opens windows of opportunity for social change by intensifying the
critical need for a truly public responsibility and civic sense, and for clear
opportunities for broad civic engagement and acts of solidarity. If crises have an
immediate effect on concentrations of power, up to and including militarization,
they also validate the ineffectiveness of sovereign states acting merely through
force (Della Porta 2020). As argued by Wendy Brown in her recent book, Walled
States, Waning Sovereignty14, the building of walls at the perimeter of
nationalized territories is indicative of the decline of a state’s sovereignty rather
than its aggrandizement under conditions of globalization. And so here we can
recognise the various failures of state-sanctioned power to halt the movement of
people through establishing circuits of curtailment including, orchestrated
administrative dead-ends, border walls, surveillance systems and other means
by which the desperate and the poor become entangled. So, while walls have
been the focus of most resistance, we may also recognise that symbolically, they
stand as a crude depiction of psycho-political ambiguity and a defensive
acknowledgement by the state itself to its own profound vulnerability.
Fortifications emerge only when sovereignty dissipates; even walled states
cannot completely interdict those who are determined enough or desperate
enough to cross (consider Calais in Northern France, the Mexican and United
States Border zone, the Mediterranean, the Schengen territory, and the list
continues).
Here, the need for the redistribution of resources and widespread support in
order to address the pandemic might bring forth an acknowledgement of the
productivity of mobilizations from within civil society. Such collective solidarity
movements might thus provide a necessary contrast to the measures taken by
authoritarian states in their repressive response to the crisis of the pandemic.
What is more significant is that the COVID crisis has shown the value of a
fundamental public goodness of citizens to mobilise not only on behalf of their
own, but in the interests of non-citizens as well. The crisis has illuminated how
solidary work requires creativity, cooperative input on aims and goals and
participatory action, from-below. In any of the mobilizations that have occurred
during the pandemic, the value of a universally accessible system of public
health has been made readily apparent as a matter of justice. We know that
trade unions have traditionally argued for health care for workers, and those on
the political Left have long fought for even broader universal health protections
as a public good. The COVID-19 pandemic has undoubtedly demonstrated the
need to reaffirm these demands and to expand them to include protections for
the most vulnerable including migrants. Indeed, this is not simply a state-based
issue as the pandemic triggers reflection on the need for a globally-established

13Della Porta, Donatella. 2020. Social Movements in times of Pandemic: Another world is
needed. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/social-movements-times-
pandemic-another-world-needed/ Last Accessed May 10, 2020.
14 Brown, Wendy, 2010. Walled States and Waning Sovereignty, NY: Zone Books.

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set of health protections—a view espoused by civil society organizations such as

Médecins Sans Frontières (Global), Food Not Bombs (North America), No One
is Illegal (Canada), Black Lives Matter (North America), Emergency (Global),
South Sudanese United Refugees Association (Africa), Médicos Unidos
(Venezuela), Seva (India), to list a few.

The specific struggles of migrants and organizations

from below
With this snapshot of the intersection between the COVID-19 crisis and
solidarity initiatives around the world, we have thus far, offered a brief
exploration of both the challenges and innovative initiatives that have sought to
respond to the needs of the most vulnerable during this crisis. Although in a
limited fashion, we have tried to hone in on some of the creative and spirited
ways in which mutual aid, and other forms of popular resistance have formed a
counter-hegemonic orientation to the COVID-19 crisis. We have touched upon
various expressions of autonomy and the agency of ordinary people engaged in
mutual aid, as well as migrant justice organizations and NGOs—each in their
own way advocating for human rights during a time in which such rights are
being placed at increasing risk, particularly for those at the bottom of the
hierarchy.
Hannah Arendt's (1976)15 most quoted phrase, often interpreted as the “right to
have rights”, sums up her skepticism towards the concept of human rights
where in theory, those rights are afforded every person by virtue of being
human, while in practice are denied to those who do not have citizenship or
legal status to stay. The migrants, we have talked about in this manuscript are
but a handful of the 65.6 million people forcibly displaced by war, conflict, and
political persecution. They join the ranks of 22.5 million refugees and ten
million stateless people currently denied basic human rights to shelter, benefits,
education, and freedom of movement.16 From Western Europe to Australia, the
United States to East Asia, undocumented migrants, refugees, and asylum
seekers spend their days simply existing, waiting to be granted the legal
acknowledgement that they are human.
The blatant hardening of borders through regulatory measures designed
specifically to keep migratory labor cheap, disposable, and controllable, is not
new or particular to COVID-19. It has long served the interests of the ruling
class both in the feudal period and became aggravated with the advent of
capitalism. In recent decades, the exploitation of global migrant populations has
been fortified with increasing technological sophistication, the spread of
globalization, and the hegemony of neoliberalism. Borders establish the political
boundaries of various exclusionary state policies that internally, legitimize both

15 Arendt, Hannah. 1976. Origins of Totalitarianism, Orlando: A Harvest Book.

United Nations. 'Refugees'. https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/refugees/ Accessed
16

May 21, 2019.

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domestic police repression of vulnerable populations and the super-exploitation

of migrant labour, while externally, surveil and criminalize refugees seeking to
escape poverty, hunger, and violence. Such practices are not unique to the
circumstances presented by COVID-19 but are rather exacerbated by the current
crisis. Viewed in this way, we can see that calls for compassion by state-bodies
or multi-national corporations for migrants at this time—to enable access to
food, sanitary accommodations, safe housing, health-care facilities, and
information—is highly unlikely.
That Black American communities have disproportionately contracted and died
of the novel-coronavirus, or that around the globe, indigenous communities
have contracted the virus, or that migrants, refugees and other marginalized
folk are being stigmatized and unjustly discriminated against for supposedly
spreading the virus, that these populations are also, disproportionately
underserved or outright neglected by medical services—all is related to the
systemic oppression, racism and colonial biopolitical practices that pre-figured
the arrival of COVID-19. Moreover, increasing neoliberal cuts to healthcare
systems as well as the constant drive towards privatization have meant that even
basic healthcare is increasingly out of reach for the poor. Xenophobic responses
to COVID-19 from both governments and the public rings familiar: consider the
response to other health crises like SARS, swine flu, Ebola. What is not well
known is that such responses—those that underpin racist, classist, and sexist
orientations—are not uni-directional. They also convey negative health
outcomes to the wider public17. Moreover, these claims are not only based in
hate, they are also divorced from facts: estimates show that transmission of the
disease from refugee and migrant populations is low. Considering these data, we
fail to see how increased border closures, including to asylum seekers here in
Canada, as well as forced returns and refoulement of migrants globally are
justifiable. In what follows, we briefly expand on the relevant work of some pro-
migrant organizations.
On one side of the Atlantic Ocean is Florida and on the other is the inhospitable
Hamada region of the vast Sahara Desert where lies the former Spanish colony
of the Sahrawi country, now annexed by Morocco after Spain. The Sahrawi
refugee camp is only a few kilometers from Tindouf in Algeria, between the
Mediterranean Sea and Sub Saharan Africa. The lives of colonized Sahrawians
who were already isolated by the so called “Wall of Shame”18 are now lives of
hyper-isolation with reduced access to humanitarian aid, sanitary supplies,
health care, and food. Worse still, those confined in the overcrowded and
squalid conditions, sleeping in tents, have no options for “social distancing”
aside from full isolation making detainees particularly vulnerable to the spread
of the disease. Since March 19, the Algerian government has suspended the

https://www.utoronto.ca/news/coronavirus-not-great-equalizer-race-matters-u-t-expert Last
17

Accessed May 10, 2020.

18An approximately 2,700 km long structure running through Western Sahara separating
Moroccan-occupied areas (the Southern Provinces) on the west from the Polisario-controlled
areas (Free Zone, nominally Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic) on the east.

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collective expulsion of irregular migrants19 yet continues to remove migrants

from Africa, while reducing the possibility of refugees crossing the border. No
new asylum policies or practices have been adopted in response to the virus. On
April 2020, 5,037 prisoners were released by the Algerian president. Migrant
detainees are now being confined in facilities with inadequate sanitary
provisions and limited health care and are being forced to share rooms with
countless others. As in many refugee camps around the world, restrictions
around COVID-19 have meant that these liminal spaces have become places of
long-term settlement with complex economic systems and alliances. In
Saharawi, capital inflows have been produced by remittances and informal
economic activities. The Sahrawians in exile and in refugee camps have
converted parts of the bleak desert into planned vegetable gardens through
initiatives of young Sahrawi agronomists as well as technicians versed with
irrigation. By their own resourcefulness, Sahrawians have also drawn on the
generational knowledge of elderly Sahrawis in order to incorporate traditional
soil and plant protection techniques. They have established self-supporting
health care facilities honing the technical and medical skills of exiled traditional
healers, doctors, and nurses. The stories of hope amidst dismay, precarity and
extreme vulnerability long-predate the spread of the virus, but we can recognize
how, with the establishment of these practices and skills, resilience continues to
manifest even in the bleakest situations. As Eric Werker has noted, the main
economic actors in any refugee camps are “the refugees themselves, many of
whom possess skills and access to networks and commercial capital acquired
either before or during their residence in a camp” challenging the normal
description of refugees as “passive, paralyzed victims who are totally dependent
on international aid” and refugee camps as “places of stasis, and of refugees as
passive, paralyzed”20
Over the past few years, Venezuela remains mired in economic, political, and
social turmoil as well as the threat of imperialist intervention, has meant the
rapid depopulation of roughly 4.5 million people including much needed
medical professionals, by foot into Columbia and Brazil. Hyperinflation and
economic sanctions have caused shortages of basic food and medical supplies.
According to local Venezuelan NGO Médicos Unidos21 hospitals are regularly
faced with repeated power outages, shortages of staff, gloves, antibiotics,
protective gear and other medical supplies or potable water. While the borders
remain closed due to the virus, informal crossings continue.
In Uganda, home of 1.4 million refugees, lockdown has been in place since
March 30th. Many in the country are faced with challenges posed not only by

19Defined generally as a person who, owing to what is considered a breach of a condition of

entry or the expiry of their legal basis for entering and residing, has no legal status in a host
country.
20https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2017/rethinking-concept-durable-solution-
sahrawi-refugee-camps/ Last Accessed May 9, 2020.
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)30718-2/fulltext Last
21

Accessed May 9, 2020.

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the virus, but by its secondary consequences including a lack of food, medicine,
and basic services. Arua, a bustling town located on the West Nile, is now
surrounded with refugee camps facing severe shortages of food due to
restrictions on mobility. Although bound by policies that prevent them from
feeding refugees, a refugee-led organization called South Sudanese United
Refugees Association (SSURA) has been drawing upon the help of refugee
families who pick food on behalf of those stuck in Arua. Another community-
based organization known as Young African Refugees for Integral
Development (YARID) has “distributed baskets of flour, soap, beans, sugar, and
cooking oil to vulnerable refugees in Kampala, identifying recipients through
community networks and reaching over 200 households”22. Similar
organizations are making efforts to dispel the myths of COVID-19 via social
media and cellphones. It has been noted that, “The current crisis may lead to
lasting models of participatory and inclusive refugee assistance – and in turn
more sustainable and localized humanitarian governance.”23 Similarly, Milan
(2020, 2-3)24 writes that in the Balkans which is in a State of Emergency like
many other places, contact with or access to refugee centers, camps, squats or
housing is restricted except for a few international organizations like the Red
Cross. Yet informal solidarity groups have sprung up to provide such things as
cooked hot meals, online vouchers that migrants can use to buy food locally,
first aid support and much-needed information on the virus. One independent
organization that is relentlessly working with refugees and illegalized border
crossers in the Western Balkans migratory passage is ŠID – Velika Kladuša or
No Name Kitchen (NNK). Having established a “solidarity market”, the NGO
manages to provide food for approximately 500 people on a weekly basis. This
sort of an activity also supports the local economy, which is emulated by other
grassroots collectives, such as the Italian Bozen Solidarity. This group uses
social networks to provide resources and aid to people on the move along the
migratory path.
Another organization like NNK is Food Not Bombs (FNB). This organization
works around the clock and 365 days in some cities in the United States. They
usually cook and serve weekly public meals and are now cooking and canning
food and dropping it off to those in need. As many in the group are in isolation
in their homes, they quickly set up a fundraising app to raise money in order
that their membership could participate in making masks and bottles of bleach
cleaner/disinfectant in their confinement. The bags of food put together for
distribution by FNB, contain a mask and a spray bottle of disinfectant. With the
help of another organization called ON A MOVE, FNB includes a printout of
information on the virus in the food bags. FNB also partners with other

22Why Refugees are an asset in the fight of coronavirus. https://theconversation.com/why-

refugees-are-an-asset-in-the-fight-against-coronavirus-136099 Last Accessed May 10, 2020.
23https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2020/04/29/coronavirus-response-refugee-
camps-humanitarian-aid Last Accessed May 9, 2020.
24https://www.interfacejournal.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Chiara-Milan.pdf Last
accessed May 19, 2020

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organizations like Philly IWW [Industrial Workers of the World], Philly Trans
March, Socialist Rifle Association, SHARE Food Program, Philly REAL
[Racial, Economic and Legal] Justice, For the People and the Revolutionary
Abolitionist Movement, each of which are pushing for social justice for the
marginalized during the pandemic.
In late January 2020, France confirmed a positive case of the COVID-19
respiratory disease. In France, roughly 3000 migrants live in temporary
makeshift camps, communal housing, on the street, or in public parks and face
poor sanitary conditions and a lack of access to basic medical care. The same
people have also been confronting harassment from police, exploitative working
conditions, and repeated evictions by the authorities. The northern city of Calais
nicknamed “the jungle,” houses more than 10,000 migrants, living in sordid
conditions. Véga Levaillant, Communications and Advocacy Officer for the
migrant aid organization Utopia 56, has said that migrants in Calais “live in
such poor conditions that the virus is not such a fear. Because they are afraid of
dying in so many other ways, like lack of food, or lack of water, or just any
disease they could have by living in the street. But yes, a lot of them are also very
scared.”25 Care4Calais is one of the only organizations still providing emergency
services to migrants and refugees in Calais. Local authorities started to move
migrants from makeshift camps to accommodation centers, but the process has
been slow, and the centers are already over-crowded. Grassroots aid groups
have reported that the camps are faced with limited water and food supplies.
Migrants are under strict quarantine, without access to the proper paperwork,
and cannot access the supermarkets to buy food for themselves. “Refugees living
in northern France already have weakened immunity from chronic stress and
the deplorable conditions they are forced to live in,” said Sarah Story, co-
founder and director of Refugee Info Bus.
Undocumented workers make up an often invisible part of the Canadian
workforce. From construction labourers, to seasonal farm workers, to house
cleaners, they are often paid in cash and can face discrimination from employers
or other workers over their undocumented status. Even more concerning,
thousands of undocumented migrants and asylum seekers have been working
on the front lines of the COVID-19 crisis in Quebec’s understaffed long-term
care homes26. In southwestern Ontario, approximately 14,000 temporary
migrants work in the agricultural sector each season. The towns of Leamington
and Kingsville alone see an annual intake of 5,000 to 6,000 workers a year, the
vast majority of whom are from Mexico, Jamaica, Indonesia, or the Philippines.
The growth in the migrant worker population in this area has been triggered by
the rapidly growing $1-billion greenhouse industry. With 2,000 acres under
glass or plastic, this region represents the largest concentration of greenhouses
in North America. There have already been problems reported in terms of

25.https://qz.com/1834508/what-dealing-with-covid-19-is-like-for-homeless-migrants/ Last
Accessed May 9, 2020
26https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-asylum-seekers-on-front-line-of-quebecs-
covid-19-battle-in-care-homes-2/ Last accessed May 19, 2020

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discrimination by employers and locals toward the migrants, yet with COVID-
19, there is great concern that these negative attitudes towards migrant workers
by the wider community will deepen, particularly for those from Asian countries
like Indonesia or the Philippines. For example, one video shared over social
media by the activist group Justice4MigrantWorkers27 shows migrant
farmworkers at one Ontario farm, housed in a warehouse, sleeping on wooden
pallets with cardboard boxes for storage28. Cast as temporary labourers and not
citizens, migrant workers already experience mental health struggles that are,
according to health care workers, “situational”—that is, produced in the context
of their conditions in the Canadian migrant labour force. This is reinforced by a
study in British Columbia29 that found feelings of unworthiness, loneliness, and
social isolation are common among migrant workers, predisposing them to
increased rates of depression and anxiety. Certainly, depression and anxiety are
likely to intensify given the restrictions associated with the pandemic.
In all, the situation is both bleak and promising. We cannot ignore the profound
hardships and struggles forced upon the most marginal at this time. Yet,
innovative and creative responses and resistance to Coronavirus have emerged
as effective interventions in critical situations facing the most vulnerable. These
grassroots, collectively based efforts have had important impacts, the most
apparent being those which have coordinated and distributed critical resources
to people most in need. In addition, local mutual aid groups, pop-up food banks,
community sourced medical gear, and free online medical-consultation30 clinics
have all been used as methods that people developed in the past several months
to address what more formal organisations and institutions have been
structurally unable, or politically unwilling to do. What is certain is that the
actions of social movements and communities around the world have already
saved countless lives. Where migrants stand out as a particularly vulnerable
group, we note that they are not in any regard, helpless. Broad reaching
commitments across all of civil society, including from the migrant community,
promises to be a source of resilience and support for us all. It also is the basis for
the development of unified resistance to state sanctioned tyranny and
dispossession, through which local groups and communities cohere around not
just local interests but establish global political demands such as health care and
human rights for all.

27http://www.justicia4migrantworkers.org/?source=post_page--------------------------- Last
Accessed May 19, 2020
28https://twitter.com/martinezdefence/status/1262026764643164160 Last Accessed May 19,
2020
29 http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0188-70172016000100085
Mendliburo, Aaron Diaz and Janet McLaughlin. 2016. “Structural Vulnerability and Health
among Seasonal Health Care Workers in Canada”, Alteridades 6, (51).
30 https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1099363 Last Accessed May 18, 2020.

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About the authors

Johannah May Black is an activist and academic living and working in
Mi'kma'ki,the traditional and unceeded land of the Mi'kmaq people. She
currently works as the Bystander Program Coordinator at the Antigonish
Women's Resource Centre and Sexual Assault Services Association and also
lectures part time in the department of Women's and Gender Studies at St.
Francis Xavier University. She is also a PhD candidate in the department of
Political Science at York University. Her research, teaching, and activism is
centered around proletarian feminism, community anti-violence organizing,
migration, and collective memory. She can be contacted at johannah AT
awrcsasa.ca
Riley Chisholm is an associate professor at St. Francis Xavier University, located
in Mi’kma’ki, the unceded territory of the Mi’kmaq People . Among other things,
she teaches and conducts her research on global agriculture, and climate justice.
She is also a regenerative beef farmer, and a mother. She can be contacted at
rchishol AT stfx.ca
Sutapa Chattopadhyay is a geographer, a mother, and a migrant scholar. She is
currently working at St. Francis Xavier University (STFX) (in the department of
Women’s and Gender studies and Development Studies) located in
Mi’kma’ki, the unceded territory of the Mi’kmaq People. Her areas of interest
are migrations, development, social movements, political ecology, and gender
and indigeneity. She is in the advisory board of ACME: An international journal
for critical geographies and an editor of Interface: a journal for and about
social movements. She can be contacted at schattop AT stfx.ca

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Doing migrant solidarity at the time of Covid-19

Anitta Kynsilehto (30th May 2020)

This paper discusses migrant solidarity in Morocco, drawing on long-term work

with migrants of different nationalities from Western and Central African
countries residing in Morocco as well as on migrant solidarity activism in the
country. Many of these people on the move have arrived in Morocco with a plan
on continuing their journeys to the European continent and ended up staying in
Morocco because of enhanced border control measures and outsourcing of the
European Union’s borders to the African continent (e.g. Andersson 2014; Casas-
Cortes, Cobarrubias & Pickles 2015). Along these ‘fragmented journeys’ (Colley
2007), people on the move have organised in different ways developing
practices of ‘circumstantial solidarities’ (Bredeloup 2013) based on the shared
condition of precarity mounting to daily struggles for survival, including shared
places of residence in makeshift campsites and crowded apartments. Since the
beginning of visible migrant protest from 2005 onwards, they have also formed
more established associations and organisations (e.g. Üstübici 2016). These
latter have been able to influence the new migration policy in Morocco, in the
making since 2013, as active and indispensable contributors in public debate
and different specialized commissions as well as through their direct contacts
with broader migrant community. However, since August 2018 there has been a
severe backlash against migrants’ rights activism in the country (e.g. Kynsilehto
2019). It is this evolving context where the global pandemic has posed
additional challenges, both immediately and potentially in the long-term:
highlighted some of the persistent structural issues related to migrants’ access
to rights such as healthcare, food and accommodation that have become all the
more precarious during the Covid-19 pandemic, but also as regards to the
migrant solidarity movement’s possibility to testify and denounce violations by
the authorities in a societal climate where these forms of solidarity are
increasingly criminalized.

Global health crisis contributing to broader social crisis

With the outbreak of Covid-19 in Morocco, all country was locked down. The
sudden closing of the whole country created uncertainty as regards to what
could happen, how to best survive in the midst of global health crisis now
affecting also the immediate proximity and, very simply, where and how to find
relevant information as regards to measures in place. Migrant communities
were particularly affected by this uncertainty as at first relevant information was
distributed in Arabic, such as in the government web page devoted to the
pandemic (http://covid19.interieur.gov.ma/). This was where migrant
organisations stepped in by seeking to map those in need of specific support,
such as lone mothers, families with small children and pregnant women. At the
same time, information on the pandemic and the measures in place to contain it
was quickly translated into different languages in order to inform everyone, and

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Serge Aimé Guemou, the president of the French-speaking umbrella

organisation Conseil des Migrants Subsahariens au Maroc (CMSM), distributed
a video and written message on the measures everyone needs to remember
during the pandemic (Guemou 2020). An important one of these was the
permission needed to justify any outdoors activity such as grocery shopping or
visit to a health centre. Earlier Mr. Guemou had also reminded migrant
community leaders of this possibility when seeking to reach out to the most
vulnerable individuals (personal communication, 21 March 2020). Hence, the
first obstacle to be mounted was the overall restriction on mobility and
understanding what reasons for moving about could still be permitted under
these restrictive measures.
Despite different projects and measures put in place over the years in order to
enable migrants’ access to health care, this remains problematic not only in
terms of the present pandemic but also during times of the ‘old normal’. Regular
check-ups on permanent diseases or follow-up of pregnancies have been halted.
Registered migrants have, in paper, access to universal healthcare RAMED
reserved for all those with low income (see, e.g., Akhnif, Macq & Meessen 2019).
This system has, however, been unevenly accessible for migrants even in normal
times, prior to the outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic: for example, health care
centres may have asked for a valid residence permit in the original version and
refused entry for prospective patients whose residence permits were undergoing
renewal, which is a notoriously lengthy process. Moreover, according to
Moroccan sociologist and migrants’ rights activist Mehdi Alioua, the specific
support measure of some 800 to 1200 dirhams for low income families during
the Covid-19 lockdown and resulting practical unemployment concerns only
those migrants who had been able to have a valid RAMED card at the end of
2019 (El Ouardighi 2020).
Access to work has become impossible for many daily laborers during the
lockdown resulting in de facto unemployment and complete lack of revenue. It
has thus impacted in many ways migrants and the communities they form. The
direct consequence of lack of income is that it has become difficult, even
impossible to pay rent for the shared apartments and rooms, and created
shortages of food, leading to hunger crisis (El Ouardighi 2020) that migrant
solidarity groups try to alleviate the best they can. Moroccan associations
mobilized swiftly to come in support of migrants (Yabiladi 2020). Soup kitchens
and other forms of collectively organised solidarity put in place in times of crisis
prior to the present pandemic, for example in Greece under the austerity
measures and the so-called refugee crisis in Europe (e.g. Rozakou 2016), have
needed to adapt to the changed context of social distancing.
For migrant groups, some of which organised according to nationality, lack of
income has created an additional problem. The activities of these community
groups rely largely on small contributions (cotisations) of all members, and
alongside other shortages, it has become extremely difficult for the members to
contribute. For this reason, independent allies and funders stepping in from
outside would be warmly welcome.

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Health emergency enabling further criminalisation of

solidarity
The context of Morocco also provides unfortunate examples of how emergency
measures undertaken because of the global pandemic can serve as an excuse for
restricting individual freedoms beyond the necessary precautions due to the
need to contain and stop the global health crisis. In the context of migrant
solidarity, the case of human rights activist Omar Naji provides an important
example. Resident of Nador, the emblematic border town shouldering the
Spanish city of Melilla, Naji has been involved in migrants’ rights activism for
many years, reminding Moroccan authorities for their duties vis-à-vis foreigners
and denouncing publicly their excessive use of force during frequent raids and
mass arrests and subsequent forced removals, for example. This time he was
arrested and accused for posting this kind of information in social media, under
the pretext of recent regulation forbidding such activity. This regulation was
passed in haste and in secrecy under the state of emergency due to Covid-19. It
has remained unclear what possible connection this interdiction would have for
doing anything to the health crisis; however, it has been immediately
implemented. What is clear, however, is that this example of Moroccan
authorities’ attack on a well-known migrants’ rights activist attests to the need
for solidarity activists and critical civil society to remain alert to states’ attempts
to use the health emergency to implement control measures that go beyond
health concerns in order to silence critical voices.

Concluding remarks
As the above suggests, the present pandemic highlights the inequality among
different populations and persisting structural problems people on the move
face in their country of settlement. As a first step forward, there is a collective
call from migrant activists across North Africa and beyond: being able to access
a regular residence status is a primordial requirement for accessing other
fundamental rights. This became clear, for example, in the webinar organised by
Maghreb Social Forum on the 30 May, 2020, addressing the additional
challenges Covid-19 poses to migrants without regular migration status in the
country they reside. This event was one amongst many recent collective online
meetings that offer possibilities for exchange across countries and regions to
collective mobilisations in times of crisis that impedes international mobility
also of those who usually have access to regular and orderly travel channels. At
the same time of being a necessity for this period of global health emergency,
they may also offer further learning opportunities for movements that rely on in
person meetings but, in so doing, render it difficult for those with limited access
to (international) mobility to take part.

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References
Akhnif, E., Macq, J. & Meessen, B. 2019. The place of learning in a universal
health coverage health policy process: the case of the RAMED policy in
Morocco. Health Research Policy and Systems, 17, 21.
Andersson, R. 2014. Illegality, inc: Clandestine migration and the business of
bordering Europe. Oakland, CA: University of California Press.
Bredeloup, S. 2013. Circumstantial solidarities and the transformation of
migratory networks. Journal of Intercultural Studies, 34(5), 517–532.
Casas-Cortes, M., Cobarrubias, S. & Pickles, J. 2015. Riding Routes and
Itinerant Borders: Autonomy of Migration and Border Externalization.
Antipode, 47(4), 894–914.
Collyer, M. 2007. In-between places: Undocumented sub-Saharan transit
migrants in Morocco. Antipode, 39(4), 668–690.
El Ouardighi, S. 2020. Mehdi Alioua: “20.000 migrants au Maroc risquent une
catastrophe humanitaire”. Medias24, 21 April 2020.
https://www.medias24.com/mehdi-alioua-20-000-migrants-au-maroc-
risquent-une-catastrophe-humanitaire-9668.html (last accessed 30 May 2020)
Guemou, S. A. (2020) Coronavirus/Migration/Maroc: le message de Serge
Aimé Guemou, président de “Conseil des Migrants Subsahariens au Maroc”.
Afrique Adulte Le sud sud, 24 March 2020.
http://lafriqueadulte.com/tag/serge-aime-guemou/ (last accessed 30 May
2020)
Kynsilehto, A. 2019. Bearing Witness to Violence at Borders: Intermingling
Artistic and Ethnographic Encounters. In Karina Horsti K. (ed.) The Politics of
Public Memories of Forced Migration and Bordering in Europe, pp. 71–86.
Palgrave Macmillan Memory Studies. Palgrave Pivot, Cham.
Rozakou, K. 2016. Socialities of solidarity: Revisiting the gift taboo in times of
crises. Social Anthropology 24(2): 185–199.
Üstübici, A. 2016. Political activism between journey and settlement: Irregular
migrant mobilisation in Morocco. Geopolitics, 21(2), 303–324.
Yabiladi. 2020. #SolidaritéCovid: Un collectif d’associations marocaines pour
venir en aide aux migrants. Yabiladi 15 April 2020.
https://www.yabiladi.com/articles/details/92215/solidaritecovid-collectif-d-
associations-marocaines-pour.html (last accessed 27 May 2020)

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About the author

Anitta Kynsilehto is Senior Researcher at the New Social Research -programme
and Tampere Peace Research Institute, Tampere University, Finland. She works
on global mobility and solidarity activism with people on the move, and her
publications include Gender and Mobility: A Critical Introduction (with Elina
Penttinen), published by Rowman & Littlefield in 2017. In 2012-2018, she
served as board member of EuroMed Rights -network as the person in charge of
migration and asylum. anitta.kynsilehto AT tuni.fi

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Interface: A journal for and about social movements Stories of struggle
Volume 12 (1): 199 – 207 (July 2020) Thieme and Tibet, Women alliances in solidarity

New political upheavals and women alliances in

solidarity beyond “lock down” in Switzerland at times
of a global pandemic
Susan Thieme and Eda Elif Tibet (3 June 2020)

“Because people have to stay home and will be working less they won’t be able to
afford their pension in the future. There will be payment gaps. Now the debate is
on the interest rates, they are arguing whether people should retire at a later age,
why because we are under a crisis and we are all in the same ship, says the
authorities. But this is not true we might be at the same sea but not in the same
ship. Some of us are journeying in a dingy boat, some in their ships, sailing boats,
vessels and luxurious yachts, laborers are already drowning.”
(May 17th 2020, Emine Sariaslan)

Quoting Emine Sariaslan1 a social worker at public health services, refers to the
recent most heard metaphor “we are all in the same ship” and draws our
attention to how people are not affected equally by the governmental measures
taken against the increasing spread of the global pandemic COVID-19. She
speaks of the common human experience to be not taking place in the same ship
but in the same sea, which for some is of comfort and for some is a matter of life
and death. Those who are drowning she mentions later in our conversation; to
be the health care, retail, service and logistics workers, among them who do not
often have Swiss citizenship, lacking full political participation with limited
possibilities to claim their rights. “These are the people working on the
frontline who make the system function amidst the devastating pandemic” also
writes Sariaslan in her recent article at Horizonte2. A fact even more striking in
a country where formal citizens can shape political decisions in a participatory
way, where many referendums have been about migrants without having them
present in the discussions. At our interview taking place on May 17th 2020,
Sariaslan further claims; “not having migrants to participate in the decision
making processes diminish migrant backgrounds into apolitical beings whom
are seen as either a surplus or a burden by nationalist parties, ripping them off
from their very human rights”.
By addressing the ongoing inequalities in our society, in this paper we aim to
show how women alliances in Switzerland could mobilize their forces and
influence in shaping state policy, as they have been able to react urgently and
took actions immediately during the lock down. Following studies made by

1 Emine Sariaslan is a voluntary board member at UNIA , a commissioned writer at the

Horizonte, originally from Turkey and a Swiss Citizen. See her profile at https://public-health-
services.ch/portfolio/emine-sariaslan/
2 Horizonte is the additional newsletter magazine published as part of the “Work” newspaper
,published by UNIA in five different languages:
https://www.unia.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Horizonte_Polnisch_1_2020.pdf

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scholars on how intersectional interests can be used to build coalitions within

and across social movements increasing the number and diversity of activists
(Fisher et all 2017:1; Carasthatis 2013; Cole 2008; ) we look at new political
upheavals leaded by a women coalition between the already active
Frauen*streik movement3, Frauen Alliance4 and Swiss Unions in Switzerland.
We interviewed two members of the coalition; Muhterem Hülya Genis and
Emine Sariaslan5, in learning their activities that correspond to the needs of
those hit by COVID-19, that shaped the premises of new political upheavals.
Our analysis based on our conversations with the activists, informed on how
current activism around the pandemic is built on the existing social movement
Frauen*streik that helped mobilizing a wide range of women with different
backgrounds within the streets and the parliament and in areas in between, in
responding to those hit by the pandemic. The movement hence became
mobilized in meeting the urgency of the COVID-19 impact particularly on labor
rights and in extending one of the criteria “willingness to participate within the
economic life” from the Swiss Integration law (passed on 2019). The coalition
have been able to shift the discourse on how “work” has not become a matter of
“will” but are determined by “restrictions” and “inabilities to access” along with
many other complex processes affecting peoples’ participation into the
economic life during the pandemic.

For those on the frontline but in the backyard of Swiss politics

“The oppressed are always the working class and laborers that also include
migrants within these categories and these categories are also differentiated
according to their residence permits from B, C to N. Last year according to the
new migrants law the number one criteria for integration has become to have a
job, second is to know the language, and permits are prolonged as such, if this
person is not a burden to the state… however since people are losing their jobs as
of now, they will not be allowed to stay in Switzerland and won’t be able to apply
to RAV (unemployment fund) either. As the UNION we have made a
concentrated meeting on this issue and have intervened starting with the case of

3 Women across Switzerland took to the streets by about 500,000 on June 14 2019 in a
historic strike called as Frauen*streik, demanding equal treatment and conditions compared
with their male counterparts, See :
https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/equal-treatment_women-s-strike-gets-underway-across-
switzerland/45030950 and official web page: https://frauenstreik2019.ch
4 Frauen Alliance is an umbrella organization for over 100 women's organizations, established
120 years ago in Switzerland. Defines itself to be the voice of women in Swiss politics and does
advocacy to achieve equality between women and men - in society, in business and in politics.
Alliance F is non-partisan and its’ members include women (and men) from all major political
parties, including active and former national, state and federal councilors. See their web site:
https://de.alliancef.ch
5Both participants did not see a need to anonymize their voices and gave consent to publish
their points of view.

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the Portuguese service providers in Zermatt whose rich employers wanted to fire
them that would have resulted in their deportation , we did not let that happen.”
(Emine Sariaslan, May17th 20202)

According to unions there has never been a time where a majority of Swiss
society (of working-age people) has faced the risk of unemployment6 with
applications to RAV (Regional Employment Centre) for claims to the ALK
(Unemployment insurance fund) are of record numbers. Many of the employers
have been reported to try cutting the unforeseen loss of their revenues by
ending peoples jobs in these peculiar times. For those with temporary residence
permits losing a job equally means to lose residence permit, without residence
they are not allowed to benefit from their unemployment insurance. Those self-
employed (including citizens too), and those with daily contracts are also not
given the chance to apply for the unemployment funds.

“Migrants are losing their jobs but not only, they are also blamed for not being
integrated as they cannot meet the number one criteria of integration; which is to
have a job. So at our meeting we asked and proposed the Federal state (Swiss
Union Confederation met the Federal Congress) that this should not be the case
for the time being, especially those who were on the verge of applying to
citizenship should still be able to do so. The implementation needs to be at the
cantonal level, if needed they should also be able to get funds from the state, so
we as well proposed a bridging fund. We also started a petition for those families
who have lost 10-20 % of their income (particularly for those families with one
sole bread winner) to be able to apply to the social and to receive the entire
salary, called Kurzarbeit7. This process has shown us how important it is to be a
UNION member, and how important it is to act together… those who did not
want to pay 10-20 francs subscription are now lined up at the door. We also give
15 mins free consultancy for those who are not members yet. We also published
political responses and this created pressure for the employers.”(Emine
Sariaslan, May 17th 2020)

The coalition demanded the extension of the integration rule and made their
proposition be accepted in the federal level. UNIA8 continues to consult non-

6According to the number given by SECO as of April 2020, there are 153.413 unemployed
people: https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/289105/umfrage/arbeitslosenzahl-in-
der-schweiz-nach-monaten/
7See the petition at: https://www.solidarisch-aus-der-
krise.ch/?fbclid=IwAR2EapVBRVuRvSeuiAPU4nt1Fz_PwJaSnnNP0o1T_VFoSoO-
vbX5c_zEs6M#aufruf
8 UNIA ,is a trade union in Switzerland that operates as the largest unemployment fund in
Switzerland and a member of the Swiss Federation of Trade Unions. It has around 190,000
members from all sectors of the private economy, offers individual advice, legal protection and
further services to its members. With more than 50 % of UNIA members not having a Swiss

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union members for 15 minutes a day, and raises awareness through public
discussions, newsletters, forums and webinars.

Our power is our movement

Another dimension of care, supported by political decisions where citizens
without Swiss passports are often affected but have not been part of the political
decision making, is child care. Child care, especially for young children is little
supported and institutionalized by the state. A fact particularly hard, for people
working in 24/7 health care and retail jobs lacking parents and grandparents for
care support close by. Muhterem Hülya Genis, originally from Turkey, today a
Swiss citizen, organizing committee member of Bern Frauen*streik and a
kindergarten care worker (kita worker) highlights;

“Women’s burden was quite heavy already now it is even more with having to
work from home and take care of the child at the same time under such
hostility…The System should see that it cannot produce anything without us, the
women, the world is experiencing the invaluability of currency and that one needs
to respect labor. Those who have a contract can stay home but among my friends
who are day laborers as child care takers got fired. You can apply to RAV but with
a reduction of 20 % of your usual salary, that is nearly thousand francs difference,
enough to destroy your entire livelihood. The weight of the virus is on the top of
the poor. At least our taxes can be given back, there should be a difference in the
way rich and poor are being treated in terms of taxes. We need concrete steps into
securing work contracts and making sure working conditions are safe.”
(Muhterem Hülya Genis, May 17th 2020)

Touching on the inequalities between higher incomes and lower, Hülya stresses
the need for a different treatment by the state for those of limited income and
precarious working conditions. Emine supports Hülya’s concerns about how
“staying at home” for women can have fatal consequences for their mental
wellbeing and socio-economic welfare:

“Whenever there is a crisis, women are immediately given the task to stay home
anyway. They should be taking care of domestic work, and as they withdraw from
their jobs their economic independence is shaken, this also has to do with their
pension frames, since they can work less they can pay less for their pension and
when they retire they will be getting less in return and will perhaps struggle to
meet the ends in the future. Since this crisis seems to go in the long run, the
situation is going to affect their economic independence on the long run too.
Women’s dependence for men will affect women’s psychology and that will have

passport UNIA is the largest organization for workers without Swiss citizenship. See the official
web site: https://www.unia.swiss, accessed 28th May 2020.

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an impact on their children’s education and homeschooling if necessary…this is

the Domino effect.” (Emine Sariaslan, May 17th 2020)

According to the activist duo, street presence is very important as Emine affirms
the need to be able to continue gathering in streets as she speaks of the way to
overcome the Domino effect is to unite and move together in the most physical
stance. Furthermore, “togetherness is our insurance”, adds Hülya;
“We managed to collect 500.000 women all across Switzerland for the strike,
with 70.000 of them in Bern. With one year of intensive labour we managed as
the coordination group,20-30 of us. Our movement had a novel impact on the
politics, we have increased women participation into the parliament by 40%9.
This is a huge success, our power is our movement. We have a power of
500.000 women. Our togetherness is our insurance, if we do not have that then
we are deemed to creep and suffer.” (Muhterem Hülya Genis, May 17th 2020)
Talking of those without an insurance, “insurance” is to be provided by
“togetherness”, and are among the core motivations behind the active
solidarity beyond the lockdown. Building on one of the largest political
demonstration10 in the recent history of Switzerland that took place on the 14th
of June 2019, Frauen*streik will possibly go digital on 2020 and take creative
forms of online protests, talks, artistic performances and webinars, says Hülya
that is still yet to be decided and implemented. Continuing to address and
redefine what the pandemic has yet to bring and transform, the Frauen
Alliance came up with a new agenda to four different target groups to be
collectively supported; 1) Underrepresented and under paid women, 2) Women
facing domestic violence, 3) Migrant women and asylum seekers and 4) Women
in politics.

9 Starting with a number of only 20 to 30 organization members made Frauen*streik come into
life and made thousands of women to participate across Switzerland (70.000 women gathered
only in Bern). A further claim by the activists is that the strike ended up increasing women’s
political participation into the parliament by 40 % on 2019. As of now there remains no official
data or research to verify the very connection between the strike and the increase ratio of
women in the parliament, but we suggest to keep an eye on the recent studies to follow up the
claim.
10June 14, 2019 goes down as the largest political demonstration in the recent history of
Switzerland, bigger than the women's first strike in Switzerland on 1991 according to "the
Swiss Trade Union Federation” : https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/equal-treatment_women-s-
strike-gets-underway-across-switzerland/45030950

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Protestors fill in through the narrow streets to the center facing the parliament
in Bern, Switzerland. Image taken by Eda Elif Tibet , Frauen*streik, 14 June
2019.

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Emine Sariaslan addresses the protesting crowd as she speaks of liberty,

freedom and justice for migrant women, behind her stands Muhterem Hülya
Genis who also addresses the crowd for an un-discriminating world and a
more participatory democracy inclusive for all. Image taken by Eda Elif Tibet ,
Frauen*streik, 14 June 2019.

Lastly, Emine Sariaslan speaks of the importance of science, the need for it to be
independent from state politics and the role it plays in contributing to national
and international solutions to the benefit of people underrepresented in
political debates and decisions.

“Science is very important particularly now, they were making fun with
professors before, now everyone looks into what science has to say. Politics and
science is in a conflict, politics look into economy but the independence of
scientists are so important, for whom am I making science? All scientists should
be questioning that, they should be doing this for humanity. The problem being
more then global it is international, so the solution should also be international.
All this requires drastic and integrated action and makes it critical to start
planning for a post- COVID-19 world as soon as possible.” (Emine Sariaslan, May
17th 2020)

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In the most urgent sense, the coalition calls on Switzerland to treat all people
living in Switzerland independent from having a Swiss passport or not when
confronting the COVID-19 pandemic through the co-creation of an evidence-
based policymaking structure that urges decision makers to take into account
the research of not just one but many disciplines, including social sciences such
as mobility and migration scholars. As academic scholars, we are convinced that
this policy vision will lead to more sustainable, equal and diverse societies based
on national and international solidarity, and to ones that can better prevent and
deal with shocks and pandemics to come.
What we perceive is a contradiction ; on how the so called global pandemic
requires a globally concerted action but at the same time is converted into a
national security problem. We do not only close borders (within and beyond the
lockdown) to feel protected but also measure and value workforce, intellectual
capacity and contributions to our society not on an equal basis but measure
through formal citizenship that becomes the decisive category to be “in” or “out”
of the society. Most of the research being done on the pandemic in Switzerland
are done in collaboration with researchers without Swiss passports, and the
underrepresentation of the majority of the academics in this field is even more
striking. It is here where sadly and gratefully social movements and alliances
remind us the importance of international solidarity in the fight of recognition.
This is not only true for the most precarious workers but also for scholars facing
precarity with short term contracts and no Swiss passports who are working and
contributing to the high international standards of Swiss universities, and are
put on hold at the moment due to their citizenships. Acknowledging those
hardest hit by this peculiar crisis, we urge politicians, policy-makers and the
general public to respond to the need of redefining formal citizenship,
representation and further visibility , so to be able to govern a much inclusive ,
participating and healthy society.

References
Carastathis, A (2013) Identity Categories as Potential Coalitions. Signs 38, 941-
965.
Cole, E.R (2008) Coalitions as a model for Intersectionality: From practice to
theory. Sex, Roles 59, 443-453.
Fischer, D.R. & Dow, D, M & Ray, R. (2017) Intersectionality Takes it to the
Streets: Mobilizing Across Diverse Interests for the Women’s March. Science
Advances 3 (9), 1-8.
Roberts, D & Jesudason, S. (2013) MOVEMENT INTERSECTIONALITY: The
case of race, gender, disability and genetic technologies. Bois Rev.Soc. Sci. Res.
Race. 10. 313-328.

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About the authors

Susan Thieme is professor for geography and critical sustainability studies at
the University of Bern, with a particular interest in the role different forms of
(im)mobilities play in the context of education and work. She is also co-chair of
the mLab at the Institute of Geography, a collaborative space that encourages
researchers to develop new modes of collective work and to critically use arts,
media and digital research methods. She can be contacted at susan.thieme AT
giub.unibe.ch
Eda Elif Tibet is an independent documentary film maker and a visual
anthropologist from Istanbul. She filmed and directed award winning
documentary films under her own label www.karmamotion.com , a non-
hierarchical collective run by academics, artists and activists. She is currently a
guest Post-Doctoral researcher at the Geography Institute (University of Bern)
and works towards a sensorial ethnography film on a transhumant family
among the Ait Atta tribe of the High Atlas Mountains of Morocco. Her research
and teaching encompass the relations between postcolonial thought and
mobilities, the application of critical pedagogies, to social movements and the
promotion of participatory action research. She can be contacted at eda.tibet AT
giub.unibe.ch

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Refugee solidarity along the Western Balkans route:

new challenges and a change of strategy in times of
COVID-19
Chiara Milan (11th May 2020)

Lockdown and restrictions to people’s movement in the

Western Balkans
Just as the COVID-19 pandemic has presented several opportunities for
strongmen in the Western Balkans region to grab extra powers, it has also made
solidarity initiatives with people in transit along the Western Balkans route
more difficult. The route has been declared officially closed in March 2016 by
virtue of the (controversial) agreement between the EU and Turkey.
Nevertheless, the migratory flow has never stopped. People escaping war and
poverty continued in their attempts to cross the region to reach Northern
Europe, although their journey became increasingly dangerous and risky. With
the progressive closure of borders and the recent restrictions to people’s
movement, also the living conditions of those stranded in the refugee centers in
Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) have dramatically worsened.
On March 15th, Serbia declared the state of emergency to prevent the spread of
coronavirus. After almost two months, on May 7th the state of emergency has
been lifted for everyone but the 9,000 individuals living in the state-run refugee
centers throughout the country. The Serbian lockdown, one of the stricter in
Europe, imposed the closing of the doors of 19 asylum and reception centres
across the country. The people held inside cannot longer leave or enter them
except for exceptional circumstances, such as medical reasons. Meanwhile, the
army and security forces caught all those found sleeping rough or in improvised
shelters in cities and rural areas of Serbia and forcibly transferred them inside
the official centres. These centres are now overcrowded, making it impossible to
comply with the necessary social distancing rules. Prevented to leave the
centres, migrants are put in a state of “permanent quarantine”. They cannot go
out to buy goods, clothes, or the food necessary to integrate the small portions
distributed daily. This situation makes also almost impossible to withdraw the
money sent from their families via Western Union, needed for the daily survival
and to pay smugglers.
The migrants stuck in Bosnia and Herzegovina face a similar destiny. Since the
beginning of 2018, the country has turned into the bottleneck of the Western
Balkans migratory route. Nowadays about 5,500 persons find themselves inside
the nine reception centers of the country, while an estimated figure of 2,000
found shelter in makeshift camps in the middle of woods, abandoned
warehouses or buildings in ruin close to the Croatian border. Unlike Serbia,
where the camps are managed by domestic authorities, the majority of centers
in Bosnia and Herzegovina are run by the International Organization for
Migration (IOM). The IOM entrusted the surveillance of the centers to private

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companies, and repeatedly cases of violence of private surveillance guards

against migrants have been reported ever since.
After the proclamation of the state of emergency on March 28th, Bosnian and
Herzegovinian authorities have progressively curb the movement of their
citizens, extending these restrictions to migrants. Foreigners are prohibited
from entering BiH as part of the measures to prevent the spread of coronavirus.
On April 17, the Council of Ministers of BiH announced that any foreigner found
without a valid document and a residence address, registered at the foreign
office, will be automatically deported to the reception centres, where (s)he will
must stay with no possibility of getting out. As in Serbia, also in BiH migrants
and asylum seekers have been forcibly transferred to refugee centres, which are
overcrowded, often with no access to hot water and laundry services. Not even
soap is provided to wash clothes and hands. In a situation in which even stricter
hygienic sanitary standards are to be followed, in the centres not even basic
hygienic conditions can be respected. Amongst deprivation, movement bans,
and closed borders, people on the move appear even more isolated and
vulnerable than before the pandemic. Inside the centres cases of fights amongst
individuals are repeatedly reported, while depression is dramatically increasing.

Refugee solidarity along the Western Balkans route does not

stop
However, this situation has not stopped international and local volunteers from
acting in solidarity with people in transit along the Western Balkans route.
Notwithstanding the enforcement of lockdowns and movement bans forced the
majority of international volunteers to leave the region, the attempts to provide
some relief to migrants have continued, just the strategy had to be changed. If in
normal times support to asylum seekers proved to be a difficult task, in times of
pandemic it is even more so for different reasons. First of all, the prohibition to
be physically present. With the outbreak of the COVID-19, the access to official
refugee centres has been restricted to few authorized organizations, usually
large international associations such as the Red Cross. Informal, independent
grassroots groups are banned from accessing them, and also can no longer
provide assistance to those living outside the centres. The physical presence is of
utmost importance for the volunteers of No Name Kitchen (NNK), an
independent organization that gathers international volunteers providing hot
meals and first-aid support to undocumented migrants along the Western
Balkans route. In Serbia since 2017, they have been kicked out of the country
following the state’s emergency declaration.
Unable to provide hot meals and human support by visiting migrants in squats
and makeshift camps, the volunteers of NKK had to suspend their activities on
the ground. However, they have decided to remain by changing strategy. “If we
cannot reach out to people to provide them with food, we can still bring people
to food”, claimed a volunteer. NKK has thus opted for distributing online
vouchers that migrants can exchange in edible goods at local shops and

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bakeries, with which NNK has previously been in contact. By means of this
“solidarity market”, NKK manages both to provide food for around 500 people
weekly and to support the local economy. A practice followed also by other
grassroots collectives, such as the Italian Bozen Solidarity, which uses social
networks to provide people on the move in BiH with coupons that they can
spend in markets of Bihać and Velika Kladuša, two important nodes of the
migratory path.
Yet the Western Balkans route does not cross only the former Yugoslav region.
The city of Trieste, in Italy, has turned into the landing place of the route. Here
relentless women and men of the Linea d’ombra association (literally “Shadow
line”) have never stopped providing firsthand support the migrants who manage
to reach the Italian territory after having been beaten up by the Croatian police
at the border. The 30-50 migrants reaching Trieste daily come with broken
arms, infected wounds, and often barefoot. “At times around 100 people showed
up in a day”, explained the founder of the association, “we kept healing their
wounds even when local authorities revoked the authorization to provide
assistance to migrants on the open space, and we were asked to hide in a less
visible spot”. Volunteer doctors of the association La Strada Si.Cura (The safe
road/The road must be cured) provide migrants with healthcare, while
continuing to operate also along the Slovenian border.
Illegal pushbacks continue even during the pandemic, although the changed
situation makes it more difficult to report them. The group Border Violence
Monitoring, which gathers several individuals and associations active along the
route, has been constantly monitoring pushbacks, collecting and reporting
episodes of police violence committed against migrants at the borders. With the
borders closed and people locked inside their houses, those experiencing
violence at the border and discriminatory treatment, mostly committed by the
Croatian police, are given the possibility to send their testimonies in a safe
manner by means of social networks.
The pandemic intensified also the efforts to join hands amongst the several
independent solidarity groups active along the route. To denounce the
unhealthy and unsafe conditions of the official reception centres for migrants
and refugees, especially those managed by the IOM across BiH, the recently
founded Transbalkan Solidarity Network launched the campaign “A soap for
IOM”. The 48-hour campaign, called “Soap bombing”, denounced the
mismanagement of the centres IOM run in BiH. Here, most often migrants lack
the most basic hygienic supplies, even more necessary in time of pandemic. The
network also wrote the open letter “CoVID-19: No one is safe until All are
protected!” to raise awareness on the worsening conditions of people in transit
along the route, calling for the end of discriminatory and dehumanizing
practices against migrants, demanding to stop the violence at the borders, and
advocating for the provision of basic sanitary conditions and healthcare to
people on the move. Formed in March 2020, the network gathers hundreds of
activists from all over the region (North Macedonia, Serbia, BiH, Croatia,

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Slovenia, Italy), striving to respond to the immobility of institutions as regards

the situation of the most vulnerable under the pandemic, the migrants.

The militarization of borders and criminalization of solidarity

The COVID-19 pandemic has worsened the conditions of people on the move,
stigmatized, segregated and discriminated even more than before. In the
pandemic, local governments have found a justification to further restrict
freedom of movement and enact the militarization of borders. In the same line
of EU leaders, also Western Balkans officials have changed the narrative
towards people on the move. While the first waves arrived in summer 2015,
local politicians showed a welcoming attitude towards them, motivated with a
discourse portraying the Western Balkans as “merely transit countries”.
Following the closure of the route, and the EU process of externalization of the
borders, local politicians changed their public discourse to depict migrants as
dangerous individuals, criminals and terrorists willing to stay in the country.
With the arrival of the pandemic, migrants are also accused of spreading the
virus. Although the data prove that the region remains a place of transit, since a
very little number of individuals files asylum claims, the attitude towards people
on the move has changed. Along similar lines, police violence at the borders, as
well as attacks of right-wing and nationalist groups refugees and volunteers are
on the rise. The change of narrative criminalizes not only migrants, but also
those acting in solidarity with them. Lately, the animosity against migrants and
international volunteers increased in particular in Šid, at the northern border
with Hungary, to the extent that at the end of February some volunteers have
been physically attacked by right-wing extremists, acting in cahoots with the
local police. As volunteers provide free support mainly to people who have not
access to, or refuse to enter, official refugee centres, they have been accused of
being a pull factor attracting migrants to the country. This narrative has been
widely used previously against NGOs rescuing migrants on the Mediterranean
sea, and mirrors the negative attitude towards migrants endorsed by local
politicians. Government and often the local population alike accuse pro-refugee
solidarity groups to be a pull factor attracting people in transit, while they are
just (and consciously) filling a void left by local institutions and large
international organizations. This results in people in transit being increasingly
invisibilized, pushed at the outskirts of cities and deported in refugee centres
that they cannot live anymore. Besides the militarization of borders, nowadays
we are assisting at the militarization of refugee centers, which have converted
from transit to detention centres, some of them being fenced overnight. In the
meantime, the possibility to file an asylum claim is de facto denied.
In times of pandemic, the declaration of the state of emergency has been used to
reinforce the negative attitude towards migrants and marginalize them even
further. By contrast, pro-refugee solidarity groups are striving to counter this
process of dehumanization and marginalization finding innovative ways to
alleviate the hardship migrants are facing, like for instance by means of the

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above-mentioned “solidarity markets”. In the meantime, their appeals to grant

migrants rights and healthcare have intensified.

About the author

Chiara Milan is Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow at the Centre for Southeast
European Studies of the University of Graz (Austria). Her research deals with
social movements, citizenship, nationalism and migration. She is the author of
Social mobilization beyond ethnicity. Grassroots movements and civic
activism in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2020, Routledge). Her twitter is
@ChiaraNalim and email chiara.milan AT uni-graz.at

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Abolish all camps in times of corona:

the struggle against shared accommodation for
refugees* in Berlin
Marco Perolini (1st July 2020)

On 8 May 2020, a group of activists who mobilize with Women in Exile and
Friends1, a self-organized group of refugee* women, visited a refugee* camp in
Hennigsdorf, in the outskirts of Berlin.2 The activists did not travel to
Hennigsdorf to deliver an empowering workshop for refugee* women living in
the camp, which is the type of mobilization in which the activists of Women in
Exile often engage. Instead, the activists distributed food and personal care
products to some of the over 400 refugees* who lived in the camp.
At the time of the visit, the refugees* in Hennigsdorf were subject to a forced
quarantine. The authorities imposed the measure at the beginning of April,
when 68 refugees* tested positive to COVID-19. Deprived of liberty and
surrounded by police who enforced the quarantine, refugees* had to order
groceries by ticking a pre-printed list of items that the management of the camp
made available to them. That list did not include diapers, sanitary towels or
soap.
The COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare some of the most endemic flaws of the
shared accommodation system for refugees* in Germany. Lack of privacy,
overcrowded spaces and more generally the exercise of biopower(Foucault,
1976) on racialized non-citizens are some among the most egregious
shortcomings. Self-organized groups of refugees* and other social movement
organizations (SMOs) have contested shared accommodation for refugees* in
Germany, which they refer to as camps or Lager (in German), since the 1990s.
They have been promoting the awareness of refugees* of their right to have
rights (Arendt, 1951) and organizing protests, marches, occupations and many
other types of collective actions.
The COVID-19 pandemic has had an impact on the mobilization of self-
organized groups of refugees* against border regimes. On 9 May 2020, Women

1Women in Exile and Friends is a self-organized group of refugees* founded in 2002. Their
offices are in Potsdam (Brandenburg, the federated State surrounding Berlin). Self-organized
groups of refugees* are social movement organizations founded by refugees*, characterized by a
horizontal decision-making structure and with the primary objective of empowering refugees*.
2 I refer to all non-citizens who have applied for asylum in Germany as refugees* irrespective of
their legal status. In the context of the ethnography that I conducted between January and
November 2018 in Berlin, I talked to dozens of activists and participated in the mobilization of
several social movement organizations. Non-citizen activists define themselves as refugees
irrespective of whether they had obtained the legal status of refugees. They contest the
hierarchies among different legal status categories embedded in the German asylum law.
Refugee* and refugees* are notions that I use in this article as they embed the non-legal
understanding of the idea of refugee shared among activists in Berlin. In view of protecting the
privacy of activists, all the names that I use in this article are pseudonyms.

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in Exile and friends staged for the first time an online protest on Youtube.
Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the activists of Women in Exile settled for a
virtual gathering to raise awareness of the daily ordeal that women and children
face in camps, including in Hennigsdorf. The activists reiterated their slogan,
which they encapsulated into a social media hashtag: “Social distance is a
privilege”. The slogan decries the impossibility for refugees* to follow guidance
on social distance in camps.
The online protest was not infused with the same powerful energy as the
protests that the activists of Women in Exile usually stage on the street.
However, the easing of lockdown measures at the end of May has enabled
Women in Exile and other social movement organizations that contest border
regimes to take it to the street again. For example, on 1 June Women in Exile
and other SMOS protested in Potsdam to demand the abolishment of camps. On
6 June, many SMOs that oppose border regimes participated in the Black Lives
Matter protest in Berlin in the aftermath of the killing of George Floyd in the
United States.
Self-organized groups of refugees* in Germany have mobilized for the abolition
of camps since the 1990s. In this short piece, I examine the multiple modalities
through which self-organized groups of refugees* resist camps. Apart from
organizing protests, activists engage in submerged forms of mobilization that
have the potential of transforming the isolation in which refugees* live.
Moreover, I explain why the COVID-19 pandemic has been an opportunity for
the struggle against camps to acquire more resonance and visibility.

Hennisdorf: a refugee* camp under forced quarantine

for over 5 weeks
The shared accommodation for refugees* in Hennigsdorf is composed of several
buildings that used to be military barracks during the time of the German
Democratic Republic. Similarly to many other camps that I visited, the complex
is fenced-off and managed by a private company. Security guards patrol the
entrance of the complex, scrutinize the movements of refugees* and monitor the
presence of external visitors.
German asylum law requires non-citizens who apply for asylum to live in a
designated reception centre for up to 18 months. During this period, they do
not have the right to work and they cannot leave the district (Landkreis) where
the reception centre is located (this restriction is commonly known as
Residenzpflicht). After 18 months, non-citizens who are still waiting for their
asylum claim to be processed are sheltered in shared accommodation.3
On 16 April 2020, a cleaner working in the shared accommodation in
Hennigsdorf tested positive to COVID-19. Following further tests, 68 out of the
more than 400 refugees* who lived in the accommodation tested positive. The

3 Articles 47, 53 and 59a of the Asylum Act.

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authorities swiftly quarantined the whole complex. While some refugees* could
leave the complex after two weeks, provided that they wore a green wristband
which many considered to be stigmatizing,4 the authorities quarantined some of
the buildings within the complex for over 5 weeks.
In a video that a refugee* who lives in the complex shot from his window,
several police cars appeared to patrol the entrance of the shared
accommodation.5 In an open letter that Women in Exile published on Twitter on
1 May, the refugees* who lived in the camp emphasized the inadequate
measures that authorities had taken to counter COVID-19. While a forced
quarantine was in place, refugees* raised the lack of face masks and sanitizers
and the failure to promptly separate refugees* who had tested positive from
those who tested negative.6 Authorities scored better on the enforcement of
coercive measures to control refugees*: CCTV cameras in the hallways, private
security and police patrolling the entrance of the accommodation.
On 8 May, a few activists of Women in Exile decided to travel to Hennigsdorf.
During the online protest that the Women in Exile organized on 9 May, one
activist explained the purpose of the visit. She emphasized:

“The reason why we went there is because the women reached out to us and said
that in the shopping list [pre-printed by the managing company] there was not
like… I call it like…women basic needs like sanitary pads,
baby diapers…the women said: ‘we need this please can you come and bring us
these things as they are not in the shopping list’. They can't go out for shopping
and it was very sad and so we decided to go… and when we went there we met the
security, they said of course you cannot get in and they said they would deliver
the shopping themselves…we said no we want to see the women whom we
brought this for […]. The security went and say the women can come down but
they can't get out and we said yeah of course we know and we don't want them to
come out…the women came but they didn't have masks only one who had a
mask… I was really shocked like they don't have masks and this is where they
report everyday cases of people testing positive [for COVID-19]”.7

After delivering the shopping bags to the women on the other side of the fences,
the activists displayed a few small banners that read “social distance is a
privilege” and “abolish all lager” and took some photos for social media. The
police who were patrolling the entrance of the shared accommodation stopped

https://www.rbb24.de/politik/thema/2020/coronavirus/beitraege_neu/2020/05/brandenbur
g-fluechlingsheime-ketten-quarantaenen.html
5 https://www.facebook.com/953605994710745/videos/1387659564757967
6 https://twitter.com/women_in_exile/status/1256108211394031616
7 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tvlt2_O7iM4

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the activists and argued that they were staging a demonstration. An activist
explained during the online protest:

“We had to talk to them for over two hours, meanwhile refugees inside became
more and more upset and started demonstrating [to oppose the police
intervention]. They told us that we should know the law of this country, when
police came they ask if anybody among us was under quarantine and infected, we
said no… some of them had masks but others they didn’t, they did not keep the
distance with us […]. They accused us of breaching the law on public assemblies
and said that this was an unregistered demo and we were forbidden to go to other
Lager for 24 hours. We were shocked as we didn’t do anything, it was not a demo,
we just took some photos with messages of solidarity. If the authorities gave
women what they needed, we wouldn’t have had to go there in the first place”.8

In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, Women in Exile joined many other
social movement organizations in calling for the abolishment of shared
accommodation for refugees*. They frame shared accommodation as camps or
Lager, a term that refers to the bare lives, the disposable lives, of non-citizens
who live in there (Agamben, 1998). They decry the flaws on camps as they put
the health of refugees* at risk.
Self-organized groups of refugees* have indeed documented the situation of
refugees* in camps during the COVID-19. Apart from Hennigsdorf, in several
other camps across Germany, the number of COVID-19 infections among
refugees* was very high. Self-organized groups of refugees* collected and made
public information that pointed to the ineffectiveness of the forced quarantine
that the authorities put in place. For example, more than 400 out of the 600
refugees* who lived in a camp in Ellwangen (Baden-Wurttemberg) tested
positive to COVID-19. Despite the forced quarantine that the authorities had
imposed at the beginning of April, refugees* continued to shared toilets and
communal areas. One month after, the 200 people who had tested negative
were still under forced quarantine. The self-organized group refugees4refugees
who mobilize in Baden-Wurttemberg emphasized:

“All inhabitants of the reception centre in Ellwangen were put into quarantine on
5 April. This protected the people outside the camp, but not the people inside the
camp. Inside the camp, a huge group of several hundred people were quarantined
together. In this large group, as was to be expected, the virus spread rapidly. After
the first mass test at the beginning of April, 250 people were infected, the next
test was 313 and finally 406 people in the camp tested positive. This means that
there are still almost 200 people in the quarantine group. If even one of them
tests positive again, the quarantine for all 200 must be extended again by two

8 Ibid. 7

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weeks according to the rules of the German government. And this can go on for a
long time.”9

International Women Space, an organization of refugee* women who emerged

during the protest camp in Oranienplatz between 2012 and 2014 (Azozomox
and IWS refugee women, 2013), collected and published audio testimonies of
refugees* about their lives in the camps during the COVID-19 pandemic. When
we met in 2018, Jennifer, one of the activists who founded International
Women Space, told me that documenting the struggle of self-organized groups
of refugees* was crucial for mobilizing against border regimes. She explained
that the activists who mobilized in the protest camp on Oranienplatz and the
refugee* women who lunched IWS did not have access to any information
regarding the resistance of refugees* who had contested camps and other
aspects of border regimes before as there was little written documentation.10
The “Corona Lager reports” of International Women Space include, for example,
a case of arbitrary use of force by the police against a refugee* woman in a camp
in Brandenburg. According to the information collected by IWS, another
refugee* called the police to complain about the noise coming from a
neighbour’s room who was having a small party with a few other refugees*.
Seven police came to the camp with two dogs, they knocked on the door from
where the noise was coming from. They asked the woman who opened to door
to produce an ID and, when she refused, they tackled her to the floor and
pinned her down. Someone started recording the scene and when someone else
shouted: “Look what they are doing to us here. They want to kill us like the
other man that was killed in America [George Floyd]”, the police released the
woman.11
The COVID-19 pandemic has strengthened the control, oppression and
biopower that refugees* experience in camps in Germany. In particular, police
and private security enforced quarantines of hundreds of refugees*. However,
the pandemic also galvanized the struggle against camps as many organizations,
including large NGOs such as Pro-Asyl, which is the biggest refugee rights
organization in Germany, demanded the closure of shared accommodation for
refugees*. On 11 May, Pro-Asyl, refugee councils and the Seebrücke movement
called for the closure of all camps in Germany and in Greece emphasizing that
no one could be left behind and that shared accommodation made non-citizens
more vulnerable to COVID-19.12 Moreover, several courts across Germany

9https://refugees4refugees.wordpress.com/2020/05/04/corona-chaos-in-ellwangen-04-05-
2020/
10 Interview with Jennifer, 20 September 2018.
11 https://iwspace.de/2020/06/in-the-shadow-of-corona-police-violence-lager-brandenburg/
12https://fluechtlingsrat-berlin.de/presseerklaerung/11-05-2020-niemand-darf-
zurueckgelassen-werden/

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requested the transfer of refugees* who lived in camps to apartments as their

health could not be protected in shared accommodation. 13
Meanwhile, self-organized groups of refugees* continued to organize protests
with other organizations to call for the closure of camps in Germany as well as at
the European borders. For example, On 1 June, Women in Exile and other
organizations staged a protest in Potsdam to ask for the closure of camps in
Brandenburg as well as in Greece.14
Self-organized groups of refugees* have framed camps as grievances against
border regimes since the 1990s. They have engaged in multiple and diverse
forms of collective actions to call for the abolishment of all camps and for
adequate housing for all refugees*. COVID-19 has made the long-term demands
of self-organized groups of refugees* and other grassroots groups against camps
acquire wider resonance.

The long-term opposition to camps

In the 1990s, groups of non-citizens organized themselves in shared
accommodation, in particular in Eastern Germany. For example, the
Voice Refugee Forum was founded in 1994 in a camp in Thuringia
(Odugbesan & Schwiertz, 2018). In the 2000s, the occupation of
Oranienplatz (O-platz), a square in Berlin, which non-citizens activists
transformed into a protest camp, provided visibility for their struggles
against border regimes (Landry, 2015; Langa, 2015; Bhimji, 2016).
One of the main grievances that self-organized groups of refugees* have
formulated since the 1990s is the opposition to the isolation in which
they live in shared accommodation. For example, Brice, an activist from
Benin who had mobilized with the Voice Refugee Forum and with the
protest camp on Oranienplatz, told me about his experiences of
isolation and fear when he lived in camps in Mecklenburg-Pomerania
(Eastern Germany). Brice arrived in Germany in 1997, only 5 years after
the racist riots that had shattered Rostock, the main city in
Mecklenburg-Pomerania, in 1992.15 Brice told me:

“We could not even leave the camp because police stopped and searched
us all the time. If you went from the camp to the train station, you were

13https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-netherlands-asylum/asylum-seeker-
wins-right-to-leave-german-centre-over-coronavirus-rules-idUSKCN2252VO;
https://www.dw.com/en/german-court-covid-19-protection-inadequate-at-refugee-home/a-
53395710
14https://www.fluechtlingsrat-brandenburg.de/pressemitteilung-demonstrationen-am-1-juni-
in-potsdam/?cn-reloaded=1
15https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/05/revisiting-germany-xenophobic-
rostock-riots-1992-170517123148797.html

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stopped. One of the camps in which I lived was very isolated and in the
middle of the forest. If you were sick you had to walk 8 km to the nearby
town and then 8 km back”.16

Brice explained that the demand to abolish all camps was grounded in
the experiences of non-citizens, whose segregation in camps contributed
to their racialization (Omi & Winart, 2015). Many of the refugee*
activists whom I met in 2018 framed camps as prisons, in which their
freedom of movement and their private life were scrutinized and
restricted. In 2018 refugee* activists were particularly concerned with
the establishment of new types of shared accommodation, the Anker
centres, in which non-citizens who claimed asylum could spend up to 24
months.17 Paul, an activist from Cameroon who mobilized with Corasol,
a self-organized group of refugees*, framed his opposition to camps by
referring to isolation and lack of privacy. He told me:

“We have to put the emphasis on humanitarian law. A human is a

human. Policy makers have to take that into account. In the shelters, you
are like in a prison. Today, those who claim asylum will have to stay in
Eisenhüttenstadt [a reception centre in Brandenburg that functioned as
an Anker centre] until the end of the procedure. At least when I was
there people were still transferred to other shelters. In the shelters, there
is no privacy, you have to leave a copy of your ID to go in and out, there
is security and you share a room with many people. It’s absurd not to be
able to leave your home and to come back when you want”.18

Women in Exile and friends have repeatedly emphasized that camps are
not adequate for women and children. In the context of their bus tour
across Germany “Women Breaking Borders” in 2018, refugee* women
spoke out against the lack of privacy for women in camps. In the
aftermath of the activists’ visit to an Anker centre in Bamberg (Bavaria),
Jule, a woman from Nigeria who lived in the Anker centre, joined the
bus tour. She made a public speech in the context of a protest in front of
Federal Office for Migration and Refugees* (BAMF) in Nuremberg in
which she decried the living conditions for women in the camp. She
emphasized:

16 Interview with Brice, 29 August 2018.

17For more information about the Anker-centre, see “Was ist ein Anker/what is an Anker”
published by Lager Mobilization Network Berlin on 15 May 2018 and available here:
https://oplatz.net/was-ist-ein-anker-what-is-an-anker/
18 Interview with Paul, 9 September 2018.

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“We are living as prisoners or we are prisoners already… we are suffering

in that camp, honestly we are suffering, look at our kids, our
families…the women have no privacy…16 people…one toilet one
bedroom…we are going nowhere…we’re here to stay!”.19

Self-organized groups of refugees* and other grassroots organizations

framed camps as a system that racialized and control non-citizens.20
Many of the non-citizen activists whom I met felt unsafe in camps as the
authorities could identify them and target them with deportation. For
example, Bastian, a young Cameroonian man whom I met during my
fieldwork, left the shared accommodation where he lived in
Brandenburg for fear of deportation. Some of the activists whom he met
in the context of his mobilization against border regimes sheltered him
to avoid his transfer to Spain, the first country from where he had
entered the European Union21. In the context of a public workshop in
September 2010, Bastian told the participants:

“One night the police came to the heim [shared accommodation] to look
for me. I was at a birthday party and a refugee called me and informed
me that police were looking for me. So, I left the heim. In the jungle, the
strongest and the most intelligent survives. When you are about to be
deported, you really need to do whatever you can to survive. It’s like
when you are a child and you fall in the water, in order to save yourself
from drowning, you need to find any available hold. The network of
activists and friends in Berlin has been really important as they provided
me with a shelter and supported me.”22

Self-organized groups of refugees* and other grassroots groups often

call for the abolishment of camps in the context of their visible
repertoires of contention. They document the lives of refugees* in
camps and ground their demands in the racialization processes through
which non-citizens who live in camps are excluded, isolated and
othered. Activists also engage in more submerged, invisible initiatives,
for example to counter deportation. Despite the difficulties to put in
place these collective mechanisms of resistance, activists often
collectively identify and make use of cracks and opportunities to resist
the alienating reality of camps.

19 Ethnographic notes taken on 27 July 2018.

20See “Was ist ein Anker/what is an Anker” published by Lager Mobilization Network Berlin on
15 May 2018 and available here: https://oplatz.net/was-ist-ein-anker-what-is-an-anker/
Bastian’s transfer to Spain was based on the Dublin III Regulation (Regulation 604/2013)
21

which establishes the responsibility for assessing asylum applications among EU countries.
22 Ethnographic notes taken on 8 September 2018.

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Submerged resistance against camps

Activists often engage in submerged and less visible forms of
mobilizations than protests to resist and transform the isolation that
refugees* experience in camps. For example, self-organized groups of
refugees* often organize outreach initiatives in camps in view of raising
the awareness of refugees* of their rights and promoting their political
mobilization.
Refugee* activists who participate in collective actions often emphasize
that their activism is grounded in a process of political activation that
other activists have facilitated. For example, when I spoke to Julia, a
woman from Kenya who mobilized with Women in Exile and friends,
about the outreach activities in camps, she stressed the impact that the
first workshop that she attended had on her determination to
collectively resist border regimes. Julia told me:

“Women in Exile visited us in the camp and told us more about the
politics here [in Germany] and that we had rights, I didn’t know that
refugees* had rights. Women in Exile ran an empowerment workshop
and taught us that we could fight for our rights, that’s how I became an
activist in Deutschland [Germany]. I felt there is a need to fight,
especially because of the conditions we are living in”.23

Julia explained that many refugee* women came from national contexts
in which they were discriminated against, they were invisible in the
political space and were not used to claim their rights. Moreover, she
stressed that refugees* in Germany were often afraid of the negative
consequences that their mobilization may have on their asylum claims.
Julia reiterated that it was crucial for refugees* living in camps to
realize the opportunities that they had to collectively mobilize.24
Guillaume, an activist who mobilized with Corasol, spoke with me about
the importance of reaching out to refugees* in camps and stressed that
these initiatives alleviated the distress and isolation in which refugees*
lived. In the context of a workshop about the new Anker-centre that
Guillaume delivered and which I attended, he emphasized:

“I got to know my rights because of my involvement in activism and all

the people whom I’ve met in this context. Despite that, I am still very
stressed, I have been seeing a counsellor for 6 months. Imagine what
would have happened if I lived even more isolated [i.e. in an Anker

23 Interview with Julia, 19 September 2018.

24 Interview with Julia, 19 September 2018.

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centre], if I couldn’t even get in touch with activists and the outside
world…”.25

Guillaume indeed often appeared sullen and absent-minded. When we

got to know each other better, he often shared with me the anxiety that
his precarious legal status prompted. In June 2018, I agreed to support
Guillaume in reaching out to refugees* living in a few camps in
Brandenburg. The activists of Corasol planned to reach out to refugees*
to involve them to a workshop and a protest scheduled on 20 June to
contest the new asylum policies that the government had recently
proposed. The activists were adamant on informing refugees* living in
camps about the new policies, explaining their consequences and
stimulating their mobilization against them.
In the early afternoon of a sunny Sunday afternoon I met Guillaume in
the shared accommodation where he lived in Brandenburg. Guillaume
was very energetic on that day. He was very keen on reaching out to
refugees*. After lunch we started knocking on the doors of the rooms
where other refugees* lived. When they peered out at us, Guillaume
hastily explained to join us downstairs in a meeting room where we
would provide them with more information about a protest against the
new asylum policies. Most of the refugees* whom we talked to did not
show much interest and I felt that they would not attend the protest.
In contrast, a dozen of refugees* who lived in another camp that we
visited afterwards were keen on participating in both the workshop and
the protest. While we were knocking on the doors a bit randomly, we
realized that several refugees* came from Chechnya and did not speak
any other language than Russian or Chechen. I showed to a couple of
them the Russian version of the flyer that we had designed to advertise
the protest. After 20 minutes in which we talked to as many refugees* as
possible, Guillaume suggested moving to the meeting room where many
of the refugees* whom we had talked to were waiting for us.
The meeting room was indeed very full as more than 30 people from
countries including Pakistan, Iran, Kenya joined us. One Chechen
woman, a young blue-eyed woman wearing a small head-cover, came
too. Guillaume made a short presentation in German and I translated it
into English. A refugee from Iran who spoke good English translated
simultaneously into Farsi. Guillaume asked me a couple of times the
German translation for “government” and “law”, which surprised me
because his German was better than mine. I thought he must have felt
under pressure to speak German in public and to a large group.

25Ethnographic notes of the summer camp organized by Welcome United between 5 and 7 July
in Falkenberg (Brandenburg).

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Guillaume repeatedly reiterated in his speech: “We have to fight all

together against these new laws”.
Several of the refugees* whom we met in the second camp that we had
visited attended the protest. One man also started to regularly
participate in the meetings and the collective actions of Corasol. Other
self-organized groups of refugees* regularly organize outreach visits and
workshops for refugees* living in camps. The political mobilization that
these activities promote is also conducive to weave new social ties which
break the isolation that refugees* experience in camps.
Apart from outreach initiatives in camps, activists also engage in
campaigns and acts of political disobedience. Some of them aim to
provide alternative shelters to refugees* who do not feel safe in camps
because they are at risk of deportation. Police often enforce
deportations during the night by conducting raids in shared
accommodation and without informing the person subject to a
deportation order.
In the last two years, activists in Berlin have launched the campaign
Burger*innen Asyl (Citizen Asylum), which aims to establish a network
of citizens willing to shelter non-citizens who are at risk of deportation
and who want to move out from camps.26 In October 2018, the
organizers of the campaign announced that they had successfully
facilitated the first case of citizen asylum by providing a shelter to a
family who were threatened with deportation and who subsequently
obtained residence rights in Germany. In April 2020 the initiative
announced that it would stop to function as a platform that facilitated
citizen asylum as it was logistically burdensome. They produced a
handbook providing tips to anyone who could offer citizen asylum to a
non-citizen who felt unsafe to live in camps because of their deportation
looming.27

Conclusions
The COVID-19 pandemic has made the long-term demands of self-
organized groups of refugees* against camps acquire a wider resonance.
Forced quarantines have become exemplary of the biopower that
authorities exercise on racialized non-citizens in camps. Authorities
have rushed in to enforce measures that, in many instances, proved
ineffective to protect refugees* from COVID-19. The pandemic has laid
bare the flaws of camps in Germany. In an unprecedented move, large
NGOs, in particular Pro-Asyl, have demanded the closure of camps and
the transfer of refugees* to private accommodation. In some individual

26 https://buerger-innen-asyl-berlin.org/
27 https://buerger-innen-asyl-berlin.org/static/blog/SolidarityAsyl_handbook_ENG.pdf

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cases, Courts have ruled that camps were not an adequate solution to
protect refugees* from COVID-19.
Self-organized groups of refugees* rallied with other social movement
organizations to call for the abolishment of camps. During the
lockdown, they continued to document the lives of refugees* in camps
and assisted refugees* who were under forced quarantine. As soon as
the lockdown measures were eased, they resumed their plans to engage
in submerged forms of mobilization through which, by promoting
collective struggles, they daily resist and transform the isolation that
refugees* experience in camps.

Bibliography
Agamben, G. (1998): Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life.
Stanford University Press. Stanford.
Arendt, H. (1951): The Origin of Totalitarianism. Harcourt. New York.
Azozomox/IWS refugee women activists (2017): Narrating the
Challenges of Women Refugee Activists of Ohlauer Strasse 12,
International Women’s Space (IWS Refugee Women Activists), Berlin.
In: Mudu, Pierpaolo/ Chattopadhyay, Sutapa (Eds.): Migration,
Squatting and Radical Autonomy. Routledge. London/New York. 207-
223.
Bhimji, Fazila (2015): Visibilities and the Politics of the Space: Refugee
Activism in Berlin. In: Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies. 14(4).
432-450.
Foucault, M. (1976): Histoire de la sexualité: La volonté de savoir.
Gallimard. Paris
Landry, Olivia (2015): “Wir sind alle Oranienplatz”! Space for Refugees
and Social Justice in Berlin. In: Seminar: A Journal of Germanic
Studies, 51(4), 398-413.
Langa, Napuli (2015): The Refugee Movement in Kreuzberg/Berlin. In:
movements. Journal for Critical Migration and Border Regime Studies.
1(2).

About the author

Marco Perolini is finishing his PhD in Sociology at Goldsmiths College,
University of London. His research focuses on how the social movement
opposing border regimes in Berlin constructs human rights. He also
works as a human rights researcher with Amnesty International
focusing on discrimination, policing and the criminalization of protests
and human rights defenders in Europe.

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#FightEveryCrisis: Re-framing the climate movement

in times of a pandemic
Clara Thompson (28th May 2020)

Just as 2019 seemed like the beginning of a new era of climate protests, early
2020 appeared to mark its abrupt end with the outbreak of novel corona virus.
Starting in Sweden in August 2018, ‘Fridays for Future’ (FFF), a group of
committed students organizing school strikes seemed to materialize out of
nowhere, grabbing media attention and creating a global sensation that peaked
in the following year. The protest tactic of choice, the school strike, was
particularly controversial, sparking discussions about the political participation
of young people, the urgency of the climate crisis and responsibility across
generations. Similarly, starting in London in November 2018, Extinction
Rebellion drew attention to the looming environmental disaster by engaging in
high profile non-violent civil disobedience in cities across Europe, leading to
debates about the legitimacy of stopping “business as usual” in order to draw
attention to the climate crisis. Especially for groups like FFF, XR or the German
climate group Ende Gelaende (which is also a German saying for “here and no
further”), that developed out of the occupation of the Hambacher Forest and has
brought thousands of people to occupy open pit mines, large scale physical
protests have been the decisive form of mobilization. In April 2019
approximately 40.000 people joined in civil disobedience actions in London. In
June 2019, over 2000 people entered a coal mine in the Rhenish lignite mining
area, blocking it for an entire day. Around 10 million people worldwide joined
the 3rd Global Climate strike organised by FFF on the 20th of September 2019. In
Germany alone there were 1.3 million people on the streets that day for climate
change protests in Berlin and several other major cities.

Disappointing results of the year 2019

Putting aside the outbreak of COVID-19 for a moment, activists already realized
by the end of 2019 that their protests were not successful enough in terms of
leading to radical change. While the European Union as well as some European
governments including Austria, Belgium and the UK declared a climate
emergency, they had not started cutting CO2 emissions drastically. In addition,
activists started suspecting climate protection policies such as the European
Green Deal to be more a tactical distraction than an ambitious plan to start
tackling emissions. Activists and others have accused it of green washing and
using the slogans of climate activism but none of its substance. Furthermore,
many scientists and activists criticize the year 2050 as the set date for the EU to
reach carbon-neutrality as being too late. In Germany, the Datteln 4 coal-fired
power plant is to be opened at the end of May 2020 despite Germany’s
announcement to phase out coal by 2038 (which is already much later than
most European countries). Finnish state-owned utility Fortum owns

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approximately 70 percent of German power plant operator Uniper, tying

Datteln 4 to the Finnish state and making it partially responsible for the
controversial opening the power plant. This means that also Finland will likely
fail to reach its target of becoming climate neutral by 2035.
In addition to this disappointing outcome, the media attention for the climate
movement had decreased by the end of 2019, as the actions of FFF, XR and
other groups started losing the news values of novelty, unpredictability and
surprise. Media attention is crucial for protest movements placing their
messages, shaping the discourse and mobilizing followers. At the same time
many climate activists were experiencing burnout after the seemingly endless
series of protest actions in 2019. Some started rethinking their strategies,
exploring new possibilities of regaining interest of the media. There seemed to
be a consensus that protests must continue until real political changes were
made that would help avoid the most catastrophic effects of climate change.
2020 has of course been much different than anyone could have anticipated.
With the outbreak of a pandemic and physical distancing measures in place
most of the actions and stories that climate activists had planned for 2020 had
to be shelved for the time being. In addition, the novel virus traumatized people
not just in terms of worrying about loved ones becoming sick or dying, but also
in terms of causing financial meltdown, worsening domestic violence, feeling
isolated, and other consequences. Thus, the issues that the climate movement
had been addressing thus far with its actions and stories were no longer the
focus of events. The outbreak of COVID-19 brought about a change in the
media, social and political resonance space. The long-lasting impact this
pandemic will have on society, politics and the economy is still uncertain, but it
is likely to be bigger than anticipated.

Media reporting in the time of a pandemic:

climate crisis vs. novel corona crisis
What does this imply for climate activists? As long as case numbers remain
high, the news will be dominated by case numbers, mortality rates, the fragility
of our health system, and the geographical spread of the virus. This will last for
an unpredictable but likely extended period of time. Climate-damaging
investment packages to rescue economies during the crisis, on the other hand,
have been subject to less critical mainstream media attention. However, media
attention for the pandemic are also likely to be in waves, as case numbers are
sinking in Europe in mid-year (although rising elsewhere) with concerns about a
second wave later in the year. Furthermore, although attention to the climate
and the environment decreased noticeably in the first couple of months of the
spread of COVID-19, it was not completely off the table. Climate activists have
still occasionally been interviewed to talk about their responses to the crisis. In
these times, climate groups with well-known activists tended to have better
chances of being heard, as the media mostly sought out “celebrity”
spokespersons.

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The media has also explored the question how the climate crisis and the virus
outbreak related. Unfortunately however, many articles mostly compared the
effects of the two crises with each other, which is not a particularly helpful
narrative, instead of searching for links between them. When journalists ask
about the ways the crises supposedly “compete” with each other it often
remained unclear which particular aspects of the crises the comparison is
referring to (the “health” crisis? The “economic” crisis?), thus making the issue
unnecessarily abstract and vague. Second of all, measuring which crisis is
“worse” holds the danger of belittling the traumatizing effects each of them can
potentially have on people’s lives. As Fridays for Future activists point out with
their Hashtag #fighteverycrisis, instead of trying to figure out which crisis is
worse, we should recognize the severity of each crisis and act accordingly to
prevent them in the future.

Taking back social media

To balance out their dependency on mass media and the minimal news
reporting on climate change at the moment, activists have increasingly turned to
social media. However, they have also struggled to keep control of more
problematic narratives circulating online being connected to the climate
movement. Misleading statements like “mother nature is cleansing itself”,
“humanity is the virus” or posts expressing support for the short-term stop of
CO2 emission due to the economic shut down were widely found on Twitter,
Instagram and other social media platforms in the first couple of weeks after the
COVID-19 breakout. Many climate activist groups responded immediately,
joining efforts to debunk these newly circulating narratives. In March, XR
Scotland stated on Twitter that “any claim that a global pandemic and loss of
thousands of human lives is a *good* thing for the climate is far more dangerous
than the virus itself” and further: “Misleading narratives about ‘overpopulation’
can lead to the promotion of eugenics or a one-race state achieved by oppressive
anti-immigration policies”. XR Germany followed later in the month with a
Twitter Post encouraging solidarity with the thousands of refugees being locked
in at the camp Moria on Lesbos:

“it is not humans who are the problem, but certain ways of living together,
economic activity and bad political decisions [..]. Such narratives celebrate
the death of mostly structurally disadvantaged people and imply that the
earth can be ‘saved’ in this way. They aim to create an irrational image of
the enemy and open the door to repressive and racist anti-immigration
policies.”

In May, Greta Thunberg published a Facebook post stating that CO2

temporarily falling might be good in showing how much emissions decreased in
the last decade, but is generally “not good news”.

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Demystifying such narratives has kept activists busy since the outbreak of the
virus. In addition, especially in the first months of the coronavirus crisis many
climate groups made efforts to support local communities and show solidarity
with overburdened health care workers. Some groups joined forces with their
local food banks and supermarkets, cycling supplies to elderly costumers so they
would not have to come pick them up themselves. Other groups created
solidarity funds. Since the outbreak of the virus efforts have been made to show
intersecting links between struggles, making solidarity between different
(climate) activist groups more visible. In Germany, one of the first big successes
and blueprint for showing solidarity within the wider movement and running
campaigns in times of corona was an action by the collective ‘Seebrücke’
(‘Seabridge’), a Germany based group calling for the establishment of safe
routes for refugees. The hashtag #LeaveNoOneBehind was widely adopted by
climate groups across Europe with many climate activists joining in small
physical protests against the catastrophic hygiene situation in the refugee camp
Moria and demanding it to be evacuated immediately.
Since the outbreak of the virus, the conservative media in particular have
criticized activists’ call for more climate protection measures following an
economic framing à la "The pandemic is more important than the climate crisis,
which is why the economy must now be rescued without regard to the climate".
This narrative sets the stage for a climate policy "rollback". Activists know that
economic and financial systems do not operate in a vacuum, but are highly
dependent on the political environment. In order to respond to and prevent this
roll back climate groups all over Europe have been getting involved with
political decisions about how to reboot the economy after the pandemic is over.
In Germany, the discussion about the so called “Abwrackprämie” - a supposed
stimulus measure providing every new car buyer with a bonus and thereby
encouraging cars purchases (including cars that run on fuels such as diesel!) -
has been intense. Including during the (now digital) weekly climate strikes,
German activists protested against the financial bailout of the car industry
which in their eyes contradicts promises of the government to pursue the
“Energiewende” – the planned transition by Germany to a low carbon,
environmentally sound, reliable, and affordable energy supply. Similarly, in
France, a 22 billion dollar investment package to support industries, largely the
aviation and automobile sectors, with no strings attached, did not slip past
French climate activists unnoticed. XR Germany started a campaign around the
theme “Klimarettungsschirm”, a “financial parachute for the climate”,
demanding governments tie financial aid for companies to climate neutrality
obligations and stop funding the fossil fuel industry. On April Fools Day a fake
Google website made by XR activists appeared, announcing that the tech giant
has reevaluated their responsibility regarding climate change in times of crisis
and has decided to immediately stop funding organizations that are associated
with climate denialism. A day later, the group Google Workers for Action on
Climate Change stated its support for the action. (The real) Google then
announced that it will desist from building AI tools for oil and gas drillers. This
communication guerrilla action by XR New York as well as the other examples

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show that activists have not lost their voices, and have instead found new and
creative ways to pressure governments, even from their desks at home.
However, COVID-19 has also shown the limits of digital campaigns. Although
activists’ concerns and narratives can also be brought to the public through
social media, they do not generally have the same reach as mass media. Since
the mass media are active co-creators of the narrative about the climate crisis,
the climate movement depends on the media to talk about it. While it is possible
to reach many through social media, it is difficult to reach people beyond the
“filter bubbles”. Furthermore, unfortunately spreading out to the digital realm
has excluded many former more senior activists who were not able to catch up
with the ever changing fast pace of digital activism. While activists have made it
into mainstream media since the outbreak of corona, and recently there has
been a rising interest in what has become of the climate movement, media
attention for the climate movement has not yet become consistent again.

So what can we do?

Even without a pandemic capturing media attention it is a great challenge for
social movements to bring their messages into the media. Not only do they lack
"real means of power", scholars have found that they are usually forced to adapt
to the "media's desire for 'simple' messages or 'imaginative' images" in order to
receive coverage.1 Protest movements typically attempt to undertake actions
that include an element of surprise, involve socially influential actors and
attempt to personalize the events to increase the interest of the news media.
But how to find new ways of exciting and provocative actions, when all that
people worry about is how to go back to normality as quickly as possible?
Activists know that the post-virus phase will be a decisive one. Politicians are
seeking a narrative that will determine how the economy will be stabilized and
further crises prevented. They will choose among competing narratives, with
some prevailing others. Activists know they must engage in this “competition” –
if they do not, climate unfriendly narratives may become dominant and the
climate crisis will intensify further.

Finding a new narrative

Since the outbreak of corona, climate activists and scientists have wearily
observed politicians and people’s growing eagerness to return to “normality”.
They know that normality and stability is only possible if all crises are tackled at
their origins instead of only their symptoms. Measures like physical distancing,
financial bail-out for key industries and vaccinations may be effective short
team measures to deal with the novel corona crisis, but they are not enough to

1Brunnengräber, Achim, Ansgar Klein, und Heike Walk, Hrsg. 2005. NGOs im Prozess der
Globalisierung: mächtige Zwerge, umstrittene Riesen. 1. Aufl. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für
Sozialwissenschaften. P. 353.

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prevent the next virus from breaking out. As long as our economic system
encourages people to destroy our ecosystems and cut down entire rainforests for
profit, the outbreak of the next virus might just be waiting behind the corner:
Destroying natural habitats forces animals to flee, making it more likely for
them and humans to get in contact with other species. In the case of COVID-19
the virus was much likely transmitted by bats that migrated to Malaysia after
they were forced to leave the rain forest in Sumatra. There they probably
transmitted the disease to other animals, that later were sold at an animal
market in Wuhan.
The story of the climate, CO2 emissions and greenhouse gases is the one that
has brought the climate movement to the forefront of public attention over the
past year. However, it has one big problem: Many people, who are lucky enough
to not have their livelihood threatened by the effects of climate change yet, still
do not understand how it affects their daily lives. This narrative refers to the
climate as if it can be isolated from our economic system, from our health and
from the outbreak of new diseases. Furthermore, at the moment, with many
people having very acute worries such as the health of loved ones and how to
pay next month’s rent, the narrative of the lurching climate crisis might
overwhelm people more than mobilize them. Framing climate and ecological
protection as the surest way to achieving true stability can directly address such
concerns.
For the period after the Corona crisis ends or at least recedes activists will need
to develop a new narrative that is concrete and immediate. In that sense, similar
to the one that has dominated during the pandemic. It must be a narrative that
answers how people’s health can be best protected and that promises economic
stability. It must be a narrative that shows the direct connection between
everyday human concerns and the protection of nature from exploitative
practices such as extractivism. It must be a narrative that shows that crises such
as COVID-19 and climate change do not affect all people equally and one that
builds solidarity beyond borders. This narrative must demonstrate that climate
and ecological protection is not a “luxury” but the basic building block of a
resilient society. In short, it must be made clear that climate and nature
conversation are the most basic form of health protection and economic
stability.
Tearing down rain forests does not just increase the probability of transmittable
diseases, it directly and indirectly contributes to raising CO2 emissions, which
results in flooding, sea-level rise and catastrophic wild fires such as in Australia
in 2019. As long as governments exclude the protection of biodiversity and
ecosystems in their plans, stability will remain an illusion. As long as people
deny themselves as part of the ecosystem and that their livelihood, health and
well-being depends on their care for it, a state of crisis awaits us and future
generations.
All activist groups need to come together to find a common narrative of climate
protection which shows that this is the world’s best hope for a stable economy
and open, healthy, resilient societies. That the corona virus crisis will change

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everything is a key narrative that activists need to communicate, so that people

can expect substantive changes and build their acceptance of this. Over time,
mass media space will become more readily available for climate activists’
actions and narratives. This chance should not be missed, as it may be the best
one the climate movement gets in the foreseeable future.

About the author:

Clara S. Thompson is an environmental activist and speaker. She studied
sociology at the University of Leipzig and the University of Edinburgh and
worked as a teaching assistant for the Department of Cultural Sociology. She
offers workshops on transformation and media strategies for social movements.

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Degrowth and feminisms ally to forge

care-full paths beyond pandemic
Susan Paulson (30th June 2020)

Abstract
This article describes four initiatives in which degrowth and feminist activists
mobilize collaborative analysis and communication in efforts to influence paths
through and beyond the COVID-19 pandemic. The efforts work together to identify
and advance actions that help our societies to address and emerge from this global
disaster in more humane, just, and sustainable ways. We join other social
movements in asking: How can we seize opportunities to build healthier values,
social arrangements, and policies? To slow down the rush toward future disasters?
Highlight is on caring and commoning as features of desired worlds ahead, and as
means and methods in our own organization and activism.

Key Words
Degrowth, feminism, COVID-19, care, mobilization

Moves toward radical redirection

Degrowth advocates seek to reduce ongoing harm to humans and earth systems by
reorienting values, practices, and institutions away from economic expansion and
toward equitable and sustainable wellbeing. Different actors work toward these
goals via everyday practices, communal initiatives, scholarly theory, and policy
recommendations (e.g., Gezon and Paulson 2017; Kallis 2018; Kallis et al. 2020;
Treu and Schmelzer 2020). This article shares processes and outcomes of four
overlapping initiatives that mobilize for change via collaborative analysis and
writing, and by communicating shared understandings among diverse audiences.
All coincide in foregrounding caring and commoning as engines for getting through
the pandemic, in policies and actions toward healthier futures, and as
characteristics of our own practices.
First is Feminisms and Degrowth Alliance (FaDA), an inclusive network of activists
and scholars launched in 2016 at the 5th International Degrowth Conference in
Budapest. A 2017 survey carried out by Jolanda Iserlohn revealed that members
are located in wide-ranging contexts around the world, and bring to the network an
immense variety of activist, academic, household, and professional experiences.
During March and April 2020, around 40 participants of this network, quarantined
in locations ranging from Chile to Finland, joined in a series of virtual
conversations that mixed strategizing for political change with mutual
encouragement for facing immediate challenges. After circulating ideas and drafts,
the group produced two messages communicated to the public on April 20, 2020:
“Feminist degrowth reflections on COVID-19 and the Politics of Social

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Reproduction” and “Collaborative Feminist Degrowth: Pandemic as an Opening for

a Care-Full Radical Transformation.” To reach beyond English language speakers,
the messages were translated into Finnish (Suomi), German (Deutsch), Greek
(Ελληνικά), Italian (Italiano), Spanish (Español), Turkish (Türkçe). The call for a
“Care-full radical transformation” begins:

The crisis we face as a global community must be understood not only as a public
health crisis, or as an economic crisis of the capitalist mode of production, but also,
fundamentally, as a crisis of the reproduction of life. In this sense, it is a crisis of
care: the work of caring for humans, non-humans, and the shared biosphere. The
pandemic is a historical rupture . . . we take this opportunity to reflect on how we
can, from our diverse positions, face this moment, organize, and collectively imagine
radical alternative modes of living: those with more time for community, relationship
building, and care for each other as well as the non-human world.

A second, parallel, processes of collaborative thinking and writing led to the

dissemination, three weeks later, of Degrowth: New Roots for the Economy. Re-
imagining the Future After the Corona Crisis. This open letter, signed by more than
1,100 individuals and 70 organizations from 60 countries, calls for various sectors
of global populations to embrace five principles to guide responses to COVID-19
crises and economic recovery: (1) Put life at the center of our economic systems,
not economic growth; (2) Radically re-evaluate how much and what work is
necessary for a good life for all, emphasizing care work; (3) Organize society
around the provision of essential goods and services, minimizing wasteful
practices; (4) Democratize societies, struggling against authoritarian and
technocratic tendencies; and (5) Base political and economic systems on the
principle of solidarity, rather than competition and greed.
Like FaDA’s messages, this letter was mobilized to bring diverse audiences into
conversation. It was translated into 19 languages, and published in Open
Democracy (UK), Mediapart (France), The Wire (India), HGV (Hungary), Pagina
12 (Argentina), Yeşil Gazete (Turkey), ctxt (Spain), Italia Che Cambia (Italy),
UDRŽITELNÝ NERŮST (Czech Republic), Ricochet (Quebec), Sin Embargo
(Mexico) and Information (Denmark), among other media outlets.
Rapid actions like these global communications are nurtured by slower processes
of collaborative learning demonstrated by a third initiative, a team of four activist
scholars whose collaborations in teaching, conferences, and writing led to the 2020
book The Case for Degrowth. Joining many others in arguing that perpetual
growth is harmful and doomed, this publication also provides encouraging
examples and reachable proposals for healthier ways forward in daily practices and
values, communal organizing, government policies, and political mobilization. In
the recent article The case for degrowth in a time of pandemic, the authors show
how their proposals address current challenges.
Promoting dialogue and debate among these and other intellectual projects, while
building convivial solidarity and trust among diverse actors and organizers, are

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goals of the fourth initiative discussed here: the world conference “Degrowth
Vienna 2020 – Strategies for social-ecological transformation” held May 29 - June
1. The call for participation foregrounded the conference’s strategy for learning
across differences:

By bringing together practitioners, artists, activists, civil society actors and

scientists, we want to integrate different kinds of existing expertise and elaborate
promising approaches to transforming the economy in a socially just and
ecologically viable way. The conference will have a participatory design, including
a thorough documentation process that will generate concrete outcomes for the
degrowth movement and research society.

Observing that expert factual knowledge has not been sufficient to move
societies toward healthier paths, degrowth and feminist activists seek more
holistic approaches that connect with bodily and emotional feelings. In
workshops, summer camps, and other gatherings, we have been experimenting
with learning and communication strategies that go beyond scientific lectures to
include theater, makers spaces, graphic facilitation, artwork, and more.
Participants at previous world degrowth conferences were charged with energy
by parading through the streets of Budapest, and by sharing locally-grown
vegetarian meals at Descrecimiento México. Below, we learn how organizers
responded to the daunting challenges of hosting a participatory world gathering
in 2020, amid quarantines that limit corporeal conviviality.
With the goal of fostering dialogue among social movements and communities,
the following discussion shares ideas and approaches from each of these
initiatives. The text draws from and complements the short article From
pandemic toward care-full degrowth published in the Interface series Social
movements in and beyond the COVID-19 crisis: sharing stories of struggles.

What does growth have to do with pandemic?

Social movements have long attacked the pursuit of profit as a root of ecological
and social degradation, and degrowth focuses explicitly on halting the drive for
relentlessly expanding production and consumption. The open letter “New Roots
for the Economy” observes,

The crisis triggered by the Coronavirus has already exposed many weaknesses of our
growth-obsessed capitalist economy – insecurity for many, healthcare systems
crippled by years of austerity and the undervaluation of some of the most essential
professions. This system, rooted in exploitation of people and nature, which is
severely prone to crises, was nevertheless considered normal.

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Today, it is tempting to portray the COVID-19 pandemic as tangible proof of limits

to growth, a messianic reckoning for our profligate ways. But such a claim would be
naïve; epidemics have spread in the past and will in the future. What is clear is that
the speed and scope of this contagion have been accelerated by global economic
dynamics, while the growing ease with which viruses like HIV, SARS, MERS and
COVID jump from animals to humans is enabled by the expansion of industrial
agriculture, ranching, and other human encroachment on habitats, as well as the
commodification of wildlife, all motivated by drive for profit.
Slow and ineffectual responses of leaders like Bolsonaro, Johnson, and Trump, as
well as impulses to restart economies before the pandemic has waned, can also be
understood in the context of ongoing pushes to sustain growth. Government
capacities to respond have been eroded by budget cuts to public health and social
infrastructures, enacted as public funds were redirected to subsidize expansion of
private ventures. Ongoing struggles to fund and mobilize responses to public health
emergencies contrasts with the agility with which national guard and other military
forces were mobilized to protect property during recent protests in the US.
A dangerous dimension of pushes for growth is the rejection of scientific evidence
and advice. In order to defend fossil fuel, climate change deniers have undermined
faith in science, opening the way for politicians to shun a range of findings that
threaten economic expansion; some had cut funding for pandemic research units
and epidemic control teams, as well as studies on mitigation and adaptation to
climate change. Even as COVID-19 spread, a number of leaders refused to respond
to scientific findings and protocols (such as distancing, testing, and protective
equipment) until pushed to do so by courageous protests of health workers, civil
society, and other actors.

Paths toward more equitable and sustainable societies

Contrary to claims of some critics, the ravages of COVID-19 do not represent
degrowth worlds strived for by social movements. Yes, the health crisis has
provoked declines in natural resources used and waste generated, giving welcome
respite to ecosystems. And yes, the lives of some people have slowed down, as
ambitious schedules give way to more time for reflection and relationships. But no,
unevenly-suffered trauma, impoverishment, and death are not features of
degrowth; on the contrary, these are precisely the kind of phenomena that planned
degrowth aims to avoid.
We would like to see societies slow down by design, not disaster. However, it looks
like transitions away from growth may be largely unplanned and messy, in
conditions not of our own choosing. Conditions like the ones we are living through
now. So, finding ourselves amid global disaster, we join other social movements in
asking: How can we seize opportunities to advance values, social arrangements,
and policies that help us move toward more livable and just worlds? That slow
down the rush toward future disasters?
Like those in other social movements, activists discussed here insist on connecting
immediate responses to deeper structural transformations. The problems we

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address did not appear with the coronavirus. They are produced and reproduced by
hierarchical and exploitative social systems that took form several centuries ago
with colonial capitalism, then continued to evolve in varied contexts. Key here are
historically-specific systems of race and gender adapted to engineer and to justify
forms of appropriation that support economic growth. Shared critique of these
historical forces nourish alliances among degrowth and decolonial feminisms, even
as they mark distance from liberal feminisms and green growth.
Transformative responses will require synergy among diverse perspectives and
movements. Our most immediate case for including degrowth in this allied front
is that its fundamental practices—modest living based in cooperation,
conviviality, sharing, and caring—are desirable in and of themselves. Even when
there seems little hope of establishing societies characterized by dignified work,
equitable and solidary communities, respect for natural environments, we can
already exercise and begin to embody these practices, enjoying their intrinsic
rewards as we take steps toward feminist degrowth worlds to come.
In spite of the beautiful simplicity of these core principles, putting them into
practice requires struggle and negotiation. In addition to battling forces
aggressively defending various aspects of the status quo, we face quotidian
conflicts around our own common senses and expectations, inherited ideas
about aesthetics, propriety, respect that are internalized in our bodies and
relationships, including our professional and academic practices. In an essay on
challenges faced in organizing the Vienna 2020 Conference, Nathan Barlow
reflects on debates about how and to what extent conference processes and
logistics should coincide with degrowth visions, and who establishes degrowth
standards for conference organizing.

Should we use social media to promote the event? All vegan or just vegetarian
catering? Paid organizers or all volunteers? Are organizations x, y, and z really
degrowth-y enough? Can we plead against flying to the conference or is this
exclusionary towards those travelling longer distances, such as would-be attendees
from the Global South? Thus, organizing a degrowth conference is not just a practical
exercise. Importantly – and we should have realized this sooner – it is also a
manifestation of ideas.

Vital ideas have also been manifest through a rainbow of actions and alliances
mobilized to deliver groceries and medicines, help others to manage welfare
benefits, telephone isolated community members. Actors deciding whether and
how to carry out these beautiful acts face their own questions, including risks of
contagion. For Benjamin Duke (2020), the confluence of these initiatives
creates fertile ground for the emergence of alliances unthinkable before the
pandemic. When the difficult journey of reconstruction begins, this resurgent
dynamism will be vital for establishing more enduring commons for care and
provisioning.

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Feminisms draw attention to diversely positioned

contributions and vulnerabilities
The coronavirus pandemic provokes us to think about our worlds in new ways.
We hope it becomes clearer that, without essential workers, none of us can
thrive. That, unless vulnerable community members are protected, even the
most privileged are not safe from contagion.
Contributions to essential care and provisioning, as well as vulnerabilities to
harm, are organized through economic systems, kinship systems, and other
social institutions that foster greater hierarchy, or greater equity, in different
historical periods and contexts. Amid experiences of COVID-19 and ensuing
economic troubles, degrowth feminisms call for heightened attention to
differentiated distribution of burdens and vulnerabilities, particularly those
associated with gender.
Data from countries around the world show that COVID infections tend to be
much more severe and deadly in men than in women, with death tolls as much
as 2.2 times greater for men. This intersects with disproportionate burden of
illness and death among racial and ethnic minority groups. In many contexts,
then, it is non-white men who are most vulnerable to suffer critical illness and
death from coronavirus, while differently positioned women are facing different
challenges and vulnerabilities.
Growing gaps by which women, on average, outlive men in every country by as
many as 14 years are driven by structural forces, including the gendered
organization of military, occupational, and incarceration systems, as well as
lifestyle expectations connected to certain masculine identities, including meat-
heavy diets, alcohol and tobacco consumption, disdain for healthcare, limited
social connections, and risk-taking. Amid COVID-19, research has found that
men in some contexts are as twice as likely as women to go without masks and
to break quarantine.
Is it useful to blame men victims for getting sick? Feminists have struggled to
motivate compassion for women whose conditions constrain the development of
self-confidence, initiative, and financial skills necessary to make dignified lives
for themselves. Transition to care-full worlds will also require compassion for
boys and men whose conditions push them to demonstrate their virility by
performing dangerous labor in hazardous conditions, by exercising and
enduring violence, and by taking risks with their health and their lives.
While some people shelter at home, others must choose between jobs that expose
them to the coronavirus and unemployment without adequate safety nets. Much
attention has been drawn to vulnerabilities of nurses, health aids, and caretakers,
in majority women. More gender awareness is needed for millions of men
performing essential jobs as sanitation workers, meat packers, food harvesters,
truck and bus drivers. While absolutely vital for public health, these occupations
were already among the most dangerous and deadly before adding exposure to
coronavirus. Around the world they are performed overwhelmingly by men, in
patterns of workplace violence so highly gendered that, in countries like USA, ten

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men die of occupational accidents for each woman (US Bureau of Labor Statistics
2019). The added exposure to virus can be the spark needed for degrowth and
feminist mobilization against gendered traditions of workplace violence that are
harming men.
While some people find comfort at home, others face conflict and crowding, or
lack homes altogether. Reports from diverse countries indicate that domestic
violence has intensified during lock-downs, impacting women
disproportionately (Taub 2020). People who don’t even live in homes face
different kinds of vulnerabilities. In most countries, women outnumber men
among residents in long-term care centers, while men make up majorities as
high as 90% in prisons, jails, migrant labor camps, homeless shelters,
immigrant detention centers, and military barracks, all of which have become
hotspots for the virus. In these residential patterns too, the forms of violence
and discrimination borne by those who embody subordinate masculinities
manifest intersections of gender, racial, and class inequalities.
Other relevant intersections involve sexuality. Many public health messages
reinforce the widespread—and incorrect—assumption that contemporary
populations live mostly in heteronormative nuclear households. “Stay home
with your family,” “balance extra domestic responsibilities between husband
and wife” are relevant for a portion of the population, for example, the 20% of
US households that consists of nuclear families (US Census Bureau 2013).
However, equating residential units with normative kinship units limits support
for the actual residential and kin arrangements through which provisioning and
care are organized in today’s societies. Inaccurate assumptions that all people
live like the Flintstones, the Simpsons, or the Jetsons seriously limit public
health efforts by obscuring empirical realities, which are plural. Those public
messages also operate to demean other ways of living and to stifle pluriversal
creativity.
Across wealthy countries, the most common household category is a single
person living alone (27% US and Canadian households, 40% of Swedish
households). Amid isolating conditions, one creative response to needs for care
and conviviality is found in queer dance parties organized online with scopes
ranging from local communities to celebrity-filled global gatherings. Dancing
together—even virtually—not only provides care and acknowledgement needed
in quarantine (and other forms of isolation), it can also build values and
pleasures outside the realm of economic competition and gain. Alliances with
LGBTQ and related social movements help us to honor the diverse identity,
household, and kin arrangements that people are already living, and to support
innovations provoked by the pandemic, as well as those motivated by desires for
positive transformation.
Equitable and sustainable transitions depend on collaborative abilities to
develop gender systems that honor diverse contributions and sacrifices, and
that minimize vulnerabilities for all. FaDA has raised awareness of this
challenge by hosting participatory workshops at the Budapest, Malmö, and
Mexico City world degrowth conferences, and by organizing sessions to share

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research findings on feminisms, masculinities, and degrowth. In their article

“Feminism(s) and Degrowth: A Midsummer Night’s Dream” Corinna Dengler,
Camila Rolando Mazzuca and Renda Belmallem summarize conference
conversations:

FaDA members were eager to emphasize that FaDA must not become one of the
many streams within degrowth. It is of the uttermost importance to understand
gender relations as cross-cutting theme that fundamentally has a say in how we
conceptualize the transformation towards a socially just and ecologically sound
degrowth society. The pervasiveness of unequal gender relations in the capitalist
system is so historically grounded that it requires a constant and in-depth
attention for its deconstruction in all degrowth-related topics.

Although it is equally true that the anti-black racism and exploitation pervasive
in capitalist systems requires constant and in-depth attention in all degrowth-
related topics, that struggle has been less visible and less organized in degrowth
activism overall. In initiatives like those discussed here, we face important work
of developing stronger understandings and more explicit actions against racism.
Building needed alliances with actors and movements working against racism
will be essential for futures of degrowth feminisms.
In mainstream environmentalism, white men have dominated organizational
leadership, science, and media. Even within climate action movements, students
and grassroots members experience currents of racialization, patriarchy, and
coloniality that make it difficult to work together equitably (Chan and Curnow
2017). In contrast, grassroots environmental and social justice movements in
low-income and wealthy countries alike have frequently been inspired, led, and
publicly represented by actors who are not men, not white, or not wealthy. Not
incidentally, they have advanced more radical proposals, such as Martin Luther
King Jr.’s 1967 call for a guaranteed basic income to abolish poverty and
decrease inequality, or the Zapatista’s demand for autonomous spaces to create
a future outside of Mexico’s national development. In order to learn from and
build alliances with diversely positioned social-environmental justice
movements, degrowth advocates must prioritize mutual and respectful dialogue
among diverse ways of knowing and being.
In one study designed to highlight diverse experiences and adaptations in
Georgia, USA, FaDA member Lisa Gezon and Deirdre Haywood-Rouse are
collaborating with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP), League of Women Voters, and Latinos United of Carroll
County to document a variety of experiences and cultural interpretations of
COVID-19. Via online surveys and phone interviews, they have gathered
testimonies from people from diverse social status, gender, and ethnoracial
positions, and plan to reconnect with many of these six months later to
document adaptations to the pandemic and its consequences.

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Politics of care
It is good to hear scientific, political, and moral authorities praise people who stay
home to protect community health and those who sacrifice to perform essential
work. Some have even suggested that caring for people’s health and wellbeing
should come before profit. But we must not be seduced into believing that such
sentiments will automatically lead to structural change. Rebuilding societies
around care will require constant material struggles.
While respect for planetary boundaries demands degrowth of the global economy
as a whole, some critical features need to be nurtured and developed, namely
infrastructures of care. Feminists call for policies that support the regeneration of
healthy humans and environments, revaluing home and neighborhood as sites of
production and reproduction, and provisioning economies grounded in solidarity
across different strengths and vulnerabilities.
In one example of social movement advocacy, the Global Women’s Strike (GWS)
and Women of Color GWS, urge governments to implement Care Incomes to
recognize the indispensable role of (re)productive work for life and survival. Care
Incomes build on and differ from other basic income proposals by foregrounding
social recognition of unpaid and gendered care work that we all perform to sustain
the life and wellbeing of households and communities. As advocates develop and
debate various ways of operationalizing care income, all seek to foster equity and
solidarity by investment of common wealth in people’s capacities to take care of
ourselves, our kin, and others, as well as our environments (D’Alisa 2020).
Like the FaDA network, the co-authors of The Case for Degrowth not only
encourage readers to prioritize care and common effort in community organization
and government policies, but practice it themselves, as communicated in the book’s
acknowledgements:

Writing this book is an act of care. Care for family, friends, and fellow citizens
striving to contribute and find meaning in the face of historic challenges. Care for
people and places around the world struggling to survive the burdens and damages
of growth. And care for each other, as collaborators and co-authors. As in any act of
care, our efforts to produce this book ran up against the limits and vulnerabilities of
our individual positions – class, gender, disciplinary, cultural, and other.

Nathan Barlow writes poignantly about care and common effort in moments when
teams organizing the Vienna 2020 conference were disheartened by challenges of
COVID-19.

[W]e face the dual challenge of the practical necessities of organizing an online
conference, which is totally new to most of us, and the important care work of
looking after each other in this challenging time. Already a few members of the
organizing team have stepped back. Some aren’t motivated to organize an online
conference in the same way that an in-person conference excited them. Others in

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the team have voiced the challenges of organizing online, which often leave little
space for emotional sharing or the chance to have informal discussions over
coffee.
We are doing our best to proactively create the spaces for emotional sharing and
caring amongst the organizing team. To highlight the work done by everyone in
the team (especially that which may be forgotten in an online conference), and
show appreciation for each other’s work, which is especially important in a time
of crisis when people are going through additional stress or challenges (health,
financial, etc.). The ComCare (communications & care) team deserves a special
shout-out for their ongoing work in this regard.

Grief over lost dreams needs to be honored. And disappointment acknowledged

when hard work invested seems no longer relevant. At the same time, the
successful and well-attended virtual conference suggests that, debating about
degrowth conference-planning and figuring out how to work in common had
provided marvelous training for unexpected scenarios. In Nathan Barlow’s words,
“it is precisely because we have had two long years of organizing together that we
were resilient enough to make such a transition.”

Policies through and beyond pandemic

The letter “New Roots for the Economy” raises hope that positive impulses among
individuals and social movements can be transformed into sustained structural
change.

We now have an opportunity to build on the experiences of the Corona crisis:

from new forms of cooperation and solidarity that are flourishing, to the
widespread appreciation of basic societal services like health and care work, food
provisioning and waste removal. The pandemic has also led to government
actions unprecedented in modern peacetime, demonstrating what is possible
when there is a will to act: the unquestioned reshuffling of budgets, mobilization
and redistribution of money, rapid expansion of social security systems and
housing for the homeless.

The Case for Degrowth shows how principles of caring and inclusive solidarity
can guide the establishment of policies and institutions that prioritize human
and environmental health: Green New Deals, work-sharing and reduced
working hours, universal public services, support of community economies, and
care incomes. In response to COVID, and to pressure from activists and
movements, governments across the political spectrum have begun to consider
and selectively adopt versions of the radical proposals advanced in this book. In
Europe and North America, public and private employers have reduced working
hours and implemented work-sharing; different forms of basic income are being
debated; financial measures have been instituted to subsidize workers during
quarantine and after businesses close; an international campaign for care

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income has been launched; governments have engaged the productive

apparatus to secure vital supplies and services; and moratoriums are being
considered or imposed on rent, mortgage, and debt payments.
On April 14, 2020, the Hawaii Department of Human Services’ State
Commission on the Status of Women delivered to Hawaii legislators a Feminist
Plan for COVID-Era Economic Recovery, conveying concrete policy
recommendations for a new kind of economy (Dolan 2020). Rather than
reinstate a status quo riddled with inequality, the document recognizes the
current crisis as the “moment to build a system that is capable of delivering
gender equality.” It calls for a universal basic income; free, publicly provided
child-care for essential workers; the creation of public emergency funds
available for high-risk groups; enhanced health care for women and LGBTQIA+
people; and reinvestment in midwifery services to improve maternal health
care. The plan also insists that 20 percent of the state’s COVID-19-response
funds go directly to Native Hawaiian communities.
Most states and countries have more than enough resources to cover public health
and basic needs during crises, and can certainly weather declines in non-essential
parts of the economy by reallocating work and resources to essential ones. Yet,
because current economic systems are organized around constant circulation, any
decline in market activity threatens systemic collapse, provoking generalized
unemployment and impoverishment. It doesn’t have to be this way. To be more
resilient to future crises—pandemic, climatic, financial, or political—we must
(re)build systems in which interruptions in market activity do not sacrifice
livelihoods and lives.
Crises in basic provisioning have raised the pitch of mobilization around the
establishment of basic incomes, ranging from feminist care income discussed above
to Pope Francis’ proposal for global universal basic wage. Degrowth aligns with
those basic income proposals that seek to enhance resilience to crises, and
simultaneously establish material conditions that liberate individuals from
exploitative employment, support transformation away from environmentally-
damaging regimes, and move beyond “jobs versus environment” antagonism
(Lawhon and McCreary 2020).
Degrowth seeks to curb ecologically-damaging aspects of current economies.
Societies in pandemic struggle to demobilize activities not immediately essential
for sustaining life. And feminists fight to reorient societies around the sustenance
of human and other life. Today, all coincide in facing the fundamental challenge of
managing public health and provisioning without growth during and after COVID-
19.

Conflict and mobilization

Bitter struggles have already arisen over which paths to pursue through and after
this crisis. Powerful actors will continue pushing to reconstitute the status quo and
to shift costs to others. There is real danger that abilities to ally in resistance will be

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undermined by politics of fear, xenophobia, and blame; intensified surveillance and

control; and isolation that constrains common efforts and political organizing.
Movement toward more equitable and resilient societies that have gentler impacts
will require alliances across social movements. Differently positioned actors will
need to raise voices, organize, vote, strike, protest non-violently, and mobilize in
other ways. We are encouraged by instances in which common senses, practices,
and politics of degrowth and feminisms are already being mobilized as people
collaborate to provision and live differently. And by the recuperation of old and
generation of new modes of (re)production and social organization. We also
recognize that journeys through and beyond COVID-19 will involve setbacks,
counter-reforms, repressions, readjustments, and unexpected turns.
Collaborators in the four initiatives described here coincide with fundamental
messages of the open letter “New Roots for the Economy”: “As long as we have
an economic system that is dependent on growth, a recession will be
devastating. What the world needs instead is Degrowth – a planned yet
adaptive, sustainable, and equitable downscaling of the economy, leading to a
future where we can live better with less.” Yet leaders around the world are now
focusing on saving growth economies; many have already moved to bail out and
re-launch profit-making industries, while media reinforce false antagonisms
between economy and public health, between jobs and environment.
Shifting priorities toward human and ecological health and justice will require
interconnections among culturally and geographically dispersed movements, such
as that proposed by the May 11, 2020 call by Progressive International To Form a
Common Front in Global Struggle for Justice and a Better World. The messages
generated and circulated in initiatives described here interact with many other
necessary contributions. Scholarly analyses have certainly contributed to social
change; yet much intellectual work has been limited by historically narrow gender,
racial, and class positioning. Seeking different paths, the collaborative initiatives
described here emerged and developed via dialogue across differences, and
explicitly seek to broaden epistemological and social horizons. They also strive to
transcend divide between theory and action. These social movement journeys of
thinking, debating, and organizing together, while caring for each other, are
outcomes in themselves. As degrowth and feminist participants, practices, and
relationships are changed in the process, they produce tangible changes in the
world.

Acknowledgements
The multiple voices represented in this article, together with the collaborative
thinking and writing processes that nourish them, are fruit of ongoing
conversations among participants too far-reaching to be identified in full. With
honor to all those unnamed, I mention here some of the actors who contributed
to this paper by engaging enthusiastically in one or more of the initiatives
described: Nathan Barlow, Renda Belmallem, Sam Bliss, Ekaterina
Chertkovskaya, Giacomo D’Alisa, Federico Demaria, Corinna Dengler, Juanita

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Duque, Manuel Grebenjak, Constanza Hepp, Max Hollweg, Giorgos Kallis,

Christian Kerschner, Pierre Smith Khanna, Vincent Liegey, Camila Rolando
Mazzuca, Sourayan Mookerjea, Andro Rilović, Emily Rose, Anna Saave, Joëlle
Saey-Volckrick, Sophie Sanniti, François Schneider, Leah Temper, Tone Smith,
and Jennifer Wells.

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https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/news/nr/young-men-most-likely-break-coronavirus-
lockdown-rules-psychology-mental-health-study-1.888316
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2019. “Census of fatal occupational injuries
summary, 2018.” U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cfoi.nr0.htm.
Vespa, Jonathan, Jamie M. Lewis, and Rose M. Kreider. 2013. “America's Families
and Living Arrangements: 2012.” The United States Census Bureau.
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2013/demo/p20-570.html

About the author

Susan Paulson, based at the University of Florida, studies and teaches about
gender, class, and ethnoracial systems interacting with bodies and
environments. She has researched and taught in Latin America for 30 years, 15
of those living in South America among low-income, low-impact communities.
Recent writing includes Degrowth: culture, power and change, and Pluriversal
learning: Pathways toward a world of many worlds.

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Coronavirus, mouvements sociaux populaires anti-

exploitation minier en Haïti
Peterson Derolus (18 avril 2020)

La pandémie du nouveau coronavirus ou COVID-19 a sapé la base de l’économie

de tous les pays, car les industries, les échanges commerciaux ne se font presque
plus. La pandémie va déboucher sur une véritable crise économique mondiale et
que les pays appauvris, dépendants, exportateurs ou fournisseurs de matières
premières vont être les premiers sacrifiés. Toujours, dans ce pareil cas, les
investisseurs, les capitalistes cherchent toujours une monnaie de refuge pour
absorber la crise. C’est ce qui justifie la tendance de l’augmentation du prix de
l’or dans les temps de crise économique, et même dans la crise de COVID-19,
car il est toujours utilisé comme monnaie de refuge et sert pour la
thésaurisation en temps de crise. Les territoires qui ont été sources
d’approvisionnement de ces ressources vont être soumis à une rude ruée vers
l’or et d’autres ressources naturelles qui pourraient aider aux investisseurs, aux
capitalistes d’absorber la crise. Donc, les périodes de crise et d’affolement
sociale généralisée sont généralement exploitées par les institutions et
compagnies multinationales pour faire main mise sur les ressources naturelles
dans les pays qui ont des gouvernements corrompus et des structures juridico-
administratives faibles notamment en Amérique Latine, en Afrique, et dans les
Caraïbes. Tout compte fait, la résistance populaire a toujours été le seul moyen
d’empêcher le pillage des ressources naturelles dans les moments de crise, or
dans ce contexte de pandémie, le confinement, la « distance sociale »,
l’interdiction de rassemblement de plus de 10 personnes, le couvre-feu sont
recommandés. En ce sens, nous pourrions dire que la conjoncture actuelle
n’offre pas beaucoup de possibilité de résistance contre les gouvernements et les
multinationaux, pendant que la situation actuelle exige une plus grande
surveillance et de résistance populaire. Dans cet article article, nous
poursuivons comme objectif de démontrer comment la crise du COVID-19 est
défavorable à la relance du projet d’exploitation minière en Haïti, vu
l’importance de certains produits naturels dans ce contexte et de démontrer
comment les mouvements sociaux populaires anti-mine ont exploités ce
contexte pour faire avancer leur lutte.

Double jeu contradictoire : Promoteurs d’exploitation minière,

sensibilisateurs contre le COVID-19 en Haïti
Dans le contexte actuel, tous les gouvernements, même les plus criminels,
prétendent vouloir protéger la vie des citoyens contre la pandémie du
coronavirus. Ainsi, ils mettent en place un ensemble de dispositifs juridico-
administratifs et émettent des consignes sanitaires pour lutter contre la
propagation du virus. Les mouvements sociaux populaires anti-miniers en Haïti
participent aussi dans des activités de sensibilisation contre la propagation du

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COVID-19, en invitant la population haïtienne, les communautés ciblées par

l’exploitation minière à se laver les mains, à ne pas toucher la bouche ni le nez
car avec les mains sales, etc. Ces mouvements croient que pour résister, il faut
d’abord être en vie et en santé. Car, il est fondamental pour eux de rester en vie
et en santé pour faire face à d’autres évènements aussi destructeurs que le
coronavirus. Ainsi, démystifier la métamorphose, le double jeu des acteurs qui
portaient de discours et de projets de développement suicidaires dans ce
contexte est une des tâches nobles que jouent les mouvements sociaux
populaires anti-miniers en Haïti dans ce moment particulier. En effet, beaucoup
d’acteurs, de projets, de discours qui ont participés à la destruction de tous les
cadres de la vie humaine se convertissent en humanistes-bienfaiteurs. Ils n’ont
jamais tenu compte de la sauvegarde de la vie, de la santé de la population, de la
protection de l’eau et l’environnement comme cadre de la vie, mais d’un coup,
ils sont devenus leurs protecteurs. Le coronavirus et l’exploitation minière,
spécialement les mines métalliques ont les mêmes effets sur la vie, la santé et
l’environnement. Donc, la métamorphose des promoteurs de l’exploitation
minière en grands sensibilisateurs contre le COVID-19 serait une stratégie qui
vise à se légitimer, à gagner et à exploiter la conscience de la population pour
mieux la manipuler après. En ce sens, renforcer la sensibilisation contre la
propagation du coronavirus c’est aussi une lutte contre les acteurs et les projets
destructeurs. « Nou pap lave men pou siye l atè!

Le mouvement contre l’exploitation minière dans le contexte du

COVID-19
La résistance populaire ne s’éteint pas en Haïti avec l’annonce officielle du
COVID-19 et les mesures prises par le gouvernement tant décrié, mais plutôt
prend d’autres formes. Si la résistance contre la mise en place du gouvernement
de facto et la lutte contre la corruption connait un grand ralentissement, mais
pour les mouvements sociaux populaires contre l’exploitation minière, le
contexte est favorable à la conscientisation de la population haïtienne non
seulement sur l’importante et la protection de l’eau, de l’agriculture familiale et
d’autres ressources naturelles, mais aussi sur les dangers que représentent
l’industrie minière sur ces derniers.
Depuis plus de cinq (5) ans, des organisations populaires, paysannes, des droits
humains, des organisations internationales se mobilisant pour défendre l’eau,
l’agriculture et l’environnement contre l’exploitation minière, plus
particulièrement les mines métalliques, n’ont pas trouvé un contexte aussi
favorable pour étendre leurs résistances. En effet, dans le contexte de lutte
contre la propagation du coronavirus, l’eau est devenue une ressource
incontournable, car le lavage régulier des mains est fortement recommandé par
le Ministère de la Santé. Aussi, comme grand pays consommateur des produits
étrangers, le ralentissement du marché import-export montre encore une fois
de plus la nécessité d’investir et de protéger le secteur agricole haïtien. Enfin,
aucun vaccin n’est encore trouvé contre le coronavirus, la population ne compte
non sur l’exploitation minière pour se protéger, mais sur certains produits

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naturels comme le gingembre, l’ail, le citron, sirop de miel, l’oignon pour

renforcer le système défensif de leurs corps. Tout compte fait, les mouvements
sociaux populaires anti-miniers en Haïti trouvent un horizon favorable pour
mener, amplifier, généraliser leur lutte sur tout le territoire haïtien en
s’appuyant sur l’importance de l’eau, de l’agriculture et des produits naturels
utiles dans le contexte de la pandémie du coronavirus.

En guise de conclusion
Contrairement aux périodes post-séisme, post cyclone Mathieu, la stratégie du
choc ne va pas être facile à appliquer dans le contexte de coronavirus en Haïti
tenant compte de la place de certains produits naturels et de l’eau dans la lutte
contre le virus et la vigilance des mouvements sociaux populaires anti-miniers.
Ainsi donc, le COVID-19, ne crée pas seulement les conditions et l’opportunité
pour la mise en branle du projet d’exploitation minière tant dénoncé par les
communautés ciblées, il donne aussi la possibilité et les moyens pour renforcer,
généraliser la lutte contre ce projet sur tout le territoire d’Haïti. Pour protéger
l’agriculture et les produits naturels, il faut d’abord lutter contre les politiques
d’accaparement des terres agricoles haïtiennes et lutter contre des projets
comme l’exploitation minière, plus particulièrement l’exploitation des mines
métalliques qui peuvent détruire la terre et empoissonner l’eau. De part de
l’impact irréparable que l’industrie minière peut avoir sur l’agriculture et l’eau,
l’enjeu de la lutte contre l’exploitation minière est de taille. Penser que le
COVID-19 donne la possibilité pour l’exploitation minière est un faux calcul. Les
mouvements sociaux ont profité de cette situation de crise sanitaire et
économique pour renforcer le processus de conscientisation de la population
haïtienne à travers des outils d’éducations populaires et mettent en place des
structures de surveillances communautaires, d’amplifier le réseautage et la
solidarité internationale.

A propos de l’auteur
Peterson Derolus est un militant anti-extractiviste haïtien.

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The pandemic does not stop the pollution in

River Periyar
Silpa Satheesh (1st June 2020)

Abstract
When the entire world has been witnessing improvements in environmental
quality, a river in Kerala flows in many colors due to pollution. River Periyar has
been flowing in black and white through the Eloor-Edayar industrial region ever
since the lockdown started in the state. On Earth Day, members of the
grassroots environmental movement, Periyar Malineekarana Virudha
Samithi (PMVS, Periyar Anti-Pollution Campaign), staged a protest, wearing
masks and without violating social distancing etiquette, to call out the continued
release of toxins into the river even during the pandemic. This essay is written
building on a conversational interview with Purushan Eloor, the frontline leader
of PMVS, and by analyzing the video recording of the protest organized on Earth
Day.

Pollution in Periyar continues unabated

Periyar, the longest river in Kerala, has been flowing in black and white colors
carrying industrial effluents, amidst the pandemic. This is ironic considering the
significant improvements in environmental quality reported from across the
world during the spread of the pandemic. Reflecting on the unique predicament
of the river, Purushan Eloor, the frontline leader of PMVS (Periayr
Malineekarana Virudha Samithi or Periyar Anti-Pollution Campaign), remarks,
“We have been paying attention to the stories from around the world about
rivers flowing clear and the slow revival of aquatic life. And we really hoped that
the River Periyar would flow clear during the lockdown. However, it has become
clear that our expectations were misplaced!”
Explaining the visible and discernible effects of pollution in the river and
aquatic life, Purushan Eloor continues:

Pollution issues have accentuated to dangerously high levels since the lockdown
came into effect on March 22, 2020. The river was seen flowing in black color
for more than 20 times, and at times the river flowed in white color with thick
layers of pollutants floating on the surface. Fish-kills were reported in the river
for about four times. We must understand that a river flowing in black also
implies that the entire river ecosystem is dismantled. Earthworms that live on
riverbeds were spotted dead and floating in a stretch of river starting from
Pathalam bridge to almost 5 km down the stream. The dead fish and
earthworms clearly indicate the toxicity of the chemicals released to the river.

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As the excerpt points out, the visible effects of pollution in the form of
discoloration of river water and fish kills signify the negative environmental
burdens borne by the local ecology and community as part of industrial
development in the region. Despite continued efforts and struggles by local
environmentalists to put an end to the release of untreated industrial effluents
into the river, pollution in the river continues unabated even during the
lockdown. The problem is compounded, given the possibility of the toxic
pollutants entering the drinking water pumping station located in the river.

Purushan Eloor, the frontline leader of the Periyar Anti-pollution Campaign.

Source: Facebook

“There is no alternative to drinking water”: Earth Day protest

On April 22, 2020, Periyar Malineekarana Virudha Samyukatha Samara
Samithi (Periyar Anti-Pollution Joint Protest Committee) staged a protest in the
Eloor-Edayar industrial belt in Kerala to call out the continued pollution of
River Periyar even during the lockdown. A few members1 of the environmental
groups lined up on the Pathalam regulator cum-bridge, built across the river.
Protestors holding placards wore masks and maintained a safe distance from
each other in compliance with social distancing norms prevailing during the
pandemic.
Talking about the rationale for organizing the Earth Day protest, Purushan said,
“Our mission here is to revamp River Periyar. This protest is only the last and
most recent one in a very long history of struggles to save this river.” He

1Apart from Purushan Eloor, the members who participated in the Earth Day protests include
Anwar, Azeez Elamana, Iqbal, Mahesh Kumar, Sakeer Hussain, Shabeer, and Shamsudheen
Edayar.

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continued to detail the conditions that led to the protest and described the event
as follows:

In a context where the river kept flowing in black, on Earth Day, we decided to
organize a protest, more like a symbolic resistance to the ongoing pollution. We
planned to organize this event without violating any lockdown regulations
imposed by the Central and State governments, and by maintaining social
distance…in other words, we planned this as an act of protest that does not
violate the law, and that’s exactly how we managed to stage the protest. Since
there was a curfew, only five of us staged the protest holding placards. All five of
us were immediately arrested. However, later when a local politician came to
take us out on bail, he was informed that there are orders from above requiring
the police to hold us in custody until the Pollution Control Board (PCB
hereafter) officials complete the collection of samples. This evidently shows how
our presence and intervention is perceived as undesirable by local industries
and unions who have access to the higher echelons of power.

The protestors were released by the end of the day only after the sampling
process was completed. However, there have been no institutional initiatives to
curb the release of pollutants into the river even when this essay is being
written. People continued to record and document the river flowing in black in
the succeeding days and share that on Facebook.
As highlighted in the mission of the movement, the protest staged over the river
reaffirmed the centrality of the river in the lives and livelihoods of the people in
the region. This focus on the river was further reflected in the placards and
slogans used during the Earth Day protest. One of the collective action frames
used during the protest said, “There is no alternative to drinking water.” Such
slogans succinctly capture how the local environmentalists establish the severity
of the problem by highlighting the implications of continued pollution on the
availability of clean and safe drinking water. More so, the strong presence of the
river in the protest vocabularies such as “Will we thrive if the river dies? Save
Periyar,” marks the long legacy of the movement organized to save the river
from pollution. Most importantly, the protest and frames used such as this one,
“April 22, Earth Day. Stop the Pollution in Periyar,” expose the irony of
celebrating Earth Day when a river, which is also the primary source of drinking
water, flows in many colors carrying industrial effluents.

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Earth Day Protest against Industrial Pollution in Kerala.

Source: Mohanan M.N

Another important aspect surrounding the most recent protest event has been
the use of technology to spread awareness and garner wider support for the fight
against pollution. The live streaming of the protest via Facebook Live also
enabled people across the world to observe the protest virtually. This helped in
receiving media coverage and public attention on the issue and the act of
defiance. Besides, Facebook has been used as a platform for documenting
evidence in addition to spreading information about the plight of the river. Live
streaming the videos of the river flowing in black and white colors helped in
documenting the release of effluents into the river. Many of such videos
gathered more than 81.8K views and more than 7K shares on Facebook. One
such video posted on Facebook clearly shows a cloud of black effluents slowly
spreading across the river underwater. This helped in countering the usual
denial from the Kerala State Pollution Control Board (PCB hereafter), the local
authority responsible for monitoring and containing pollution.

“Stop the unholy nexus between industries and the PCB”:

Fighting the nexus between industries and PCB
The Earth Day protest also called out how the nexus between industries and the
PCB, a state agency, is preventing the implementation of any sustainable
solutions for curbing the release of untreated effluents into the river. The
problem of industrial pollution in Periyar has a very long history and trajectory
dating back to the 70s. The region housing more than 280 chemical industries
were declared a toxic hotspot in 2003. At least 50 industries have pipes that
release industrial effluents directly into the river.
The story of industrial pollution in the region is compounded by the story of
institutional apathy and negligence by PCB. More so, local environmentalists
allege that the PCB has been facilitating pollution by producing reports that link
river discoloration to factors other than industrial effluents. One of the slogans
used during the protest exposes this compliance as follows, “When Periyar flows

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black, that’s caused by the rotten grass. And when it flows in red, that’s due to
disturbances at the riverbed—le PCB.”
The Earth Day protests and the subsequent intervention from the Kerala High
Court directed the PCB to collect water samples from the river for testing.
According to Adv. Ashkar Khader, who leads the legal fight against pollution,
the scientific reports released by two government agencies came up with two
competing inferences. When the Irrigation report confirmed the presence of
heavy metals and extremely low DO (dissolved oxygen) levels in the stretch of
the river next to the industries, the PCB report only makes cursory reference to
this.
According to Purushan, some of the important demands outlined by the
protestors include:

One of the important demands we proposed was to find the reasons behind the
discoloration of the river. PCB knows the reasons very well, but they continue to
say that they don’t. We all know that water is colorless, odorless, and tasteless.
However, the water in this river flows in many colors, has a pungent smell, and
tastes terrible. This implies that the water in River Periyar is a chemical
compound. The reason for discoloration can be pinned down to the toxic and
untreated effluents released from the industries on the banks of the river. The
continuous release of such chemical effluents would bring down the level of
dissolved oxygen (DO) in the river. It is disappointing that even when we
exposed the sources of such pollution, the negligence from PCB cares to take no
action. This stand taken by PCB stands testimony to the institutional negligence
and apathy displayed by an institution entrusted with the responsibility to
monitor and control pollution. We were fighting against this injustice. And by
saying that, I would like to reiterate that this protest has been just one event in
the long history of struggles against pollution here…. We demand PCB to break
free from corruption and take action to remediate the issue of industrial
pollution in the river.

Other major demands raised by the local community include implementing

mechanisms to prevent the release of industrial effluents into the river and
maintaining a material-balance record for all operating industries. The local
environmentalist illustrates how the current situation is conducive to the
unfettered release of effluents into the river and for that reason the local
environmentalists demand the construction of a dike along the banks of the
river throughout the industrial belt to monitor and control the release of
industrial wastes into the river through underground and hidden pipes. This has
been an important recommendation made by several scientific committees
appointed by the state.
Furthermore, Purushan elaborates on how a community-based pollution
monitoring committee can help break the nexus between private industries and
the PCB as follows:

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We have been demanding a Local Committee modeled after the Local Area
Environmental Committee formed by the Supreme Court of Indian in 2004. We
envision this as a monitoring committee constituted by local stakeholders,
including inland fish workers, local environmentalists as well as PCB. Such a
community built on the principle of social accountability alone can monitor,
regulate, and contain the issue of industrial pollution in this region. This can
put an end to this nexus between private industries and the PCB. In doing all of
this, I am sure the condition of River Periyar would improve if we do this. In
fact, our struggle for the last 25 years or so has been to save this river. To bring
back the old River Periyar, a river in which we all used to bath, we are trying to
revamp the river we all once had.

The excerpt reiterates the centrality of the river in the protest vocabularies and
motives of the local environmental movement. The primary mission of the
movement emerges loud and clear from the excerpts, and it is a commitment to
“Save Periyar.” The clarity of diagnoses and prognoses done by the local
movement is further evidenced by the careful distancing of the movement from
any groups that call for the complete shutdown of all industries in the region.
Frames such as “We are against pollution and not against the industries,” used
by the movement uncovers how the movement recognizes how industries form
an integral part of the livelihoods of the factory workers in the region.

Left and environment in Kerala

The Earth Day protest highlights the unending issue of industrial pollution that
has forced the people in the region to deal with the double pandemic: Covid-19
and toxic industrial effluents. “We could tame Nipah, we are taming Corona, but
we couldn’t yet tame the people who pollute River Periyar? Why would that be?”
said a member of the grassroots environmental group in a Facebook post. The
lingering issue of pollution in the Eloor-Edayar region raises questions about
the Kerala model of industrial development.
Kerala recently garnered international attention for its remarkable initiatives to
contain the spread of the pandemic2. The response spearheaded by Minister
K.K. Shailaja reaffirms the continued relevance of socialized health care and the
provision of necessities to tackle public health crises. Furthermore, the model of
pandemic response emulated by the communist government in Kerala grounded
in the idioms of social solidarity, stand in stark opposition to the crumbling
health system in capitalist countries such as the U.S. However, the protests in
Eloor-Edayar raises pertinent questions about the environmental sustainability
of the development model and how the nexus between state authorities and

2https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/aggressive-testing-contact-tracing-cooked-meals-
how-the-indian-state-of-kerala-flattened-its-coronavirus-curve/2020/04/10/3352e470-783e-
11ea-a311-adb1344719a9_story.html
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/apr/21/kerala-indian-state-flattened-
coronavirus-curve

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industrial capitalists amplify the issues at the ecological front. Further

exemplifying the role of environment in Kerala’s development, Purushan
remarked:

When the Left Democratic Front (LDF) government came to power, they made
a promise to conserve the environment. In fact, environmental conservation
was an important agenda in their election manifesto. Once the government
assumed power, they stated that conserving the water bodies of our state is of
prime importance. So far as the revamping of rivers is concerned, I think, the
government perceives this only in terms of river widening and deepening. It
completely ignores the preservation of river catchment areas. More importantly,
the state has overlooked the issue of river pollution. There has been no
systematic effort to curtail the dumping of wastes and pollutants into the
river…In other words, the promise to preserve the rivers does not translate into
action. It’s been four years ever since the new government took office, and I am
disappointed to say that I won’t even give “pass marks” for its performance at
the environmental front. A state like Kerala that receives international accolades
for its performance on many other fronts is stalling at the environmental front.
And I am forced to assume that this is due to other priorities. We continue to
believe that a state that truly is a model state on so many other fronts would, at
some point, take adequate action to alleviate the issue of pollution.

As narrated in the excerpt above, despite the stride made in social and public
health sectors, the proliferation of grassroots environmental struggles highlights
the environmental issues associated with the development and infrastructure
projects launched in the state. PMVS emerged as a working-class environmental
movement and continues to hold strong affiliations to left politics. Most of the
members are continued members/erstwhile members of the Communist Party
(CPIM). This complicates the dominant narratives pitting progressive politics
against environmentalism. Grounded in principles of equality and social justice,
most environmental struggles in Kerala seek to expose how the environmental
burdens of development are unequally borne by people at the margins.
In sum, the working-class and Marxist ideological orientations of many of these
local environmental struggles (Vayalkili struggle in Kannur, Save Alappad
campaign against mineral sand mining, Kandankali Samaram, etc.) poses
important questions about the interface between left and environmental politics
in the state. By exposing the impasse between environment and development,
the grassroots environmental movements in Kerala uncover the need to perceive
the environment as a class issue that needs to be brought to the center of the
idioms and practices surrounding development. More so, the heightened
vulnerability to climate change disruptions make such questions urgent and
makes it imperative for the states to reimagine development in the post-
pandemic world by making it ecologically just and sustainable.

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21).https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/apr/21/kerala-indian-
state-flattened-coronavirus-curve
Spinney, Laura. 2020. The coronavirus slayer! How Kerala’s Rockstar health
minister helped save it from Covid-19.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/14/the-coronavirus-slayer-
how-keralas-rock-star-health-minister-helped-save-it-from-covid-19
The New India Express. 2017. Kandankali protest pose another challenge to
CPIM (November 22).
https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/kerala/2017/nov/22/kandankali-
protest-poses-another-challenge-to-cpm-1707405.html

About the author

Silpa Satheesh successfully defended her dissertation exploring the conflicts
between labor and environmental movements in Kerala from the Department of
Sociology at University of South Florida. Her research focuses on issues
surrounding environment, development and social movements in Kerala, India.
She can be contacted at silpas AT usf.edu

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Corona can’t save the planet, but we can,

if we learn from ordinary people
Ashish Kothari (16 April 2020)

It is fascinating that the only people who know nothing of the COVID-19
pandemic are also those completely unaffected by it: uncontacted or isolated
forest peoples in the Amazon and Papua New Guinea, a couple of adivasi
communities in the Nicobar Islands, perhaps some groups in the Arctic circle.
How I wish I was amongst them, as much to escape the virus as to be mercifully
far from the incessant chatter about it!
But then there are so many silver linings to this astonishing knockout punch
humanity has been delivered, that I’m going to add to the chatter. Note that I
say ‘silver lining’, for at the centre of this is a massive humanitarian crisis, not
only of the suffering of the sick and the loved ones of those who are dying, but
also of the working classes who cannot switch to ‘online’ work, whose daily wage
labour is imperiled, whose vegetables and fruits are not selling, whose
industries are shut and who unlike their capitalist or government bosses do not
have wealth to fall back on. One cannot talk positively about a crisis in which
100,000 people have already died, and, according to the International Labour
Office, 195 million people may lose their jobs 1.
The corona pandemic has grabbed global attention like no previous disease,
generating historically unprecedented actions by nations, partly because it has
hit the rich and brought the global economy to its knees. But we must not forget
that like always, the ‘poor’ are paying a higher price. This is true of other
ongoing global crises, including of climate, biodiversity loss, and conflict.
Everything else I write, in this article, has to be tempered by this very sobering
reality.
We have been handed an incredible opportunity to right many historic wrongs.
One is with regard to how we have treated our earthly home. And the other is
regarding how our economies and polities have marginalized vast sections of
humanity, the ones disproportionately suffering the consequences of multiple
global crises - and these factors are connected.

What is the crisis telling us?

Images of how clean the air of cities like Beijing and New Delhi has been since
the virus took over and halted vehicular traffic, industries and other sources of
pollution, have been flashed worldwide2 must have significantly reduced carbon

1 https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/04/1061322
2https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/apr/11/positively-alpine-disbelief-air-
pollution-falls-lockdown-coronavirus; https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-
51944780). The cessation of much of the world’s air traffic

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emissions. Likewise many populations of fish and other aquatic life, and of
terrestrial wildlife, must be breathing a bit easier as industrial scale fishing and
hunting, and pollution, would have significant declined.
In The Swarm by Frank Schätzing (2004)3, deep sea micro-organisms form a
collective intelligence, and wreak mass scale revenge on a rampaging humanity
for its complete disregard of planetary ecological limits. I am not superstitious,
but who knows if viruses are not doing precisely the same thing? Why should we
think only human beings have agency, and the rest of nature is only a mute
bystander?
But even if the message of the viruses is not consciously generated, we should be
heeding it. Industrial forms of natural resource use (including hunting for the
global market rather than only for local subsistence use and markets, and
monocultural commercial agriculture) have disrupted natural systems
irreversibly, with fatal consequences for millions of species and for ourselves4 .
Amongst many consequences, we are frequently unleashing micro-organisms
that were not earlier affecting human beings but now are latching on to us as
new hosts. And this is only one kind of impact; others include the rapid and
widespread collapse of ecosystems that sustain the livelihoods of or provide
security to billions of people … and eventually of the planet’s ability to sustain
life as we know it.
All this is a consequence of the triple forces of capitalism, statism (domination
of the state in our lives), and patriarchy running amok. It is not only with the
earth, but vast sections of humanity that are suffering. The growing chasm
between the have-lots and the have-nots has grown so much that even those
benefiting from it are worried, if nothing else because of the backlash they fear.
The lack of accessible healthcare for millions in so-called ‘developed’ countries
like USA, where the pharmaceutical and medical industry has been profiting
shamelessly, has also been horribly exposed. The central role of the fossil fuel
and military-industrial complex in the earth’s destruction and the exacerbation
of inequalities, is clearer than ever before.

What is the opportunity?

With the whole world listening, we have possibly history’s biggest chance of
changing course. We can refashion the economy and polity, local to global, to be
respectful and sensitive to ecological limits, and to work for all of humanity. But

https://www.economist.com/business/2020/03/15/coronavirus-is-grounding-the-worlds-
airlines
3 Schätzing, F. 2004. The Swarm. NY: Regan Books.
4https://theecologist.org/2020/feb/04/eating-animals-will-be-death-us;
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/mar/18/tip-of-the-iceberg-is-our-
destruction-of-nature-responsible-for-covid-19-aoe?CMP=Share_AndroidApp_Gmail;
https://climateandcapitalism.com/2020/03/11/capitalist-agriculture-and-covid-19-a-deadly-
combination/

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this requires not simply some cosmetic managerial fixes of the kind that
governments hastily applied after the 2008 economic collapse. Such fixes (such
as bank bailouts) in fact made things worse by privileging the elite; even now,
bailouts of the airline industry are being considered, rather than using such
resources for rebuilding the livelihoods of the poor5. Nor is the solution the kind
of technological fixes that those destroying the earth’s climate and biodiversity
are promoting, such as giant screens (‘geoengineering’) that will supposedly
reduce global warming.
We need transformations that are systemic, replacing the currently dominant
structures of injustice and unsustainability with more equal political, economic,
and social relations. We need a dramatic transformation towards genuine
democracy, a swaraj (‘self-rule’ in Sanskrit) that encompasses not only all
humans, but the planet as a whole, based on an ethics of life.

What course changes are required?

What does this mean? It means reversing economic globalization, a process that
was supposed to bring prosperity to all peoples but has actually brought
enormous distress, growing inequality and ecological devastation. This process
has entailed the integration of production, consumption and trade into complex
global structures and relations in such a way that no community or country is
able to strive for self-reliance, or to protect livelihoods and environment from
damage by multinational corporations and unfair trade. A system whose fragile
economic interdependencies have been rudely exposed by the virus crisis; for
instance, when the components of a single consumer product are made in a
dozen countries, mostly by informal labour with little economic or legal
security, the collapse of even one of these links in the chain can cause a domino
effect across the entire production chain. This is one main reason why this crisis
may result in the loss of millions of jobs.
It is also a system that has also meant the domination of one way of being and
knowing (‘western’) over all others. Entire libraries of knowledge, embedded in
thousands of languages and worldviews and ways of knowing around the world,
have been wiped out or are in the process of being erased due to epistemological
colonization.
To be clear, in pointing to globalization as one major factor in the current crisis,
I am not talking of global social relations that help exchange ideas, principles,
cultures, and knowledges on an equal plane, which has been a valuable
component of human existence for millennia.
But what will economic globalization be replaced with? Open localization, a
process of striving for self-reliance in meeting basic needs (food, water, shelter,
learning, health, governance, dignity, livelihoods) from within a certain human-

5https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/apr/14/us-government-coronavirus-bailout-
airlines-industry; https://stay-grounded.org/savepeoplenotplanes/

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scale local region. In such a system, each of us in our local communities has a
level of control over decision-making, and localized feedback loops mean that
we can’t easily overlook ecological and social damage, unlike in a globalized
economy in which the damage of my over-consumption is borne by someone a
thousand kilometres away. Most important, such a system will significantly
reduce (not eliminate) the necessity of global movement of products and people,
with much less chances of pathogens spreading quickly across the world. It will
also reduce, in many cases even reverse, the mass migration of people from
rural areas into cities, which has resulted in densely packed populations where
disease can spread so easily. The need to reduce global trade and travel, and
densities of human habitation, must surely be amongst the biggest lessons from
the corona virus disaster.

Communities show the way

Thousands of initiatives at food, energy, water, and other forms of community
sovereignty across the world show that localized but interconnected solutions
can work (such as India6 , and from other parts of the world7). And many of
them are showing how resilient they can be during a global pandemic.
In India, several thousand Dalit women farmers (severely marginalized in
India’s patriarchal, casteist society, and facing hunger and malnutrition, three
decades back), organised themselves as sanghas (associations) of the Deccan
Development Society in a few dozen villages of Telangana state8 . Using their
own traditional seeds, organic methods, local knowledge, and cooperation, they
have achieved food sovereignty, completely eradicating hunger and
malnutrition. They are currently donating about 20,000 kilograms of
foodgrains for COVID-19 related relief work, and feeding thousand bowls of of
millet porridge every day to municipality and health workers and police
personnel who have to be on duty despite India’s ongoing lockdown.
In the Ecuadorian Amazon, the Sapara nation have fought hard to gain
collective territorial rights over their rainforest home. They are now defending it
against oil and mining interests, and trying to demonstrate a localized economic
well-being model that blends their traditional cosmo-vision and new activities
like community-led ecotourism9. In COVID times, their income from the latter
would have dropped, but their forests and community spirit give them all the
food, water, energy, housing, medicines, enjoyment, health, and learning that
they need. Across vast areas of Abya Yala and Turtle Island (native indigenous

6 www.vikalpsangam.org
7 www.radicalecologicaldemocracy.org
https://www.localfutures.org
https://solutions.thischangeseverything.org
8 http://www.ddsindia.com/
9 https://theecologist.org/2019/sep/17/resistance-and-rebuilding-amazon

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names for the Americas), Australia, and South-east Asia, indigenous peoples
have fought for and in many cases obtained collective title for self-
determination.
In central India, adivasi (indigenous) people over 90 villages have formed a
Mahagramsabha (federation of village assemblies) to move towards self-rule,
resist mining, conserve and sustainably use forests by getting community rights
recognized, and empower women and youth in decision-making10. Some of their
members who had migrated out to work have returned during the COVID
lockdown, and have no income; the village assemblies are using funds collected
by sustainable harvest and sale of forest produce, to help them tide over the
crisis period.
Across the world, ‘territories of life’ conserved by indigenous peoples and other
local communities have proven to harbor some of the most important areas of
biodiversity and ecosystem functions, providing millions of people with basic
needs and with critical back-up sources of food, water, energy, during times of
disasters and crisis (https://www.iccaconsortium.org). On a recent webinar
organised by the ICCA Consortium, a global network of over 100 indigenous,
community, and civil society organisations, Giovanni Reyes of the Kankanaey
tribe of northern Philippines described how indigenous peoples there have
traditional systems of grain storages specifically for disease outbreaks and other
such disasters.
Also globally, the movement for the commons is reclaiming privatised or state-
owned spaces for the public good, such as parking lots and disused
governmental lands into collectively governed urban agricultural plots, unused
private buildings into housing for the poor and for refugees, and so on11. As
David Bollier, who with Silke Helfrich has compiled several books of
commoning examples and the principles that underlie them, notes:
“Throughout history commoning has always been an essential survival strategy,
and so it is in this crisis. When the state, market, or monarchy fail to provide for
basic needs, commoners themselves usually step up to devise their own mutual-
aid systems12.”
Most such examples have had to struggle against adverse macro-economic and
political contexts, so imagine how much more they could spread if there were
positive policy environments. For instance in India, if the billions of rupees of
subsidy for chemical fertilisers was to be given to small farmers to generate
organic inputs, there would be a rapid transition to ecologically sustainable
farming. But they have also had to confront entrenched socio-cultural inequities
and discrimination, especially related to gender, ethnicity, caste, ability and age.

10http://www.vikalpsangam.org/article/transformative-alternatives-at-
korchi/#.XpdWty2B2V4
11 https://commonstransition.org
12 https://www.freefairandalive.org/commoning-as-a-pandemic-survival-strategy/

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Towards Eco-swaraj: a radical ecological democracy

Crucially, such a transformation would mean a shift back to the real economy,
focused on actual products and services, and not the crazy roller-coaster virtual
economy of shares and bonds and derivatives on which a tiny minority of people
have become immensely rich. It will bring back the importance of biocultural
regions, defined by close, tangible social and ecological relationships. It will
emphasize once again that instead of the privatization of nature and natural
resources (including land, water, forests, and even knowledge and ideas), we
need to place these in the public domain, with democratic custodianship. It will
also have to press for a significant reduction in overall material and energy use,
and especially that of the world’s elite, as argued convincingly by Europe’s
degrowth movement13 .
It is important that all this is accompanied by radical democracy, i.e. where
people take political control in collectives where they are (rather than putting all
their faith in elected parties); and by the struggles for social justice and equity
(on gender, caste, ethnicity and other fronts). This means also that the
xenophobic ‘shut the borders’ call of racist and religiously bigoted right-wing
elements is not what I am supporting. Civil society initiatives in Greece and
many other European countries have shown the possibility of open localization,
in which attempts at self-determination and self-reliance are combined with the
welcoming of refugees from war-torn areas14. And it works both ways, as
migrants show how they can give back; as part of the Barikama cooperative,
African migrants who were once exploited as labour in Italy’s plantations, are
working extra hard to produce and deliver food to the country’s locked down
population15.
In the long run, of course, conflict zones from where people have to flee, need to
themselves become areas of peaceful localization, as for instance has been
attempted in the incredibly brave autonomy movement of Kurdish people
(especially its women) in Syria-Iran-Iraq-Turkey border area. Both this and the
Zapatista autonomy movement in Mexico show how communities can address
multiple issues through local radical democracy, informed by principles of
ecofeminism. The worker-led ‘one million climate jobs’ campaign in South
Africa16, and the Green New Deal of Bernie Sanders in USA17 and the Labour

13 https://www.degrowth.info/en/2020/03/a-degrowth-perspective-on-the-coronavirus-crisis/
14https://www.radicalecologicaldemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Alternatives-in-
a-world-of-crisis-2019-2nd-ed1.pdf
15https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/01/a-beautiful-thing-the-african-migrants-
getting-healthy-food-to-italians
16 http://aidc.org.za/programmes/million-climate-jobs-campaign/about/
17 https://berniesanders.com/issues/green-new-deal/

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Party in UK18 , despite some serious flaws19 , demonstrate in earthy details how
society can move towards justice and ecological sustainability.
The transformation also needs to encompass a spiritual or ethical reconnection
with the earth, and each other. Indigenous peoples have long warned of the
consequences of our alienation from the rest of nature, the penchant of
modernity to think of human beings as outside of nature, somehow not bound
by the limits and norms of the planet around us. In their movements they have
brought back a diversity of ways of being and knowing … buen vivir, ubuntu,
sumac kawsay, kyosei, country, minobimaatasiiwin, swaraj, and many others …
that speak of living with the earth and each other in harmony20. ‘Ordinary’
people have shown extraordinary innovation in forging eminently practical
socially and ecologically sensitive solutions to everyday needs, across the world.
Now its up to the rest of us to heed the warnings, resist injustice, undermine the
systems of oppression, and learn from the pluriverse of alternatives already
available.
Am I hopeful we will take this opportunity? We did not when the 2008 financial
collapse shone a blazing torch on the ills of economic globalization and the
capitalist-statist-patriarchal forces underlying it. But this crisis is much bigger,
it is different, it is showing much more vividly the dangers of economic
hyperconnectivity even as it highlights the crucial ecological connections our
lives are dependent on. It is bringing out humanitarian and community spirit in
wonderfully diverse ways, including singing along with neighbours, distributing
leaflets offering help to the elderly, volunteering for health care, learning to live
slower, less consumerist lifestyles. It is pushing or encouraging young people to
go back to their communities, learn from their elders how to live off the land,
such as amongst indigenous peoples of Turtle Island, Canada21. It is showing
how communities that have regained governance over the natural ecosystems
around them (such as some in India using the Forest Rights Act), have built up
economic reserves that can be used to support members who no longer have a
job because of the COVID-related economic collapse.
Movements of the youth and women and indigenous people and other
marginalized populations, already vocal for many years on many issues, must
use these opportunities to push for radical transformation, personal to global.
There lies the hope.

18 https://www.labourgnd.uk/gnd-explained
19 https://wsimag.com/economy-and-politics/61905-the-green-new-deal
20 https://www.radicalecologicaldemocracy.org/pluriverse/
21https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/indigenous-canada-turn-land-survive-
coronavirus-200401073446077.html

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About the author

Ashish is with Kalpavriksh, Vikalp Sangam, and Global Tapestry of Alternatives.
A shorter and earlier version of this article was published in The Wire,
31.3.2020: https://thewire.in/environment/we-will-survive-the-coronavirus-
we-need-to-make-sure-we-survive-ourselves

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Self-governance food system before and during

the Covid-crisis on the example of
CampiAperti, Bologna, Italy
Dagmar Diesner (28th April 2020)

At the end of the 1990's agro-industries together with the European

Commission cut through meta and mesa spacial and ecological geographies
dislocating farming activities from the regional level, and tied producers and
farmers to the 'open' competitive market. The abolition of the stable price-
mechanism for European farmers and producers in conjunction with the
diversion of caring for nature in production, had exposed producers and farmers
to a fall in their wages, and land, water, animals were subject to sheer
expropriation for the relentless linear production and distribution systems of
agro-industries. Emilia-Romagna is a province in Northern Italy and is the
second highest agricultural producer in Italy with its vast agricultural outputs of
cheese, wine, vinegar, ham, fruits and pasta, of which its products is only 5%
certified as organic, whilst 75 percent of intensive farming in the plain area and
of animal husbandry employ high and medium agricultural intensive methods
causing so-called environmental externalities, such as high concentration of
nitrates and phosphorus in freshwater and groundwater and soil erosion. This
skewed situation led to the formation of CampiAperti, an Association, composed
of about 80 producers and farmers in the region of Emilia-Romagna, Italy, who
decided to take the economy, production and nature back through self-
governing the markets and their production.
The producers and farmers of CampiAperti decided on exerting complete
autonomy over their production and the distribution systems, which would
allow them to employ farming practices that can be aligned to sustainable
agroecological methods and thus avoiding complying with the regulations for
producing goods to the capital- and state-controlled markets. By doing so, they
have challenged the regulatory body of the state, which administered the
organic certification procedures, on its strong alliances with agribusiness. In
Italy, sanitary regulations were composed toward the agro-industries and their
production of scales undermining small- and medium-scale farmers and
producers in the process, and as a result of this legislation over a third of them
had closed down in the early 2000s.
On the merit of commoning, CampiAperti had issued their own certification
label for striving toward food sovereignty, and by doing so implementing a de-
centralised agricultural system whose production systems is experimenting with
and practising agroecological farming methods. Their pursuit is the
multiplication of small and medium-scaled farms with each of them producing
products from the seed to the farm gate. Material and immaterial inputs for the
production of particular foodstuff is coming from close-by circuits or are
produced on the farm building up their resource stock over time. Because labour
takes place outside of the capital circuits, the valorisation of labour is radically

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different than to the commodity cycle. In this context, CampiAperti's foodstuff

produced on virtuous farms are certified with their label called Genuino
Clandestino, genuine, referring to the production of food products in an artisan
or virtuous fashion, and Clandestino, mirroring the hostile socio-politico
environment.

The participatory-guarantee-system
The PGS is defined by the International Federation of Agricultural Movements
(IFOAM: 2020) like this: “Participatory-Guarantee System (PGS) are locally
focused quality assurance systems. They certify producers based on active
participation of stakeholders and are built on a foundation of trust, social
networks and knowledge exchange.” The self-governed mechanisms main aims
include: the removal of local trade barriers, to safeguard specific crafts in
farming, to protect local biodiversity and diversity of foodstuff and ensure
animal welfare standard. CampiAperti uses this system in a modified form
adapted to their socio-political and ecological circumstances, and included
further no worker's exploitation, ensure quality organic local and affordable
foodstuff to the local community and to instigate a decentralisation of food
production. Over the years their self-certification process had become complex
because of the growing number of farmers, and also, farmers are scattered into
all four cardinal directions with a distance of about 80km from Bologna. The
self-organized participatory guarantee system by CampiAperti as it is in its
current form:

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No General
Assembly
Candidate Coordinator
contacts makes initial
Yes
questioning
CampiAperti
Organise
farm visit

Yes

In-depth
Farm visit
Discussion

No

Yes
Feedback to
the general
2nd undecided assembly
Feedback farm
to General visit
Assembly

No

The coordinator of Campi Aperti gets in contact with the new potential farmer
and asks a set of standard questions on ecological values and farm structure,
and also on their committment to participate in the self-governance structure of
CA. If, at that point, the candidate does not match with the basic principles with
CampiAperti, the ‘inspection’ process closes. If, on the other hand, the
coordinator decides that the new potential farmer fits into the CA structure,
then the coordinator puts forward a request for a visit to the next general
assembly. At the general assembly the farm visit is coordinated, usually one
person has to share the same craft with the candidate in order to interrogate in
detail the how and with what the product is produced and who else is involved
in making this product. In case there are third parties involved in making the
product, for example an external pasta-making site or a close-by farmer
produces barley for the animals, then also these sites are scrutinized for its

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sustainable and organic standard.

The other accompanying persons support the interview process with general
questions on sustainable productions and on the arising responsibilities and
long-term commitment to self-governance organization when taking part at
Campi Aperti. The impression and gathered information of the farm visit is
reported back at the next general assembly, to which the whole group responds
by discussing the sustainable aspect in production in great detail. If a decision
was not made, another farm visit is coordinated. At the next assembly another
discussion is held with the additional information, before the general assembly
finally decides.
The main advantage of this mechanism is its flexibility in the application
procedure. By doing so, it is underlining the diversification of agroecological
methods and techniques of each specific craft. The merit for qualifying with the
PGS is to develop virtuous labour skills and abilities, for example in making
cheese, or brewing beer, producing wine or vegetables, etc. in such a way that
integrates the intrinsic nature-human-animal relationship. It is in this light that
the principles of agroecological methods and practice extends the organic
labelling system of the EU's regulatory body, such as caring for soil fertility (no
use of petrochemicals), regenerating resource material, respecting the rhythm of
the animal's natural production cycle of milk and gestation period, the effective
use of natural resources (water collection system; grey water systems), and
lastly, producing an output within the limits of one’s own manual labour
capacity.
For the actualisation of virtuous farm, which is the autonomous production of
the seed to the product, farmers and producers have to go through a long
struggle with the varied local regulatory bodies, which involves in challenging
the structural guidelines for workshops on a smaller scale, for example, a toilet
can be reached via a staircase from the laboratory rather than it has to directly
be attached to the workshop, or the ceiling can be 2,80m high instead of 3m.
During the phase of setting up the farm individual farmers are consistently
engaging with the authorities, forming a somewhat relationship with individual
bureaucrat. As a result of it, laws and regulations can be interpreted to local
circumstances. The bearing of the authorities is in those moments an individual
struggle, however, since everybody at CampiAperti has to deal with the
authorities, this experience is a shared one. Because of this collective
experience, farmers support each other and show solidarity amongst each other.
For changing the dire structural conditions for small- and medium farmers in
Emilia-Romagna, only recently, after years of engaging with the local and
regional authorities, amendments for local small- and medium-scale farmers
were made by the region. Finally, new regulations were introduced that are apt
for small- and medium-scale farmers and producers. Despite of this thrust from
the authorities recognising self-governance institutions, CampiAperti remains
persistently alert to the political and socio-economic situation.

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The self-governance markets

The PGS-system distinguishes from other foodstuff on farmer's markets in
Bologna in so far that only self-certified products can be sold on the markets of
CampiAperti. Farmer's markets in Bologna purchase 100 percent of their
foodstuff from wholesale markets, and thus bypassing the regional legislation,
which says, that at least half of the foodstuff sold on farmer’s markets should
come from the producer's production. Because of this shortcoming,
CampiAperti only sells foodstuff that went through their self-certification
process recognised on their label. They had coalesced with the social centre
movement and neighbourhoods Associations in Bologna and together with them
or through them were able to set up their own self-governance markets. For
each market CampiAperti uses their Association status for applying for a market
licence from the Council of Bologna. With the licence they offer a market stall
for all producers even for those producers that are not officially registered as
producers with the state yet. These markets are vital for the producers as many
of them are at the beginning or in the middle of setting up their farms. It gives
them from early on an opportunity to earn an income, create a body of clients,
and lends them an empowerment to develop their skills and abilities through
the constant communication exchange on the market. I must emphasise here
that CampiAperti does not have the authority to regularise new or irregular
producers, but what is capable of doing is offering an economic opportunity
through their Association.
The most important feature of theirs markets is the annual convergence for
establishing a common price list for their products. By doing commoning, they
reach out to clients, and thus make them part of the food system. Each year
farmers and producers of each of their craft come together and decide on the
price of the product. The collaborative price-mechanism subverts the price
volatility of the market by fixing a price for their products together. As one
farmer puts it: “It would make no sense to offer the same products for different
prices. Otherwise the consumer goes to the stall with the lowest price and the
other farmers do not sell anything. And if we set-up the price too high
consumers would not come and buy our stuff”.
Each market is self-organised by the producers who attend the markets. This
means when a producer attends three markets, the producers participates in
three monthly market assemblies where details of the management of the
markets and distribution of responsibilities are discussed. Each market liaises
directly with the Council, and in case problems with the Council exceeds the
market boundaries and affects all members of CampiAperti, then the issue is put
forward for discussion at the bi-monthly general assembly of CampiAperti.
One of the constant issues with the Council is the threat of closures of their
currently eight markets, and any methods and tactics is used by the Bologna
Council to chase them away. Only recently, another social centre was closed
down after more than twenty years in existence. The producers and farmers are
resilient and continuing to set up their stalls anywhere, where they think they
can create a market. The involvement of city consumers is crucial, who have the

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mobility to quickly turn up and support them during negotiations with the
Council, battling for new market spaces and licenses, or just lend them support
in many other ways.

The Covid-crisis, struggle, and strategies

Now during the Covid-crisis, the Council of Bologna had closed down all
markets immediately even though supermarkets and food shops should remain
open. With the Covid-crisis, supermarkets had increased their market share by
thirty percent. Paradoxically, Rumanian migrant workers were flown into Italy
to work in the fields, though are not subject to receive any health checks from
their governments and neither from the Italian government. The lockdown in
Emilia-Romagna, which had the second highest Covid-rate after Lombardy, was
controlled heavily by the police with every ten kilometres a control, tele cameras
taking photos from licence-plates, helicopters in the air controlling public
spaces and roads from above. This trajectory had given hardly any space for
building up a solidarity structure with the producers of CampiAperti. For
example, the set-up of a vegetable box scheme is only feasible within the
extreme restricted mobility limitations ringfencing the numbers of consumers to
a very limited area. Though CampiAperti had opened up their farms for
consumers to buy directly from them, but CampiAperti is not located in one
place and thus the challenge for CampiAperti was to somehow surpass these
restrictions in order to remain together.
The producers geared toward a direct confrontation with the Council of
Bologna. They organised a virtual protest with the slogan “Defend solidarity,
and not the virus!” asking people to join from balconies, corridors, gardens,
wherever people are, and share the individual protest on a collective platform.
This protest was part of the petition they have launched successfully to re-open
the markets, of which only three were given the permission to open within two
weeks after the petition but under social distancing conditions. CampiAperti
was not able to sell directly to any customers, but only to members of the
Association, which in turn increased the pressure to build-up their membership
quickly. This was also coupled with only permitting customers onto the market,
who have pre-booked their food items online. In a very short time, CampiAperti
had moved from the direct market to putting their products online. The market
was turned into a collection point for picking up the vegetables only in order to
handle the social distancing between people. They have received an enormous
amount of solidarity with membership rising by the day.
At the time of writing there is still a lot of uncertainty around for whom the
lockdown is going to be lifted on 4th May, and on what conditions will be
increased mobility permitted. However, one thing is certain, the producers of
CampiAperti are resilient to the market conditions, because of their autonomy.
As the founder of CampiAperti said on autonomy: “We will never give-up our
autonomy”.

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Conclusion
The acceleration of the local food economy through the commoning institutional
framework of CampiAperti had found roots in all regions throughout Italy,
which ultimately, had evolved to becoming the Genuino Clandestino movement.
The Associations or networks of the social movement adapted to the horizontal
self-governance system of CampiAperti in a modified version that is to the
socio-economic and political conditions within their trajectory. Though the
Covid-crisis is for producers, such as at CampiAperti, just another crisis within
the food system to deal with, the Covid-crisis highlights many shortcomings
within the agri-industrial system that might have an effect in the long-run in
terms of guaranteeing our food security. It is these autonomous networks like
CampiAperti, who need our solidarity through purchasing their products not
only during the crisis but also thereafter. For CampiAperti it had always been
clear that only together with the consumer they can work and walk together
toward a de-centralised and real economic and ecological sustainable food
system.

Bibliography
De Angelis, M. 2017. Omnia Sunt Communia. On the Commons and
Transformation to Postcapitalism. London: Zed Books.
De Molina, G. 2013. “Agroecology and politics: How to get sustainability? About
the necessity for a political agroecology”. Journal of Agroecology and
Sustainable Food Systems 37(1): 45-59.
European Commission (2015) Factsheet on 2014-2020 Rural development
Programme for Emilia-Romagna, [Online], Available:
https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/rural-development-
2014-2020/countryfiles/it/factsheet-emilia-romagna_en.pdf [20.05.2019]
International Organisation for Organic Agriculture (IFOAM) (2015)
Participatory Guarantee Systems (PGS), [Online], Available:
https://www.ifoam.bio/en/organic-policy-guarantee/participatory-guarantee-
systems-pgs [Accessed at 05.01.2020].
Migliorini, P. and Wezel, A. 2027. “Converging and diverging principles and
practices of organic agriculture regulations and agroecology. A review”. Journal
of Agronomy for Sustainable Development 37: 63.
Potter, C. and Tilzey, M. 2007. “Agricultural multifunctionality, environmental
sustainability and the WTO: Resistance or accommodation to the neoliberal
project of agriculture?”. Geoforum 38(6): 1290-1303.
Regione Emilia-Romagna (2017) The agrifood system of Emilia-Romagna
[Online], Available:
http://agricoltura.regione.emilia-romagna.it/entra-in-
regione/pubblicazioni/the-agrifoodsystem-of-emilia-romagna-region/view

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[Accessed at 15..03.2020].
Rogozanu, C. and Gabor, D. 2020. Are western Europe’s food supplied worth
more than east European workers’ health?. The Guardian
https://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2020/apr/16/western-
europe-food-east-european-workers-coronavirus#maincontent [Accessed at
16.04.2020]

About the author:

Dagmar is currently a Phd-Candidate at the Centre for Agroecology, Water and
Resilience at Coventry University, UK writing her thesis on "Transformation
to Food Sovereignty: Opportunities, barriers and resilience strategies from the
commoning perspective on the case study of CampiAperti, Bologna,
Italy". Previously, she had co-founded an ecological-cultural Association in the
Apennines in Emilia-Romagna where with others had set up a community
permaculture garden, organised events around local herbal medicine, climate
change and local agriculture, as well as intercultural events convening African
migrants with the local community.

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Volume 12 (1): 274 – 279 (July 2020) URGENCI, CSA in the time of Covid-19

Community Supported Agriculture is a safe and

resilient alternative to industrial agriculture in the
time of Covid-19
International Network URGENCI (7th April 2020)

The international campaign we are all engaged in to reduce our tragic losses to
the Covid-19 crisis is just a rehearsal for the big campaign that lies ahead – to
preserve and build sustainable local and territorial food systems that connect
producers and consumers and provide healthy, nutritious food for all. We are
learning a lot about the weaknesses and gaps in the global food distribution
system. Communities are discovering that they cannot rely only on food that
requires transportation across borders or even from distant regions within a
single country. Nor can producers on large-scale industrial farms rely on
migrant labour as they have done in the past. In some countries food is
beginning to rot in the fields. Many local markets have been shut down.
Supplies of critical items in supermarkets disappear quickly through panic
buying and profiteering. In countries like India, where farmers are on lock down
along with everyone else, middlemen are taking advantage of the crisis to buy at
cut-price rates from the farmers and sell at high prices to those who can afford
to pay.
Community Supported Agriculture (CSA)1, however, is quick to
respond and is successfully facing the crisis. Isa Álvarez, a food activist
from Spain, and the Vice-President of URGENCI, the International network for
Community Supported Agriculture, describes the situation in the Spanish
Basque country “The government recommendation has been to close the open
air markets but the CSA networks are working more than ever. The only
problem is that because of the restrictions to mobility, only the farmers are
allowed to do the deliveries and they have to do it house by house.”

1Community Supported Agriculture has been defined by the European CSA Declaration adopted
in Ostrava, in 2016, as “a direct partnership based on the human relationship between people
and one or several producer(s), whereby the risks, responsibilities and rewards of farming are
shared, through a long-term, binding agreement”. (http://urgenci.net/the-european-csa-
declaration-adopted-in-ostrava/ )

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We are on the brink of a global food crisis, not because of lack of available food,
but rather because it cannot be harvested or transported to consumers through
the industrial long chain food system. The future genuinely lies in building
stronger short food supply chains that allow local food sovereignty
and traceability. As Bregje Hamelynck, a CSA vegetable grower from the
Netherlands says,“The nearer the source, the stronger the relation between
farmer and citizen, the more secure the food supply.”
We are also seeing a rapid rise in food prices making it difficult for vulnerable
families to afford essential food items. And unlike 2008, when the food crisis
was due to a lack of food, there is no such lack. Just a total breakdown in the
supply and demand industrial system.
By contrast, local CSA farmers are adapting quickly to provide food to their
communities in safe ways. As Ruby van der Wekken, from the Finnish CSA
network, quoted “CSAs are not only the safest way to get food during this time,
they are also part of the solution to have a healthier future.”
Farms can and do sell direct to the public. Open air CSA distributions of pre-
ordered and pre-paid produce from farms are one of the safest ways of
providing food, safer than indoor supermarkets! There are also many new,
creative local platforms springing up to connect producers and eaters at local
level. “In China, at the peak of the Covid crisis in January, demand
increased by 300%” said Shi Yan, the pioneer of CSA in China and the co-
President of URGENCI. “Our producers came under extreme pressure to meet

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the demand.”

Many new vegetable boxes are extensions of existing ethical platforms such as
CSAs and local food co-ops, others are more opportunistic, as up to double the
cost of CSA shares. Such high prices clearly exclude access for low-income
groups. This violates one of the core values of Community Supported
Agriculture, solidarity economy, and thus affordability that still ensures
producers a decent livelihood.
In the current pandemic, Community Supported Agriculture weekly
share distribution has been widely maintained, thanks to the safe
nature of how it is done, and the hugely responsive reaction of both
producers and consumers in ensuring that it is done in accordance
with new, highly rigorous health and safety regulations. CSA shares
are prepared upfront. This drastically reduces human contact with the food and
between people. CSA is planned in advance. There is no need to gather, queue or
stand in line at a check-out like in a supermarket. Each group can organize
things so that the pick-up is staggered and there are never more than a small
handful of people present at any one time. There are no cash transactions:
everything is ordered and paid for in advance and paid for on-line or by cheque.
As cash (both notes and coins) are a vector for virus transmission, this is an
important aspect. Distribution is short and immediate. This reduces

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interactions and potential contamination. Correct social distancing is always

observed. All necessary sanitary recommendations – washing hands frequently,
wearing masks and gloves when touching food, and staying home when feeling
at all sick are systematically observed. And finally where needed to protect the
vulnerable, food can be delivered to your door. Just check with your local CSA to
see. There are also many new initiatives to set up additional CSAs to provide
greater supplies.
In many cases, the national and regional CSA networks, gathered in the
international network URGENCI, have worked closely with their local
authorities. According to Gaelle Bigler, president of a Swiss CSA network, the
“CSA members have had to change their practices, from changing their
delivery system to managing volunteers. It is super complicated but at the
same time very exciting, because everybody seems to realize that we play a big
part in providing healthy food to the city population. With the closed borders,
huge vegetable growers have had employment problems as they usually hire
temporary, foreign, low cost workers and we, as CSA groups, don't. As the
network coordinator, I have been contacted by several public servants trying
to list all the short supply chains possible, and they all knew us and thanked us
for our work!”
A critical and as yet overlooked aspect of the current pandemic is that of social
and mental well-being. In times of generalized lock-down, people are becoming
more isolated and there will certainly be many knock-on effects linked to the
social and economic crises that will result from this pandemic. According to
Fatima Zohra Hocimi in Algeria “CSA allows people to connect with each other,
to break social boundaries and serve a cause that lies beyond themselves. CSA
with multidimensional health building is the future of communities’ well-
being”.

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Many of the CSA networks around the world are putting together resources to
support their members, such as in the UK
(https://communitysupportedagriculture.org.uk/covid-19/) and in France
(http://miramap.org/-COVID19-et-AMAP-toutes-les-infromations-.html).
These are precious resources to ensure that local supply chains remain open.
At this frightening moment when we need solidarity and compassion so badly,
but must remain separated, Community Supported Agriculture has a critical
role to play in feeding local communities safely. And as we face the even greater
crisis of climate change, family-scale farms using agroecological practices
provide the surest solution to world hunger and malnutrition and to harnessing
the power of photosynthesis to reduce the carbon in the atmosphere by building
healthier, more productive soils to feed us all.
We must continue to take the long view of the crisis. What will happen once the
pandemic comes under control? How will it affect the industrial supply chain
and alternative food systems? Will this be the moment when public awareness
reaches a new level and allows peasant agriculture and family farming to
become the mainstay of our food systems? And will the current gains in
reductions of greenhouse gas be converted into a lasting victory in the battle to
overcome climate change? We all know that the relocalisation of our sustainable
food systems and many other forms of production can play a key role in
ensuring that solidarity economy and food sovereignty, two of the key levers in

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this essential struggle for the collective survival of humanity, become recognized
and normalized around the world.
CSAs in many countries are also reaching out beyond their traditional role to
create new on-line platforms helping local producers to sell direct to consumers.
Our role is to contribute to a human rights-based approach that looks to
preserve the livelihood of producers and ensure consumers have on-going
access to the healthy, local nutritious food they need for their families. This is
the most effective way we can counter the increasingly repressive measures in
favour of industrial agriculture that are being pushed through various legislative
processes, from the UN to the EU. Our role is to call for more institutional
support for the CSA networks in this time of crisis, and to make sure they are
able to meet the enormous surge of demand for safe, nutritious and resilient
food. It is our responsibility to continue working with our allies in other social
movements to ensure that our food systems do not fail us all. It is our role to
promote agroecology and food sovereignty as the way forward to the realisation
of food systems by the people and for the people.

For more information about CSAs and solidarity economics, please visit the
URGENCI Hub: hub.urgenci.net, where materials, videos and booklets can be
found on "how to set up your CSA."

About the authors

URGENCI is the international network of Local and Solidarity-based
Partnerships for Agroecology. Its mission is to coordinate the movement of local
food systems around the world, in particular Community Supported
Agriculture.

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Volume 12 (1): 280 – 283 (July 2020) Gkiougki, Greek farmers counterstrike

Corona-crisis affects small Greek farmers

who counterstrike with a nationwide social media
campaign to unite producers & consumers
on local level!
Jenny Gkiougki (May 7th)

Greece is experiencing low corona-related mortality rates, but the measures

imposed came early and were as harsh as in other, more stricken countries,
posing severe strain to a society and an economy in shambles due to the
ongoing economic crisis. In an understandable move to protect an already
depleted National Health System, on Feb. 27, a day after the country’s first
Covid-19 case was diagnosed in Thessaloniki, all Carnival celebrations got
cancelled everywhere. On March 11, schools closed down, and two days later,
Greece limited non essential travel and closed down cafes, restaurants,
libraries, museums, etc. From 23/3 till 4/5 (a proper 40 days of ‘quarantine’)
the country has been on strict lock-down where citizens are only allowed out
for limited time and for a set of specific reasons, and need to notify via SMS of
their moves.

Small agroecological farmers were hit very hard by COVID-19. Strict restrictions
in movement and the provisional closing of many businesses meant that places
like small restaurants, hotels and farmers’ markets suddenly became
inaccessible for most of them -who do not receive subsidies or compensations
and rely on short supply chain for their survival. This is critical, not just for their
livelihoods, but for the continued existence of family farming in Greece. CSA
farmers, who usually operate in more local scale, also faced difficulties as in
many cases they were not allowed to travel and had to use the services of already
overwhelmed delivery companies instead, adding cost and subtracting quality
from their produce. Furthermore, most CSA schemes in the country, until now,
are informal, there is no ‘contract’ signed between the two parties, and there is
no formal national association to promote, or advocate for their interests.
The movement restrictions served to highlight many underlying pathogenicities
pertaining to the agricultural sector and food production in Greece, but also to
bring forth how the globalised food systems we rely on can collapse, and how
the most effective solutions for food security, let alone food sovereignty, have
got to be based on the foundations of agroecology and localisation. The
consumers were suddenly faced with a new reality: that the place were the
majority of them procure their food (the supermarkets) is not safe any more,

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and that foods purchased there will have to be washed with soap in order to
eliminate the possibility of getting infected. The problematic of a food system
fraught with intermediaries is showing its face again, not in terms of profit
accumulation, but in terms of endangering public health.
Agroecopolis - The Hellenic Network for Agroecology, Food Sovereignty and
Access To Land (AEP) instigated an e-meet with small producers from all over
the country in mid-March; with representatives of organic growers’
associations, members of EcoFest networks and individual farmers, in order to
assess the situation and decide on collective action, as assembly. As an urgent
and immediate response, it was decided to run a nationwide digital
and social media campaign promoting local direct links between
producers & consumers all over the country.
Within a few days, a collection of food activists with no direct personal gain,
under the coordination of Agroecopolis, started developing the campaign and
were even able to create a short promotional video while being unable to shoot
new footage! We all came together because we realise the importance of
standing by our farmers; now more than ever! Out of the blue, without any
access to resources or prior organisation, at a time of extreme uncertainty, we
were able to organise four different groups, working on aspects of the campaign,
including content creation, dissemination, liaising with producers and
organising the final ‘match-making’.
The main message of the campaign is: #Support local small food production#
#We are staying in our fields and cater for your household needs# We aim to
reach a much larger audience than the ‘usual receptors’ of similar actions
organised by eco-activists and bio-farmers in the past. We are addressing the
average coronavirus ‘quarantinees’: consumers living in urban setting (from big
cities to small towns), who are now, concerned about the safety in big crowded
stores; are interested in eating healthy; and wish to protect and cater for their
families in times of uncertainty. The campaign will run till July, each week
focusing on a different aspect -why it is important to eat locally; why
agroecology is the solution; showcasing producer profiles from different areas,
etc.
As this is an urgent matter, and not a planned campaign, it is quite tricky to
organise resources and create a model that works, immediately! Our first goal is
to make sure ‘not one more leaf rots unpicked in a field’. Drawing from the
principles of Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) and Reko (The Finnish
alternative), the interested consumers in one locality and the chosen producers
(experienced volunteers have created a ‘vetting system’ to make sure they
comply to the same principles as us) are brought together using Facebook
groups, where our volunteers set up each group, instigate interaction and
monitor first steps until members take over and self-organise. The idea is to
promote self-management of needs and citizens’ mobilisation on local level -
thus creating conditions for higher levels of autonomy and food sovereignty in
local terms. We have teams of volunteers working on the creation of content and
the dissemination of the campaign so it generates responses from consumers all

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over Greece, and we aim to have groups in each major city, in each prefecture,
by the end of June, to make sure all these small farmers are supported by
networks of consumers.
In the first four days of going ‘live’ we’ve had more than 400 responses from
consumers and the goal now is to make sure we can match demand with supply.

This project started as an immediate and urgent

response to the fact that small bio producers
everywhere in Greece are facing difficulties
accessing markets due to corona restrictions. It
aims at connecting, on a local and direct level,
producers and consumers in all prefectures of
the country, so their sustainability is assured.
But, it will also serve as fertile ground for the
creation of PGS (Participatory Guarantee
Systems) and CSA (Community Supported
Agriculture) networks that will further solidify
the Food Sovereignty movement on a national level -a necessity in the
uncertain times that are coming, in a country that has already been exhausted
by the ongoing, ten year economic crisis. For more info, or to join the
campaign visit https://www.agroecopolis.org/covid-19/ (only in Greek)

About the author

Jenny Gkiougki is a food sov activist from Greece, founder and president of
Agroecopolis - The Hellenic Network for Agroecology, Food Sovereignty &
Access To Land.

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While we remained inside….

Pension at 72 years instead of current 68 - 800,000 fines to politicians waived -
‘Lagarde list’: 500 rich Greeks finally get away with not paying 330 ml euro in
taxes - Philopapou Hill and Athens National Garden become private property -
11 ml euro given away to private highway/toll operator as compensation for
reduced traffic(!) -11 ml euro to private media to play the StayHome messages -
30 ml euro to private hospitals for using their facilities for testing - waive 21 ml
euro that private TV stations should pay for licences - authorities cut off the
power to the (only) self-managed Vio.Me. factory in Thessaloniki, that is
producing cleaning products and soaps -needed items during this time.
But, perhaps worst of it all is the huge attack on our environment with this
new (anti-)environmental omnibus-bill that 1. essentially eliminates the
protection of Natura 2000 sites and promotes mining and hydrocarbon mining
in nature conservation areas 2. abolishes the autonomy of the Protected Areas
Management Bodies (PAMB) 3. allows for the destruction of the environment in
the name of investment projects at will, by consigning control of Environmental
Impact Assessments (EIA) to private entities and by imposing tight deadlines
for the required opinions/recommendations of the relevant public service
departments 4. promotes the reckless expansion of industrial Renewable
Energy Sources (RES), especially wind, which have already caused
environmental degradation and a financial burden on consumers to ensure
excessive profits for investors 5. legalises illegal construction in forestlands and
in some cases, within wetlands and streams 6. simplifies solid waste
management procedures and does not take measures against the
degradation/deterioration of streams from the uncontrolled disposal of urban
and industrial waste within them 7. violates Constitutional Provisions,
European Directives and International Conventions
To support our opposition please sign the petition!

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Volume 12 (1): 284 – (July 2020) Foran, Eco Vista in the quintuple crisis

Eco Vista in the Quintuple Crisis1

John Foran (19th May 2020)

The interlocked triple crisis of capitalist globalization-driven inequality, bought-

and paid-for democracies, pervasive cultures of violence – from our most
intimate relationships to the militarism of the United States – has for a long
time been bound up with the truly wicked fourth of climate chaos. And now we
have the wake-up moment of the coronavirus breaking upon these structural,
systemic burdens.
Suddenly, it seems like we might have a quintuple crisis on our hands!
So, how do we connect this many dots?
Does less global trade and use of cars to commute mean less greenhouse gas
emissions?
Will there be less (or more) militarism and violence as the dangers of the virus
reduce the health and maneuverability of armies?

1
An earlier version of this essay was published at Resilience.org on April 21, 2020.

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Might this economic crisis of unprecedented scope lead to universal health care
and sky-rocketing unemployment lead to a guaranteed basic income for all, even
in a place like the United States?
And how can we adapt our movements and systemic alternatives in the time of
the Corona crisis?
Every movement, organization, systemic alternative, and countless activists,
theorists, and intellectuals are asking questions like these (and better) as the
crisis unfolds.
Everywhere, there is evidence that people are rethinking and imagining things
like alternatives to our outmoded educational systems, an economy that works
for all to meet real, basic needs, a new and better kind of politics for the purpose
of radical social transformation, the shifts in culture and affect to design the
whole ways of life we desire, the fair, ambitious, and binding global approach
that the unfolding climate change will force on states and other elite
institutions…

* * *

This is the story of a systemic alternative that is new and young, emergent and
hopeful, and rooted solidly on the ground, yet informed at the same time by the
pluriverse of such alternatives.
“Eco Vista” was the name chosen in 2017 by a group of students at the
University of California, Santa Barbara acting together with long-time
community members to describe their vision of turning their rather unusual
community of Isla Vista into an ecovillage in the next ten years. Unique because
23,000 people live together in an area of .54 square miles, with eighty percent of
them between the ages of 18 and 24. In March 2020, the Eco Vista Transition
Initiative became the 169th member and the newest link in the Transition US
network.
We aim to encourage and inspire the foundation of an eco-village with
renewable energy, a flourishing and regenerative agro-ecology of public urban
gardens, cooperative, affordable eco-housing, a circular eco-economy based on
solidarity and capable of meeting the real needs of the inhabitants, and radical
self-governance and community priorities determined by all who reside here, all
within a vibrant web of imagination and cultural creativity.
We know that to achieve this aspirational aim will require significant political
organization, social movement building, and visionary policy proposals,
including the design of strategies for achieving a systemic alternative and
perhaps even the invention of a new kind of party!

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Isla Vista, a 50-year experiment in community built on five

centuries of indigenous dispossession in the Americas
The land on which Isla Vista and the adjacent university and city of Santa
Barbara sit is Chumash land, and the crime of their dispossession by white
settlers is a history we are acutely aware of, as seen in this video on Eco Vista’s
real foundations made by Sierra Emrick. There will be no climate justice in
California or anywhere in the Americas until this monumental injustice is
overturned by making common cause under the leadership of indigenous and
other frontline and fence-line communities everywhere.
Built on this tragedy and sold again by the Regents of the University of
California to unscrupulous private landlords in the mid-1950’s and early 60’s
with the inception of the UCSB campus, for the past half-century the
unincorporated college town of Isla Vista has been a site for radical experiments
in alternative ways of living, civil disobedience to authority, community
governance, and environmental stewardship. As an epicenter for both youth
culture and intergenerational solidarity, Eco Vista consciously draws on these
histories of struggle, which are well narrated in the book Isla Vista: A Citizen’s
History, written by Carmen Lodise and a number of other community members
who lived there from the 1970s onward.
Today, the community presents many opportunities for active engagement that
touches upon some of the most critical issues facing U.S. society – food
insecurity and injustice, landlord rip-offs, houselessness, and tenant struggles,
mental health, sexual violence, free speech, and police-community interactions.
After a forty-year battle again landlords, college administrators, and the county
of Santa Barbara, in late 2017 Isla Vista elected its first local government – the
Isla Vista Community Services District; two years later another referendum
empowered the new government to tax utilities, drawing revenue to a $1 million
annual budget by 2019. This would soon be followed by an even more
surprising development as community interest in carbon-neutrality, just
transition, critical ecological post-sustainability, and systems change from
below has grown deep roots.

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The Eco Vista Project

In 2017, two UCSB undergraduates, Jessica Alvarez Parfrey (now a member of
the permanent community) and Valentina Cabrera (who graduated and moved
on to do this work elsewhere) conceived a project whose goal was to lay the
groundwork for an ongoing effort to turn their community, Isla Vista, into a
model “eco-village” through a thoughtful bottom-up process of engagement with
others.
Over the summer and fall of 2017, the project was named Eco Vista, and activity
began. Since then, students and community members, both inside and outside
classes on topics such The World in 2050: Systemic Alternatives, What’s Wrong
with the World? How Do We Fix It?, and a regular group studies called, simply,
Eco Vista – have worked in the community on projects around food issues,
housing, energy, transportation, local cooperative start-ups, a newsletter/zine
and a website, community outreach, and a burst of cultural creation. In the fall
of 2019 my Environmental Studies/Sociology 134EC class “Earth in Crisis”
engaged in a two-week exercise that produced the beginnings of a Green New
Deal for Eco Vista and resulted in a 27-page list of projects for aligning Isla
Vista’s next community development planning process with the most
progressive versions of the concept, such as the Red Deal, the U.S. Green Party’s
plans, feminist and labor GNDs, Bernie Sander’s detailed platform, and
ecosocialist ideas.
There are now more than 250 people on the Eco Vista e-list, with bi-monthly
General Assemblies that have continued to meet on-line during the corona
crisis. There are on-going working groups involved in projects including a food
forest, community gardens, tenants’ rights (including UCSB-owned housing),
and more. As we imagine the future, we also have the precious legacy and ideas
of the late resident scholar and activist Michael Bean, who just before his

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untimely death in February created an Eco Vista Sourcebook of imaginative

ideas and detailed proposals for bringing about Eco Vista on which to draw.
Our collective grief at the passing of this shining spirit could only be borne
because he had helped us discover each other and our collective strength.
Conceptually our efforts draw on the latest thinking about Transition Towns,
degrowth, buen vivir, just transition, radical climate justice, and the many
worlds to be found in the path-breaking Pluriverse: A Post-Development
Dictionary, edited by Alberto Acosta, Federico Demaria, Arturo Escobar,
Ashish Kothari, and Ariel Salleh. Another approach that guides our thinking
and practice is adrienne maree brown’s Emergent Strategy, which counsels
working from the bottom up in an inclusive and un-predetermined way to
generate a collective analysis enabling members to articulate their desires and
dreams for what could be.

Image by Charlotte Götze, www.charlottegoetze.de

This image from the work of Extinction Rebellion is so vivid and beautiful that I
have stolen it openly for it resonates deeply and expressively with the feel of
what we are doing with our own project. Some of this comes through in the

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community values we have embraced and our invitation for participation, open
to all who agree with them:

Community values and principles

We are inclusive.
We are democratic.
We are non-violent.
We work collectively whenever possible, and all are free to organize their own activities
and projects.
We are open to all points of view that are aligned with these values and supportive of
the Eco Vista Mission.
We act and live out of love for the dignity of all living beings, and base this love on
social and climate justice, and on radical hope.

Corona crisis
And now our worlds have been shaken by the coronavirus. How has this crisis
impacted our efforts in the past three months? We last met face to face on
March 13, 2020, just before the two-week spring break at the university.
When we returned to start a new ten-week quarter on March 30, we found
ourselves beset by the challenges of continuing the work of system change as did
all of the world’s peoples in movement.
And like many of these organizations, we moved our work to the Zoom space.
We have used a regular Friday meeting starting at noon and often continuing till
3 in the afternoon to keep our projects moving forward, to rebuild community
and support each other’s struggles in the new environment, in a community that
was reduced to half its size as many students elected to live at their non-
university homes all over the state of California.
We have probably fared better than most organizations in these changed
circumstances, and the students among us have probably coped better than
most of their peers around the U.S., both of these outcomes effects of the
community we had already built and the possibilities we have found of working
in the remote on-line environment.
We hosted an Eco Vista community event on Earth Day, April 22, and a webinar
on our work for Transition U.S. We launched an ambitious new project, the Eco
Vista Climate Justice Press this month and published the first in what we hope
will be a long line of inspiring and cutting-edge free offerings to the world, a
work of climate fiction by local novelist Maía with the beautiful title See You in
Our Dreams.
We have continued to pursue a project for the food forest, to help feed the
community with Food Not Bombs, to bring out a weekly newsletter/zine for the
first time, to deepen our knowledge of our own history with the help of Carmen

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Lodise’s book and a conversation it has started between the activists of the
1970s through 1990s and ourselves, to prepare a synergizing proposal for
consideration by the local government that would create a position for an Eco
Vista organizer to draw our projects more tightly together with the many other
popular initiatives and institutions of Isla Vista, and to seek the funds to pursue
them.
There are ongoing collaborative research projects this spring involving over 200
students engaged in conducting interviews, designing surveys, and unearthing
the archival record of the past to further the transformation of the community.
There is a household carbon-reduction program underway, and plans for
continuing to meet over the summer, which would be a first for this student
community!
We are seeding the future of our community and the network of communities
with whom we hope to be in alliance as this “decade of decision” unfolds, in all
its uncertainty.

Conclusion: a far-reaching significance?

We are aiming high: to assist in and lay the foundations for the establishment of
an ongoing, multigenerational, student-community project for an equitable and
just transition in Isla Vista, California, and to put the result, Eco Vista, forward
as an experiential model that other small towns with college students might
want to try in their own communities. We consider what we are trying to do as
experiments in sustainable, resilient, participatory development, in a space we
call Eco Vista, a very real place and also a timeless, cosmic community of radical
visionaries and seekers.
I close with this passage from our mission statement:

In the end, Eco Vista is … a promise, a pledge, a dream, a future.

The promise of Eco Vista is that together we might create a place that is
life-affirming for all its inhabitants and that might inspire others
elsewhere – particularly young people in their own communities – to use
their imaginations to create the innovative future communities we all
want to live in, right now!
Our pledge to each other is to co-create, imagine, dream, and transform
our community into a place that matches the name of Eco Vista. We
want to dream and make manifest this vision together with you!
The Eco Vista dream is a communal, shared, joyful adventure – may it
transport us to a place worthy of the love we feel for it.
The future of Eco Vista is … well, that’s what we hope and aim to find
out!

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About the author

By day John Foran teaches sociology at the University of California, Santa
Barbara. Most of the time, he lives the life of a scholar-activist in the global
climate justice movement, at the center of the struggle for achieving social
justice and radical social change in the 21st century. He also feels that far too
much activism falls short of its potential for liberation because groups and
individuals fail to acknowledge and work on the inner transition and nurturing
of relationships that the best spiritual practices enable in us. Some of his work
along these lines is available at www.resilience.org. He can be contacted at
jforan5 AT gmail.com.

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Karlsruhe’s ‘giving fences’:

mobilisation for the needy in times of COVID-19
Michael C. Zeller (20 April 2020)

Abstract
Protective measures against the spread of COVID-19 have placed strains on
many segments of society, but perhaps homeless and impoverished people
most of all. In Karlruhe (Germany), a form of collective action has emerged to
help provide for needy individuals while their normal support structures are
unavailable: ‘giving fences.’ This article reviews this practice and considers its
qualities and defects. The giving fences are a promising example of solidary
collective action, providing considerable advantages to participants and
beneficiaries. Its shortcomings, however, emphasise the importance of
resuming institutionalised social service provision as soon as emergency
conditions are relaxed.

Keywords: COVID-19; homelessness; collective action; expectancy-value

theory; digital mobilisation; solidarity

The outbreak of COVID-19 and activation of protective measures in Germany has

introduced unique restrictions on public life. For many, these restrictions are
fairly minor inconveniences or annoyances; for others, for those living at mere
subsistence levels in normal circumstances, the consequences of COVID-19 are a
serious threat to survival. In many instances, essential service providers to
homeless and needy individuals have been forced to suspend operations.
In the German city of Karlsruhe, these unprecedented circumstances have
indeed caused many charitable organisations to close temporarily or to reduce
operations. Yet several residents in Karlsruhe have responded to this emergency
by organising food and supply drop-offs. These ‘giving fences’–a term derived
from the location (fences) and legal context (which makes an important
distinction between ‘gifts’ and ‘donations’) surrounding the practices–are a form
of solidary collective action that provide sustenance to Karlsruhe’s homeless and
needy.
This article reviews this practice. The following section presents the context in
which the ‘giving fences’ emerged, including the typical support available to
needy individuals and the challenges presented by COVID-19. Then, it presents
the practice and its qualities and defects. The article concludes by discussing the
prospects of the practice and outlook for service provision to the needy after the
COVID-19 emergency conditions abate.

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Social welfare in Karlsruhe and the onset of COVID-19

Karlsruhe is a medium-sized city located on the western edge of Baden-
Württemberg in southwest Germany. Baden-Württemberg is economically
prosperous and, vis-à-vis other German states, has low levels of poverty, welfare
scheme enrolment, and homelessness. Nevertheless, these issues do manifest,
particularly in the region’s largest cities, Stuttgart and Karlsruhe.
Germany’s welfare system has ample provisions for people who are homeless or
struggling economically. Unemployment benefit (Arbeitslosengeld), basic
security benefit (Grundsicherung), social benefit (Sozialgeld), and housing
benefit (Wohngeld) are the most common sources of financial support from the
state. There are, moreover, dense and stable networks of philanthropic
institutions in Karlsruhe that support people in need: the ‘Worker’s Welfare’
(Arbeiterwohlfahrt, AWO) charity, Catholic Caritas missions, and Evangelical
diaconal (‘Diakonie Deutschland’) missions operate or supply short- and long-
term housing facilities throughout the city. Donations from restaurants, grocery
stores, and private individuals sustain numerous food distribution centres.
Clothing depots at a handful of central locations give individuals a place to get
garments suitable to the weather, especially during winter months. Taken
together, the support and services provided to the needy in Karlsruhe1 are
considerable and do much to alleviate the extremities of homelessness and
poverty.
Crucially, however, there are not many rendundancies within these support
networks. They often work to capacity, and without them people in need may
have no alternative source of help. The onset of COVID-19 in Karlsruhe has
compelled some parts of this network to shutdown.

COVID-19 in Karlsruhe
The southern states of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria–as well as North-Rhine
Westphalia–have been hardest hit by the COVID-19 outbreak in Germany.2
Proximity to particularly stricken regions like northern Italy, Tirol in Austria,
and Alsace in France presumably influenced the high number of infections. By
the middle of March the total number of confirmed cases in Germany numbered
several thousands, which prompted the German government to move from
‘containment’ to the ‘protection’ stage of its strategy (Robert Koch Institut
2020a, 13). This entailed, first, the closure of schools and daycare centres (13
March), and subsequently several restrictions on public spaces, including
prohibitions against gatherings of more than two people, the closure of
restaurants and businesses, and general guidance to avoid leaving one’s
residence (21 March) (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2020b). In a nationally
televised address on 18 March, Chancellor Angela Merkel declared that ‘since

1 Catalogued online in several online resources (e.g., Ruf (2020)).

2The first case recorded in Germany was in Munich in late January (Deutsche Presse-Agentur
2020a).

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the Second World War, no challenge in our country has demanded more of our
collective solidary action’ (Merkel 2020).
The first recorded cases of COVID-19 infections in Karlsruhe appeared on 6
March. Insofar as testing reveals it, the spread of COVID-19 has not taken on
the sort of geometric growth witnessed in more severely affected places; as of
mid-April there were just over 300 cases and only four confirmed fatalities.3.
Nevertheless, the containment and protection measures enacted nationally and
regionally apply in Karlsruhe like everywhere else: restaurants and businesses
are closed or operating at reduced capacity, social services are restricted to
operations deemed ‘essential,’ and individuals are encouraged to remain at
home as much as possible.
These restrictions to public life have diminished the resources upon which many
homeless and impoverished people rely. A food bank in West Karlsruhe, for
example, closed their ordinary distribution service on 16 March. Though the
service later made arrangements for a fixed number of pre-prepared meals that
could be collected, this provision (72 meals) is smaller than usual and available
for shorter periods on fewer days of the week. Yet the fact that this service has
continued in any form is exceptional. Other providers, often reliant on supply
chains that have gone into abeyance or volunteers that feel compelled to stay
home,4 have had to suspend operations. Perhaps most disturbing of all: the
short- and medium-term economic impact of COVID-19 may result in a
contraction in funding for welfare and social services, whether through reduced
state expenditure or fewer private donations. Apart from the direct health risks,
COVID-19’s secondary and tertiary effects pose a serious threat to economically
struggling people in Karlsruhe and around the world.

‘Giving fences’: digital mobilisation for Karlsruhe’s needy

On 24 March, a group page called ‘100% Karlsruhe helps the homeless and
needy’ (100% Karlsruhe hilft den Obdachlosen und Armen) appeared on
Facebook. The creator, a 36-year old Karlsruhe resident using ‘Loco Dias’ (‘crazy
days’) as a nom de guerre, announced his intention to improvise a food and
supply station for the needy near a local railway station. Crates of food and
hygiene supplies were arrayed along a low fence beneath an overpass–free to
any who came to collect and superintended by ‘Loco Dias’ himself. Within the
space of a couple of days the group page had upwards of 100 members and had
attracted a handful of participants to act as administrators (i.e., taking on core
organising duties). In less than three weeks, the group had well over 1000
members and the practice had developed from a random collection of spare
food, hygiene products, and clothes for a dozen needy persons to more regular

3For up-to-date figures, see the Robert Koch Institute’s COVID-19-Dashboard (Robert Koch
Institut 2020b).
4Many soup kitchens are staffed by elderly volunteers, who are particularly at-risk from COVID-
19. Soup kitchens, moreover, have not been allowed to take on new volunteers during the crisis.

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provision of meals, distribution of vouchers for use at local groceries, and even
delivery of supplies to more than 80 people per day.
This emergent practice unfolded in a thick legal structure. In German law, the
term ‘donations’ (Spende) has specific legal usages, which generally imply
liability. Since the ‘100% Karlsruhe’ group page scarcely constitutes a legally-
recognised entity–let alone one capable of assuming liability–the activists
clarified on signs posted on the fence that only ‘gifts’ (Gaben, a less legally
restricting term) are accepted, and referred to their project as the ‘giving fence’
(Gabenzaun).5 This terminological choice, however, is not the end of legal issues
for this practice: ‘100% Karlsruhe’ did not have a permit for their activity.6
German law has longstanding and all-encompassing permitting requirements
for activity in public spaces; yet the protection measures against COVID-19
caused municipal registrar offices to close, leaving no possibility for legally
permitted public activity. Police inquired with Loco Dias, but were content to
allow the giving fence to continue as long as social distancing measures were
observed (Rastätter 2020). This signaled an open opportunity for this and other
giving practices–but it is a legally tenuous opportunity which leaves much to
police discretion (Betsch 2020).
Members of the group page came from various areas of Karlsruhe; that fact and
recognition of the limited mobility of homeless and needy persons led the ‘100%
Karlsruhe’ group to establish other giving fences: in less than a week the group
had initiated three other sites, and four more in the week after that. The group
also spurred on others: in West Karlsruhe a group (‘Karlsruhe West helps the
needy’, Karlsruhe West Hilft Bedürftigen) set up a ‘giving wall’ (Gabenwand) in
an underpass; in the nearby city of Pforzheim, too, a group started a giving fence
(Scharfe 2020). These practices and the not inconsiderable mobilisation of
activists and resources that they require have continued and grown for several
weeks.

5Admittedly, this distinction is not observed in several comments and exchanges on the ‘100%
Karlsruhe’ group page, where commenters often refer to ‘donations’–but it is present in all the
practice site’s signage.
6 Indeed, when interviewed ‘Loco Dias’ declined to give his real name to ensure that the action,
the giving fence, remains the focal point, but also because the activity was, strictly speaking, not
legal (Rastätter 2020).

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‘Giving wall’ in West Karlsruhe. The text reads, ‘Giving-wall for homeless and
needy. Together instead of alone.’

Practice benefits
The mobilisation of participants in this practice seems commonly motivated by
both a sense of potential efficacy–that this practice can achieve a desired effect
(i.e., it can provide food and supplies for the needy)–and a value-based
sympathy for a disadvantaged, marginalised group (Saab et al. 2014). It is, in
other words, a case of solidary collective action. This motivational pairing
supports the expectancy-value theory of collective action articulated by
Klandermans (1997), Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013), and others–
though not necessarily to the exclusion of other socio-psychological theories of
collective action participation.
On the ‘expectancy’ side, wherein participants engage because of an expectation
of efficacy, giving fences achieve a visible and emotively powerful effect. On
many of the group pages there are pictures and videos of organisers distributing
or delivering food and supplies to beneficiaries. While it is difficult to determine
the proportion of local needy persons who have benefitted from the giving
fences–both because statistics on homelessness and the socio-economically
disadvantaged are scarce and because the COVID-19 crisis has likely enlarged

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this group–recurrently witnessing several dozens of individuals collecting from

a single giving fence over days and weeks bears out the practice’s effect.
On the ‘value’ side, wherein participants derive benefits (moral self-esteem, a
heartening sense of community, or even just useful preoccupation in
circumstances where typical activities of work and leisure are not available)
from their engagement, there are numerous daily posts on the organising group
pages that express joy at the solidarity evinced in the giving fences and gratitude
for the various contributors.

‘[I] just hung something [on the fence]. People are super grateful and happy. I’m
supposed to send along greetings and a big thank you’ (‘gabENZaun Pforzheim’
page, 31 March 2020).7

‘[I] was at the fence around 7 this morning to bring some things by - there were
already several bags. Really great, I’m totally happy!’ (‘gabENZaun Pforzheim’
page, 3 April 2020).8

‘… Thanks to the many donors who provide us with supplies every day. Thanks go
not only to the many companies, but especially to the many members of this
group, who provide us with urgently needed food, fruits and vegetables, as well as
hygiene products and other supplies. … Even with the smallest donations, you are
all guarantors that we can help many homeless and needy people through this
difficult time’ (‘KA West hilft Bedürftigen, Lebensmittel Ausgabe Haltestelle
Kühler Krug’ page, 8 April 2020).9

‘Good morning everyone! Just thank you to everyone who brings something, who
has a kind word for us and who helps make life a little easier for those in need’
(‘100% Karlsruhe hilft den Obdachlosen und Armen’ page, 19 April 2020).10

7In original: “Habe gerade was angehängt. Die Leute sind super dankbar und freuen sich. Ich
soll liebe Grüße und ein herzliches Danke ausrichten”
8In original: “war heute morgen gegen 7 am zaun um ein paar sachen vorbeizubringen - da
hingen schon mehrere beutel. echt super, freut mich total!”
9In original: “… Danke an die vielen Spender, die uns Tag für Tag mit Nachschub versorgen. Der
Dank geht nicht nur an die vielen Firmen, sondern ganz speziell an die vielen Mitglieder dieser
Gruppe, die uns täglich mit dringend benötigten Lebensmitteln, Obst und Gemüse, sowie
Hygieneartikeln u.s.w. versorgen. … Ihr alle seid auch mit noch so kleinen Spenden Garanten
dafür, daß wir vielen Obdachlosen und Hilfebedürftigen über diese schwere Zeit hinweghelfen
konnten.”
10In original: “Guten Morgen an alle!Einfach mal lieben Dank an alle,die etwas
vorbeibringen,die ein liebes Wort für uns haben und die helfen,den Bedürftigen das Leben ein
wenig zu erleichtern.”

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An unmistakeable impression emerges from such comments and informal

conversations with participants of a clear constellation of psychological benefits
from engagement with the giving fences. First, during crisis circumstances that
are likely to impart feelings of helplessness and paralysis, there is a sense of
purpose and of contribution expressed; to be sure, some of this benefit is
attributable just to empowering participants to get out of the house (no mean
feat given the pressures to remain at home). Then, witnessing the engagement
of others and the response of beneficiaries can engender faith in community,
which also mitigates the deleterious impact of social isolation.
In sum, the giving fences are a practice that, so to say, keep on giving.
Beneficiaries and participants alike derive clearly recognisable rewards.
However, it should be noted that the advantages of this practice are not
unalloyed. In fact, the struggles and shortcomings of the giving fences are
largely by-products of the stopgap motivations that gave rise to them, thereby
underscoring the importance of resuming institutionalised social service
provision as soon as emergency conditions are relaxed.

Practice problems
Though no problems have arisen from their legal status, giving fences in and
around Karlsruhe have nevertheless encountered several challenges. The most
serious of these stem from the use, or rather ‘misuse,’ of the service. In every
group page there are reports or speculation of people who are not really needy
taking from the giving fences. With remarkable regularity, participants on group
pages use the metaphor of ‘black sheep’ (schwarze Schaf) to refer to such
individuals. The black sheep problem is essentially an issue of verification: the
normally operating institutions for homeless and needy persons in Karlsruhe
have established procedures to ensure that services go to those truly in need.
For example, Karlsruher Tafel e.V. (that is, ‘Karlsruhe Table registered
Association’)–which has reduced operations due to COVID-19 prevention
measures–provides free and low-cost groceries, but to access the service
individuals must obtain an ‘authorisation card’ (Berechtigungsausweis) by
showing a personal ID and confirmation that they receive some form of state
welfare (Karlsruhe Tafel e.V. 2020); Karlsruhe’s Caritas branches employ a
similar verification procedure (Caritasverband Karlsruhe e.V. 2020). But the
giving fences do not have sufficient resources to institute these procedures.
Besides, many group members flatly dismiss the idea of using such a procedure,
at least partially because the notion of eyeballing someone’s state benefit
confirmation at the side of a road or in an underpass is a grim prospect. Yet
posts about people with new smartphones or nice bikes and backpacks taking
from the fences evince a suspicion about the efficacy, or at least efficiency, of the
practice.
In several instances, the black sheep problem has a pointedly ethnic facet: at the
giving wall in West Karlsruhe a participant posted that he had asked a
beneficiary who was taking a large amount of food and supplies whether that

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was necessary and found that the beneficiary could hardly speak German. The
participant’s emphasis on this detail triggered a tense exchange about ‘latent
racism,’ which eventually prompted one of the group administrators to disable
comments on that post. A participant in Pforzheim, conferring with
beneficiaries, was informed that Russian individuals were collecting all the food
and supplies, and even threatening others–though the participant noted that
this did not necessarily mean they were not in need. It could be that some
people who do not need help are misusing the giving fences; it could be that
some needy persons are over-using it, which evidently disappoints participants
who feel that some beneficiaries’ behaviour does not reflect the solidarity (and
other values) they are acting upon. This, in turn, can trigger demobilising
pressures of ‘lost commitment’ and ‘membership loss’ (Davenport 2015, 35–36),
depriving the collective action of essential resources.
Core participants initiated conversations about how to deal with the black sheep
problem. At the giving wall in West Karlsruhe, for instance, one of the group
administrators wrote,

‘It had already bothered me and annoyed me. Skin colour doesn’t matter for me. I
don’t want to read that here anymore! How can we control the whole thing
better? Post guards? Also stupid, camera? Stupid … or just hope that some who
badly need [help] get enough. Or should we abandon [the giving wall] entirely so
that nobody gets anything anymore since there will always be people who take
advantage of things? Think about it please’ (‘KA West hilft Bedürftigen,
Lebensmittel Ausgabe Haltestelle Kühler Krug’ page, 3 April 2020).11

With such interventions, participants combat the internal demobilising

pressures caused by doubts about the efficacy of their action. They engage in
what Davenport (2015, 43–47) terms ‘reappraisal’ and ‘trust-building.’12 In the
cases of the giving fences, reappraisal denotes reconsideration and alterations
arising from efficacy concerns, while trust-building refers not only to exchanges
and interactions between activists–strengthening intra-group bonds–but also
repeated endorsement of the notion that the practice is worthwhile so long as
some of the food and supplies are getting to people who genuinely need it.

11In original: “Es war mir auch schon aufgestoßen und hat mich geärgert. Die Hautfarbe spielt
da für mich keine Rolle. Das möchte ich hier nicht mehr lesen! Wie können wir aber nun das
ganze vielleicht besser kontrollieren? Wachen abstellen? Auch doof, kamera? Doof…oder hoffen
das einige die es dringend brauchen genug bekommen. Oder sollen wir es ganz lassen damit
niemand mehr was bekommt, da es nun Mal immer Menschen geben wird, die Dinge
ausnutzen? Denkt Mal drüber nach bitte.”
12Davenport theorises about the demobilisation of social movement organisations (SMOs)
based on induction from a case study of antagonistic dyadic interaction between a SMO and the
state. However, his theorisation of demobilisation is generalisable to many other forms of SMOs
and collective action.

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In all cases, some of the most active participants put forward optimistic
perspectives on the black sheep problem, attempting to dispel efficacy concerns.
One ruminated on the ‘gift’ terminology that the legal opportunity structure
imposed on the practice:

‘I think if you give a gift it is given away. I hope and then trust that it provides a
benefit, but there are always black sheep, no matter where. That is annoying, of
course, but as soon as I have given something away, passed it out of my hands, it
is beyond my authority. Strange if someone then comes and takes it away, but
that’s the way it is. And I think–that is where I start from–it is not easy to take
something from a fence if there is no good reason. So maybe respond [to someone
behaving suspiciously]. But don’t let it annoy me or mess up my day when I
cannot change it’ (‘KA West hilft Bedürftigen, Lebensmittel Ausgabe Haltestelle
Kühler Krug’ page, 3 April 2020).13

Others downplayed the black sheep problem:

‘We don’t want to judge [who is really needy] and hope that those who really
need it will take it. Black sheep are everywhere - but if, of the 100%, 25% are
black sheep, then we are happy about the other 75%’ (‘gabENZaun Pforzheim’
page, 4 April 2020).14

Some are even more forceful about imposing this sort of perspective as the basis
for participation:

‘Hello to all helpers. This group is all about love and humanity. Something like
[the misuse] described above can happen. If someone is convinced that he or she
needs blankets and food, please help yourself. You don’t have to be homeless and
have signs of decomposition to be in need. We want to reach everyone. And in the
event that it was unjust, their karma should take care of it. However, please
continue with your good deeds. Don’t scold anyone. You are great people, so we

13In original: “ich finde wenn man eine Gabe abgibt ist es verschenkt. Ich hoffe und vertraue
dann darauf das es beim richtigen ankommt, aber schwarze Schaf gibt es immer, egal wo. Das ist
natürlich ärgerlich, aber sobald ich etwas verschenkt habe, in dem Fall abgelegt, entzieht es sich
meinem befugen darüber. Doof wenn man dann sowas mit bekommt, aber ist halt so. Und ich
denke- da gehe ich von mir aus- es fällt nicht leicht an einem Gabenzaun was mit zu nehmen
wenn es keinen triftigen Grund hat. Ansprechen ja eventuell. Mich ärgern nein, versaut mir den
Tag und ändern kann man es nicht.”
14In original: “Wir wollen das nicht beurteilen und hoffen darauf, dass es sich diejenigen
nehmen, welche es auch wirklich brauchen. Schwarze Schafe gibt es überall - aber wenn von den
100%, 25% schwarze Schafe sind, dann freuen wir uns doch über die anderen 75%.”

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will continue with that. The comment function is hereby switched off’ (‘100%
Karlsruhe hilft den Obdachlosen und Armen’ page, 29 March 2020).15

In their conversations, participants (particularly core organisers) in the giving

fences ultimately affirm the view that the food and supplies will at least reach
some who need it; they adopt an approach of trust–but the desire to ‘verify’ is
plainly there.
One other challenge deserves mention: the giving fences can be absorbing,
demanding considerable commitment and active involvement–especially from
core organisers and especially after black sheep problems prompt participants
to adopt more demanding procedures (Witke 2020). As ever, when collective
action demands such intense engagement there is a danger of ‘burnout’ or
‘exhaustion’ (Davenport 2015, 32–33; Gorski, Lopresti-Goodman, and Rising
2018). Demands on participants have been dealt with by a habitual readiness to
ask for help and to share around administrative responsibilities, but the longer
the collective action continues, the more likely are the exertions of participation
to induce burnout.

Outlook
The giving fences are a promising practice and well suited to the exegencies of
the COVID-19 emergency measures in Germany. Its benefits are modest in
scope, but certainly meaningful among direct beneficiaries and participants:
cumulatively over the whole municipal area, probably a few hundred homeless
and needy individuals take succour from the giving fences; and participants
clearly derive distinct psycho-social benefits from engagement, which can
alleviate strains arising from the public health response to COVID-19.
All the giving fence group pages reveal struggles with inefficiency and efficacy
concerns, and difficulties in establishing optimal arrangements for supply and
distribution. This underscores a distinctive feature of collective action focused
on service provision. Unlike other areas of collective action, in which
institutionalisation (Tarrow 2011, 207–13) is sometimes viewed as the death
knell of a movement, mobilisation that centres around service provision
overwhelmingly benefits from the establishment of fixed institutions and
regularised procedures. Institutionalisation facilitates more efficient provision
of services and more constancy for beneficiaries. Some participants expressed a
desire to continue the giving fences after the COVID-19 crisis abates–but this
15In original: “Hallo an alle Helferinnen und Helfer. In dieser Gruppe geht es ausschließlich um
Liebe und Menschlichkeit. Sowas wie oben beschrieben, kann passieren. Wenn jemand davon
überzeugt ist, dass er oder sie decken und Lebensmittel notwendig hat, dann bitte bedient euch.
Man muss nicht obdachlos und Verwesungs Anzeichen haben um bedürftig zu sein. Wir wollen
alle erreichen. Und für den Fall das es doch ungerecht war soll sich deren karma darum
kümmern. Ihr allerdings macht bitte mit euren guten taten weiter. Schimpft niemanden. Ihr
seid tolle Menschen, also machen wir genau damit weiter. Kommentarfunktion wird hiermit
abgeschaltet.”

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can almost certainly be attributed to the ‘initial euphoria’ (Anfangseuphorie) of

engagement. The daily demands on participants, especially those most involved,
are intense, which more than anything else suggests that the practice cannot be
maintained in the long-term.
The giving fences are an encouraging manifestation of solidary collective action.
Their inherent shortcomings underscore the importance of re-starting social
work and service provision institutions as soon as COVID-19 protective
measures are relaxed. The resumption of these normal operations may draw
some individuals mobilised in the giving fence practices into established
institutions. Understandably, the merged senses of ownership and
accomplishment that some participants have for the giving fences are not lightly
relinquished, but the extensive network of welfare institutions in Karlsruhe and
other German cities offer channels for participants to continue acting upon their
values–and with greater efficacy.

References
Betsch, Melissa. 2020. “Karlsruher richten Gabenzaun am Kühlen Krug ein: ‘Ihr
seid nicht allein, wir sind für euch da’.” Karlsruhe. https://www.ka-
news.de/region/karlsruhe/coronavirus-karlsruhe./karlsruher-richten-
gabenzaun-am-kuehlen-krug-ein-ihr-seid-nicht-allein-wir-sind-fuer-euch-
da;art6066,2516096?utm{\_}medium=Social{\&}utm{\_}source=Facebook{\
&}wt{\_}mc=Facebook.ka.echobox{\#}Echobox=1585895052.
Caritasverband Karlsruhe e.V. 2020. “Beiertheimer Tafel.” https://www.caritas-
karlsruhe.de/hilfen-und-beratung/hilfen-in-notlagen/beiertheimer-
tafel/beiertheimer-tafel.
Davenport, Christian. 2015. How Social Movements Die. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Deutsche Presse-Agentur. 2020a. “Bayerische Behörden bestätigen ersten Fall
in Deutschland.” Der Spiegel, January. Hamburg.
https://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/medizin/corona-virus-erster-fall-in-
deutschland-bestaetigt-a-19843b8d-8694-451f-baf7-0189d3356f99.
———. 2020b. “Diese Einschränkungen gelten in den Bundesländern.”
München. https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/corona-coronavirus-
ausgangssperre-1.4853205.
Gorski, Paul, Stacy Lopresti-Goodman, and Dallas Rising. 2018. “‘Nobody’s
paying me to cry’: the causes of activist burnout in United States animal rights
activists.” Social Movement Studies. Routledge, 1–17.
doi:10.1080/14742837.2018.1561260.
Karlsruhe Tafel e.V. 2020. “Die Tafeln: Essen, wo es hingehört.”
https://karlsruher-tafel.de/.
Klandermans, Bert. 1997. The Social Psychology of Protest. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.

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Merkel, Angela. 2020. “Fernsehansprache von Bundeskanzlerin Angela

Merkel.” https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-
de/aktuelles/fernsehansprache-von-bundeskanzlerin-angela-merkel-1732134.
Rastätter, Tanja. 2020. “Coronavirus: Gabenzaun hilft Obdachlosen und
Bedürftigen in Karlsruhe-Durlach.” Karlsruhe.
https://bnn.de/lokales/karlsruhe/coronavirus-gabenzaun-hilft-obdachlosen-
und-beduerftigen-in-karlsruhe-durlach.
Robert Koch Institut. 2020a. “Ergänzung zum Nationalen Pandemieplan –
COVID-19 – neuartige Coronaviruserkrankung.” Berlin: Robert Koch Institut.
———. 2020b. “Robert Koch-Institut: COVID-19-Dashboard.”
https://experience.arcgis.com/experience/478220a4c454480e823b17327b2bf1
d4.
Ruf, Isabel. 2020. “Obdachlose in Karlsruhe – Unterkünfte, Essen & Kleidung.”
https://meinka.de/obdachlose-karlsruhe/.
Saab, Rim, Nicole Tausch, Russell Spears, and Wing-Yee Cheung. 2014. “Acting
in solidarity: Testing an extended dual pathway model of collective action by
bystander group members.” British Journal of Social Psychology 54 (3): 539–
60.
Scharfe, Karoline. 2020. “Wo es in Karlsruhe, Rastatt und Pforzheim
Gabenzäune als Hilfe in der Corona-Krise gibt.” Karlsruhe.
https://bnn.de/lokales/karlsruhe/coronavirus-wo-es-in-karlsruhe-rastatt-und-
pforzheim-gabenzaeune-gibt.
Stekelenburg, Jacquelien van, and Bert Klandermans. 2013. “The social
psychology of protest.” Current Sociology Review 61 (5-6): 886–905.
Tarrow, Sidney G. 2011. Power in Movement: Social movements and
contentious politics. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
doi:10.1017/CBO9780511973529.
Witke, Marlene. 2020. “Gabenzaun am Kühlen Krug zerstört - doch die Helfer
geben nicht auf!” Karlsruhe. https://www.ka-
news.de/region/karlsruhe/Karlsruhe{~}/gabenzaun-am-kuehlen-krug-
zerstoert-doch-die-helfer-geben-nicht-auf;art6066,2519642.

About the author

Michael C. Zeller is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science
at Central European University (CEU). His dissertation research concerns the
demobilisation of far-right demonstration campaigns, particularly the role of
counter-mobilisation against the far right. He is also an Associate Researcher at
the CEU Centre for Policy Studies, working on the ‘Building Resilience against
Violent Extremism and Polarisation’ (BRaVE) project. He can be contacted by
email at zeller_michael AT phd.ceu.edu.

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Organising a solidarity kitchen: reflections from

Cooperation Birmingham
Sergio Ruiz Cayuela (28th April 2020)

Covid-19, a “not-so-natural” disaster

The global Covid-19 pandemic is being faced by governments and covered by the
media as a natural disaster. And in a way they are right: as scientists predicted,
the rapid change in climatic conditions has created a favourable environment
for the virus to spread. However, practices related to the agribusiness model can
also be related with the increasingly recurrent outbreak of global pandemics1.
Other factors have also contributed to the transmission and mortality of the
disease. Global capitalism and the frenetic movement of people and goods that
it entails; an endemic lack of funding (or plain privatisation) of public
healthcare systems all over; cultural inclination to frequent socialising; and
most importantly, widespread lack of access to basic goods such as healthy food
or clean water and air. Critical geographers already discovered decades ago that
natural disasters are not purely natural, but to a great extent they are socially
constructed. Or as Neil Smith, in his account of hurricane Katrina, puts it –
natural disasters don’t just create indiscriminate destruction, “[r]ather they
deepen and erode the ruts of social difference they encounter”2.

From disasters to solidarity

But there’s a more hopeful side to natural disasters which seems to be
reproduced across temporal and geographical scales: the outstanding popular
responses based on solidarity and cooperation. In this extreme situations in
which the social order is temporarily broken, people tend to organise together in
order to fulfil each other’s basic needs and ensure their collective survival3.
Whilst there’s goodwill in all the help being offered, the current pandemic is
proving that it’s not enough. A clear lack of experience in political involvement
and community organising by most of the population is undermining mutual
aid efforts in the UK.
Take as an example WhatsApp groups created to connect residents of the same
street or area in several cities, which have become the locus of popular self-
organisation in times of Covid-19. Whereas they might be useful to help some
people in self-isolation access basic goods, their reach is very limited. They
embody a type of solidarity which, even if necessary, is insufficient because it is

1 Rob Wallace (2016). Big farms make big flu: dispatches on influenza, agribusiness, and the
nature of science. NYU Press.
2 https://items.ssrc.org/understanding-katrina/theres-no-such-thing-as-a-natural-disaster/
3 Rebeca Solnit (2010). A Paradise Built In Hell. The Extraordinary Communities That Arise
In Disaster. Penguin Books.

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exclusively based in locality, which is translated in a lack of coordination among

networks. Moreover, unequal access and ability to use technology or lack of time
to follow conversations are factors that, when not taken seriously, prevent many
members of the community from being actively involved. In the end, these
groups tend to become taken over by a few residents who dominate the
interactions and/or modify the scope of the group – and with it its potential
effectiveness.

How to organise a solidarity kitchen

Aware of these dynamics, and of the fact that structure and purpose are key
factors in mutual aid efforts, Cooperation Birmingham4 has recently brought
together several grassroots organisations and workers’ cooperatives to create a
solidarity kitchen. Funded with donations collected through an online
platform5, we offer warm meals to people in self-isolation in Birmingham. We
ask no questions and we take no money, we practice solidarity without
conditions.

4 https://cooperationbirmingham.org.uk/
5 https://www.gofundme.com/f/cooperation-birmingham-mutual-aid-kitchen

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Source: Sean Farmelo

Securing access to a professional kitchen

Two infrastructural dimensions are basic in the organisation of the Cooperation
Birmingham solidarity kitchen: physical and political infrastructures. As
obvious as it may sound, in order to provide cooked meals you need a kitchen,
the bigger and better suited, the more meals you will be able to provide. Key to
the success of the project, thus, is the participation of the Warehouse Cafe, a
centrally located cafe, organised as a workers’ cooperative and home base to
several leftist and environmental organisations. The temporary closure of the
business when the pandemic started has given us access to a professional
kitchen.

Social measures encourage solidarity

Besides providing a kitchen, many of the workers of the cafe (including the
chefs) are contributing with their labour to the project. They are currently
furloughed, and that allows them to concentrate efforts on the project. But not

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only cafe workers, over 100 people contribute regularly to the project by cooking
food, cleaning the kitchen, delivering meals and doing backroom work. This
constantly expanding group is mostly composed of people who are not able to
engage in waged labour in the current situation. This fact shows the real
importance of adopting social measures directed to covering the basic needs of
workers, as they encourage solidarity and mutual aid and have an impact that
surpasses economic calculations.

Organising – horizontal, practical and open

As for political infrastructures, the experience in organising of most of our
members is key for the success of the project. We work on an ideally horizontal
but practically layered structure of decision-making in which decisions are made
by a mix of consensus and pressing-need. The main decisions are made in open
online meetings that take place usually weekly. For smaller issues related to the
daily operations we have created working groups that have a certain degree of
autonomy and specific tasks assigned. We also hold regular feedback meetings
with participants, where important operational issues are raised but also bring
humanity and care to the tasks of the people involved. The assessment of the
operations in the open meetings allows all members to reflect on the general
direction of the project, but also on specific practical matters.
Thus, the fluid interaction between open meetings, working groups and
participants avoids the accumulation of power and ensures that the political
orientation of the project remains in the correct path. It is important to
acknowledge that all political infrastructures are open, and we encourage both
participants and users of the kitchen to join a working group and attend to the
organising meetings.

Communication
Crucial for the smooth functioning of our political infrastructures is technology.
We have an open online forum6 where whoever is interested in joining the
solidarity kitchen, or just curious about it, is able to see at a glimpse the form of
our political structure, join a working group and read the minutes of the
meetings. We also make use of social media, which is key for reaching new users
and recruiting participants. And of course, instant messaging apps provide a
much needed bridge between political and physical infrastructures. We are
aware of different degrees of confidence when using technology, so we offer
personalised training to everyone interested and make sure that important
information is available in different formats. A financial update is published
weekly, and there is a section on the forum where all decisions are compiled,
including how and by whom they were taken in order to ensure accountability.
Transparency is one of our core values, and we take it very seriously.

6 https://forum.cooperationbirmingham.org.uk/

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Councils externalising social services onto the commons

However, our solidarity kitchen is far from perfect. We understand the project
as a process in which we try to learn from our mistakes and adjust to the needs
and abilities of the people involved. It has been difficult to deal with a huge
workload and different levels of involvement that have led some organisers to
the edge of burnout very soon. However, we have been put in a very difficult
situation by the Birmingham city council, which is denying responsibility and
relying on the commons to respond to the crisis. Instead of setting a relief
operation of sufficient scale that would reach most of the vulnerable population
in Birmingham, the city council has been systemically directing people to
community efforts like ours. After our second day of operation, the council
started referring calls to us, which meant a surge of over 500% in food requests
from one day to next. At the same time we received a call from a council worker
vaguely offering support to our solidarity kitchen. However, we are aware of the
history of cooptation and institutional intrusion within social movements in the
city, so we decided to decline their offer. The early spike on the number of
requests caused a great disruption to the solidarity kitchen. We felt
overburdened with a responsibility that should not fall on us and was
disproportionate with our capacity at the moment, and that paid a toll on our
physical and emotional well-being. After capping our daily deliveries to around
150 meals, we are currently involving new members, recruiting participants and
looking for infrastructures that ensure the sustainability of the project and allow
a controlled expansion while ensuring a certain degree of autonomy.

A perspective beyond the current crisis

Even if the cost comes high, this systemic externalisation of social services onto
the commons makes the existence of politicised mutual aid projects like ours
more important than ever. Because our purpose is not just to respond to the
current crisis, we need to look beyond. What awaits after the immediate public
health emergency is an economic crisis of unprecedented magnitude that will
change the capitalist system as we know it. Socio-economical reconfigurations
that follow disasters and crises traditionally offer “an opportunity for elites to
recapture and even intensify their power”7. However, critical events such as the
current pandemic can also pave the ground for the emergence of ‘moments of
excess’ in which existing patterns of oppression and resistance crystallise to
expand the realm of possibility and produce new subjectivities8. We need to
seize the window of opportunity that is now opening. We need popular mutual
aid efforts such as Cooperation Birmingham to become strong alternative
institutions that take power from political elites and redistribute it among the
working class. We need to have a major role in writing the new rules of the

7 Ashley Dawson (2017: 257). Extreme cities: The peril and promise of urban life in the age of
climate change. Verso Books.
8 Free Association (2011). Moments of Excess: movements, protest and everyday life. PM
Press.

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world to come. A world defined by the worst economic crisis of our times and by
climate change, an uncertain world in which the elaborate system of social
ordering will start to crack9. A world of hope.

Update
This article was written during the first week of April 2020. By the end of May of
the same year, Cooperation Birmingham has already delivered over 8,000 meals
to people in self-isolation in the city. The project has also expanded with the
inclusion of a mask-making operation and the production of a weekly newsletter
open to participants and food recipients.

Acknowledgements
An early version of this article was published in Pirate Care. I have received
funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation
programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 765389. I
also acknowledge that many people (mostly women) have contributed to my
social reproduction beyond waged labour, and they are not subsidising fossil
fuel infrastructures or migration policing programmes.

About the author

Sergio Ruiz Cayuela is a Marie Skłodowska Curie fellow at the Centre for
Agroecology, Water and Resilience - Coventry University, where he conducts his
PhD on the expansion of emancipatory urban commons. He is a member of Plan
C and is involved in several community groups and organisations such as
Reclaiming the Coventry Canal and Cooperation Birmingham.

9 John Holloway (2010). Crack Capitalism. Pluto Press.

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Volume 12 (1):310 – 316 (July 2020) Nichols, Locked out of the prison classroom

On lockdown and locked out of the prison classroom:

the prospects of post-secondary education for
incarcerated persons during pandemic
Clinton Nichols (18th June 2020)

Covid-19 has prompted advocates for post-secondary education in American

prisons to focus their activism on the wellbeing of their students as prisons and
jails have become vectors for infection. Incarcerated persons lack access to
adequate healthcare and the ability to practice preventative measures like social
distancing and basic hygiene. In the United States, prisons and jails account for
nearly 75% of the top fifty congregate sites of known infections (New York
Times 2020). Incarcerated persons, their families, activists and medical
professionals have raised alarm about the spread of the virus. Since mid-March
2020, incarcerated persons and supporters working through grassroots
organizations have conducted more than 120 actions to demand improved
sanitary conditions, immediate release, and increased coronavirus testing in the
United States (UCLA Law Project 2020). Activists have also raised funds to
donate soap, hand sanitizer, and face coverings for persons caged in jails and
prisons in states like Illinois as one example.1 Among these supporters are
teachers who volunteer their time and expertise to offer classes inside prisons
and jails. Prison education programs adjusted quickly by stopping the term or
transitioning to a correspondence pedagogy. The ability to sustain educational
opportunities during this pandemic may prove in jeopardy. This reflection
outlines the status of prison education in the United States before identifying
the challenges that lay ahead and suggesting that innovations may result in
closing rather than expanding classroom doors to incarcerated persons.
Activists will need to develop new strategies to sustain and amplify arguments
for the expansion of educational opportunities for persons caged in American
prisons and jails.
The American federal system of government delegates responsibility for
education and crime control to states and local governmental units. This system
has resulted in more than 50 different state-level prison systems for felony
convictions and more than 3,100 county-level jails for persons awaiting trial or
serving misdemeanor convictions. With almost 85% of incarcerated persons
caged in state prisons and local jails (Sawyer and Wagner 2020), access to the
classroom as a way to promote rehabilitation, societal re-entry, and ending mass
incarceration requires activism at the level of state and local governments.
Studies have consistently shown that prison education reduces significantly the
likelihood of recidivism, but educational programs in American prisons and jails
only reached 12% of incarcerated persons at its highest point in the late 1970s
(Wright 2001). Ironically by 1982, when the greatest number of post-secondary
programs inside prisons and jails peaked at 350, only 27,000 persons
representing 9% of the total population of incarcerated adults and juveniles
were enrolled in classes (Robinson and English 2017). Consequently, twelve

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programs that offered degree granting programs to incarcerated persons

expanded by the year 1982 to 350 programs operating in every state. In that
year approximately 27,000 persons, representing almost 9% of the total
population of incarcerated adults and juveniles in the country, were receiving
some form of post-secondary education. American lawmakers decimated post-
secondary and vocational programs with Congressional passage of the 1994
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. This law made incarcerated
persons ineligible for federal financial aid to cover tuition which college and
universities had come to rely on after decades of declining support from state
governments. By 1997 only eight colleges and universities had continued their
programs; over the next eighteen years this number grew to forty-one largely
due to the generosity of private donors and volunteers (Sawyer and Wagner
2020). Under a presidential executive order by the Obama administration,
federal financial aid started in 2015 as a pilot program enabling 4,000
incarcerated persons to take undergraduate or vocational classes (Robinson and
English 2017). The current administration has expanded this initiative but
without Congressional repeal of the 1994 law federal support remains tenuous.
The emergence of the novel coronavirus in American prisons and jails earlier
this year resulted in quick and ongoing changes to the delivery of educational
programs. Structural factors such as a state’s dominant ideology about
incarceration, the degree of demographic similarity between incarcerated and
non-incarcerated populations, and the nature of the working relationship
between education program leaders and prison or jail authorities also shape this
response. The classes run by the University of Maine at Augusta exemplifies a
situation where instructors found supportive partners in that state’s prison
authorities. When prisons in Maine entered lockdown, prison staff at different
facilities agreed to extend ethernet cables into classrooms, even at the maximum
security facility, so that instructors could meet smaller groups of students via
online meeting platforms (Weissman 2020). This cooperation is not simply a
matter of a cooperative relationship between university faculty and prison
authorities. This situation also stems in part from the Maine’s status as one of
two states where incarcerated persons retain the right to vote regardless of the
conviction (Lewis 2019) and the demographic racial similarity between its
imprisoned population and the state’s general population living outside sites of
incarceration.
Another structural reality for sustaining educational programs during the
pandemic centers on the material commitment prisons are willing to make.
Southside Virginia Community College operates College Within Walls (CWW)
program at Lunenburg Correctional Center. CWW had developed a residential
learning model before the pandemic. The prison authorities dedicated a single
housing unit for 90 men to live together while they are enrolled in classes. This
dormitory-like setting includes seven teaching assistants who have graduated
from this program. CWW students enjoy access to laptops, a quiet study
environment, and support from fellow students and the teaching assistants
(SVCC 2020). Committing physical infrastructure to has enabled this program

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to mitigate the abrupt end to in-person learning that most programs had to
adopt across the United States.
The response to Covid-19 by educational programs and prisons and jails in
Maine and by Southside Virginia Community College suggest exceptional
innovations. Most programs and prisons very quickly shutdown classroom
learning and switched to correspondence learning. Lyle May’s experience
(2020, 2019) as correspondence student on North Carolina’s death row
highlights the challenges that come with this learning model. Contending with
the noise, lack of space, and the lack of technology to study and complete
assignments are obstacles inherent to confinement (May 2020). May also
identifies how correspondence courses elevate the role and power of prison staff
in ways that are instructive of the challenges outside educational programs will
encounter as the pandemic continues. Prison staff had to communicate with
instructors on his behalf, sign registration forms, receive his course materials,
send assignments, designate an exam proctor, and maintain his academic
records for case manager, the court, and parole board (May 2019).
In-person classroom interaction as a pedagogy draws its strength from the
dialogic interaction between students and instructors. Unexpected learning
emerges for all participants. Instructors also gained insights about incarceration
by momentarily experiencing humiliations such as the procedure correctional
officers use to check visitors are not carrying anything unauthorized into or out
of a prison or jail, seeing the physical condition of the facilities, and by hearing
the accounts of daily life from their incarcerated students (Walker 2004).
Ositelu (2020) notes that face-to-face learning reconnects students to their
humanity as instructors see the potential for intellectual and personal
development. The abrupt turn to correspondence learning ended these multi-
faceted forms of witnessing that instructors bring back to the outside world and
that students share with the outside through their writing, artwork, and
performances.
The short-term impact of the novel coronavirus has involved restricted visitor
access and a shift to a correspondence model of education for many
incarcerated students. While the long-term impact of this infectious disease is
not fully known, supporters for prison education must be prepared that a
therapeutic regimen or even a vaccine will not return everything to the status
quo ante. Innovative solutions such as extending greater access to technology to
students, segregating students into a separate housing unit, and cooperative
partnerships with prison authorities will remain exceptional. Three issues loom
large for educational programs and their proponents: constrained prison
budgets, privatization of medical concern, and vaccine prioritization.
Prisons will face constrained budgets in the next few years as the economy
suffers from outbreaks that disrupt the sources of revenue state and local
governments rely on. Prison authorities will not have funds to modify
classrooms and other spaces for face to face instruction that meet health
guidelines. Prisons have already failed to provide adequate amounts of
cleansing supplies to incarcerated persons (IL-CHEP 2020; PNAP 2020). It is

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unrealistic that these institutions will install infrastructure to adequately expand

access to monitored internet for students to use through tables, laptops, or
modified computer labs. Non-profit educational organizations will have to take
the lead in funding these efforts. Forms of online instruction also create new
and more robust opportunities for prison authorities to surveil students, which
has already happened through email systems available to incarcerated persons
(see Raher 2016).
Pushing medical concerns onto volunteer instructors and teaching organizations
will be one way that prison authorities respond to Covid-19. Once prisons have
lifted lockdowns there will still be restrictions on visitors and increased efforts
to conduct basic health screening such as a temperature check. Classroom
learning inside prisons and jails will not resume until prison authorities have
developed more protocols. Volunteer instructors will face heightened scrutiny
since a course running for a 14-week semester necessitates recurring visits to a
prison or jail. One possibility involves voluntary educational programs to
maintain and provide up to date documentation about instructors’ test results.
Only instructors who test negative, have Covid antibodies would have
permission to enter the prison to teach a class. While there is no cost for testing
now, it is likely that private insurance companies will raise costs over time for
Covid testing. In this way non-profit organizations and their volunteer teachers
will need to consider how to bear these costs for regular testing.
Where prison staff and incarcerated persons fall in the order of importance to
receive a vaccine once one (or more) is available will influence any return to
face-to-face teaching. If frontline prison officers are not included among doctors
and other first responders, correctional officers through their labor unions will
oppose efforts to expand the number of outsiders who can enter prisons beyond
lawyers who have a constitutional right to see clients. The availability of a
vaccine will also become the gold standard that prison authorities will rely on to
permit outside educators to resume teaching inside jails and prisons. Outside
educational programs can expect limited availability of instructors until
vaccination of the general population has started. Prison authorities will likely
demand instructors show proof of vaccination just as it is a common
requirement for volunteers to provide test results that they are free of
tuberculosis. Satisfying universal demand for a vaccine will take more than a
year especially if more than one dose is necessary to achieve immunity. Unless
the federal government coordinates the efforts of manufacturers to produce the
vaccine and necessary related supplies, and the distribution of these items to
medical facilities. The haphazard response to the first wave of Covid-19, in
which state governors competed against each other for the procurement of
supplies and equipment, suggests that vaccination will be as troubled as it was
for the polio cure (Conis et al 2020).
Relying almost entirely on voluntary efforts to offer post-secondary classes
inside prisons and jails, prison education in the United States had begun to
expand under tentative federal support. The advent of Covid-19 presents major
challenges with the abrupt transition from classroom instruction to

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correspondence learning for students housed in jails and prisons. Effective

advocacy for post-secondary education in prisons and jails will require pursuing
closer, and in some cases unusual, collaborations. Prison authorities are viable
partners only in situations where maximizing the learning opportunities does
not result in strengthening the punitive or surveillance power of these
institutions. Improving ties with other organizations that run programs inside
prisons and jails presents another opportunity. In many prisons and jails a
chaplain’s office coordinates programming for multiple faith communities.
Advocates for prison education can seek to strengthen ties to these religious
groups by drawing on their university’s historic religious affiliation if applicable.
The urgent health concern Covid-19 presents to incarcerated persons invites
working with congregations to donate items like soap and face coverings while
also informing faith communities about the importance of and ways to support
secular educational opportunities inside prisons and jails.
Responding to Covid-19 also presents opportunities for coalition building
among universities operating educational programs within the same facility and
across a state. The presence of multiple post-secondary educational programs
within a prison or jail is less frequent but this situation raises the prospect for
coalition building among universities. Stateville Correctional Center, a
maximum-security prison near Chicago, hosts five different academic programs.
Lockdown at this facility has compelled greater logistical cooperation.
Administrators from the five different programs are in greater communication
with each other so that one person travels to collect or return student
assignments for multiple programs. These university programs can deepen this
cooperation by issuing joint media statements and reports, and co-organizing
local public events. At the statewide level, university programs can work
together to amplify their concerns about incarceration and about the need for
increased educational opportunities to state lawmakers and gubernatorial
leadership. Nonetheless proponents for prison education will need to be
mindful that the current heightened attention to the failures in the American
criminal justice system will not lead to immediate reforms. Student access to
classrooms in prisons and jails will likely remain limited and or even decline
during this pandemic and its immediate aftermath. At its zenith educational
programs for incarcerated persons reached only 12% of the American prison
population (Wright 2001). This statistic speaks to the ongoing challenge of
seeing persons in prisons and jails as inherently worthy to learn and of the need
to fundamentally change, if not abolish imprisonment.

References
Elena Conis, Michael McCoyd and Jessie A. Moravek (2020) “What to Expect
When a Coronavirus Vaccine Finally Arrives” New York Times (20 May 2020).
URL, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/20/opinion/coronavirus-vaccine-
polio.html Retrieved on 20 May 2020.

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Illinois Coalition for Higher Education in Prison (2020) “COVID19 and Higher
Education in Illinois Prisons” URL, https://ilchep.org/ Retrieved on 15 June
2020.
Illinois Coalition for Higher Education in Prison (2020) “Join IL-CHEP in
getting much-needed hand sanitizer into Illinois prisons!” URL,
https://ilchep.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Sanitizer-One-Pager-_IL-
CHEP-1.pdf Retrieved on 15 June 2020.
Lewis, Nicole (2019) “In just two states, all prisoners can vote. Here’s why few
do” The Marshall Project. URL,
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/06/11/in-just-two-states-all-
prisoners-can-vote-here-s-why-few-do Retrieved on 15 June 2020.
May, L (2019) “Prison officials cut off higher education for people on North
Carolina’s death row” Scalawag Magazine URL,
https://www.scalawagmagazine.org/2019/10/prison-education/ Retrieved 5
June 2020.
May, L (2020) “A prisoner describes his and other inmates’ struggles for access
to higher education” Inside Higher Ed URL,
https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2020/03/18/prisoner-describes-his-
and-other-inmates-struggles-access-higher-education-opinion Retrieved on 2
June 2020
New York Times (2020) “Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count,
Hundreds of thousands of cases traced to clusters” URL,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-
cases.html#hotspots Retrieved on 13 June 2020.
Ositelu, Monique (2020) “What Covid-19 means for incarcerated students:
Isolation, Uncertainty, and a Loss Sense of Humanity” New America. URL,
https://www.newamerica.org/education-policy/edcentral/what-covid-19-
means-incarcerated-students/ Retrieved on 2 June 2020.
Prison and Neighborhood Art Project (2020) “COVID-19 Emergency Response
Efforts” URL, https://p-nap.org/donate.html Retrieved on 15 June 2020.
Raher, Stephen (2016) “You’ve got mail: The promise of cyber communication
in prisons and the need for regulation” Prison Policy Initiative (26 January
2016). URL, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/messaging/report.html
Robinson, G and E English (2017) “The Second Chance Pell Pilot Program: A
Historical Overview” American Enterprise Institute. URL,
https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/The-Second-Chance-Pell-
Pilot-Program.pdf#page=2 Retrieved on 15 June 2020.
Sawyer, W and P Wagner (2020) “Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020”
Prison Policy Initiative URL,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html Retrieved on 15 June
2020.

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Southside Virginia Community College (SVCC) (2020) “Campus Within Walls”

URL, https://southside.edu/campus-within-walls Retrieved on 10 June 2020.
UCLA Law Covid-19 Behind Bars Data Project (2020) “Grassroots and Other
Organizing Efforts” Jordan Palmer, Content Moderator URL,
https://law.ucla.edu/centers/criminal-justice/criminal-justice-
program/related-programs/covid-19-behind-bars-data-project/ Retrieved on 13
June 2020.
Walker, Jan (2004) Dancing to the Concertina’s Tune: A Prison Teacher’s
Memoir. Northeastern University Press.
Weissman, Sara (2020) “How will the coronavirus change higher eduation for
incarcerated students?” Diverse Issues in Higher Education URL,
https://diverseeducation.com/article/176769/. Retrieved 14 May 2020.
Wright, M (2001) “Pell Grants, Politics and the Penitentiary” Journal of
Correctional Education 52(1):11-16.

About the author

Clinton Nichols is assistant professor in the Department of Sociology &
Criminology at Dominican University. His doctoral research focused on the
intersection between the informal economy and informal housing in the lives of
Windhoek, Namibia’s poorest residents. Since 2017, he has volunteered as an
instructor with Prison & Neighborhood Arts Project (PNAP). This non-profit
organization offers liberal arts courses at Stateville Correctional Center, a
maximum-security prison located 30 miles from Chicago. Through exhibitions
and publications PNAP shares incarcerated students’ visual art, literary work,
and essays in galleries and community centers throughout Chicago’s
neighborhoods. For more information about PNAP or to donate to its Covid-19
relief efforts, please visit https://p-nap.org/.

1IL-CHEP (Illinois Coalition for Higher Education in Prison) reported on its website that the
Illinois Department of Corrections requested in-kind donations that could assist incarcerated
persons to have better access to soap and hand sanitizer (URL: https://ilchep.org/ and
https://ilchep.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Sanitizer-One-Pager-_IL-CHEP-1.pdf, 15
June 2020). Chicago-based Prison & Neighborhood Art Project reported that more than $4,000
in contributions enabled donation of 4,000 units of soap and six gallons of hand sanitizer to
incarcerated men at Stateville Correctional Center at the end of March 2020 (Covid-19
Emergency Response Efforts, https://p-nap.org/donate.html, 15 June 2020).

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Solidarity forever?
Performing mutual aid in Leipzig, Germany
Micha Fiedlschuster and Leon Rosa Reichle
(4th June 2020)

Keywords: COVID-19; Solidarity; Germany; Mutual Aid

Introduction
The global pandemic COVID-19 not only started a discussion on the crisis of
health systems around the world, it also brought a discourse on solidarity to the
fore. The World Health Organization (WHO) called on global solidarity. Asking
for donations for a Solidarity Response Fund, the WHO has named its clinical
trial “solidarity”. European solidarity meant treating some French and Italian
patients in German hospitals (also in Leipzig) but economic aid is still debated
controversially. The German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that “since the
Second World War, there has not been a challenge for our country in which action
in a spirit of solidarity on our part was so important” (Address to the nation,
March 18, 2020).
The political discourse on solidarity remained poor in content, mainly restricted
to issues of charity; more significantly, this discourse continued to be largely
detached from existing discussions and practices of social movements and the
Left.
As a scholar on social movement democracy and an activist scholar working on
neighbourhood relations, we are curious about the political and transformative
potential of solidarity in action during this crisis. Hence, we analyse different
initiatives of mutual aid during the pandemic in our city. In Leipzig, a city of
600,000 in Eastern Germany, the number of infections are relatively low (about
600 cases in May 2020) but the social consequences are enormous. On March 17
all public events were banned and a week later an almost complete lockdown
came into effect. It was partially lifted on April 20 and public life re-opened with
restrictions on May 4. The right to protest and assemble was banned for most of
the time.
We first give a short overview of concepts of solidarity, providing a lens to analyse
the mutual-aid groups. Second, we discuss six cases with differing political
backgrounds and organizational set ups. We wanted to capture their experience
during the crisis and their analytical and practical conceptualizations of
solidarity.1

1
Our research is based on six interviews that we conducted May 11 - 15, 2020. We would like to
thank our interview partners for their time and their effort to help other people during COVID-
19. We would also like to thank Alia Somani and Helena Flam for comments on the draft.

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Three types of solidarity

In this section, we present three types of solidarity to guide our empirical
findings. Even if we cannot review the rich discourse on solidarity here, we outline
some important variations.2
Solidarity as (or based on) shared identity has been recently criticized as
exclusive, explicitly in the context of COVID-19 (August, 2020). The critique
relies on perspectives of Richard Sennett, who since his early writing condemned
community solidarity as a purification tool neglecting differences in a shared ‘we’
(Sennett, 1973). Yet others interpret shared identities as less fixed, highlighting
merely a necessity of shared experience for collective identification and solidarity
(Mühe, 2019), or, even more radically pluralist, use feminist theories to define
solidarity as an attachment possible despite or even because of difference
(Bargetz, et al. 2019).
August (2020) is equally critical on solidarity as compassion and a moral
duty, its disregard leading to sanctions. This evokes a kind of Durkheimian
notion of pre-modern solidarity. Nuss’ (2020) take on solidarity as compassion is
less judgemental, framing it as taking responsibility for one another.
Finally, solidarity as political practice is the perspective, we, as critical
scholars and activists have worked most with so far. It is defined as a relation of
a shared struggle against oppression (Featherstone, 2012), a struggle for the same
goals, positioned against something or someone specific (Nuss, 2020) or, on
more universalist terms, based on an analysis of a concrete universalism implying
that all are concerned differently by the same oppressive society (Adamczak,
2018; Meißner, 2016; Mühe, 2019; Struwe, 2019).
As we show below, these different variations help to analyse the differences of the
mutual-aid groups in Leipzig.

Please, let me help you: six cases of solidarity

Witnessing the popping up of solidarity initiatives, both by existent and newly
forming groups in Leipzig, and following their trajectories, the first impression is
that all are doing the same thing: they are encouraging mutual help with practical
daily life tasks complicated either through the virus itself (for those with highest
risk) or the respective measures. Another commonality is that relatively few
people use their services. The differences lie in the ideological framework, the
organizational philosophy, the target groups, and the time horizon of action. We
discuss these differences alongside the aforementioned conceptualizations of
solidarity.

2
On the non-fixity of the concept, its contested nature and permanent need for reconstruction
see Wallaschek, 2019; Bargetz, et al. 2019 or Mühe, 2019. For a recent discussion of exclusive
and inclusive/transversal forms of solidarity in the context of migration see Schwiertz and
Schwenken, 2020.

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Solidarity based on shared identity

One initiative in particular has grown out of a shared identity: the legal-help
collective of the local soccer club BSG Chemie, which was formed in 2014 as a
response to harsh police brutality towards fans and ultras. When their work
slowed down in the face of COVID-19, they thought “what can we do, we are quite
an organized group, have a network, how can we use it?”3 Their aim was “to come
out of the crisis strengthened, initially the idea was for the Chemie fans.” Asked
what solidarity means, the interview person laughs and says “of course it means
that we are there for one another within the fan-scene [...] and support one
another.”
Providing their infrastructure for a helpline, setting up chat groups and drafting
flyers for neighbourhood mutual help, they were quickly discovered by the local
public health department. It was the pragmatic cooperation with this department
that provided them with their only help requests. Adapting to the situation, their
focus shifted, “it got a bit more global, throughout the whole city and outside of
the scene.” Their highlight was supporting a financially precarious family in
quarantine and organizing Easter presents for the kids: their large network
gathered such a massive lot of presents, that they redistributed it to several
refugee shelters and the local food bank.
They were not discouraged by the low demand (“we are happy if a majority stays
healthy”), but have adapted their work through, for example, encouraging blood
donations which went down in the pandemic and asking people to donate the
remuneration to food banks or the local women’s shelter “because through our
big network we just reach many folks.”
Therefore, even if grown out of and based on a strong shared identity as soccer
fans, their solidarity quickly became more universal and supportive of all those
in need they could identify. Their solidarity is shaped by compassion: “in the fan-
support we simply like to support people and [...] have an inner drive to do so”,
but also a political critique. Besides their pragmatic mutual help, they continued
critical evaluation of state measures “we also wrote texts on how to deal with
constraints of freedom and observe many policing measures critically.”

Solidarity as compassion
The group Nachbarn für Nachbarn (Neighbours for Neighbours) operates in the
quarters Schleußig and Plagwitz, the former being of Leipzig few central middle-
class neighbourhoods and the latter becoming one too. The group did not exist
before the Corona crisis and was initiated through an individual’s appeal in an
online social network. Its members set up a Telegram chat group for coordinating
help and a phone line as an access point. The service was made public mainly
through flyers. The main target group are the elderly who they identified in
accordance with the public authorities as those who need help most. The group

3
The interviews were conducted in German. All quotes were translated by the authors.

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responded to an estimated eight requests so far and at least in one case the help
for grocery shopping lasts until today. Despite low numbers of requests they will
continue their work because they want to be ready for further expected waves of
mass infections.
The intention of the group can be characterized as offering help without political
attachments.
Friedrich, one of the two interview partners, stressed that they do not want to
create a formalized organizational structure or engage in political activities. They
decided against social media activity, arguing that it is too time-consuming.
Similarly, the group sees internal discussions as detrimental to the organization
of help. As Friedrich explains, the group has about 30 members and they practice
a form of direct democracy where decisions are taken by majority vote in a
Telegram chat group.
Their solidarity can be characterized as a form of compassion or felt responsibility
for people in need. The two interview partners pointed out that their Christian
world-view is a source of motivation but this is not generalizable for the group
which they characterized as being diverse. They want to avoid labels in order to
be as open and approachable as possible and to avoid in-group conflicts. When
asked about the term solidarity, Friedrich said that the core idea of solidarity is
to help the needy, which he sees as their source of motivation. However, they do
not use the term because it is used by other groups in Leipzig and because of its
socialist legacy. Charity, altruism and a moral duty to help are more accurate to
describe the group’s ideational framework than solidarity.
The non-political setup of the group did not save them from a significant conflict.
The initiator of the group, who saw himself as a leading figure, started posting
political messages and became involved in the organization of protests against
the government restrictions. These protests are associated with the new right and
conspiracy theory. At first, the group tried to discipline his activity within the
group, without excluding him. But when he did not follow their request to abstain
from political postings in the group, tried to obtain a leadership role, and when
the group became associated with his political activities by the public, the
members decided to create a new group under a new name and thus excluded the
initiator from its ranks. The conflict within this group can be understood as
reflecting the growing polarization within the broader population itself around
the issue of restrictions and their appropriateness. Interestingly, this conflict,
both within the group and within the broader society, is not between the left and
the right but rather between the political mainstream and the new right.
Whereas this group does not want to be a vehicle for social change and its
temporal horizon is the pandemic, the following groups aim in different ways at
transforming society.

Solidarity as political struggle for transforming society

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The foundation Ecken wecken (Awaking Corners, https://stiftung-ecken-

wecken.de/) is located in the Western part of Leipzig but offers help city-wide.
Similar to other initiatives, they set up a help platform and a phone line. Specific
here is that they use professional software (constituent-relationship
management, as it is called in the non-profit sector) to coordinate help efficiently.
On May 20, 2020 they counted 1,115 supporters and had answered 225 calls for
help since they started on March 15, 2020.
The foundation pursues a collaborative approach towards local politicians and
bureaucracy to implement projects for community development. They can be
located in the tradition of a reformist way of community organizing which has
roots in the US civil rights movements and has been introduced to Germany more
than 10 years ago (see e.g. Penta, 2007). At the same time, they also market their
solution for mutual aid to other organizations and cities in Germany. This situates
them closer to the field of NGOs in development aid which often provide model
solutions that are marketable.
The foundation’s work during COVID-19 can be classified as charity (just like that
of many other, also more radical left groups) and solidarity is not an explicit
concept that they use. Yet their long-term goal has a transformative dimension.
Similarly to many other initiatives in the world, they seek to democratize
representative democracy by strengthening political agency through increased
citizen participation in the existing political system (Fiedlschuster, 2018, p. 245;
see also Fung and Wright, 2003; Santos, 2005).
Whereas Ecken wecken seeks moderate social change and aims at becoming
recognized by the local authorities and politicians, the next group set up a state-
independent redistributive system.
Direct.support Leipzig (https://leipzig.directsupport.care/en/), which is
modelled after groups in Berlin and Halle, connects people with money with
people in a financial crisis. They set up a simple way of redistributing money:
someone, who self-identifies as needing money urgently (they do not restrict help
to but explicitly encourage people who are exposed to structural discrimination),
contacts the group. The group organizes what they call ‘bidding rounds’ among
the supporters in a Telegram group to collect the money, which is then directly
transferred from the supporters to the person in need. They started at the
beginning of April, 2020, have around 100 supporters and helped about 17
people. The process is as anonymous as possible to protect the people in need,
which raises the question of how to establish long-term exchanges and how to go
beyond a mere monetary redistribution. Nevertheless, they try to fill a gap in the
allocation of state-run emergency funds, which are inaccessible for some.
The group has not had the time (yet) to discuss a common understanding of
solidarity. Whereas for the one interview partner the charity aspect and their
involvement in other initiatives of solidarity economy seemed to be the
motivation to take action, the other interview partner stressed that being
solidaristic involves being against social injustices and questioning own
privileges. Direct.support Leipzig sees solidarity as a political practice connected

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with an anti-capitalist critique and their long term goal is to promote the idea of
redistribution in general and not only during crises.
A similarly radical transformative approach characterizes the work of two
initiatives in Leipzig’s East. One of them is a Telegram chat group Leipzig Ost
Solidarisch (Leipzig East Solidary) with 860 members, set up by three friends,
self-identifying as “politically engaged people” who adapted their activism to
COVID-19 and the restrictions which accompanied it. Initially they wanted to
coordinate neighbourhood mutual help especially for people in high risk of
COVID-19, but being confronted with the difficulty to reach those in need, the
group served mainly as a platform for sharing information material. This ranged
from inspirational leaflets from groups in other cities to comics for explaining
COVID-19 to kids, and flyers with hotlines about domestic violence. Once the
group shared a call for volunteers from the food bank and “shortly after we posted
it, the food banks contacted us and told us to immediately stop sending people,
they were being flooded by help-offers”. Also, an initiative for Gabenzäune (gift-
fences) grew out of the group. Its volunteers arrange different material donations
for homeless people in a given public space.
The problem of reach did not discourage them but “made us question how
political work can better reach those people it refers to.” For the organizers,
solidarity is “unconditional mutual support based on a perceived form of
injustice, and it is not limited to any group membership, except maybe certain
political attitudes.” This probably refers to far right or racist attitudes.
They quickly established a cooperation with friends from another initiative we
interviewed, the Poliklinik. With a core group of 15-20 people from different
medical and social professions, this “solidary medical centre” was supposed to
open right when COVID-19 started to spread in Germany. Their idea is “that you
can only change health via social conditions - we think that social determinants
make you sick, like housing conditions, working conditions, racism.” Therefore,
they explicitly chose the neighbourhood Schönefeld as their area of activity a
location because people here are maybe more marginalized than for example in
Schleußig.”
First being resigned about the interruption of their work through COVID-19, they
quickly established a specific COVID-19 task force preparing neighbourhood
action through a phone line, the organization and distribution of self-made masks
and the distribution of information material about the governmental restrictions,
translated to many different languages. Our interview partner explains: “We want
to support solidary neighbourhood help, so people get empowered, especially in
times of such intense isolation, also people without internet or who don’t speak
German fluently, […] so they don’t suffer even more, […] we want to build
structures and simultaneously utter our criticism, because we are now doing the
work, that should actually be done by the state.”
Whilst receiving many support offers, their assessment was that “like in all other
groups” they were in touch with, demand for help was quite low. They distributed
flyers extensively in the neighbourhood, yet “especially elderly people sometimes

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eye us critically, this new left wing project, and maybe, I’m not sure, people in
need sometimes find it even harder to accept help […] or it’s simply distrust. Or
maybe people already have good support structures.” Yet, they were happy to have
done so much publicity work and astonished at the positive feedback they
received, especially by employees of refugee shelters for the translation of
information.
Similarly as in the other groups, “what remains is the question of how you reach
people.” Replying to the question about solidarity, the interviewee says: “generally
we work against an unjust system, where the responsibility is dumped off onto
the individual. But of course we’re changing that on a small scale, we won’t
manage to change the whole system - unfortunately (laughs).”
To sum up, whereas Ecken wecken hopes for reforms in the established political
system of representative democracy, the remaining three groups (direct.support
Leipzig, Leipzig Ost Solidarisch, Poliklinik) have a radically transformative
perspective on solidarity, interpreting their mutual-aid work as a tool within a
wider struggle against oppression and social injustice.

Outlook
The population reached by all groups that we interviewed remains low. However,
their work may be very important to cater to specific people in need, be this the
affluent elderly in Schleußig or the manifold precarious workers who cannot
momentarily pay their bills (direct support). Beyond this commonality, our
preliminary analysis of a selection of mutual aid in Leipzig 4 revealed important
differences in the political dimensions of their work.
Mapping the groups along different types of solidarity reveals their temporal and
political horizons, but also allows to capture the shifting nature of solidarity in
action. Whereas the base of a shared identity for solidarity in action seems
obvious coming from a specific soccer club, their support work became more
inclusive and reached a plurality of people. Meanwhile, a shared identity is not an
outspoken base for any of the other group’s work, yet their very different political
characters stand in an interesting relation to their location in the city. The non-
transformative form of solidarity based on compassion arose in one of Leipzig’s
wealthiest neighbourhoods, the reformist-transformative one in a quite
gentrified area and the explicitly radically-transformist ones in the poorer East of
the city where living costs are (still) lower. It is especially these neighbourhoods,
where often financially precarious (yet mostly middle class) left wing activists
have moved in the last years. The city’s South, in contrast, while quite expensive,
holds the longest left-wing tradition and is the base of many of the explicitly left-
wing soccer fans. These observations raise the question, to what extent there is
an undiscussed shared (class) identity, or at least a common experience of one’s

4
Of course there are more than these six initiatives, which were not covered due to time and
reach constraints.

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location in the city, and therewith society (Joseph, 2002) at the base of some of
the groups’ work and horizon of social change.
To what extent any of their work is not just immediately charitable and efficient,
but also sustainable or maybe even transformative for the city’s social and
political life remains to be seen and will depend crucially on the reach and
therewith the relationships these groups manage to build within the local
population.

References
Adamczak, B., 2018. The Double Heritage of Communism to Come: 1917-1968-
2018. communists in situ. URL
https://cominsitu.wordpress.com/2018/12/07/the-double-heritage-of-
communism-to-come-1917-1968-2018/ (accessed 5.29.19).
August, V., 2020. Gegen Solidarität! Zwei Modelle sozialen Zusammenhalts und
die Corona-Krise. theorieblog.de. URL
https://www.theorieblog.de/index.php/2020/04/gegen-solidaritaet-zwei-
modelle-sozialen-zusammenhalts-und-die-corona-krise/ (accessed 5.6.20).
Bargetz, B., Scheele, A., Schneider, S., 2019. Impulse aus dem feministischen
Archiv: Zur Theoretisierung umkämpfter Solidaritäten. theorieblog.de. URL
https://www.theorieblog.de/index.php/2019/11/impulse-aus-dem-
feministischen-archiv-zur-theoretisierung-umkaempfter-solidaritaeten/
(accessed 5.11.20).
Featherstone, D., 2012. Solidarity: Hidden Histories and Geographies of
Internationalism. Zed Books, London.
Fiedlschuster, M., 2018. Globalization, EU democracy assistance and the world
social forum: concepts and practices of democracy. Palgrave MacMillan, Cham.
Fung, A., Wright, E.O. (Eds.), 2003. Deepening democracy: institutional
innovations in empowered participatory governance. Verso, London.
Joseph, J., 2002. Hegemony. A realist analysis. Routledge, London; New York.
Meißner, H., 2015. Eine Renaissance der Kapitalismuskritik? Feministische
Suchbewegungen zur Erneuerung radikaler Emanzipationsvisionen.
Feministische Studien 33. https://doi.org/10.1515/fs-2015-0106
Mühe, M., 2019. Bewegende Solidarität – Gedanken zur Solidarität im Kontext
Sozialer Bewegungen. theorieblog.de. URL
https://www.theorieblog.de/index.php/2019/11/bewegende-solidaritaet-
gedanken-zur-solidaritaet-im-kontext-sozialer-bewegungen/ (accessed 5.11.20).
Nuss, S., 2020. Unsere Vernunft, unser Herz füreinander. Rosa Luxemburg
Stiftung. URL https://www.rosalux.de/news/id/41763/ (accessed 4.10.20).
Penta, L. (Ed.), 2007. Community organizing: Menschen verändern ihre Stadt.
Ed. Körber-Stiftung, Hamburg.

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Santos, B. de S. (Ed.), 2005. Democratizing democracy. Verso, London; New

York.
Schwiertz, H., Schwenken, H., 2020. Introduction: inclusive solidarity and
citizenship along migratory routes in Europe and the Americas. Citizenship
Studies 24, 405–423.
Sennett, R., 1973. The uses of disorder: personal identity and city life. Penguin,
Harmondsworth.
Struwe, A., 2019. Was ist emanzipatorische Solidarität? theorieblog.de. URL
https://www.theorieblog.de/index.php/2019/10/was-ist-emanzipatorische-
solidaritaet/ (accessed 5.8.20).

About the authors

Micha Fiedlschuster has a PhD in Global Studies, he works on social
movements, globalization and democracy. He is based in Leipzig. Contact:
fiedlschuster AT uni-leipzig.de
Leon Rosa Reichle is a PhD student at the Centre for Urban Research on
Austerity at De Montfort University in Leicester, and a politically active tenant
working on and with neighbourhood relations in Leipzig. Contact: leon.reichle
AT dmu.ac.uk

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Music, solidarities and balconies in Spain

Kerman Calvo and Ester Bejarano (28th May)

Balconies are not just beautiful architectural features; they also work as a social
space for communication (Morant and Martín, 2013). Balconies are political
and cultural artefacts and they often become ‘sites of contention’ between
residents and authorities (Aronis, 2009). So it comes as no surprise that
balconies (and windows) have acquired an extraordinary relevance during
confinement in Spain, particularly between March 14th (beginning of lockdown)
and April 26th (when relief measures started to be implemented). Through
balconies and windows Spaniards have clung to the life they wanted to
recuperate. In their balcones, Spaniards are organizing dance and theatre
competitions, but also in prompt religious parades. Children-made banners with
positive messages have been displayed while neighbours organize collective
readings of poetry. The call on March 18th to bang pots and pans from balconies
(‘cacerolada’) against the monarchy was considered to be a great success. Pots
and pans are also being banged against the Government, or even against
Podemos. Of course Spaniards are not unique in their inclination to use their
balconies for expressive purposes; pro-democracy activists in Serbia, for
instance, are using them to organize different forms of contentious mobilization
during confinement1. And music has been played; a lot of music2. Right during
the first weekend of confinement, a growing number of individuals started to
play their music after the minutes of collective applause to express gratitude
towards health workers and doctors. This involved professional musicians3, but
also many anonymous individuals who struggle to see themselves as ‘musicians’.
More often than not performances have been posted in social media, by
performers themselves, by relatives, friends or by neighbours.

Musicking in balconies
In this short piece we share some intuitions drawn from an ongoing research
project of ‘musicking’ in balconies in Spain during the pandemic. As Eyerman
and Jamison (1998) anticipated, musicking can connect people with their
neighbours and communities, promoting bonds that will last because funds of

1https://wagingnonviolence.org/2020/05/serbian-activists-nationwide-anti-authoritarian-
protest-covid-19-
lockdown/?fbclid=IwAR0PXqzMMFeoU9Oc5tdm3pYhvTS94sb2v_7orzUo5Vfj5Q7kbfqH6v815
Ew
2https://www.elmundo.es/comunidad-
valenciana/2020/03/19/5e735f2bfc6c83c3188b4657.html;
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/21/life-in-lockdown-spain-curtailed-by-
coronavirus-but-still-rocking
3 https://www.operaactual.com/noticia/opera-solidaria-desde-los-balcones/

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shared memories have been created. This departing point explains our
conceptual background. The socio-cultural approach to music (see, above all,
Small, 1999) defines music as a form of social interaction shaped by the
particular physical setting where that interactions takes place. Music, as a
substantive, turns into ‘musicking’, a verb. Such an approach shifts the
emphasis from the listenable to the contextually-contingent dynamics of
collaboration and interaction that are fabricated around music. Singalongs,
balcony to balcony classical music duos or serenading with traditional
instruments express a social message that transcends the quality of the music
performed. The focus should be on those social factors, and also on the powerful
narrative that balconies help create, when the privacy of home can become the
center of public social action. In this view, it does not matter how proficient a
performer you are: as a respondent (cheerfully) confessed: “you do this in any
other day and everybody would have yelled at you!” We have built a database of
150 individuals who had played or sang in their balconies at least twice. We
went the extra mile to identify informers in places with strong regional
identities, such as Galicia or the Basque Country, and also with strong traditions
of band music, such as Valencia. We have run 51 interviews over the phone.
Questions addressed several aspects of confinement, the reasons to play music,
and also specific questions regarding the selection of repertoire, staging or the
way neighbours reacted to their music.

Community resilience
Political and music movements have often linked. Particular songs have firmly
established as parts of the symbolic narratives of various forms of mobilization.
Practicing congregational music has been found to strengthen solidarities and
senses of collective identity, as in the case of the civil rights movement (Ward,
1998). Youth subcultures, very often glued around musical taste, develop
mechanisms that contribute to new structures of mobilization, as in the case of
Punk (Moore and Roberts, 2009). Music has been linked to framing and the
emotional arsenal of mobilization, and has been found to be a connecting
element for people engaged in contentious mobilization (see, for instance,
Collin’s 2001 work in relation to opposition to authoritarianism in Serbia).
Despite these solid theoretical grounds, however, it is still unclear if musicking
in balconies is an expression of mobilization-in-the-making. Many of our
informers wanted to remain clear of ideological and party disputes. That is
relevant the more the handling of the pandemic by the current left-wing
Government has unleashed a ferocious reaction by conservative and extreme-
rightist political parties, a reaction that also involves politics from the balconies.
What is clear, however, is that musicking is linked to a search for networking
and solidarity4. For these reasons, we find it safer to address musicking in

4This was a point made in relation to the Italian experience of balcony to balcony singalongs,
which in many ways was the model for interpreters in Spain.
https://www.artshub.com.au/news-article/opinions-and-analysis/covid-19/trisnasari-

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balconies as an example of community resilience, which has been defined as

“the collective ability of a neighbourhood or a geographically defined area to
deal with stressors and efficiently resume the rhythms of daily life through
cooperation following shocks” (Aldrich and Meyer, 2015: 2). The concept has
been applied in the context of natural disasters, but also to explain endurance
and resistance against forms of cultural and political exclusion.

Music, connectivity and solidarity

A relationship can be established between musicking, solidarity and
interconnectedness, one that goes both ways: musicking is likely to be stronger
where social capital abounds. But musicking, as a relational practice, can
contribute to the development of social capital, a process that can have strong
healing properties. We summarize now some data on the motivations for
playing music in balconies. Musicking in balconies expresses the search of
communities to find collective ways of handling disaster. Performers played
motivated by the idea to build a sense of collective strength. Individuals played
while neighbours listened, one day after another. They kept playing because
neighbours (and later on followers in social media) asked them to do so,
sometimes explicitly in the form of balcony to balcony requests of specific
music, sometimes by social media or other means. Very often performers and
audiences were not acquainted. But they had connected visually thanks to their
balconies and the musical experience. We organize our findings following a
popular typology that distinguishes between three types of social capital:
bonding, bridging and linking (Aldrich and Meyer, 2014). This allows us to
highlight those elements of musicking that reflect a ‘solidarity agenda’.
‘Bonding’ social capital represents interaction with people with whom you are
already connected. This is the least interesting aspect of musicking for our
present purposes. On the other hand, ‘bridging’ social capital builds on solidary
and networks with people that might be more or less similar to you, but with
whom you do not have prior strong connections. In time, perhaps, these bonds
might lead to permanent forms of exchange, solidarity and, if activated,
contentious mobilization. In ‘linking’ social capital you reach out beyond close
groups, making claims with a universalistic appeal.

Bonding: Breaking the tedium of confinement

Not all musicking in balconies relates to a larger purpose. In many cases,
performers reacted to informal or formal petitions to sing or play, by close
relatives, door to do neighbours or even by brass bands and orquestras. ‘Viral
challenges’ have played a part. A professional association of music teachers

fraser/music-across-the-balconies-social-cohesion-and-community-resilience-in-action-
260050; see also
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=3&v=Q734VN0N7hw&feature=emb_logo

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launched #musicaviral5, an online challenge which invited music teachers to

simultaneously play a different score each day. Music teachers spoke about
these challenges as a very ‘persuasive’ reason to keep on playing, perhaps in fear
of breaking relationships of trust and respect with peers in their profession.
Despite differences in professional background, respondents quoted personal
reasons to play from balconies. They talked about the need to provide a break to
the tedious life of confinement. Musicking helped with children: “I keep the kid
busy with this, we look for a song, we arrange this, he helps out”. Performers
with children at home, DJs and also music teachers (who in most cases do not
seem themselves as ‘musicians’) emphasize the entertainment element of
musicking. Some music students and teachers made the most of the obligation
to keep on practicing. As a young musician explained to us, “it is a fine moment,
neighbours can listen to some live music and I make a case for the value of
music, they have a good time and I carry on practicing”. The local media in
Bilbao, for instance, reported the experience of a music teacher who organized
balcony to balcony study sessions of txistu (a traditional instrument popular in
the Basque Country that resembles a flute) with students who happened to live
nearby6. This, however, also connects with the ‘linking’ dimension of musicking,
as these practices were also intended to raise the profile of traditional music and
Basque culture.

Bridging: Community making

The dominant theme emerging from our data is the need to create bonds with
neighbours, and also to help others. This powerful idea came in very many
different formats, often intersecting with personal, individualistic arguments
(bonding social capital), but also with universalistic, very general appeals
(linking social capital). The following quotation exemplifies this:

I like playing, it is a natural thing, I enjoy it. Then I saw colleagues playing on
Instagram, and also my parents and neighbours were asking me to play. It is a
good thing, it shows that we are united, that we stand together. We get together at
20:00, I play a couple of tunes and then we chat for a while, and we feel ok; they
like it, so I keep on playing

Whether to commemorate nurses or doctors dead in the fight against the virus,
to live up to a challenge, to entertain kids leaving nearby or even to increase the
number of followers, respondents acknowledge the powerful effect of music to
create new bods among strangers, and also to help circulate a sense of
interconnectedness. Professional musicians saw this as their ‘duty’ as ‘artists’
(titiriteros, in Spanish); in other cases, performers simply wanted to do

5 https://musicaviral.weebly.com/
6 https://www.deia.eus/bizkaia/eskuinaldea/2020/03/21/txistu-rompe-monotonia-durante-
tardes/1025977.html

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something for other people. Community making is embedded in emphatic

appeals to help. A running theme has been the presentation of music as a stress
reliever, a way to cope with anxiety, loneliness of the pain associated to not
being able to meet your loved ones. A good number of musicians started playing
on March 19th (fathers’ day in Spain), as a way to express love and affection.
Musicking helped with the celebration of birthdays, in an interesting process
where private rituals became a vehicle to connect with neighbours. Helping
others has been the most common expression found in our data, a goal that,
however, adopts different expressions: performers have wanted to cheer up
people hospitalized in nearby mental health centers, to remind senior
neighbours that there is someone ‘out there’, to cheer kids up, and so on. The
realisation that music had a potential to do good transformed what was meant
as a single-off act into a daily routine.
Community is a fuzzy word in Spanish, not always taking the meaning that is
more common in countries such as the United States or the United Kingdom.
Respondents referred to communities sometimes in a very general way. In other
cases, however, they adopted a narrower definition that relates either to very
close neighbours (possible those living in the same block) or to those with whom
they had established visual and ‘sonic’ ties. Underlying this was a sense of
similarity with those people living nearby, a commonality that needed to be
reinforced in times of distress. The discussion about community-making
intersected with the impact of musicking on social media. Respondents shared
a call for altruism. They acknowledged the positive consequences of posting
their videos, often in terms of a huge raise in the number of followers. This,
however, was presented as a by-product of an action that was not meant to give
a boost to their popularity. Respondents very often linked their impact on social
media with an expanding sense of togetherness that might last well beyond this
crisis. A performer living in a rural community explained this idea to us:

new people are now in the WhatsApp group that we have in the village, they do
not live here but they want to watch the live streaming when I play; I do not want
to get anything out of this, but it is true that a lot of people are interested. I think
I entertain them

Are these networks going to last? That is of course a crucial question here. The
majority of our respondents were optimistic about the positive social
consequences of musicking. Social relations would become stronger, more
‘resilient’, empowering people to deal with future problems. The crisis creates a
window of opportunity to put a limit to individualization, recuperating the value
of close ties and collective action.

Linking: A better world after all this?

A strong final theme brings together a great number of respondents, one that
frames music-making (and other social responses during confinement) as a

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factor engineering changes in the fabric of society. In the case of professional

musicians, but also with performers living in rural areas, they addressed a wider
audience: “music is a breath of fresh air to all of us”, “if only we could cheer
everyone up”, “life music helps a lot to cheer everybody up”, “so very many
people are living this on their own, and perhaps my music can help”. We
particularly like one quotation about this:

something within me reacted, I was like this is a battle that we must win together,
that is what I felt, that we had to go deeper; since I was a little girl I have always
found easier to express myself playing the bagpipe, my heart told me I had to play
(…) it broke my heart that people were applauding on their own, alone, but we all
had the same goal; so I started playing

This effort to link with society connects with intriguing dynamics that cannot be
addressed here in full. For instance, musicking appeals to the intersection
between culture, values and national identities. Musicians in places with strong
national identities, which often involves playing folk song and traditional
instruments, see their balconies as platforms to vindicate national identities. A
young musician from Galicia, for instance, explained that his serenades with the
gaita (bagpipe), which were posted on facebook, worked to disseminate “our
culture”, and to make people outside Galicia “more familiar with it”.
Professional musicians also saw their music during confinement as an
opportunity to generate a societal conversation about the role of culture.

Conclusion
Pandemics are not necessarily the cause of social disintegration; as a matter of
fact, in most pandemics most people manage to carry on with the lives in more
or less normal ways (Jacobsen, 2018), looking for ways to cope and resist.
Musicking from balconies is not perhaps the most obvious form of collective
mobilization; participants do not have obvious political agendas, and were not
explicit about any connections between their own actions and political goals.
Musicking, however, is all about solidarity and networks. Music can provide the
means for ‘exemplary’ forms of social solidarity (Eyerman and Jamison, 1998)
which are so necessary in times of acute crisis. In sociological parlance,
musicking contributes to the creation of social capital, a fantastic resource that
helps communities to deal with the kind of crises that are likely to become
common in the years to come.

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Ward, B. 1998. Just my soul responding: Rhythm and blues, black
consciousness and race relations. London: UCL Press.

About the authors

Kerman Calvo is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the Department of Sociology
and Communication, Universidad de Salamanca. kerman AT usal.es
Ester Bejarano is Lecturer in Sociology at the Department of Sociology and
Communication, Universidad de Salamanca. esbejarano AT usal.es

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Movimentos e ações político-culturais do Brasil em

tempos de pandemia do Covid-19
Neto Holanda e Valesca Lima (30 de abril de 2020)

Em seu livro “Manual e Guia do Palhaço de Rua”, o palhaço Fernando

Chacovachi comenta sobre a ausência de políticas públicas para a cultura, mas é
interessante notar que o teor de seu discurso não perpassa pela lamentação por
tal descaso; por outro lado, ressalta a importância dos movimentos
independentes de artistas pela implantação de ações e programas que
contemplem seu ofício. No Brasil, o setor cultural emprega mais de 5.2 milhões
de pessoas em 2018 (IBGE, 2019), e gerou o equivalente a 2.6% do PIB
brasileiro em 2017 (Firjan, 2018). Apesar da riqueza cultura e da grandeza do
setor cultural no Brasil, o setor sofre com ciclo de descomprometimento do
Estado com a cultura. O desafio maior para os artistas brasileiros ao longo dos
anos é transformar a cultura em política de Estado, desatrelada de políticas de
governo (Cerqueira, 2018). Durante período de isolamento causado pelo
coronavírus, a falta de estratégias para desenvolver a cultura fica mais evidente.
Com o advento da pandemia do coronavírus, o setor artístico-cultural foi um
dos mais socialmente afetados, tendo suas atividades canceladas e/ou adiadas
em decorrência dos decretos de isolamento, necessários ao controle da curva de
contaminação da doença. Sendo o Brasil um país federativo, cabe ao governo
federal determinar as diretrizes gerais da política de combate ao vírus, e aos
governadores estaduais determinar as medidas específica. No estado do Ceará,
no Nordeste do Brasil, foco desde texto, o Decreto nº 33.510 de 16 de março de
2020 determinou o fechamento de equipamentos culturais públicos e privados,
interferindo diretamente na vida e nos calendários dos trabalhadores da cultura.
O impacto foi imenso, e logo no começo da crise, muitos artistas começaram a
relatar os impactos da paralisação de suas atividades: contas atrasadas,
cancelamentos de contratos de serviço e até desoladores relatos de falta de
alimentos. Algo importante a frisar é que o trabalho do artista geralmente
envolve o contato direto com o público e a formação de aglomerações de pessoas
para a participação de seus espetáculos, concertos, exposições etc., o que torna a
situação ainda mais delicada, haja vista que se instala um “acréscimo” de
incertezas no que se refere ao futuro da classe. Isto é, se exercer a profissão
artística, no Brasil, já se configurava como um desafio árduo; com o novo
contexto trazido com a pandemia, exercê-la se tornou um verdadeiro feito de
sobrevivência.
A história das políticas culturais no Brasil está marcada por autoritarismo,
caráter tardio, descontinuidades e fragilidade institucional (Rubim and Bayard,
2008). No período da administração do Partido dos Trabalhadores, houve uma
relativa retomada do papel ativo do Estado brasileiro nas políticas públicas
culturais no sentido de revisar, formular, estruturar e executar das políticas
culturais (Cerqueira, 2018). Nesse período, foram criados de espaços
sustentação e operacionalização da cultura, como o Sistema Nacional de Cultura

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(SNC), e espaços de participação democrática, como o Conselho Nacional de

Política Cultural (CNPC).
Apesar de existirem órgãos e ações específicos para a cultura (como os citados
acima), com editais de financiamento de espetáculos e cursos promovidos pela
FUNARTE (Fundação Nacional das Artes) e as Secretarias Regionais de Cultura
de cada estado, existe ainda grande quantidade de artistas mobilizados
politicamente pelo seu direito que continuar exercendo dignamente sua
profissão, haja vista que as ações empreendidas por tais órgãos e programas
ainda não são suficientes para abranger todas as demandas pertinentes à classe
dos trabalhadores e trabalhadoras da cultura.

Experiência dos Artistas Cearenses

As manifestações artísticas do Ceará, advindas de todas as partes do estado e de
qualquer classe social, detêm um árduo histórico de luta a fim de preservar sua
legitimidade. Desde os primórdios de sua história, da instalação de sua primeira
vila de colonização na cidade de Aquiraz em 1713 (mais tarde transferida para
Fortaleza em 1726), com o despontar do chamado coco do Iguape e da confecção
de arte sacra, os artistas cearenses vêm resistindo de maneira popular e
independente. Em todas suas expressões, sejam nas artes cênicas, na música ou
no artesanato, etc., urge o reconhecimento do poder de mobilização da categoria
para se preservar legítima cível e juridicamente. Vale lembrar, possivelmente
como reflexo dessa trajetória de luta e resistência, que a Secretaria Estadual da
Cultura (Secult) é a pasta estadual de cultura mais antiga do Brasil (Lei nº
8.541, de 9 de agosto de 1966), criada antes mesmo que as pastas de regiões
mais desenvolvidas do País, como o Sudeste e o Sul. A criação da secretaria
adveio outrossim de uma mobilização organizada da categoria em prol da
produção artística local (Leitão & Guilherme, 2014).
Hoje, com reuniões frequentes, conselhos, fóruns e entidades socioculturais
mobilizam sua classe e linguagens artísticas a fim de melhorar suas condições
de trabalho no setor cultural. Essas linguagens – quais sejam: teatro, dança,
circo, música, literatura, cinema, artesanato, humor, artes visuais, cultura
popular e tradicional, entre outras – se organizam em nichos específicos de suas
áreas e também em nível mais abrangente. Como exemplo de nicho específico,
podemos citar o Fórum Cearense de Teatro e, como exemplo de nicho mais
abrangente, podemos citar o Conselho Municipal de Cultura (Fortaleza/CE),
que aborda as demandas e necessidades das várias linguagens existentes no
estado.

Redes de colaboração entre artistas

Nesse sentido, logo no início da crise, na segunda quinzena do mês de março de
2020, formou-se uma rede de colaboração independente dos artistas da região
de Fortaleza (capital do Ceará). A rede iniciou uma campanha de arrecadação de
fundos e alimentos destinados aos colegas em situação de maior de

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vulnerabilidade. O uso das redes sociais e de plataformas de financiamento

coletivo (como a Vakinha, Catarse, etc.) foi essencial na propagação dessa
primeira “ação de resistência”, que teve como foco inicial o provimento básico e
rápido de insumos para os indivíduos mais necessitados de seu movimento.
Fortalecendo-se a rede, algumas outras ações foram implementadas, como a
realização também independente de um festival virtual multilinguagem para
financiar e manter a produção criativa e intelectual dos artistas atingidos. O
Festival Quarentena, como foi chamado – em referência ao período de reclusão
vivenciado –, foi uma produção coletiva de várias lideranças da cultura em
parceria com jornalistas e publicitários que com duração de quinze dias, com a
participação de artistas cearenses de várias linguagens, em formato virtual
através de lives no Instagram. A forma de arrecadação também era virtual, por
meio de transferências, boletos e plataformas de pagamento como o PicPay. O
festival teve um grande impacto na categoria, com o fortalecimento da referida
rede de apoio e a expansão da ideia da rede até para outras cidades, como
Maracanaú e Caucaia/CE (Região Metropolitana de Fortaleza), contemplando
artistas de outras regiões.

Artistas virtuais – um novo nicho para a categoria

Nesse rumo, sobreveio ao período de adaptação a necessidade de criação de
novos nichos de trabalho no setor artístico. Sem poderem estar em contato
direto com seu público, em decorrência do período de isolamento, muitos
artistas da região começaram um movimento de ações virtuais estratégicas para
se manterem em criação e também para incrementarem outros meios de
autossustento. Seguindo uma tendência de proporções nacionais, em que
muitos grandes artistas promoveram lives dentro de suas próprias casas, os
artistas de menor envergadura de público começaram a reativar suas contas no
YouTube e a produzir vídeos nessa plataforma, buscando, de preferência,
ampliar o número de inscritos nos seus canais, haja vista que tal plataforma
monetiza (em dólares) o canal que atingir no mínimo 1000 pessoas inscritas.
Ademais, muito grupos de teatro, dança, música e também equipamentos
culturais públicos e privados começam a produzir e a publicar as filmagens de
seus espetáculos, aulas e palestras, tornando o material acessível para o público
em geral.
No Instagram, as lives se tornaram frequentes na categoria, sendo um meio de
divulgar esse novo nicho de trabalho, colaborando na venda desses novos
produtos culturais e na criação de um novo público espectador. Arte-educadores
que promoviam cursos e oficinas culturais em tempos pré-crise também se
viram forçados a adaptar suas estratégias de trabalho, oferecendo cursos on-line
em plataformas de aulas/reuniões, como o Zoom, o Google Meet e o Microsoft
Teams.

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Intervenção do Estado na cultura durante a crise

Com o isolamento social exigido pela pandemia, artistas viram seu percurso
profissional ser inteiramente transformado. Assim cresceu entre os artistas a
necessidade de pressionar o estado e governos locais para realização
de editais simplificados para apoiar financeiramente os artistas e fortalecer a
economia criativa.

Em relação às intervenções de governo a nível nacional a fim de mitigar os

impactos econômicos e sociais da pandemia, inicialmente, podemos citar o
Projeto de Lei nº 873/2020 de 2 de abril de 2020, que expande o alcance do
auxílio emergencial de R$ 600,00 aos profissionais da cultura, até então não
incluídos no benefício. A medida, de fato, gerou um “respiro” na situação
financeira da categoria, que foi atingida diretamente em sua forma de trabalho.
Ademais, não é exagero esclarecer que tal medida não foi uma iniciativa do
próprio governo federal, através da Secretaria Especial da Cultura
(remanescente do antigo Ministério da Cultura), mas uma ação incitada por
deputados federais.
Em nível estadual, a partir da mobilização do Conselho Municipal de Cultura de
Fortaleza e apoiadores, com o apoio do governador do estado do Ceará, Camilo
Santana, e o secretário de Cultura do governo, Fabiano Piúba, foi lançado o
edital emergencial Cultura “Dendicasa”, com a liberação de recurso no valor de
um milhão de reais para a seleção de 400 projetos artísticos de todas as
linguagens. Assim como o Festival Quarentena, toda a programação do edital
será virtual, através das redes sociais e dos canais virtuais dos proponentes
selecionados. O edital recebeu um total de 1.700 inscrições e, à altura da escrita
deste texto, encontra-se em fase de homologação dos resultados para processo
de pagamento. Importante frisar uma mobilização de cuidado na classe, que
incentivou a inscrição restrita dos membros mais vulneráveis de seu
movimento, muito apesar de tal recomendação ter sido seguida fielmente.
Outros editais semelhantes também foram lançados noutros estados além do
Ceará, como o “MS Cultura Presente”, contemplando 700 artistas do estado do
Mato Grosso do Sul; O Edital do Fundo de Apoio à Cultura (Brasília) para
apresentações on-line de até 107 projetos, com investimento de dois milhões de
reais; e o edital “Fica na Rede, Maninho”, da Secretaria de Estado de Cultura e
Economia Criativa do Amazonas, contemplando até 300 propostas.
Entre as iniciativas privadas de nível nacional, podemos citar o protagonismo do
Itaú Cultural, ao lançar o edital “Arte Como Respiro: Múltiplos Editais de
Emergência”, recebendo inscrições de todo o Brasil e abrangendo as áreas de
artes cênicas, música, artes visuais, além de trabalhos com acessibilidade para
deficientes auditivos. Além desse, mencionamos também o Edital “Pipa em
Casa”, promovido pelo Instituto Pipa (Brasília), destinando 50 mil reais para 10
artistas plásticos locais;
Em nível municipal, especificamente na cidade de Maracanaú, cidade na região
metropolitana de Fortaleza, Ceará, podemos elencar o Edital “Maracanaú Live

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Festival Cultural” (Lei nº 2.926), destinando 100 mil reais para a seleção de 100
projetos culturais da cidade. Um fato interessante a ser lembrado com nessa
iniciativa é que o edital foi divulgado e lançado sem a consulta da classe, o que
gerou uma série de limitações em seu plano de ação, como a inserções de
critérios de seleção que privilegiam os artistas mais experientes e uma
burocracia de pagamentos que não contempla a urgência que o período implica.
Partindo desse contexto, os artistas locais, através de reunião virtual do Fórum
de Arte e Cultura de Maracanaú, organizaram uma carta pública direcionada ao
prefeito e às autoridades da Cultura, a fim de alinhar as ações do governo e as
necessidades da categoria. Tal movimento (o fórum) é recente, e tem como
interesse restaurar o Conselho Municipal de Cultura, com respaldo legal, mas
inativo por razões turvas aos profissionais da cultura da cidade.
Neste ínterim, artistas do Brasil e do mundo seguem criando de maneira
autônoma, seja individualmente ou seus grupos/coletivos, preservando a
consciência de todas as medidas apresentadas até então são paliativas no que se
refere à atual crise. Contudo, tal contexto mais escancarou as fragilidades do
sistema político brasileiro, deixando ainda mais vulneráveis aqueles setores
historicamente relegados, tendo a Cultura como um deles. Por outro lado, os
movimentos político-culturais seguem resistindo e lutando pelo direito dos de
exercerem criativa e politicamente a sua profissão.

References
Cerqueira, Amanda 2018. Política cultural e trabalho nas artes: o percurso e o
lugar do Estado no campo da cultura [Cultural policy and work in the arts: the
path and the place of the State in the field of culture]. Estudos Avançados 32,
119–139.
Firjan, I., 2019. Economia Criativa: Mapeamento da Indústria Criativa no
Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Firjan. Acessado em 29 Apr 2020. Disponível em:
https://www.firjan.com.br/EconomiaCriativa/downloads/MapeamentoIndustri
aCriativa.pdf
IBGE, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 2019. Estatísticas Sociais -
Cultura. Brasília, Brasil.
Leitão, Claúdia e. Guilherme, Luciana 2014. Cultura em Movimento [Culture in
Movement]. Armazém da Cultura, Fortaleza, Brazil.
Rubim, Aantonio e Bayardo, Rubens 2008. Políticas culturais na ibero-américa.
Salvador: Editora UFBA.

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About the authors

Neto Holanda é arte-educador, ator, palhaço e produtor cultural. É também
poeta e membro titular da Academia Maracanauense de Letras (cadeira nº 17).
É membro e cofundador do Coletivo Paralelo, grupo de artes cênicas radicado
no município de Maracanaú/CE. Idealizou o projeto pioneiro Academia do Riso:
Escola de Iniciação à Palhaçaria, em parceria com a Prefeitura de Fortaleza e o
Governo do Estado do Ceará, a primeira escola de palhaçaria do Norte-
Nordeste. Pesquisa a comicidade e o palhaço em suas variadas manifestações,
associando a esse eixo temas como física quântica, consciência corporal e
espiritualidade no trabalho do artista e do não artista.
Email contato AT netoholanda.page

Valesca Lima é pesquisadora na área de políticas públicas, governança

participativa e movimentos sociais.
Email contato valescalima AT gmail.com

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How Covid-19 led to a #Rentstrike and

what it can teach us about online organizing
Margherita Massarenti (19 June 2020)

Abstract
What are the impacts of the sudden online shift of social life forced by the global
pandemic, on the organizing capacity of worse-off, socioeconomically marginal
communities? This article analyses the 2020 Rent Strike movement in response
to the Covid-19 crisis, to investigate how online and offline protest practices can
be combined to support local struggles and transnational networks.

Keywords: Covid-19, Rent Strike, Social Media Activism, Online Social

Movements, Class, US, Transnational Networks, Leftist Politics.

Class struggle and collective action in the midst of a pandemic

As Covid-19 spread across the world, society and communities have been forced
to re-adapt individual and collective life, and to move a big part of it online. This
includes organizing and protest practices, in a time in which worsened
socioeconomic conditions urge solidarity and action to protect livelihoods.
Bringing about more than a health crisis, the pandemic has been opening cracks
in the existing inequalities, it has further exposed marginalized groups and
inflated the number of people in precarious situation. Housing conditions are
no exception, rather, they play quite a key role in a crisis characterized by the
imperative to “stay at home”.
Breaking out in the first weeks of the American wave of contagion, the
movement for rent strike pooled such widespread struggles and gained
international visibility, with the diffusion of top hashtags such as #RentStrike,
#CancelRent, #CancelMortgages and #NoIncomeNoRent. Reference websites
were set up, like Rentstrike2020 and WeStrikeTogether , to share action
trackings, resources and tools that would help activists worldwide build their
own strategies, giving the campaign a transnational reach.
Just as for any other example of digital campaign, activists and researchers will
have seen these calls to action and rightfully wondered what’s beyond the
surface of social media advocacy. This is a particularly relevant interrogative
when it comes to a movement that requires timely, specifically localized
solutions, and a deep and tight coordination between strikers to actually have
them protected from evictions and other legal consequences. A reflection on
such challenges of online activism places itself within the wider debate around
the reconceptualization of collective action in the Internet era (Bimber,
Flanagin, Stohl, 2005; Schradie 2018 a, b). Against claims of the internet being
a democratizing space that would have facilitated access and participation to all,

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researchers have pointed out that lower costs of engagement often lead to a lack
of real impact, while also not really being low for everyone. Speaking of
practices such as rent strikes, which stem from socioeconomic inequalities,
higher costs of engagement and lower resources are found to characterize the
digital experience of marginalized or disadvantaged communities, just as they
do offline (Schradie, 2018, a,b). In this perspective, the rent strike movement
constitutes a great example to understand the ways in which class struggle plays
out online when forced to.
So how does the mobilizing capacity of worse-off groups change in an historical
phase that allows little if none physical collective action to happen? Here is a
summary of how I went about researching the issue through a sample of tweets.

Mapping social media mobilization

My research combined institutional data, social network analysis and content
analysis of users’ profiles, with the goal of understanding the structure and main
actors of the rent strike movement on Twitter.
Social network analysis (through NodeXL) allowed me to map the use of the
hashtag #Rentstrike in 436 tweets, posted between April 25, 8.12 PM and April
26, 2.39 PM Paris Time. The resulting graph outlines the main groups and
subgroups in the network, shows the relationships within and between them,
and highlights the users that play key roles as vectors of information, organizing
or both (Figure 1).

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Figure 1: Social Network Analysis graph, hashtag #RentStrike

I identify as central figures the ones placed at the core of subnetworks, arguably
their referents. Gatekeepers instead are the isolated figures that are responsible
for bridging those segregated subnetworks, and without which the overall
structure would be fragmented. Highly visible tweeters are those that present
more than 800.000 followers and thus are able to raise visibility around the
issue. Once these actors have been identified, an analysis of their Twitter
accounts provides information relevant to understand the movement -
particularly whether they are organizations or individuals, if they state an
ideological affiliation (through symbols, colors, groups names or political
values) and their eventual connection to specific territorial contexts and
communities organizing the rent strike.
Finally, evidence from both my sample of tweets and the dedicated websites can
give us an idea of the reach of the movement beyond the American context.
In the next sections, the main findings of this combined research will be
outlined and analyzed to elaborate the takeouts of the rent strike 2020
experience.

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Individualized core, structured peripheries:

a layered network of political actors
The graph resulting from the social network analysis layout highlighted a sharp
opposition between what happens at the core and what happens at the margins
of the network (Figure 1).
On one hand, a tight web of interactions between mainly individual users, forms
a chaotic mass at the center of the map. Leader-less and structure-less, this
cluster in a way accounts for a the fast rhythm at which the hashtag has been
retweeted and reshared. These, in fact, are likely to be the main social media
activities in which highly visible tweeters and other users in this position are
engaged: while they are active supporters and participants in the wider online
political conversation, they seem to have a less direct contact with the actual
planning of the rent strike.
On the other hand, several subgroups occupy segregated, peripheral positions
and are connected to the core with only few links. Despite being marginal, these
smaller clusters present clearly identifiable central figures, dominant elements
of strong hierarchical structures. These are not only important to their own
audience but, for the indicators they present, they qualify among the key
elements of the entire network. Moreover, an observation of their profiles shows
most of them are ‘institutional’ accounts of either associations, organizations,
mutual aid or activism groups. The majority of them presents a strong
ideological background recalling typical leftist narratives - the black and red
colors, the fist symbol, statements on values of equality, class struggle, anti-
capitalism and anti-fascism. Finally, most of these accounts show affiliations to
offline local groups whose purposes they serve through online activities of
coordination and resource sharing. Such coordination seems to happen most
often at the state and city-level, and to involve working class, black and overall
vulnerable communities. Not surprisingly, this matches with data from the
American context showing that the harshest health and socioeconomic
consequences are falling on young people, precarious and low-paid workers, and
on those coming from the service sector - features that characterize a large
proportion of the American renter population (Adamczyk, 2020).
To summarize the main findings, a prevalence of institutional accounts over
individual ones, and a clear cultural and political background emerge from the
analysis of our sample, as the distinctive features of its leading speakers. Online
collective action thus seems to be based on the work of leftist organizations
rather than individuals. Despite often being marginal, these organizations prove
strong offline ties and ideology, as well as experienced background in social
activism.

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Local fights, global narratives:

tenants unions going transnational
What was particularly fascinating about mapping and combining Twitter data
on the #RentStrike hashtag is that it allowed me to unfold the multiple,
interwoven venues through which the movement developed and grew. By
looking at one actor, a whole new set of information would uncover in front of
me, often providing links to other actors that eventually happened to figure in
the network themselves.
This was the case with @igd_news, the Twitter account of a well-established
platform for mutual aid and anarchist organizing across the US. The website,
called ‘It’s Going Down’ (Igd, 2020), gave me access to a map of the rent strike
actions that were being taken worldwide. Such map had been designed by
5DemandsGlobal, another reference platform for anti-system politics in
response to the Covid crisis. In addition to this, among the striking groups
reported in the map, I found the New Zealand activist community of RentStrike
Aotearoa, whose Twitter account figured among the central users of my dataset.
Examples like this suggest that a deep interconnection exists across groups and
regions involved in the initiative. Despite the challenges posed by the global
situation and beyond the actual success of the strikes, this tells us that activists
were able to create networks of solidarity and support across worse-off
communities, and to build online tools that made them visible to the other
struggling populations.
Another map, published by the San Francisco Tenants Union and Anti-eviction
Mapping Project, provides records of the level of Covid-19 Housing Protection
Legislation and presence of Housing Justice Action all over the world. It reports
a high density of offline engagement on the two sides of the US (especially New
York and California), in the UK and in Italy. Although the question of where this
is all happening is really different from the one about the online reach of the
hashtag, users themselves and the content they rely on for coordination overall
suggest agreement on the part of the movement on a major dissemination
starting from the US and echoing in the anglophone world and across Southern
Europe. In addition to this, the transnational character of the movement can
also be assessed by looking at its discursive framing in online advocacy: in fact,
the rent strike was often integrated within a global, holistic and anti-system
political narrative, that places it among other intertwined goals (formulated, for
example, on the 5DemandsGlobal website) for the achievement of social justice
against the damages brought up by Covid.

Digital class struggle: teachings from a pandemic

To conclude, how can these findings inform our understanding and practice of
online organizing?
As mentioned, literature suggests that low-SES and marginalized groups face
similar challenges online as offline, making their claims harder to articulate in

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the digital space, which is understood as largely individualized and often not
paired with on-site engagement. Researchers also argue that class entails more
risks with participation, especially if in political debates and activities in general
(Shaw and Hargittai, 2018; Van Deursen and Helsper, 2015; Seong-Jae 2010;
Shradie, 2018a).
These arguments allow to assume that the prevalence of institutional over
individual tweeters in our network might find a reason in the lower classes’
higher costs of engagement. They highlight the importance for such groups to
pool claims into organizations and strategies able to protect individuals from
risks. They point out that individualization might not always be the case, as
class opportunities and constraints require shaping networks of social media
activism differently (Bennet and Segerberg, 2012).
Following what Bimber (1998) has called accelerated pluralism, the
structureless core of our network can be considered responsible for the visibility
and spillover effect of the hashtag. However, this type of digital activism proves
to be not enough and not the most relevant one in the context of a rent strike, as
little would have been put in place or achieved without the effort of the marginal
political groups actually connected to specific local contexts. This reminds
activists to not overestimate the ability of digital tools to mobilize individuals,
but rather focus their efforts on building offline strong ties within and between
communities first, without which an impactful use of ICTs wouldn’t be possible.
In light of these elements, the rent strike 2020 experience tells us that, contrary
to what is thought of social media activism - that weaker ties and a less defined
political color allow for a larger spreading of the cause -, a clearer framing is
necessary when anti-system politics, timely solutions and socio-economic
justice are advocated for. In this sense, the intertwined challenges, sharper class
conflict and higher urgency created by the pandemic is likely to continue to offer
us insights on how a combination of online and offline tight linkages, and an
acknowledgement of the political dimension of such struggles, is increasingly
fundamental for social movements to navigate their costs of action and achieve
their goals.

References
Aaron Shaw and Eszter Hargittai, 2018. The Pipeline of Online Participation
Inequalities: The Case of Wikipedia Editing. Journal of Communication 68:
March 2018, pp. 143–68.
Van Deursen Alexander J. A. M. and Helsper Ellen Johanna, 2015. The Third-
Level Digital Divide: Who Benefits Most from Being Online? in Communication
and Information Technologies Annual, Digital Distinctions and Inequalities, ed.
Laura Robinson et al. London: Emerald Group, 2015, 10, pp. 29–53.
Bennett Lance W. and Segerberg Alexandra, 2012. The Logic of Connective
Action. Information, Communication & Society, 15:5, pp 739-768.

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Bimber Bruce, 1998. The Internet and Political Transformation: Populism,

Community, and Accelerated Pluralism, Polity, 31:1, pp 133-160.
Bimber Bruce, Flanagin Andrew J., Stohl Cynthia, 2005. Reconceptualizing
Collective Action. Communication Theory, 15 : 4, pp 365–388.
Earl Jennifer and Kimport Katarina, 2011. Digitally Enabled Social Change:
Activism in the Internet Age, Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews
2012, 41: 486.
Jen Schradie, 2018a. The Digital Activism Gap: How Class and Costs Shape
Online Collective Action, Social Problems. 65: 1, pp 51–74.
Jen Schradie, 2018b. Moral Monday Is More Than a Hashtag: The Strong Ties
of Social Movement Emergence in the Digital Era, Social Media and Society 4:1.
Seong-Jae Min, 2010. From the Digital Divide to the Democratic Divide:
Internet Skills, Political Interest, and the Second-Level Digital Divide in Political
Internet Use, Journal of Information Technology & Politics 7:1, pp 22–35.

Sitography
5 Demands Global, 2020 https://5demands.global/toolkit/ (Last Accessed Date
19/06/2020)
Adams-Prassl Abigail, Boneva Teodora, Golin Marta, Rauh Christopher, 2020.
The large and Unequal Impact of Covid-19 on Workers. 08 April, Vox Europe.
Accessed 6/05/2020. https://voxeu.org/article/large-and-unequal-impact-
covid-19-workers (Last Accessed Date 19/06/2020)
Adamczyk Alicia, 2020, A housing ‘apocalypse’ is coming as coronavirus
protections across the country expire, cnbc, 2020.
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/10/how-to-prevent-the-coming-coronavirus-
tsunami-of-evictions.html (Last Accessed Date 19/06/2020)
Anti Eviction Mapping Project, Rent Strike Map,
https://antievictionmap.com/(Last Accessed Date 19/06/2020)
Bahney Anna, 2020. New Data shows more americans are having trouble
paying their rent, CNN, 11th April.
https://edition.cnn.com/2020/04/09/business/americans-rent-payment-
trnd/index.html (Last Accessed Date 19/06/2020)
It's going down, 2020 https://itsgoingdown.org/?s=rent+strike (Last Accessed
Date 19/06/2020)
San Francisco Tenants Union, Rent Strike Map, 2020
https://www.sftu.org/2020/04/28/rent-strike-map/ (Last Accessed Date
19/06/2020)
Rentstrike 2020 https://www.rentstrike2020.org/ (Last Accessed Date
19/06/2020)

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Westriketogether.com https://westriketogether.org/ (Last Accessed Date

19/06/2020)

About the author

Margherita Massarenti is an Italian student of Political Science, currently
specializing in Public Policy, Social Policy and Social Innovation at Sciences Po
Paris. Her main research focuses are social and environmental inequalities and
justice, critical sustainabilities, global and local economies and gender issues.
After taking part in several protests and grassroots initiatives in Bologna and
Paris, she developed her interest for social movements and social change. She
particularly investigates the use of ICTs in activism and the politics of the digital
space. Primary Affiliation: Professor Jen Schradie. Contact email:
margherita.massarenti AT sciencespo.fr

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Volume 12 (1): 347 – 354 (July 2020) Dounya, Knowledge is power

Knowledge is power: virtual forms of everyday

resistance and grassroots broadcasting in Iran
Dounya (8th May 2020)

Resistance in a totalitarian state takes on unique forms - manifesting in mass

protest, underground activities, everyday forms of resistance and more. In 1985
James C. Scott first introduced the concept of everyday resistance. In his book
Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, he explained
“These techniques [of everyday resistance], for the most part quite prosaic, are
the ordinary means of class struggle. They are the techniques of “first resort” in
those common historical circumstances in which open defiance is impossible or
entails mortal danger.”1 For over two years, I have been researching,
documenting and analyzing everyday forms of resistance in contemporary Iran.
Such forms can appear through casual conversations, defiant and ‘illegal’
gestures, grassroots initiatives, and many other methods devised by the
oppressed to bypass rules and regulations set by oppressing forces. As an
example, communications apps such as Telegram, WhatsApp, Viber as well as
social media platforms like Facebook, Instagram and Twitter are frequently
used in Iran in both organized forms of activism or what Saeid Golkar in the
book The Whole World is Texting: Youth Protest in the Information Age,
recognizes as “non-movements” 2 which are “shaped under authoritarian
regimes where there is no freedom of organization and expression.”3
In Iran, apps and communication channels are a means through which people
organize protests, share news and report information that remains otherwise
unreported or is manipulated by the state media. Such grassroots broadcasting
has undermined the oppressive Iranian regime to such an extent that the
government constantly attempts to limit, hack, censor and ban these
communication and social media platforms. Beginning with an analysis of
online resistance and grassroots broadcasting during the current Covid-19 Crisis
and moving backwards with other examples from the events of the last year,
1396 AD (Spring 2019-Spring 2020) in Iran, I will unpack the importance of
such forms of virtual resistance in shaping Iran’s contemporary social and
political climate.

1James C Scott, “Everyday Form of Resistance,” The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 4,
(1989): 34, https://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/cjas/article/view/1765.
2 “ […] the term ‘social non-movements’ refers to the collective actions of dispersed and
fragmented actors; ‘non-movements embody shared practices of large numbers of ordinary
people whose fragmented, but similar activities trigger much social change, even though these
practices are rarely guided by an ideology or recognizable leaderships and organizations’ (2010,
p. 14).” Saeid Golkar, “Student Activism, Social Media and Authoritarian Rule in Iran,” in The
Whole World is Texting: Youth Protest in the Information Age, 2015, ed. Irving Epstein (The
Netherlands: Rotterdam, 2015), 62.
3 Golkar, The Whole World is Texting, 62.

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Iran has a complicated relationship with social media, communication apps,

and Internet as a whole. Since the 1990s when Internet grew more popular in
Iran and with it access to information became easier, the use of Internet in and
of itself became an act of everyday resistance as people were able to obtain less
censored information, blog and communicate without following many of the
rules and regulations set by the state. It took some time for the Iranian regime
to realize and act on the threat that Internet posed to their existence and control
but since then, their techniques of controlling people’s Internet activities have
become increasingly more advanced. The Iranian government has been utilizing
censorship and surveillance technologies made in China and has created a Cyber
police branch, The Supreme Council of Virtual Space, to combat the anti-state
activities and target political activists and dissidents in Iran. However, this has
not deterred Iranians from using Internet as a new public space in which to
organize and resist their totalitarian government. For example, many in Iran are
using proxy servers and VPNs to access the censored and banned websites and
social media channels. The techniques devised and employed by the people in
Iran have also improved to better sidestep the restrictions.

Covid-19 pandemic
Becoming one of the epicentres of the new Corona pandemic back in March of
2020, Iranians have been dealing with the devastating impacts of the virus ever
since. The first official confirmation of a Covid-19 death in Iran was reported in
mid February. Attempting to downplay the scale of this pandemic, the Iranian
government was refraining from releasing more accurate information and
statistics about the number of cases. Nonetheless, in the days following the first
reports people were already questioning the official statistics. To retaliate and
discredit such speculations however, as reported by the National Review; “An
Iranian parliament spokesman on Wednesday announced that anyone found to
be ‘spreading rumors’ about the Wuhan coronavirus outbreak will be sentenced
to one-to-three years in prison and flogging.”4 Nonetheless, anonymous reports
were being circulated online. People are still sharing information about the
disease and warning each other despite government orders. voice and video
recordings as well as photos taken by doctors and nurses in Iran’s hospitals
were demonstrating, first hand, the scale of the pandemic.
Another example of grassroots broadcasting during the pandemic was the early
reporting of the detection of the Covid-19 virus in the infamous Evin Prison. The
news was quickly broadcasted through social media channels, despite the
relentless attempts by the government to hide this information which
endangered the mostly political detainees of this prison. Though other forms of
pressure also contributed to the government temporarily releasing over eighty

4Zachary Evans, “Iran to Sentence Citizens Who “Spreads Rumors” about Coronavirus to
Flogging, Three Years in Prison,” National Review, February 26, 2019,
https://www.nationalreview.com/news/iran-to-sentence-citizens-who-spreads-rumors-about-
coronavirus-to-flogging-three-years-in-prison/.

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five thousand prisoners, the public knowledge of the virus leading to pressure
from the people was a significant factor. Reports from those inside the prison
and those temporarily released about the conditions and lack of proper
preventative measures and supplies have also exposed the dangers for those
who still remain incarcerated in prisons across Iran.
Iranians have also been taking matters into their own hands when it comes to
public safety. Some companies with the ability to produce disinfectants have
been halting their regular work to provide the necessary disinfecting agents to
hospitals and medical centres. Videos of people teaching how to sew masks and
scrubs to donate to their near medical centres have also been circulating on
social media. Fundraising initiatives have been organized by Iranian expatriates
and citizens to support the fight against Corona. As an example “Help Iranians
Fight Coronavirus” Go Fund Me page is set up by Negar Mortazavi, an
American-Iranian Journalist, to provide supplies to healthcare facilities and
families in Iran.5
Exposing government shortcomings is one part of such forms of activism, but
demonstrating the lack of control of the government in handling the pandemic
is far more important and devastating to the Iranian regime. BBC Persian, a
news station based in the UK, recently released a discovery on the role of Mahan
Air, a popular Iranian airline, in spreading the Corona Virus in Iran. According
to the article, Mahan Air had defied the orders of the Iranian government to halt
direct flights from China to Iran due to the pandemic. The spread of this report
on social media brings to question the freedom and autonomy such companies
have in Iran and by proxy questions the power of the Iranian government over
its own internal affairs.
In another case, an Iranians citizen journalist revealed the impact of the US
sanctions during this pandemic through a cellphone video. The video showed a
series of trucks which were carrying medical supplies to Iran being held for
three days in Romania at the Bulgarian border. In the video one of the truck
drivers was asked about the situation. He explained that the drivers had been
stranded there for three days without being provided food or water as the
Bulgarian government was refusing entry, stating the US sanctions as their
reason. He then remarked that the Iranian consulate was also not responding.6
This video, as an example, was widely shared on twitter.

5 Negar Mortazavi, “Help Iranians Fight Coronavirus,” Gofundme, March 24, 2020,
https://www.gofundme.com/f/negar039s-campaign-for-relief-
international?sharetype=teams&member=4039340&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitte
r&utm_campaign=p_na+share-sheet&rcid=ae7854d31775458da6d0c0e895d61a5e.
6Sami Ramadani (@samiramadani1), “Lorries packed with medical supplies destined for Iran,
to fight Coronavirus, are being stopped by #Romania & #Bulgaria obeying US sanctions &
economic warfare on Iran.” Twitter, March 23, 2019,
https://twitter.com/OlsiJ/status/1241870466282856451.

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Amidst crippling sanctions which have limited medical supplies to Iran in the
best of times and worsened the economic situation of the average Iranians, a
pandemic is a near impossible task to handle. This, the corruption,
mismanagement and plain stupidity apparent the Iranian government’s actions
has worsened the already devastating effects of the pandemic in a country that is
densely populated. A simple example of such negligence was the deputy health
minister of Iran, Iraj Harirchi, downplaying the scale of the pandemic in a press
conference only to test positive for the virus a day after his speech.7 The news
and video of this incident circulated quickly on social media as people mocked
the government’s actions. Iranians mistrust in their government however, has a
long history and such incidences only work to reaffirm this feeling. Such forms
of virtual resistance have been present in the everyday life of people in Iran for
over two decades and in the following sections, I will draw from some of the
other major events of the last year in Iran to further demonstrate the trend.

March 2019 floods

The year 1396 begun with major floods across several regions in Iran caused by
heavy and persistent rainfall for over two weeks. The hardest hit regions were
faced with high casualties, destruction of their houses, their farms and cities’
infrastructures. The government response to this disaster lacked both urgency
and did not reflect the gravity of the disaster. The official reporting of the
devastation was insufficient and distorted. During this time Instagram accounts
of both Iranian residents and expatriates were swarming with videos of houses
being washed away by the flood. People were using these channels to report
more accurate statistics of casualties and to amplify the voices of the outraged
victims who had not received the support they needed from their government.
One can gauge the threat that such grassroots forms of broadcasting pose to the
Iranian regime by looking at its response. According to an article in Iran News
Wire for example, Iran’s Attorney General, Mohammad Jafar Montazeri, had
stated that publishing ‘fake’ news–which means any negative reports– about the
2019 flood in Iran on the Internet is a security violation and those found guilty
will be prosecuted.8

November protests
On November 15th, 2019, after the sudden rise in oil prices and the subsequent
rise in the price of all goods in Iran, people took to the streets. Protests irrupted

7“Iran's deputy health minister: I have coronavirus,” The Guardian, February 25, 2020,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/25/irans-deputy-health-minister-i-have-
coronavirus.
8Adena Nima, “Iran Attorney General says posting flood news on social media ‘disrupts
security’,” Iran News Wire, March 27, 2019, https://irannewswire.org/iran-attorney-general-
says-posting-flood-news-on-social-media-disrupts-security/.

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in several cities and location in Iran including Ahvaz, Mashahd and Tehran.
Protestors parked their cars in the middle of the roads, blocking highways and
streets. In some locations, demonstrators set fire to gas stations and cars. The
scale of the protests reflected people’s built-up frustration at their financial and
political situation since the collapse of the nuclear deal.9 To silence the
protestors and undermine the protests the government induced an Internet
shutdown beginning in a few cities and quickly advancing to the whole country.
By November 16, Iran had entered a near complete Internet blackout. The
Iranian expatriates however, joined in these protests through virtual means by
drawing attention to the human rights violations inherent in an Internet
blackout. Because the Internet shutdown was gradual, some images and video
documentations of the protests were still leaked on the Internet and circulated
quickly by those outside of Iran.
The Iranian government had learnt its lessons from the 2009 Green Movement
and the role that social media platforms and communication apps played in the
uprising. As Golkar explains, during the Green Movement “Social media also
helped activists circulate information and news among people in a country
where the majority of the media had been under severe state control.” 10 This
time, the total Internet shutdown was implemented quickly and worked
effectively to disrupt any potential for a more organized movement. It as well
blocked any further videos and images from circulating on the Internet at the
time of the protests and, from any statistics about the number of casualties and
arrests to be made public. The protests were crushed by the government
through extreme violent force, thousands of arrests and hundreds of deaths. At
this time, as Internet was gradually restored, people took to social media to
report on the violence they had just witnessed and to circulate the images and
names of those who were arrested, some without a trace, demanding for their
safe release.

Boeing 737 crash

As tensions between Iran and the US escalated, due to the recent US
assassination of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in Baghdad, on January 8th,
a Ukrainian plane carrying 176 passengers and personnel crashed only minutes
after take off from the Imam Khomeini International airport in Tehran. Reports
of the crash stormed the news and social media channels and with the cause of
the crash and the death toll still unknown many were already publicly
speculating. For three days following the crash, the Iranian government
attempted to pass off a mechanical malfunction as the cause of the incident to
the public. For most Iranians and especially the friends and family of the

9“The Guardian view on Iran’s protests: unrest is crushed, unhappiness endures,” The
Guardian, November 26, 2019,
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/nov/26/the-guardian-view-on-irans-
protests-unrest-is-crushed-unhappiness-endures.
10 Golkar, The Whole World is Texting, 71.

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causalities, the prospect of a mechanical malfunction was the least devastating.

Shortly following the crash however, a video footage of the incident taken by a
civilian was surfacing online. When the online community, including
journalists, further inspected the footage, they noticed an object hitting the
plane prior to the explosion. This finding, as well as other inconsistencies,
forced the Iranian government to reveal the truth. The plane was shot down by
Iranian missiles through what the state called a ‘tragic accident’. Iranians were
devastated by the news and shocked by the ease in which their government lied
for three days while knowing the cause of the crash. A translated section from
an Instagram post of Hamed Esmaeilion, a father who lost his wife and
daughter in the crash, reads; “if you wanted to kill these 176 people, wouldn't it
have been easier if you had lined them up in front of the international airport
and shot them? […] so that at least they would not have been tormented in the
sky for six minutes. At least we would have a body that we could feel. Maybe we
could caress the hands of our children one last time. […] come out and say why
you did this? why did you do this?.” 11 This feeling of betrayal was widespread
and easily detectable both online and in the resulting protests.
After the government’s public announcement, Iranians, yet again, took to the
streets and social media to verbalize and publicize their anger and disbelief at
the level state corruption. The government was again desperate to muffle the
voices of the public and instil fear in those who tried to report the truth. As an
example, the state tried to find and arrest the man who had shot the video of the
plane crash.12 The protests were yet again met with extreme police force.
Families of the victims were threatened by the state and sometimes forced to
hold private funerals. Hence, much of the grieving was moved to social media
channels. Hashtags such as Boeing #737 or #176 were used to circulate news
and information about the crash and mourn the deaths. Family and friends of
the victims created online groups in which they demanded justice for the
victims. Many also formed initiatives to raise funds for the victims’ burials.

Conclusion
It can sometimes be difficult to pinpoint the extent to which each of these
instances of virtual resistance and activism have direct effect on government
policies and people’s social reality but they are undoubtably part of the path to
change. With Iran’s population median age being around 30 years old, Internet
is a tool used by the masses. As an example, an estimated 50 million people are

11Hamed Esmaeilion (Hamedesmaeilion), “ ‫ این خواستید می که شما‬۱۷۶ ‫را همه اگر نبود تر آسان آیا بکشید را نفر‬
‫” ؟ زنید می هم را تان کثافت هی ؟ دهید می بیانیه هی حاال ؟ بستید می رگبار به و کردید می صف به تان المللی بین فرودگاه جلوی‬
Instagram, Febrauay 5, 2020,
https://www.instagram.com/p/B8KkaZGpuj3/?igshid=n5a88xh3v6jg.
12Yaron Steinbuch, “Iran arrests person for sharing video of missile striking Ukrainian airliner,”
New York Post, January 15, 2020, https://nypost.com/2020/01/15/iran-arrests-person-for-
sharing-video-of-missile-striking-ukrainian-airliner/.

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currently using Telegram in Iran.13 Hence, such grassroots broadcasting

methods can potentially reach a large number of people. Though it is important
not to depict a false utopian idea of virtual resistance in Iran, as much of the
dangers of physical protests and resistance also exists in the online sphere, it is
important to acknowledge its effectiveness and credit its often anonymous
activists. As seen in the examples above, Iranians have embarked in both a
virtual and a physical battle against their oppressive government and they are
proving unstoppable. As Iran has been on the road to recovery in the fight
against Covid-19, there are talks of returning the temporarily released prisoners
back to prison and yet again, people have taken to social media to call attention
to this and to demand the permanent release of the many political prisoners and
those unjustly incarcerated. Furthermore, social media is still being used to
bring attention to and demand answers regarding the victims of the events of
last year as the Corona crisis has overtaken the news. We can see, this fight
continues with full force.

References
Esmaeilion, Hamed (Hamedesmaeilion). “ ‫ این خواستید می که شما‬۱۷۶ ‫آسان آیا بکشید را نفر‬
‫جلوی را همه اگر نبود تر‬
‫هم را تان کثافت هی ؟ دهید می بیانیه هی حاال ؟ بستید می رگبار به و کردید می صف به تان المللی بین فرودگاه‬
‫ ” ؟ زنید می‬Instagram. Febrauay 5, 2020.
https://www.instagram.com/p/B8KkaZGpuj3/?igshid=n5a88xh3v6jg.
Evans, Zachary. “Iran to Sentence Citizens Who “Spreads Rumors” about
Coronavirus to Flogging, Three Years in Prison.” National Review. February 26,
2019. https://www.nationalreview.com/news/iran-to-sentence-citizens-who-
spreads-rumors-about-coronavirus-to-flogging-three-years-in-prison/.
Golkar, Saeid. “Student Activism, Social Media and Authoritarian Rule in Iran.”
in The Whole World is Texting: Youth Protest in the Information Age. 2015. ed.
Irving Epstein (The Netherlands: Rotterdam, 2015).
Iqbal, Mansoor. “Telegram Revenue and Usage Statistics (2020).” Business of
Apps. March 24, 2020. https://www.businessofapps.com/data/telegram-
statistics/.
Mortazavi, Negar. “Help Iranians Fight Coronavirus.” Gofundme. March 24,
2020. https://www.gofundme.com/f/negar039s-campaign-for-relief-
international?sharetype=teams&member=4039340&utm_medium=social&utm
_source=twitter&utm_campaign=p_na+share-
sheet&rcid=ae7854d31775458da6d0c0e895d61a5e.
Nima, Adena. “Iran Attorney General says posting flood news on social media
‘disrupts security’.” Iran News Wire. March 27, 2019.

13Mansoor Iqbal, “Telegram Revenue and Usage Statistics (2020),” Business of Apps, March 24,
2020, https://www.businessofapps.com/data/telegram-statistics/.

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Volume 12 (1): 347 – 354 (July 2020) Dounya, Knowledge is power

https://irannewswire.org/iran-attorny-general-says-posting-flood-news-on-
social-media-disrupts-security/.
Ramadani, Sami (@samiramadani1). “Lorries packed with medical supplies
destined for Iran, to fight Coronavirus, are being stopped by #Romania &
#Bulgaria obeying US sanctions & economic warfare on Iran.” Twitter. March
23, 2019. https://twitter.com/OlsiJ/status/1241870466282856451.
Scott, James C. “Everyday From of Resistance.” The Copenhagen Journal of
Asian Studies 4, (1989): 33-62.
https://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/cjas/article/view/1765.
Steinbuch, Yaron. “Iran arrests person for sharing video of missile striking
Ukrainian airliner.” New York Post. January 15, 2020.
https://nypost.com/2020/01/15/iran-arrests-person-for-sharing-video-of-
missile-striking-ukrainian-airliner/.
“Iran's deputy health minister: I have coronavirus.” The Guardian. February 25,
2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/25/irans-deputy-health-
minister-i-have-coronavirus.
“The Guardian view on Iran’s protests: unrest is crushed, unhappiness
endures.” The Guardian. November 26, 2019.
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/nov/26/the-guardian-
view-on-irans-protests-unrest-is-crushed-unhappiness-endures.

About the author

Dounya (pseudonym) is a Canadian/Iranian researcher and artist. She holds a
Bachelor in Fine Arts and a Masters in Spatial Strategies.

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How progressive social movements can save

democracy in pandemic times
Donatella della Porta (19th May 2020)

Against all odds, the first stages in the Covid19 pandemic have been met by what
media and activists can see is a new wave of protest. While the fear of contagion
and the lockdown measures, heavily constrained physical movements, and
seemed to jeopardize collective actions; activists invented new forms of
expressing their increasing grievances, but also spread new tactics Car caravans,
pot banging, collective performance of protest songs from balconies, live-
streamed actions, digital rallies, virtual marches, walk outs, boycotts, and
rent-strikes have multiplied as forms of denouncing what the pandemic made
all the more evident and all the less tolerable: the depth of inequalities and their
dramatic consequences in terms of human lives.
In most of the countries that have been harder hit by the pandemic, the workers
of the health care sector called for immediate provision of live-saving devices as
well as resources to be invested in the public health system. In Italy, 100,000
doctors signed a petition calling for territorially decentralized organization of
healthcare provision. In Milan, the health care personnel of private hospitals
staged stay-ins (keeping social distance) to protest the deterioration of their
working conditions. In the US, nurses staged peaceful rallies, and were attacked
by radical right activists calling for the end of the lockdown. In Spain, as in
many other countries, citizens express support for the health workers by
collectively clapping their hands on their balconies.
All over the world, workers of the so-called gig economy, including bike delivery
people, Amazon drivers, and call center workers; mobilized in wildcat strikes,
walking out of workplaces, calling in sick and staging flashmobs asking for
protection against the contagion as well as for broader labour rights. They also
often denounced their companies’ attempts to discourage collective action by
firing those who stood up to denounce the poor conditions. Inequalities have
also been challenged by students calling for reductions of fees and grants, and
by those who are suffering from unemployment and drastic drops in
income, promoting rent strikes.
Protests also address the increasing deterioration of environmental conditions.
A main example of a digital strike is the fifth Global Strike Against Climate
Change carried out on 24 April 2020 by Fridays for Future with activists
geolocalizing themselves in front of highly symbolic places (such as the Italian
Parliament). Digital assemblies allowed activists to discuss perspectives and to
build proposals. This happened with the Back to the Future program, which
focused on building a socially equitable and environmentally just response to
the pandemic. Posters have been left in squares and on buildings to call for
changes in environmental policies.

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As with contentious politics in non-pandemic times, disruptive street politics by

other means mixed a logic of numbers showing support for their proposals (as
in digital strikes or petitions); a logic of damage, creating costs for their
targets (as in the workers’ strike but also on the citizens ‘ rent strikes), as well as
a logic of testimony, by proving the extent of their commitment displaying the
sacrifice, risks and costs of collective action (as in the vigil of the nurses
standing in front of abusive rightwing militants).
The activities of progressive social movements in the pandemic are not limited
to the visible protests. Activists called for political and economic power to be
accountable through a careful work of collection, elaboration and
transmission of information on the effects of the pandemic on the poorest and
more disadvantaged groups of citizens—such as prisoners, migrant workers,
homeless—but also on the unequal distribution of activities of care within the
family and the violence against women. In fact, activists have produced a lay
knowledge that is at least as much needed as the specialized knowledge of the
expert. Using digital resources for information sharing as well as online teach-
ins, they contributed to connect the different fields of knowledge that the
hyperspecialization of science tends to fragment. Intertwining theoretical
knowledge with practical , experimenting with different ideas, building on past
experiences, they also prefigure a different future.
Besides protesting and constructing alternative knowledge, progressive
movements have also contributed to a much needed task in a tragic moment:
the production and distribution of services of a different type. Faced by the
limited capacity of public institutions (weakened by long lasting neoliberal
policies) to intervene and to bring support to those in need, activists have built
upon experiences of new mutualism, that had already been nurtured to
address the social crisis triggered by the financial crisis and especially the
austerity responses to it at the beginning of the years 2010. So progressive civil
society organizations and grass-roots neighborhood groups distributed food and
medicines, produced masks and medical instruments, given shelter to the
homeless and protected women from domestic violence. The principle of food
sovereignty and the solidarity economy spreads through these practical
examples.
In doing this, activists are challenging a top down conception of charity or
humanitarianism, by spreading norms of solidarity that contrast with the
extreme individualism of neoliberal capitalism. Through social interventions,
they reconstitute social relations that have been broken well before the
pandemic but they also also politicize claims, shifting them from immediate
relief to proposals for radical social change. In performing these activities,
progressive social movements constitute public spheres in which participation is
praised in a vision of solidarity as born out of a recreated sense of shared
destiny.
In action, different (pre-existing and emerging) groups are building ties and
bridging frames. In fact, these energies are connecting around a series of
central challenges for the construction of post pandemic alternatives. First and

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foremost, progressive movements are elaborating innovative ideas about how to

contrast ever-growing inequalities, in labour conditions and income, but also
among generations, genders, racialized groups, and different territories. Here
the struggles are for not only a return of the labour rights that neoliberal
capitalism had already taken away, with consequences that become all the more
dramatic during the pandemic, developing claims for a basic incomes for those
who are expelled or never entered the labour market, as well as rights to
education, housing, public health. The pandemic demonstrates the killing
consequences of differential access to public health care in countries that (like
the US) have historically had a weak welfare state, or countries where neoliberal
policies by right-wing governments have been more widespread (as the UK). In
other countries (including European ones) the consequences of
commodification of health services, cuts of resources to public institutions, the
savings on the number and the salary of the public workers have been visible in
the spread and lethality of the virus. Besides the immediate challenges, the
pandemic has made evident the dramatic long term effects of inequalities by
hitting ethnic minorities, old people in overcrowded shelters, and poor
neighborhoods especially hard. Highlighting the importance addressing climate
change, the contagion was particularly intense and the mortality higher in the
most polluted areas. Besides the increase in the episodes of violence against
women, the pandemic also made blatantly clear both the importance of care
activities and their unequal gender distribution with heavy burdens on women.
Besides claiming social and environmental justice, progressive social
movements mobilized in the pandemic are also suggesting that the path to
achieve it is not through the centralization of political decision making and even
less through technocratic moves but rather by increasing the participation of the
citizens. Pandemic times have been times of scapegoating on the others, the
poor, the migrants, accused by right wing politicians of spreading the virus.
These have been times of a lack of transparency and of low accountability, with
the proclamations of state of emergencies used, in different forms and degrees,
to curb dissent. Xenophobic governments have increased forced repatriation
and closed the borders even to refugees. Through car caravans (as in Israel) or
bike marches (as in Slovenia), progressive groups have protested government
attempts to exploit the crisis to limit political participation and citizens’
rights. In this direction, they can build upon the democratic innovations that
were developed as responses to the financial crisis in the last decade.
Through deliberative experiments, direct democracy, crowd-sourced
constitutional processes as well as the building of movement parties, the ideas
of the commons develop, pointing at public goods that need to be managed
through the active participation of the citizens, the users and the workers.
Times of deep crisis can therefore (admittedly not automatically) trigger the
invention of alternative but possible futures. As the pandemic changes everyday
life, progressive social movements create needed spaces for reflections about a
post-pandemic world, one that cannot be conceived as if it were in continuity
with the pre-pandemic one.

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About the author:

Donatella della Porta is an Italian sociologist and political scientist, who is
Professor of political science and political sociology at the Scuola Normale
Superiore, Firenze, Italy.

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Responding to coronavirus pandemic: human rights

movement-building to transform global capitalism
Jackie Smith (15th May)

Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic makes patently clear the limitations and
vulnerabilities of the global capitalist system, portending significant changes
in the world economy. Given the long history of divisions in the global Left, is
there hope that we might forge the unity needed to transform the global
economic order? In this essay I argue that global social movement practices
and history reveal human rights as a unifying and transformative framework
for organizing across issues and across local-global scales. More localized
human rights movements are now well situated to help unite and guide
transformative global activism in this moment of crisis, and I provide
examples from current Pittsburgh and U.S. national human rights cities
organizing.

The COVID-19 pandemic makes patently clear the systemic crisis of global
capitalism, portending significant changes in the world economy. Now in focus
are the fundamental contradictions between a system organized to prioritize
wealth accumulation and one oriented to promote life and well-being. Should
we accept an even more ruthless version of what Naomi Klein calls “coronavirus
capitalism”? Or can we overcome our many divisions to transform global
capitalism?
Neoliberal capitalism’s worldwide erosion of social and ecological foundations
for health and well-being fuel this unfolding tragedy. The chaotic and slow
response of the U.S. Government, the denial of health care for victims, and
limited social supports for the most impacted residents will intensify the global
suffering both within and outside the country’s borders. Rescue packages laden
with corporate giveaways and thin on help for struggling people expose the
dangerous incompatibilities between corporate power and human well-being,
leaving unambiguous the question of which side political leaders are on. The
disruption of prevailing, market-oriented “common sense” makes this crisis
moment a unique opportunity to popularize a long-emergent vision of a world
organized around human needs.

Globalizing struggles for well-being

In a recent essay, Valentine Moghadam has called on progressive forces to
“Planetize the Movement,” calling for work to overcome a long history of
fragmentation and lack of unity around a shared analysis and vision. She points
out that the World Social Forum (WSF) process has, since 2001, enabled various
elements of progressive/Left movements to develop thinking about global

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problems, alternative visions, and strategies for social transformation. But she
sees it as failing to generate a unified structure—like a new socialist
international—to coordinate action and strategy in response to new threats or
openings, such as those we see today. She points to local, municipalist
movements as one source of hope.
I believe the WSF process has indeed provided a foundation for global and local
action today, although its significance is in its decentralized and emergent
nature, keeping it under the radar of most political analysts and public
discourse. By creating spaces for global movement-building and anti-systemic
learning, inspiring countless inter-linked regional and local social forums
around the world, and supporting network connections across struggles, the
WSFs have helped extend global analyses and organizing to diverse local
contexts (See Smith 2020). Significantly, the forums have helped amplify voices
of indigenous peoples, peasants, and feminists in the broader, global
conversation. Because of the WSFs, local activists have new tools for
confronting globalized capitalism and the global and local hierarchies upon
which it relies. By disrupting old ways of thinking and inspiring new forms of
agency as well as multi-scalar and cross-sectoral networks and organizing, the
WSF process has been a catalyst for system-transformation.
While the networks generated by the WSFs remain highly decentralized, they
are more interconnected as a result of the WSF process and the practices and
platforms it helped generate. They also integrate local- and global-scale activism
better than ever before. Global activist networks are now more unified around
shared language and analyses—and this largely reflects the wisdom brought into
global movement spaces by feminist and indigenous movements. Thus, they
provide critical structural and ideological foundations for global justice
movements going forward (Smith 2014).
The intentionality of the WSF process (Santos 2008), privileges voices of the
global South and other marginalized and excluded groups, creating potential for
new challenges to the Western development paradigm’s global scale,
anthropocentrism, and extractivism in Left politics (see, e.g., Conway 2017). In
contrast, labor internationalism has reproduced extractive, capitalist logics and
obscured this long history of humanity’s struggles for life and well-being,
confounding efforts at Left unity.
Thus, what we learn from the WSF and related movement processes is that
feminist and indigenous praxis can unite progressive movements, especially at
this moment when health and life are most visibly at stake. By centering the
voices and experiences of marginalized groups (however imperfectly), the WSF
process helped make more visible for the global Left the social reproductive
work made invisible in the racialized, anthropocentric, patriarchal capitalist
paradigm. This recognition is evolving through ongoing interactions and
movement-building processes, shaping what Goodman and Salleh (2013) call
another “class” of labor—one whose identity is grounded in the shared
foundational needs and experiences of life and community, rather than in
processes of work and capitalist production:

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the global majority of meta-industrial workers—urban women carers, rural

subsistence dwellers, and indigenes…share the experience of exclusion and
diminishment by social stratification and cultural bias. That said, …[they] are
victims only to hegemonic eyes. In a time of multiple crises, there is an urgent
need for political decisions informed by ecologically embedded modes of
existence. Women and men with “holding skills” have a head start in constructing
the parameters of a “bio-civilisation.” This positive concept of labour and
creative knowledge making at the humanity-nature interface challenges
conventional sociological categories. By the Eurocentric model, class is defined
by “lack” in relation to the mode of production and reproductive labour is deemed
non-productive. As the focus of counter-hegemonic politics shifts from
production to reproduction, “another labour class” comes forward with unique
capacities for regenerative knowledge. …The next question is: under what
conditions will this socially diverse labour grouping “in itself” become a class “for
itself?”

Thus, through intense struggle and debate (Sen and Waterman 2007), the WSF
process helped bring forward a new set of global protagonists—that is,
progressive activists who have recast a shared, decolonized history to confront
the violence of capitalism towards both people and the planet. It has helped
authorize Goodman and Salleh’s “meta-industrial logic,” or an “epistemology of
the South” (Santos 2004) obscured by prevailing Right- and Left-political
narratives.
The coronavirus pandemic is a tragic reminder that the global economic system
depletes our capacities for social reproduction and thus, survival (Feminisms
and Degrowth Alliance 2020). Much labor internationalism has neglected the
fact that a global economy focused on economic growth and jobs versus one
that is designed to support and protect livelihoods undermines our
foundational economy. Thus, the COVID-19 crisis opens opportunities not only
for transcending traditional Left-Right divisions but also for addressing long-
standing contradictions in global Left organizing.

Localizing human rights in a pandemic

Global movement processes like the WSFs have supported the localization of
global movements and nurtured global formations like the “right to the city”
movement, which are now advancing different visions of Zapatismo’s “one
world where many worlds fit.” As national governments have deprived localities
of needed revenues, and as economic globalization and climate change
intensifies local governance challenges, new unlikely alliances are forming to
implement “people-centered” human rights “from below.” The political project
of “human rights globalization” advances an emancipatory, biocentric,
decolonized understanding of human rights (Baraka n.d.), or what Fregoso
(2014) refers to as “alternative human rights imaginaries: a pluriversality of
human rights not dependent on legalism or the state.”

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COVID-19 is now drawing more attention to the fact that those left furthest
behind by this system are now on the front lines doing essential work that
sustains livelihoods. Their health and well-being is critical to the global effort to
contain this pandemic. Yet, substantial lapses in governance have undermined,
for these groups especially, the rights to health, housing, food, workplace
protections, and environmental justice. All of these are human rights claims,
and the enjoyment of each right requires all the others. Such interdependence
supports movement-building, and inter-networked human rights city activists
are connecting trans-local policy conversations to global human rights
discourses, drawing legitimacy and leverage via global movement alliances.
While many see existing international human rights law as “toothless” due to
weak enforcement, human rights activists have been working behind the scenes
to build, slowly but steadily, an increasingly potent global framework for
monitoring human rights practices and holding human rights offenders
accountable (See Sikkink 2018). Most notable are the establishment of the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in 1994, the Permanent
Forum on Indigenous Issues in 2000, and the Universal Periodic Review (UPR)
process in 2006.
In the midst of the unfolding pandemic, this global human rights infrastructure
can be a resource for people and communities worldwide. Global human rights
bodies are speaking out to remind governments of their legal obligations to
respect and protect rights, reinforcing “from above” the demands activists are
making “from below.” For instance, in response to the COVID-19 crisis, global
human rights officials have issued the following reminders to national and local
governments of the continued salience of international human rights
obligations, including:
● Draft Human Rights Council resolution on the human rights implications
of the COVID-19 crisis calls on national officials to center human rights
in their responses to the pandemic.
● The UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights
warned of the devastating effects of many states’ responses to COVID-19
on people living in poverty.
● Chairpersons of ten U.N. Treaty Bodies called on states “to adopt
measures to protect the rights to life and health, and to ensure access to
health care to all who need it, “without discrimination.”
● UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing, Leilani Farha
has been especially vocal, issuing COVID-19 Guidance Notes with specific
policy recommendations on evictions, homelessness, and financialization
of housing markets. Farha states, “Now is the time to address structural
inequalities in our financial and housing systems and ensure that they
are guided by, and responsive to, international human rights.”
Thus, despite limited tools for enforcement, international laws and norms
provide legitimacy that can, especially in times of crisis, help tip the scales in
favor of those advocating for people’s rights and dignity against politicians and

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business leaders favoring status quo policies. The growing human rights
architecture provides more resources for local residents and activists to advance
human rights, but its effectiveness requires active efforts of grassroots
movements. As more people find themselves vulnerable, and as the pandemic
forces people to see that the denial of rights to any vulnerable group undermines
health everywhere, there is greater resonance for human rights demands in the
wider public, and greater possibility for “human rights globalization from
below.”
Drawing from my experience working with local human rights movements, I
have seen in recent years greater potential for appeals to global human rights
laws and institutions to impact local policies and practices. The public in the
United States especially has limited knowledge of international human rights,
and few local officials are aware of their human rights obligations. So when local
activists reference UN human rights reports and related documentation, such
reminders that local officials even have international legal obligations can elicit
new attention and responsiveness. We found this in Pittsburgh when we shared
documents from the UN Special Rapporteur on Housing with the local City
Council and Planning Commissions,1 and when we referenced our submission of
a report on local human rights conditions to the United Nations at a City
Council hearing.
Nationally, human rights organizers are uniting in response to COVID-19 to
make human rights more a priority in public policy, and this work is aided by
global human rights bodies. For instance, a network of U.S. human rights
activists sent this letter to the State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Human Rights on his office’s obligations to “ensure that all levels of
government-from Executive branch through state and local levels are informed
of their human rights obligations under international law.” And they have
appealed to the President of the UN Human Rights Council for the chance to
provide supplemental documentation for the UPR Review of the United States,
which was initially scheduled to take place in May 2020.
Recently, U.S. human rights city advocates have been using the UN’s UPR
process to build human rights movements in the United States. They launched
the “UPR Cities” initiative in 2019, as part of work to generate local human
rights documentation for the formal UN review of the U.S. government.
Webinars and online organizing toolkits provided guidance for local activists on
the UN process and models for local actions. UPR City organizers are explicitly
advancing a two-pronged, or “sandwich” strategy that brings evidence about
local conditions to other national leaders while supporting movements bringing
pressure on local, state and national governments “from below” (Tsutsui and
Smith 2019). Other national leaders are now more likely to confront the U.S. for
its human rights failures, since they are now so directly threatening to their own
national interests.

1UN to US Government: Do Better on Housing Shelterforce June 3, 2019, Jackie Smith and
Emily Cummins.

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In Pittsburgh, I’ve been part of our UPR Cities work, helping coordinate a local
coalition that submitted a report to the UN’s UPR working group entitled Racial
Inequity at the Core of Human Rights Challenges in Pittsburgh. Pittsburghers’
mobilization against the city’s bid to host Amazon’s second headquarters, and
concerns over developers’ impacts on affordable housing helped shape
conversations that produced the national Human Rights Cities Alliance UPR
submission, “The growth of corporate influence in sub-national political & legal
institutions undermines U.S. compliance with international human rights
obligations.”
Our local UPR Cities coalition had planned to work during the spring of 2020 to
prepare a local version of its UPR report which would identify specific municipal
and county policy recommendations deriving from international human rights
commitments. We planned to formally present our UPR report to local officials
in conjunction with the timing of the UN’s review of the U.S. government.
The pandemic has given local and national organizers additional time to build
local activist knowledge about human rights and opportunities in the UN. The
pandemic highlights that the United States is indeed exceptional for its failure
to recognize the right to health, and this failure is behind its disastrous and
dangerous inability to address the COVID-19 crisis. This failure has deadly
global repercussions, and the UPR process provides one avenue for other world
leaders to address the connections between the human rights of U.S. residents
and the health and safety of their own populations. Human rights movements
are needed to fortify their political will.
As an example of how community leaders have responded to this crisis moment,
Pittsburgh’s Human Rights City Alliance and an array of coalition partners have
organized a virtual community forum series, Learning from COVID-19: Shaping
a Health and Human Rights Agenda for our Region. The series convenes panels
of organizers helping spread awareness of local conditions and responses to the
pandemic, and deliberate attention is made to generating ideas for alternative
policy landscapes and strategies for transforming the status quo. Since
participants in these forums are the same ones who have been working around
the UPR initiative, there are synergies across these efforts, and local organizers
are increasingly using human rights to frame their demands.
It is important for our movements to be conscious of the long traditions of
human rights activism and its relationship to supporting the social foundations
for life and health. Through this lens we can see a long-emergent human rights
globalization that provides today’s movements with institutional support and
movement strategies that can challenge the power structures of globalized
capitalism and confront its violence against nature, indigenous peoples, women
and other vulnerable groups.
The right to the city movement has helped movements from below in localities
around the world to “bring human rights home” by holding local governments
accountable to globally recognized norms. They have helped build unity against
corporate power and the health and food industrial-complexes and offer a

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compelling justification for the decommodification of basic needs. These ideas,

the emerging global institutional framework they are shaping, and the models of
global- and local-level organizing they have generated reflect a powerful project
of human rights globalization that supports life, community, and the human
and ecological care work upon which all depends. In this moment of global
pandemic, we should look to this movement knowledge and organizing
infrastructures for guidance to build a planetary movement for transformative
change.

References
Baraka, Ajamu. n.d. "'People-Centered' Human Rights as a Framework for
Social Transformation." Development and Change. At:
https://www.ajamubaraka.com/peoplecentered-human-rights-as-a-framework-
for-social-transformation. Retrieved: May 4, 2020.
Conway, Janet. 2017. "Modernity and the Study of Social Movements: Do We
Need a Paradigm Shift?" Pp. 17-34 in Social Movements and World-System
Transformation, edited by J. Smith, M. Goodhart, P. Manning and J. Markoff.
New York: Routledge.
Feminisms and Degrowth Alliance (FaDA). 2020. "Collaborative Feminist
Degrowth: Pandemic as an Opening for a Care-Full Radical Transformation."
https://www.degrowth.info:
Foundational Economy Collective. 2020. "After the Pandemic: A Ten-Point Plan
for the Collective Provision of Basic Needs ". Open Democracy (Online).
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/author/the-foundational-economy-
collective/.
Fregoso, Rosa-Linda. 2014. "For a Pluriversal Declaration of Human Rights."
American Quarterly 66(3):583-608. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1353/aq.2014.0047.
Goodman, James and Ariel Salleh. 2013. "The 'Green Economy': Class
Hegemony and Counter-Hegemony." Globalizations 10(3):411-24.
Santos, Boaventura de Sousa. 2008. "The World Social Forum and the Global
Left ". Politics and Society 36(2):247-70. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329208316571.
Santos, Boaventura de Sousa 2004. "The World Social Forum as Epistemology
of the South." Pp. 13-34 in The World Social Forum: A User's Manual, edited by
B. d. S. Santos.
Sen, Jai and Peter Waterman, eds. 2007. Challenging Empires: The World
Social Forum, 2nd Edition. Montreal: Black Rose Books.
Sikkink, Kathryn. 2018. "Human Rights: Advancing the Frontier of
Emancipation." Great Transition Initiative.
https://greattransition.org/publication/human-rights-frontier.

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Smith, Jackie. 2020. "Making Other Worlds Possible: The Battle in Seattle in
World-Historical Context." Socialism and Democracy:Online. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1080/08854300.2019.1676030 .
Smith, Jackie. 2017. “Responding to Globalization and Urban Conflict: Human
Rights City Initiatives” Studies in Social Justice 11(2):347-368.
Smith, Jackie and Joshua Cooper. 2019. "Bringing Human Rights Home: New
Strategies for Local Organizing ". Open Global Rights.
https://www.openglobalrights.org/bringing-human-rights-home-new-
strategies-for-local-organizing/ .
Tsutsui, Kiyoteru and Jackie Smith. 2019. "Human Rights and Social
Movements: From the Boomerang Pattern to a Sandwich Effect." Pp. 586-601 in
The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, edited by D. A. Snow, S.
A. Soule, H. Kriesi and H. McCammon. New York: Wiley Blackwell.

About the author

Jackie Smith (jgsmith AT pitt.edu) is Professor of Sociology at the University
of Pittsburgh and editor of the open access Journal of World-Systems Research.
She is co-coordinator of the Pittsburgh Human Rights City Alliance and
coordinator of the national steering committee of the U.S. Human Rights Cities
Alliance.

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Volume 12 (1): 367 – 370 (July 2020) Mohar, Human rights amid covid-19

Human rights amid covid-19:

from struggle to orchestration of trade-offs
Yariv Mohar (19th April 2020)

Abstract
If pre-covid-19 human rights organizations dealt mainly with violations of
rights, amid the novel pandemic's challenges they ought to center on conflicts
of rights - i.e. trade-offs and dilemmas - and reorient themselves toward that
task

Keywords: human rights organizations, covid-19, conflicts of rights, re-

tooling, mobilization

Human rights amid covid-19

Human rights work should transcend the struggle framework to
include orchestration of trade-offs amid the novel pandemic
As the covid-19 pandemic endures it obliges governments to deal with related
trade-offs between health and other aspects of life and with conflicting rights
which unfold rapidly. At best governments handle this by using a balancing
strategy - i.e. trying to weigh the damage of each pathe and look for a middle
way. But alas governments’ balancing strategy is often a flawed one; it is
frequently tailored based on the masses’ interests and lived experience, which
leads to glossing over “special cases” and marginalized groups. Hence in such a
context human rights and social justice organizations’ activism needs a
reorientation toward the task of ameliorate governments’ balancing strategy.
This task may take new forms or just involve ramping-up already established
repertoires. For example amplifying the voices, and mapping the cases, of those
who are left behind and find no real relief by the state and its policies is
important nowadays not only in and of itself but also as a way to fine tune the
balancing strategy. Without such activism governments will keep turning a
blind eye to what is really at stake in regard to the moral dilemmas stemming
from the novel pandemic and will keep using the average citizen as their point of
reference for social trade-offs management.
Before diving into the model for such activism the context should be explicated:
Dealing with human rights and social justice was never a black and white task; it
has always involved moral dilemmas and conflicting rights. Yet the field of
human rights was mainly guided by what can be termed the struggle metaphor -
a framework juxtaposing human rights supporters with their adversaries, and
which takes human rights violations as the key problem to be addressed. The
coronavirus pandemic, and the unprecedented intensity of trade-offs it

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introduces, are fundamentally subverting against the struggle metaphor and

therefore call for new forms of activism.
Indeed the covid-19 pandemic brings about a set of pressing trade-offs; most
notably the right for health (and ultimately for life) clashes with pricipeles like
freedom of movement, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, the right to
privacy and with economic, social and cultural rights. Lock-downs and cellular
phones monitoring are the most obvious examples of policies embodying such
trade-offs.
How should human rights organizations deal with such challenges?
Traditionally “proportionality” is the key term to be utilized amid conflicts of
rights. Yet even in more settled time human rights organizations struggled to
define proportionality; now it becomes totally vague - nothing is proportional
about imposing a lock-down on 60 million Italines, still nothing is proportional
in the threat posed by coronavirus. Hence the struggle metaphor collapses and
may give way to, say, the orchestration metaphor - that is, a framework for
balancing and orchestrating conflicting rights (according to well-defined
proportionality) and for mitigating the trade-off between rights. Rather than
dealing with violations, the focal point here is balancing and mitigation.
But it would be wrong to impose an “either-or” choice between the two
frameworks - the struggle and the orchestration - since both are vital for
promoting human rights, albeit in different doses depending on circumstances.
Indeed struggling against human rights violations is still a critical task even as
the coronavirus spreads but orchestration seems much more inline with the
challenges introduced by the novel pandemic. Having said that, broadening our
framework and moving the focal point to orchestration is not just doing more of
the same - dealing with proportionality or balancing as the locus of activity,
amid a new and complex situation, requires re-tooling of our NGOs.
On the surface human rights organizations are ill-equipped for orchestration.
Furthermore, the current situation mainly emphasizes an enduring flaw in the
field of human rights - it's limited capacity for dealing with trade-offs which are
nothing but new. Indeed human rights organizations are not political
philosophers nor experts in the various fields of knowledge at stake; they can
say little about the hierarchy of rights in principle and little about empiric
questions pertaining to the anticipated damage of compromising certain rights
for the sake of others. In a different vein activism and mobilization is heavily
leaning toward the struggle schema to the extent that it is hard to imagine
collective action in the absence of a salient villain. In contrast the task of
orchestration entails careful judgment rather than gut-level enthusiasm and
sense of injustice which are so crucial for mobilization (e.g. Gamson 1992;
Benford and Snow 2000). Currently human rights organizations can, therefore,
contribute little to ameolarating policies amid conflicting rights. Yet I would like
to suggest some initial thoughts on modalities of orchestration - and related
activism - that human rights organizations can successfully govern. Most of
these modalities are not new, but they should become much more central and
eveloped:

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Mediating and amplifying the lived experience of various

constituencies
Conflicting rights are somewhat connected to diversity in societal characters -
i.e. young and healthy people and older and wealthy people may fear from
different aspects of the current situation. Hearing all voices is the first step for
intelligible and fair orchestration of trade-offs, especially when it comes to
marginalized groups whose voice is habitually disenfranchised. In the course of
such grassroots work the enthusiasm and sense of injustice so crucial for
mobilization may be maintained even within the framework of orchestration.

Mapping policy lacunae

Gaining familiarity with the lived experience is also pivotal for mapping lacunae
in governmental policies and taking them into account - that is, monitoring
cases of people or groups who are left behind and find no real relief by the state.
If we want to balance rights properly we need to know to weigh the actual
damage of certain policies including their “blind spots” - i.e. the people who are
damaged more than the average or more than what was intended. Yet even as
governments aspire to formulate balanced policies they are often biased toward
the macro-level, hence glossing over “extraordinary” cases and the
marginalized. Here human rights organizations have a unique utility; they can
start off where governments’ capacity ends.
One current example is an ongoing project by the Israeli section of Amnesty
International, which aims to monitor and map cases of people or communities
whose income and livelihood was hurt by the pandemic situation yet they can
find very little, if any, support by the government of Israel. Beside obvious
marginalized communities - such as Palestinians and African asylum seekers -
some types of individuals whose circumstances rendered them ineligible were
found in this framework. The overall picture enables Amnesty to demonstrate
the many lacunae in Israel’s social policy amid the pandemic and may facilitate
a more nuanced balance between conflicting rights as the hidden impact of
policies is brought to light.

Constructing shadow government of experts

While often lacking professional knowledge human rights organizations can
construct forums for external experts and experienced ex-seniors in the civil
service, relevant to the various issues at stake, that can mirror the forums
governments form in order to debate policies toward the crisis. Working like a
shadow government or cabinet, such a parallel forum is actually a mechanism
for scrutiny, for double checking the validity and merit of balancing and
mitigation strategy in the face of conflicting rights. If we suspect a government
not to have done the most to mitigate and balance trade-offs, we have to
replicate the kind of debates and reasoning done in the corridors of power. Such
forums need not be ed-hoc ones but can be an ongoing oversight mechanism.

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Nurturing the wisdom of the crowd for mitigation

Mitigating trade-offs between rights is always better than properly balancing
them - it means that we can find a way to outsmart the dilemma by going “out of
the box.” Achieving this best case scenario requires not just a good will but
creativity which governments often lack. Hence human rights organizations may
mobilize masses via digital platforms as a hive mind for thinking trade-offs’
mitigation thoroughly. The shadow government of experts may be involved here
too so that the output of the masses is processed by professionals and
professionals may also brainstorm among themselves and come up with creative
mitigation. Even if the vast majority of suggestions by the hive mind may be
considered as “noise,” we need just one briliant idea for a breakthrough. It may
be worth the bother.
The 4 modalities presented above are just a preliminary reflection on what
should be done in order to facilitate orchestration and compatible activism.
Formulating and refining the orchestration framework is still mostly ahead of
us. It requires first and foremost a conceptual expansion of frameworks - human
rights work should be thought of not only as a struggle but also as an
orchestration - which could impact the field of human rights to the extent that
governments of good will may find it to be not only a critic but also a partner
with great utility to fine tune the orchestration of ever pressing social trade-offs.
To accomplish that a crucial strategic process will have to be launched in the
field coupled with massive capacity building. The time to start this is now.

References:
Benford, Robert. D., and Snow, David. A. 2000. “Framing Processes and Social
Movements: An Overview and Assessment.” Annual Review of Sociology 26:
611–639.
Gamson, William. A. 1992. Talking politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.

About the author

Yariv Mohar is an Israeli sociologist dealing with collective action, a long time
human rights activist in Israel and the OPT and is currently working as a
programs director at Amnesty International Israel. For contact: yariv AT
amnesty.org.il

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Social justice snapshots:

governance adaptations, innovations and practitioner
learning in a time of COVID-19
Julien Landry, Ann Marie Smith, Patience Agwenjang, Patricia
Blankson Akakpo, Jagat Basnet, Bhumiraj Chapagain, Aklilu
Gebremichael, Barbara Maigari, Namadi Saka1
(29th June 2020)

In early 2020, COVID-19 swept across the globe, prompting widespread

government responses with far-reaching implications for civic space and actors
working to strengthen transparency, accountability, participation and inclusion
in governance at all levels. For many graduates of the Coady International
Institute — over 7,000 development leaders and practitioners working with
social movements, advocacy groups, networks and alliances, civil society
organizations, community and civic associations in over 130 countries — the
pandemic and the measures put in place in response have led to adaptive and
innovative ways to continue their work in solidarity with citizens and
communities.
Since 2015, the Institute has worked to support over 22 graduates in 14 countries
to document case studies based on their advocacy, governance, and citizen
participation work as part of the Participedia project, a global knowledge
mobilization effort aimed at cataloging and better understanding participatory
political processes.
In April 2020, a small group among these graduates came together virtually to
share their experiences as practitioners, advocates, and activists working for
inclusive and accountable governance through the pandemic. What follows is a
snapshot of what their organizations, networks, and communities have been
doing in the first few months to sustain or adapt their work aimed at building
transparency, participation, accountability and/or inclusion in decisions
affecting communities.
This virtual dialogue and writing exercise provided these authors with an
opportunity to reflect on their own practice and learning as they navigate the
realities and opportunities brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic. This
article summarizes how each author’s organisation/work has adapted to new
realities, including emergent themes, lessons, and reflections from the authors.

1 Parts of this article were published elsewhere.

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Adaptation and innovation:

a few snapshots of governance practice
Advocacy through Nepal’s land rights movement
In Nepal, the Community Self-Reliance Centre (CSRC) has been supporting the
national land rights movement and advocating on land and agrarian issues
alongside landless and smallholder peasants since 1994. Jagat Basnet describes
how Land Rights Forums (LRFs) have played a key role in making the
government more accountable for the COVID-19 response. Land Rights Forums
are people’s organizations that generate grassroots participation for policy
influence, just governance, and accountability. During the pandemic, CSRC and
LRFs have leveraged their relationships with communities to provide the
government with real-time data and accurate information from the field on
COVID-19. They have supported a more adequate local response by coordinating
advocacy from civil society groups to the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock
Development in support of landless and smallholder peasants, while facilitating
connections between local governments and communities.

Citizen feedback data in Nepal

In the same country, as mentioned above, a new media organization called
Sharecast Initiative Nepal is formed to promote citizen participation through
media and local radio launched a nationwide survey to understand citizens’
knowledge, attitudes, and practices regarding COVID-19. As Bhumiraj
Chapagain writes, one week after the lockdown measures were imposed,
Sharecast trained enumerators to remotely survey 1,110 respondents across
Nepal. Sharecast then provided the government with key data on people’s
awareness and attitudes regarding the virus, as well as opinions and feedback on
their responses. The research was acknowledged by the Prime Minister and
helped multiple stakeholders understand the baseline regarding the COVID-19
response, allowing them to better address needs.

New channels for children’s and youth’s voice in Kenya

In Kenya, the Mombasa County Child Rights Network (MCCRN), a network of
child rights advocates, are focusing their efforts on child protection as a major
governance issue in the advent of COVID-19. Peggy Saka from the Kenya
Alliance for Advancement of Children outlines the disproportionate impacts the
pandemic is having on children, and how the network is adapting to enable
children to participate and speak out on COVID-19. Through online meetings
and live media broadcasts with elected officials and leaders of community and
national organizations, children and youth are able to express themselves and
share their fears and anxieties about the pandemic

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Engagement and mutual aid among Ethiopia’s

marginalized communities
Aklilu Gebremicheal explains how Love in Action Ethiopia (LIAE) is responding
to the COVID-19 pandemic by engaging community structures and systems in
regions of the country where predominantly underserved and marginalized
communities were already facing economic hardships and poor service delivery
prior to the spread of the coronavirus. LIAE has balanced a shift to home-based
operations with ongoing community engagement aimed at raising awareness,
supporting mutual aid, providing emergency supplies and addressing the
immediate needs of communities most at risk. As in much of LIAE’s work,
citizen participation has been key to this effort. Through newly established
community-based COVID-19 task forces, LIAE is mobilizing 1,200 volunteers as
community resource persons to collaborate with local and regional government
offices.

Alternate pandemic responses in Cameroon

In Cameroon, youth and democracy advocate Patience Agwenjang observes how
the COVID-19 pandemic represents one of a number of crises, particularly in
English-speaking regions. Response to the pandemic has been marred by pre-
existing political tensions and questions around the relationship between the
President and citizens, and a lack of transparency around the management of the
COVID-19 Fund. The public’s distrust of government has meant that citizens
have been participating in alternate pandemic response programs set up by civil
society groups, rather than engaging in the government scheme. Meanwhile, the
crisis has created opportunities for skills development, technological
advancement, and for businesses and civil society organizations to produce,
distribute, and sell emergency supplies.

Rights awareness through virtual and media engagement in Nigeria

In Nigeria, Barbara Maigari of Partners West Africa — Nigeria (PWAN) describes
how the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted their advocacy visits and awareness
campaigns related to human rights and sexual and gender-based violence.
Lockdown measures have resulted in exclusive reliance on remote engagement
through the PWAN website, social media, and call-in radio and television
programs. Not only has this adaptation altered the interactions between PWAN
and citizen groups, it has also brought certain rights issues and violations to the
fore. For instance, PWAN is addressing increased community concern over the
right to freedom of movement (especially for journalists), freedom of expression.
Awareness-raising efforts now include COVID-19 safeguards for survivors of
sexual and gender-based violence and other pandemic-related rights and
responsibilities.

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Leveraging advocacy networks for women’s rights in Ghana

In Ghana, a largely informal economy, the predominance of self-employment,
communal living conditions, and the nature of its markets have resulted in the
government’s COVID-19 related measures having disproportionate effects on
women. Patricia Blankson Akakpo explains how, NETRIGHT, a national
women’s rights network, has adapted its usual work to ensure women’s voices
and interests are taken into account during the pandemic response. NETRIGHT
has mobilized funds among women’s groups to support the Ministry of Gender,
Children and Social Protection in its outreach efforts to vulnerable and homeless
women and children. As part of their COVID-19 response, NETRIGHT’S
members have distributed relief supplies to communities while also encouraging
women and girls to report cases of sexual and gender-based violence.

Bridging diverse experiences:

common grounds on shifting sands?
Based on the small yet diverse set of responses to the COVID-19 crisis described
above, a few observations and lessons emerge. Some actions focus on the basic,
immediate needs that an emergency response requires. LIAE’s public
sensitization and citizen engagement for proper handwashing in Ethiopia,
CSRC’s food provision in Nepal, PWAN’s quick response to provide communities
with accurate information on COVID-19, and NETRIGHT members’ fundraising
and resource mobilization for women and vulnerable groups, all contribute to
immediate, far-reaching, and lifesaving impacts during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Further, these immediate responses foster more informed grassroots
participation and support community mobilization, solidarity, and mutual aid
among groups and stakeholders who may not have previously worked together
towards common solutions.
Parallel to these shifting dynamics at grassroots, many responses hint at gradual
shifts in the complex systems that affect people’s lives, livelihoods, quality
essential services, and effective public decision-making and governance. Below,
we outline these trends and discuss related lessons based on the authors’
accounts and reflections on their own experience as social justice practitioners
and advocates working both in solidarity with citizens and communities, and in
the civic space and political processes shaping how the pandemic response is
governed.

Information, transparency and trust:

national challenges and local solutions
The pandemic has had far-reaching implications for national-level institutions,
governance, and politics such as disruptions to the Ethiopia’s electoral processes
and the post-electoral politics playing out in Cameroon’s response. On top of
political systems struggling with cultures of opacity and corruption, this crisis
highlights the importance of transparency as a bedrock of trust and

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accountability between citizens and governments. This lack of trust has

manifested through alternate and parallel governance and service delivery in
Cameroon’s response (despite increased transparency through social media) and
through questions around the use of COVID-19 funds in Kenya.
In Nepal, Sharecast’s work reminds us that understanding the nature of citizen
trust and satisfaction (or discontent), through accurate information and timely
data, is key to an effective response. Where trust and transparency are lacking,
advocates often contend with challenges around misinformation and
misconceptions related to the virus, as is the case in Nepal and Kenya where
people turn to alternate sources of information and to traditional and religious
practices for guidance.
In the midst of these national challenges, much of the immediate response has
been at local government level. Through community-based COVID-19 Task
Forces and by mobilizing volunteers, LIAE has facilitated community-driven
responses that are not only building the capacity of local governments, but also
strengthening collaboration across civil society and government at the local level.

Collaboration, relationship-building and shifting social contracts

Collaboration has been and will continue to be indispensable through this
moment. None of the stories shared speak to the success of any individual or
organization acting unilaterally in responding to this pandemic. On the contrary,
the strategies that work are based on collaborative efforts — often across sectors
and linked to parallel mutual aid processes in communities. Whether these are
new relationships or built upon existing ones, networks, alliances and
partnerships have extended the reach of solidarity around the pandemic
response, and have served as a key asset as advocates adapt to new realities. In
Nigeria, for instance, PWAN’s prior advocacy among law enforcement agencies
and community leaders was critical in forging new relationships, allowing them
to pivot their advocacy to a focus on COVID-19.
Previously ineffective relationships are now working to address this collective
challenge. In the Ethiopian case “government leadership, faith-based
organizations and community actors are working hand in hand unlike previous
times.” The collaborations being forged by NETRIGHT in Ghana and the
children’s organizations in Kenya are other cases in point. In the Nigerian case,
“effective leadership needs collaborative engagement with the people and
listening to the greater demand of the populace.”
The shifting nature of collaboration and relationship building are connected to
the roles, rights and responsibilities of states and citizens. The crisis impacts how
social contracts are evolving. For instance, the work in Nepal illustrates the key
intermediary role that civil society organizations, member-based organizations,
and national movements play in facilitating relationships – and claiming rights –
during emergencies. This kind of collaboration was recognized for its positive
results, following unilateral attempts by the state that were much less effective.

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Also in Nepal, Sharecast’s work shows that citizens are willing to cede some
rights and freedoms (at least temporarily) to curtail the spread of the virus.
There are, of course, longer-term risks related to these emergency measures. In
Ghana, the measures and legal instruments put in place have had the effect of
closing civic space and further marginalizing some citizen groups and
community organizations’ efforts to engage them. In Cameroon, the pandemic
has on the one hand revealed that the executive is willing to take steps (even if
they are perhaps merely symbolic) towards improving governance and
safeguarding the rights of citizens. On the other hand, the pandemic compounds
existing crises facing the country, where “the COVID-19 curfews do not represent
a new phenomenon for […] residents,” who for the last three years spend about a
hundred days in lockdown annually.

Digital technology, governance, and advocacy

The global crisis has accelerated an ongoing trend towards digital governance,
with an increasing reliance on online communication and engagement, and an
enhanced role for traditional and social media. Even though some pandemic-
related directives hinder effective social mobilization and participation in
governance processes, some strategies adopted through media and digital
channels are supporting innovative forms of virtual engagement.
The stories shared here demonstrate adaptability, creativity and innovation in
the use of technology to improve access, provide information, support mutual aid
and grassroots responses, make and maintain connections, deliver services,
enable participation and feedback, foster transparency and accountability, and
spur further innovation. The telephone has been leveraged in Nepal and Nigeria,
enabling Sharecast to conduct a nationwide survey in a novel way, and PWAN to
connect with communities through home-based rights awareness campaigns.
Sharecast’s work also shows how technology-enabled data generation and
accurate community-level perceptions and public opinion serve as a foundation
to design appropriate, targeted messages for public awareness and safety, as well
as for advocacy. PWAN’s work reminds us that a shift to technology-mediated
engagement, while perhaps expanding the breadth of participation, comes with
less depth in engagement. In Mombasa County, where technology provides a
virtual space for children’s voices at decision-making tables, the media becomes
an intermediary in governance and accountability relationships, bringing with it
implications around power, responsibility, and the ability to limit or enable
participation.
A shift to mediated engagement has also meant that many authors’ advocacy and
activism has also adapted to a new reality. On the one hand, public awareness
raising and mobilization now relies much more heavily on local and mass media
to ensure citizens know both their rights and their responsibilities as they face
the pandemic. Similarly, the kinds of advocacy tactics commonly used to apply
pressure on policymakers are also being adapted, as CSRC’s collective lobbying

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efforts in Nepal and NETRIGHT’s public advocacy statements in Ghana

demonstrate.
On a smaller and more personal scale, individual practitioners and organizations
have embraced digital channels and technologies such as Zoom and Facebook
Live, and have developed increased resourcefulness and confidence in using the
digital environment to pursue their accountability and engagement work.
Sharecast’s efforts in Nepal have led to a commitment to do a follow-up
digital/telephone survey. This said, there are ongoing challenges as virtual (and
home-based) work comes with the increased potential for digital surveillance, a
digital divide, other family obligations and gender-related risks.

Gender dimensions and intersectional vulnerabilities

These stories have all explicitly or implicitly revealed that — as is widely
acknowledged — the pandemic has a gendered impact that amplifies existing
gender disparities. This is in line with suggestions that the economic and social
toll will be largely borne by women and girls, and further compounded by other
intersecting dimensions of disparity and vulnerability.
There is a clear gender dimension to care. In Ghana, “women constitute the
majority of primary caregivers for family members, as well as in professional
capacities as health and social workers. At the same time, they face [the]
increased burden to provide for their [families], particularly if family members
fall ill or lose jobs due to the economic hardship linked to the pandemic.” In
Kenya, the scaling down of some child protection services and the school
closures has left many parents unable to carry out their roles as duty bearers —
in providing “proper nutrition, safety, healthcare and education for their
children.” This hits women particularly hard because much of the responsibility
for childcare continues to fall on them.
Meanwhile, groups with multiple vulnerabilities are not being given the requisite
support. In Ethiopia, high-risk groups “have been disproportionately affected by
the virus” including “street children, commercial sex workers, people living with
HIV/AIDS, children and girls living in high risk areas.” The Kenyan case also
references an increase in teenage pregnancies and “the sexual abuse of both boys
and girls.”
The need for physical distancing has curtailed one of PWAN’s advocacy roles in
Nigeria for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence, as the organization is
unable to “conduct confidential interviews and represent them in courts” during
this period. This has effectively silenced the voices and delayed justice for these
survivors, who are largely women and girls. In Nepal, people in remote villages
have suffered from delayed communication and misinformation, which “affects
illiterate people from remote areas in particular and [has] increased health-
related tensions in the country.” Generally, as information from remote villages
is also slow in reaching those who govern, the responsiveness, effectiveness, and
quality of services provided to communities suffers.

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NETRIGHT reminds us that while the Ghanaian government has been proactive
in engaging different groups in its pandemic response, “this engagement has not
been sufficiently broad or inclusive to ensure the voice and concerns of a
majority of people — such as women and other vulnerable populations.” Further,
stay-at-home orders exacerbate the existing vulnerabilities of domestic abuse
survivors — largely women and girls — who are stuck at home with perpetrators
and have little recourse, support, or access to provisions to hold abusers
accountable.
The virus is not gender-blind and governance around this issue cannot be either.
Any strategy to address the impact of the pandemic must take into account its
intersectional and gender dimensions. Alongside the impacts on women and
girls, some of the authors also raise the adverse consequences the crisis has had
on boys and men. The Kenyan and Ethiopian cases mention the sexual
exploitation of boys. In Ethiopia, young men have been deprived of their
livelihoods, with some turning to crime for survival. It thus behooves
policymakers, community organizers, civil society groups, and social movements
to be alert to these realities while determining entry points and designing
strategies for more inclusive, accountable, and equitable remedies.

The many faces of effective and adaptive leadership

Collectively, these reflections confirm what we know: the complex, multi-layered,
multi-pronged and intangible nature of COVID-19 impacts every part of society,
every nation, and every sector. In terms of leadership, such a complex problem
has and will continue to require a dynamic and adaptive approach.
One particular approach — situational leadership— seems to resonate with the
authors’ emerging reflections on effective leadership through the crisis: it is
anticipatory, anchored at both the macro and micro levels, and responsive to the
specific nature of the situation at hand. Key to situational leadership is
adaptability. Leaders navigate among leadership styles to meet the changing or
varying needs of communities and citizens, and have the insight and flexibility to
understand when to adapt their leadership strategy to fit emerging and
competing circumstances.
In the case of Nepal, we have learnt that in responding to the crisis “local and
volunteer leadership” had been more imperative than the leadership and
presence of “paid and government staff.” The call is made for the deliberate
development of local leadership in each community to support change. Beyond
this, endogenous leadership capability would certainly enhance governance and
local development beyond the immediate COVID-19 crisis, and in anticipation of
future ones.
In the experience of the MCCRN, “true leaders have to offer direction and be
firm in the implementation of the same,” and further, the value of communities
and other stakeholders “rallying behind” such leaders and implementing
solutions in the best interest of citizens is necessary for good governance. In

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contrast, shared leadership was also seen as an effective approach in responding

to the pandemic, as well as being an avenue to advancing citizen participation in
democratic governance.
What is clear is that no one form of leadership works everywhere and in all
situations. In emergency situations, leaders often need to be directive, as there is
little or no time for engagement and dialogue. Yet in response to COVID-19,
alongside this kind of directive leadership leaders have also had to be
collaborative, inclusive, compassionate, and participatory. As one practitioner
puts it “success comes from thinking for and with the people,” both being critical
steps in the process and practice of advocacy and movement building.

The value of reflection in social justice work

Reflection is one of the most powerful tools that leaders have at their disposal.
Often it is through reflection that transformative learning happens, leading to
deep and sustainable change in perspectives, behaviors, and outcomes.
Through this reflective writing exercise that some of the authors reported
enhanced their understanding of themselves in the unfolding crisis, leading to
changes in their behavior. This included learning to be measured in their
communication style and recognizing personal biases, preferences, and
tendencies.
As social justice practitioners, it is important - to become aware of oneself, to
divest oneself of unproductive biases, preferences and tendencies, and to one’s
creativity. As advocates we often invite the communities we serve and work with
to shift their perspectives and change their behaviors. Authentic leadership
requires that practitioners model the behaviors that they are inviting others to
embrace and practice. Understanding how this works can be key to supporting
and enabling others to experience their own change. In a time of crisis and
uncertainty it may be more difficult, yet no less important, for social justice
practitioners to model this type of behavior and leadership.
In a similar vein, the exercise of collaborative writing and reflection (among a
group of social justice scholars, educators, and practitioners from Nepal,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Cameroon, Nigeria, Ghana, Jamaica and Canada) has not only
been a platform for collaborative learning, mutual support, and solidarity, but
has also modeled the kind of collaboration and reflective practice sought in this
moment of crisis.

Learning is happening at the individual, organizational, and national

levels
In sharing their own stories and learning, this group of practitioners has also
shared the learning that is taking place around them at organizational, collective
or community, and societal levels:

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“As a practitioner, I am learning that I can be more creative and adaptive if I want
to. It is important to be flexible when engaging with people. […] As an
organization, we are learning to adapt to suit the community.” (Nigeria)

“Issues such as flexible working hours, workplace childcare facilities, our capacity
to respond to emergency situations and meeting the needs of the communities we
work with, while adhering to protocols to curb the pandemic are concerns that we
are still thinking through as a leading network advancing the rights of women.”
(Ghana)

“Cameroonians are keen on reading, responding and spreading the Minister of

Public Health’s daily updates using various social media platforms. This increases
public consciousness and engagement in hygienic practices and protection from
health-related problems.” (Cameroon)

This learning is not only essential to enabling redress for the pandemic, but is
being applied to other areas of governance, enabling participation and citizen
engagement and thereby ownership of responses now and for the future. By
sharing their stories, the authors are also influencing learning outside of their
national jurisdictions.

Balancing acts and new possibilities

The pandemic has left governments, civil society organisations, movement actors
and communities with multiple points of tension. A form of polemic paralysis
can set in as they try to balance competing socio-political imperatives and the
complexity of satisfying the needs and demands of constituents while upholding
the rights of the people.
These tensions are apparent in various authors’ accounts and efforts, expressed
in this reflective piece. At the fore is a difficult balancing act of governance:
saving lives, keeping people healthy, and keeping the economy buoyant while
providing transparent, evidence-based and timely information, ensuring
meaningful participation and inclusion of diverse communities, and remaining
accountable throughout the response.
As is the case globally, the authors’ experiences show that this process has had
both intended and unintended consequences. Many of these are positive and
dynamic developments, offering new and adapted channels for governance and
mobilization: innovations in remote working and virtual engagement; expansion
in the use of new and existing technologies to generate data; greater attention to
health-related public awareness and practice; enhanced collaboration between
the state, the private sector, communities, and civil society actors; virtual
governance and nimble advocacy tactics.
Yet these stories also show that the disease itself and the need for an urgent
response have had negative impacts on individuals and communities

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everywhere. Shielding children from contracting the virus by closing schools has,
for example, exposed many of them to increased levels of violence and neglect,
setbacks in development due to lack of necessary play, as well as a withdrawal of
social protection services and nutrition support received through institutions
such as the school system. Similarly, lockdown measures requiring families to
stay home has exposed many to loss of employment, hunger, and violence,
among other ills.
These measures and the expansion of executive power in general have also
accelerated a closing space for civil society in many countries, as citizens
(willingly or unwillingly) cede their rights in favor of health protection, and as
some state actors overstep their authority. States of emergency and quarantine
orders have negatively impacted youth unemployment and led to increases in
crime. Already marginalized segments of the population, such as migrants, have
become more impoverished. Many women and girls are increasingly subject to
violence behind closed doors.
The need for new forms of social action, advocacy, and governance arrangements
continues to evolve, increasingly requiring meaningful connection to the
solidarity efforts and mutual aid initiatives emerging in many communities,
greater trust across sectors, adaptations to existing accountability mechanisms,
and the creation of new ones. Central to this is the ability of civil society actors to
build on their (often novel) concerted efforts with state and private actors, to
work more collaboratively together, and to continue expanding their networks
and alliances as the pandemic waves ebb and flow into a ‘new normal.’
Communities in their diverse forms will need to build on these emerging
strategies and novel methods to foster greater self-reliance and resilience. The
extent to which this is possible will depend on the kinds of efforts documented in
these stories, contributing to transparency, citizen voice, critical collaboration,
and accountable governance throughout and beyond the COVID-19 pandemic.
As social justice advocates, as development leaders, and as citizens, we must
continue to remain curious, interrogating our own motives, our work and our
next steps. And in our curiosity, we are invited to sit with the question of what is
possible today that was not possible prior to this pandemic.

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About the authors

This article was written by staff, associates and graduates of the Diploma in
Development Leadership and various Certificate programs at the Coady
International Institute, St. Francis Xavier University (Antigonish, Nova Scotia,
Canada). They are contributors to Participedia, a global platform for
researchers, activists, and practitioners of public participation and democratic
innovation. Julien Landry is Senior Program Staff at the Coady International
Institute where he leads the Institute’s programs on citizen engagement,
advocacy, social accountability, governance and accountable democracies. Ann
Marie Smith is a Learning and Organisational Effectiveness Consultant with
over thirty years of experience in public sector leadership, gender and diversity
and development leadership in Jamaica and the Caribbean. She is a former
Coady Institute Fellow and co-facilitator of the 2018 Promoting Accountable
Democracies course. Patience Agwenjang is a Cameroon-based consultant in
the areas of law, governance, and development. Patricia Blankson Akakpo is
the Program Manager for the Network of Women’s Rights in Ghana
(NETRIGHT). Jagat Basnet is a social activist, researcher, founding member
of Community Self-Reliance Centre (CSRC) and a key facilitator in Nepal’s land
and agrarian rights movement since 1994. Bhumi Raj Chapagain is a media
manager, broadcast journalist, and organizational development expert with
Sharecast Initiative Nepal. Aklilu Gebremichael is the Executive Director of
Love in Action Ethiopia (LIAE). Barbara Maigari is a Program Manager and
consultant for Partners West Africa Nigeria (PWAN): Rule of Law and
Empowerment Initiative. Namadi (Peggy) Saka is a development leadership
professional with a strong focus on advocacy for child rights and child
protection throughout Kenya.

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Innovations in citizen response to crises:

volunteerism and social mobilization
during COVID-19
Roger Spear, Gulcin Erdi, Marla A. Parker, Maria Anastasiadis
(April 30th)

Introduction
The global pandemic of Covid19 is having severe social and economic impact on
people and communities in nearly every country on the planet and we have seen
differential impacts exacerbating pre-existing social and health inequalities
particularly in poor and minority ethnic communities. Inevitably the responses
of governments and institutions have been found wanting, partly because of the
scale and rapidity of the infections, but also due to failures in preparedness, as
well as mistakes and delays in responses. Subsequently there have also been
clear market failures in the way government procurement and business supply
chains have functioned.
Civil society particularly through different forms of social-economic-political
action has played an important role in helping to address these response
weaknesses, and implicitly or explicitly revealed a critical dimension to
established governments and institutions. The characteristics of typical
government responses (lockdown, tracking, tracing, modelling) has pushed
digital technologies to prominence for citizen digital/virtual responses. The
purpose of this paper is to introduce a framework (with associated examples
from the U.S and Europe) for understanding and subsequently empirically
examining and evaluating COVID19 responses that can be used for further
improvements both in application and theory. The framework has four key
dimensions: digital continuum, institutional-constituent continuum, tool
innovation, response targets. To conclude the paper, several lessons are
offered, which may initiate and inform discourses and empirical observations
about evolutions in social innovations related to crisis responses.

Framework: digitization, institutions and constituents,

tool innovation, response targets
The following framework reflects extant literature on factors related to crisis
responses; but coupled with the COVID19 examples presented, new insights
may emerge. In addition to providing descriptions of each framework element,
political and policy dimensions inherent in each of them are highlighted.

Digital continuum
The role of information communication technologies (ICTs) and other tech
based innovations have changed the boundaries, roles, resources and dynamics

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of political and policy stakeholders in the context of responsiveness during

crises. More specifically, these innovations have in many cases increased
response capabilities, enhanced collaboration, provided agency to communities,
increased demands for accountability, altered institutional arrangements,
enlarged the scale of responses and contributed to the various narratives
present during responses (Bennet, 2019; Pipek et al., 2014; Gonzalez, 2010;
Palen & Liu, 2007). At one end of the continuum, innovations have not
completely eroded the value and need of low-tech or no-tech approaches. While
at the other, Jarvis (2005) identified “hashtag revolts” as key ways social media
networks support internet activism, like occupy-type movements; although in
successful global campaigns and mobilisations combine both the internet and
public space. For this particular framework, the digital continuum considers
how COVID19 responses exist as purely digital, purely non-digital or some
combination of both.
The novelty of COVID19 is that it requires social distancing in the face of
meeting physical and non-physical human needs, thus highlighting the
simultaneous necessity of effective tech and non-tech solutions. Moreover,
these varied responses play multiple roles by providing needed community
information, soliciting for and providing help, and providing socio-emotional
support. For example, in Austria there are numerous self-organized purchasing
initiatives for risk groups initiated by young people. Users on Twitter and Co.
are calling for help for these people in their neighbourhoods. With the
#NeighbourhoodChallenge1, people want to help those quarantined with their
daily errands. To this end, users posted photos of notes that they hang up in the
neighborhood, leading to young people offering their neighbours support - a
movement which inspired imitators in Germany. Another example is the use of
Instagram by actors and influencers in various parts of the world who read to
children at home due to quarantining or create public service announcements
encouraging social distancing2. A network of women in France named “Over the
Blues”3 who sew masks and hospital gowns for hospital staff established a
Facebook and internet page to organise their distribution, allow entry into the
network and provide a map showing similar activities throughout the country.
In the French banlieue of Sartrouville, at the Cité des Indes, known as a
marginal and problematic area, a group of young people use Facebook4 to
organise and solicit participation to bring food and meals to both hospital staff
and to elderly people in their neighbourhood. Even in the absence of ICT tools,
essential needs such as direct health care, health support, food, clothing and

1See e.g. https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000115636108/nachbarschaftschallenge-wiener-

rufen-dazu-auf-aelteren-mit-besorgungen-zu-helfen
2 See e.g. https://www.instagram.com/carolinepetersliest/
3See https://over-the-blues.com/, they have now 2500 voluntary with 156 local solidarity
branch
4See “les Grands Frères et Soeurs de Sartrouville”,
https://www.facebook.com/LesGrandsFreresEtSoeursDeSartouville/; for a media coverage of
this network, see : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4A6w3wVXuUc

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shelter have increased demands for in-person volunteerism that may require
physical, non-digital actions such as packaging and distributing goods. As an
example, the gifts fences (previously used in the freezing winter of 2017) in
Austria are dedicated fences where the citizens hang bags of food, hygiene
products and anything else that helps, and where homeless people can help
themselves freely5. Overall, these examples demonstrate the value of technology
to scale responses and minimize risk of illness, but also reveal their limitations
that still need to be filled with non-tech approaches. In other words, these
online organisation tools are used for needs in offline life. Finally we can
advance the idea that social media and the internet by shaping coalitions,
creates space for online social networks to facilitate activists to strengthen
connections and build social capital (Mundt et.al, 2018).

Institutional-constituent continuum
Public, nonprofit and private institutions have varying capacities and
motivations for addressing crises centered on the public values, institutional
structures and formal policies (Wetter & Torn, 2020; Brugh et al., 2019; Culebro
et al., 2019). Yet, insufficiencies and even unfairness of institutions have largely
driven more community, grassroots based approaches (Anderson, 2008; Palen
et al., 2007). Literature about the role of emotions in social movements in
community-solidarity responses also informs constituent driven crisis responses
where emotions trigger, shape strategies, and target objects of movements
(Goodwin et.al 2009; Jasper 2011; Traïni 2009 ). However, collaborative
governance has led to more hybrid approaches (Moynihan 2008, 2009). The
literature on volunteer responses in crises (Whittaker et al, 2015) indicates two
types: 1) emergent, where volunteers respond in the immediate aftermath, often
innovatively as they are closely connected to the crisis impact; and 2)
extending, where those who are already part of existing groups and NPOs and
draw on those networks and resources. In this paper, our cases reveal the full
range, but various forms of hybridity are most typical. In the platform "Covid-19
Civil Society Initiatives"6 established by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Social
Affairs (an extension of the already existing platform "Freiwilligenweb" - a
volunteer recruiting platform), self-organised groups as well as NPOs and social
entrepreneurs but also commercial businesses can publicise their support offers.
This list of helpers refers to a multitude of different initiatives that offer support
to citizens of all ages and in different problem and life situations (elderly people,
children, families, people with health and psychological problems etc.) but also
to small entrepreneurs, self-employed and artists affected by the crisis.They
range from neighbourhood initiatives, delivery services, fundraising platforms,
appeals for donations, lists of regional online shops to support the regional

5See e.g. https://www.1000things.at/blog/wie-du-obdachlose-menschen-momentan-

unterstuetzen-kannst/
6 See http://www.freiwilligenweb.at/de/freiwilliges-engagement/österreich/covid-19-
zivilgesellschaftliche-initiativen

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economy to online courses and consultations of all kinds (e.g. how small
businesses can apply for the announced state financial support or telephone
discussion groups for caring relatives of people suffering from dementia).
From a policy, political and even administrative perspective, the extent to which
responses reside in the domain of institutions or constituents has implications
for efficiency, effectiveness, support, usage, and raises issues of civil rights and
liberties violations.
The scale of the crisis has demanded huge levels of resources for institutional
based responses by national, state and local governments to provide direct
financial support to residents and the economy. In addition to the huge sums of
money for the economy damaged by the lockdown similar support structures
can be found in Austria and in France (e.g. support for short-time work to keep
unemployment low, funds for small businesses and artists, discussions on
additional welfare support for marginalized groups). Corporations have also
been drawn into lend support, but the extreme needs has also required hybrid
approaches such as the UK’s Enabling Social Action programme which supports
local authorities to collaborate on services with local people, service users, and
civil society organisations in routine work; these have been extended to link
with different volunteer recruitment platforms.
Governments in multiple countries had weaknesses in their preparation phase,
due to poor planning, and years of austerity, plus difficulties with global supply
chains, thus motivating communities to engage in social entrepreneurship to
address failures such as lack of PPE (personal protective equipment). For
example, the Hackney Wick Scrubs Hub was formed when four women talked
to a doctor friend who was worried about scrub supplies. As a result, their
friends from the fashion industry began designing and creating scrubs for
healthcare workers out of their homes. They now coordinate a team of over 50
volunteers. Their Mutual Aid Group also established a fundraising online
platform. Similarly in France, the government was not able to provide all
necessary equipment, especially gowns. News on the TV showing hospital staff
wearing trash bags7 instead of real hospital gowns and the loss of several
hospital staff from Covid19 due to insufficient personal protective equipment
pushed many citizens to take initiatives and constitute help and solidarity
groups to support hospitals. In all these initiatives, indignation and compassion
were major factors in the emergence of collective action. In the Covid19
pandemic, from our cases we can see the impact of two kind of emotions
motivating people to mobilise: reflexive, and moral emotions motivate people
to organise themselves and create solidarity networks in order to do something,
to participate in the collective effort against Covid, but also against stereotypical
stigmatisation (e.g. of marginal neighbourhoods). These two kinds of emotions
transform into an emotional energy as it finds rapid recognition, compassion
and gratitude from society and state institutions (hospitals, municipalities, etc.).

7 See about this : https://fr.theepochtimes.com/des-sacs-poubelles-utilises-comme-blouses-par-

le-personnel-hospitalier-pour-pallier-a-la-penurie-1323519.html

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Tool innovation
Examining innovation cycles reveals common outcomes when disruption and
problems (i.e crises) arise: 1) adaptation of existing tools, 2) repurposing of
existing tools, 3) removal of obsolete tools and 4) creation of new tools (Dekkers
et al., 2014; Pumain et al, 2009;Schumpeter, 1991). This section of the paper
provides examples illustrating some of these outcomes during the pandemic.
One indicator is The Coronavirus Tech Handbook a crowd sourced continually
evolving library of tools, services and resources relating to COVID19 responses,
with an impressive range of over 20 categories of tools (from developers, to
health workers, to consumers). For ordinary citizens and community groups its
category of tools support Mutual Aid Groups, skills and time matching, fund-
raising, and volunteering. And from the examples provided in this paper this
involves extending the use of social media and communications platforms
(Twitter, Facebook, Snapchat, WhatsApp; Google Duo, Zoom, Facetime, Skype,
Slack for communications; for e.g. WhatsApp Groups to connect volunteers).
For supporting skill-time matching and volunteering, there’s also more
sophisticated local connectors and apps, like Nextdoor, a neighbourhood social
networking app for connections and exchanging of information, goods, and
services locally; established in California, 10 yrs ago, and now operating
internationally in 11 countries, and volunteer platforms have also been extended
for Covid initiatives, like: do-it.org with UK government support and the alread
mentioned Austrian “Covid-19 Civil Society Initiatives”.
Extending the use of existing technologies has shifted Digital Technologies
Frontiers: knocking on a neighbours door is taking place, with more regularity,
in fact some people say they’ve met their neighbours for the first time. But the
digital technologies have moved substantially into more of our lives, our work,
and our families. Almost every social innovation we’ve encountered was made
possible through these new digital technologies, particularly the global
companies founded in the last 20-25 years. As noted above, Nextdoor, the
neighbourhood social networking app (which purchased the UK’s Streetlife in
2017), gets its income from ads, and was valued at more than $1bn two years
ago. But at the next level citizen expertise has indicated considerable levels of
innovation. Many Hackathons have been initiated to support social innovation -
#HackForce virtual hackathon organized by TechChill Foundation is hosting a
fully virtual hackathon for the online environment. Organized by volunteers
from the startup community, HackForce gathered more than 650 hackers from
18 countries, working on many of the 71 originally submitted ideas. While some
highly skilled citizen researchers have used open source data to inform the
public, for example a Singaporean coder created a website using open data from
the Singaporean government to map the daily status of every coronavirus
patient, to provide detailed geographic and demographic detail. (Ref:
https://oecd-opsi.org/innovation-in-the-time-of-coronavirus/). John Hopkins
University in the U.S. has created a similar tracking mechanism open to the
public that illustrates the rate of virus (new cases, recovery and death) across
the globe.

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While not exhaustive, the examples have revealed a few insights into outcomes
related to tool innovation. First, there are winners and losers. Digital tech
companies have been the big winners, together with online delivery companies,
and essential goods and services; poor people, the precariat, unemployed,
vulnerable people have been the losers, who have been the focus for community
responders and social innovation. There’s been a scandalous neglect of care
homes which have been the biggest losers. Second, bricolage and use of social
networks seems to have been most prominent in community responses, mainly
using or extending existing tools. Some quite low tech have nonetheless been
very inventive, as the mentioned gifts fences.

Responsiveness targets
Crises are rarely confined to one domain. They have equally devastating impacts
beyond their direct targets. In case of COVID19, it has not just been healthcare
systems experiencing a toll, but also economic, financial, political and
educational systems. As such, the responses have focused not only on directly
saving lives and treating the illness, but helping to mitigate the damaging
indirect effects such job loss, business downturns, partial school shutdowns,
and overwhelmed public resources.
Additionally, the pandemic has exposed existing disparities in socio-economic
and health systems disproportionately impacting marginalized communities
and thus compounding the negative impact of the virus. Thus some responses
have specifically aimed to address unique needs of specific communities, fill
gaps in institutionalized services and counter entrenched narratives of
marginalized communities that can also prevent adequate care. The pandemic
response becomes usurped or part of existing social movements aimed at
eliminating marginalization. For example as noted above, the group of young
people, “Les Grands Frères et Soeurs de Sartrouville”, in the French banlieue
Cité des Indes, in Sartrouville, are highly stigmatized and known as “badlands of
the republic” (Dikeç 2007). Despite negative media attention on the inhabitants
of this kind of banlieue (especially the young ones) who are, according to the
media, not able to respect the curfew or the law, solidarity networks have been
organised in order to better organise the needs of health workers and elderly
people in the neighbourhood. Another example comes from the U.S. where
public sessions and media pieces have aimed to expose and explain the
connection between inequitable systems and COVID19 death rates that are
disproportionately high among communities of color and low income
populations. They are accompanied by calls to action that galvanize targeted
support for those communities (e.g. demand for more transparent data that
provides more information about minority COVID19 cases). Anti-Asian
sentiment and anti-African sentiment in China have also revealed the cultural
norms and values associated with xenophobia where the virus has enabled
negative narratives about belonging and “citizenship”, which has led to
responses from institutions and individuals that either fan the flames of racism
and “othering”, or seek to dismantle it.

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Conclusions: Lessons learned for moving forward

This paper highlights how the unique COVID19 pandemic has motivated and
even required a range of responses to alleviate its direct and indirect impact on
individuals, communities, institutions, systems, culture and policies. While
responses reflect the insights from extant literature on the intersection of
technology, social innovation, volunteerism, the cases presented in the paper
also provide an opportunity to consider possibilities for new frameworks. The
presented cases reflect variation in responses based on a digital continuum;
institutional versus constituent driven action; use, evolution and creation of new
technology tools; and targeted responsiveness based on direct and indirect
needs as well as marginalized status.
There are inevitable limitations to this study, being based on case studies from
Western countries, it can only indicate emerging patterns and types of
responses. And it has not been able to map global responses, nor able to touch
on the secondary socio-economic impacts in exacerbating or restricting
responses to the risks of famine to 130m people. However, although this
presented framework remains to be applied in an empirical context that can
yield more rigorous insights into the evolution of social innovation vis a vis
responses during crises, lessons can still be gleaned that address a critical
question posed on the webpage https://covid-entraide.fr/:

“The Covid-19 and its hideous face leave us the choice: do we want to find the
world before or change course? The after covid is now: Act, reflect, organize,
oppose, claim, think about tomorrow”.

● Technology combined with constituent action and emotions are powerful

tools with the potential to erode, circumvent or even replace entrenched
institutionalized approaches to crises that can be insufficient.
● Market and state failure in vulnerable economic based systems reveal the
necessity and resourcefulness of civil society, thus motivating
considerations for new systems centered on sustainability and inclusivity.
● Common experiences and needs at the global and local levels underscore
interconnected dependency on goods, services and data that may inform
new norms and values related to solidarity, community and globalism.

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About the authors

Roger Spear is emeritus professor of social entrepreneurship at the Open
University UK, and teaches on an International Masters in Social
Entrepreneurship at Roskilde University, Denmark. r.g.spear AT open.ac.uk
Gülçin Erdi is full-time CNRS researcher at the Research Center
"Cities,Territoires, Environnement and Society (CITERES). Her research, in the
realm of urban studies, is at the junction of production of urban space, urban
citizenship and right to the city. gulcin.erdi AT univ-tours.fr
Marla A. Parker is an assistant professor at California State University-Los
Angeles in the Department of Political science where she teaches introductory
politics, public administration and STEM policy. Her research interests include
public management, diversity and equity, social innovation and
entrepreneurship. She is also the co-founder of the Civic and Social Innovation
Group on the campus. marlaparker09 AT gmail.com
Maria Anastasiadis is Assoc. Prof. in social pedagogy at the institute for
educational science at the University of Graz. She can be reached
at maria.anastasiadis AT uni-graz.at; For additional information
see http://www.maria-anastasiadis.com

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Covid-19 and the new global chaos

Breno Bringel (25th June 2020)

Introduction
We are living in a moment of global chaos. Chaos does not mean the complete
absence of some kind of order, but suggests a level of turbulence, fragility and
contemporary geopolitical uncertainty in the face of multiple "global risks" and
possible destinations. Unpredictability and instability become the norm. This
refers not only to greater volatility in the face of threats, but also to the very
dynamics of political forces and contemporary capitalism.The world order that
emerged with the fall of the Berlin Wall and sought to expand formal democracy
in the world (despite how often the major powers destabilized and interrupted it
whenever they thought it was necessary) hand in hand with neoliberal
globalization, in a kind of "global social-liberalism". A narrative of global
"prosperity" and "stability" was created that confined democracy to capitalism.
This strategy is now being challenged in light of the prospect that the
international market can hold up well, even with authoritarian drifts, neo-
fascism and constant violations of individual rights. If the pandemic ends up
producing a geopolitical shift, it would then be necessary to discuss some of the
main emerging geopolitical trends and patterns, as well as the contentious
scenarios in dispute at the global level. That is the focus of this article.

Neither de-globalization nor the end of capitalist globalization

We are not facing the end of globalization and the emergence of "de-
globalization", although we are possibly facing the end of capitalist globalization
as we know it. The degree of radicalization of the territorial and financial
expansion of capital during the last decades has been made possible by the
creation of an agreement championed by the West – with the United States at
the helm (even as its hegemony is on the decline) – which has allowed for the
creation of dominant narrative of growth. This was attuned to the unlimited
expansion of transnational companies and to the approval of diverse groups that
hold power and national and international organizations. Its unfolding took
place, as is well known, by removing all barriers in accordance with a grammar
of deregulation, flexibilization and liberalization that secured neoliberalism’s
place around the world, while destroying the environment and the social life.
With it came a process of cultural struggle to entrench neoliberal globalization
as a model that was not only economic but also societal. Despite intense
criticism of the alter-globalization movement and a host of resistance
movements – and how much the 2008 crisis uncovered the most tragic and
lethal dimension of financial capitalism and globalization – the response was
not an alternative to it, but a radicalization of the model. The losses were shared
with the entire population and states applied policies of adjustment and
austerity while bailing out the banks, which in turn privatized the benefits.

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Capitalist globalization was thus able to follow its course of accumulation and
plunder, deepening the extractive model.The recent scenario, amplified in times
of pandemic, seems to be a little different: among the different sectors of the
right and extreme-right, "anti-globalists" and nationalist positions emerge
everywhere, whether in the core of the system, in the "emerging powers", or in
peripheral countries, seeking to reorganize capitalism in a more closed and
authoritarian way.There is no single strategy or course. In fact, Luis González
Reyes and Lucía Bárcena show how the three main hubs of capitalist
globalization are following different strategies. The United States promotes
protectionist policies while, at the same time, strengthening the trade war with
China, which, like the European Union, seeks to strengthen global economic
chains, although in different ways. In the first case, by pushing an ambitious
plan of economic expansion, in which the new Silk Road initiative stands out. In
the second, with trade negotiations and bilateral investments. Meanwhile,
international trade, privatizations and capital flows may stumble over more
public regulations proposed by different actors; dependence on inputs and
products from other countries (visible in the pandemic with masks or
respirators, but in reality extends, in many cases, to essential products), is
prompting many countries to revise their policies, thinking about self-
sufficiency or, at least, about reducing dependence. Strategies for specialization
and internationalization of production, on the other hand, are being reworked
and central states and transnational companies are reorganizing and increasing
investments in technologies such as robotization or artificial intelligence.The
world, therefore, seems to be moving, at least in the short term, not towards
deglobalization, but towards a more decentralized, reticular and ultra-
technological capitalist globalization.
Global value chains will change directions in the face of the post-pandemic
recession, although they will certainly continue to carry a lot of weight. The
supranational institutional framework designed to facilitate the logic of
accumulation may lose weight in the face of a more complex economic and
political plot of accumulation in cities and in hierarchical networks. Not
everything is new, but the pandemic may accelerate and consolidate geopolitical
changes and trends that have been triggering over the past decade. This is the
case with the relative strengthening of China, which, even if it does not become
a new hegemon in the short term, it will play a more decisive role in the world
system. Conversely, the gap between the center and the periphery – or North
and South – tends to increase even more, due to both the centrality of
technological development and the economic recession, which is always
accompanied by a known macroeconomic prescription that is harmful to the
countries of the Global South.These scenarios and trends reinforce the fact that
the current geopolitical order is predictably marked by greater rivalry in the
interstate system, distrust between political and economic actors, but also by
the deepening, on the part of dominant actors, of global militarization, which
could strengthen systemic chaos.
It seems unlikely that a new global governance of health can emerge, both
because of the faltering role of the World Health Organization and because of

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the lack of commitment from the states themselves. International and

multilateral organizations of all kinds have also failed to cope with the tragedy
of the pandemic, either through silence, inability or incongruity. That is
precisely why they need to reinvent themselves. Most of the regional blocs have
been weakened and, in some cases, dismantled and without moral authority in
the face of the pandemic. This is the case with the European Union, which,
during the global health crisis, missed the opportunity to establish itself as an
alternative to the failure of the US’ response to the pandemic, but also in the
face of the centralized and authoritarian Chinese model. Cracks and
asymmetries within the block appeared again, making internal coordination and
external projection difficult. On the other hand, those regional projects that
some years ago tried to project themselves in Latin America as counter-
hegemonic regionalisms – such as UNASUR, CELAC and ALBA-TCP – went
almost silent in the pandemic and were not large enough to build any relatively
well articulated supranational political response. In the case where they
minimally functioned, as with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum
(APEC), this occurred mainly through the objective of exchanging information
and coordinating policies to stimulate trade and business. Thus, in some cases
the pandemic may lead to the definitive burial of some regional projects. In
others, regionalism will be reorganized as a result of broader geopolitical and
geo-economic changes.

Between the virus contention and social protests:

national shock and local alternatives
During the pandemic, national sentiments were mobilized, and the intervening
state was vindicated even by neo-liberals. A kind of "transitional health
Leviathan” emerged, as proposed by Argentine intellectual Maristella Svampa.
With it came, in most cases, policies of social and health protection, but also the
military in the streets, states of emergency where everything was suspended and
the establishment of a dangerous warlike narrative. It turns out that permanent
surveillance from the most classic forms to digital tracking and drones, control
and management of big data, new facial recognition devices, and other
sophisticated forms of social control are deepening and not just to fight the
virus. Power concentration adopted to combat Covid-19 may even be necessary
to enable public health care and "protection" of the population. However, there
is a very thin line between this and authoritarian practices. The state responses
were diverse, also varying according to the profiles of their political regimes. In
some cases, authoritarian state capitalism prevailed, while in others the more
socially conscious face of the state appeared. However, much of the analysis of
the state management of the crisis sought to highlight cases of "success" and
"failure". The main variable for this was the lockdown of infected people and of
the dead. There are certainly more successful strategies than others, and cases
in which denial, coupled with incompetence (in this sense it is difficult to beat
Bolsonaro and Trump), offers the worst side of the responses seen. But we must
not forget that in the case of dependent states on the periphery and the global

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semi-periphery, the difficulties in confronting the pandemic are even greater:

public health systems are practically non-existent, the right to water is
compromised, housing is precarious and overcrowded in the urban peripheries,
and the state' s capacities are limited. Nevertheless, the importance of the State
and the national sphere coexisted with a strong appreciation of places and the
local scale. All over the world, local initiatives have appeared, seeking to
generate dynamics of mutual support and to build neighborhoods and
communities to provide collective responses from below, based on people's daily
needs. Given the difficulty of protesting in the streets, much of the analysis of
resistance in times of coronavirus tended to emphasize the crucial role of digital
activism, but also the creativity of social movements to generate spaces and
innovative proposals.
The press, as usual, tends to pay attention only to the most visible aspects of
citizen action and social movements, such as flash mobs, cacerolazos (pot-
banging protests) or online petitions. Although this has been an important part
of the collective actions during the pandemic, it is essential to also note what
happens under the surface, such as the self-organization and protection of
workers who have had to continue working, either because they cannot survive
without their income or because their jobs fall within what are considered
"essential services". Despite the restrictions and difficulties inherent to protests,
uprisings can always occur through some catalytic event, even at unlikely times
like a pandemic. This was the case with the brutal death of an African American
man, George Floyd, by a white policeman in Minneapolis on May 25, 2020,
which unleashed a wave of anti-racist protests not seen in the United States
since the fight for civil rights in the 1960s, impacting the entire world.
Although it is common to hear that the elderly population is the most vulnerable
to the coronavirus, recent events have made it clear that being African-
American in the United States or Black in Brazil, and in so many other countries
with strong structural racism, also means that you belong to a high risk social
group. In other words, the chances of dying from racism are greater than from
the coronavirus, which leads to a relative reduction in the costs of protest in
times of pandemic. Beyond the material and immediate needs, the commitment
of many groups and collectives to the community and the reconstruction of the
social bond in times of deep individualization of society has been significant. It
has also sought to bring to light care work inequality, solidarity and food and
energy sovereignty. The lockdown of a third of the world's population has also
served to spread a message that feminists have long insisted on: the body must
also be considered as a scale. But the local scale was not only important in a
transformational, non-institutional and, in some cases, anti-institutional sense.
In those countries that failed to push forceful measures throughout the national
territory, there was fierce dispute with local and regional leaders who, along
with unofficial initiatives, took on the institutional lead in the fight against the
pandemic. In other cases, progressive and leftist municipalities have also sought
to promote collaborative care platforms or have directly taken over the reins of
crisis management.

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This "new return" of places and their importance to social resistance and social
movements in times of coronavirus cannot lead us to fall back into had seemed
to be overcome, but which are once again widely circulating today, as if the
global scale is the place of capitalism and the local scale the locus of resistance.
As I have insisted on several occasions, in the past two decades, the most
globalized social struggles were the more localized ones. In other words,
territorialized movements are the ones that have managed to internationalize
more successfully. This has been the case, for example, with the peasant and
indigenous movements in Latin America since the 1990s, but also with the
several experiences gathered around the alterglobalization movement and
global and environmental justice struggles. However, the emergence of what I
have defined as a new geopolitics of global indignation during the last decade
seems to have led to a lower intensity of organizational density among social
struggles around the world.That protests expand globally, or rather, through
different countries, does not mean necessarily that it is globalized in a strong
sense – that it articulates with solid ties and builds a truly global response to the
capitalist world system. On the one hand, it is important to distinguish between
global actions and global movements. On the other, faced with the hypothesis
that we would be facing new political cultures without such an internationalist
effort, it would be necessary to deepen the debate on the changes in the "social
movement form" and in the types of activism today. Although they continue to
coexist with more traditional formats, they force us to question previous lenses
to grasp cognitive, generational and identity dislocations, with important
repercussions on practices of resistance, political articulations and conceptions
and horizons of social transformation.

Three geopolitical scenarios:

recovery, adaptation or transition
In Classical geopolitics, there was a strong "geodeterminism", which links the
provision of political actions to environmental conditions or places. Moreover,
the predominant anthropocentrism allowed for unlimited territorial expansion
and capital accumulation, in an effort to "domesticate" nature and natural
resources. Although the ecosystem boundaries have long been crossed, the
pandemic seems to have opened an inflection with regard to the importance
that the environmental issues and the possible geopolitical scenarios acquire
vis-à-vis social and economic models. In the contemporary political debate,
three different projects dispute the directions of the post-pandemic world:

- Business as usual, focused on GDP growth, predatory developmentalism

and the search for new market niches to lift economies out of the crisis,
from adjustment policies that require, once again, the sacrifice of the
majority to maximize profits for the few;
- The "Green New Deal", which initially emerged a decade ago in the
United Kingdom, has gained more prominence in recent years from the

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proposal of Democratic representatives in the United States to generate

social and economic reforms to transform the energy sector. It has also
spread very quickly in the last year (and especially during the pandemic),
with diverse appropriations from companies, international organizations
and the European Union, which is creating its own "European Green
Deal";
- The paradigm shift towards a new economic and ecological social matrix,
proposed by more combative environmental movements and various
anti-capitalist sectors that see degrowth, buen vivir (“good living) and
more disruptive measures as the only possible alternative.

These projects seem to open up three possible scenarios, which do not occur in a
"pure" mode and can interwoven in multiple ways, although all have their own
logic: the recovery of the most aggressive logic of economic growth; the
adaptation of capitalism to a "cleaner" model, although socially unequal; or the
transition to a new model, which implies a radical change in the ecological,
social and economic matrix. In view of these projects and scenarios, it is
important to ask ourselves the implications of each of them.
The implementation of "business as usual" implies an even greater
strengthening of militarized globalization, of the biopolitics of authoritarian
neoliberalism, and of a model of destructive despoliation that would lead,
predictably, to even more catastrophic scenarios, including wars and the
deepening of the eco-social crisis. Terms such as "return to normality" or even
"the new normal" justifies and ensures this type of scenario, based on the
anxiety of a large part of the population to recover their social lives and/or
employment. In the case of adapting to a green capitalism, deep geopolitical and
geo-economic adjustments seem likely. According to this vision, a green makeup
is no longer enough, a process that began with the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de
Janeiro and the "adjectivation" of development as "sustainable". The situation
now requires going a step further. And we know that, if capitalism accepts it, it
does so not necessarily for the protection of the environment, but because this
may be a way to maximize profits. The new strategies of coexistence between the
accumulation of capital and the environmentalist imaginary may give more
room for autonomy to local politics, but also deepen North/South inequalities
and environmental racism.
However, it is necessary to be fair: this predominantly "adaptive" scenario is still
strongly disputed. On the one hand, an important part of the dominant
collectivities, especially in the North, understands that it is a path to follow. On
the other hand, political forces that defend social justice and sustainability seek
to stress it in various ways, towards a rupture and an integral reconfiguration.
This is the case of proposals that claims for the "decolonization" of the rationale
of the Green New Deal from the South; or that critically discuss their
assumptions, but ground them in other realities such as Latin America, Africa or
Asia, giving more importance to the State and to the contributions of popular

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movements, with the objective of promoting, as Maristella Svampa and Enrique

Viale suggest in the context of Argentina, a great ecosocial and economic pact
that can address some national realities and serve as a basis for essential
North/South democratic dialogues.
Finally, the third scenario is the most difficult, but also the most necessary so
that the environment is not only, once again, a banner to save capitalism, but to
save humanity and the planet. It is the social movements themselves, the
territorial experiences and a diversity of popular and political-intellectual
struggles that drive this scenario, stretching the limits of the narratives of green
capitalism. The transition towards a radical change in the eco-social matrix is a
goal of several social movements today in both Global North and Global South.
At a time of systemic inflection point, when attempts at a capitalist exit from the
crisis join a growing political authoritarianism, it is essential to create broad
democratic and transformative platforms that bring together activists,
committed citizens and social organizations that seek to prevent the destruction
of ecosystems and that the multiple inequalities brought to light by the Covid-19
crisis be swept under the rug. There is not one recipe, but a multiplicity of
routes to escape from capitalist globalization and to articulate a new
globalization of trans-local movements. Many are already underway and seek to
reinvent transnational solidarity and militant internationalism, expanding
future horizons. It is in this spirit that the proposal for a Latin American
Ecosocial Pact was born on June 2, 2020, with the support of more than 2,300
people and 450 organizations until the first public presentation of the initiative
on 24 June. One of the key points of the platform is the articulation of
redistributive justice with environmental, ethnic and gender justice.
To this end, concrete proposals, that also spread in other forums – such as
solidary tax reform, cancellation of states’ foreign debts and a universal basic
income –, are combined with broader horizons associated with building post-
extractivist societies and economies, strengthening community spaces, care and
information/communication from society. Moving in this direction will require
sacrifices and drastic changes ranging from the personal sphere (changing
habits, reducing consumption or reducing travel) to the more macro (policies
that make it possible to relocate food and a change in the food system or a
radical decline in sectors such as oil, gas and mining), as well as labor relations
and social life as a whole. It also implies territorial resistances that seek new
forms of articulation, connection and intelligibility within the global map of
emerging struggles. Or, in other words, to develop, from the struggles of our
time, a global movement that can challenge the directions of this new alter-
globalization moment. Only then we will move from a destructive globalization
to a "pluriverse" one. Only then other possible worlds will emerge.

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About the author

Breno Bringel is Professor of Sociology at the Institute of Social and Political
Studies at the State University of Rio de Janeiro. Founder and editor, with
Geoffrey Pleyers, of Open Movements (Open Democracy), Director of the Latin
American Sociological Association and President of the International
Sociological Association Research Committee on Social Classes and Social
Movements (ISA RC-47). His last book is Critical Geopolitics and Regional
(Re)Configurations (Routledge, 2019.

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The social and the subjective:

defining disablement at the birth of
the Disabled People’s Movement in Britain
Luke Beesley

Abstract
Recent activist memoirs and archival work has begun to challenge our
understanding of the historical Disabled People’s Movement in Britain;
recentring the voices of self organised groups of activists in its strategic and
analytic development. This article takes advantage of the results of this work
to explore the emergence of a social definition of disability during the
formation of the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation
(UPIAS); the first national organisation of disabled people to form in post-war
Britain.
Utilising a previously private, internal UPIAS communique from before its
first conference, I show that the adoption of the social definition followed a
period of extensive debate amongst activists on the nature of subjective
responses to disablement and the social position of disabled people. I situate
this debate in the history of UPIAS’ emergence from a critique of the existing
Disability Movement, and outline both the objections raised to the social
analysis of disability, alongside the counter-arguments deployed to defend it. I
conclude by evaluating the success of this defence against UPIAS’ final agreed
policy document.

Key words: Disability Politics, UPIAS, Disabled People’s Movement, Disability

History, Finkelstein, Radical Theory.

Introduction: between the theory of the movement and the

movement of theory
The last eighteen months have seen a significant upsurge in resources on the
history of the Disabled People’s Movement (DPM) in Britain, albeit with little
indication that Disability or Social Movement scholars have recognised the
significance of newly available accounts. The summer of 2019 alone included
the publication of Judy Hunt’s No Limits - a comprehensive history of the DPM
by one of its most longstanding activists - alongside the public opening of the
Greater Manchester Coalition of Disabled People’s archives - a vast collection of
papers related to Disabled People’s Organisations (DPOs) held at Manchester
Central Library. Alongside these developments, Tony Baldwinson’s Radical
Community Archives1 has continued to publish internal documents from

1 https://tonybaldwinson.com/archives/

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historic DPOs online, allowing us a fascinating insight into the development of

policies, strategy, and political theory within the early period of the DPM.
This article seeks to complement these developments with a study of how
political theory was collectively contested and formulated in the earliest days of
the DPM. Using Vic Finkelstein’s Are We Oppressed? (2018) [1974], a
document which collects and responds to objections to the social understanding
(or ‘model’) of disability during the movement’s formation, I seek to show that
the most emblematic and controversial tenet of theory generated by the
movement has a more complicated democratic history than is often imagined;
one which has direct implications for evaluating its rejection in later academic
accounts of disability.

----

The DPM in Britain exhibits a peculiar, deep seated, and extensive split on
questions of theory. This division, which carries almost universally between the
organisations of the movement and its academic wing in Disability Studies, is all
the more stark in that it does not concern the interpretation or implications of
certain pre-agreed theoretical premises or questions, but the foundational
concepts and definitions used to explain the existence of disability and the
position of disabled people in society. Consequent on these fundamental
disagreements over the nature of disablement, there exists no vision of disability
liberation, or emancipatory strategy, that is shared between the academy and
activist community.
DPOs, from the most politically militant (such as Disabled People Against Cuts)
to government funded service providers (such as the Kent Centre for
Independent Living), hold a structuralist and materialist account of disability
which emerged with the formation of the DPM in the mid 1970s. This account,
somewhat misleadingly labelled as the Social “Model” of Disability, was first
formulated by the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation
(UPIAS):

‘(I)t is society which disables physically impaired people. Disability is something

imposed on top of our impairments, by the way we are unnecessarily isolated and
excluded from full participation in society. Disabled people are therefore an
oppressed group in society. It follows from this analysis that having low incomes,
for example, is only one aspect of our oppression. It is a consequence of our
isolation and segregation, in every area of life, such as education, work, mobility,
housing, etc.’ (1976: 3-4)

By this definition, disability is the result of a social formation that separates

impaired people from the core activities of modern civic life and the social
leverage which comes with participation. While impairments - conditions of the

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body or mind which can be identified by medical science - hold a material

existence, their social implications rest entirely on how governments,
employers, civil society, and civic institutions structure the rules of social
participation. The strategy of DPOs has, therefore, been externally focussed:
with the aim of identifying barriers to full integration and dismantling them
through a mixture of direct action, lobbying, and the promotion of alternative
forms of access to public life.
Much of contemporary Disability Studies, on the contrary, begins from the
indissoluble link between impairment, disabling barriers, and prevailing
attitudes in the experience of individual disabled people: a nexus within which
the qualitative aspects of a physical or mental condition interact directly with
the discursive practices of institutional and non-institutional sub groups
(medical regimes, the family, ethnic or religious communities, the media) active
in disabled people’s lives. (Thomas: 1999; Shakespeare and Watson: 2002). This
focus has generated a significant critique of the activist view which, at its
mildest, seeks to radically revise the social definition to include explicit
reference to the experience of impairment types (Levitt: 2017) or the emotional
impact of disablist social practices on identity formation (Reeve: 2012). At its
most stringent, it rejects the activist framework entirely, and seeks to build
analytic models which collapse the categorical distinction between the body and
the social through Critical Realist (cf, Shakespeare: 2006a) or Poststructuralist
(cf. Tremain: 2006) methodologies.
The purpose of this piece is not to arbitrate these debates, but to explore one of
their ironies. If we grant the claim that impairment and social phenomena are
experienced simultaneously, then how do we explain the adherence of a
democratic mass movement - numbering tens of thousands of activists at its
height - to a theory that runs so contrary to their immediate lived experience?
What arguments were successful in convincing people that their situation was
the result of macrological social organisation and not, more obviously, a mixture
of their own bodily limitations and the attitudes and intentions of those they
came into contact with? Furthermore, how do we make such an explanation
without diminishing the agency of lay activists by focussing exclusively on
organisations’ leadership or movement theoreticians?

-------

Thanks to archival work undertaken by the Greater Manchester Coalition of

Disabled People, and its subsequent digitisation by Tony Baldwinson, we are
beginning to get a picture of the internal life and debates of the DPM from
which to launch such an enquiry. Are We Oppressed? is a key resource;
collecting the earliest responses and critiques of disabled activists to the social
definition of disability alongside a defence, from Finkelstein, of its validity and
its uses for social and political action.

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The objections in this document concern the role of subjective views and
experience in identifying the social position of disabled people; and in particular
how much primacy should be given to the feelings, attitudes, and self-
conceptions of disabled and able-bodied people in an analysis of disability.
Compiled with commentary on the eve of the Union of the Physically Impaired
Against Segregation’s (UPIAS) first conference in the winter of 1974 - at which
this definition of disability was adopted by its membership - it stands as a rare
insight into exactly what activists conceived as the role of their own experience
within their project, and how wavering activists were convinced of the viability
of the social approach2.
This article argues for two distinct but interrelated claims. Firstly, through an
historical account of the formation of UPIAS in response to the professionally
dominated ‘Disability Movement’, I argue that rigorous internal debate was
integral to the UPIAS project and that, as such, any discussion of its collective
policies or positions cannot be separated from their formation in internal
discussion and the active assent of its membership. Secondly, I show through an
exegesis of the arguments in Are We Oppressed? that the role accorded
subjectivity within UPIAS’s analysis was a matter of significant debate within its
early cadre; which only subsided after both a counter-critique of proposed
alternatives to the social definition, and the development of an account of
subjective responses to disability that is distinct from (although compatible
with) later attempts to explain divergent experiences of disablement in terms of
racial and gendered oppression (Oliver: 1990 pp.73-7: Barnes & Mercer: 2003
pp.60-1).
I begin by outlining the critique of the democratic deficit in the Disability
Movement developed by Finkelstein and Paul Hunt alongside their earliest
theorisations of the nature of disability, and their attempt to counter such a
tendency by creating channels for internal debate in the fledgling UPIAS. I
subsequently outline three strains of counter-argument to the social
interpretation found within internal literature and Finkelstein’s responses to
them. Finally, I discuss Finkelstein’s own alternative account of the generation
of subjective attitudinal response to disablement, before concluding with an
indication of how successful these counter-arguments were by comparing the
propositions raised in the internal literature with the final policy statement of
UPIAS’s first conference, and the proceedings of the conference itself.

2Social understanding/definition/interpretation/approach’ will be used instead of ‘social model’

to refer to the thesis that disability is imposed on the impaired person due to the rules of social
organisation. This is to avoid anachronism (as no attempt was made to model this thesis until
several years after the debates that I recount), and to avoid confusions that arise from blurring
distinctions between a set of definitions and their operationalisation within specific contexts in
the form of a model or models (Finkelstein 2007).

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Finkelstein, the social understanding of disability, and the

birth of UPIAS
The impetus for the creation of UPIAS arose from a dual critique of the
Disability Movement in Britain, and in particular its strategy of prioritising
welfare issues over broader strategies of social integration, developed privately
by Vic Finkelstein and Paul Hunt in the early 1970s. Finkelstein, a refugee and
former political prisoner from Apartheid South Africa, and Hunt, a campaigner
within residential homes in Britain, came to the conclusion that only a new
organisation with a radically different mission to those already in existence
could solve the problems they identified, and began to seek the support of other
disabled people nationally for its creation.
Their first critique concerned the subject matter of disability itself, and
stemmed initially from Finkelstein’s period of imprisonment. Paradoxically,
Finkelstein had found that South African prisons were much more
accommodating to his access needs than wider South African society. In prison,
he later revealed, he found the first bed he could comfortably get into (a
mattress on the floor, as provided to all political prisoners) and that even the
hard labour ordered on him by the court was facilitated through the assignment
of ‘helpers’. Conversely, the long list of prohibited activities contained in his
banning order after his release ‘didn’t make much difference to (his) life’, as the
premises he was banned from (educational institutions, premises of
publications, courts, etc) were places wholly in-accessible to him as a wheelchair
user (2005a 1-2). From this perverse situation, and a re-engagement with
Nelson Mandela’s trial speech on the ‘disabilities’ imposed on black South
Africans under Apartheid, Finkelstein began to conceive of the social exclusion
of Disabled People as something rooted in the structures of the society they live
in, rather than as caused by the fact of them having an impairment of the body
or mind. By early 1972, Finkelstein had begun to say, in private, that disability
was best understood as ‘’a social relationship between a person with an
impairment and the social environment in which they live, rather than just
being a personal (medical) possession, condition, or attribute’ (ibid: 2); a
position bolstered by the support of Hunt.
The consequences of such a view were that the social relationships that created
disability could be changed in order to eliminate the social exclusion of people
with impairments; and that the contemporary focus on welfare benefits within
the Disability Movement was far too limited to meet that aim. Finkelstein and
Hunt attempted to convince professionals working with, and organisations for,
disabled people of their position, and to alter their own practice accordingly. As
Finkelstein later recalled, the results of these meetings were non-existent (2001:
5; 2005a: 2).
Secondly, Hunt and Finkelstein identified a failure of representation within the
British Disability Movement. At the time of Finkelstein’s emigration, the
Disability Incomes Group (DIG) was the most influential Disability organisation
in Britain, with significant support amongst disabled people (J.Hunt 2019: 69).
As Finkelstein recounts, however:

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‘Although it was started by two women, Megan Duboisson and Berit Moore
(Thornberry / Stueland), who were concerned about broad social rights of
disabled people and the way disabled ‘housewives’ were ineligible for any of the
current disability benefits, policy became dominated by men, including some
influential male academics, and they transformed the organisation into a rather
narrow parliamentary lobbying group wholly focused on ‘benefits’. (...) Having
started as a mass organisation, concentration on parliamentary lobbying meant
that the grassroots membership soon had no clear role within the organisation
and membership began to decline. In order to lobby parliament only a few
experts are needed who know the issues and who can present and argue them
effectively.’ (2001: 3)

To prevent the domination of the Disability Movement by a professional

element, the pair decided to solicit support for building a group whose policy
would be determined solely and democratically by disabled people. To this end,
Paul Hunt wrote a letter to the national and disability presses in 1972 asking
disabled people who shared their concerns to respond and indicate their
willingness to create such an organisation (P.Hunt: 1972).
The critique of the democratic deficit within the Disability Movement had direct
implications for the establishment of the social understanding as the guiding
principle for an organisation. If the new organisation was not to repeat the
mistakes of the DIG, it would be necessary for lay members to have real control
over the organisation’s activities and strategy - including the political theory
under which it laboured. It would not, then, be sufficient for Hunt and
Finkelstein to attempt to get into positions of organisational leadership and
then simply impose the social understanding by dictat; to be a dominant
theoretical force, it would have to be accepted by the majority of the
organisation’s members and be upheld by them in their campaigns. The
attempts to convince prospective members began shortly after Hunt’s letter was
published, and only concluded in the first conference of the organisation some
two years later. As we shall see, the debate around this was rich and wide-
ranging; provoking both clarifications and defenses of the initial argument from
Finkelstein which are relevant to any ongoing debates of the validity of the
social interpretation.

The internal circulars and the early membership:

UPIAS before its first conference
That Finkelstein and Hunt held the position that disability is a product of social
relations (rather than the fact of having an impairment) before UPIAS was
formed is a matter of historical record; it was not, however, the starting position
for those who responded to Hunt’s appeal. In order to gain organisational
consensus on what the policies, aims, and analysis of the new group should be,
two years’ worth of private debate were conducted by way of confidential

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circulars in which those who wished to join the fledgling UPIAS were free to
express their views, share news from campaigns they were involved in, and
propose or criticise any prospective policy. This process culminated in the first
congress of UPIAS in Winter 19734, in which the Union’s Aims and Policies
document (1975) was adopted by the membership.
Between the 1972 letter to the disability presses and the date of the first
conference, eleven internal circulars were distributed amongst the UPIAS
membership (Baldwinson 2019: 76). Paul Hunt composed the first circular as a
questionnaire to find out what correspondents believed were the most pressing
issues in their lives and how they’d like the new organisation to operate, and
used the second circular to collate the initial thoughts of prospective members
(ibid: 21-31). From the third circular onwards, independent pieces by activists
and members began to be circulated to disabled people who had expressed an
interest in the organisation (ibid. 8). Only the first two of these circulars, along
with Are We Oppressed? are currently available in their entirety. The
publication of the latter marks the first time where the content of these missing
pre-conference circulars is quoted at length, and is thus a vital resource for
understanding who the early cadre of UPIAS were, what they believed were the
priorities for the Disabled People’s Movement, and how these should be met.
The document also records an important turning point in Britain’s Disabled
People’s Movement. The text was written during August of 1974, circulated to
members shortly afterwards, and contains Finkelstein’s responses to criticisms
raised of his and Hunt’s position in the period immediately before the first
conference of UPIAS (where this position would either be approved by the
membership or rejected in favour of a different formulation). It is one of the last
opportunities that Finkelstein had to convince the membership of the
desirability of his and Hunt’s view as the guiding principle for their new
organisation.
Later critiques of the social interpretation and models used to operationalise it
imply that this membership was already predisposed to such a view in light of
their racial and gender homogeneity, their shared spinal impairments, and the
prevalent influence of Marxism on their worldview (cf, Shakespeare 2006: 197-
8; Lloyd 1992: 209-12). While Finkelstein himself accepts that wheelchair users
were over-represented in UPIAS for ‘historical reasons’ (2001: 4), the members
quoted in Are We Oppressed? don’t appear to fall neatly into any kind of
demographic or ideological category. In the public edition, contributors are
referred to anonymously, making it difficult to identify immediately the gender
(or any other characteristic) of the writer. From some explicit statements within
their contributions, however, it appears that there was a greater level of
heterogeneity within the membership than is often imagined. For example,
while most writers quoted do not explicitly state their impairment, one author
mentions being blind (48), and it is clear that the level of institutionalisation
3The conference was split into a physical session in October, followed by a period in which
members not in attendance were able to vote on UPIAS’ policy documents and committee
positions by post. This process ended in December 1974 (Baldwinson 2019: 9)

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which members experienced at the time or writing varied - with contributors

writing to the circular from residential homes (16), community living
arrangements (17), and in at least one case a university (41). Marxism is only
positively appealed to once by any contributor quoted in Are We Oppressed?;
interestingly, this writer also states their involvement with a local branch of
Women’s Liberation (47). Explicit rejections of antagonistic political projects
(18, 40), and Marxism in particular (41), are more common.
Without the names of the contributors, the full set of circulars, or a list of
members, we should be cautious about extrapolating from the information
presented in Are We Oppressed? about the broader demographic makeup of
UPIAS. As the lengthiest piece of public evidence of both the positions and
concerns of the early membership4, however, it undermines the plausibility of
attempts to explain the UPIAS analysis of disablement on the basis of shared
impairments or political philosophy within the organisation at its inception.
This insight, alongside the sharp political disagreements that are recorded in
members’ contributions, mean that the fact that the Union’s analysis developed
in the way that it did requires a more nuanced and less mechanical explanation
than the one often offered.

Alternative positions
While the first two circulars do not touch explicitly on the nature of disability
itself; an extract of Finkelstein’s contribution to the third circular late in 19725
(2005b) gives us an early statement of the position the organisation was to
express in Fundamental Principles of Disability (1976). This appears to be the
first time that the content of Finkelstein and Hunt’s theoretical position was put
forward to the UPIAS membership.
In this early piece, Finkelstein differentiates between impairment, handicap,
and disability as three distinct phenomena whose treatment by a social
organisation require different forms of intervention. Impairment is defined as
the physical state of having ‘an abnormality (or damage) in an individual’s body’
which is then described and treated by medical science. Handicap is considered
to be a context dependent, functional limitation which ‘accrues from an
impairment’. As the same functional limitations may arise from a variety of
distinct impairments, Finkelstein argues that their reduction falls properly into
the realm of physio- and occupational therapy, rather than the direct treatment
of a medical condition.

4Circular 2, by contrast, is less than seven pages in length - including Paul Hunt’s editorial
commentary, a discussion of the logistics of meeting in London, and two responses from people
unwilling to join. The majority of members’ contributions to it are rarely longer than two or
three sentences (Baldwinson 2019: 24-31)
5I date the initial publication of this extract according to that placed on it by the archivists of the
online Disability Archive (Finkelstein 2005b). Baldwinson, in his chronology of the UPIAS
circulars, estimates the date of publication at 1973 (2019: 76). It is unclear why there is a
discrepancy in dating.

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Disability, by contrast:

‘results when an individual is unable to participate in social relations because

these very social relations are organized in such a way that the physical handicap
excludes its possessor.’

Regardless of the level of medical stabilisation of a given impairment, or the

reduction of a functional limitation, available to a person at a given moment,
Finkelstein argues, there remains a disjunct between the level of integration of
people with impairments within that society, and the level of integration that
would be technically possible if society were organised differently. This takes the
form of exclusion - or segregation - of people with impairments within that
social totality; with degrees of severity stretching from being unable to access
certain environments, to exclusion from work and leisure activities, to its purest
form in the completely segregated and dependent forms of life found in
residential institutions. Finkelstein described this relationship of segregation as
a variety of oppression and, unlike the medical and technical problems raised by
impairment and handicap, sees it as purely as a socio-political imposition on
impaired people to be resolved by collective struggle.
The critiques of this view collected in Are We Oppressed? fall into three
categories: arguments prioritising the epistemological position of the disabled
person6; arguments from the explicit intentions of those who produce
exclusionary social relationships; and one alternative explanation for the social
exclusion of disabled people which I will call the ‘Attitudinal Account’.

Epistemological priority
A number of members quoted by Finkelstein object to his conclusion that the
exclusion of physically impaired people amounts to a social oppression on the
basis that physically impaired people do not, or can be imagined not to,
recognise oppression as part of their experience of disability. If this is the case, it
follows that measures to end what Finkelstein identifies as oppression aren’t
guaranteed to reflect the aspirations of disabled people themselves, and are
likely to be based on a falsification of their actual experience.
Part of the justification for this argument is phenomenological7; with members
indicating that they don’t feel that the subjective threshold for feeling oppressed
in their case has been met (‘Oppressed never. When I feel weighed down with
impossible burdens, tyrannically severed and harshly dominated then I may
agree’ (49), ‘As for me, as someone physically impaired, I don’t feel particularly
oppressed, so why bother?’ (40)), with some indicating that different words
would better describe their subjective state when dealing with service providers
6 I.e., the role of their individual experience in explaining the phenomenon of disability.
7 i.e., relating to their subjective interpretation of the world.

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and wider society (‘dreadfully upset ‘ (40), ‘it’s a nuisance’ (49)). It is further
speculated that this view is shared by a sizeable number, if not the majority, of
physically impaired people in Britain: either through the psychological effects of
institutionalisation (18), the relative benefits of institutional life (lack of
housework, guaranteed company, etc) (41), or from analogy from the personal
feelings of the writer (40). One member argues that, if the claim that physically
impaired people are oppressed is to be considered valid, its proponents ‘will
require a large sample of the physically impaired population to provide those
experiences’ (49)

Arguments from intention

These counter-arguments criticise the use of the term ‘oppression’ on the basis
that, in common language uses of the term, there is an implication that
oppression results from the conscious action of an individual, or groups of
individuals, which is designed to cause harm or restrict freedom. Such an
intention is difficult to prove in light of other, more plausible, explanations. As
one writer has it:

‘Oppression to me is something akin to malice aforethought. Something

premeditated. To prove oppression we would need to prove premeditation. Our
problems stem from disunity and lack of coherent voice. Our need is to put across
our feelings, opinions. We know, others assume’ (43)

Another contribution indicates the difficulty of proving any intentional

oppression in large institutional bodies that physically impaired people interact
with:

‘I honestly don’t think that this is the intention of the NHS or other official
bodies. I don’t think they intend to oppress or set out to oppress us. I think we are
neglected, forgotten, and wrongly treated often enough, but I don’t think it is
deliberate oppression (...) I’ve felt they’ve fallen sadly short in their duty very
often, and also in their understanding and the choice of persons they employ to
carry out the wishes of the State and various organisations can be very poor
indeed. Yet again, I have still never felt that they have set out to oppress me. (40-
1)

If this critique holds, it would mean that the social interpretation, as laid out by
Finkelstein, leads to an untenable conclusion, and that strategic decisions
resulting from the hypothesis that physically impaired people are oppressed are
unlikely to reflect the real cause and nature of their social position.

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The attitudinal account

Unlike the two counter-arguments above, this account provides an alternative
description of the social position of disabled people and its cause within wider
society. It was originally published in the third internal circular (the same issue
in which Finkelstein expressed the position outlined above), and at over-six
pages is the longest single contribution quoted in Are We Oppressed?
The account begins from the premise that, while an impairment does disqualify
someone from taking part in certain exceptional activities (the example used is
participating in an Everest expedition), there are many other spheres in which
the physically impaired are excluded despite there being no causal basis for this
in their impairment. The writer identifies education, housing, and employment
as areas where physically impaired people experience ‘mistreatment (...) without
their having done anything to merit it’ (9).
Such mistreatment is characterised as discrimination, and the author asserts
that its existence is caused both by an existing prejudice within the minds of
some members of society, and a ‘norm conforming’ set of behaviours in others
caused by a lack of accurate information on what disability means or by the
existence of stereotypes of the disabled (10). These active or passive beliefs
about disabled people can be caused by a number of different factors, all of
which imply varying scopes of influence: some applying only to one individual at
a time (as the result of a personal bad experience (11)), while others may apply
to large numbers of people (such as through scapegoating (12), or ignorance of
the social cost of segregating disabled people (14)); some directly cause
prejudice (such as taking the existing ‘equality gap’ between disabled and able
bodied people as a permanent consequence of disability (12) and developing
feelings of superiority on that basis (13)), while others merely imply a feeling of
unease or confusion about disabled people (such as a general ‘dislike of
difference (10)).
The author proposes that changing these attitudes should be the main focus of
UPIAS policy, and that its strategy should reflect the three forms in which these
attitudes can be expressed: as rational or rationalised beliefs, as affective or
emotional responses to a situation, and as the activity of discriminating against
a physically impaired people. The first two forms, the author argues, can be
combated by ‘propagating accurate and relevant information about the situation
of the physically impaired to as many people as possible’ (14), while in the case
of discrimination UPIAS should

‘stand firmly behind all who are the victims of discriminatory practices. People so
suffering should be encouraged to resist ... if penalisation occurs - this should be
publicised’ (ibid).

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Finkelstein’s response: structural and systemic exclusion and

the problem of explanation.
Finkelstein begins by pointing out a methodological distinction between the
three arguments that contradict his claim that physically impaired people are
oppressed, and the premise he and others in UPIAS use to reach the oppression
claim. The former, Finkelstein argues, are predicated upon the assumption that
the social position of physically impaired people can be identified and described
from the first person experience of their social relationships - whether through
that of the impaired person, or that of the able-bodied member of society. The
latter is extrapolated from macro-economic phenomena, measurable inequality,
and systematic policies of segregation within firms and institutions (6). Citing
examples used by other contributors to the circular, Finkelstein points to high
rates of unemployment and low pay amongst physically impaired people, lack of
choice in terms of housing, limited access to education (21), and policies which
charge impaired people more to travel (15) as examples which corroborate the
claim of oppression.
Concluding oppression from these kind of examples does not, he argues, require
any specific mental state to be held by any party, but is concluded from the
nature of the aggregate relationship of the actors:

‘“Oppression” does not exist simply because it is in the “mind” of the doer as
intention, nor to the “mind” of the done-to as a feeling. It is in the factual
situation that exists between a “doer” and a “done-to.” If someone was being hit
in the face, we would not have to ask him whether [they] “felt” hit before we could
decide that this is what was happening to him. Nor would we have to ask the
hitter whether this is what he “intended” doing. We look at the situation between
the two, what is happening between them whether they admit this or not,
whether they are fully aware of the facts or not, whether they are conscious of it
or not. Then we decide on the reality of the situation. If physically impaired
people are oppressed we have to decide whether we agree that this is a matter of
fact, in spite of the “intentions” or “feelings” of anybody.’ (7-8) [gloss in original]

That there are various thoughts, feelings and attitudes which correspond to a
social position, and which can be accurately described, is taken as prime facie
true by Finkelstein (26). To be an adequate basis for analysing the social
position of impaired people, and for being any kind of guide to action for an
organisation, accounts based on these qualitative mental states would need to
account for how and why systematic exclusion and inequality emerge within a
social organisation, and how they are sustained. Conversely, an account which
begins from the fact that the systematic exclusion exists, and wishes to provide
guidance for social and political action, is required to account for why subjective
responses to it differ and may be in tension with its analysis.
Finkelstein asserts that the existence of qualitative mental states does not imply
their generalisability, and while I may be sure that I have an attitude, feeling, or

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belief, it does not follow that other people share it (7). If these qualitative states
are to provide a causal basis for the social position of disabled people as a whole,
or an insight into its nature, they will require a grounding in phenomena that
can be recognised as generalisable between subjects. Finkelstein identifies two
difficulties with finding such a general or universal basis for attitudes: in its lack
of support within the scientific study of mental states and behaviour; and in a
modal or logical paradox which emerges from trying to explain individual
mental states while maintaining their primacy over social phenomena.
As a practicing psychologist, Finkelstein is aware of the disunity within
psychological research at the time of his writing, and the relative decline of its
dominant schools, which rooted attitudes and behaviours within universal
tendencies of the human subject:

‘Ideas such as, “norm-conforming behaviour may be based on stereotypes” and

“attitudes may be ego-defensive, rooted in insecurity and inferiority” have long
been suspect and we should be wary of being involved in the shop-worn concepts.
Professional psychologists are at present involved in violent disagreements about
the various theories of human behaviour and are divided into definite schools of
thought. Each school produces arguments that prove the other schools wrong!’
(28)

If there is going to be any explanation of attitudes wide enough to account for

the social position of disabled people, it is unlikely to find backing from within
science that isn’t already compromised by critique. Without taking sides in these
debates within psychology, and thus advocating this or that form of counselling
to overcome this situation (21), accounts based on mental states and attitudes
cannot simply assume a shared basis for these mental states that transcends the
individual.
The second problem arises when we ask what kind of phenomena explain
mental states or attitudes. If these are explained through appeals to pre-existing
mental states that the subject holds about themselves or the world (such as
explaining scapegoating by reference to beliefs about one’s interest, or
prejudiced ideas through imagination and fear (26-7)), then they are grounded
in phenomena which are equally un-generalisable and cannot be used to explain
broad social phenomena. As Finkelstein puts it, ‘we wander in the fog bumping
into isolated attitudes and invent connections between them’ (27).
If, alternatively, we explain the belief or attitude on the basis of an experience
that a number of subjects may share, such as accounting for a negative view of
disabled people on the basis of bad personal experiences (26), then the question
remains ‘exactly what is happening between the “doer” and “done-to”; and who
says it is a bad experience?’ (27). As the situation which generated the mental
state is prior to it, and thus independent of it, it is governed by the social
relationship between the parties rather than the attitude that it generates, and
would need to be explained and intervened in on those terms. That is to say,

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explaining attitudes about physically impaired people on the basis of collective

experience would require falling back on the method proposed by Finkelstein,
rather than maintaining the one held by his interlocutors.

The social account of attitudes

From the above paradox, Finkelstein concludes that an approach which holds
the subjective attitudes of actors as responsible for the social position of
Disabled People is not only untenable, but politically limiting and has more in
common with a reactionary ideology than an emancipatory one.

‘There is constant pressure on physically impaired people to talk about their

feelings, their personal experiences, and their innermost thoughts. When we
complain about the things that are wrong (that lead to feelings of frustration,
depression, etc.), then we are said to have “chips on our shoulders”, to be
“paranoid”, to have “the wrong attitude”, and so on. If we take this up, soon we
are no longer talking about what is wrong, but whether our attitudes have been
wrong. (...) When we argue about attitudes before real problems, then we are
being “conned” (31).

This critique is repeated in Finkelstein’s later work - where its scope is extended
to attack the right wing of the Disabled People’s Movement (2001: 13) -,and is
not a simple determinist claim. Unlike one contributor to the circular,
Finkelstein does not make the argument that the social position of disabled
people is a result of society being ‘brainwashed by the media’ (2018: 17) or
believing certain things because they are told to by those with vested interests.
His account of attitudes and subjective responses rests, instead, on the interplay
of three distinct but interrelated factors: the personal, the ‘social rules of
participation’, and that which is possible within a society at a given moment.
Finkelstein identifies attitudes, feelings, and beliefs as a constituent ‘part’ of a
situation - rather than its cause or simply being caused by it (29). In a
discriminatory or oppressive social relationship, both oppressing and oppressed
parties are capable of taking an attitude that challenges the basis of that
relationship, finds reconciliation with it, or tries to find a way to turn it to their
own personal advantage (32). The conditions under which the oppressive
relationship arises, and the possible challenges and advantages that both parties
could identify, are governed by the rules and institutions that determine how
society functions. In the case of disability, Finkelstein identifies the rules of
competition for profit, especially as they pertain to the labour market, as the
most relevant determining factor:

‘In this situation people have to compete in the labour market for jobs in order to
earn a living. When the person hires labour [they do] not want to buy labour that
is physically impaired, or at least, [they are] not going to pay the same amount for

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an imperfect purchase. This is a fact regardless of his “intentions” or “feelings”.

When the rules of earning a living are fixed in this way then, in reality, physically
impaired people are discriminated against. Consequently, we can’t get jobs, or are
paid less for our work, or end up in the poorer paid, less desirable jobs. In all
these cases we end up with less income and/or the quality of life is inferior. We
are also deprived of choice in where we work, where we live, and so on.’ (ibid)
[gloss in original]

The fact of a person’s unequal treatment or status is, Finkelstein believes,

something that is bound to call forth some kind of resistance or challenge on
their part. This resistance can be purely personal, taking the form of non-
compliance or an attempt to find more freedom in the situation imposed on one
than is initially given, or can be aimed at the structure of the inequality itself,
and the set of rules and institutions which maintain it (33).
Both the scope and the intensity of this resistance is dependent on what possible
avenues a person has to express it. If an individual can see no possibility of
changing the situation they are in, they are more likely to try and find some
accommodation with it or a purely individual solution to it. In the position of
having minimal social power with little opportunity of changing one’s situation,
claims that one’s unequal treatment are due to innate and permanent traits one
has (an impairment for disabled people, a ‘feminine psychology’ for women, etc)
can appear plausible (33-4). Conversely, if social and technological
developments imply that the situation one is in could be structured differently,
then the possibility exists of taking an antagonistic position to the whole of that
relationship and wishing to reject it in favour of an alternative.
Citing elevators, hoists, iron lungs, and ‘housing with help schemes’ as examples
(36); Finkelstein argued that such a possibility had already arisen:

‘When society has not yet achieved the technical ability to solve the practical
problems (of integrating physically impaired people), so that we can compete, for
example, for jobs, then prejudiced attitudes tend to remain unchanged over a
period of time. However, in the 1970s we have already the “know-how” and
technology to solve these problems. Consequently, a few physically impaired
people have successfully integrated into society – they have got well paid jobs,
adapted houses, their own families, cars, etc. (...) But, it is only rich people that
get the full benefit of society’s technology. What is required is that these practical
aids are provided by society to all that need them. In this respect our society
denies us what is available and ignores what are perfectly reasonable requests’
(35-6)

From the perspective of what is socially possible, the segregation of disabled

people is a mere ‘technical problem’ which could be solved by changing the way
that a situation, or society more broadly, is structured (30). Doing so, however,
would violate the existing ‘social rules of participation’ (ibid) as they are
administered (knowingly or otherwise) by state, social, and market institutions.

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Thus the struggle against these rules becomes, in the first instance, an
antagonistic struggle against those who administer them (33) combined with an
attempt to build support within the ranks of the oppressed for alternative social
arrangements - or, as Finkelstein puts it, converting ‘unconscious struggles’ that
exist on a purely individual level into ‘conscious struggles’ which recognise
individual circumstances as part of a contested social reality (34).

Conclusion
I hope that it is clear, from the above discussion, that Finkelstein proposes a
response to attacks on the social definition made on the basis of its failure to
encapsulate all of the lived experience of a disabled person, and those that
presume a transparent and direct link between an attitude and the outcome of
exclusion and oppression. In the first case, Finkelstein argues strongly that
attempting to base a universal analysis on individual experience is
unsustainable; due to its collapse into a fog of competing psychological
explanations or a necessary appeal to outside factors. As Finkelstein’s argument
for his social explanation of disability oppression aims to avoid this outcome,
and explicitly focuses on a methodology that does not rely on the heterogeneity
of individual experience, the lack of reference to individual thoughts and
feelings in his argument hardly invalidates it.
In the second case, Finkelstein problematises the relationship between attitudes
and social outcomes by interjecting the problems of power and existing social
formations; which not only determine the possibility of an attitude being
adopted, but equally dictate the chance it has of successfully manifesting itself
in behaviour which oppresses or liberates. On Finkelstein’s model, even if I and
those I deal with have a positive attitude to my impairment, my low social power
and the governing rules of engagement are still such that I will experience
oppression. Similarly, if I have an elevated leverage, and the rules of
participating in society are changed in my favour, I will experience considerably
more integration in society even if outright bigotry still exists.
I leave it to the reader to decide whether these arguments convince a modern
audience. The extent to which Finkelstein’s arguments were successful in
convincing UPIAS members is, however, shown by the repetition of his
premises and conclusions in the eventual policy of the organisation. While the
first policy document had been drafted by Hunt prior to the writing of Are We
Oppressed (20018: 3), and it is thus unsurprising that there is significant
crossover between the position the two developed privately and the final policy
document; the extent to which the Union’s Aims and Policies (1975) reflect this
position is notable in light of the support from the membership required for its
adoption.

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This document ratifies the distinction between a factual or material impairment

and the social disablement of impaired people; albeit without the interim
concept of Handicap8 used by Finkelstein in his earliest writing:

‘What we are interested in, are ways of changing our conditions of life, and thus
overcoming the disabilities which are imposed on top of our physical
impairments by the way this society is organised to exclude us. In our view, it is
only the actual impairment which we must accept; the additional and totally
unnecessary problems caused by the way we are treated are essentially to be
overcome and not accepted.’ (Clause 15)

Not only does this public statement of aims accept the claim that this relation of
society to disabled people is ‘essentially oppressive’ and that this finds its purest
expression in the segregation of impaired people in residential institutions
(Clause 7), it also roots this oppression in the mechanisms of the labour market
(Clause 4). It notes that this situation has no basis in material necessity, with
the relevant technology and technical know-how already in existence to solve it,
but in a social organisation which allocates resources to on the basis of profit
rather than need (Clause 1). The existence of the capacity to solve the problem of
segregation, alongside pre-existing political struggles by disabled people and
their supporters, is accounted to explain both the increasing (although limited)
integration of impaired people, and a partial change in the attitudes of wider
society (Clauses 3 & 4). Strategically, the Union commits itself to providing
political, secretarial, and advisory support to campaigns by individual disabled
people, and informing other activists of their campaigns within its newsletter
(Clause 18). The success or failure of strategies, it argues, are to be assessed by
their efficacy and their ability to to be replicated:

‘We need to learn from our failures and successes, and so develop arguments and
a theory which have been proved to work - because they do actually bring about
practical gains for disabled people. In this way the value of our practical
experience will be multiplied many times over, as the essential lessons learned
from it are made available to other disabled people now and in the future.’
(Clause 19).

Tony Baldwinson’s recent work (2019) reproduces, for the first time, the
internal report of the first UPIAS conference as an appendix (47-59). Given the
initial disagreement with Finkelstein’s claims that disability is an essentially
social phenomenon, irreducible to subjective attitudes or interpersonal
8As one UPIAS member recalls (Davis & Davis 2019), the earliest definitions discussed in the
organisation were modelled on the tripartite definitions of disability, handicap, and impairment
used by the Office for Population Censuses and Surveys and the World Health Organisation. As
UPIAS’ analysis progressed, sharper distinctions between forms of social organisation and the
disabled person’s body or mind made the second category superfluous (103-4)

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prejudice, it is striking to note that these arguments were not replayed on the
conference floor. The points of contention between members were in large part
the consequences of this view, not the view itself. For example, the conference
debated whether specialist holiday facilities should be opposed by the Union on
the grounds of their segregative function, or whether they could be presumed to
disappear by themselves if rights to inclusive housing and work had been won
(53); and, more pressingly, whether disabled people as an oppressed group
should be open to able-bodied people joining the organisation for their
liberation (55). Only on three occasions were arguments akin to the objections
outlined above raised: a proposal to include a reference to the ‘individual
character’ of decision makers as a cause of greater integration (51), and two
seperate objections to the characterisation of residential homes as ‘life-
destroying’ and ‘prisons’ (54-55). These interventions are recorded as being
raised by one member on each occasion, and none of them gained enough
support to be moved to a vote. The questions of the summer seem to have been
answered for the delegates in the room, and the debate had already moved on.

-------

Bibliography
Baldwinson, Tony 2019 UPIAS: Research Notes Manchester, TBR
Barnes, Colin & Mercer, Geoff 2003 Disability London, Polity Press
Centre for Independent Living, Kent; Our Ethos:
http://www.cilk.org.uk/about/our-ethos/ (accessed 23/10/2019)
Davis, Ken & Davis, Maggie 2019 To and From Grove Road Manchester, TBR
Disabled People Against Cuts Policy Statement:
https://dpac.uk.net/about/dpac-policy-statement/ (accessed 23/10/2019)
Hunt, Judy 2019 No Limits: The Disabled People’s Movement - A Radical
History Manchester TBR Imprint
Hunt, Paul 1972 ‘Letter to the Guardian’
https://disability-studies.leeds.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/sites/40/library/Hunt-Hunt-1.pdf (accessed 24/10/2019)
Finkelstein, Vic 2001 “‘A personal journey into Disability politics”
https://www.independentliving.org/docs3/finkelstein01a.pdf (accessed
24/10/2019)
Finkelstein, Vic 2005a “‘Reflections on the social model of dIsability; the South
African Connection” https://disability-studies.leeds.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/sites/40/library/finkelstein-Reflections-on-the-Social-Model-
of-Disability.pdf (accessed 24/10/2019)
Finkelstein, Vic 2005b UPIAS CIrcular 3 (extract) [1972]

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https://disability-studies.leeds.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/sites/40/library/finkelstein-03-Extraction-from-UPIAS-
Circular.pdf (accessed 24/10/2019)
Finkelstein, Vic 2007 ‘The social model of disability and the disability
movement’
https://disability-studies.leeds.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/sites/40/library/finkelstein-The-Social-Model-of-Disability-
and-the-Disability-Movement.pdf (accessed 24/10/2019)
Finkelstein, Vic 2018 Are We Oppressed? Manchester, TBR Imprint
Levitt, Johnathan 2017 “Exploring how the social model of disability can be re-
invigorated: in response to Mike Oliver” Disability and Society 32:4 589-94
Lloyd, Margaret 1992 “Does she boil eggs? Towards a feminist model of
disability” Disability, Handicap & Society, 7:3 pp.207-21
Oliver, Mike 1990 The Politics of Disablement London, Macmillan
Reeve, Donna 2012 “Psycho-emotional disablism: the missing link? Pp 78-92 in
Routeledge Handbook of Disability Studies edited by Nick Watson, Alan
Roulstone, & Carol Thomas. New York, NY, Routeledge
Shakespeare, Tom 2006a Disability Rights and Wrongs London, Routeledge
Shakespeare, Tom 2006b “The social model of disability” pp.197-204 n The
Disability Studies Reader: Second Edition edited by Lennard. J. Davis. New
York, NY, Routeledge
Shakespeare, Tom & Watson, Nick 2002 “The social model of disability: an
outdated ideology” Research in Social Science and Disability 2 pp.9-28
Thomas, Carol 1999 Female Forms: Experiencing and Understanding
Disability London, Open University Press
Tremain, Shelley 2006 “On the government of disability: Foucault, power, and
the subject of impairment” pp185-96 in The Disability Studies Reader: Second
Edition edited by Lennard. J. Davis. New York, NY, Routeledge
Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation 1975 Aims and Principles
London, UPIAS statement
Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation 1976 Fundamental
Principles of Disability London, UPIAS Pamphlet

About the author

Luke Beesley is a doctoral student at the Centre for Applied Philosophy,
Politics and Ethics (CAPPE) at the University of Brighton. His research covers
the history of the Disabled People’s Movement and its unique contribution to
radical political thought; most particularly in its engagements with Marxism
and Anarchism. He has a background in radical community activism within the

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Disabled People’s, Migrant Solidarity, and Working Class Movements. Contact:

l.s.beesley AT brighton.ac.uk

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Repealed the 8th:

Self care for reproductive rights activists in Ireland
Doris Murphy

Abstract
This article investigates the experiences of activists during Ireland's Repeal the
8th campaign, which secured abortion rights in Ireland through a 2018
referendum. The focus is on activists' experiences of self-care and collective care
during their activism. Differences between attitudes and approaches to self-care
are investigated, the emphasis on work versus care in movement culture is
explored, and the need for a move from self-care to collective care for continued
feminist activism is suggested.

Keywords: Repeal; reproductive rights; activism; abortion rights; care;

aftermath; sustainability; motivation; campaigning.

Introduction

I felt so deflated and lost after the campaign. After being part of such a
monumentally important campaign, making positive changes for our country,
having those conversations, meeting such incredible people… I questioned all
aspects of my life. My work, hobbies… it all seemed vacuous and pointless in
comparison. I also couldn't understand why I was so low when the result was
better than I could ever have imagined. It took a while to shake off.
(Survey respondent, 2019).

Activists in the Republic of Ireland successfully achieved access to abortion

services for the first time in a landmark Referendum campaign in 2018. This
was a long-fought campaign, 35 years in the making, and should have resulted
in complete euphoria in feminist circles. I was a member of the campaign, and
despite our victory, I observed that many campaigners, including myself,
experienced exhaustion and burnout in the aftermath of the campaign. This led
me to conduct this research, with a view to investigating activists’ experiences of
caring for themselves and each other during the Repeal the 8th campaign.
Stories played a huge role in the success of the campaign. Many people told
their personal stories of abortion and pregnancy loss, often at huge risk to
themselves. While this was a successful strategy, I wondered what impact it
might have on those people who laid themselves bare in the interest of political
progress.

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I was fortunate to be part of this wave of pro-choice activism. I was the co-
founder of Pro-Choice Wexford. Wexford is a county in the South-East of the
country, with a population of 150,000. Wexford town, where I was based, has a
population of 20,000. It is a rural town, and would be considered a traditionally
Catholic community, but it has a strong culture of arts and drama. As noted
previously, I experienced burnout in the aftermath of the campaign. This
prompted me to reflect on the impact that activism can have on the wellbeing of
social justice campaigners, and how best activists can sustain themselves to
continue their important work.
Flacks (2004) noted that attending to the self-understandings of activists is
important when analysing social movements. Furthermore, Cooper (2007: 243)
noted that ‘care has become a central frame for feminist scholarship, providing
a primary term through which intimacy and labour are configured’. For this
article, self-understandings of care during the Repeal the 8th campaign will be
investigated. My central research question is thus: How did activists engage in
self care during the Repeal the 8th campaign? Audre Lorde (1988) reflected on
the political importance of self-care, noting ‘caring for myself is not self-
indulgence, it is self-preservation, and that is an act of political warfare.’ I will
consider how the Repeal activists understood care within the campaign.
I will first provide a brief history of abortion rights activism in the Republic of
Ireland so as to situate the activists I interviewed within a broader context. I will
then discuss my methodology and limitations. I will then look at differing
practices of self care between groups within the campaign. Next I will look at
attitudes to work versus self care in movement culture. I will then discuss the
need for movements to shift focus from self care to collective or community
care. I will conclude with a reflection on self-care within the movement. I will
now begin with a discussion of pro-choice activism in the Republic of Ireland.

A brief history of abortion activism in Ireland

The 1861 Offences Against the Person Act in Britain rendered abortion services
illegal in Ireland, and this remained the legal position in Ireland until 1983,
when a referendum was announced. Ireland has traditionally been a majority
Roman Catholic country, with conservative laws around women’s place in
society, and their bodily autonomy. Conservative groups in Irish society worried
that the successes of feminist groups in improving access to contraception, as
well as the liberalising of abortion laws internationally, might lead to relaxation
of Ireland’s abortion laws (Kennedy, 2018). These groups campaigned for the
insertion of the eighth amendment to the constitution, Article 40.3.3, which
said: ‘The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due
regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect,
and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right’ (Wicks,
2011). This meant that there would be a constitutional ban on abortion in
almost all circumstances.

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Pro-choice activists formed the Anti-Amendment Campaign (AAC) in 1982, to

oppose the insertion of the eighth amendment for a variety of reasons (Anti-
Amendment Campaign, 1982). Muldowney (2015: 130) in her discussion of pro-
choice activism in Ireland in the 1980s noted ‘the anti-Amendment campaigners
were portrayed and for the most part saw themselves as the harbingers of a
more open, liberal society’. The Catholic Church still held a lot of power at this
time in Ireland, so these activists were brave in their opposition to the
amendment. The referendum passed with a 2:1 majority, meaning that the 8th
Amendment was added to the Irish Constitution. In her discussion of abortion
rulings in Ireland, Ciara Staunton (2011: 208) noted:

Prior to the passing of the Bill to amend the Constitution, the Attorney General
voiced his concern that the wording was ambiguous and would lead to confusion and
uncertainty among the medical profession, lawyers and judiciary.

It took 35 years for this amendment to be repealed, despite concerted pressure

from feminist activists in the intervening years. The Anti-Amendment
Campaign was understandably dejected after the Referendum. The next wave of
pro-choice activism was surrounding the X case in 1992, when the term “Repeal
the 8th” was first used. A 14 year old girl who had been raped and became
pregnant was forbidden to travel to England for an abortion by a court
injunction. She became suicidal, and at appeal in the Supreme Court it was
decided that she could be permitted to travel for an abortion because of the risk
to her life.
There were mass protests from both pro- and anti-choice activists in 1992. A
referendum in November 1992 enshrined the right to travel for an abortion, as
well as the right to information about abortion. The Irish Government did not
legislate for these situations despite sustained pressure from pro-choice
activists. Ruth Fletcher (1995) noted that many pro-choice activists had
suggested Irish women should tell their abortion stories, however ‘Irish society’s
negative view of abortion, which has developed without listening to women’s
words, now inhibits Irish women voicing their experience of abortion’ (1995:
63). Abortion was so stigmatised that people were reluctant to tell their stories
in the 1990s.
The latest wave of pro-choice activism began in 2012, when the death of Savita
Halappanavar resulted in renewed momentum. Savita Halappanavar was an
Indian woman living in Galway, who in 2012 experienced a miscarriage. When it
became clear that her foetus had no chance of survival, she and her husband
Praveen requested a termination of pregnancy. This request was denied, as
there was still a foetal heartbeat. Savita developed sepsis and died as a result of
the inaction of her doctors. Inquiries into the death afterwards found that the
8th Amendment resulted in a chilling effect which meant that doctors were
afraid to take action even when the life of the mother was at risk. Savita’s death
angered the Irish public, and precipitated a new wave of pro-choice activism.

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The Abortion Rights Campaign, and the Coalition to Repeal the 8th
Amendment, along with the National Women’s Council of Ireland put pressure
on the Irish Government to Repeal the 8th Amendment. Decisions from the
European Court of Human Rights also supported this, noting that Ireland was
contravening human rights protocols by not providing abortions when a
woman’s life was at risk. Enda Kenny, Taoiseach (Government leader) at the
time, recommended that the Citizens’ Assembly (a group of 99 citizens) look at
suggested changes to the abortion legislation. The Citizens’ Assembly
considered the issue from November 2016 to June 2017 and recommended
radical changes to the legislation. These recommendations were debated in both
houses of the government, and a referendum was announced in February 2018,
to take place in May 2018. This resulted in a frenzy of campaigning by pro-
choice activists.
On May 25th 2018, 66.4% of the Irish public voted Yes in a referendum to
“Repeal the 8th”. Legislation was enacted on 1st of January 2019, and abortion
services became available from then. There are still many issues with this
legislation, including a 12 week gestational limit for most abortions, a
mandatory three day waiting period, and barriers that migrant women face in
accessing abortion. Service provision varies across regions, with many doctors
and hospitals refusing to provide abortions. In the rest of the paper I will
discuss the research that I conducted into activists’ experiences of care within
the Repeal the 8th campaign. This was mostly focused on the latest wave of
activism (2012 0nwards), but some activists had been involved for decades
longer. I will begin by discussing my methodology and its limitations.

Methodology
Hemmings (2005: 121) notes that ‘nostalgia smoothes away the rough edges of
this particular history; an innocent essentialism can be seamlessly integrated
into a feminist progress narrative’. This is applicable to the Repeal campaign, as
it would be easy to reflect on the campaign as a complete success. While this is
one facet of the story, it does not preclude other more complicated factors. The
personal cost of change can be high, and through surveys and interviews I
hoped to document a variety of experiences that would contribute to the
complex story of the Repeal campaign. I circulated an online survey to activist
organisations, and received 221 responses. I completed nine oral history
interviews, all with women who were active with different organisations during
the Repeal campaign.
While reading the literature on activism and social movements research, I
became aware of autoethnography, and of its use as a feminist research
methodology. Autoethnography transforms ‘personal stories into political
realities’ (Ettorre, 2017: 2). With this in mind, I endeavoured to intertwine my
own personal story of the Repeal campaign with the stories of my interviewees
and survey respondents, and with the objective outcomes of the campaign. The
importance of storytelling as a feminist methodology exists here on several

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levels: the stories that were told during the campaign, the stories that
interviewees told me about their experiences, my story of the campaign, and
how they all intermingle to provide a complex and often contradictory story of
the Repeal campaign as it was experienced by the activists within it. In the next
section I will consider limitations to my research methodology.

Limitations
There were several limitations to my chosen methodology. Firstly, the survey
contained only one qualitative question, and many of the respondents noted
that they wanted to provide further information. Secondly, due to time
constraints only nine activists were interviewed. While this covered a cross
section of different activists, there were some groups who were not represented.
Ideally, I would have liked to interview multiple members of various
communities, as I do not think that one member of a community is
representative of the whole group. One of my interviewees, who has a disability
noted:

The experience of disability is so diverse, for me while I have experience of

mental health difficulties, vision impairment and blindness, and physical
impairment, there’s so much disability experience I don’t have, so it’s very
important that there isn’t just one voice at the table.

She made that comment in relation to committees and working groups, but it is
applicable to research projects also. Thus, while I tried to interview a variety of
people with different life experiences and viewpoints, it was not possible to
cover every group in society. I decided to interview only women due to my
limited time, so further research into the experiences of men involved in the
Repeal campaign would be enlightening. Throughout the surveys and
interviews, themes around self-care emerged. In the following section I will
discuss the first theme, which is differing practices of self-care.

Differing Practices of Self Care

Gender and generation
While analysing survey responses and interview transcripts it became apparent
that self-care was viewed and practised differently by activists within the
campaign. Gilligan (1995: 124) problematised the gendered association of
women with care, when care is framed as ‘an ethic of selflessness and self-
sacrifice’.
Interestingly, this idea was echoed by one of the survey respondents, when she
commented:

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Because the organisations were mostly made up of women, there was an expectation
that everyone would be “mothered” in some way … I believe this to be an internalised
sexist response where, as women, we are conditioned to feel entitled to unreasonable
amounts of emotional labour from each other. I believe this is a recurring problem in
women-led movements and should be critically analysed within movements so that
unreasonable expectations of quasi-maternal care from comrades can be mitigated.

Another activist and organiser who provided an in-depth comment on the survey
also raised this issue:

I think it's also interesting to consider the gendered element to this - because it
was women led, we were possibly better at considering care, but also was the
expectation of care higher because we were women led?

These comments raise interesting questions about the gendered lens through
which we view women’s rights movements. It is possible that social movements
made up primarily of men, or with a balance of men and women, would not be
expected to provide care to their activists.
Another interesting comment which suggested a generational difference in
attitudes to self care was the following, which was made by an older activist who
has campaigned since 1983:

To be honest the focus on self-care amongst some of the younger activists

involved was quite amusing and at times frustrating as they had to go to yoga or
mindfulness sessions rather than campaign and canvas.

Another respondent noted that she hadn’t realised how much of an issue self-
care was for younger activists, suggesting that generational differences might
have presented in a variety of organisations. A comparative study of older versus
younger activists’ experiences or expectations of care within social movements
could be an area of further study. In the next section I will consider individual
differences in approaches to self-care.

Individual differences
It was clear when analysing survey responses and interview transcripts that
people had varying ideas of what self-care looked like for them, for example one
activist who is based in Northern Ireland noted:

A lot of sea-swimming went on during Repeal as well in Donegal, a lot of us just

needed to get in the sea. So I do think that nature, and tapping into our inner
Celtic goddesses and all … it was earthy, for me anyway, really earthy and in

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touch with something more primal, which is maybe where I drew a lot of strength
from as well.

Thus, for this activist, self-care was a spiritual endeavour, which helped her feel
connected to her past, and also energised her for the campaign. Another activist
spoke of more hedonistic ways of practising self care:

Drugs and alcohol! [laughing]. My need to unwind was growing exponentially

with the amount of work that I was doing… So if I’m carrying a lot of stress, I have
to relax that much harder. So that for me is super indulgent, it’s music and
getting a buzz on, it’s just really immersive, losing myself in music and dancing
and stuff like that. At the end of every single night. That’s what I found, I’d be
going home and I would need like four hours at the end of every night to go
somewhere else.

This quote really highlighted for me how personal self-care is, and how much it
differs from person to person. Another activist, who now campaigns with a
group of women with disabilities, noted that following the Repeal campaign, her
group are cognisant of minding themselves and each other:

It’s not just about your workload personally, it’s about where your energy levels
are at, we’re very conscious of trying to mind ourselves and mind each other, I
suppose because we were born out of the whole Repeal thing, and it was very
traumatic for a lot of us, that self-preservation, minding each other, minding
ourselves is at the heart of everything we do… Yeah, it’s a serious focus because I
think we all got burned. We learned in the trenches, and it’s like ok, going
forward this is something we really need to be conscious of.

Thus, this organisation learnt the importance of caring for each other, and how
it should be a primary focus for activist groups. One area in which some groups
succeeded more than others was in assisting members with practicalities such as
childcare and transport. I will discuss this further in the next section.

Practicalities
Motta et al. (2011) considered care as it applied to women’s movements. They
questioned whether movements consider the individual needs of activists, and also
what organisational practicalities allow or prevent certain people from participating
in organisations e.g. childcare, time of meetings etc. (Motta et al., 2011). In my
research, many activists noted that practical support from their organisations
allowed them to be active in the Repeal campaign. One activist, who is a single
mother and a migrant noted:

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Yeah, there’s that solidarity within MERJ [Migrants and Ethnic minorities for
Reproductive Justice], we know that we have other challenges, so we looked after
each other. So say for example if there’s a meeting in Dublin, most of the girls will
make sure that I get a bus ticket, a place to stay over, they understand that I’m a
single mother, you know? Just my struggles as a migrant woman, who has no
family support.

The fact that her colleagues understood the challenges she faced, and tried to
mitigate them by providing material support allowed her to be an active
member of the group. Similarly, an activist in another group noted “I think as a
parent for me, sometimes I needed to be able to bring my kids to meetings and
stuff, and that was ok”. The knowledge that her group was receptive to children
made it easier for her to maintain her activism.
Another practical aspect of caring within activism was clear communication
between organisation members. Good working relationships allowed activists to
communicate clearly with each other, and to be mindful of each other’s
boundaries and limitations, as was expressed by one of the interviewees:

We worked really well together. And I think that was really important, there was
no big egos or expectations, we constantly communicated, and we knew if
someone had something on, or needed some time away, that was accepted, and
that was the way it was. So I think that was the main thing, communicating well,
and taking personal responsibility for not burning yourself out, and I think we all
had to do that.

Thus, good group dynamics allowed activists to care for themselves and each
other. This is a good example of the relationship between organisational and
personal sustainability, as the structures put in place by the members of the
organisation allowed the group to function at its optimum level, while ensuring
that all members were cared for personally also.
Another practical area that a lot of activists mentioned was food, and the
difficulty of cooking when activists were so busy in the campaign. One activist
mother noted “I think we all gained a good few pounds, and had plenty of
burning dinners while you’re trying to work, and you’re on your phone, yeah it
was very intense.” In a similar vein, another activist noted:

I don’t think I cooked for myself once. If it wasn’t for my best friend being like
“Come eat”, or just turning up with food, like I was eating a pack of biscuits in the
car for dinner. Eighteen months ago I was two and a half stone lighter.

This shows how the practical and routine aspects of people’s daily lives were
disrupted by their involvement in the campaign, and how this affected their

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health. It also speaks to the importance of social networks, which I will discuss
further in the next section.

Social networks
Many of the activists who I interviewed spoke about the importance of support
from their social networks. This included husbands, partners, families, and
friends. As one activist, who is a migrant said:

I was saying to someone, they were saying how do you get on with all those things
that you’re doing, I said I’m relying on my social networks, otherwise I would
have long collapsed. What keeps me going is my social networks and the support
that is there. And if I didn’t have that, I wouldn’t be doing what I’m doing.

This quote encapsulates the importance of social networks, they provide support
and encouragement when activists need it. Another activist noted that she relied
on her social networks for practical childcare when it was not appropriate to
bring her children with her:

When we started the canvassing I set up with my girls’ dad that there was one
night a week that he was always going to take them for the duration of the
campaign, and then that was going to be my night to go canvassing, and obviously
then towards the end of the campaign, when we were out maybe four nights a
week, I just relied on friends to help out with childcare.

Another activist noted her husband had to take on more caring responsibilities
than he would usually have, to allow her the time to be active in the campaign:

My husband was a really good support, like brilliant, so he was taking over
minding the kids, I mean I was still breastfeeding around the clock but yeah, he
just stepped in, and knew this was important, and let me off with it.

Thus all of these activists benefited from the strong social networks that they
had built up outside of their activist circles. It is clear that there is an overlap
between the efforts made at self care, the practical support offered both within
organisations and outside them, and the support that activists received from
their social networks. Unfortunately, many groups found that the urgency of the
campaign pushed caring for oneself and one’s colleagues into second place. I
will discuss this further below.

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Attitudes to work versus self-care in movement culture

There were external constraints that set limits to the movement’s capacity to
balance productivity with care, especially the short time frame between the
announcement of the referendum and the date of referendum. This meant
activists had an enormous work to do in a short time frame not set by them.
While this was one element of the overwork that activists experienced, there was
also a sense that the movement culture expected overwork. Individual activists
dealt with this differently, some thrived. Downton and Wehr investigated traits
that allowed some activists to persist in social movements, and noted that "they
got a 'second wind'… For a renewal of commitment of this kind, the new
challenge had to be met with a sense of inner motivation" (1997: 108). Many of
the activists I interviewed noted that their motivation was so strong, it sustained
them throughout the campaign. One activist encapsulated this when she said:

I think what kept me going was that I’m making a difference, I’m making a
difference to someone’s life, it might not be seen immediately, but along the line.
Yes, it was very stressful, very stressful, and also to be told “this is not your
country, it’s not your issue” was very stressful.

She went on to say that despite the racism and misogyny she faced, she had to
continue, because “this is a fight that I have to fight for my people”. Another
interviewee, who is a doctor and long time advocate for reproductive choice
noted:

It was never hard because there was loads happening, the sheer momentum of it,
in that you’d be wrecked by it, but it won’t go on forever, it is a once-in-a-lifetime
event.

Thus her awareness of the importance and historic nature of the campaign
allowed this activist to stay motivated, even when she was exhausted. I will
investigate further how activists stayed involved in the campaign, and what
contributed to their personal and collective sustainability.
Barry and Dordevic (2007) wrote a book about human rights activists and their
ability to sustain themselves. They noted:

Quite simply, rest seems selfish. It's the context. How could anyone take a break,
take time for themselves, when all around them others are suffering? When there
is so much work to be done? When everyone around you expects you to work
without stopping… (Barry and Dordevic, 2007: 26).

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This quote resonated with me, as it encapsulated my own experience during the
campaign, and echoed the attitudes of many of my survey respondents and
interviewees. Do activists put pressure on themselves to keep working in the
face of burnout? Or is there a collective pressure applied by other activists
within the movement? An in-depth analysis of the contributing factors to
burnout is outside the scope of this article, but I have discussed some of the
barriers to care in the following paragraphs. The main barrier mentioned by
interviewees and survey respondents was the lack of time for self-care. One
interviewee noted:

So self-care is very paramount, but also it becomes the last thing on your mind as
well, because you are so struggling just to have that time until something major
happens and you think oh I have to look after myself.

This interviewee knew on an intellectual level how important self-care is, but
highlighted the reality that when activists are in the midst of a frantic campaign,
care is often relegated to the end of one’s list of priorities. Another interviewee
evoked the frantic nature of the campaign when she said:

There was zero self-care during it, none. And there were reminders, you know, be
kind to yourself, remember to take time for yourself, but there is no time, there is
no time, I can’t.

This relates to the external factors noted at the start of this section, external
time constraints made it difficult to prioritise self-care. One survey respondent
noted that this was the case in her experience also:

Although organisations talked about the importance of balance and looking after
your mental health there was very little time for practice but even short debriefs
and cups of tea after canvasses helped.

Thus, while there was no time for organised activities, even short conversations
and shared beverages were seen to positively impact on campaigners. However,
one survey respondent also noted that they had a lack of personnel for
organising self-care: “The entire organisation of our regional campaign fell to
two individuals who were already stretched; should those two have organised
self-care days too?”
Kennelly (2014) studied the interactions of global justice activists in Canada, who
were engaged in anti-globalisation, antipoverty, anti-colonialism and anti-war
organising. She found that young women put a lot of pressure on themselves to care
for their fellow activists, as well as continuing all of their organising work. She
noted that this pressure often led to burnout:

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Amongst the women, I noted professions of an overwhelming – at times even

crippling – sense of responsibility and culpability. They regularly commented on the
powerful sway of negative emotions (feeling upset, outraged, angry) acting as both
motivators and self-flagellation devices for their activism. In both field observations
and interviews, I witnessed their tense negotiation between ‘caring for self’ and
‘caring for others’. (Kennelly, 2014: 243).

Laurence Cox (2011) noted that there can be ‘features of movement culture that
directly contribute to burnout. Some of these have to do with the importation of
productivist and / or patriarchal attitudes to work into movement contexts’
(2011: 14). One of the activists who responded to the survey noted this
phenomenon during her work on the campaign, and especially during reflection
after the campaign:

I also felt very much that in TFY [Together for Yes] (and in ARC [Abortion Rights
Campaign], to a lesser extent), there was a culture of busy-ness and egoic burnout
- as in, if you were tired and stressed and overworked, that meant you were an
amazing activist and deserved praise for it. I think it is a dangerous territory to
give someone praise for working themselves to the ground… It's a delicate subject
matter because in one way, of course people deserve support and praise for all the
hard work they've put in, but in another way, if we praise and value people
working themselves to the bone, aren't we just continuing to propagate a
patriarchal, capitalist culture, where "more work = better" and "taking time for
reflection and care = weakness?".

This activist had reflected deeply on the culture within the main Repeal
organisations. Her insight suggests that even within activist groups who aim for
anarchist or socialist organisational structures, the neoliberal focus on overwork
and achieving goals persists. As feminist organisers we must endeavour to
operate in a way that rejects neoliberal and patriarchal organising, to create a
more caring system. It is clear that this was not achieved for many activists
during the Repeal campaign. One of the interviewees noted the level of
overwork that she put herself through, and how it impacted on her health:

I was putting all of my energy, 24 hours, into this. So I wasn’t sleeping, anxiety
attacks, severe depression, but this was really important and I just knew that I
had to do it. So it wasn’t healthy, I wasn’t coping, but I didn’t feel like I had a
choice.

It is clear that this activist was not operating at a sustainable level, and this had
lasting consequences for her health. The absence of self-care was a significant
contributing factor to this outcome.

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Sharing personal stories versus protecting self

Another area that impacted on a lot of the activists was the campaign strategy of
sharing personal stories. Quesney (2015) wrote about the campaign for abortion
rights in Ireland, and noted that ‘speaking out in a hostile environment is an act
of bravery not many women are prepared to undertake, and nor should they be
expected to’ (2015: 160). While nobody forced women to share their story, a lot
of women chose to share the traumatic impact of the 8th Amendment. Sharing
personal stories was a particular type of campaign work which led to people
experiencing trauma. One campaigner eloquently noted:

The problem was that traumatised women were forced to rip open their old scars
and bleed in public, to put their most private business on full display, to watch as
other women did the same, in order to beg people to vote for them to be legally
human. There's no amount of self-care that could make that OK.

This sentiment was echoed by a number of respondents. The strategy to tell

personal stories was successful, it made clear the extent of the problems with
the 8th Amendment, but it had a lasting impact on a lot of the activists who
shared their stories. Another responded noted that “you gave a bit of yourself
away at each door, at each debate, at each stall. Endlessly telling your truth to
them, giving your hurt to them”. This response highlighted the visceral impact
that the campaign strategy of telling personal stories had on the women who
shared their own stories. Future campaigns will need to consider whether the
work of telling personal stories can be balanced with collective care, so as to
avoid trauma for the story tellers. I will consider collective care further in the
next section.

Shifting focus from self-care to collective care

Sara Ahmed, following Audre Lorde, spoke about the political work of creating
caring communities:

Self-care is about the creation of community, fragile communities, assembled out

of the experiences of being shattered. We re-assemble ourselves through the
ordinary, everyday and often painstaking work of looking after ourselves; looking
after each other. (Ahmed, 2014).

It became clear through the course of my surveys and interviews that

emphasising self-care was not sufficient to maintain activists’ wellbeing during
the Repeal campaign. There has to be a focus on collective care in social
movements if activists are to be able to continue their feminist activism. Nina
Nijsten (2011: 222) noted that ‘activism shouldn’t be self-sacrifice. Feminist
activists have the responsibility to look after each other and make sure we don’t

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get discouraged’. Similarly, Mountz et al. (2015: 1251) remarked that ‘a feminist
ethics of care is personal and political, individual and collective. We must take
care of ourselves before we can take care of others. But we must take care of
others’.
When analysing the results of the survey, it became clear to me that people’s
awareness of self or collective care was not always matched by the resources
available for this care, and that this differed across organisations. To highlight
this, 61.5% of respondents thought that there was sufficient emphasis on caring
for oneself and others during the campaign. Only 44.3% of respondents said
that their organisations arranged self-care activities for campaigners. One
activist who worked in the national office noted:

Efforts were made to promote care - there was a dedicated helpline available from
the IFPA [Irish Family Planning Association], we did our best to check in with
each other, a wonderful human organised yoga and chair massage, I did my best
to flag care with canvassing groups.

It is worth noting that many of the official care activities were scheduled in
Dublin (capital city of the Republic of Ireland), making it difficult for regional
activists to attend. Some organisations provided support within their own
groups, one activist noted that they “had a wellness team of trained counsellors
on hand to support our volunteers and organising team”. Other activists took it
upon themselves to support the activists in their group, like the activist who
commented:

I feel like I stressed to other people the need for basic self care and made sure
plenty of water and fruit was available. I did not pressure people to attend and
reassured them if they had to cancel. I checked in with people who I knew had a
hard time e.g. antis shouting at them.

Thus, it appears that the efforts made at collective care varied across groups.
Feminist organisers should consider embedding collective care within their
activism from the start of campaigns, so that burnout can be avoided, and
activists can continue to fight for reproductive justice, and other social justice
issues.

Conclusion
In this article I have investigated and documented the experiences of activists
involved in the Repeal the 8th campaign. I utilised a combination of surveys, in-
depth interviews, and autoethnography to collect data, and then I used thematic
analysis to identify common themes among campaigners. I discussed these
themes further with reference to the social movements literature, situating these

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experiences within the global abortion rights movement, but also within social
justice movements more widely.
Oral history and ethnographies are valuable, because “so many of the actors are
still on the stage” (Muldowney, 2015: 142). By documenting the experiences of
these women, I have given activists a chance to tell their stories. Ireland was a
beacon of light in challenging times for reproductive rights globally. Ordinary
people were the lifeblood of this campaign, and by working together, they made
extraordinary things happen. One of the survey respondents summed up the
enormity of what we achieved:

I think we should not lose sight of what we did - we carried a referendum by

66.4%, we were a beacon of hope in a world where reproductive rights are being
rowed back. I know people have enduring pain from the campaign - damaged or
broken relationships, health issues, financial issues and unresolved trauma. But
we changed Ireland. We changed our constitution. We gave a generation of young
women female role models, we gave thousands of people (mainly women) a taste
of activism and of politics, we did what everyone was so busy telling us we could
not do.

In this article I focused on care within the Repeal campaign. I looked at the
differing practices of self-care among activists, the movement culture of work
versus self-care, and the need to move from self-care to collective care. One of
the implications of lack of self-care for social movements is that ‘instead of
figuring out ways to take care of ourselves and each other, social justice groups
lose brilliant and committed activists to burnout, disillusionment and poor
health’ (Plyler, 2006: 123). Feminist research requires practical applications.
Increased care towards one another is essential for continued feminist activism.
One interviewee, who is a sex worker, noted that we need to create space for the
messiness of real life. Feminist activists need to create space, and endeavour to
care for each other within that space. As Mac and Smith (2018: 6) succinctly say
“caring for each other is political work”. By committing to engage in care-full
activism, we will be able to continue to work towards a more socially just world
for all.

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Cooper, Davina 2007. ‘`Well, you go there to get off’: Visiting feminist care
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Margaret Walton-Roberts, Ranu Basu, Risa Whitson, Roberta Hawkins, Trina
Hamilton, and Winifred Curran 2015. ‘For slow scholarship: A feminist politics
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About the author

Doris Murphy completed her MA in Women’s Studies in University College
Cork, Ireland. Her thesis focused on the experiences of reproductive rights
campaigners during the recent campaign to legalise abortion in Ireland, and
underlying structures supporting feminist activism. Doris was the co-founder of
Pro-Choice Wexford, a regional group which campaigned for abortion rights.
Doris will complete her PhD research in University College Cork, exploring sex
work and care through Participatory Action Research. She is an ardent
supporter of the decriminalisation of sex work, and of full labour rights for sex
workers. She also supports the abolition of Direct Provision, a system which
segregates and incarcerates asylum seekers in Ireland. Doris advocates for full
rights and appropriate healthcare for trans people. She provides space for
marginalised people to tell their own stories, and is open to collaboration on
projects in this area. She is an experienced group facilitator, presenter, and
provides freelance transcription services. She is a qualified Speech and
Language Therapist. She can be contacted at dormurf AT hotmail.com

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Volume 12 (1): 437 – 463 (July 2020) Kolluoglu, A 21st century “repertoire”

A 21st century “repertoire”: affective and urban

mobilization dynamics of the Gezi Commune
Poyraz Kolluoglu1

Abstract
This paper presents a deeper first-hand understanding of the post-2010
collective action forms by proposing “repertoire” as an analytical tool. In
doing so, it primarily aims to bring a critical perspective on normative and
culture-focused approaches to the 21st-century activism that tend to take
various aspects of mobilization processes for granted. By questioning how
participants “remember” their movements from a critical insider point of view
and relying on an ethnographic analysis of Istanbul’s Gezi Park protests of
2013, this paper also sheds light on the ways in which the protest repertoires
are adopted and performed in demonstrations spaces wherein they are first
applied as well.

Keywords: #occupygezi, occupy movements, Gezi, repertoire, commune, Paris

Commune, memory, affect, neoliberal metropolis, mobilization,

“Could one speak of a statement if a voice had not articulated it, if a surface did
not bear its signs, if it had not become embodied in a sense-perceptible element,
and if it had not left some trace —if only for an instant—in someone's memory
or in some space?” (Foucault 1972).

This paper presents a deeper first-hand understanding of the post-2010

collective action forms by proposing “repertoire” as an analytical tool. In doing
so, it primarily aims to bring a critical perspective on normative and culture-
focused approaches to the 21st-century activism that tend to take many aspects
of mobilization processes for granted. By questioning how participants
“remember” their movements from a critical insider point of view and relying on
an ethnographic analysis of Istanbul’s Gezi Park protests of 2013, this paper also
sheds light on the ways in which the popular protest repertoires are adopted and
performed in demonstration spaces wherein they are first applied as well.
New forms of sustained mobilization patterns of the 21st century
characteristically include heterogeneous crowds that are mobilized with

1 This research would not be possible without those who bravely agree to participate in it. I would
additionally like to thank Richard Day for teaching me the activist research principles and showing the
most necessary theoretical tools to analyze and understand the occupy movements. Without him, I could
not learn humility and be a face in the photograph. To Susan Lord, Deniz Yukseker and Ugur Tekin, for all
their supports during my most difficult times. I would also like to thank respectively Graham Ferguson,
Lily Cuthbertson Amanda White for staying in touch with me during all this writing process.

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affective sensoria, along with an inclination to occupy the symbolically strategic

sites in the neoliberal metropolis. Segmented multitudes temporarily taking
control of public spaces of global cities, I suggest, is a distinctive peculiarity of
the 21st-century social protest “repertoire.” And I characterize this new modular
form of social protest as the commune repertoire because, as will be shown
below, the common grievances, emotions and particularly memories of the
Turkish protesters frame the Gezi uprising of 2013 around the nostalgic
imaginary of 1871 uprising in Paris rather than contemporary exemplary cases,
which would be more comparable to the incident itself.
Since its debut scholars, as well as activists on the ground, have put forward
different interpretations regarding the pros and cons of this protest form what is
commonly known as the “occupy” strategy. While some critiques, which are
more inclined to rely on mainstream sociological analysis, draw attention to its
short lifespan and the apathy among “occupiers” regarding practical social and
political gains, other discussions, especially those leaning toward more
autonomous-activist based approaches, point out that the power of occupation
comes from its peculiar anarchistic nature. The latter camp suggests that the
action in and on itself provides the dissident multitudes with both a common
physical site and shared opposition rhetoric by identifying the public with the
common people instead of the state. They also add that the shared space and the
common cause protestors embrace simultaneously enable the occupiers to forge
new social relations alternative to state hegemony in these short-breathed
resistance enclaves. What all these critiques have in common is their emphasis
on the fact that the "occupation" of public spaces has become one of the most
widespread protest tactics on a global scale following the 2008 financial crises
and the Arab Spring (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 301,311; Calhoun, 2013, p. 5; Farro and
Lustiger-Thaler, 2014; Gibson, 2013, pp. 342–343; Iranzo and Farné, 2013;
Ross, 2015, p. 15; Tejerina et al., 2013, p. 378,382).
Without a doubt, the occupation practices, which were actually used pretty
often in Italian factories and American university campuses in the 1960s and
1970s in micro contexts, did not arrive in the contemporary world protest stage
out of the blue. It has been noted in several studies that the so-called Arab
Spring actually wove the different threads of the anti-globalization struggles of
the early 2000s and their daily occupy strategies into a new and distinct form,
enduringly seen in Cairo (Kamrava, 2014, p. 66; Leveille, 2017, p. 100; Shihade
et al., 2012, p. 5; Velut, 2015, p. 37) by staging a successful occupy performance
in episodic forms that lasted about over a year. It can, therefore, be argued that
Madrid, London, and Zuccotti Park in Lower Manhattan respectively attempted
to take their anti-globalization struggle one step further with the excitement
heightened by the fall of a Middle Eastern dictatorial regime against all the odds
in the early 2010s. I would further argue that defiant demonstrators in Kyiv's
Independence Square (Euromaidan) and the streets of Hong-Kong in 2014
attempted to emulate the same collective performance despite the peculiar
characteristics of their own political ecosystems. Last year, Hongkongers
smartly shifted the site of action from streets and squares to strategic
transportation hubs and commercial zones following the controversial

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extradition bill of 2019 as if paying homage to the Seattle’s WTO protests. Thus,
the occupy strategy and its derivations have reached a point wherein they can be
observed at multiple sites of the global protest scene within a particular time
frame regardless of the nature of local regime space, be it liberal-democratic,
authoritarian or semi-authoritarian like Turkey, Ukraine Hong-Kong. In this
regard, it would not be entirely wrong to suggest occupy has become a major
component of a single “cycle of contention” (Tarrow, 1993). A global contention
that takes place between the agents of neoliberal globalization, that is
authoritarian or pseudo-liberal political state apparatuses, and multitudes
mostly made by precariat classes that are reflexively jumping off from the
bottom, in the way Hardt and Negri depicted in their meticulous historical
analyses (Hardt and Negri, 2005, 2000). But is it literally accurate to
characterize this mobilization strategy as occupy form both an empirical and
normative perspective, as well as the collective action groups that perform it as
multitudes, crowds, or as occupy movements as if they are entirely different
from their antecedents?

Theory
Without a doubt, the occupy movements display different features from the
working-class movements of the past centuries, as well as they differentiate
from the new social movements of the past decades in terms of class
composition and site of action. While new social movements were more male,
white-middle class-oriented and peculiar to Western Europe and North
America, today’s occupiers are socially more diverse and their life-world is
defined by the dynamics that transcend the boundaries of the nation-state (Day,
2005, p. 102). Nonetheless, most scholars also point out that the occupy
movements share certain characteristics with new social movements in terms of
addressing a wide range of social, political, and cultural issues that cannot be
reduced to a single line of conflict. The diversification of motivational reasons
has led scholars leaning to this position to emphasize the “intersectional”
systems of political and social injustices in the immediate aftermath of
occupiers’ retreat with a nuanced terminology accordingly. (Collins and Bilge,
2016, pp. 136–158; Özkırımlı, 2014, p. 3; Tejerina et al., 2013, pp. 384–385).
Through the prism of intersectionality, the scholars of this canon suggest that
each group involved in the “movement”, be it feminists, communists, anarchists,
environmentalists or the LGBTQ community, come to the site of occupation
with their own specific ideological agenda, as well as social and cultural
grievances peculiar to their own subject positioning in the social cosmos. In
search of common themes that can depict these different groups and identities
in the same picture, the intersectionality approaches understandably direct the
attention to sort of an empty signifier, a common denominator that takes the
form of a dictatorial regime or global financial actors, as well as to the political,
social and economic injustices that these power nodes cause. Collective
identities which shape the mobilization agendas have, therefore, naturally been
highlighted in a processual framework in these accounts from a culturalist

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perspective, which comes along with a strong normative critique of global

political economy (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 301; Bamyeh and Hanafi, 2015, p. 344;
Gitlin, 2013, pp. 4–14; Smaldone, 2015).
I share a certain amount of sympathy with these culturalist and normative-
based analyses, most of which are usually articulated from an exciting critical
activist-academic perspective. I would nonetheless argue that since they have
inclinations toward relying on participant-observation methodologies and
negating meta-theories, these narrations which just seem to be celebrating the
state of being together on a semantic ground are deprived of directing
formulated, refined and precise answers to the question of why these previously
disconnected actors and groups come together under a common protest scheme.
More importantly, since researchers and participants share the same lifeworld
to a certain extent, that is the lifeworld of activism, these culturalist-activist
based approaches take many questionable and researchable dimensions of
occupy movements for granted. First and foremost, they do not thoroughly
investigate how protesters themselves give meaning to their own positionality
within the cycle of global contention. Do occupies really think and imagine the
protest tactic they use on the ground as the occupy strategy? Are they truly
emulating this protest form after seeing its successful performances in other
parts of the world? What kind of associations and analogies they use to express
their own occupy encampment? In this regard, I would argue that approaching
the post-2010 protest scenery in and through repertoire will enable us to answer
such questions, thereby providing the researcher with a narrative potential to
generate analyses alternative to critical cultural accounts and normative
critiques. The repertoire manages to accomplish such a theoretical feat because
it forces the researcher to pinpoint the place of imaginations, perceptions,
emotions, and particularly memories (Beinin and Vairel, 2013, p. 15) of
protesters within a grand protest cycle.
The concept of repertoire is a fairly complex and open-ended analytical tool.
Charles Tilly considered one of the leading scholars in the field and the creator
of the concept, defines the repertoire as “learned” and “shared” “cultural
creations” that express the recurrent patterns of socio-political mobilization
within a limited set of alternatives (Tilly, 2015, pp. 42–43, 2008, p. 121, 2008,
p. 390, 1993, pp. 264–265). This is not to say, nonetheless, that we may
characterize all the repetitive protest forms as repertoires. Repertoires should be
“contagious” elements and one way or another they have to be transmitted
across the different nodes of a politically connected protest stage (usually a
nation-state for Tilly). This transmission process usually becomes possible by
various telecommunication means such as pamphlets, brochures as well as more
contemporary mediums like media (Tilly, 2005, p. 13, 1978, p. 158; Tilly and
Tarrow, 2015, p. 188).
Tilly suggests that generally a successful, “innovative” and “improvisational”
performance made by a small group of protesters, as happened in the case of
Black counter sit-ins the Southern United States before the rise of civil rights
movements, motivates and inspires other dissidents who share more or less

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similar grievances and political concerns to stage a similar resistance (Tilly,

2010, pp. 34–35, 2008, p. 68; Traugott, 1995, p. 44). Right after a successful
innovation sets an example and “impress” others, Tilly points out that the
protest performance becomes more open to adaptation and modulation through
“word of mouth” (Tilly, 2010, p. 41) in addition to telecommunication means.
Despite highlighting the role of media channels and discourse in the diffusion
processes of protest forms, Tilly acknowledges that “exactly how people draw on
contentious repertoires remains a controversial variable” (Tilly, 2010, p. 34-35).
As a scholar who likes looking at big temporal intervals with historical sociology
lenses Tilly understandably refrains from clearly specifying the dialogical
cultural mechanisms by which the protest repertoires diffuse in a political
milieu he calls “regime space” (Tilly, 2010, p. 39), which for him is usually in a
state of flux because of state-making processes and arising/demising
opportunities2. To animate these cultural aspects of the protest action he makes
use of metaphorical expressions such as "jazz" (Tilly, 2010, pp. 34–35, 1993, pp.
264–265; Tilly and Tarrow, 2015, p. 183) and metaphysical human practices
like rituals (Tilly, 1978, p. 158; Tilly and Tilly, 2013, pp. 33–37). "Like their
theatrical counterparts, repertoires of collective action…designate interaction
among pair or larger sets of actors" he adds on such analogies to emphasize the
intersubjectively performed elements of social mobilization (Tilly, 1993, p. 265).
As seen, Tilly’s regime-repertoire model is fairly complex since it navigates
analytical terrain that lies between culture and structure. Perhaps it is through
this multi-vectored conceptual framework that Tilly masterfully succeeds to
conceptualize human acts amid protest action along with structural and political
ingredients despite he never had the chance to make first-hand observations in
an activist manner on the ground. Nonetheless, Tilly himself and the school of
thought he represents, that is, the political process theories, have received a fair
amount of criticisms for overlooking “emotions,” as well as micro-mobilizations
dynamics because of the so-called “structural bias” (Goodwin and Jasper, James
M., 2004) in their analyses. Against such critiques, Tilly responded by
explaining that the main contours of his models “spanned the entire range from

2Like many of his generations, Tilly utilized the epistemological and methodological
understanding of historical sociology, which was the rising scholarly trend back in the late 1960s
and 1970s (Smith, 1991), to observe the transition of social protest repertoires from more
parochial forms to national ones (Tilly and Tilly, 2013, pp. 390–392). Within this longitudinal
approach, for Tilly, it is generally through “improvisational performances” (Tilly, 2010, p. 34;
Tilly and Tarrow, 2015, p. 188)2 that a social protest repertoire diffuse to other relevant protest
settings, and all the innovations and improvisational protest tactics at micro-level crystalize as a
result of democratic openings in what he calls "regime space" (Tilly, 2010, p. 25, 2008, pp. 4–
12) at the macro level. Tilly's regime space is quite a Machiavellian and dynamic political arena
that constantly oscillates under state-making and national market processes in temporality.
Because of the dynamic nature of the political ecosystem, "opportunities" rise and demise in a
constant fashion for dissident actors to make social and political gains (Tilly, 2010, p. 211, 1978,
pp. 8,223-234; Tilly and Tarrow, 2015, p. 45). Thereforeö dissidents constantly modify the
repertoires in an "unceasing" fashion with a formula, which blends rational aspirations for
politics/social rights with spontaneously developed cultural modifications, in the course of
action (Tilly, 1978, pp. 7–8; Tilly and Tarrow, 2015, p. 158; Tilly and Tilly, 2013, p. 390).

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individual interactions to whole revolutions…no single unit of observation has

priority” (Tilly, 2010, p. 46).
I think what causes problems in Tilly’s model is not the intense structural-
political focal point he utilizes but his persistence in seeing and placing the
repertoires within the nation-state context. Since he built his entire model on
historical evidence extracted from the French revolutions and democratic
demands made by the common people in industrializing Britain and its colonies
across the Atlantic, he is understandably more inclined to cook the repertoire
within the container of the emerging nation-state of the 19th and 20th centuries.
Yet with a little touch of discourse and media analyses, recent studies have
salvaged the concept from the dark depths of the nation-state by shedding light
on the cultural transmission mechanisms Tilly was hesitant to his finger on. In
such more contemporary analyses, repertoires appear to be gas particulates not
only oscillating within the nebula of the nation-state which is caught in the
push-pull forces caused by structural and political processes, but they are more
depicted as solid molecules that are capable of independently moving across a
global spatiotemporally via dramatic live footages, images, and public
discourses. Michael Biggs’ meticulous media analysis that demonstrates how the
suicide protests spread across the world following the death of a Vietnamese
monk who set himself on fire in front of cameras to protest the pro-Western
government policies, for instance, show us the ways in which protest repertoires
can be transmitted via press and communication means independent of
national-political structures. And I would argue his study constitutes a perfect
example for understanding the repertoire outside of national political milieu
besides a few similar studies (Andrews and Biggs, 2006; Biggs, 2013; Braun,
2011; Koopmans and Olzak, 2004; Myers, 2000).
In his later studies, Tilly himself also acknowledged the power of
telecommunication means in a visually wired world (W. Tennant 2013, 121) yet
interestingly still in relation to national democratic demands and politics rather
than the concept of repertoire itself. “Today, mass media have made the
performances of social movement—especially their demonstrations—so visible
through the world that dissidents in nondemocratic regimes often emulate their
forms” he once noted (Tilly, 2010, p. 186; Tilly and Tarrow, 2015, p. 30)3 with a
euro-centric approach right before the aftershocks of the Arab Spring shook
Continental Europe and North America.
Without a doubt, the rise of smartphone technologies and mobile computing
have carried the interactive world Tilly acknowledged one step further. These
new pocket-sized gadgets not only seem to have accelerated and amplified

3 Tilly exemplified the transitional connections of social mobilization by addressing how the
Rose Revolution in Georgia was triggered by an American documentary followed by the
dissidents who were in close touch with Serbian activists. What should be noted in this context
is the fact that the documentaries showing the fall of a long-lasting dictatorship regime in Egypt
by cross-class and cross-cultural alliance set the motion of a new form social protest form, but in
a reverse way, that is, from the so-called Orient to the Occident, as I pointed out in the
introductory section.

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mobilization processes on the ground but also remarkably allow protesters on

the far corners of the world to communicate with one another even outside the
channels of mass media and transnational activist networks in a direct and
instant way. Perhaps more than ever, I would argue, social protest repertoires
have become more open to emulation, adaptation, and modulation on a global
scale than Tilly could ever imagine. As a result, it is not surprising to see an
exponential increase in studies that discuss the role of social media with respect
to mobilization activities and changing nature of transnational activist
connections especially following the reverberations of the Arab Spring (Cole,
2014; Gerbaudo, 2012; Olorunnisola and Martin, 2013; Shaked, 2017; Trottier
and Fuchs, 2015; Tufekci, 2017). Given that each millisecond of eventful
protests can be recorded and globally shared via new communication
technologies, digital matrixes and global news sources, one can indeed assume
that dramatic scenes displaying the successful performance of occupation in
Tahrir Square offers, on a global platform, a model for protesters who took to
the streets and gathered in public spaces of other global cities (Tejerina et al.,
2013, p. 384).

Methodology
With precisely this assumption and problematic in mind, in the late spring of
2014, I conducted ethnographic field research on one of the most recent
examples of the 21st-century movements, that is the so-called #occupygezi, to
throw light on the transmission mechanisms of what I first imagined as the
occupy repertoire then. In other words, through an ethnographic exploration of
this unique protest event in Turkey's history, I questioned whether
demonstrators in Istanbul adopted today’s most prevalent global protest
strategy, which seemed to be diffusing from one corner of the world to another,
to their own protest culture and political eco-system via new media
technologies. More specifically, I investigated if the Turkish protestors truly
draw inspiration from the visuals of Tahrir Square, the Occupy movement of
New York, or other similar eventful protests before taking to the streets. If so,
what was the source lying beneath this transmission mechanism? I would argue
that such an inquiry was definitely necessary from a Tillean methodological
point of view, given that his “repeated calls for empirical modification or
falsification” with respect to the basic transmission mechanisms of the
repertoire have not been sufficiently answered (Biggs, 2013, p. 407; Tilly, 2008,
p. xiv). Besides this main area of inquiry while continuing my fieldwork another
key question had preoccupied me as well: was the decision to participate in Gezi
given in a more rational manner or emerged more in response to emotional
motivational reasons that surfaced in the course of action? In a nutshell, I pitted
emotions/culture against structures/politics in order to provide a few empirical
evidence for the most contemporary decisions in social movements studies as
well.
The ethnographic investigation, which approximately lasted over two years,
mostly involved semi-structured one-on-one interviews carried out with the

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participants who were drawn from different socio-cultural backgrounds and

activist-political groups, which represent the complex multiplicity the occupy
movements reflected on the world protest stage. Thus, the general profile of
Gezi participants was spanning an entire cultural and political spectrum as well.
The majority of the participants who accepted to speak to me under the
conditions of Turkey’s volatile political climate during these times were from a
precarious class background with no regular job or social insurance except one
protester who was a laborer in the private construction sector. One participant
declared himself to be a “conservative entrepreneur at heart” in the same
sector.4 In this regard, it should be noted that Gezi included not only
subjectivities from the left-leaning groups such as environmentalists, Marxists,
LGBTQ members, anarchists, feminists, progressive Islamists, but also socially
conservative pro-government and government-allied ultranationalists.
Nonetheless, studies that immediately came out following the afterglow of Gezi
overlooked the presence of such right-wing subjectivities because of ideological
as well as statistical reasons.5
In order not to pollute or taint the claim to objectivity and to channel all the
voices of subjectivities in the repertoire, I conducted semi-structured interviews
with 17 participants (approximately two members from each group and
subjectivity) who were recruited via a two-stage snowballing technique. The first
key group of interviews involved prominent public and well-known leader
figures in their activist and political circles who acted as the gatekeeper for the
second group interviewees. The second group involved relatively younger
participants with independent roles in their groups, social settings, and
organizations. Overall, interviewees came from a higher-education background
except a few who seemed to be critical of the possibilities that education
institutions could offer to people in the age of information. I commenced the

4 The interviewees were not specifically asked about their class orientation to avoid the unequal
power relations that could surface between the researcher and participants. They were asked to
introduce themselves and encouraged to talk about "their past before Gezi." Since issues of
social class are expressed in cultural and ideological means in Turkey, the interviewees
preferred to define their identities according to the political ideology of the activist groups they
were affiliated with. Some of them also mentioned their family background and ethnic ties while
introducing themselves, even so, the social class was not specifically emphasized in the first
place. This is not to say that that Gezi was a movement driven entirely middle or upper-middle
groups or working-class segments did not involve in it at all. In a world where the number of
citizens who are absent from the protection of social insurance systems is structurally increasing
because of the general tendency in the labor market and economic transformations, it would be
a futile attempt to map out the class composition of this incident. As I have noted before and
debates in social movement literature indicate, new social movements and the Occupy
movements differentiate from the working-class movements of early capitalism since their
struggles cannot be reduced to a single line of conflict.
5In this article, I have particularly chosen to include analyses elicited from such conservative
participants to paint a clearer picture of the protest scene in Istanbul because I would argue
these protesters displaying liminal characteristics may be thought as better empirical channels
to dig deeper into the core dynamics at play in micro mobilization processes. Participants with
different ideological visions and cultural orientations also enable me to perform my role as
critical insider.

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ethnography with ideologically the most distant and challenging group for me,
that is the nationalist youth organization called the Turkish Youth Unity (TGB).
I myself had also actively participated in the incident beginning from its
embryonic occupation phase along with environmentalist groups. I attended
many public forums and the meetings of Gezi (June) Unity Movement’s quorum
series, which lasted almost over two years after Gezi till the winter of 2016.
Nonetheless, as I suggested above, I strived to position myself as a “critical
insider” (Graeber, 2009, p. 12)6 throughout whole this process. To accomplish
this ethical activist methodology, besides playing the role of devil’s advocate
during the interviews the data I collected was filtered through epistemological
matrices derived from memory studies (Bornat, 2013; Brown and Reavey, 2013;
Fivush, 2013; Kansteiner, 2002; Keightley, 2010; Radstone, 2016; Roediger and
Wertsch, 2008; Taylor, 2003) and critical approaches to narrative analysis
techniques, which encourage the researcher to use his/her emotions as
investigative tools during both transcription and data collection processes
(Arditti et al., 2010; Hubbard et al., 2001; Kleinman and Copp, 1993). As a
result of this methodological combination, I focused on consciously and/or
unconsciously included and/or excluded metaphorical expressions, as well as
common or clashing accounts that surfaced during the dialogical exchanges of
the interviews (Keightley, 2010, pp. 57-58,64). I then made use of the
expressions and accounts that compelled me to see the incident in a different
light from the perspective of my own lifeworld in the panorama of Gezi. Thus, I
must confess I went out in the field to disprove my own theoretical projections
on the incident and set a common-knowledge production process in motion,
which would eventually lead to a narrative reflecting the motivational factors of
all the diverse subjectivities involved in Gezi.
The interview questions that would provide answers for the two main research
questions I mentioned above were particularly structured in a very abstract and
open-ended manner in order not to contaminate the remembering processes
and means for the interviewees. With vague questions such as “what does Gezi
remind you of?”, “what was the last protest event you remember before Gezi” or
“what things came to your mind during the mobilization night” I tried to open
enough space for the interviewees to shape their own narratives and memories,
thereby contributing to the common knowledge production process as much as
possible. On the other hand, the follow-up questions that were posed toward
the end of the interviews purposefully brought up a couple of the tangible
incidents such as the Tahrir Square, the occupy movements of the Global North,
or more local-oriented protest events that took place before the Gezi Commune.
Such questions also specifically reminded the interviewees of main mobilization
factors such as class issues, increasing authoritarian tendencies in Turkey in the

6David Graber defines critical insider as activist ethnographer "whose ultimate purpose is to
further the goals" of the movement s/he is part of. For him, social movements are made up of
participants with different social and ideological backgrounds, and maintaining solidarity in
such diverse mobilization settings requires self-reflexive lenses directed at the ethnographer's
own privileged subjectivity, as well as other participant's political views and subject positioning.

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context of arising/closing political opportunities and emotional aspects of

mobilization as well. Based on the answers given to all of these questions, the
common denominator that brings all the interviewees together, I would argue,
take shape around three important facts: first, the theatre protests as a matter
of urban commons that occurred a couple of months before Gezi, second the red
woman, one of the iconic images of the mobilization night, and lastly the Paris
Commune and communal way of life as an example of utopic, nostalgic
representation, which transcends the boundaries of contemporary temporality
and consciousness as affect.

“Transformative events”
At the outset, the Istanbul protests emerged in response to the latest installment
of the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) neo-Ottomanist urban renewal
scheme, which proposed the restitution of a 19th-century Ottoman artillery. This
seemingly historical revitalization project reflexively created public outrage
since it would have served as a façade for privatizing Taksim Square and
constructing yet another new five-star hotel and shopping mall, which
significantly threatened to destroy Gezi Park (Gürcan, 2014, pp. 73–80;
Harmanşah, 2014, pp. 126–127; Özkırımlı, 2014, p. 2; Tuğal, 2013, pp. 152–
153). In conjunction with independent environmentalist activists, various
groups from a local grassroots organization called the Taksim Solidarity (TD)
set up a small encampment inside the park to halt the construction process.
By the night of May 31st, 2013, the struggle for a sustainable urban life spread to
other parts of Istanbul as well as to other major cities in the country, thereby
evolving into nation-wide civil disobedience over a night. On the afternoon of
June 1st, people from all walks of life amplified the intensity of the small
environmentalist occupation, as a result causing it to expand in size and scope
rapidly. The rapidly increasing crowd, both inside and outside of the park,
carried out a nearly 24-hours of active struggle against security forces, who
gradually withdrew from the square following the Istanbul governor’s
instructions. The state’s decision to back down revealed the unpreparedness of
its security apparatus to what I characterize as the commune repertoire, which
was a performance unique to Istanbul’s urban space as opposed to other
metropolitan areas of Turkey. Thus, Gezi had reverberated across the whole
country, yet it only managed to morph into a commune in Istanbul.
In the following two weeks, the demonstrators transformed the small
encampment that was initially set up by the environmentalists into a self-
sustaining and experimental protest enclave, as happened in the other previous
episodes of the repertoire. With its library, collectively organized dinners and
cleaning activities, mass yoga sessions, free food courts, botanic garden, solar
ovens, infirmary, radio station, and daily press, the protest space conjured up a
communal way of life within a metropolis, which was wrecked by three decades
of neoliberal policies (Kolluoglu, 2018, p. 32). The park itself subsequently
became an emotional point of reference that kept drawing other demonstrators

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and by-standards in from a multitude of social and cultural backgrounds.

Statistical projections estimated that almost 16 (3,5 million) percent of
Istanbul's population (15 million) temporarily visited or participated in what is
popularly known as the Gezi events (Yörük and Yüksel, 2014, p. 15). No one
could have imagined that the small environmentalist encampment would form
in Taksim’s Gezi Park, much less it would ignite a cycle of protests throughout
the country and lead to a commune in the city's ever whirling spatiality.
I first asked whether my participants were involved in any protest event prior to
Gezi to analyze how the small picketing event culminated in a mass uprising. In
this way, I aimed to explore how and why demonstrators from various socio-
cultural backgrounds and political affiliations simultaneously took to the streets
in solidarity unprecedented in Turkey's protest culture. Based on the answers
provided, I then asked the interviewees to describe the demonstration, sit-in,
picketing event, vigil, political campaign, or rally they participated in before the
commune. My intention behind this inquiry was to examine whether any sort of
“transformative event” (Tilly and Tarrow, 2015, p. 183) built up to the rapid and
instantaneous collective action of the 31 May night. In other words, I tested
Tilly’s model on an empirical ground.
Fourteen out of the seventeen interviewees told me they either actively
participated in or closely monitored two protest events before the commune.
The first protest incident the interviewees recalled was the International Labour
Day gatherings, which was organized in the same square between the years of
2011 and 2013. The second case was the Emek Theater demonstrations. Emek,
roughly translated as labor, was more of a micro-scale picketing event. In this
incident, local dwellers confronted another privatization project targeting urban
commons in the Taksim area. And I would argue that the theater protesters
were particularly significant considering they erupted just a couple of weeks
before Gezi.
Subsequently, I inquired had the participants “observed,” or “witnessed”
anything “unusual” or “uncommon” in these both key turning points leading up
to the commune. In other words, I looked at whether they came across any
modulation, improvising performance, or innovation in the local protest
repertoire pool from a Tillean perspective. Those who were actively present or
followed the incidents via mainstream and social media channels told me they
noticed a different “momentum,” “social texture,” and “crowd” in the course of
events. Thus, contrary to my expectations, they told me that they observed a
transformation in the social composition of performers, rather than a change or
innovation in the forms or nature of collective action itself.
One LGBTQ individual who went out into Taksim Square for Labour Day
celebrations in 2012 describes the scenes he witnessed as follows: "I could not
see the thing that we may call the traditional left in 2012. That May 1 coincided
with the student pact that was emerging against the AKP. There were many
anarchists, black colors, rainbow flags, visible feminist organizations. That was
a difference for me.” In a similar fashion, a young member of the ultra-
nationalist youth organization verified his statement. “There were more

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independent protesters than organizations” he recounted when he was asked to

articulate his “feelings” and “thoughts” about his last demonstration before
Gezi.
The last demonstration the TGB member participated in was the May Day
gathering of 2013 in Taksim Square. That year the government authorities
decided to cancel the celebrations that they let back in 2011. Up until then, the
Turkish state had closed the site for all kinds of public gatherings following the
May Day massacre of 1977, where right-wing contra-guerrilla organizations
opened fire over a crowd gathered that year (“Turkish police, May Day
protesters clash in Istanbul,” 2013, p. 1). In other words, the Taksim Square had
remained a no man’s land over almost 30 years before the liberal vein of the
AKP announced the site was open to gatherings in 2011. In the following two
years, the site brought the cultural movements of Turkey together with unions
in the new millennium. The statements that were given by the two diametrically
opposed subjectivities (one LGBTQ individual one young proud nationalist)
verify how cultural movements tried to articulate themselves upon the working-
class movements under the conditions of the flexible labor market. Thus,
unions, Marxist-Leninist party fractions, and syndicalist organizations were not
only actors in the 21st century May Day gatherings as it used to be back in the
1970s. Interestingly, this heterogeneous, independent young activist profile
mixing laborers with precarious classes showed up for Emek theater as well.
Similar to Gezi Park, in the early spring of 2013, the municipality announced a
project that included the demolishment of the old historic theater hall, which
was designed in the art deco style by a Levantine architecture in 1884. This
urban renewal project was proposing to turn the non-profit theatre hall into a
shopping venue, which generated considerable public disapproval in early April
2013 (Letsch, 2013). The spreading news captured the attention of young, left-
leaning, and precariat middle-classes, including art curators, environmentalists,
and the LGBTQ people who were living in the near vicinity. These young
segments of the society were far more inclined to turn the area surrounding the
theater (İstiklal Avenue) into an aestheticized space of resistance against global
capitalism, rather than a profit-oriented venue. Interestingly, Emek also became
a matter of concern for nationalist youths who are more sensitive about
protecting “Turkey’s secular values” and sovereignty against the “imperialism”
of the West. Another young member of the TGB surprisingly told me the Emek
protests were among the last demonstration he attended. When I directed a
volley of probing questions concerning his motivation, he pointed to the
“operational logic of capitalism” and vehemently explained how this “mindset”
could “devour national treasures like Emek.”
When asked about “memories” from her last “protest experience,” another
protester, who introduced herself as a feminist socialist and film studies
student, made the following comment: “Almost everyone was there. I noticed
that there was more of a cosmopolitan crowd both in Emek and during the last
May 1 celebration in 2013.” As if echoing this student’s sentiments, an
environmentalist activist described the protester profile of the theater picketing

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as follows: “Most of the people there were independent, they were just ordinary
people, local dwellers and arts people living in the neighborhood, maybe a few
from outside (other neighborhoods).”
The privatization of Emek theater hall epitomizes the three-decade neoliberal
urban policies to which Istanbul has been left exposed. Today’s Istanbul can be
thought as the product of what Çağlar Keyder refers to as the “new urban
coalition,” which encompasses the city government, sub-state actors, and the
conservative Islamic bourgeoisie, which crystallized in the aftermath of political
Islam’s first victory in the municipal elections of 1994 (Keyder, 2010). This
coalition took a more overt Islamic tone following the AKP’s rise in the national
elections in the early 2000s especially in terms of reconfiguration processes of
urban space. However, their ultimate goal, that is Islamising and globalizing the
city, were diametrically opposed to the urban visions of new middle classes who
were yearning for a cosmopolitan and sustainable city.
In this regard, I would suggest that the lifestyles of those deviating from
orthodox Islamic norms, values, and the aesthetic and market understanding
that the AKP represents, manifested themselves in both events, which is the
theater and Labour Day celebrations. In a way, the Labour Day gatherings may
also be viewed as an attempt to reclaim public spaces because there were many
groups and movement members who will probably never grasp to chance to get
unionized but cares more about the city they live in. Ultimately, in both
incidents, I would argue that we are looking at a segmented crowd mostly made
up of new urban, precariat middle classes that challenged what Ariel Salzmann
characterizes as "Islamopolis," which she characterizes as a distorted, post-
modern version of cosmopolitan Ottoman urban life (Salzmann, 2012, pp. 68–
71, 86).7 Hence, the post-modern Islamic urbanity and the segmented crowds
that took shape against it constitute the two main pillars on which the
transformative events leading to the mobilization night were based on.

The mobilization night

On several counts, the mobilization process of Gezi may be likened to the
uprisings that occurred in both Tunisia and Egypt, behind which simmering in
social media is counted among the most important triggering forces. The scenes
showing the forceful evictions of the environmentalist protesters and the TD
members from the park created outrage to a significant extent among Turkish
demonstrators just as it happened after Mohammad Bouazizi’s self-immolation

7 Salzmann, in fact, stretches the appearance of this multi-layered crowd back to the
assassination of Armenian-Turkish in 2007. In this regard, she points to the funeral cortège
that involved not only ethnically Armenian Turks, but also new urban middle classes as well as
other minorities of the Ottoman past. She discusses the unexpected rise of this multi-ethnic and
cross-class multitude in the context of the cosmopolitan historicity of Istanbul's urban space
nonetheless urges to "reflect on the varied motivations and emotions" of them from a more
empirical point of view. My own field research findings, as suggested above, show us that this
layer of the new urban middle-class composition is in a growing tendency.

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incident spread throughout digital matrixes. On the night of May 31st, there was
a similar surge of digital images and snapshots that went viral on social media.
In particular, an image of a young graduate student, also known as the red
woman (Benjamin Seel, 2013), became extremely popular online, which later on
emerged as one of the iconographies of the commune.
The majority of my interviewees addressed this image throughout our
discussions without me giving them any clue or reminder. The interviewees did
not include political, social rights or class issues among factors the culminating
to the uprising, even though I specifically asked whether they would view the
AKP’s decision to lift the ban on Labour Day celebrations in the square as a
“window of opportunity.” Rather than such political matters and constitutional
rights, most of the interviewees lined up the “asymmetrical use of force” by
police, “unjust violence,” and dramatic images they came across on social media
as motivational reasons.
One of the interviewees, who introduced himself as an AKP supporter and an
“Erdoğan sympathizer,” pointed to the snapshot of the red woman and
described it as the most "memorable moment left from Gezi." He stated, "The
red woman, she had a very strong stance in there. Images like that really made
me thought there was a matter of injustice in the park, which is why my wife and
I decided to go down there." Another participant, who was affiliated with
various anarchist organizations and also an employee in the construction sector,
told me he first encountered the image of the red women on his cell phone while
he was working. He stated, "After that, I made up my mind to go Taksim as soon
as I finish off work." As an anarchist Kurd, he used an interesting metaphor to
express his "feelings" and "opinions" regarding the red woman. He shared, "I
felt the whole country was under invasion. It was as if the public emerged as
enemy…how could they do that to this girl I kept mumbling myself."
The women of Gezi, who actively struggled on the frontlines throughout the
mobilization night, inspired not only the dissident Kurdish laborer but also the
young Islamist entrepreneur, revealing yet another pair of socially and
ideologically contrasting subjectivities and intersecting motivating forces in the
same picture. Another interviewee, who declared his allegiance to the Pan-
Turkist ideology and its political actor the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP),
said to me: "I was impressed by ordinary people's bravery during the
insurrection night, especially that of women. They did not seem to possess
extraordinary talents and skills, like heroic characters we see in the films…the
courage they showed just impressed me. That is how I found myself amid the
crowds trying to reach the park."
Another interviewee, who was a socialist growing up in “a secular family
environment”8, also underlined the significant role the female protesters took

8In the Turkish political jargon such a statement corresponds to sympathy felt for the founding
party of the Turkish Republic, the Republican People's Party, which channels the voices of
secular opposition in the political platform since the 1940s against parties representing liberal
and vernacular/Islamic conservative values.

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on during the mobilization night. She included the red woman among the most
“unforgettable moments and scenes” of the uprising night without any
reminder. She recounted, “The gas gun pointed at that girl’s face. That frame, its
memory still haunts me.”
Of course, the red woman was neither the only social media heroine of the night
nor was it the only morally shocking incident that reverberated across the
affective domains of dissidents. When asked to recall memories, my other
interviewees recounted many similar events and dramatic scenes they witnessed
either first-hand or on saw social media9. The anecdotes they narrated, which
forced the boundaries of my own theoretical projections, included the stories of
elders and old-school protesters in about their “seventies,” “brave LGBTQ
members” physically confronting security forces, and also environmentalists
who locked themselves to the top of swaying trees following the night assault.
Overall, most of the commentaries on such dramatic events, I suggest,
highlighted the “heroic acts” of women in particular and explained how such
brave initiatives encouraged and motivated male and personal involvement in
the uprising.
In this regard, I would argue that the red woman can be considered the
embodiment of many other morally shocking dramatic incidents, which slipped
off the radar of social media that night. Expressed differently, I imagine its
aestheticized effect, that is, the contrasting effect of her red dress disappearing
into her pale white skin which evokes the spirit of the Turkish flag in a
compositional sense, as the incarnation of a common denominator. And
through this common affective circuit, the heterogeneous crowds that previously
gathered around the urban commons and transformative events like the May
Day celebrations horizontally managed to mobilize without a leadership figure
and organizational structure in a true anarchistic sense.
Without a doubt, the affective sensoria the red women created cannot even be
compared to Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation. Ultimately, the latter
caused the life of a poor street vendor in a country where the wealth gap is much
greater. Yet the exercise of violence on a young woman’s body, I would suggest,
woke up the young Turks of the new millennium who were alleged to be
apolitical. The red woman created a spillover effect in digital publicity because
she morphed into a simulacrum, thereby emerging as an inter-subjective or
interactively experienced truth in its own right. The fragility of the female body
arose as an accentuated reality that warped and slowed down the accelerated
spatiotemporally of postmodernity. As a result, it created incentives for an
already atomized segment including even relatively obedient conservative and
nationalist groups to connect to the moment from a politically decontextualized
point of view. The aesthetics of the image depicted the violence as if it was
almost stationary, like a frozen timeframe that was reaching beyond space and

9See e.g. https://t24.com.tr/haber/gezinin-sapanli-teyzesi-tahliye-edildi,733829 and

https://t24.com.tr/haber/taksimde-tazyikli-suya-karsi-kipirdamadan-durdu,231113

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time configurations during which it was recorded.10 It was as if the composition

of the static body, the pale skin, and its stark contrast to the red dress, opened
onto infinite possibilities. By creating “a powerful indetermination” in everyday
routine and also simultaneously establishing an “affective intensity,” (Bartelson
and Murphie, 2010), the image weaved the moment itself into previous
contentious episodes, including Emek and the Labour Day protests. The
affective intensity the red woman created, I would even argue, reached as far as
many other “unjust” 11 events that had hitherto taken place in Asia Minor’s
history.
A historical approach to social protest, in fact, shows us that iconography,
motifs, and representations of woman body are associated with the abstract
idealization of “liberty” during uprisings like Gezi, and it is very common to see
this type of female images in times of revolutionary situations and socio-
political turbulences. In the 1840s of France, images showing women fighting
on barricades, for instance, circulated widely in pamphlets and brochures as
reoccurring revolutionary symbols, which animated the dissident segments to
rebel against the absolutist regime of Napoléon. Sexualized iconography of
women motivated the Parisians, who gathered around common causes and the
images depicting the notion of “liberating Paris.” Womanhood in a sense was
associated with the image of “free motherland” (a very clichéd metaphoric
imagination in official nationalist narrations, especially in the context of third
world nationalisms) in these depictions, which usually portray the crowds
gathering for the sake of the common cause they believe in. (D. Harvey 2004,
4,280-285).
Interestingly, memories of the second stage of the Gezi occupation did not
appear to be very distant from the city of Paris en route to the Commune of
1871. The Pan-Turkish participant's observations on the late hours of the
rebellion were as follows: "Unlike other demonstrations organized by the left,
you know where you usually see people only raising left fists, this was without
organization. This is a historical moment I told myself as I followed what other
protesters were doing. Taksim was engulfed in flames." When asked to describe
what those scenes reminded him of, interestingly, and immediately he said, "the
French Revolution." He said this with a determined and self-assured tone in his
voice as if there was no place for more contemporary exemplary cases like
Tahrir and the Occupy movements in North America.

10I would argue that the snapshot showing Alan Kurdi's on the Aegean coast of Turkey had a
strikingly similar effect on the Western world, especially in Canada concerning the Syrian civil
war and migration policies.
11I would suggest that the entrepreneur 's comments and his word choice about the red woman
might serve to reinforce the argument I am presenting here. He suggested Gezi became a matter
of justice for him after seeing the images of the red woman. In case I had directed probing
questions to clarify what he meant by "injustice" he would probably have referred to the
freedom for veiling protests organized in Taksim in the early 2000s. In this regard, it would not
be entirely wrong to suggest that the red woman revitalized the memories of these repertories
organized by socially conservative feminists in his imagination.

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As I noted above, I would not anticipate such a response given my own

theoretical projections on the mobilization factors that draw the main contours
of “occupy” repertoire. As a communard leaning toward the Pan-Turkist
political tradition, which takes its inspiration from the mythical
spatiotemporally of Central Asia, rather than the Western political culture. I
would expect this proud young nationalist to associate the dramatic scenes he
saw with a contentious episode recorded in the history of Turkey’s protest
culture, or perhaps one that involves his own party organization, or at the very
least with Egypt’s Tahrir revolution, which falls somewhere near the outer edge
of Turkey’s political and cultural landscape. Nonetheless, as a subjectivity that is
proud of his national history and Islamic heritage, the last hours of the
mobilization night paradoxically revived the political imaginaries of the French
Revolution in his lifeworld. And he was not the only interviewee framing the
first days of the second occupation phase around similar distinct historically
analogous events and metaphoric expressions, which were alluding to the
revolutionary situations of the past century in world history.

The Paris Commune on the horizons of the park

Following the affective intensity that brought the fragmented young Turks
closer to one another, the encampment in Gezi Park was restored along with
larger crowds following the police’s gradual retreat from the square on the
afternoon of June 1st. This second occupation move continued into the second
week of June 2013. Throughout the two-week commune experience, the
protesters turned the park into a utopian space by forming small and large-
scaled platforms where they put the direct-democracy principles into action,
staged ritualistic art performances, organized counter-cultural activities. Above
all, the tents and space per se allowed communards from all walks of life to get
in touch with one another. Despite ongoing clashes with security forces in near
vicinities, floor discussions, music gigs, political tirades, and soapboxes one by
one blossomed around the tents of each collective and individual group pitched
in the park. Formerly antagonized political and social identities such as the
nationalist-secularists and Kurds, Islamists and feminists, LGBTQ people, and
soccer fans shared the same space for almost two weeks. And furthermore, they
slept in the camp mattresses as the police forces assaulted the borders of the
commune.
By reminding such colorful and dramatic scenes Gezi engraved in Turkey’s
social memory, I asked the interviewees to visualize the first day of “occupation”
and then requested them to articulate their “opinions,” “thoughts,” and
“feelings” over the very first scene” they themselves remember from a
chronological point of view. I then asked them to associate the “the very first
image they recall” with “anything” that flashes in their minds. Considering that
memories regarding the mobilization night often verified the culturalist camp
and produced a limited narration of the incident itself, my intention behind this
memory exploration I suggest was to see to what extent the roots of the
repertoire performed in the park could be viewed in the global protest climate

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that the post-Arab spring brought with itself. In other words, I questioned
whether the post-2010 global protest scenery inspired the Gezi protesters on the
ground, be it via social media or mainstream media channels, or any sorts of
means of new computing and media technologies. Did they really adapt the
occupy strategy to their own protest environment?
Against my expectations, neither the contemporary cases of Egypt, Tunisia, nor
the examples of Occupy movements in the global north came up in their
recounts. Similar to the Pan-Turkist communard’s commentaries, other
participants primarily mentioned the Commune of 1871, or other similar
historically analogous events like the Spanish Civil War, which lies in the distant
past of revolutionary situations of Europe. Following my probing questions,
they similarly weaved such historical cases, in which we also see fragmented
crowds with diverse social and cultural backgrounds coming together, into
Situationist expressions like “utopian space,” “a space of hope,” “liberated zone”
and “commune.” Just like the Pan-Turkist protester, the Kurdish anarchist
entered the park in the early hours of dawn Taksim Square appeared to be
literally a battle zone. The anarchist communard described the scene he came
across as follows: "I barely remember my first moment in the park. I was all
drained out. All the area was covered up with a thick cloud and burnt smell.
Flaming fires around the square were lighting up the far corners of the park. It
was like the Spanish Civil War." When I asked him to elaborate on what he
specifically meant by that "comparison," he responded in a determined manner:
"You know sort of a liberated zone."
Another environmentalist protester remarked on her very first day in the park
as follows: "I was wondering how such a huge crowd fit into the park. But there
was something out there organizing everything. I do not know what that was or
how to describe it. I cannot find the words…perhaps a commune, like the Paris
Commune maybe." One of the members of the TBG, who was mesmerized by
the same chaotic scenery, shared similar sentiments and thoughts regarding his
first-day experience in the square without state authority. "There were
overwhelmingly too many colors. But I felt something new at the same time. I
felt hope. I could have never imagined the left resisting through art and humor
before…It was like a utopian space."
The AKP voter was also among the dissidents who immediately visited the park
on June 1st. He went to the site of action along with his wife to deliver the food
they cooked together for the communards. He recounted, “the first thing that I
noticed when we were handing food round was that people were lining up to
carry plastic water bottles to the park in chains. At that moment, I came to
understand that the Turkish left was not just about people raising left fists in
times of demonstration. A sense of thrilling excitement covered (boiled) up
inside me as we kept on watching them. I actually realized a petit anarchist was
lying inside me at that moment. That scene enabled me to see what a commune
life would actually be like. It showed me how it really looked like there.”

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In lieu of conclusion: “mnemonic community”

Methodologically and ontologically speaking, “memories are at their most
collective when they transcend the time and space of the event’s original
occurrence” (Kansteiner, 2002, p. 189). Remembering is a “mediated” process
(Fivush, 2013, pp. 15–17) and memories often expand upon their own
ontological existence through mediums such as images, written or oral
metaphoric expressions, as well as grander collective memories or narratives.
“Means of representation” that facilitate the act of remembering, the “physical
and cultural proximity” to analogues events and their “subsequent
rationalization and memorialization” do not have to entirely overlap with the
actual event that occurred before people’s eyes. Hence, people may “embrace”
memories of the medium events “that occurred in unfamiliar and historically
distance cultural contexts” to “reconstruct” the real event after its happening
(Kansteiner, 2002, p. 190). The more temporally distant the medium event is,
the more the memory of the event being remembered becomes collective,
thereby representing the lifeworld of a particular “mnemonic community” on
common ground. (Keightley and Pickering, 2012).12
In light of this critical approach to oral history and the empirical findings I
presented above, I argue that it was the political imaginary of the Paris
Commune, its symbolic representation, as well as distant memories of other
similar historical revolutionary situations in the past century that inspired the
communards in Istanbul, rather than the contemporary post-2010 protest
scenery. In other words, the Gezi participants collectively and retrospectively
reconstructed the core meaning of their own performance by articulating a
yearning for the Paris Commune and its symbolic derivations in a nostalgic way.
Once again, I want to emphasize that I am neither arguing that the Istanbul
communards consciously adopted the genesis of commune repertoire to their
own protest eco-system nor the symbolic representations of the French
revolutions were back in their mind before they decided to take on the Turkish
state. They used the symbolic meaning of these events to reconstruct the past
and their collective identity.
As narrated above, the Istanbul protests exactly crystalized in parallel to the
transformative events of the International Labor Day celebrations and the
theater demonstrations; the watershed moments that relayed and reflected the
grievances mainly revolving around urban commons. These two key turning
points then weaved themselves into morally shocking incidents and affective
mimicries (Gibbs, 2010), especially those triggered by female protesters in the
course of action, all of which created the necessary emotional intensity that led
to the mobilization night. Hence, I would shortly suggest that the fusion of
urban commons with women’s affects were articulated through the nostalgic
representation of the Paris Commune in the words of the Turkish communards.

12Holocaust remembrance by different young generations of Jewish communities around the

world and the reproduction of Jewish identity in contemporary societies through that mean
perfectly exemplifies the ways in which mnemonic community come into existence.

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One might argue that such a finding is not surprising at all given the overall
Marxist-anarchist orientations of the interviewees and Gezi participants in
general. But given the fact that even the conservative and ultranationalist
communards used the Commune to shape their narratives I do not see any
methodological and ontological reason not to characterize this protest form as
the commune repertoire, at least in the Turkish context.
The term I coined at the end of this long common knowledge production
process constitutes contrary evidence to the conceptual approaches that frame
Gezi as another offshoot of the Occupy movement or as the ramification of the
Arab Spring, as the expression of "Turkish summer" exemplifies. The commune
repertoire also urges the scholars of social movements to check whether they
use the expression of "occupy" in its place from a methodological and literal
perspective. As a matter of fact, the responses I received for the probing
questions at the end of interviews verified the accuracy of the commune
repertoire for characterizing today’s social movements.
Toward the end of the interviews, I reminded the participants of the various
dramatic scenes of the Arab Spring, including the live footage of Mohammed
Bouazizi whose self-immolation sparked waves of protest in a political
geography reaching from the Maghreb to the Levant. Additionally, I directed
their attention to various examples of occupy movements in the global north,
such as the case of Zuccotti Park and Madrid. In particular, I pointed out how
"similar types of people" in these separate “movements” communicated with
one another outside the channels of diplomacy via social media despite
distances (Shenker and Gabbatt, 2011). I specifically asked if they followed or
monitored the performances by such similar crowds implementing “occupy
strategy” via news sources or social media. Upon that, I also inquired whether
they heard any comments about the Arab Spring or anti-globalization struggles
in general during the two-week occupation experience.
The things communards articulated after the probing questions proved to me
that Istanbul’s commune repertoire was experienced, imagined, and performed
in its own microcosm despite the support that came from global activists,
intellectuals, and other protests that erupted more or less around the same
times (Bevins, 2013).13 In other words, the majority of the participants verified
that other similar contemporary incidents did not spring to their mind neither
before the mobilization night nor during the heydays of the commune. This was
the situation for almost all the communards I interviewed except the Pan-
Turkist communard who pointed out that as a young law student specializing in
the field of human rights, he had an intellectual curiosity for “protest
movements.” Upon my probing questions, he said that Gezi reminded him more

13 At its peak point, the Turkish commune repertoire became a source of inspiration for the
newest social movements such that the protests in Brazil, which erupted as a reaction to the
liberal government’s increase in public transportation fees, culminated with a slogan shouting
“the love is over here is Turkey.” Besides anti-globalization protesters that came from Europe, I
also met two Brazilian activists who flew all the way from the southern hemisphere to give their
support for Gezi.

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of the 2005 suburban riots rather than “the Arab protests” in a determined
manner.
The resonances of hyper-capitalism become far more dramatic in developing
countries that go through authoritarian transformations like the whole Turkey
is currently experiencing. In these countries, the accelerated time-space of
configurations” of post-modernity that Harvey mentions (Harvey, 1992) would
reach to such high levels that, I would argue, it could ultimately cause a severe
social amnesia in the strictest sense. Under this type more vulnerable
conditions, the political, and economic social crises that keep the publicity
preoccupied melt into thin air before they ossify, as Marx once put it in regard to
the dynamics of early capitalism. The volatility emerging from this unrestrained
form of capitalism eventually cuts off the link between the reality of present and
social memory. Understandably, this condition what I characterize as the
neoliberal state of being peculiar to belated modern milieus in effect draws the
attention away from the matters of global capitalism as well as anti-
globalization struggles formed against it. In simple words, I would suggest that
citizens in the global south have less time, resources as well as incentives to give
meaning to their own struggles in a global context.
Perhaps Gezi protesters remained apathetic to the common trenches dug
against global capitalism because of the neoliberal-Islamic vortex. They might
have seen or heard about the Arab Spring before Gezi but that faded in
memories because of the intensity of Turkey’s local economic and political
landscape. Further research is required to fully understand and map the
perception of Turkey’s new middle classes toward global activism and struggles.
Yet, I would suggest that young Turks paid homage to another global struggle
that occurred almost two centuries before while most of the other occupiers in
the global north almost forgot about it (Lustiger-Thaler, 2014). They managed
to re-invent a modern 21st-century version of the global repertoire performed in
1871. Thus, Istanbul’s commune was global in its own nostalgic cocoon.
In fact, striking parallels can be drawn between the genesis of the commune
and Istanbul’s encampment through the prism of critical human geography in
addition to memories. Many scholars suggest that besides the political and
structural dynamics and international politics leading to Napoleon's
dictatorship, re-shuffling of city space, urban renewal initiatives, and the social
segregation that came along with such penetrations into urban space can be
counted among the main factors that led to the seventy-two days of the
occupation of a significant portion of the arrondissements in Paris. Similarly to
today's occupy movements, sort of heterogeneous crowd, a mix of crafts
populations, and working-class segments took control of the city for a period of
time as a result. (Gould, 1995, pp. 1-4,6; Harvey, 2012, pp. 7–10, 2004, pp. 1–
20).
I also drew the attention to similar urban transformations in neoliberalizing and
Islamizing urban space of Istanbul above. As if verifying the place of the city as
the epicenter of the multi-layered alliances, twelve out of the seventeen
communards chose the expression of “lifestyle” when they were asked to

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summarize the “overall agenda of the protests in one word.” Nonetheless, when
they were given more time to define what “Gezi was about” retrospectively, each
participant responded according to their positioning in the political and social
panorama of Turkey. Hence, for an environmentalist, the commune was more
about protecting trees and ensuring the environmental sustainability of the
park. Whereas secular-nationalists (TGB) framed it as the uprising and
“awakening” of a secular society, as a resistance effort against a neoliberal
Islamic government threatening the values of “enlightened” of the country. For
an LGBTQ individual, the space inside the park carried a symbolic historical
meaning since it is one of the first cruising ground, and still taking on that role
for the community. Similarly, for the Turkish communists and socialists, Gezi
signified the resurrection of a new class-consciousness in the age of
neoliberalism. For transgender and feminist subjectivities, Gezi symbolized a
resistance movement against the patriarchal state (devlet baba), which
attempted to manipulate and abolish progressive abortion rights they won back
in the 1980s. For ethnic and religious minorities like Kurds and Alevis, as my
interviewees emphasized, the year of 2013 gave the secularist middle classes,
who were living in the nostalgic legacy of Atatürk’s secularism and its safe
institutional domains in the 1990s, the taste of their own medicine, that is the
sense of being “the other.”
Without a doubt, the mobilization process of multi-layered protest crowds like
Gezi involves a set of complex structural factors, forms of action, ideological
derivations, and overlapping affective domains from an intersectional point of
view. Nonetheless, as this article has pointed out, such heterogeneous protest
crowds are more inclined to gather to protect urban commons and mobilize
through affective intensities, particularly the affective resonances created by
women in the course of action.14 This article has also underlined that protesters
in belated modern milieus retrospectively give meaning to their protest
strategies in light of the political imaginaries of the past centuries’ revolutionary
situations.

14I closely followed the Lebanese protests of 2019 via different news sources, which channeled
the voices of many participants from different ethnic, religious and ideological backgrounds.
What was interesting is that, at least from my point of view, the Lebanese dissidents suggested
that the civil unrest has escalated right after the privatization of a public space in Beirut’s
coastline that restricted the access of city dwellers access to the sea in a significant way.

2020-07-06 11:35:00 AM

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About the author

Poyraz Kolluoglu is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Work at
Istanbul Aydin University. His research interests focus on, among most other
things, social policy and development, social movements, social work,
sociological theory, sociology of music, sociology of health, popular culture and
gender, cultural anthropology and human rights. He has also participated in
various research projects on migration and refugee, as well as in activist-policy
dialogues in various roles. In 2019, he won the promising young scientist award
from the Ortak Yasamı Destekleme Dernegi. Please direct all correspondences
to poyrazkolluoglu AT aydin.edu.tr or poyraz AT hotmail.com.

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Volume 12 (1): 464 – 491 (July 2020) Papanikolopoulos, Contentious politics or populism?

Contentious politics or populism? Protest dynamics

and new political boundaries in the case of Greek
Indignados
Dimitris Papanikolopoulos

Abstract
In Greece, an intense anti-austerity protest campaign (2010-2012) was
followed by the reformation of Greek party system (2012-2015). This
development is strongly related with the emergence of a new political
boundary dividing Greek society on the basis of the acceptance, or not, of the
Troika (EU, ECB, IMF) inspired austerity policy packages. In this article I
examine how mass mobilization influenced the emergence of this new political
boundary, focusing specifically on the Greek Indignados protests. Theorists of
populism have argued that contemporary (movement) politics is dominated by
a new political boundary separating the people and the elites, but, as I suggest,
they fail to unpack the boundary activity, since they underplay the differences
between parts of the people as well as the huge cognitive work that took place
among protesting masses. Instead, drawing from both the framing
perspective and contentious politics theory, I argue that the emergence of a
new political boundary was a result of operating cognitive and relational
causal mechanisms and processes such as frame alignment, deactivation of
traditional political boundaries, and boundary change. Finally, I discuss why
theories of populism do not constitute an adequate analytic framework for the
study of social movements.

Keywords: Political boundaries, cleavages, framing processes, anti-austerity

protests, Greek Indignados, movement of the squares, Greece, contentious
politics, populism

Introduction
In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, a new wave of contention swept western
countries. European Indignados and American Occupiers very quickly sparked a
wave of academic conferences and publications. Some scholars approach post-
2010movements through the prism of anti-austerity claims, while the
imagination of others is captured by the innovative traits of “prefigurative
politics”. Researchers also call attention to the interplay of economic and
political crises (e.g. Hernandez and Kriesi 2016, Kriesi 2012) and the
interactions between social movements, parties, and electoral dynamics (e.g.
Almeida 2015, Kriesi 2015, della Porta et al 2017, McAdam and Tarrow 2010,
2013). Similarly, Greek scholars have highlighted the positive relation between
anti-austerity protests (Indignados in particular) and a new political boundary
(Papanikolopoulos et al 2014, Simiti 2014, Aslanidis and Marantzidis 2016), a

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Volume 12 (1): 464 – 491 (July 2020) Papanikolopoulos, Contentious politics or populism?

new electoral regime (Serdedakis and Koufidi 2018) and the rise of SYRIZA
(Simiti 2014, Karyotis and Rudig 2016, Vogiatzoglou 2017, Papanikolopoulos
and Rongas 2019). Unlike relatively minor political changes hat occurred in
most countries hit by the economic crisis, the party system in Greece ended up
totally reformed. Indeed, SYRIZA’s rise was directly related to the emergence of
a new political boundary: anti-memorandum vs pro-memorandum forces.
Whoever was resisting austerity policies associated with the successive
Memoranda of Understanding signed by the centre-Left and centre-Right Greek
governments with Greece’s lenders (EU, ECB, IMF) was dropped into the first
category, while all those who considered the bailout agreements and subsequent
austerity packages necessary were placed in the second.
Rather than focusing as suggested by Perugorria et al. (2016) on the cleavage
structure of institutional politics to explain support for such extensive protests,
in the Greek case it would be more appropriate to attempt the opposite as
traditional boundaries had lost salience relative to the new boundary.
Accordingly, in this article I examine the way protest dynamics contributed to
the emergence of this new dividing line. Half a century after the emblematic
work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), research on cleavages focuses on how social
cleavages shape political boundaries and therefore party systems, attributing
more or less weight to the agency of political elites, but ignoring the potential
role of social movements when it comes to introducing/shaping/deepening
political divisions.
In my analysis, I prefer to use the more empirical concept of political boundary
rather that the notion of cleavage which is frequently referred to in the
literature. Indeed, cleavage and political boundary are not identical concepts,
although they are very often used as such. Cleavages constitute political
expressions of historically embedded social divisions, like owners-labourers,
centre-periphery, urban-rural, church-state (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). In
contrast, political boundaries are more plastic and ephemeral since they are
more closely intertwined with the current political climate and economic
developments. Cleavages feed political boundaries with raw material and
ongoing political activity shapes the latter. In the 21st century, old cleavages
have either lost their salience or their clarity, while new ones revolving around
employment status, identity and culture, age and gender have emerged. In this
way, it is more fruitful to focus on political boundaries rather than cleavages
when striving to explain the political earthquake of 2011.
In this context, we could assert that the formation of the anti-memorandum –
pro-memorandum political boundary gave shape to the existing debate around
neoliberal policies signifying what della Porta (2015) called “the re-emergence
of a class cleavage” as well as to the cleavage between winners and losers of the
globalisation or denationalisation process (Kriesi et al 2006). As we will see, an
articulation of these two structural conflicts took place in the Greek squares.
SYRIZA, a small party belonging to the Radical Left, positioned itself astutely on
the side of anti-memorandum forces, and subsequently saw its popularity and
support skyrocket from 2012 to 2015. After winning the elections in January

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2015, it formed a coalition government which attempted to annul the

Memoranda of Understanding and ensuing austerity policies, but was finally
forced by Greece’s lenders to accept another bail-out program. The signing (in
July 2015) and implementation of the latter by a re-elected SYRIZA-led
government (in September 2015), along with its more tolerant approach to the
migration issue and the signature of the Prespa Agreement between Greece and
North Macedonia which ended the nationalist dispute over the name of the
latter, led to SYRIZA’s re-positioning with regard to these two axes of conflict.
Part of the electorate no longer considered SYRIZA to be a fully anti-neoliberal
and truly patriotic party. Protests against the Prespa Agreement were massive,
unlike those against the implementation of the new memorandum. In this case,
the articulation of the two conflicts (economic and identitarian) was incomplete.
By that time, all major political parties had accepted austerity programs, the last
adjustment program being completed by Greece in August 2018. Thus, the anti-
memorandum – pro-memorandum political boundary lost most of its salience.
SYRIZA came under mounting criticism for its heavy taxation policy and was
accused of national treason by the right-wing New Democracy party which
shifted its positioning (at least on a communication level) regarding the
aforementioned cleavages and went on to win the national elections in July
2019.
In this way, it becomes clear that a) cleavages are multiple; and b) their content
is unstable and open to debate (e.g. the enemy of national sovereignty might be
the EU or migrants/neighbouring states; anti-austerity may refer to
salaries/pensions/subsidies or taxes). Therefore, their very existence is as
important as their articulation into political boundaries. Political forces struggle
both to position themselves within the structure of conflicts and to pinpoint
their content. Hence, political boundaries are the contingent by-products of
political activity and not the direct expression of social cleavages. Consequently,
my analysis focuses on mechanisms and processes through which collective
action transformed the political space in Greece.
Political boundaries emerge as a result of a complex process which is cognitive
and discursive as well as relational. People talk politics using broader social and
political categories to define opponents and allies. Political boundaries change
as people interact with one another in the social and political arena. In this
context, I draw on both the framing perspective theory (Snow and Benford
1988, 1992, Benford and Snow 2000) and contentious politics theory (McAdam
et al 2001, Tilly and Tarrow 2007) to establish an adequate theoretical
framework to address the issueatstake. The identification of cognitive and
relational causal mechanisms allows us to unpack the process of boundary
changewhen every outcome is contingent. “Mechanisms are a delimited class of
events that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or
closely similar ways over a variety of situations” while processes are regular
sequences of such mechanisms (McAdam et al 2001, 24). In the first half of the
article my research focuses on the Greek Indignados protests as this cognitive
work was publicly staged to a crucial degree in main city squares during the
summer of 2011. In order to explore these mechanisms and processes, I

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conducted extensive fieldwork in Syntagma Square in Athens between 25/5 and

31/6/2011, which included participant observation, attendance of dozens of
popular assemblies, and participation in working group discussions as well as a
range of political and artistic events. However, I do not present original data,
since Greek Indignados protests were widely reported, while an already
published series of academic researches offer a detailed picture of the Greek
movement of the squares. Hence, my analysis of protesters’ boundary activity
neither rely exclusively upon a primary empirical research nor it is a meta-
analysis based on reflection on the existent literature.
By contrast, I proceed to such a reflection in the second part of the article in
respect with the well established theory of populism. Theorists of populism have
argued that contemporary politics is dominated by a new cleavage separating
the people and the elites, but, as I will demonstrate, the latter fail to unpack the
boundary activity since they underplay the differences between parts of the
“people” as well as the huge cognitive work that took place among protesting
masses. Furthemore, I discuss why theories of populism do not constitute an
adequate analytic framework for the study of social movements, highlighting
that the notion of populism has been so overstretched that seems to include
almost every political aspect, while many definitions of populism contain
normative considerations currently included in the elite’s rhetoric. Finally, I
reflect on the question if “square movements” can be classified under a “radical
democratic populist” label as suggested by some scholars or contemporary
populism has to be considered simply as a collective action frame as proposed
by others.

Convergence between anti-austerity socio-political forces

Throughout the (western) world 'pauperisation of the lower classes as well as
proletarianization of the middle classes' marks a shift from a two-thirds society
to a one-third society (della Porta 2014). In Greece, the vast majority of the
population was opposed to austerity measures. Employees in the private and
public sectors (77% and 78% respectively), the unemployed (73%) and students
(75%) rejected austerity measures most categorically according to a first poll
(Public Issue 2010). Researchers using actor attribution analysis (Kousis et al.
2016, Kanellopoulos et al. 2015) found that during the mass mobilisation of
2010-2014, Greek interest groups and other protest groups were placing the
blame for economic hardship directly on the successive Memoranda of
Understanding signed between successive Greek governments and Greece's
lenders. The Memoranda were considered as a serious common threat, while an
increasing majority realised that the cost of inaction could be higher than the
cost of mobilisation. People felt frustrated and deeply discontent, while the
highly educated and skilled youth who were worst hit by the neoliberal
restructuration felt deeply frustrated due to the fact that the jobs they aspired to
simply did not exist. However, unlike the Occupiers in New York (Milkman et al.
2013), Montreal (Ancelovici 2016) or Israel (Perugorria et al 2016) who were
predominantly young, left-oriented and educated, young Greek people and in

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particular those aged 25 to 35acted,in accordance with the general assumption

put forward by Tejerina et al, “as catalysts, igniting but not really ‘leading’ the
protests” (2013, 18). As Rudig and Karyotis point out (2015, 508) “the main
carriers’ of this protest movement were ‘those involved most closely in economic
life, rather than people on the margins or outside of the labour force”.
Although Greek leftist parties were extensively involved in the street politics of
the period, it is the trade unions that actually act as “internal governance units”
within the anti-austerity campaign. Besides, Greece is not the only country
where traditional labour organisations remained at the forefront of protest
during the crisis period. Unions played a central role in staging demonstrations
and strikes in Portugal (Accornero and Ramos Pinto 2015), Spain (Cristancho
2015), and Italy (della Porta, Mosca, Parks 2012).The backbone of the anti-
austerity campaign consisted in a series of five well-articulated networks (trade
unions, SYRIZA, KKE, ANTARSYA, anarchists) (Kanellopoulos et al. 2017)
present in the vast majority of the Large Protest Events (Kousis 2016).
Figure 1 (Papanikolopoulos et al. 2014) depicts the boundaries between
different movement actors that began to lose salience in favour of new political
boundaries. Before the imposition of austerity policies by the Troika (EC, ECB,
IMF) and their implementation by Greek governments, trade unions,
parliamentary parties (KKE, SYRIZA) and extra parliamentary organisations
(ANTARSYA) of the Left as well as anarchist groups formed different networks
on the basis of conflicting political positions (Kanellopoulos et al. 2017). Leftist
unionists and political forces accused PASOK’s (PASKE) and ND’s (DAKE) trade
union fractions of “governmental unionism”. In their turn, anti-governmental
forces were divided on the grounds of ideological issues. SYRIZA is a party of
the Radical Left aiming for a peaceful transformation of the political institutions
(national, local and European) in which it has a longstanding presence. In
contrast, extra-parliamentary leftist organisations, KKE, and the anarchists
uphold anti-capitalist solutions to political, economic and social problems. For
that reason, the latter refuse to cooperate with those they consider to be
“reformists”, with the exception of ANTARSYA which cooperated at that time
with SYRIZA’s forces in many student, human rights, and labour protests. Use
of violence constitutes another controversial issue among movement forces.
While nobody on the left of the political spectrum rejects a priori defensive
violence, almost only the anarchists engage in violent actions on a regular basis.
All the aforementioned dividing lines lost salience relative to the boundary
between pro- and anti-memorandum forces that emerged as a result of the
economic crisis. In this context, the latter joined forces to reverse Troika-
inspired austerity policies. Neo-fascist Golden Dawn opposed austerity too, yet
found itself left out of this coalition structure made up of actors that
traditionally stand against fascism. As a result of this ensuing political isolation,
Golden Dawn found itself unable to participate in the anti-austerity protest
campaign in a visible way, although its members did strive under the cover of
anonymity to create a political space for their activities during the Indignados
protests.

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Figure 1. Dividing lines between organisations/groups involved

in the movement

Anti Memorandum forces

Governmental unionism Anti-governmental forces

PASKE, DAKE

Institutionalization Anticapitalism

Anti-governmental unionism, SYRIZA

Cooperation Sectarianism

Extra-parliamentary leftist organisations

Contentiousness Violence

ΚΚΕ-PAME Anarchists

In general, participants in the Indignados protests were “a combination of

experienced political activists and people participating in street politics for the
first time” (Simiti 2014, 16), with 43% leaning to the left of the political
spectrum, 38% to the right, and 38% declaring no ideology, the latter being
people who had voted for PASOK or New Democracy in 2009 (26% and 17%
respectively) or had abstained or cast a blank/invalid ballot (Public Issue 2011).
Although popular participation increased to unprecedented levels during the
Indignados protests (2011) in comparison with the labour-dominated protest
events (2010) and the younger generations were more extensively involved,
Karyotis and Rudig (2016, 7) found that “more than 70% of protesters had
engaged in both types of protest”. Consequently, “the profile of 2011
demonstrators is relatively similar to that of those from the earlier wave, with
the exception of younger age groups” (ibid, 6). Data from other countries (Italy,
Spain, Belgium, UK) provides similar evidence, namely differences in protestor
profiles between union-based mobilisations and Indignados/Occupy protests
with respect to socio-demographic composition as well as organisational
embeddedness and similarities as to their motives, ideology, and sense of
efficacy (Peterson et al. 2013).
All that said, we can conclude that at least two interrelated causal mechanisms
played a crucial role in the initial phase of the anti-austerity protest campaign:
attribution of threat and coordinated action. McAdam et al (2001, 95) consider
attribution of threat as “the diffusion of a shared definition concerning

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alterations in the likely consequences of possible actions (or, for that matter,
failures to act) undertaken by some political actor”. Threats can be related to
state repression or economic or other harms currently experienced or
anticipated (Goldstone and Tilly 2001, 184-5). On the other hand, coordinated
action entails “two or more actors’ mutual signalling and parallel making of
claims on the same object” (Tilly and Tarrow 2017, 216). These combined
mechanisms produced an ongoing process of convergence, “where increasing
contradictions at one or both extremes of a political continuum drive political
actors between the extremes into closer alliances”. (McAdam et al 2001, 189)

Deactivation of traditional political boundaries

Indignados protests, as I have already mentioned, were triggered by a
combination of unprecedented economic distress and massive political
dealignment. Calls for peaceful protests in Athens, Thessaloniki and Patras were
addressed to every social group hit by the crisis, seeking to reinforce what Mc
Adam et al. (2001, 334) identified as attribution of similarity mechanism, that
is “the mutual identification of actors in different sites as being sufficiently
similar to justify common action.”
Hundreds of thousands of people passed by or stayed for long periods of time in
Syntagma Square, thus giving shape to Large Protest Events (Kousis 2016).
What for? As Castells puts it, “these movements are rarely programmatic
movements”, “they do have multiple demands”, which is both “their strength
(wide open appeal), and their weakness (how can anything be achieved when
the goals to be achieved are undefined?)” (2012, 227). However, it is worth
attempting to define them in order to understand the real dynamics of such
movements. Did Greek Indignados aim to overthrow the whole systemic order,
or did they have more moderate goals like shrugging off neoliberal dominance
and political corruption (Douzinas 2011), struggling to bring down the
government and repeal the Memorandum (Simiti 2014)? Indignados refused to
continue suffering what they perceived to be constant downgrading and called
Greek people to join forces to overcome it.In fact, they engaged in all three core
framing tasks outlined by Benford and Snow (1988): diagnostic, prognostic, and
motivational framing. “Diagnostic framing involves identification of a problem
and the attribution of blame or causality”, prognostic framing suggests
“solutions to the problem” and “identifying strategies, tactics, and targets”,
while motivational framing consists in “the elaboration of a call to arms” (idid,
200-2).
As Papanikolopoulos et al. (2014) have indicated, social movement
organisations participating in the anti-austerity campaign showed remarkable
agreement on diagnostic framing, targeting economic and political structures
and agents, on a national and international level. Among the Indignados
however, marked division emerged between “upper” and “lower” square
narratives (Simiti 2014, Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos 2013) or political
imaginaries (Kaika and Karaliotas 2014). Protestors in the upper square, mainly

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leaning to the right of the political spectrum, tended to explain the crisis
through the prism of politicians' widespread corruption and foreign lenders’
hostility towards Greece. Meanwhile,mostly progressive and leftist protesters in
the lower squarefocused on democracy, social and political rights, as well as the
economic and political institutions. In other words, “accusations of ‘national
treason’ prevailed in the upper square, while accusations of ‘social justice’ were
predominant in the lower square” (Simiti 2014, 27). Nevertheless, people who
filled city squares shared strong feelings of injustice. These “injustice frames”
(Gamson et al. 1982) quickly dominated the public sphere.
Similar differences emerged with regard to prognostic framing. Some
participants, and in particular the older generations, supported the idea that the
Indignados should appoint delegates in order to negotiate their claims with the
powerholders, or even form a new party and take part in the elections.
Meanwhile, others and especially the younger generations rejected every form of
“old politics” and insisted on non-institutional self-organised collective action
seeking to block the parliamentary decision-making process while
simultaneously transforming people's consciousness. However, there was
overwhelming agreement throughout the square when it came to the idea of
blocking parliamentary approval of the Mid-term austerity program and
reversing austerity policies, even if a change of government was required to
ascertain this. Similar convergence emerged among core activists with regard to
motivational framing, since they all adopted a discourse focusing on severity of
the threat, the urgency of addressing the problem and the most efficacious
strategy to be adopted by each and every citizen. “Ohé, ohé, ohé, get off the
couch” was chanted by thousands of participants almost every day in front of
the Parliament.
The average discourse remained simple and calm, in contrast with the
unappealing stereotyped political rhetoric. All attempts made by political
activists from the Left or Right to impose a slogan reflecting their own exclusive
rhetoric failed outright (Stavrou 2011). What made tens of thousands of people
feel comfortable with the decision-making processes of the squares was the
inclusiveness regarding both procedures (every person could speak
independently of his/her rhetoric capacity, political status or affiliation) and
language (exclusive concepts and symbols were precluded) (Giovanopoulos
2011). As Prentoulis and Thomassen (2014, 224) put it, “the signifiers through
which the protesters are represented, and through which they represent
themselves, are sufficiently abstract and vague to be able to include just about
everybody”. The strong causal relation between inclusiveness of framing and the
massive scale of the Indignados protests was highlighted by other scholars too
in relation to the Spanish and Israeli cases (Perugorria et al. 2016).
In the case of Greek Indignados, inclusiveness was provided via a frame
alignment process (Benford and Snow 2000) between the two aforementioned
distinct discourse repertoires, i.e. the leftist and the patriotic. Radical left
activists performed a balancing act, trying to “gradually insert elements of their
radical agenda, without scaring the public with maximalistic claims” and

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“without coming forward as unduly antipatriotic, which would alienate the

conservatives of the square” (Aslanidis 2016, 315). They actually performed
what Tarrrow (1998) considers being one of the key framing tasks undertaken
by activists: avoiding very unfamiliar and scary slogans on the one hand and
very familiar ones which are incapable of mobilising people on the other. At the
same time, the upper-square conservatives were constantly heard shouting the
well-known leftist slogan “Bread-education-freedom, junta did not end in '73”.
Similarly, the leftist agenda focusing on economic hardship was combined very
productively with the patriotic one highlighting the loss of national sovereignty.
“We don't owe, we don't sell, we don't pay” was one of the favourite slogans on
both sides of the square. While some Greek scholars still focus on the
incompatibility between the two narratives (Simiti 2014, Kaika and Karaliotas
2014), others have recognised this very frame bridging process (Roussos 2014).
Anti-austerity and sovereignty claims were finally integrated into the
“democracy” claim (Diani and Kousis 2014, 503). However, this does not mean
that “democracy, rather than the economy, was clearly at the centre of popular
reactions to the Greek crisis” (ibid, 504). Research into attributions of
responsibility made by trade unions and other protest groups showed that
blaming authorities on the grounds of austerity policies was at the core of
protestors’ discursive activity (Kousis et al. 2016, Kanellopoulos et al. 2015),
although general assembly debates were dominated by both political demands:
cancellation of the Memorandums and real democracy (Gaitanou 2016).
However, what did the “democracy” claim mean in the Indignados’ context?
“Democracy’ was transformed into “real democracy” or “direct democracy’ via
“frame amplification”, “frame extension” and even “frame transformation”
strategies (Benford and Snow 2000), depending on the scope of changes
someone was seeking for. Democracy was considered to be malfunctioning and
everybody tended to propose measures correcting democratic institutions,
reinforcing people's participation (amplification) as well as expanding
democracy on every level of social life (extension), or even going beyond
parliamentary democracy (transformation). In this context, “real/direct
democracy” functioned as a “master frame” (Snow and Benford 1992), a kind of
collective action frame so broad in interpretive scope, inclusivity, flexibility, and
cultural resonance that it could be used by almost every protester seeking to
voice his/her claims.
Some participants declared it was the first time they had spoken with people
with such different political affiliations (Papapavlou 2015). Individuals leaning
to the left and right of the political spectrum were chanting slogans together or
singing the same songs, and acting in unison to defend their ground during
cases of police repression (Stavrou 2011), in solidarity with unknown people
(Roussos 2014). Apart from the upper and lower square extremists, the majority
of participants did not remain stationed exclusively at one end of the square
(ibid).
A conscious effort was made, in particular among core activists, to avoid using
concepts or adjectives that could exclude anyone (Giovanopoulos 2011). For this

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very reason the organisers avoided playing music identified with the Left
(Papapavlou 2015). Some protesters reacted positively to being able to take part
without being obliged to identify with specific organisers, while others
participated as “individuals” stressing the fact that “the presence of parties
divides protesters and imposes differentiations” (Gaitanou 2016: 196, 200).
Meanwhile, others blamed themselves for being aligned for decades with parties
that ended up deceiving them (Stavrou 2011). It seemed that in Syntagma
Square the post-civil war division between victorious Right and defeated Left,
which fuelled the power relations for almost 60 years, came to an end (Douzinas
2011). Despite the fact that the Greek Left initially resisted this outcome, part of
them gradually put aside the traditional rhetoric and symbols (Aslanidis 2016).
This erosion of the differences between within-boundary and cross-boundary
interactions, which was facilitated by the attribution of similarity and frame
alignment among protesters, denotes a boundary deactivation process (Tilly
2003, 21, 84).
The boundary deactivation process was marked by the extensive use of national
symbols, especially by more conservative and elderly people. Participants were
singing the national anthemas well as Cretan songs associated with the concept
of Hellenism, while waving national flags of various sizes (Papapavlou 2015). As
this was not a common feature of popular protests, it needs to be explained.
Some social scientists tried to explain it through the catch-all concept of
populism (Aslanidis and Marantzidis 2016). According to this perspective,
nationalism is an unavoidable (if not constitutive) element of populist
mobilisations.
Contrary to this argument, let us consider both the expressive and instrumental
aspects of this choice. Successive austerity packages were imposed by external
institutions (Troika), while people were contesting the ability of their
representatives to lead the country (Sotiris 2011). It was easier for people with
no prior experience of collective protest and unfamiliar with traditional symbols
of labour movements and the Greek Left to appropriate national symbols (ibid).
Let us now turn to the strategic aspects of this choice. First, it is difficult to
imagine how people can involve themselves in politics without addressing the
only legitimising authority of the nation-states era, the nation, or call into
question the legitimacy of elected authorities without references to higher-level
concepts. Second, use of national symbols helps people express massively what
Charles Tilly (2004) considers the core tasks of (successful) social movements:
the public presentation of Worthiness, Unity, Numbers, Commitment. Third,
activating popular historical narratives and bridging them with the current
situation, such as claiming the heritage of the Greek resistance against the
Nazis, is a relatively typical frame alignment process (Benford and Snow 2000),
and is simply an inherent part of the protesters' communication strategy.
Therefore, considering that protesters, some consciously and others not,
undertake to bolster the political leverage of protests, we have to ask: did the
use of national symbols increase “frame salience” by securing “frame centrality”
and “narrative fidelity” (ibid)? Were beliefs, values and ideas associated with

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protest frames essential to the lives of the wider public (frame centrality)? Were
they culturally resonant (frame fidelity)? If we answer positively (as I do), then
speaking of (national)populism prevents us from understanding how protesters
try to defeat their opponents by unpacking their strategies and rationales. It
would be at least paradoxical if protesters could not respond to a government
claiming to serve the nation's interest while downgrading the overall standard of
living, by conveying that this is not the nation's will or interest, especially in
Greece where notions of massive popular mobilisation, uprising or even
revolution are highly resonant and constitute an integral part of the national
narrative (Kouvelakis 2011). “Nation” as well as “people” or “society” are but
modern “master frames” that everybody can use at will. These are “empty
signifiers” that anyone may fill with whatever transforms them into a winning
discursive formula.

Boundary change and the formation of the anti-memorandum

“us”
After the signature of the 1st Memorandum, the political climate was polarised.
Polarisation can be defined as the “widening of political and social space
between claimants in a contentious episode” that “vacates the moderate centre
[and] impedes the recompositions of previous coalitions” and combines
mechanisms of opportunity/threat spirals, competition, category formation, and
the omnipresent brokerage” (McAdam et al 2001, 322). Every large protest
event (general strike and demonstration in the centre of Athens) resulted in
violent clashes with the police forces. Indignados’ large scale protests in front of
the Parliament during the two general strikes (on 15 and 28-29 June 2011) were
met with harsh police repression too. Vociferous chants were aimed at
politicians, the police, or broadcasters of the main private news programmes
who were considered to be threatening popular interests. State repression
triggered a “backlash effect”, with some participants declaring they had changed
their minds concerning the political system, the role of the state and their own
social position (Gaitanou 2016), and others directly linking this shift to the fact
that they had personally experienced repression for the first time (Papapavlou
2015, Roussos 2014). This process was reinforced by the widespread practice of
“citizens' journalism” which brought social media and mass media into direct
confrontation. Competition across the lines for uncommitted allies in society
and the linking of previously unconnected sites and individuals (brokerage)
brought about further convergence between different components of every
single bloc. Everyday interactions between a converging “us” and a respective
“them” overshadowedallotherpolitical boundaries resulting in the formation of
almost exclusive categories. The category formation process was captured by
slogans like “it is either us or them”, “they decided without us, we move on
without them”.
However, as I have already mentioned, the boundary between organised
democratic anti-memorandum forces and mainstream pro-memorandum ones
was as deep as the respective boundary between the former and the Golden

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Dawn, according to relevant research based on interviews and questionnaires

(Papanikolopoulos et al. 2014). Despite this, “ideological convergence of the
extremes” became the favourite motto of pro-bailout parties and media
(Doxiadis 2016). Obviously, the aim of this political assumption was to defame
protests by concealing that the convergence process between anti-austerity
protesters took place not in favour of the extremes, but against the extremes of
pro-bailout forces on the one hand and authoritarianism/fascism on the other.
Besides, the formation of the anti-memorandum oppositional structure was
triggered by the convergence between governmental parties of the Centre-left
and Centre-right on the grounds of neoliberalism and authoritarianism.
Did the aforementioned processes (convergence, boundary deactivation,
boundary change) result in the emergence of something more than an alliance
structure? Scholars have suggested a series of such protest outcomes. The
emergence of a social (Giovanopoulos 2011) or collective subject (Simiti 2014), a
social coalition (Sotiris 2011), the social category of Multitude (Douzinas 2011),
an inclusive identity (Aslanidis and Marantzidis 2016) are among them. The
pluralism of concepts reveals the difficulty to deal with a movement process
with contingent and uncertain outcomes as well as unclear, complex and
possibly transitory forms of doing popular politics.
First and foremost, it would be a mistake to underestimate the “frame disputes”
(Benford and Snow 2000) through which collective action frames were
developed. Stavrou (2011) describes three such disputes, which I personally
observed from up close. Left-wing activists migrated from the lower to the upper
square and started shouting leftist slogans to balance the nationalistic ones that
prevailedduring the first few days. Similarly, in order to offset the impression
created by the omnipresent national flag, they distributed flags of Spain,
Portugal, Argentina, Tunisia and Egypt. Finally, they managed to persuade a
crucial majority that trade-unions are not total sell-outs (as most of them were
thinking) and the movement of the squares could cooperate with labour
movements. In this context, we can acknowledge different identities feeding
Indignados protests (Simiti 2014) or their activation, consolidation,
amplification, and convergence (Roussos 2014), whereas identity or actor
constitution (McAdam et al. 2001) could hardly been identified. Aslanidis and
Marantzidis (2016) assert that an indignant citizen's identity was constructed,
although Kioupkiolis (2019) considers such an identity as a practical one. On
their part, Prentoulis and Thomassen stress that Indignados “never achieved a
unified, full political identity” (2014, 231). Fieldwork provides evidence that “the
Greek Square Movement was not a representative case of a social movement
sharing a minimum collective identity”, since “even though protestors shared a
common opposition to the memorandum, they did not always identify positively
with each other because of their conflicting norms and values” (Simiti 2014, 8).
Serious tensions appeared “between those who only want to restore their old
privileges and those who think that ‘another world is possible’” (Sotirakopoulos
and Sotiropoulos 2013, 453). As an interviewed participant put it, “you could
find among the five thousand in the square, at least two thousand perceptions of
what was happening” (Gaitanou 2016, 256). Protestors did not abandon their

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particular political identities in favour of a new one. In fact, out-group dynamics

were more developed than in-group ones, so they did not create a coherent
collectivity (and a respective internal life) which could continue acting as an
entity. Instead, they voted for different anti-memorandum parties in the
elections of 2012 and 2015 (SYRIZA, Democratic Left, Independent Greeks,
Golden Dawn). Hence, the anti-memorandum socio-political category did not
develop into something more than a coherent electoral pool.

Theories of populism and contentious politics

Populism is a contested concept. As a matter of fact, there are four different
approaches to the study of populism: populism as an ideology (Mudde 2004),
populism as a strategy (Weyland 2001), populism as a discourse (Laclau 2005),
and populism as a style (Ostiguy 2009). However, when it comes to qualifying a
political actor as populist, all of them seem to include as minimum
denominators what Stavrakakis (2017, 528) has called “people-centrism” and
“anti-elitism” criteria. Thus, a common feature between populist parties,
movements or leaders is that society is considered as being divided into two
main blocks: the unprivileged people and the established elites. According to
ongoing research, economic and political distress produced by the Great
Recession and the way national governments dealt with it gave rise to populist
phenomena, including populist social movements (Aslanidis 2016, 2017,
Gerbaudo 2017, Kioupkiolis 2019). However, theories of populism do not seem,
at least to me, an adequate analytic framework for the study of social
movements, for many reasons.

Is every social movement populist?

Even if we put aside that the notion of people does not seem to be brand new,
since it can be considered as a “modification of the idea of proletariat” (Dean
2014), “people” is not the only key-word that the so-called populists use in their
rhetoric. They share with non-populists their systematic appeals to “society” and
the “citizens”, which in fact are synonyms of “people”. Hence, as Stavrakakis et
al (2015, 73) have shown, populism is a matter of degree, since all parties use a
populist framing, albeit in varying degrees. Besides, many scholars have
indicated that populism is to be found both on the left and the right of the
political spectrum, in the streets or in power, organised in top-down or in
bottom-up fashion, leader-centric or leaderless, statist or neoliberal, democratic
or anti-democratic, agonistic or antagonistic, refined or vulgar, and so forth
(Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013, Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014, Katsambekis
2019). In this sense, the notion of populism has been so overstretched as to
become almost all-embracing, thus leading some scholars to call into question
its relevance (e.g. Meade 2019, 12).
Similarly, at least in the work of the most prominent populism scholar (Laclau
2005), the logic of populism is the logic of (democratic) politics, which means
that all democratic politics are populist in one way or another. Having said that,

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in the democratic era (and area) political actors can only overcome their
political opponents by gathering forces under the umbrella of the normative
principle of “people” (and its synonyms). The notion of people is the master
frame of the democratic era, as was “God” during the Middle Ages, when
everybody was fighting in his name. In this way, characterising political actors
as populist when they claim that “he or she cares about people’s concerns”
(Jagers and Walgrave 2007, 323) makes no sense. Who can address multiple
political issues nowadays without making reference to the people, except if they
abide by oligarchic or dictatorial principles? I believe (and hope) that the
answer is “none”.
Furthermore, if we differentiate populist movements from other types of social
movements on the grounds of their broader scope of membership and policy
range (Aslanidis 2016), we have to conclude that movements for national
liberation, democratisation, social-democratic, communist or other radical
change, are by definition populist. In this context, using the catch-all concept of
populism in social movement studies does not seem fruitful. Having said this, it
is logical to ask ourselves if there are any political actors out there who are
undoubtedly non-populist. Most definitions identify the elites as standing at the
opposite end of the spectrum from populists, while many scholars speak of an
emerging populism/anti-populism frontier (Stavrakakis 2014, Moffit 2018).
However, populism scholars frequently make abstraction of the stance of the
elites in the face of populist challenges: “you do not truly represent people, we
do”. In this way, the elite claims that it is the real representative of people’s
interest, while the populist opposition is a kind of political, ideological or
economic elite, which tries to take advantage of people’s discontent. Even
members of the establishment or a privileged class may use populist rhetoric
when they criticise the state of political affairs (Vittori 2017). Similarly, anti-
populist discourse, although it targets and demonises populism, “conveniently
ends up by incorporating all references to the people as well” (Stavrakakis 2014,
506), while moralisation and binary consideration of politics characterises both
populism and anti-populism.

Populism and the elite’s rhetoric

Aslanidis states that “social movement scholars have thus far failed to give
populism its deserved attention and to incorporate it into their field of study.
Although sociologists, political scientists, and historians have explored diverse
facets of the intersection of populism and social dissent, there has been no
concerted effort towards building a comprehensive framework for the study of
populist mobilisation, despite its growing significance in the past decades”
(2016, 301). The truth is that the unwillingness of social movement scholars to
use the concept of populism to characterise popular protest is rooted in the
rejection of Le Bon and Tarde's argument about the transformation of mobilised
individuals into undifferentiated and unreasonable masses as well as of the
subsequent academic sociology focusing on psychological strains rather than
rationality and strategic options of social movements. The theory of populism,

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like the aforementioned “old-fashioned” social movement theories, does not

constitute an analytical tool alone, since “populism […] was consciously
transformed in an all-encompassing word aimed at denigrating or, at least,
criticising those movements or parties, which contrast the mainstream views”
(Vittori 2017: 43). If Calhoun's remark that “the most widespread, powerful, and
radical social movements in the modern world have been of a type we may call
'populist'” is valid (Aslanidis 2016, 302), why is the opposite not so? Do the
elites not call every widespread, powerful and radical movement “populist”?
Indeed, during the Great Recession we witnessed “the proliferation of new types
of ‘anti-populist’ discourses aiming at the discursive policing and the political
marginalisation of emerging protest movements against the policing of
austerity, especially in countries such as Greece, Spain and Portugal”
(Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014, 134).
If we define “populist social movement as non-institutional collective
mobilisation expressing a catch-all political platform of grievances that divides
society between an overwhelming majority of pure people and a corrupt elite,
and that claims to speak on behalf of the people in demanding the restoration of
political authority into their hands as rightful sovereigns” (Aslanidis 2016, 304-
305), 1) we exclude as a priori incorrect any explanation of crisis based on the
unwillingness and incapability of political and economic elites to deal with crisis
on behalf of the middle and working classes; 2) we consider as “populist” every
ideology that does not recognise the necessity and legitimacy of inequalities; 3)
we name “populist” even the denouncement of the many constitutional
violations on the part of the elites during the crisis era. In this case, it would be
difficult to distinguish the definition of populism from the elite’s rhetoric.
Similarly, defining populism as “democratic illiberalism”, whose main feature is
supposed to be the idea of people’s political sovereignty (Pappas 2015), would
lead us to criticise as illiberal the Greek Constitution itself, which explicitly
declares that “all powers derive from the People and exist for the People” or that
“observance of the constitution is entrusted to the patriotism of the Greeks who
shall have the right and the duty to resist by all possible means against anyone
who attempts the violent abolition of the Constitution” (last article of the Greek
Constitution). But it is impossible to be faithful to a liberal constitution and an
enemy of political liberalism at the same time. Hence, it is not an exaggeration
to state that definitions like the aforementioned include normative
considerations and political connotations currently included in the elite’s
rhetoric. By contrast, even prominent populist scholars have argued that “actors
or parties that employ only an anti-elitist rhetoric should not be characterised as
populist” as well as “discourses that defend the principle of popular sovereignty
and the will of the people are not necessarily instances of populism” (Mudde
and Kaltwasser 2013, 151).
Furthermore, it is important to note that many definitions identify populism
with any endogenous movement resource that can make a movement really
dangerous for the status quo: mass mobilisation and leadership (Roberts 2006,
127), as well as moral struggle (de la Torre 2010, 4). Given that, we have to think
of how mass non-populist movements can emerge. For most social movement

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scholars it is difficult to imagine such a movement not relying on the

mobilisation of mass constituencies, injustice framing, and formal (or informal)
leadership (or leadership tasks).

(Protest) politics without “us-them” confrontation?

Democratic politics are dominated by a series of antagonisms and
confrontations. But populism is supposed to recognise only a single battle line
separating society into two antagonistic social groups, the people versus the
elite. Yet, “populists” are not alone in adopting this Manichean way of thinking.
Adversary framing is the typical discursive strategy of every challenger, in
contrast with power holders who are likely to call for “unity”. In this context,
both challengers and power holders seek to increase their political leverage via
simplification and binary logic. Populism scholars bypass the fact that social
movements are polycephalic and heterogeneous with these various parts being
devoid of any control mechanisms, and consequently “populist” simplifications
are unavoidable. A protest movement is not endowed with the ability to address
authorities via detailed analyses and long discussions; it is not a party or a
person. Consequently, it makes no sense to associate simplistic construction of
“we”-”them” identities with conspirational theories. “Boundary framing” (Hunt
et al. 1994) is a very typical social movement activity.
However, the theory of populism could shed light on the strategic options of
protests. As Aslanidis notes, “cultivating the antagonism between People and
elites was the best way to sustain a healthy level of mobilisation. The identity of
the sovereign People-citizens became a jealously guarded treasure. Whenever
individuals or groups attempted to assert a competing identity invoking class,
religion, ethnicity, or other category, their actions were considered divisive or
centrifugal and were met with great hostility by a majority of vigilant protesters”
(2016, 315-316). Notwithstanding, he does not link these concerns with
protesters' attempts to find a winning formula with respect to the
legitimation/delegitimation game between themselves and the authorities. In
other words, he underestimates the instrumental use of discourse and symbols.
In final instance, protesters want to win their struggle, not express themselves.
Even Tejerina et al., who consider that “one of the central themes in occupy
movements has been the attempt to attain/restore valorised identities that
provide the person or the group with recognition and dignity”, specify that
“these movements cannot be said to be expressions of identity politics” (2013,
19).

A new kind of populism?

Some researchers of contemporary protest movements prevent us from fully
embracing the pan-populism argument by arguing on the one hand that
extreme right activists cannot be considered fully populist in the strict sense of
the term and on the other that populism that may be observed in the Occupy

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Volume 12 (1): 464 – 491 (July 2020) Papanikolopoulos, Contentious politics or populism?

and Indignados movements is highly specific. In particular, serious doubts have

emerged concerning the conceptualising of the extreme right as populist, since
the latter seems to be seeking to replace selfish and greedy elites by a more
protective nationalist elite instead of returning the power to the people (Caiani
and della Porta 2011), while mostly denigrating the immigrants, leftists, lgbtqi
or roma people, rather than the dominant elites themselves. In this sense, the
profile of the extreme right is more nationalist and nativist than populist
(Stavrakakis et al 2015, 65-66).
By contrast, contemporary grassroots left-wing activism holds a more
democratic, inclusionary and pluralistic profile (Gerbaudo 2017, Mead 2019,
Kioupkiolis 2019). Contemporary mass movements, like the 2011 “square
movements” are markedly different from traditional populist movements in a
number of respects: they are leaderless, organised in a bottom-up fashion,
through open, inclusive and participatory procedures (Gerbaudo 2019,
Kioupkiolis 2019). They intentionally move away from the top-down, leader-
centric populism of the past, which relied upon a vertical model of
representation of a passive and homogeneous people. In this sense, most
definitions of populism prove inadequate here. “Square movements” constitute
a new kind of populism, a “radical democratic grassroots populism” or “post-
populism” from the bottom-up (Kioupkiolis 2019), or a libertarian and
individualistic variation of populism, a convergence of “neo-anarchism” and
“democratic populism” that Gerbaudo (2017) call “citizenism”. However, to my
understanding, it would be difficult to consider as populist a political discourse
that has “citizen” in its centre (Gerbaudo 2017, 8) or is centreless, pluralistic,
practical and hardly engaged with identity processes (Kioupkiolis 2019).
Horizontality and autonomy were the real novelty of the 2011 movements
(Castells 2012), and this key trait prevented protests from taking a hegemonic
and representational form (Prentoulis and Thomassen 2014). This very
characteristic of “square movements” which combined the capability and
intention of acting together with the incapability and unwillingness of self-
transformation into an unitary entity with unitarian features led some scholars
to speak of the emergence of a “multitude” in Hardt and Negri's terms
(Douzinas 2011, Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos 2013). For theorists of
multitude, this latter is defined as a heterogeneous group of singular individuals
that act in common without representatives creating a common political will
(Hardt and Negri 2004, 2012). If it is true that postmodern capitalism promotes
individualism and networking instead of ideological identities and political
concurrence (Douzinas 2011), we understand that it provides both opportunities
and obstacles to collective mobilisation, since it facilitates mobilisation against
an external common enemy, while it weakens in-group dynamics. This was
exactly the Indignados case: the creation of a mobilised (but internally divided)
social category unable to transform itself in a self-serving, self-reproducing and
self-representing entity.
Hence, despite some attempts having been made to combine the theories of
populism and multitude (Kioupkiolis and Katsambekis 2014), no common

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political culture or set of beliefs could unite the logic of hegemony and that of
autonomy. In fact, there were different sets of participants in Syntagma Square
with opposite values and ideas.
Did many passers-by, employees, elderly people or parents who participated for
a while in the squares’ activities find the idea of direct-democratic social or
political organisation attractive? Were they disposed to undertake such
commitments and pay the associated personal costs? Of course not. Since we
suggest that horizontality and autonomy on an organisational level is linked to
the efforts to create a micro-society according to a prefigurative logic (Ancelovici
2016), we have to take into account that the direct-democratic discourse was
expressed by only a few thousand people from particular social groups: leftists
and politicised youths. Horizontalism and prefigurative politics are associated
basically with the protest community and culture (ibid). The majority does not
express such concerns. They mobilise mostly on the grounds of fear rather than
on the grounds of enthusiasm. Crisis of representation, which is “old” among
the younger generations and “new” among the more elderly, constituted the
common ground on which they met.
“Direct democracy” was a frame adopted after voting during one of the first
General Assemblies in the lower square (27 Mai 2011) dominated by leftists and
younger age groups (Mitropoulos 2011). As I have already mentioned, the
politically more conservative protesters in the upper square made use of very
different political imagery. Slogans were mainly aimed at politicians and the
Parliament (Papapavlou 2015). A general agreement emerged on this topic,
while everything touching on “direct democracy” remained shrouded in
vagueness (ibid). Gaitanou's research “revealed that participants tend to locate
the problem in the specific functioning of the Greek political system rather than
questioning the structure of the system as such”, since “the majority of
participants claimed that the problem is not inherent in parliamentary
democracy as a regime, but in the way it functions in Greece or in its political
representatives (parties, politicians, etc.)” (2016, 177, 209).
What followed the signature of the Mid-term austerity program by the Greek
Parliament (29th June 2011) was somewhat revealing of the dynamics of this
movement. The masses withdrew, leaving a few thousand (and gradually a few
hundred) “usual suspects” in the square. Afterwards, instead of a substantial
diffusion of direct-democratic procedures or institutions, we witnessed
spectacular changes in the party system along with the spectacular rise of
SYRIZA. Assuming that the Greek anti-austerity campaign encompassed
characteristics of both “contained” and “warring” movements (Diani and Kousis
2014), we consider the magnitude and type of changes Greek protesters were
seeking to impose upon the Greek political system. There was an overwhelming
desire to regain control over political decision-making through active
participation. But not in order to replace parliamentary democracy with
another, direct one. The masses sought to restore the state's capacity rather than
decrease it. While many left-wing youths were inspired by direct-democratic
ideals, the vast majority of citizens were inspired by its opposite: statism.

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With this in mind, we can hardly argue, at least within the framework of our
case study, that “the movement of the squares tried to build an ‘under-power’, a
power from below, which starting from the square could progressively reclaim
all levels of society, including state institutions” (Gerbaudo 2017, 10). What
Gerbaudo (2017, 17-18) and Kioupkiolis (2019, 180-188) indicate as distinct
features of “citizenism”/“anarcho-populism” and “radical democratic grassroots
populism” respectively constitute the political culture of just one demographic
component of the “squares movement”, the left-wing youth. “Populism” among
the more elderly and/or more right-wing participants was totally different, and
clearly more traditional. Hence, populism scholars should speak of the
coexistence of different kinds of “populisms”. In such a case, what really counts
is the examination of the frame alignment processes. But, if so, the contentious
politics theory seems to be more relevant than the theory of populism when
addressing this issue.

Populism is just a frame

Bringing together conflicting orientations is not only a matter of adequate
political discourses. It is equally a matter of a) a new repertoire of action (square
occupations, popular assemblies) that allowed people with such different social
and political profiles to gather all together; b) the massive presence and
mobilisation of the “movement community”, members of acknowledged leftist
and anarchist organisations, groups and networks, holders of skills and social
capital acquired via previous engagement in social movements, campaigns or
the December 2008 uprising, that all contributed to secure inclusiveness of
popular assemblies, appeasement of tensions, direct-democratic processes in
decision-making, sustainability and viability of square occupations and
encampments as well as the coordination with other civil society actors, that are
all crucial for protests to reach a massive scale, durability as well as social and
political leverage; and c) claim-making on the grounds of master frames (anti-
austerity and democracy). Populism can explain neither the physical presence of
the people in the squares nor the development of protest dynamics. Instead,
tactical innovation, networking of the protest community, and frame alignment
processes can do. Hence, it is more fruitful to examine the role of relational and
cognitive mechanisms and processes activated during the hot summer of 2011 in
the shaping of protest dynamics in Greek Squares.
As Caiani and della Porta (2011) suggest in relation to social movement studies,
it would be more useful to conceptualise populism as a frame, which can easily
be bridged with other frames. At least one scholar of populism follows their
suggestion (Aslanidis 2017). I preferred not to use the theoretical framework of
populism at all for several reasons, which I will outline in a brief, yet analytic
way.
Let us take Laclau’s definition of populist discourse, which is articulated
through the establishment of a chain of equivalence among unmet demands of
heterogeneous social groups, the formation of an antagonistic frontier

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separating the people from the unresponsive power bloc, and the construction
of an identity around of the notion of people. In my analysis, I preferred to use
the relevant notions of Dynamics of Contention Program (McAdam et al 2001).
More particularly, I spoke of convergence among protesters, instead of chain of
equivalence, because convergence includes physical face-to-face interactions
which are as important as the equalization of social demands on a discursive
level. Furthermore, on the protest level, convergence presupposes deactivation
of traditional boundaries between protesters with different values and ideas. In
fact, this is where the difference lies between top-down and bottom-up political
procedures: the latter take place exclusively among people with flesh and blood,
whose communication is a demanding interpersonal and intra-group give-and-
take process that exertsdiscursive articulation of claims, which can be
accomplished by representatives. Moreover, equalisation of claims is not
sufficient for protesters to converge, since common (or compatible) diagnostic
and prognostic framing is needed too. For that reason, the establishment of a
chain of equivalence among popular demands needs to be completed by frame
alignment. As we saw earlier, scholars of populism associate different
individuals and groups’ opposition to authorities or the elites and their self-
identification with empty signifiers (e.g. people) with the construction of an
identity. In contrast, contentious politics theorists focus on the middle level of
framing activity and its outcomes, which are considered to be contingent and
subject to the broader protest dynamics. In this context, the polarisation
process between protesters and the authorities can lead to category formation
(McAdam et al 2001, 323), but not necessarily to the formation of a new
identity. Finally, boundary change and the “formation of an antagonistic
frontier” are obviously synonyms, albeit in our analysis boundary change is a
by-product of both state repression and state unresponsiveness.

Concluding remarks
Many scholars have tried to explain the Occupy/Indignados protests through
the prism of populism. It is of the utmost importance for activists to be aware of
the uses of populism by both academics and politicians or journalists, since
populism is mostly used as a pejorative concept. As we have seen, many
definitions of populism contain normative considerations currently included in
the elite’s rhetoric, while targeting whatever makes protests dangerous for the
elites: contentiousness, massiveness, moral strength, and leadership. In
contrast, contentious politics theory avoids political connotations, while being a
very useful tool for the study of protest dynamics by focusing on mechanisms
and processes activated mostly through experienced protesters’ agency. Protest
dynamics and the emergence of new political boundaries cannot be explained by
the diffusion of a new kind of rhetoric alone. As the Indignados movement has
shown, mass mobilisation from below entails much more than adopting a catch-
all populist discourse.
Political conflict in the democratic era (and area) has much to do with the
attempts of governments, parties, movements, and other political actors, to

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transform social cleavages into political boundaries in a strategic way. The

Greek “movement of the squares” is significant insofar as it enabled the
emergence of a new political boundary that shaped the Greek political landscape
and substantially changed the Greek party system. Indignados protests were
characterised by social and political inclusiveness. Most importantly, previous
boundaries between protesters started to lose salience, since a wide process of
frame alignment was under way. In this context, a huge cognitive task was
undertaken by thousands of activists, whose capability to appease internal
disputes, bridge differences, highlight commonalities, and canalise common
action towards common targets, proved a crucial precondition for long-lasting
grassroots mobilisation in times of unprecedented social and labour
fragmentation. For movements concerned with the victorious resistance to the
neoliberal dictates, this strategic boundary framing must be resolutely employed
as a tool for the reconstruction of key socio-political blocs that are capable of
striking back.

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About the author

Dimitris Papanikolopoulos is a post-doctoral researcher in the Aegean
University. He specializes in the study of social movements and contentious
politics. He has published three books, on '60s movements, the December 2008
riots, and the internal life of the contemporary movement community in Greece,
while he has participated in research projects on Greek social movement
organizations in the context of the anti-austerity campaign (2010-2012) as well
as on actor attribution analysis in the context of Eurozone crisis. His current
research focuses on protest in contemporary Greece and especially on
Indignados protests and labor movement.
Email: papanik8 AT yahoo.com

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“We’re not the party to bitch and whine”:

Exploring US democracy through the lens of a college
Republican club
Noah Krigel
Abstract
Following Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential win, college Republican clubs
across the United States – anecdotally reported by mainstream media outlets
(Godfrey, 2018; Martinez, 2016; Steinmetz/Fullerton, 2018) – have
increasingly supported the Trump Administration. This form of political
support, however, appears to parallel elements found in the development of
authoritarian governments. Contextualized by ethnographic exploration of
one particular college Republican club at a mid-sized, western, public,
wealthy, highly selective university which grew to become one of the largest
clubs on the campus, I argue that these political expressions, similar to those
found in single-party governments, could be a harbinger of broader
governmental shifts within the US.

Keywords: Conservatism, college Republican clubs, fascism, Donald Trump,

politics, social movements

Introduction
Across the globe, democracies appear to be entering a new era of “fragility”
(Curato, Hammond, & Min, 2019, p. 21; Frazee, 2019; Traverso, 2019). For
example, in Brazil, South America’s largest economy, president Jair Bolsonaro
has stripped land from indigenous communities (Sims, 2019); attempted to ban
“Marxist Garbage” from Brazil’s public schools (Bolsonaro, 2019); and
supported far-right militants through such acts as calling Colonel Carlos Alberto
Ustra – a former army officer who was convicted of torture and who frequently
suppressed leftist political opponents – a “national hero” (Boadle, 2019). In
India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s rule has propagated a resurgence of hate
speech toward Muslims; government erasure of historical, political, and
religious Muslim ties to India; and an elevation of Hindu nationalism at the
expense of growing violence toward lower-caste and non-Hindu groups
(Gettleman, Schultz, Raj, & Kumar, 2019). The European Union’s 2019 elections
demonstrated unprecedented representation among nationalist and populist
groups as well as increasing political instability in the region (Erlanger, 2019).
In the United States (US), President Donald Trump’s “Make America Great
Again” rhetoric, suggestive of a mythically racially pure past, and frequent slurs
toward underrepresented groups have been used to widen divisions within the
country and destabilize the country’s democratic structures (Giroux, 2018;
Stanley, 2018).
Analyzing these global shifts away from democracy, scholarly discourse appears

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to focus primarily on macro-level repercussions, particularly a potential

resurgence in authoritarian governments (Giroux, 2018; Harris, Davidson,
Fletcher, & Harris, 2017; Robin, 2017; Snyder, 2017; Stanley, 2018). One micro-
level aspect that has been overlooked, however, is contemporary conservative
college student mobilization (Munson, 2010). With the exception of Binder &
Wood (2012) and Kidder (2016, 2018), contemporary conservative college clubs
have been understudied. This oversight by activists and academics must be
addressed given that conservative college students have historically been
important players in Republican elections and administrations1. Conservative
college students – both historic (Andrew, 1997) and current (Binder & Wood,
2012) – have also become conservative leaders and voters; therefore, their
practices, value systems, and experiences must be better understood in order to
predict and engage with future tensions, machinations, leadership, and policies
of the conservative movement, as well as US democracy more broadly.
I addressed this oversight through a six-month ethnography of a college
Republican club at a mid-sized, public, wealthy, highly selective, western,
Predominantly White Institution (PWI), referred to in this paper as WestU.
WestU students have a median household income significantly above $100,000,
highly disproportionate to the national median household income, which was
$61,937 in 2018 (Guzman, 2019). Socially, WestU students are involved in a
plethora of on-campus clubs, organizations, and activist groups. Politically,
WestU is predominantly liberal, though it has a student population slightly
more conservative than the national average which, at the time of this
ethnography, sat at approximately 21% (Jacobo & Lopez, 2019). Similar to this
national study, I also characterize conservatives and liberals as those who self-
identify as such. During my research, while there appeared to be hostile
relationships between liberal/underrepresented student groups and the college
Republican club, common ground was found in their mutual frustration with
the WestU administration for their involvement in campus life.
Using an exploratory method common in qualitative research (Hochschild,
2016; Kidder, 2016), I began this project curious to understand how
conservative students navigated a college campus, particularly those associated
with the WestU college Republican club, which, following Trump’s presidential
victory, grew to become one of the largest clubs on campus. Students from this
club typically identified themselves as “CRs” (College Republicans), therefore I
use this term throughout the paper. I also use the term “under-level” to describe
students in their first or second years at WestU, and “upper-level” to describe
students in their third, fourth, or fifth years. While I openly identified as a gay,
liberal, Jewish researcher, I believe being white and male – two identities highly
representative of the club – helped me feel welcomed with open arms by CRs,
and made it challenging to reconcile the increasing and lasting fondness I felt
for many members, and discomfort with the club’s rigid gender roles and

1See Andrew (1997) for his analysis on the impact of conservative college students involved with
Young Americans for Freedom (YAF) in the 1960’s on both the Nixon and Regan
administrations.

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rhetoric against minorities. Operating together, these norms suggest a striking

parallel with “mobilizing passions” (Paxton, 2004, p. 41) that have historically
been associated with rises in authoritarian governments. This phenomenon
must not be overlooked given the deep and often hidden ties to broader political
environments that are forged during these formative years (Andrew, 1997,
Binder & Wood, 2012, Robbins, 2002).
Given research suggesting that college campuses produce different types of
conservative performances – that is to say that politicians and voters frequently
reproduce activist styles learned during their undergraduate years (Binder &
Wood, 2012) – CRs could, in future years, become important agents in
authoritarian development. While there were frequently elements of
authoritarianism embedded in US history throughout the 1900’s (Stanley,
2018), norms documented at WestU’s Republican club, as well as other clubs
across the United States post-Trump’s political arrival (Godfrey, 2018;
Martinez, 2016; Steinmetz/Fullerton, 2018) suggest a novel and unexplored
challenge to democracy. In the context of an increasing number of unstable
democracies across the globe (Curato, Hammond, & Min, 2019; Giroux, 2018;
Stanley, 2018), it is paramount to continue excavating these potential threats.

Literature review
Conservatism and college Republican clubs
For the purpose of this article, I take at face value CRs’ understandings of
conservatism. It is important, however, to highlight the myriad of discussions
among activists and scholars regarding the challenges in identifying and/or
defining different factions of right-wing politics. For example, focusing on
morality and values, Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009) argue that conservatives
are a group that hold a “pessimistic view of human nature, believing that people
are inherently selfish and imperfectible” (p. 1030) as well as place equal weight
on “Harm, Fairness, In-group, Authority, and Purity” (p. 1041). Robin (2017)
tracks the development of the Republican party in the US, describing
conservatism as “an idea-driven praxis” (p. 18) that is “disciplined by its task of
destroying the left” (p. 245) and a reaction to social progress from marginalized
groups. Blee and Creasap (2010) draw boundaries between conservative and
right-wing movements, arguing that the former coalesce around patriotism,
capitalism and a set of morals while the latter centers on race/ethnicity. In
comparison, Berlet and Lyons (2000) argue against drawing these boundaries,
stating that they make invisible the links within different streams of
conservative politics and reinforce the misconception of the fringe-right as
socially marginal. In other words, precisely defining conservatism is fraught.
With regard to the intersection of conservatism and college students, however,
despite widespread mobilization of conservative students (Munson, 2010),
contemporary college Republican clubs have been understudied by social
movement literature. Among the academic research that has emerged,
conservative college clubs have been studied as vehicles for identity formation,

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group solidarity, generating distrust of liberal bias embedded in academia, and

community development for conservative students (Binder & Wood, 2012;
Gross & Frosse, 2012; Kidder, 2016, 2018). There has been slightly more
discussion in mainstream media, including a Vanity Fair article exploring
victimhood among college Republican women at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill (Sales & Laub, 2018) and an NPR podcast highlighting
anger and distrust among conservative and libertarian students associated with
Turning Point USA2 (Chace, Kolowich, & Chivvis, 2018). Still, the academic
research and mainstream coverage that has emerged does not connect
victimization and isolation expressed by these students (Binder & Wood, 2012;
Kidder, 2016; Sales & Laub, 2018; Steinmetz/Fullerton, 2018) to highly similar
emotions found among right-wing members from extremist groups (Bacchetta
& Power, 2002; Blee, 1991, 2002a; Ezekiel, 2002). Additionally, while Binder
and Wood (2012) and Kidder (2016, 2018) both note that the conservative
students they studied coalesced around political and social views that mirror the
mainstream Republican party, such as limited government, secure borders, and
a strong military, new reporting in The Atlantic and Time has suggested that
mobilization is now occurring around Trump as an individual rather than an
ideology (Godfrey, 2018; Martinez, 2016; Steinmetz/Fullerton, 2018). Yet these
tensions between conservative students who are pro- and anti- Trump have not
been contextualized within broader US and global trends of increasing white
nationalism and transnational governmental shifts from democracies to
authoritarianism (Stanley, 2018). In other words, there is minimal analysis
exploring tensions among contemporary conservative college students under
Trump’s presidency.

Authoritarianism
While many scholars agree that democracy is increasingly threatened by fascist-
like elements, there is debate surrounding the manifestation and implications of
this shift. Regarding political tensions in the US, Giroux (2018) points to
Trump's attacks on public values and language as prescience of “ghosts of a dark
past which can return” (p. 23). Similarly, Snyder (2017) states that “post-truth is
pre-fascism” (p. 71), highlighting Trump’s propensity toward banning reporters
from his rallies and criticizing the media. Harris, et al., (2017) look at the ways

2 According to its website, Turning Point USA (TPUSA) is an activist non-profit with over 800
high school and college chapters across the US with the mission to “educate students about the
importance of fiscal responsibility, free markets, and limited government” (Turning Point USA,
nd). TPUSA has also been known for its attempts to “defund progressive student organizations”
(Fucci & Catalano, 2019, p. 3), fund right-wing student government candidates in order to
transform college campuses (Vasquez, 2017), and oversee a professor watchlist which
encourages students to “ … document college professors who discriminate against conservative
students and advance leftist propaganda in the classroom” (Professor Watchlist, nd). It should
be noted, however, that approximately half of the professors on the list are included due to their
personal beliefs, and not instructional behavior (Fucci & Catalano, 2019). While TPUSA does
not publicize its funding sources, tax returns highlight millions in funding from leading GOP
donors including the Koch brothers (Kotch, 2017).

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in which the Republican party uses fear and racism to challenge definitions of
conservative identities as part of a national shift toward a single-party system.
Similarly, Stanley (2018) argues that power and fear, increasingly used by 21st
century governments to propagate distrust of public discourse, are fracturing
democracies. Curato, Hammond, & Min (2019) also take a global approach,
although, they explore the ways in which understandings of human rights and
global freedom challenge democracy and authoritarianism across the world. No
scholar, however, has connected the growth of fascist-like – or even
authoritarian-like – tactics to conservative undergraduate students.

Conservative women
In far-right spaces, while white women typically “are less publicly visible than
their male counterparts,” they nevertheless wield tremendous influence in
membership recruitment, organizational development, and orchestrated attacks
on outsiders (Baccetta & Power, 2002 p. 5; Blee 2002b; Blee & Creasap, 2010).
Most notably, Blee (1991), in her study of women in the Klu Klux Klan,
highlights how right-wing women frequently utilize “rumor, gossip, and
demonstrations of political strength” (p. 153) as a mechanism to reinforce
patriarchal ideals. Other scholars showcase a consensus among right-wing
women to reject feminism and bolster patriarchal systems (Bacchetta & Power,
2002; Ginsburg, 1998; Schreiber, 2008, 2018). It is paramount, however, to
study authoritarianism through a feminist lens as it provides powerful – yet
historically overlooked – insight into the many political actors operating within
a group (Blee, 2017; Passmore, 2008). In the 1920s, for example, “Klanswomen
created a politics of hatred in ways differently than did Klansmen” that were
overlooked for decades (Blee, 2017, p. 75). Additionally, in 1930s Germany, the
Nazi party, with the support of many women’s groups, created the mantra
“Kinder, Küche, Kirche” – Children, Kitchen, Church – to reward women with
larger families and support religious and patriarchal structures (Bridenthal,
1973; Mason, 1976).

Methods
Methodology
Qualitative research is a powerful tool to combat tenets of positivism and the
expansion of neoliberalism (Denzin, Lincoln, & Giardina, 2006). Additionally,
qualitative research can provide unique insight into a specific culture, aspects
invisible to quantitative research (Binder & Wood, 2012; Hochschild, 2018).
Furthermore, qualitative research allows for the opportunity to validate – but
not overpower – the writing and analysis of subjects with whom researchers
may disagree (Ginsburg, 1998; Ezekiel, 2002; Hochschild, 2018). One form of
qualitative analysis which I utilize frequently throughout this paper, grounded
theory, provides data analysis prior to applying theories (Charmaz, 2014;
Creswell, 2012; Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2010).

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Reflexivity
Though CRs consider their meetings, emails, and events open to the public, in
the interest of transparency, I received written consent from the club’s president
and verbal consent from the club’s board before beginning this research. To
quell suspicion and build trust, I explained that I wanted to add their voices to
the dearth of literature on college Republican clubs, utilizing a similar method
to Blee (1991), who reached out to women in racist organizations by positioning
herself as a “recorder of their lives and thoughts” (p. 11) as well as other scholars
such as Ezekiel (2002) and Hochschild (2018), who also studied far-right
spaces. I hoped my research would not present a platform for CRs to espouse
their ideas – a concern noted among some activists (Tolentino, 2019) – but
rather would allow me to “scale the empathy wall” (Hochschild, 2018, p. 10) and
understand their community. Though I never hid my identity as a gay, liberal,
Jewish researcher, as a white, male undergraduate student, I nevertheless
blended into the spaces I was studying. In fact, not only was I frequently told I
did not look like a “social justice warrior” by many CRs, there were many
moments during meetings and events when I even received smiles, nods of
approval, and welcoming gestures from other CRs. I believe details such as these
are important as there is an absence of research on contemporary conservative
college students performed by a researcher who, at the time of the study, was
also an undergraduate student. Thus, I have also incorporated auto-
ethnography into this paper, as this research method “legitimates the personal
location as a site of cultural criticism” (Toyosaki, Pensoneau-Conway, Wendt, &
Leathers, 2009, p. 58; Creswell, 2012).

Data collection
Data were collected from a mid-sized, public, wealthy, highly selective, Western
Predominantly White Institution (PWI) referred to in this paper as WestU.
During the 2018 Spring and Fall school terms (a total of six months), I attended
12 club meetings and events, each lasting between one and three hours. I
utilized content analysis on the club’s Facebook page, emails, and group text
messages to fully capture the breadth of perspectives, as well as performed 17
in-person semi-structured interviews with WestU students who identified as
current or past CRs.
Following Gusterson (1997), I initially used polymorphous engagement,
building rapport with a board member and a general club member in social
circles outside of club settings. After I established their trust, these key
informants introduced me to other current and past board and club members
who then connected me with their friends, an iterative technique in qualitative
research called snowball sampling (Charmaz, 2014; Hesse-Biber & Leavy,
2010). Interviews lasted approximately 45 to 90 minutes and were performed
wherever interviewees felt most comfortable, which included the WestU library,
WestU dining halls, off-campus coffee shops, and students’ homes. To further

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build trust and protect identities, pseudonyms were assigned unless explicitly
asked otherwise by interviewees. Since CRs prohibited me from audio-recording
any participant observations or interviews, I took notes in a notebook and on a
laptop, highlighting verbatim and non-verbatim quotes. Following Strauss,
Leonard, Bucher, Ehrlich, & Sabshin, (1964) and Kidder (2016, 2018), in this
paper, verbatim quotes are represented with standard quotations while almost
verbatim quotes are represented with single quotations. Block quotes, unless
represented with single quotations, are verbatim.

Data analysis
Utilizing Dedoose qualitative data analysis software, interviews and fieldnotes
were analyzed using axial coding strategies, a vehicle to identify and connect
experiences and relationships (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Initially, I had planned
on developing one large codebook to better systematically capture themes from
both interviews and fieldnotes. After open coding, however, I noticed significant
differences between interviews and fieldnotes; while interviews illuminated
general reflections on how to navigate the club and WestU’s campus, fieldnotes
captured specific club sentiments regarding upcoming and prior WestU events
as well as (inter)national policy changes by the Trump Administration. To
respect the unique nature of these data sets, I open-coded the data again,
creating two separate codebooks. Codes included emic terms derived from club
members’ discussions, such as “witchhunt,” “identity politics,” and “diversity of
thought,” as well as etic codes I developed to denote themes such as “gossip,”
“types of conservatism,” and “free speech.” Utilizing Dedoose qualitative data
analysis software, data were then close coded to improve organization
(Charmaz, 2014; Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2010). Throughout this process, I
frequently memo-ed on these data sets and reviewed them with a feminist
anthropologist and an organizational sociologist.

Background
In the years leading up to Trump’s presidency, the club was known as a small,
loose-knit group of around five white male students. About a year before Trump
was elected, however, two white female under-levels who were avid Trump
supporters joined the club. Said one of the white women, Shannon, an upper-
level and board member at the time of the interview, “When I first showed up,
there were just five people in a room. It was small and sad. So, I started by
pestering the current president at the time about things I could do which got me
a position [on the board] the next year. We then revamped the board, … the
bylaws, … and the meetings.” Restructuring the board to allow for more
leadership, shifting responsibilities, and adding social and educational
components to meetings and events, said Shannon, helped CRs to become one

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of the largest clubs on the WestU campus.3 Lynn, the second white woman,
added, “It’s now a full operation. We have 30 to 40 people consistently and the
first meeting had over 100 people.” Indeed, meetings continued to have an
average of 35 attendees, events upwards of 200 attendees, and an email
distribution list contains over 500 students. Between the frequent free pizza,
blasting of country music, scavenger hunts, Jeopardy games, and shooting
range nights, the club felt more like a social gathering than a political space.
That said, during its weekly meetings the club still included PowerPoint slides
with news from Fox News and PragerU4, as well as an occasional segment they
called “Craziest Things Liberals Have Done,” which highlighted recent incidents
they thought were inflammatory. When asked how the club financed these
meetings and events, Lynn stated, “Last year, we raised $4,000 from donors.”
Marcy, an under-level, white, female board member overseeing fundraising,
corroborated Lynn’s statement, explaining, “We go door knocking on weekends
and send letters to companies and other large Republican organizations.”
Outside of fundraising, the club received a $500 stipend from WestU for being a
registered club, and also charged a voluntary $50 yearly membership fee. While
the majority of CRs were white men – a trend common to college Republican
clubs studied by Binder & Wood (2012) and Kidder (2016, 2018) – at WestU,
the club’s board was almost entirely white women, a contradictory phenomenon
which will be further explored later in this paper.
Among interviewees, seven identified as white males, two identified as Asian-
American males, and eight identified as white females. All but one interviewee
grew up conservative. Approximately one-third identified as Catholic, one-third
identified as Christian, and one-third Jewish, Mormon, or non-religious.
Interviewees came from different academic disciplines and about two-thirds
were upper-levels. At the time of the interview, about half of interviewees
defined their involvement in the club as “very involved” while the other half
defined their involvement as “somewhat” or “not at all” involved. When asked
how they joined the club, almost all interviewees spoke of another CR who
extended an invitation during their freshman year, a trend that echoes the use of
social networks in social movement mobilization (Luker, 2007; McAdam,
2007). While I did not directly study class and/or wealth levels in this research,
I did ask each interviewee for their home zip code. Cross-listing their self-
reported zip codes with data from the US Census Bureau, it appeared that
interviewees had a median household income lower than that of all WestU

3 During this time, similar stories of Trump-supporting students taking over college Republican
clubs were reported across the US, reflecting broader transitions of the conservative movement
under Trump’s leadership (Godfrey, 2018; Martinez, 2016; Steinmetz/Fullerton, 2018).
4According to its website, PragerU is a non-profit started by Dennis Prager, a conservative,
Jewish writer and talk show host that “promotes the ideas that have made America and the West
the source of so much liberty and wealth” (PragerU, nd). Famous for its weekly five-minute
videos which have garnered billions of views, PragerU argues that “the Left” is “akin to hate
groups” (p. 39) and that mainstream media is untrustworthy. It also promotes white nationalist
thought by far-right thinkers such as Paul Joseph Watson, Milo Yiannopoulos, and Stefan
Molyneux (Tripodi, 2017).

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students – which is estimated to sit significantly above $100,000 (Aisch,

Buchanan, Cox, & Quealy, 2017) but still significantly higher than the US
median household income, which was reported to be approximately $61,937 in
2018 (Guzman, 2019).

Manufacturing victimhood
Overwhelmingly, CRs told me they felt frustrated by how they were treated by
their peers and professors for identifying as “conservatives.” Describing these
feelings of marginalization, most CRs recalled moments of being called names
or silenced in classrooms. Regarding this seemingly ubiquitous experience,
Shannon even joked, “You’re lucky if people don’t call you a racist, homophobic
bigot.” This theme of victimhood is highly similar to findings by other scholars
studying conservative students (Andrew, 1997; Binder & Wood, 2012; Kidder,
2016; Sales & Laub, 2018; Steinmetz/Fullerton, 2018). Indeed, it may even be
reflective of broader mechanisms of melodrama in the US (Anker, 2014) and a
reinforcement of what Lowndes (2017) would describe as producer and parasitic
language. Yet, when CRs described these attacks – and how they felt they should
respond – three themes emerged: Clouded History, Appropriation of Liberal
Thought, and Disrupted Hierarchies.

Clouded history
CRs frequently expressed frustration toward and felt attacked by dominant
historical narratives. Reflecting many other CRs’ beliefs, Shawn, a male upper-
level and general member, said, “I don't like this narrative that America was
built on slavery or oppression. Obviously, we know that, but saying that America
is a terrible nation won’t get us anywhere.” Like many other CRs, Shawn
critiqued historical accounts of the US, suggesting that acknowledging slavery,
for example, was detrimental to the development of the country. This mentality
was also present throughout meetings; during one such gathering in November,
board members walked club members through a PowerPoint they developed
entitled, “Were the pilgrims villains like your teachers might say?” Slides
included topics such as “Why the liberals think [Thanksgiving is] evil” and “Why
you shouldn’t feel guilty.” One board member told the club, “Conquering land is
a thing that has happened throughout all of human history. Europeans had
better tools, so the Natives didn’t really protect their land all that well.” Feeling
uncomfortable with the violent history of the US, CRs suggested it was best not
to acknowledge the past. A better approach, they believed, was to augment these
narratives in a manner that portrayed white Americans in a positive light at the
expense of those oppressed.

Appropriating liberal thought / terminology

CRs also commonly expressed their feelings of marginality through
appropriation of liberal thought/terminology, including “coming out of the

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closet,” “safe spaces,” and “diversity of opinion.” This terminology, however,

also had the added effect of furthering an “us versus them” mentality,
constructing boundaries around political leanings and racial backgrounds.
In the LGBTQ community, the expression “coming out of the closet” signifies
the announcement of one’s sexuality to the public (Tamashiro, 2005). Framing
the campus as an oppressively liberal environment, CRs utilized this expression
to illuminate their feelings of marginality. “Closet conservatives” I was told, was
a term used by the club to describe conservative students who were not public
about their political views. Similarly, the phrase “coming out as conservative”
was commonly used to describe a moment when conservative students publicly
announced their political leanings. Russell, a multiracial male upper-level and
board member, summarized what many other CRs felt:

Wearing a [conservative] shirt, standing in line [to attend a conservative

activity], openly putting a [conservative] sticker on your water bottle, it’s hard
because it ‘outs’ you. … It’s hard to come out as Republican. … I wonder what it
must have been like in the early 1900’s to come out publicly or proudly as gay.
And I feel like I almost do by being conservative. … The hate and resentment we
get over time from peers or people we thought were friends is astonishing.

An announcement of one’s conservative political beliefs – as many CRs

explained – frequently resulted in backlash and ridicule from friends. As a
result, CRs believed it was important to “come out” only when one felt
comfortable. For example, Lisa, a white Christian female under-level and board
member, said she frequently told incoming freshmen: “It’s okay if you’re not
ready to talk with other people about [being conservative] yet. There are a lot of
closeted conservatives around campus.” CRs felt they had to “pass” within the
dominant liberal community, which served as a barrier to their freedom of
expression.
CRs also appropriated the phrase, “safe space” to highlight their desire for
freedom from what they perceived as hostile dominant liberal perspectives. In
fact, at many meetings, board members welcomed club members by saying,
“this is your safe space.” When asked why CRs frequently used this expression,
Cheryl, a white Catholic upper-level and general member, replied, “It can get
heated within the club, but no one is going to yell ‘bigot’ at you. That’s why I
kind of like the safe space analogy.” Randy, a white Catholic male under-level
and board member, added, “We help kids feel safe in a place that might be
intimidating.” Jane, a white Christian under-level and general member,
compared CRs to other spaces on campus, saying, “It’s a little nice safe haven
like the Black Student Union. You can be around people with similar viewpoints
like you.” Similar to the LGBTQ epithet, the “safe space” analogy allowed the
group to further strengthen a sense of community within the club by identifying
themselves as an underdog within a liberal system.
CRs, while critical of broader diversity and inclusion initiatives that they

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believed were typically supported by left-leaning groups, nevertheless supported

one form of diversity: “of thought.” For example, the club’s Facebook page
stated that one of their overarching goals was to “foster intellectual diversity.”
When I asked Shawn, a male upper-level and general member, what this meant,
he responded, “Diversity of thought…is being driven into the ground, taking
second to diversity of color. But I believe it is more valuable having diversity of
ideas rather than one single megaphone.” For Shawn and other CRs, diversity
and inclusion initiatives felt burdensome, erasing their larger identities as
conservatives. At another moment, reflecting on a recent WestU initiative to
increase racial diversity on campus, Jane said, “I never understood how let’s say
a Black student comes to a college that’s primarily White and they feel uneasy.
... It doesn’t make sense why we need to force diversity. But I fully understand
the importance of diversity of opinion.”5 For CRs, racial and other forms of
diversity were inconsequential compared to political diversity, which was
considered a necessity. At the expense of other “underrepresented” groups, CRs
validated their own feelings of marginality, drew boundaries around whiteness,
and erased systemic oppression.

Disrupting hierarchies
In the Fall 2018 term, Judge Brett Kavanaugh was in the midst of a highly
contentious confirmation hearing for the US Supreme Court. Kate Manne
(2018), in her analysis of Dr. Christine Blasey Ford’s sexual assault allegations
against Judge Kavanaugh contextualized by other #MeToo moments,
highlighted the term “himpathy” to explore the ways in which sympathy was
shifted away from female victims and toward male perpetrators. Similarly,
many CRs felt that men – and particularly white men – faced unprecedented
persecution, which should be noted, is a common trope in white male
victimization and a hegemonic sentiment that has pervaded US culture for
decades (King, 2012; Robinson, 2000). Said Lisa, a white Christian female
under-level and board member, “I consider myself a feminist but not the type
who is around today. I define feminism as women equal to men. But nowadays
women tear down men. … There is definitely a war on men.” Sympathizing with
male perpetrators, Lisa and many other white women in the club believed it was
their duty to support these white men who represented a significant portion of
the club and further fed the narrative of victimhood. Comparatively, almost
every white male whom I interviewed, when asked how they felt as a
conservative navigating a college campus, instead expressed frustration with
their feelings of helplessness as a white male. Encapsulating these feelings, Billy,
a white Mormon upper-level and general member said, “I’m a normal white guy
who has no problem with anyone, but it seems like everyone has a problem with
white dudes.” He and other CRs noted feelings of displacement – both on

5While it may have been worthwhile to challenge CRs’ views by asking harder questions, I
decided it was important to maintain the genuine relationships I had developed as well as
ensure I did not compromise my research method – snowball sampling – which relied on trust
(Charmaz, 2014; Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2010).

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campus and by the media – as though white men were being attacked in ways
that other “underrepresented” groups were not.

Community as a remedy
At WestU, CRs used provocation – similar to CRs studied by Binder and Wood
(2012) – and drew ideological boundaries between themselves and liberals –
similar to CRs studied by Kidder (2016). Yet unlike CRs studied by these
scholars – and following what may appear to be a national trend at other college
Republican clubs (Godfrey, 2018; Martinez, 2016; Steinmetz/Fullerton, 2018) –
CRs at WestU also used these tactics to foster a collectivized, hyper-loyal, and
policed identity around President Donald Trump.

De-individualization
A respite from the perceived hostility and sense of victimhood faced on campus,
club meetings and events became an important site for community development
and group thought. CRs encouraged each other to become unabashedly
conservative, by being provocative publicly. When asked what constituted
successful events, Lynn, a white Christian female upper-level and board
member who reflected many other CR perspectives, said:

‘Every year, we have a free speech wall. Literally, all we do is put up a wall and
people go crazy. I think it’s important to do things that are outrageous and
provocative to see that the basic concept of these liberal policies can be
outrageous. … Like oh, whoa, that is kind of a crazy idea.’

A free speech wall, intended to commemorate the fall of the Berlin Wall, is a
common political event that has been noted at other college Republican clubs
for at least the past 15 years (Binder & Wood, 2012). At WestU, however, this
large plywood board in the middle of campus was more commonly recognized
as a vehicle to spark reactions due to the Islamophobic, anti-Semitic, racist,
misogynistic and transphobic slurs written by students. This, in turn, provoked
frequent op-eds in the WestU newspaper, protests across campus, and
occasional news coverage by national media outlets. In previous years, CRs also
hosted “Empty Gun Holster Day” to encourage CRs to parade around campus
with an empty gun holster, as well as invited self-identified far-right speakers
who preached racial superiority. Events such as these felt empowering to CRs
who believed it helped foster an important sense of community. As Randy, a
white Catholic male under-level and board member, explained, “The free speech
wall, I helped put the nails in that. I love being part of something bigger.”
Events and social gatherings produced a sense of electrifying excitement and a
social cohesion. At meetings and events, particularly those that sparked protests
outside, CRs welcomed each other with large smiles and hugs, rarely permitting
anyone to sit alone. After one such contentious event, when CRs were met with a

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group of about seven protesters wearing black hoodies and with handkerchiefs
over their faces, yelling and taking photos, CRs began wrapping their arms
around each other, chuckling as they walked by. “Good to know that they’re
brave people” one white male CR said sarcastically, while another joked, “I’m a
little underwhelmed.” Comradery among CRs appeared to be reinforced by
verbal attacks from other students, helping legitimize their actions.
During one club meeting, while discussing a recent on-campus racist event, a
white male general member proudly regaled CRs with stories from attending an
open-forum put on by the WestU student government. Dismissing the
emotional toll that the racist event had on multiple student communities
(particularly the Black, Latinx, and queer communities), the member proudly
explained how he represented the club’s voice: “I was the only one who wasn’t
crying and stuff. It makes us look really good. We’re not the party to bitch and
whine.” CRs relished the belief that their inflammatory actions, which
represented their collectivized standpoint, would be propagated to by other
students.6 During another interview, when asked about inclusion on campus,
Kevin, a white Catholic male upper-level and general member who also
identified as a member of the on campus Turning Point USA club, said, “I’m
always open-minded, but excluding Turning Point USA, the Republican club is
the most open-minded club on campus. The rest of the clubs are basically
fucking Communists. It’s really sad.” Many CRs, some of whom were also
members of the on campus Turning Point USA club, drew boundaries around
tolerance, suggesting that acceptance was found only in libertarian and
conservative spaces, while insinuating that liberals reflected or were
manipulated by radical-left thought.
There also appeared to be an ostensibly growing consensus to refuse ruling out
violence against liberals. Kevin, when asked what he thought about CR’s record
of inviting provocative speakers, explained, “We need someone to [verbally]
punch back and hit people. I’m willing to accept [a speaker] who is a little rough
around the edges but is able to fight for us. It’s either that or capitulating.”
Similarly, when asked what he would do if he faced provocative protests from
liberal groups, John, a white male upper-level and general member, said, “It’s
good to get a little bruised up sometimes.” Violent rhetoric was also common
during meetings and social events. During one meeting, a white female board
member suggested CRs even host an “alt-Right fight night” and pit a liberal
against a CR.

Legitimized viewpoint
While there was some internal debate regarding the club’s official view on issues
such as local candidates during elections, CRs vehemently defended almost
every statement/action expressed by Trump, coalescing around him rather than

6While I did not explicitly study relationships between CRs and other WestU clubs, relations
seemed mutually antagonistic.

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an ideology. Life-size cutouts of Donald and Melania Trump and flags stating
“Make America Great Again” (MAGA) – the official slogan during Trump’s 2016
presidential campaign – commonly draped the walls of club meetings and
events. CRs also adapted the MAGA slogan, signing most emails, “Make WestU
Great Again” and selling $25 red hats with the slogan as well. Meeting
PowerPoints almost always included pictures of Trump and frequently included
Trump-themed dating advice. At one meeting, for example, a risqué picture of
Melania Trump was followed by the words, “Work hard so you can land
someone banging and way out of your league like Trump did.” During the
weekly club meeting speed-dating activity in which CRs were paired together,
the Board asked questions such as, “Why is Hilary Clinton the worst?”; “Why do
you like Trump?”; and “Which of Trump’s policies is your favorite?”. The Wi-Fi
password at the unofficial house for club parties was, “Trump2020,” and the
group text for all CRs was entitled, “God King Trump.”
Anyone who disagreed with or did not support Trump was excluded from the
club. Said Annie, a white Christian under-level in the process of leaving the
club:

'Ever since winter last year, it went downhill. The Libertarians that wanted to
drink and have fun were pushed out because they weren’t conservative enough.
They were considered RINOS – Republican in name only. The club thought my
friends weren’t conservative enough because they didn’t like Trump. To be
conservative in the club now is to be as right-wing as you can. … Our club has
become the most extreme conservatives on campus, some of the most extreme
right-wingers. That’s why I’m not that involved this year. I don’t even challenge
them. I feel outnumbered. I don’t want to be on the girls’ bad side. I’m worried
they’re going to spread rumors about me. … They witch-hunted a lot of people
out of the club.’

After Trump was elected, the board created socially unpleasant experiences for
those who did not support the new president, using gossip to attack dissenters’
social reputations and encouraging them to leave the club. Members who stood
up to voice disagreement with this practice were met with a similar reaction.
One such member, Tim, a Catholic Asian male upper-level and former CR who
was forced out of the club after criticizing this exclusionary tactic, said, “The
purpose of the club is to be Trump’s puppets. …They go out of their way to
defend [Trump] on every basis imaginable.” More than merely defend Trump,
however, it seemed that CRs did not tolerate almost any form of disagreement.
In fact, for the most part, CRs did not challenge the board’s decisions. Many CRs
did not feel comfortable explaining what they disliked about the club, fearful of
becoming social pariahs. One CR during our interview frequently asked to
obscure their demographic information, as well as speak “off the record.”
Another interviewee, Cheryl, a white Catholic upper-level and general member,
felt comfortable saying only, “If you’ve done something to upset one or multiple
women on the board then it can kind of, word spreads quickly.” Suggesting that
backlash came from the female-dominated board, Cheryl hinted at the policing,

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but quickly asked to move on to the next question. Fear was a powerful vehicle
in the club’s regulation of their internal discourse.
This policing extended outside the club as well. At one meeting, after receiving
backlash from the Republican party for inviting a controversial speaker to
campus, a white Christian female under-level and board member said to her
fellow cheering CRs, “Local Republicans are pushing against us. I say they’re not
real Republicans.” In another incident, in response to a WestU policy that
increased student fees for out-of-state students to support working-class
students – who were more likely to be students of color – a different white
female board member spoke on a national conservative media outlet where she
argued that WestU was cutting enrollment for white students. After WestU
immediately released a counterstatement pointing out that it was illegal for the
University to consider race in its enrollment process, the national media outlet
apologized for falsely reporting on the issue. In response, CRs then released
their own statement, denouncing both the conservative media outlet and WestU
for their “promotion of identity politics.” Despite receiving financial support
from the off-campus Republican party, CRs still challenged those Republicans
for disagreeing with them. Preaching dogma which, in its dominant form, rested
on an unwavering idolization of Trump, CRs regulated discourse and ostracized
those with whom they disagreed.

Women in the club

While most CRs were white men, the club’s board was composed almost entirely
of white women, a phenomenon that may be increasingly common at other
college Republican clubs across the US (Sales & Laub, 2018). At WestU, when
asked why she thought this phenomenon was occurring, Annie’s response
reflected many other women’s perspectives:

It’s really nice to be a woman in the club because there aren’t many of you, so
you’re coveted. Like people will say damn she’s hot. If you’re a Republican girl,
you’re way more attractive to conservative guys. … I love to bake and clean, but I
can also party hard. Other guys would look down on that. Certainly, liberal guys
would look down on that. Like oh, you just want to be a housewife?
Conservatives think you're an awesome independent woman.

Annie, like other CRs, embraced a belief that the small population of Republican
women made them more desirable to their male counterparts because of their
aspiration, among other activities, to perform domestic work. Similarly, Lisa a
white Christian female under-level and board member said:

Feminists tell women that if you want to stay at home then you’re less than. It’s
unnatural and unhealthy. Science has proven that men are better at spatial
reasoning skills. There are so many things that women are good at, why can’t
they recognize that?

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This was a common trope heard from many board members. Being a woman in
the club appeared to grant a sense of empowerment and validation toward a
hope to become a housewife. In fact, at almost every club meeting, the board led
“group dating sessions” where they informally paired themselves with different
men, answering questions about their personal lives. While male CRs typically
groaned, shuffling their feet and glancing across the room uncomfortably, the
women nevertheless cheerfully counted off everyone, forming different groups.
While never explicitly discussed – at least in group settings or with me – it
appeared that female CRs had a shared goal of finding conservative husbands,
marrying, and having children. It was apparent that these women’s’ objectives
were rooted in a desire to find a husband who would shape their future.

Discussion and conclusion

Coinciding with Trump’s presidential win, WestU’s college Republican club – a
large group of white men led by a small team of white women – became one of
the largest clubs on campus. Feeling victimized by liberals and people of color,
CRs augmented their perceptions of US history to gain a sense of empowerment.
Fortifying their in-groupness, CRs encouraged coalescing around Trump as an
idol – rather than uniting under a set ideology. Protecting these values, CRs
seemed to promote a singular opinion, which was regulated through violent
rhetoric and a fear of internal social ridicule. While boundary work and in-
group policing are certainly not unique to WestU's CRs (Oren, 1986; Robbins,
2002), given the current political environment under Trump’s presidency, such
policing may be reflective of more consequential constructs of victimized
privilege. Indeed, individually, these strategies could be harmless, but taken
together suggest a striking parallel with “mobilizing passions” (Paxton, 2004, p.
41) historically associated with rises in fascist governments. To be clear, it is
certainly not my attempt to identify CRs as fascists; even defining fascism –
which is understood by its elements rather than its historical manifestations –
can be challenging (Harris et al., 2017; Paxton, 2004; Stanley, 2018). That said,
there have been fascist elements increasingly documented in governments
across the globe (Giroux, 2018; Stanley, 2018) and as I argue, these fascist
elements may grow when we ignore their intellectual centers.
In fascism, there is a “sense of aggrieved victimization” (Stanley, 2018, p. 90).
Constructing a sense of loss within privileged groups while gaining power from
the perceived loss, fascism encourages “replacement of reasoned debate with
immediate sensual experience[s]” (Paxton, 2004, p. 17) causing a reliance on
emotions rather than rationality (Harris et al., 2017; Snyder, 2017). Similarly,
CRs, a group primarily of white men led by a small team of white women with
deference to masculinity, identified themselves as victims while naming liberals
and people of color as a cause for their believed oppression. Imitating the
mental shift from reality to fiction explored by Hannah Arendt (1951), CRs’
sense of victimhood contributed to their ability to produce an obfuscated
history, distorting and/or dismissing historical documentations of oppression

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toward underrepresented groups in order to build their “mythic past” (Stanley,

2018, p. 7; Traverso, 2019). Pointing to the club as a safe haven from hostility on
campus (such hostility, it should be noted, was intentionally exacerbated by
their own provocative measures), CRs felt an overwhelming sense of
community, which frequently slipped into an erasure of individuality, another
common trait in fascism (Ushpiz, 2015), and was replaced with a singular truth
centered around Trump. In fact, almost every club activity, meeting, and event
featured an element of Trump, be it himself, his family, or his “Make America
Great Again” slogan. This unwavering faith in a male leader who “stands to the
nation like the patriarchal father stands to his family” (Goodman, Shaikh, &
Stanley, 2018) is, of course, another hallmark of fascism (Paxton, 2004; Stanley,
2018). Any criticism of Trump was met with immediate exclusionary tactics as
CRs believed their “legitimate viewpoint” (Stanley, 2018, p. 35; Paxton, 2004)
left little room for debate or alterative understandings. Removing CRs who did
not support Trump, CRs used threats of social ostracization to police this
dogma. While no physical acts of violence were ever committed leading up to
and during the ethnography, the language used by CRs evoking violence as a
form of political imagery is important as words do not only “produce meaning”
but “generate consequences” (Giroux, 2018, p. 10). Furthermore, in fascism, in-
groupness is policed to a level of violent enactment as reality is distorted into a
“war of survival” (Ezekiel, 2002, p. 156; Arendt, 1951; Paxton, 2004; Snyder,
2017; Stanley, 2018; Traverso, 2019). Lastly, white female CRs, by identifying
potential husbands who would dictate their future, mirrored the common role of
women in fascist governments to bolster patriarchal values (Goodman, Shaikh,
& Stanley, 2018; Paxton, 2004; Harris et al., 2017; Traverso, 2019).
At first glance, CRs at WestU may appear contradictory to current US and global
trends. On a macro-scale, in 2019, approximately 59% of Americans 18 to 24
identified as Democrats while 33% identified as Republican (Badger & Miller,
2019). The percentage of Americans of all voting ages who identify as
Republican has been slowly declining since 1992 (Saad, 2019) while among
college students who identify as “right-of-center”, Trump’s approval ratings fell
approximately 20% in his first year in office (Della Volpe, 2017). Furthermore,
in the last decade, there has been a steady decrease in the number of incoming
first-time, full-time freshmen who identify as “right-of-center,” falling to a level,
20%, last seen in the late 1990’s (Eagan, 2016). That said, in recent years,
millions of dollars have been pouring into college campuses to support
conservative students, financed by groups such as Young Americans for
Freedom (YAF), the Heritage Foundation, and the Koch Brothers (Kotch, 2017).
Following Trump’s initial presidential announcement, there have also been
reports of a sharp increase in the number of chartered college Republican clubs
(Godfrey, 2018) and Turning Point USA clubs (Kotch, 2017) across the US.
Additionally, as the US becomes a majority-minority country, white Americans
– regardless of political identification – are projected to increasingly support
conservative policies (Craig & Richeson, 2014).
While this argument is based on an ethnographic exploration of a single club,
there should be similar ethnographic accounts, particularly on both more and

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less ethno-racially diverse campuses, rural and metropolitan communities, and

within both pro- and anti- Trump states. Furthermore, with the introduction of
Turning Point USA, there should also be greater research exploring how their
novel involvement may shift campus terrains, as well as further research into
the interactions of algorithms, media outlets, and college students (see Tripodi,
2017). For liberal activists, I believe it becomes increasingly critical to pay
attention to and understand the driving/mobilizing forces behind conservative
college student activism. This is a population that has historically been
overlooked (Munson, 2010) and that is increasingly observed to act in ways
paralleling national political trends (Curato, Hammond, & Min, 2019; Frazee,
2019; Godfrey, 2018; Sales & Laub, 2018; Stanley, 2018). It becomes
increasingly crucial to engage with these actors during their formative years as
they become future conservative leaders and voters (Andrew, 1997; Binder &
Wood, 2012). As the practice of fascist behaviors may grow when we ignore
their intellectual centers, liberal college activists therefore cannot afford to
overlook these important players; they must instead anticipate and respond to
the unique ways in which their conservative college peers operate and react
(Binder & Wood, 2012). In other words, “the ghosts of fascism should … educate
us and imbue us with a spirit of civic justice and collective courage in the fight
for a substantive and inclusive democracy” (Giroux, 2018, p. 23). These threats,
while disconcerting, must also provide us with a sense of empowerment to
promote change. This is a group that can offer key understandings into the
future operations of the conservative movement.

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About the author

Noah Krigel holds a B.A. in Sociology with minors in Science, Technology, &
Society and Women & Gender Studies. He lives in San Francisco and can be
contacted at noahkrigel AT gmail.com.

Acknowledgements
I feel grateful for the mentorship from Dr. Joan Meyers and Dr. Coleen Carrigan
– both their keen insights have brought this paper to life. I’m also indebted to
Suzanne Stroh, Dr. Patricia Frumkin, Mike Krigel, and Maya Rotman for
reviewing earlier drafts. Lastly, thank you to the editors of Interface and the two
anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments.

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Looking to ‘Bern’ for inspiration: the future of the

Pro-Palestinian movement in Australia
Rohan Davis

Abstract
What is happening with Pro-Palestinian Movement in Australia? What can it
learn, if anything, from the modern political situation in the US? How can it
become more relevant to, and improve its image amongst, ordinary
Australians? In addressing these questions this article is inspired by the great
deal of work undertaken within the cult of personality and sociology of
intellectuals tradition. This article highlights the increased prominence the
Palestinian struggle for self-determination has received in the US since 2016,
and reflects on and suggests changes the Australian-based pro-Palestinian can
make to increase its exposure, highlight the current plight of Palestinians
living in the Occupied Territories and ultimately help fulfil the long-held
Palestinian desire for their own state.

Key words: Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Australian politics, US politics, Bernie

Sanders, cult of personality, sociology of intellectuals.

Introduction
Social movements anti-colonial and anti-imperial in nature are often treated in
inimical ways by the political and intellectual groups, namely the elite, with
vested interests in maintaining the status quo. The pro-Palestinian movement
championing self-determination for Palestinians living under Occupation in
their homeland has often been treated in this way in both the US and Australia.
The global movement continues to find many allies throughout Europe
(Barghouti, 2011), particularly in the Irish nations (Abu-Ayyash, 2015) who have
experienced similar struggles against colonial and imperial enterprises, however
it remains largely friendless amongst the prominent political, intellectual and
media forces within Australia.
Australia’s duopolous democratic political system mirrors the US. Both parties,
Labour and the Coalition, have always had a stranglehold at the ballot box. Both
parties also share the foreign policy posture that Australia must remain
unwavering in its support for Israel, and must push back against both internal
and international criticism of Israel. Australia remains one of the few nations in
the world consistent in its support for Israel at the United Nations (Becker et al.,
2014), and the dominant political, intellectual and media elements who drive
much of the public discourse within Australian want this situation to remain the
same.

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All of this is unacceptable to the Pro-Palestinian movement operating in

Australia, which has expressed itself in some interesting and unique ways. It is
best characterised as a loosely connected movement with key elements
operating with a strong presence in Australia’s most populous cities. The
movement’s core elements include Australian Friends of Palestine Association
in Adelaide, The Australia Palestine Advocacy Network in Canberra, Palestine
Fair Trade Australia in Sydney, and Friends of Palestine Western Australia in
Perth. There are two interrelated key aims uniting these groups: 1) support the
Palestinian people in their struggle for self-determination, and 2) raise
awareness about the brutal nature of the Occupation amongst the Australian
politic and policy and decision-makers.
Australia’s location vis-à-vis the Palestinian Territories geographically, and the
relatively small population of those of Palestinian extraction living in the
Oceanic nation (rough estimates put the population of Palestinian-Australians
at around 7000) mean these are challenging tasks. Nonetheless this has not
dampened the passion these groups have displayed for the cause. A close
monitoring of the functioning of these groups in recent times reveals some
interesting and effective approaches to helping achieve these aims and goals.
There have been many fund raising activities, including dinners with visiting
international speakers / Palestinian activists with on-the-ground experience in
the West Bank and Gaza. There have also been events like Run for Palestine,
organised study tours for Australians to visit the Palestinian Territories, and
street protests, which are typically in reaction to the latest major strike in the
Territories or to commemorate important days.
It is typically the case that these events receive very little, if indeed any,
attention from the mainstream Australian media. Activists using social media
and alternative media like Green Left Weekly and the now defunct Indymedia
have done their best to help fill this void, however their reach has proven to be
very limited. Obviously their readership is nowhere near that of the Australian
mainstream news media. It is also the regretful reality for the Australian arm of
the Pro-Palestinian movement and its supporters that they are not taken
anywhere near as seriously as they would like to be by the majority of
Australians. Visiting their demonstrations or occasional activist movie night
held at universities or small independent movie theatres reveals the average
Australian pays the movement little if any attention.
Of the Australians who have some kind of awareness about the existence and
nature of the pro-Palestinian movement, it is very likely they will erroneously
conflate the case with Islamic radicalism and terrorism. This is due in large part
to the mainstream news media operating in Australia and concerted efforts by
the comparatively well-funded and well-connected Australian-based pro-Israeli
movement. The mainstream news media, which is dominated by the Rupert
Murdoch-owned News Corporation, is involved in a sustained process to
represent the Palestinian resistance in ‘Israel’ to be one of the latest
manifestations of the same radical Islamism that has inspired other ‘terrorists’
in places like Afghanistan and Iraq (Han and Rane, 2013) – nations where

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significant numbers of Australian military forces were deployed, and ultimately

killed, alongside the US military as part of the Global War on Terror.
Important research undertaken by Han and Rane (2013) reveals that while the
Australian mass media routinely frame Palestinian resistance to the Occupation
in terms of terrorism, there was a moment in time when the mainstream
Australian news media acknowledged the Occupation of Palestine. Their
extensive qualitative analysis of news articles found these representations
experienced a qualitative shift with the democratic electing of Hamas in 2006.
The Murdoch-owned media in particular chose to drop reference to the
Occupation from their reporting in favour of focusing on Hamas’ calls for
violence resistance against Israel and its general ‘radical’ and ‘terrorist’
behaviour.
In light of these findings, and a range of other and often more recent studies
focusing on the representing of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by the Australian
news media (Manning, 2018; Abdel-Fattah and Saleh, 2019; Kabir, 2007), it is
safe to say the pro-Palestinian movement, just like the Palestinian struggle in
the Occupied Territories, suffers a significant image problem amongst everyday
Australians. This is certainly a serious problem, however the pro-Palestinian
movement and its supporters should take heart in knowing that this situation is
far from terminal. It can be rectified, and one of the chief aims of this work is to
offer some valuable insight as to how this can be achieved. These ideas are
informed by extensive research undertaken in the cult of personality and
sociology of intellectuals traditions, and by casting a critical eye over the Bernie
Sanders political phenomenon in the US.
If our goals are to help raise awareness about the true nature of the Occupation,
and to improve the public profile of the pro-Palestinian movement within
Australia particularly amongst the politic, with a long-term view of helping
bringing about some kind of change to the Australian Government’s current
official stance as unwavering in its support of Israel, then we must first have an
understanding of the major obstacles standing in the way.

Cult of personality
The cult of personality is an interesting and revelatory field of study with
important implications for helping improve both the visibility and influence of
the Australian-based pro-Palestinian movement. The relation between an
appealing personality of a leader or leaders, and the success of social, religious
and political movement to which it is attached is well established (Paltiel, 1983;
Strong and Killingsworth, 2011). On first appearances it is not uncommon for
one to associate the cult of personality phrase and notion with totalitarian
movements and regimes, both historical and modern, such as Joseph Stalin the
former Soviet Union, Kim Jong-Un in North Korea, Mao Zedong in China and,
in more times, Xi Jinping in China. However, it is no longer the case that the
cult of personality exclusively pertains to totalitarian movements. In fact, many
of the ideas within this field of study possess great utility for modern

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movements like the pro-Palestinian movement with far more altruistic

objectives.
Research in the cult personality field reveals that an individual’s charisma and
therefore popular appeal of can be leveraged as a powerful political tool by a
movement to achieve specific political, religious and/or social aims. The kind of
cult of personality we are dealing with here is not the prevailing autocratic idea
of yesteryear typically associated with Stalin in Soviet Union and Mao in
Communist China – the bulk of Western literature in this field certainly does
not advocate for the creating of new, or moulding of current, movements to fit
an authoritarian style in order to take advantage of a charismatic personality.
Rather we are here talking about a more modern conceptualisation that,
amongst other things, utilises the great power of social media for grassroots
mobilisation to purse humanitarian aspirations.
We are able to glean from Lu and Soboleva’s (2014) studying the phenomenon
of the cult of personality in the context of more modern political systems that
some leaders who have achieved political success share similar characteristics.
While Lu and Soboleva are not explicitly advocating for a cult of personality, we
are able to see the critical importance of a political leader having a clear
programme or ideology the politic interprets as providing the answers to
pressing issues, having a broad appeal that translates into political supporters, a
clear programme, mission or ideology, and being embedded within an
established movement or institution possessing the ability to sustain itself.
Their noteworthy research builds on earlier work undertaken by Plamper
(2012). While certainly not advocating for the recreating of a Joseph Stalin style
cult or a cult of personality per se, his research helps bring into view some of the
commonalities between personality cults operating within authoritarian
regimes, and those located and working within more open and free societies.
These similarities include the ability to use the mass media to construct an
appealing image of the leader with the purposes of raising their profile and
garnering widespread support amongst the politic, and having legitimate claims
vis-à-vis the support of a significant part of the population. These are important
findings to keep in mind as we go about analysing the pro-Palestinian
movement operating in Australia, and think about new strategies to be adopted
in order to increase its visibility and influence.

Feeling the Bern

When looking at the political phenomenon that is Bernie Sanders in the US, we
find it satisfies the criteria gleaned from work undertaken by Plamper, Lu and
Soboleva. Sanders has been operating within the established movement that is
the US Democratic Party, which is clearly able to sustain itself given its huge
following and financial resources. His radical anti-establishment political
message has been consistent since his bursting onto the political scene in the
1970s and has proven appealing to large swathes of the US politic particularly
the next generation of political leaders (Sunkara, 2018). Political polling

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consistently reveals millennials have wholeheartedly embraced his personality

and his political agenda (Bahrampour, 2016; Wagner 2015; Savodnik, 2019),
and it is noteworthy the current face of the young and highly mobilised left in
the US, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, is also product of Sanders’ first major tilt /
2016 campaign for the US Presidency.
Much has been written about the charismatic nature of Sanders. Some academic
researchers and mainstream news media writers have used the term
‘Berniemania’ to describe this political phenomenon first taking root in 2016
(Maxwell, 2018; Guentzel, 2016). The coining and repeating of neologisms like
‘Berniemania’ and phrases like ‘feel the Bern’ by those within the academe and
the news media only serves to strengthen the cult of personality that is Bernie
Sanders. Keating (2016) is among those to have studied how Sanders’
charismatic nature during political debates, revealing how Sanders’ deliberate
gesturing achieves positive results with his audience.
Further research by Abdullah, Bare and Burling (2016) found Sanders’ appeal
amongst voters was largely due to his methodical and diplomatic nature, and his
ability to address pressing issues in a serious and thoughtful way. This contrasts
with many of his political opponents who have, for the most part, proven
themselves more arbitrary in their political behaviour and speech. ‘People, who
seem to support a candidate like Sanders’ they found, ‘are probably more
introspective and tend to think a lot of things through a number of times before
deciding on the decisions they should make in everyday life (p.19).’ In short,
Sanders has proven himself to be the thinking man’s man.
Sanders’ political campaign has inspired a grassroots following and revitalized
segments of the US politic who had already succumbed, or looked destined to do
so, to the kind of motivational deficit described by Simon Critchley (2013) as
prevailing within modern liberal Western societies. Critchley makes the
important point politics should be about dedicating ones energies to helping
end injustice and wrongs suffered by the Other. This is a process he describes as
‘infinitely demanding’, meaning more ‘good’ can always be done. Among the
major issues with the modern neo-liberal democratic systems of government we
see in nations like the US and Australia, is the state apparatus has primarily
been conceptualised and utilised as a tool to promote partisan interests.
This prevailing approach to the political is reinforced by many intellectuals who
assume key roles in the functioning of modern societies. As ‘mediators of ideas’
for a politic, or rather an ‘Imagined Community’ as Benedict Anderson (1991)
has famously described, intellectuals play critical roles in translating or creating
information about what is happening ‘out there’ in the social world for their
audiences. They engage in this process despite often having very little, if indeed
any, direct experience with many of the issues and events they are writing
about. ‘Mediators of ideas’ is a phrase commonly used by authors like Gilles
Deleuze (1995) and Thomas Osborne (2004), whose research forms part of what
we call the sociology of intellectuals tradition.

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This phrase is designed to convey the integral role modern intellectuals are
playing in the knowledge-production occurring within todays societies. ‘The
mediator is interested above all in ideas’ writes Osborne, ‘ideas which are going
to make a difference…in some later event (p.381).’ Intellectuals writing in
scholarly journals, newspapers, online and in magazines, are producing a lot of
what we think we know about the nature of the social world. As many writers
rightly acknowledge (Osborne, 2004; Said, 2002; Nazer, 1999; Wilson, 1981), it
is these intellectuals who are ‘producing knowledge’ about the social world in
the form of representations, which are then informing our judgments and
decisions, including foreign policy-making processes.
Since his candidacy in 2016, Sanders has helped in shifting the US political
landscape in such a substantive way that he has been setting Democratic Party
policy. The is perhaps best exhibited by the fact the majority of his Democratic
Party members hold favourable views about democratic socialism as a
legitimate form of governance (Parnes, 2018). This seismic shift means a lot to
close observers of US politics, who no doubt fully appreciate just how poisonous
the term ‘socialism’ and its associated ideas have come to be thought of.
However, what is most pertinent and illuminating here is what Sanders has
been able to achieve for the US manifestation of the pro-Palestinian movement.
Sanders has been able to utilise his cult of personality phenomenon, which has
manifested into the popular and catchy slogan ‘feel the Bern,’ to help put the
Palestinian struggle on the US political agenda. More specifically, he has been
able to leverage his popularity to promote the specific idea that Palestinians, like
all people around the world, have a right to self-determination. This is some
achievement given he is working within a duopolous political context revealing
itself as typically unwavering in its support of Israel; so much so that in some
US states it has been made illegal to criticise Israel in anyway (Younes, 2018).
While his major internal Democratic opponent Hilary Clinton continued to tow
the pro-Israeli line prior to the 2016 US election, Sanders has remained
steadfast in his belief that Palestinians are deserving of a state of their own
rather than having to continue to live under occupation.
Sanders’ long-time and firm commitment to the Palestinian cause has been
music to the ears of many associated with the US-based pro-Palestinian
movement. This movement has responded in kind to his political speeches,
doing their part to support and promote Sanders’ campaign in the hope he will
help bring about a major change to the official foreign policy stance of the US.
There is no doubt the Occupation would look very different without the US’
political backing – not to mention the billions of dollars in ‘aid’ the US provides
Israel each year, which has been used to develop its already impressive military
capability designed in part to sustain the subjugation of the Palestinian
population.

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Lessons for the Australian arm of the Pro-Palestinian

movement
When comparing and contrasting the Sanders situation in the US with the
current political situation in Australia; a nation similar in political structure and
function, we find there is no such cult of personality phenomenon within the
Oceanic nation that has made the struggle for Palestinian self-determination a
key part of their political agenda. As it currently stands, Australia is under the
leadership of an Evangelical Christian (Pentecostal to be specific) leader Prime
Minister Scott Morrison, who like many of his colleagues in the Coalition party
and like the majority of self-confessed followers of Christian-Judeo faiths in the
US, has firm theological ideas about Israel’s claim to the Holy Land. Morrison
was one of the very few leaders around the world who responded in kind to
President Trump’s announcing his intention to move the US embassy from Tel
Aviv to Jerusalem. In December 2018, Morrison told the Australian politic his
government would have no problems in recognising the Holy City as the Israel’s
capital: ‘Australia now recognises West Jerusalem being the seat of the Knesset
and West Jerusalem is the capital of Israel. We look forward to moving our
embassy to West Jerusalem in support of and after a final resolution (Kwan,
2018).’
During this December speech, PM Morrison also spruiked Australia’s close
relationship with Israel, particularly in terms of military exchange and support:
‘The Australian Government will establish a trade and defence office in West
Jerusalem. With deepening defence industry ties and Australia-Israel trade now
running at over $1.3 billion per year, this will help continue to build our strong
bilateral trade relationship (Kwan, 2018).’ This landmark political speech
signalled a more fervent commitment to the Israeli state by a nation who had
already proven itself unwavering in its support. To say this signalling of
Australian foreign policy by Australia’s PM was not well-received by the
Australian-arm of the pro-Palestinian movement and its supporters is an
understatement. President of the Australia Palestine Advocacy Network Bishop
George Browning was spot on when he responded that any claims by Morrison
or his government that Australia supports the establishing of an Palestinian
state were ‘empty words’ designed to placate the many Islamic nations with
whom Australia enjoys close economic relationships (Kwan, 2018).
It is within this political climate the pro-Palestinian movement in Australia has
been crying out for a charismatic leader in the mould of Bernie Sanders. The
human rights of the Palestinian people, which includes freedom of movement
and access to healthcare and other basic life necessities many of us here in
Australia take for granted, in addition to self-determination, has been pushed
off the Australian political agenda. Not only does the movement need a similar
cult of personality phenomenon to spark debate and help bring to light precisely
how Australia’s actions are directly resulting in negative outcomes for the
Palestinian people, it also needs the support from a network of prominent and
influential public intellectuals. What is needed are intellectuals who are driven
by the more lofty goals of shining a light on injustice, rather than a concern with

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advancing their material wealth and political status within a neo-liberal system
which has long demonstrated itself as prioritising economic outcomes ahead of
acting in moral and ethical ways.
Not since the retirement of progressive and Greens Party leader Bob Brown in
2012 has Australia had such a popular and influential personality who has been
committed to the promoting the Palestinian struggle. Brown led the Greens to
its crescendo in terms of popularity amongst the Australian politic, achieving a
primary vote of nearly 14% in the 2010 Federal Election (Holmes and
Fernandes, 2012). This was no mean feat in what was up until this moment in
time, and has since returned to following Brown’s retirement, a duopolous
political system dominated by parties who have consistently failed and proven
unwilling to do anything substantive to help promote the Palestinian plight.
Most importantly, Brown also helped to create a political environment in which
the Israeli Occupation and Australia’s specific role in supporting it were able to
be seriously challenged. For e.g. emboldened by popularity of their leader and
inspired by his desire to shine a light on injustice, West Australian and Greens
senator Scott Ludlam called for an arms embargo on Israel in light of its brutal
subjugation of the Palestinian population, and South Australian colleague Sarah
Hanson-Young backed up these claims when attending protest rallies organised
by the Australian Friends of Palestine advocacy group. All of this was occurring
in 2011 and 2012, when I was student at a popular inner-Melbourne university,
and I could see the important flow on effects with regards to the willingness to
discuss the Occupation on campus. The situation is vastly different now; the
Palestinian-Israel issue and Australia’s involvement in it simply does matter to
students in a way it did nearly a decade ago.
As it stands now the Greens Party is a shadow of itself. It has a leader most
Australians cannot identify with, and its recent political campaigns at Federal
and State levels have been marred by allegations of internal sexual harassment,
bullying (Henriques-Gomes, 2019) and by the endorsing of candidates with
controversial backgrounds especially with regards to the treatment of women
(Willingham, 2018). Any claims by the third most popular party in the
Australian political landscape to some kind of moral and ethical superiority are,
simply put, no longer tenable. Combining this with the fact any substantive
attempts by those associated with the either of the two dominant political
parties to put forth the case for Palestinian determination have been shouted
down and, in the recent case of Melissa Parke, disendorsed, and the net result
has not been positive for the Australian-arm of the pro-Palestinian movement.
Parke was a Western Australian candidate representing the Labour Party at the
2019 Federal Election who was gently persuaded by Labour hierarchy to step
down when her long-time support for the Palestinian struggle came to light. Her
activism included working as a human rights lawyer for the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East from 2002-
2004. Parke’s impressive CV also included assuming an Ambassadorial role for
International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (winner of the 2017
Nobel Peace Prize for its critical role in Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear

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Weapons) and an appointment by the United Nations Human Rights

Commissioner to the Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen to investigate alleged
human rights violations in Yemen. It was her specific views on Palestine
however that made her ‘undesirable’ and politically untenable; a sad reflection
on the current nature of the Australian political landscape.
In order to stay relevant the pro-Palestinian needs a new charismatic
personality in the mould of Bernie Sanders. A leader able to act as a vehicle for
the Palestinian cause and arouse the kind of political debate about the
Occupation that is so desperately needed in Australia, and hopefully inspire the
next generation of leaders currently studying in Australian universities. The
movement needs a cult of personality with the kind of mass appeal amongst
millennials that Sanders currently enjoys in the US. Additionally, the movement
needs a cohort of public intellectuals located within the mainstream news media
dedicated to prosecuting the case that Australia should be helping to end the
ongoing colonisation of Palestine, rather than strengthening existing and
pursuing new (military) relationships that only assist Israeli forces in their
stranglehold on the Palestinian Territories. Whether or not the Australian
academe currently possesses the ability to produce these kinds of intellectuals
given the neo-liberalisation of these learning spaces is a matter for further
discussion.
The alternative is the status quo will remain. Australia will remain among the
handful of nations around the world who enjoys a pariah status, particularly
amongst Islamic nations, because of its unwavering support for Israel. The
Australian mainstream media will also continue on largely unimpeded in its
piecemeal covering of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the event the media
does choose to cover the issue in any substantive way, it will continue to use
frames representing pro-Palestinian forces as radical Islamists and terrorists in
an attempt to elicit feelings of anger and condemnation within the Australian
public. These are not viable nor acceptable outcomes for a movement that
continues to watch what is left of the Palestinian Territories slowly disappear,
and its children forced to live in abject poverty in Gaza, the West Bank, and in
refugee camps in neighbouring nations.

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winning-the-black-vote
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McAlpine over another questionable lyric. ABC News. Retrieved from:
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Younes, A. (2018, May 17) Critics denounce South Carolina's new 'anti-
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About the author:

Rohan Davis holds a PhD from RMIT University in Melbourne, Australia. He is
the author of two books, Western Imaginings: The Intellectual Contest to
Define Wahhabism (Cairo & New York: American University in Cairo Press,
2018) and Next Stop, Tehran: The Neo-Conservative Campaign for War With
Iran (Washington & London: Academica Press, 2020). He can be contacted at
davisrohan86 AT gmail.com

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Volume 12 (1): 527 – 558 (July 2020) Zeller, Rethinking demobilisation

Rethinking demobilisation: concepts, causal logic,

and the case of Russia’s For Fair Elections movement
Michael C. Zeller

Abstract
The study of social movement organisations (SMOs) has tended to converge on
the initial, upward trajectory and most intense activity of SMOs, that is,
mobilisation and campaigning. Comparatively little attention has focused on
the downward slope: how do movements falter and fail; how do SMOs
demobilise? Recent work has sought to fill this lacuna. Davenport’s (2015)
theorisation is the latest, most useful addition to the topic. Yet existing theories
still omit facets of demobilisation and bear the mark of over-reliance on case
inference. This article addresses these persistent conceptual problems. First, it
argues for a reformulation of Davenport’s theorisation of SMO demobilisation,
re-aggregating demobilising factors internal to SMOs and broadening the
scope of external factors to include the repressive activities of non-state agents.
Next, the article asserts that the causal logic of demobilising factors is
complex: the concurrence of factors is what produces demobilisation (this is
‘conjunctural causation’) and multiple combinations of factors can cause
demobilisation (this is ‘equifinality’). Finally, the article demonstrates the
analytical utility of the proposed conceptual framework and concomitant
causal logic by briefly analysing the case of the For Fair Elections (FFE)
movement organisation in Russia in 2011-2012. This case exhibits the
multiplicity of internal strains and external pressures that converge to
produce demobilisation. Taken together, the article’s conceptual framework
and empirical example provide a guide for identifying, analysing, and
characterising SMO demobilisation.

Keywords: demobilisation, social movements, SMOs, Russia, For Fair Elections

movement

The study of social movements has long concentrated on mobilising and

campaigning, that is, how movements get moving and then move. Yet this
concentration on the initial upward slope and plateau of the life of movements
deprived the latter, downward trajectory of much scholarly focus. How do
movements falter and fail? What takes them from the apex of their strength and
brings them low? At one level, demobilisation is simply the partner process of
mobilisation. What goes up must come down. But at closer inspection the
processes of demobilisation that social movement organisations (SMOs)
undergo is composed of different elements; not the mere failure to continue
mobilising, but resulting from different conjunctions of demobilising pressures.

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Some recent research—for instance, Lapegna (2013), Davenport (2015) and

Demirel-Pegg (2017)—has gone some way toward building understanding and
explanation of demobilisation. Yet existing theorisation is sometimes vague or
else excessively particular, distorted by induction from case studies. While case
studies can provide rich empirical depth, they cannot be representative; as such,
deriving generalizable theory from single or small numbers of case studies is a
shaky proposition. Further study is needed to create a more durable theory of
social movement demobilisation.
This article contributes to that research agenda by addressing the question:
what demobilising factors are omitted or obscured by existing theorisation? In
answering this question, the article advances a ‘descriptive argument’ (Gerring
2012), that is, an answer to two ‘what’ questions: (1) what causal factors produce
SMO demobilisation and (2) in what manner do those factors have a causal
effect? Davenport (2015) provides the best existing theorisation of SMO
demobilisation,1 but inference from a single-case study produces a few
significant omissions and misapprehensions. I provide a revision of Davenport’s
theorisation, most notably by incorporating Earl’s (2003, 2004) concept of
‘social control,’ which yields a typology (Gerring 2012, 727) of demobilising
factors, and by specifying important causal features of demobilisation processes.
To underscore the advantages of this revision—particularly in regards to the
demobilising pressure imposed by non-state agents and the causal complexity of
demobilisation—the article illustrates the conceptual framework with the case of
Russia’s For Fair Elections SMO, source of the largest demonstrations in the
country since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In Davenport’s
theorisation, this would be (to some extent) a deviant case (Gerring 2007), but
revising Davenport fits it within a fuller coherent framework. The article thereby
contributes a more comprehensive theorisation of SMO demobilising factors
and the manner in which those factors have a causal effect.
I begin by reviewing the existent research on demobilisation, synthesising
research from a few fields of study that address the issue but between which
there has been little communication. Secondly, I formulate a conception of
demobilisation and its causes. This involves discussing demobilising pressures
inside a SMO, pressures outside a SMO, as well as the causal nature of these
pressures in demobilisation processes. Thirdly, I apply the paper’s
conceptualisation to the case of the Russian For Fair Elections SMO that
emerged in 2011 and began to demobilise after the presidential inauguration of
Vladimir Putin in May 2012. Interpreting this case with the revised
conceptualisation of demobilisation reveals omissions and shortcomings within
Davenport’s conception. Lastly, I identify some areas in which study of
demobilisation can progress and contribute to better understanding of social
movements.

1 That is, demobilisation at the meso- or organisational-level of analysis.

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Demobilisation research
At first glance, demobilisation2 is a simple concept, the complement of
mobilisation. Tilly’s (1978: 54) definition typifies this: “Mobilisation: the extent
of resources under the collective control of the contender; as a process, an
increase in the resources or in the degree of collective control (we can call a
decline in either one demobilisation).” Yet this (parenthetical) inverse
formulation obscures the peculiarities of demobilisation, its distinct conditions
and causal mechanisms, and may encourage the notion that it is the mere
condition of a failure to maintain mobilisation. This false impression is perhaps
compounded by the paucity of demobilisation research. Scholars have noted the
relatively sparse exploration of demobilisation phenomena (Fillieule 2015), a
sizeable gap in the field. This is not to say that scholarship has altogether
ignored demobilising phenomena; on the contrary, there is rich case study data
on several forms of demobilisation. But these studies are scattered across
several research silos and frequently marked by descriptive specificity at the
expense of theory building. Demobilisation research should be positioned
within broader conceptual frameworks, facilitating generalizable theorisation.
In studies of terrorism, demobilisation—mostly in its literal military sense—has
been a regular focus. Case studies examine instances of internal division
(Morrison 2013), loss of critical public support (Murua 2017), ceasefire and
negotiation processes (Bláhová and Hladká 2019), and several other
demobilising processes. To date, Cronin (2009) offers the best theoretical
synthesis of demobilising terrorist campaigns. She identifies six patterns of
terrorist demobilisation: “(1) capture or killing the group’s leader, (2) entry of
the group into a legitimate political process, (3) achievement of the group’s
aims, (4) implosion or loss of the group’s public support, (5) defeat and
elimination by brute force, and (6) transition from terrorism into other forms of
violence” (Cronin 2009: 8). Together, these patterns encompass the various
forms of terrorist group demobilisation.
There is some overlap between the demobilisation of terrorists and that of less
violent mobilisations. Achievement of objectives, successful outcomes, ‘positive
demobilisation’ are potential outcomes across mobilisation forms. Entry into
established political processes, too, is an alternative available to many
contentious organisations: ‘institutionalisation,’ as it is commonly termed. Yet
the distinctive features of (wholly) militarised antagonism against the state,
inherent in half of Cronin’s typology (i.e., capture or killing of the leader,
military defeat, and transition to other forms of violence), generally and rightly
sequesters analysis of terrorist demobilisation from other forms.

2The concept of demobilisation is troubled by the use of many different labels. Decline, decay,
decapitation, termination, discontinuation, disbandment—just a few of the terms that have been
applied. I favour ‘demobilisation’ largely because in the existing theorisation and empirical
study it encompasses many previously examined phenomena, it connotatively balances between
the inadvertence of terms like ‘decline’ and the intentionality of words like ‘termination.’

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In a related vein of inquiry, research on ‘anti-regime campaigns’ or ‘regime

change campaigns,’ encompassing violent and militarised action as well as non-
violence3, occasionally considers demobilisation, alongside the more common
interest in outcomes (i.e., success and regime change or failure and regime
continuity). Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) supplement their large cross-case
analysis of regime challenges with in-depth examination of the failed Burmese
uprising in 1988-1990. Internal division and insufficient mobilisation made the
campaign vulnerable to repression, which ultimately effected movement
demobilisation and the reassertion of regime control. Similarly, Davies (2014)
identifies pathways in which non-violent campaigns fail to change the regime
and, concomitantly, demobilise. There is a tendency in this research area to
treat as one the (failed) end of a campaign and the end of a movement or a
movement organisation—a common, but not inevitable concurrence, which
requires greater scrutiny in focused study of demobilisation (see below).
Nevertheless, in highlighting the importance of mobilising supporters, securing
elite defections, dealing with repression, and other elements, analysis of regime
challenges speaks to the demobilising impact of certain factors.
Examination of repression, one category of demobilising factors, has garnered
extensive inquiry all its own. Findings are vexingly inconsistent, though.
Classically, repression can have its intended effect, raising the costs of
participation enough to deter many or most would-be participants (Tarrow
2011). The resultant loss of participants (through deterrence or detention or
some other means) and shrinking opportunity for mobilisation and action
drives demobilisation. Yet repression can also backfire. Gurr’s (1970) landmark
study identified the inciting anger, rather than suffocating despondency, that
repression can trigger. Some subsequent research corroborates this claim (see
Ayanian & Tausch 2016; Chenoweth & Stephan 2013), noting that repression
can compound instigating grievances or earn challengers sympathy from third
parties. What emerges from these antithetical findings is the synthesis that
repression is one condition within the causally complex phenomenon of
demobilisation. It is not necessary for demobilisation; after all, countless
movements demobilise without the faintest whiff of repression. Neither is it
sufficient for demobilisation. Demobilisation may occur because of repression,
but only in conjunction with other conditions or, at most, as the initiating
condition in a causal chain.
Finally, social movement scholarship has occasionally, if often only secondarily,
scrutinised forms and levels of demobilisation. The ‘contentious politics’
literature typically addresses macro-level phenomena: the demobilisation (in
the sense of declining levels of activism overall) of social movement industries
and of broad, coalitional campaigns (Lasnier 2017; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly
2004; Tarrow 2011) or even of whole societies (Beissinger 2002; Tilly 1978,
2008). At lower levels of analysis, theorisation is spread across many sub-fields.
Some scholarship focuses on biographical outcomes or ‘impact’ (McAdam

3Indeed, one of the liveliest subjects of debate is the effect of ‘radical flanks’ on otherwise
moderate and non-violent campaigns. See Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) and Haines (1988).

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1999), declining participation (Klandermans 1997), exhaustion and burnout (P.

C. Gorski and Chen 2015; P. Gorski, Lopresti-Goodman, and Rising 2018;
Nepstad 2004), and other micro-processes of demobilisation. Other scholarship
addresses meso-level, organisational facets of demobilisation: factionalisation
(Tarrow 2011, 104, 206–9), recruitment and retention of members (Hirsch
1990), bottom-up and top-down pressures (Lapegna 2013), organisational
capacity (Ganz 2010). Within their sub-fields, such studies provide illuminating
findings about forms of demobilisation. However, these close examinations have
generally done a poor job of positioning themselves within broader conceptual
frameworks, failing to integrate these pieces in an overarching theory of
movement demobilisation.
Christian Davenport’s (2015) study is a rare exception to this trend: it puts the
diffuse, un-systematised strains of demobilisation literature into conversation
with one another, formulating a general theory of the demobilisation of SMOs.
The resultant theorisation in places bears the marks of over-reliance on
Davenport’s case study, the black separatist ‘Republic of New Africa’ movement
in the United States. The theory provides solid theoretical foundations, but it
omits private (i.e., non-state) agents as sources of demobilising pressure and
mischaracterises the causal nature of demobilisation. The next section describes
and revises Davenport’s theorisation.

Conceptualising demobilisation and its causes

This section unpacks Davenport’s (2015) theory of SMO demobilisation. It
identifies conceptual gaps within this framework and provides a corrective
revision by incorporating Earl’s (2003, 2004) typology of social control. Taken
together, the regrouped internal factors and added external factors yield an
inclusive typology of demobilising factors (Table 1), which offers enhanced
analytical leverage for cases of SMO demobilisation.
An important starting point in forming a fuller conceptualisation of
demobilisation is uncoupling it from mobilisation. To be sure, at one level it is
the partner concept of mobilisation, but at closer inspection it is comprised of
different elements. Davenport (2015: 21) achieves this with his definition,
identifying four forms of demobilisation:

“(1) official termination and/or significant alteration of the formal institution engaged
in challenging authorities;
(2) departure of individuals (members) from relevant organisations – especially the
founding and/or core members that participate most frequently;
(3) termination of or significant reduction in dissident interventions (behaviours); and
(4) a fundamental shift in the ideas of the challenger (particularities of the claim) away
from what was earlier established.”

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Davenport focuses the definition at the meso-level, that of organisations. Hence,

the first form refers to ‘the formal institution’ that may exhibit demobilisation.
Note also that this definition accounts for demobilisation in kind—i.e., the
qualitative change between states of ‘being mobilised’ to ‘being un-mobilised,’
most clearly in the first and third forms—and in degree—i.e., becoming less
mobilised.
Moving from what demobilisation is to how demobilisation occurs, we can say
that prods to demobilise occur internally, from within SMOs, or externally,
from outside movement organisations.

Internal sources of demobilisation

Davenport (2015: 32–37) identifies five internal sources of demobilisation,
which can be meaningfully aggregated into two categories. First is
demobilisation by lost participation.4 This category includes
burnout/exhaustion and lost commitment. ‘Burnout’ or ‘exhaustion’ describes
“not just a state of temporary fatigue or exasperation, but an ongoing and
debilitating condition that threatens its victims’” participatory persistence (P. C.
Gorski and Chen 2015: 385).5 ‘Lost commitment’ refers to fraying ideological or
emotional connection to a movement organisation.6 Whereas burnout denotes
an inability to participate in SMO activities, lost commitment signifies an
unwillingness to participate. For example, when activists in Russia’s For Fair
Elections (FFE) movement no longer have the stamina or resources (such as
funds to pay higher fines for protest activity) to participate, their exhaustion
becomes a demobilising factor; when activists grow sceptical of the efficacy 7 of
protesting against the Putin regime, their lost commitment is demobilising.
Taken together, these sources of lost participation refer to deterioration at the
micro-level: not necessarily a product of deficient organising, rather of social
psychological processes among individual activists. These processes result in
less participation, depriving SMOs of their lifeblood, members.
The second category of internal demobilisation can be termed organisational
failure. This category encompasses membership loss, factionalisation, and
rigidity. Similar to the fundamental logic of lost participation—that is, a SMO
requires a sufficiency of members—‘membership loss’ refers to the demobilising
effect that results from a failure to recruit and/or retain members (Hirsch
1990). Yet here it represents an organisational deficiency: not drawing on

4 On what causes individuals to end their participation in movement activities, see Klandermans
(1997).
5See also Klandermans (1997: 103–104); Nepstad (2004); Gorski, Lopresti-Goodman, and
Rising (2018).
6 See Edwards and Marullo (1995), Klandermans (1997), and Nepstad (2004).
7 Cf. Klandermans (1997) on the expectancy-value theory of collective action.

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available mobilising structures8; not involving members enough to retain their

participation9; not recruiting new members to commence new actions.
Next, ‘factionalisation’ denotes the internal splitting of a SMO. Objectives,
strategies, and tactics are sources of tension within SMOs, most basically
between ‘moderates’ and ‘radicals’ (Tarrow 2011: 104, 206–9). Whereas
moderates prefer more modest goals and restrained means, radicals favour
further-reaching goals and more extreme means. Although ‘radical flanks’ can
be an asset for movements,10 coexisting comfortably or tolerably with moderate
wings, the tension between moderates and radicals is at least as
disadvantageous, threatening the cohesion of the movement overall.11 The FFE
movement conspicuously involved political actors across a wide ideological
spectrum: from committed communists like Sergei Udaltsov to liberal
democrats like Boris Nemtsov and Garry Kasparov to nationalists like Alexei
Navalny. Such diverse ideological representation may serve the goal of mass
mobilisation, but it leaves SMOs more vulnerable to factionalisation.
Last, ‘rigidity’ principally refers to an inability to adapt to change; more
specifically, to modify objectives and strategies according to new circumstances
(Davenport 2015: 36). This failure can manifest directly in the manner of SMO
campaigns—as when a campaign of demonstrations is banned, and the SMO
fails to adjust—or indirectly in the facilitating structures of a SMO—as when
financial resources are blocked or disrupted, and the SMO fails to find
alternatives. Many scholars have noted the importance of innovation and
adaptability to SMO effectiveness (Bogad 2016; Ganz 2010; Mayer 1995;
McAdam 1983; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996, 2008); inversely, failure to adapt
produces demobilisation by obsolescence, if nothing else. Collectively, these
three sources of demobilisation represent facets of organising failure, that is,
failure to manage and deploy resources.

External sources of demobilisation

Lost participation and organisational failure, however, only account for the
internal sources of demobilisation. A realistic conception of demobilisation
must recognise that it typically occurs as a consequence of intersecting internal
and external factors. Davenport (2015: 23–32) distils the sources of externally
induced demobilisation to three types: (1) resource deprivation, (2) problem

8 See Boudreau (1996) and McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) on mobilising structures.
9As discussed below, Russia’s FFE was robust in this respect, incorporating members’ input
through the Workshop of Protest Actions
10On the ambiguous effect of radical flanks in anti-regime movements, see Chenoweth and
Stephan (2013) and Haines (1988).
11Tarrow (2011: 207–208) discusses the paired mechanisms of institutionalisation and
radicalisation that mirror the centrifugal pressures within a movement, between moderates and
radicals. In Tarrow’s theorisation, these intra-movement mechanisms can be compounded by
external mechanisms of facilitation and repression.

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depletion, and (3) repression.12 Resource deprivation describes the restriction of

vital movement resources. Problem depletion refers to “removing (1) the
perceived need for the movement and/or (2) the perceived relevance of the
claims-making effort within the relevant population” (Davenport 2015: 26).
Repression, according to Davenport (2015: 29), denotes “coercive actions
undertaken by political authorities directed against someone challenging their
beliefs, institutions, and actions or the context or conditions within which the
government exists.” Insofar as this tripartite formulation attempts to account
for all external sources of demobilisation, it errs. Implicitly in the
conceptualisation of resource deprivation and problem depletion, explicitly in
the conception of repression, Davenport identifies the state as the sole agent of
external demobilisation.
Repression is the most relevant area of research to theorisation of external
sources of demobilisation. Tilly’s (1978: 100) definition makes this plain:
repression is “any action by another group which raises the contender’s cost of
collective action.”13 Reviewing the literature on repression, one may note the
tendency to focus on the coercive apparatus of the state and omit other sources:
systematic state-based repression (della Porta 1995), institutional versus
situational repression (Koopmans 1997), policing of protest (della Porta and
Reiter 1998), legal constraint of movement activity (Barkan 1984), covert
repression (Churchill & Vander Wall, 1988; Davenport, 201514). Yet a
misconception of repression as the sole province of the state does some discredit
to this body of research. ‘Raising the costs of collective action’ for another group
can result from any number of actors and actions. Some case study research
explores various forms of non-state repressive activity: countermovement
activity (Kuhar and Paternotte 2017; McMillen 1971; McVeigh 2001), mercenary
disruption (O’Hara 2016), hired or incited hooliganism (Kuo 2019).15 Therefore,

12Cf. Piven and Cloward’s (1979) fourfold typology of state responses to challenges: ignore,
conciliate, reform, or repress.
13It is worth contrasting Tilly’s definition with others; for example, Davenport (2007: 2,
emphasis added) limits repression to “actual or threatened use of physical sanctions… within
the territorial jurisdiction of the state.” But this excludes legalistic repression, as well as
repressive action beyond the state’s territory (assassinating dissidents in exile, for instance).
14Davenport’s theorisation of demobilisation derives largely from a case study of the ‘Republic
of New Africa’ movement, a separatist black-nationalist movement in America in the late 1960s
and early 1970s.
15A brief digression: at time of writing, we are witnessing a complex, deliberate attempt to
demobilise a movement in Hong Kong. Kuo reports the overt, coercive action of apparently
private individuals (possibly connected to Chinese crime syndicates operating in Hong Kong) on
protesters. Other sources report the overt, coercive action of state agents distantly connected to
national political elites (i.e., police), as well as of state agents closely connected to national
political elites (i.e., the Chinese army units amassing on the Hong Kong border) (Chor 2019b).
We also see the attempt through covert channelling by state and private agents both to
promote factionalisation within the movement (i.e., between ethnically non-Chinese residents
of Hong Kong and Chinese Hong Kongers) and to inflict membership loss by persuading
bystanders that its is a seditious foreign plot (Chor 2019a). In other words, the 2019 Hong Kong

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we need a model that retains the forms described in Davenport’s theorisation,

but also includes the whole range of external agents of demobilisation.
Earl (2003, 2004) generates a typology of ‘social control’16 that circumscribes
the universe of external sources of demobilisation. Integrating this typology into
Davenport’s theorisation provides a fuller conceptual framework for SMO
demobilisation, accounting for the demobilising pressure that non-state agents
can impose.
‘Social control’ explicitly stems from a Tillyan conception of repression (Earl
2003: 46) and thereby allows for any actor that might raise costs of collective
action.17 Earl’s typology consists of three dimensions. First, what is the identity
of the repressive agent? This dimension consists of three categories: (1) state
agents closely connected to national political elites (e.g., the military or national
law enforcement bureaus), (2) state agents distantly connected to national
political elites (e.g., local police and administrative units), and (3) private
agents.18 The first two categories are most commonly associated with
repression, but the third should not be overlooked. By ‘private agents’ Earl
refers to other actors in the social sphere that can ‘impose a cost’ on SMOs. This
may involve the use of physical force (e.g., some of the actions of the Pinkerton
security and detective agency during labour uprisings in the United States in the
nineteenth century [O’Hara, 2016]), or the threat of force (e.g., ‘Antifa’ activists
partially rely on their violent reputation to deter participation in far-right
protests). However, it also includes softer means of repression. Ferree (2004)
describes how non-state actors typically employ non-violent repressive tools:
ridiculing, stigmatising, and silencing opponents. Even counter-demonstrating,
at first blush a merely expressive19 form of opposition, is oftentimes an attempt

protest movement is facing intense external demobilising pressure. So far, its adaptation to this
pressure has included adopting new ‘creative approaches’ (Chor 2019b).
16The typology relates to ‘repression,’ but Earl (2004: 58) favours the term ‘social control,’
arguing that repression is a term overloaded with connotations that skew research toward the
violent, coercive action of the state.
17NB: ‘social control’ can be understood as attempts to change a SMO’s opportunity structure,
whether ‘political’ or ‘discursive.’ Following Tarrow (2011: 32), ‘Political opportunities’ denote
“consistent—but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national—sets of clues that encourage
people to engage in contentious politics.” Following Koopmans and Statham (1998: 228),
‘discursive opportunities’ refer to “which ideas are considered ‘sensible,’ which constructions of
reality are seen as ‘realistic,’ and which claims are held as ‘legitimate’ within a certain polity at a
specific time.”
18 Regarding the difference between state agents closely and distantly connected to national
political elites, compare with Koopmans’s (1997: 154) distinction between institutional
repression (“formal, more general, less direct, and usually legally sanctioned repressive
measures taken by higher-level state authorities, such as government or the judiciary”) and
situational repression (“informal actions of lower-level state agents, most importantly the police,
who in direct contact with protesters apply repression in a relatively spontaneous, ad-hoc
manner”). In these two terms, Koopmans bundles together the identity of the repressive agent
and the character of repressive action.
19 See Rucht (1988) on the ‘expressive’ and ‘instrumental’ logics of social movement action.

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to impose costs on an initiating demonstration, organisation, or movement

(Reynolds-Stenson and Earl 2018). The creation of Nashi, a pro-Putin youth
group, was motivated by a desire to mobilise a counter-demonstration force
against any ‘colour revolution movements’ (Atwal and Bacon 2012; Horvath
2013); unsurprisingly then, Nashi demonstrations were organised at the same
time as Russia’s FFE movement. The advantage of Earl’s typology is most
evident in this agent dimension, accounting for the full range of actors in the
social sphere.
The various forms of action available to these agents introduces Earl’s second
dimension: what is the character of the repressive action? Broadly, repression
is ‘coercive’ or ‘channelling.’ Coercion accounts for the threat and use of force
(Earl 2003: 48; Oberschall 1973). This concept accounts for Davenport’s
formulation of repression, but strips away the aspects restricting it to state
activity. Channelling “involves more indirect repression, which is meant to
affect the forms of protest available, the timing of protests, and/or flows of
resources to movements” (Earl 2003: 48).20 It accounts for low- and high-level
state actions, such as withholding permits for public protests or passing a law
proscribing an SMO’s activity. It also accounts for private actions, such as
donors withdrawing financial support to SMOs.
Channelling encompasses Davenport’s concept of resource deprivation. While
channelling action against a SMO’s resources is commonly associated with
financial or human resources, external forces could also attempt to deny any of
the ‘moral,’ ‘material,’ ‘informational,’ or ‘human’ resources on which a SMO
relies (Cress and Snow 1996). When Nashi activists held pro-Putin rallies (often
at the same time as demonstrations by the For Fair Elections movement), they
attempted to disrupt media and public attention directed at oppositional events.
Pro-government protests thus have a channelling effect. Furthermore,
susceptibility to channelling depends on the extent to which a SMO relies on
external support. Hence, a strain of scholarship concentrates on the potentially
co-opting or controlling effect of sponsorship. Some find it a de-radicalising,
limiting force (e.g., McAdam 1982; Piven and Cloward 1979) while others find it
a facilitating element (Jenkins and Eckert 1986).21
Similarly, channelling includes the concept of problem depletion. This
manifestation of channelling is perhaps most relevant when SMO moderates are
supported and successful—in other terms, being ‘accommodated’ (Gamson
1990) or winning ‘concessions’ (Denardo 1985)—thereby decreasing the support
and potency of a movement’s radicals. Equally, a crowded field of SMOs
working on the same issue may crowd out some SMOs: unable to garner enough
support for their activities on the basis that others already are (likely with more

20 See also Oberschall (1973).

21Here, again, the study of radical flanks is relevant. Haines (1988) finds that the presence of a
radical flank drives up support for more moderate groups, without imposing any tangible cost
on the radical flank.

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demonstrable success) (Soule and King 2008). In both instances, channelling

action deprives SMOs of relevance.
Finally, Earl’s third dimension asks, is the repressive action visible? This
dimension distinguishes between ‘covert and overt’ coercion, and ‘latent and
manifest’ channelling (Earl 2003: 48). Coercive actions taken to counter SMOs
can be overt state violence against demonstrations, for example, or covert
infiltration of opposition organisations. “Covert repression occurs when the
agents of repression, their actions, and the purpose of their actions are intended
to be unknown to the general public. In contrast, overt, coercive repression is
intended to be obvious to both protesters and wider publics” (Earl 2003: 48).
More ambiguously, channelling could be manifest, such as laws banning
symbols particular to a movement or SMO, or could be latent, such as
alterations to tax code that affects the opposition’s funding. The latter is marked
by nuance and a certain plausible deniability of any targeting of a group,
whereas the former is a blatant attack against a particular group. This
distinction is fuzzy, moveable, but essentially refers to the extent to which
repression is visible to the general public.

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Table 1. A typology of demobilising factors of social movement organisations

Internal External
Lost Organisational Social Control
Participation Failure (group- (Three dimensions)
(individual-level) level)
Burnout/ Membership loss (1) Identity of repressive agent
exhaustion (failure to
(inability to recruit/retain
continue members) State agents closely State agents Private
participating) connected to distantly agents
national political connected to
elites national political
elites
Lost commitment Factionalisation (2) Character of repressive action
(unwillingness to (internal splitting of
continue movement
participating) organisations) Coercion – direct Channelling – indirect
repression; the threat or repression (e.g.,
use of force resource deprivation,
problem depletion)
Rigidity (3) Visibility
(failure to adapt to
change, to modify
objectives and
strategies according Overt / Manifest – Covert / Latent –
to new observable, explicit, unobserved, concealed,
circumstances) obvious repressive veiled repressive actions
actions

Collectively, the foregoing discussion yields a typology of demobilising factors,

graphically presented in Table 1. Five internal factors, organised in two
categories (lost participation and organisational failure) are matched by as
many as twelve forms of social control (state agents closely connected to
national political elites, applying coercive action, which is overt; private agents,
applying channelling action, which is latent; etc.).22 And the presence of one
form of social control from one actor does not necessarily preclude it from
simultaneously exerting another form, as when a regime makes concessions to
moderate opposition while attempting to repress radicals (Tarrow 2011).

22Cf. Davenport’s (2015: 39) table of “Intersections of external and internal sources of
demobilisation.”

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The causal nature of demobilisation

Different factors, both internal and external, combine in different permutations
to produce SMO demobilisation. Davenport (2015: 38–42) suggests that sources
of demobilisation occur in internal-external pairs, that state agents identify and
attempt to compound internal pressures. But, in addition to omitting private
agents as sources of demobilising pressure, this is the other major flaw in
Davenport’s theorisation. External agents are not always (or perhaps even
‘often’) shrewd, rational actors discerning and incisively targeting movement
weaknesses. More importantly, demobilising factors occur in more complex
combinations, unfolding in unique demobilisation processes.
SMO demobilisation displays several distinct causal features. Most
fundamentally, it is conjuncturally caused: multiple demobilising factors
concur to produce demobilisation. (It is unlikely that one form of demobilising
pressure could occur in isolation and generate SMO demobilisation—such a case
would be quite peculiar and potentially very instructive.) So it is not just, for
instance, overt state coercive social control—as when the Putin regime arrests
numerous oppositional demonstrators—that engenders demobilisation, but also
resultant lost participation (both from exhaustion and lost commitment) and
organisational rigidity that combine in a demobilisation process. Davenport’s
(2015: 39) theorisation would conceive of such a process as attributable only to
one external factor (repression) and one internal factor (presumably either
‘exhaustion,’ ‘lost commitment,’ ‘departing members,’ or ‘rigidity’). Closer
inspection of cases reveals that the causal combinations of demobilisation are
more variegated.
Speaking of demobilisation plurally, demobilisation processes, denotes that it
can occur in multiple ways. In other words, SMO demobilisation is equifinal:
there are many pathways of demobilisation. Different combinations of
demobilising factors represent different ideal-typical patterns of demobilisation.
What causes demobilisation, moreover, is not the mere inverse of what is
causally relevant for non-demobilisation (or continued mobilisation)—and
certainly not the opposite of mobilisation. This is causal asymmetry. Examining
demobilisation concerns different process and, in all likelihood, different causal
factors than non-demobilisation and mobilisation. Similarly, some causal
factors are causally relevant for both demobilisation and non-demobilisation.
This is multifinality. Repression, by turns deterring (e.g., McAdam, Tarrow, and
Tilly 2004) and inciting (Gurr 1970), exemplifies multifinality.
Taken together, these causal attributes are consistent with a set-theoretic view
of causation. That is, rather than conceiving causal factors as having linear
additive effects, set-theoretic23 approaches attend to the characteristics of
conjunctural causation, equifinality, asymmetry, and multifinality.
Demobilisation research should align its methodological choices with these

23For an explanation of set-theoretic causation, and of the wider subject of set theory and set-
theoretic methods, see Schneider and Wagemann (2012).

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ontological expectations (Hall 2003): this means utilising case study methods
and cross-case techniques, such as qualitative comparative analysis and
coincidence analysis.
The next section presents a case study of Russia’s For Fair Elections (FFE) SMO,
which was mobilised in late 2011 and, by the middle of 2012, had begun a
process of demobilisation. Whereas Davenport’s theorisation offers some
analytical leverage in examining this case, it would omit the demobilising
pressure of non-state agents, like Nashi, and obscure the causal complexity of
the demobilisation process. The revised theorisation facilitates a fuller analysis
of FFE’s demobilisation.

Russia’s For Fair Elections movement

On 4 December 2o11 Russia went to the polls for elections to the Russian
parliament (i.e., Duma). Despite a sizeable drop in the overall vote share—from
nearly two-thirds of all votes in 2007 to just over half in 2011—United Russia,
the ruling party associated with Vladimir Putin, retained a majority of
parliamentary seats. These results, however, were marred by widespread
accusations of electoral manipulation and malfeasance. The substance of these
accusations came from a variety of sources—the fact that Russia’s primary news
channel, ‘Rossia-24,’ broadcast results that totalled well over 100 per cent in
several regions deserves note (Volchek 2019)24—most notably an extensive
network of volunteer election observers from the Golos organisation, which
works for free and fair elections. The nearly 8000 electoral violations (Голос
[Golos] 2011) recorded in 2011 remains by far the highest total observed by the
organisation in any one electoral event. Thus, there were solid grounds to
question the legitimacy of the election results, as well as a directly involved
cohort of citizens already mobilised around the event. The day after the election,
5 December, approximately 5,000 ‘whistle-blowers’ (many protesters blew red
whistles) marched down Chistiye Prudy Boulevard to protest electoral
falsification. Unsurprisingly, a central rallying cry was a longstanding slogan of
the Golos organisation: Za Chestnye Vybory!, ‘For Fair Elections!’

24Reportedly at the insistence of government officials (Volchek 2019), the television station
broadcast inflated numbers for the United Russia party—without manipulating the results of
any other parties, so that tallies exceeded 100 per cent. The most egregious case came from the
Rostov region, for which Rossia-24 reported results totalling 146 per cent (58.99 for United
Russia). But this was not an anomaly as other regions were reported with evidently manipulated
results: for example, the Sverdlov region with 115 per cent (39.61 for United Russia) and
Voronezh region with 128 per cent (62.32 for United Russia).

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Figure 1 - Timeline of the For Fair Elections movement

Fraud in the parliamentary elections offered a conspicuous discursive

opportunity and, at least superficially, a slight political opportunity.25 Activists
and groups that were already active before the vote, such as ‘Strategy 31’26 and
‘Ecological Defence of the Moscow Region,’27 joined individuals involved in
election monitoring to form the For Fair Elections (FFE) movement
organisation. As illustrated in Figure 1, for roughly a year and a half after the
December elections, FFE was mobilised and campaigning. The organisational
structure of FFE mostly took shape during the initial phase of mobilisation, in
December, and more or less persisted through the phase of peak mobilisation.
Following the presidential inauguration on 7 May 2012, which coincided with
combative protests in central Moscow, FFE entered a phase of demobilisation
that significantly diminished it by the end of 2012 and culminated, at the latest,
by the middle of 2013.
The following sections present a concise analysis of the demobilisation of FFE.
Of course, this noteworthy SMO, its campaign and leading figures, displays
many characteristics worthy of scholarly consideration. Indeed, several articles

Appeals for the head of the election commission, Vladimir Churov, not to certify the results
25

were repeatedly voiced at the first protests, in early December 2011.

26 This is a campaign group that formed to protest restrictions to the constitutionally-enshrined
(in article 31, hence the group’s name) freedom of assembly.
27This group, which included leaders like Yevgenia Chirikova that would feature prominently in
For Fair Election rallies, campaigned against government-supported plans to clear parts of the
Khimki Forest in order to build a highway.

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have directed attention to it.28 But as yet there is no study of the demobilisation
of FFE itself. This is rather surprising since FFE organised the largest
demonstrations since the disintegration of the Soviet Union; that no study has
examined this case of SMO demobilisation speaks to the general neglect of
organisational demobilisation. At the same time, the case of FFE is crucial
(Gerring 2007): an adequate conceptual framework should be able to identify
the causal factors of FFE’s demobilisation. Yet Davenport’s framework falls
short. FFE deviates in some parts from the causes accounted for by Davenport.
To correct this and to indicate the enhanced analytical leverage of the preceding
theorisation of demobilisation, firstly, I detail the organisational structure of
FFE; then, I identify internal and external demobilising pressures that manifest
in the case of FFE; lastly, I review the sequence in which these factors impacted
FFE and highlight the conjunctural nature of the resultant demobilisation.
Before proceeding along these lines, it would be prudent to take note of two key
contextualising events29 that were actuating for FFE and for the regime it
challenged. First, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2005, as well as the other
colour revolutions in several post-Soviet states in the 2000s, undoubtedly left
an impression on the Russian regime. In several countries, SMOs, supported to
some limited extent by Western governments, toppled authoritarian regimes
and (at least for a time) inaugurated more liberal democratic ones.30 Incumbent
authoritarians took notice—none more so than the one in Russia. By the time
FFE emerged in 2011, the Kremlin had developed several defences against
‘colour movements,’ including mechanisms for managing divisions among the
elite (March 2009) and purpose-built youth movements, like Nashi, that were
made to counteract movement-based opposition to the regime (Atwal and
Bacon 2012; Horvath 2013).31 Second, at the United Russia party conference in
September 2011 it was announced that Vladimir Putin would stand as a
candidate for the presidency in 2012, and that then-President Dmitri Medvedev
would lead the party list in the parliamentary elections. This executive
switcheroo laid bare the regime’s power dynamic: despite vacating the
presidency in 2008, Putin had remained in charge; and re-assuming the

28Koltsova and Selivanova (2019) plumb the connection between online connections and offline
participation; Semenov, Lobanova, and Zavadskaya (2016) assess the participation of opposition
political parties in FFE’s campaign; and Lasnier (2017, 2018), and Litvinenko and Toepfl (2019)
have presented illuminating analysis of the consequences of FFE failure and demobilisation.
29Here, too, one might well include the sustained tightening of constraints on Russian civil
society and activism that opposed the Putin regime or its vested interests, as well as swells of
protest activity, such as the campaigns by ‘Strategy-31’ for free assembly and the ‘Ecological
Defence of the Moscow Region’ for the preservation of the Khimki Forest, that fed into the
eventual mobilisation of the For Fair Elections movement (i.e., ‘precursory mobilisation and
activism’).
30The indicators compiled by the ‘Varieties of Democracy’ (V-Dem) project (https://www.v-
dem.net/en/analysis/CountryGraph/), for example, attest to the liberal democratic gains made
by Ukraine and Georgia after their colour revolutions in the mid-2000s.
It is not a coincidence that Nashi was formed in 2005, in the immediate aftermath of the
31

Orange Revolution in Ukraine.

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Presidency signalled his intent to remain in charge for a long time to come.
Though not remotely surprising, the move certainly exacerbated the grievances
of those who were ultimately stirred enough to go out onto the streets during the
election cycle.32

The organisational structure of FFE

Though comprised of leaders and members from a variety of groups and
organisations, the formal organisation of FFE was itself exceedingly spare. It
consisted of three principal units: the Organisation Committee, the Workshop
of Protest Actions, and the League of Voters.
The Organisation Committee performed the overarching managerial functions
of FFE: organising protest events (including format, speakers, venue, time, etc.),
fundraising to support FFE, promoting the movement and its events. Despite
these vital duties, the Organisation
Committee was “an unsophisticated Image 1 - Leaflet announcing the 'White
mechanism, which did not have a clear- Circle' protest, organised by FFE's
cut hierarchy, an organisation, a Workshop on Protest Actions, on the
structure or a leader” (Volkov 2015: 13). Garden Ring Road
Such haphazardness was the result of a
lack of planning: the December elections were
much anticipated, and the prospect of at least
some electoral fraud rarely in doubt. Yet there are
no indications that the major election monitoring
initiatives—Golos, RosVybory,33 and ‘Citizen
Observer’34—had any plans to mobilise around
this imminently foreseeable grievance. The
Organisation Committee therefore formed only
after the first protest (on 5 December 2011), and
was immediately preoccupied with the
arrangements for demonstrations in mid- and
late-December.
While the operation of the Organisation
Committee was driven by party and civic group
leaders, the Workshop of Protest Actions was
more malleable; an open forum where members

32Polling from the Levada-Center (Volkov 2015) found that emotions like indignation and
discontent were the most common motivations among protesters that participated in the initial
mobilisation.
33Initiated by the Fond Borby s Korruptsiyey (‘Anti-Corruption Foundation’), which was
established by Alexei Navalny. RosVybory was also supported by several oppositional political
parties, including the Communist Party, the Yabloko party, and businessman and 2012
presidential candidate (with his own embryonic political organization, ‘Civic Platform’) Mikhail
Prokhorov.
34 Or Grazhdanin Nablyudatel. It was the initiative of the Solidarnost organisation.

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of any standing could propose various protest actions and initiate them.
Attendees occasionally formed small ‘steering committees,’ but these were ad
hoc, focused on realising and then assessing protest actions (Volkov 2015).
Workshop initiatives often took the form of actions within the large
demonstrations organised by the Organisation Committee, though included a
few separate protests, most prominently the ‘White Circle’ protest35 on 26
February, when activists formed a massive human chain along the ring road that
encircles central Moscow.
The League of Voters essentially served as a propaganda or public relations arm
of FFE, attracting attention to issues of electoral transparency, as well as
organising election monitoring initiatives for the 4 March presidential
elections.36 It was composed of ‘celebrity figures’ active within the SMO:
journalists, artists, poets, and personalities. Though the League operated
somewhat autonomously from the overall managerial role played by the
Organisation Committee, the overlap of members represented in the two units
kept their actions in harmony.
This organisational triad presents a couple important issues worth noting for
they relate to demobilising factors and potentialities of FFE. First, the degree of
horizontality is remarkable. Both the Organisation Committee and the
Workshop of Protest Actions were open to all FFE participants. (The League of
Voters was only open to invited persons.) And while decisions of the
Organisation Committee remained in the hands of an indefinite collection of
leaders from other groups, the Workshop did not even have that minimum of
differentiation; rather, it was an open forum composed of spontaneously
forming, operating, then dissolving ‘steering committees.’ Research on strategic
capacity stresses the utility of organisations and structures that encourage
tactical input from regular members (Ganz 2010) or allow for constructive
‘trust-building’ and strategic ‘reappraisal’ (Davenport 2015: 43–47). In other
words, some organisational horizontality can guard against several demobilising
pressures. The FFE’s horizontal, open units appear to be a by-product of its
rapid formation, however, rather than a design feature. Nevertheless, FFE’s
loose structure insulated it from demobilising rigidity issues since its
organisation was never irretrievably locked in to any one course of action.
Second, the benefits of flexible structure were minimised by the preservation of
striking factionalisation issues. FFE included leaders and members from a wide

35 As many as 40,000 people (Radia 2012) lined Moscow’s Garden Ring Road, festooned with
white ribbons, holding white balloons, and waving white flags and flowers. Opposition leaders
were interspersed along the ring; sympathetic motorists drove around the 10-mile loop, holding
flags out their windows and honking in support (or else because the protest was causing several
traffic jams). By way of counter-protest, groups of pro-government youth activists deployed at
several points along the road and wore signs that said “Putin loves all” or “One week until
Putin’s victory.”
36Organisation for election monitoring included systematising means of processing observer
reports, issuing a ‘black list’ of individuals observed engaging in fraud in the parliamentary
elections, and offering legal assistance to voters and monitors.

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ideological spectrum: from liberal groups like Solidarnost and the Yabloko
party, to the Communist Party and arms of its organisation, to avowed
nationalists. Sharing the same dais, one could routinely see far-left activists, like
Sergei Udaltsov, next to nationalist figures, like Alexei Navalny, and business
figures, like Mikhail Porkhorov, next to environmentalists, like Yevgenia
Chirikova.37 Paradoxical ideological pairings abounded. On the one hand, it is a
testament to the common interest in fair electoral institutions; yet on the other
hand, it signals that FFE’s structure, particularly the Organisation Committee,
harboured significant factional divisions moored together only by a bare
sufficiency of common interest.

The demobilisation of FFE

Intense activism by FFE lasted from mid-December through Putin’s presidential
inauguration on 7 May 2012. FFE activists seized on the opportunity of Putin’s
inauguration, organising several events (here, again, the influence of factions
within FFE was evident), including the so-called ‘March of Millions’
(approximately 100,000 participated) on the day before, 6 May. Participants in
these events were met with mass deployments of riot officers and eventually
beaten and/or arrested for unpermitted protest action. This was overt coercive
action by the state. The crescendo of activity was followed by a long, sustained
diminuendo, where resolute external demobilising pressures exacerbated
internal stresses and hastened the demobilisation of FFE.

37NB: Ideological pluralism, and the frequently concomitant diversity of movement claims, is
not necessarily a problem. Wang and Soule (2016) reveal how multiple claims and wide aims
tend to be more advantageous than campaigns and movements with narrower purposes.
Specifically, “multi-issue protest events are more likely to use novel re-combinations of tactics”
(2016: 522) and “more peripheral claims, which you might find in large, coalitional SMOs, are
more likely to introduce new protest tactics” (2016: 529).

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Figure 2 - the demobilisation of For Fair Elections

May 2012 marked the beginning of FFE’s demobilisation. Putin’s inauguration

represented the last event directly related to the contested election cycle at the
core of FFE’s claims. Merely by executing the inauguration, the government
effected a demobilising pressure: ending the succession of events directly
related to grievances mobilised by FFE; in demobilisation terms, this is overt
channelling by state agents closely connected to national elites.38 At the same
time as this opportunity was closing—likely reducing protesters’ perception of
the ‘political efficacy’ of their actions39—the risks of protest participation were
purposely intensified. Following the arrest of protest participants on
inauguration day, a series of legal steps were taken, by the federal government
and by state agents more distantly connected to national elites, that restricted
the mobilisation options for FFE: that is, instances of overt channelling. Three
of these were of particular importance: new legal restrictions on protest activity,
the so-called ‘Foreign Agents’ law, and frequent detention and criminal
proceedings against opposition leaders. With the first of these measures, the

38What Davenport (2015: 26–28) terms ‘problem depletion,’ or might also be called a ‘discursive
opportunity’ ( Koopmans and Statham 1998).
39See Ayanian and Tausch (2016).

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new law on protests40 that President Putin signed into law on 8 June 2012,
penalties for participation in unlawful protests were increased 150-fold (Amos
2012): minimum fines exceed the average annual salary in Russia. Succeeding
years witnessed a fivefold increase in the number of fines imposed (Beilinson,
Borovikova, and Smirnova 2019). The new penalties on protest represent overt
channelling by state agents closely connected to national political elites; it was
the federal government attempting to discourage a kind of protest participation
(‘unlawful protests,’ i.e., protest that had not been given governmental
authorisation) in a very visible manner. Unsurprisingly for a traditional
conception of repression,41 protest activity markedly declined in 2012, and has
since largely remained below the levels of preceding years (see Appendix I,
Figure 1).
In the next month, July 2012, the government introduced the ‘Foreign Agents’
law.42 It instituted registration and reporting requirements on organisations
that receive funding or other material support from outside the country, and
required them to label informational materials as coming from ‘foreign agents,’
a term heavily laden with negative connotation in the post-Soviet context. In a
similar vein, the government expelled the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) in September 2012. USAID had supported organisations
and networks that produced colour revolutions in neighbouring states. The
decision to expel it was explicitly justified in terms of preventing meddling by
foreign agents in Russian politics (Elder 2012b). These measures, too, were an
instance of overt channelling by state agents closely connected to national
political elites; the federal government compelling many organisations involved
in FFE to divert resources from activism to comply with new legal requirements,
as well as to undermine their legitimacy, and banishing a common source of
funding for many. (Golos, for example, received many grants from USAID.) In
this specific case, it was an attempt to constrain the sort of oppositional
networks that had led colour revolution movements in neighbouring states.
The final instance of ‘overt channelling’ social control—this time by state agents
distantly connected to national political elites—manifest in the persistent legal
harassment of opposition figures. To start, Alexei Navalny, Sergei Udaltsov, and
Boris Nemtsov, three luminaries of the FFE and wider opposition, along with

40Article 20.2 of the Administrative Code (Violation of the established procedure for organizing
or holding a meeting, rally, demonstration, procession or picketing). (Статья 20.2 КоАП
[Нарушениеустановленногопорядкаорганизациилибопроведениясобрания, митинга,
демонстрации, шествияилипикетирования].)
41Again, such a conception would hold that raising the costs of participation (literally, in this
case) is enough to deter many or most would-be participants (Tarrow 2011).
42121-FZ: Federal Law on Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the
Russian Federation Regarding the Regulation of Activities of Non-Commercial
Organizations Performing the Function of Foreign Agents. (N 121- ФЗ: О
внесенииизменений в отдельныезаконодательныеактыРоссийскойФедерации в
частирегулированиядеятельностинекоммерческихорганизаций,
выполняющихфункциииностранногоагента.)

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hundreds of others, were arrested for their activities at the protest on Bolotnaya
Square the day before the presidential inauguration. Subsequent to their 15-day
detention, these leaders had their homes searched and were summoned to a
police inquisition (Amos 2012). Later in the year Udaltsov was arrested again
and then placed under house arrest with limited means of communicating with
anyone besides his relatives and lawyers (BBC 2013). Navalny (and his brother)
was tried for embezzlement (Elder 2012a); conviction on these charges would
eventually justify invalidating his presidential candidacy in 2018. These and
other legal attacks on the opposition severely limited the scope for activism by
the FFE: depriving it of its most charismatic figures and their resources, tarring
it with the appearance of petty law-breaking.
In conjunction with the other pressures brought to bear against it, including
internal pressures, FFE stagnated. Turnout for demonstrations dropped. Its
organisational structure became less active; an attempt to formalise the FFE
organisation, replacing the Organisation Committee with the openly-elected
Opposition Coordination Council (OCC), proved unsuccessful as the OCC
dissolved in late 2013. By that time FFE was wholly demobilised.
What is illuminating about this case? Primarily, it exhibits the complex
causation that the preceding theorisation of demobilisation emphasises.
Davenport’s (2015: 39) conception would omit the concurrence of multiple
demobilising pressures, instead maintaining the simplistic model of paired
demobilising factors. Similarly, while the role of the state was pivotal in
effecting FFE’s demobilisation, theories that omit private agents would miss
much in cases like that of FFE: pro-Kremlin youth groups like Nashi and Young
Guard regularly held parallel protests or menaced FFE participants; pro-regime
news sources like NTV badgered opposition leaders and routinely portrayed
FFE as orchestrated by U.S. Ambassador Michael McFaul. Non-state agents
were important sources of demobilising pressure, distracting attention from and
undermining the legitimacy of FFE—but these sources of pressure would be
missed under Davenport’s framework.
During its period of peak mobilisation, FFE was to some degree beset by
coercion from low-level state and private agents, as well as internal
factionalisation issues. Nevertheless, it appeared largely unaffected, or at least
not prohibitively hindered, by these pressures. Only when overt channelling by
high-level state agents began, and pressure from low-level state agents
persisted, did the movement begin its downward slide: factionalisation among
leaders followed by lost commitment43 among members, evinced by decreasing
protest participation. Thus, overt channelling by high-level state agents
comprised the pivotal causal condition in FFE’s demobilisation process. Yet this
effect occurred in conjunction with other causal factors, including social control
from private agents. The revision of Davenport’s conception of demobilisation
accounts for these non-state sources of demobilising pressure.

43Again, driven by increased risks combined with a decreased sense of political efficacy for
engaging in protest action.

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Despite its failure to bring about new elections and institute fairer democratic
procedures, the experience of FFE shows that such cases of ‘negative
demobilisation’ can still mobilise and train new cohorts of activists, establish
social linkages that support future activism, and impart operational lessons.
After demobilisation numerous FFE participants were elected to local
government institutions. Anti-corruption protests in 2017-2018 drew on the
networks of connection developed during FFE’s mobilisation. And recent
protests against the refusal to register independent (read: not regime loyalist)
candidates for regional elections display the endurance of affective dimensions
of FFE.
Organisational demobilisation is only one part of contentious cycles.
Demobilisation may signal a start, as well as mark an end. Events (and their
agents) that fail to transform nevertheless produce effects: on participants, on
the area of activism, and on the wider environment. Yet the conceptual
framework detailed in this article and the For Fair Elections case direct
attention to the part of social movement activity that has received the least
attention. Much about demobilisation remains unstudied and under-theorised.

Next steps in the study of demobilisation

Tracing the demobilisation of a movement or SMO or campaign, even just
identifying their final, definitive ends, presents several challenges. In part, this
is because the boundaries of these units are fuzzy: demobilisation can be a
lengthy process and often ends in whispers, rather than a clearly identifiable
bang.
Several aspects of demobilisation remain un- or under-examined. The
theorisation and analysis presented in this article is directed at the
organisational- or meso-level. It is configured around SMOs and dimensions of
their operation; hence, the first element of Davenport’s definition of
demobilisation, which concerns alteration to the ‘institution’ of a SMO.
Nevertheless, inquiry might also be directed toward broader or narrower
elements. In broader terms, some scholarship examines the demobilisation of
whole movements (typically composed of several SMOs). Orcutt and Fendrich
(1980) gathered survey data about activists perception regarding the decline of
the student protest movement in the United States during the 1970s. Franklin
(2014) examined the demobilisation of several U.S. movements (civil rights,
black power, New Left) that resulted from the demobilisation of several SMOs
that constituted them. And Heaney and Rojas (2011) specified the factors that
undermined the coalition of the anti-war movement in the U.S. in the late
2000s. Such studies speak to macro-level sociological phenomena and
movement dynamics.
Nearer to the opposite level of analysis one encounters the thorny issue of
‘campaigns.’ The term refers to the activism work of SMOs: their deliberate and

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continuous application of tactics to further their objectives.44 Campaigns might

take the form of legal challenges mounted by an SMO, or of a series of
demonstrations, or of strikes and boycotts, or of myriad other actions.45 The end
of a SMO’s campaign is coterminous with a determination of the future of the
SMO, wherein one of three outcomes is possible: (1) the campaign ends but the
SMO endures, remaining active with other campaigns or activities; (2) the
campaign ends and the SMO goes into ‘abeyance’ (Sawyers and Meyer 1999;
Taylor 1989), that is, stops actively campaigning, but retains at least some of its
organisational infrastructure; or (3) the campaign ends coincident with the
demobilisation of the SMO. In other words, campaigns are often the stuff of life
and death for SMOs: propelling them forward or signifying their end.
Future research can clarify the distinction between contention-based (i.e.,
movements challenging the state) cases of demobilisation from those resulting
from social movement dynamics (e.g., movement-countermovement
interaction). Examination of demobilisation can add to the burgeoning
literature on social movement coalitions and their campaigns. Most
importantly, theorisation of demobilisation will benefit from cross-case study.
For demobilisation research, like other areas of social movement studies, must
guard against the inclination to particularise, to rely on single case studies and
to ignore or obscure the generalizable elements of demobilisation.

44 Cf. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, 51).

45Sharp (1973) made an initial attempt (since revised and expanded) to list all methods of non-
violent protest action, resulting in a catalogue of 198 actions.

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Appendix I: Protest in Russia from Lankina dataset46

Figure 1.
140

120
Numbers of protest events
100

80

60

40

20

0
Apr-07

Apr-12
Dec-08

Dec-13

Oct-14

Jan-16
May-09

Mar-10
Aug-10

May-14

Mar-15
Aug-15
Oct-09

Jun-11

Jun-16
Jan-11

Nov-11

Nov-16
Sep-07
Feb-08
Jul-08

Sep-12
Feb-13
Jul-13

No. Protests
No. Political Protests
No. Political Protests >1000

46The Russian Protest Event Dataset compiled by TomilaLankina(2018) relies on news reports
from ‘namarsh.ru,’ a non-government information source that collects information regarding
protest activity throughout Russia.

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Graph 2.

Number of political protesters

300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
Apr-09

Feb-10

Apr-14
Jan-08

Jan-13
Aug-07

Nov-08
Jun-08

Aug-12

Nov-13
Jun-13

Feb-15

Oct-16
Mar-07

Jul-10

Jul-15
Sep-09

Oct-11
Mar-12

Sep-14
Dec-10

Dec-15
May-11

May-16
About the author
Michael Zeller is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at
Central European University (CEU). His dissertation research concerns the
demobilisation of far-right demonstration campaigns, and particularly how
counter-mobilisation against far-right movements affects this process. Michael
is also an Associate Researcher at CEU’s Center for Policy Studies, working on
the ‘Building Resilience against Violent Extremism and Polarisation’ (BRaVE)
project. Michael earned master’s degrees in political science and in Russian,
Central and Eastern European Studies, from Corvinus University of Budapest
and the University of Glasgow, respectively. He can be contacted at
zeller_michael AT phd.ceu.edu

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank participants (especially at the Theory of Contentious Politics
panel) at the 2019 European Sociological Association annual conference and two
anonymous referees for their comments on earlier versions of this article, as well
as András Bozóki, Carsten Schneider, and Dorit Geva for their supervision of the
Ph.D. project that informs many of the theoretical points herein.

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Scaling up nonviolent action:

Do scholars and activists agree?
Charla Burnett and Karen Ross

Abstract
In this article, we explore the way that both activist-oriented manuals and
academic scholarship on nonviolent action in social movements and civil
resistance have addressed issues related to the concept of scaling up:
increasing movement strength, size, and impacts. Drawing on a database of
nearly 200 case studies and activist-oriented manuals, we highlight
similarities and discrepancies in the emphases of both scholarly and activist-
oriented materials to illustrate differing priorities among academics and
practitioners in the field. Our analysis addresses possible reasons for these
discrepancies and suggests directions for scholar-activist cross-fertilization.

Key words: scaling up, civil resistance, social movements, activists, scholars,
impact

Introduction
Research on the undertakings of social movements and movement activists has
long been a focus of scholars seeking to better understand the process of social
change at local, national, and international scales. Despite a broad and varied
literature in this field of study, however, little focus has been placed on how
movements scale – that is, how they create a solid foundation that allows for
increasing their size, spatial presence, and overall impact (in both intended and
unintended ways). Moreover, while scholars have long studied movement
endeavors through methods such as discussions with activists or examination of
archival resources, few analyses exist of materials produced by and for
movement activists, in terms of their areas of emphasis. Fewer studies still
engage these materials in comparison with academic research. This article
addresses these gaps by examining the concept of scaling up as it is discussed
both in empirical case studies of nonviolent movements and within training
guides and manuals written for on-the-ground movement use.
Understanding how and when movements use scaling up tactics is important for
several reasons. First, under certain conditions, specific strategies may have
negative consequences that can prevent social movements from obtaining their
goals, while at the same time, movement events may have positive consequences
beyond those explicitly intended (Dedouet 2008). Second, lack of consistency in
what is meant by movement “success” makes comparative analysis challenging.
As we argue below, researchers’ understanding of what characterizes
“successful” movements and campaigns is subjective, yet it strongly shapes the
way we conduct research and interpret results.
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Our analysis highlights significant discrepancies between empirical studies and

activist-oriented materials. We suggest that these discrepancies, in particular
lack of scholarly focus on internally-oriented scaling components such as
strategic planning and creating a shared ideology, have limited our capacity to
fully comprehend why movement campaigns are successful – or not. Lack of
focus in manuals on certain key issues is also problematic in terms of ensuring
adequate preparation for successful movement campaigns. We suggest that
greater cross-fertilization across scholarly and practitioner-oriented writings for
and about movement initiatives can lead to greater understanding of movement
success and how to ensure that campaigns have the positive impacts they strive
for.

Conceptualizing scaling-up
Nonviolent movements have long engaged in processes aimed at enlarging the
size of their networks and the scope of their initiatives. Indeed, the primary
approach to exploring ‘scaling’ in relation to nonviolent activism and social
movements has centered around increasing the size of the movement in terms
of membership or territory, or expanding partnerships and coalitions (Lackey
1973; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 2005). However, we suggest that
the process of ‘scaling up’ is multi-dimensional and includes more than just
aspects related to movement size. For example, the social entrepreneurship and
international development literature suggest that internal strengthening is
crucial for building a foundation that enables not only physical/territorial
growth , but also allows for broadening the impact of work done by social
movements and small scale, grassroots peacebuilding and social justice
initiatives (Dees 2004; Uvin 1995). Thus, we define scaling up as: elements
contributing to the internal strength of initiatives that result in and allow for
external expansion in ways that broaden both intended and unintended
impacts. In other words, scaling is a process of increasing the potential for
positive impact at a higher level or scope than it currently is.
To address the multi-dimensional nature of scaling up, we have developed a
conceptual model of scaling that includes both internally- and externally-
oriented elements and that emphasizes contributions to both intended and
unintended impacts of movement endeavors (see Ross et al, 2019). In this
article, we use this model as a framework for analyzing peer reviewed empirical
case studies of social movement endeavors and nonviolent direct action, as well
as activist-oriented movement manuals, to highlight aspects of scaling up that
are emphasized by researchers and those utilized by activists and practitioners
of nonviolent action – both when these are similar and when they differ.
Our conceptual model is grounded in the desire to identify a framework for
scaling up that is embedded in both the theoretical conceptualization of
nonviolence and the experiential knowledge of its practice. To this end, it is
based on an extensive review of the theoretical literature on nonviolent direct
action and civil disobedience, manuals and guides written by and for movement

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activists, as well as social movement scholarship and literature in the areas of

international development, organization studies, and entrepreneurship.
Conceptually, the model draws upon but also extends upon the concept of “scale
shifts,” that is, changes in, “the number and level of coordinated actions to a
different focal point, involving a new range of actors, different objects, and
broadened claims” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 331). In particular, we
distinguish between two dimensions of scaling: what occurs internally in order
to strengthen the movement (internal strengthening); and what happens
externally in order to enlarge the movement in size or space (external
expansion). Although some activities clearly are relevant to both of these, most
fall largely on one dimension rather than both. We further distinguish between
the “what” of scaling, or tactics for scaling that must be used as evidence of a
scaled movement, and processes of scaling, that is, the concrete actions
providing a basis for scaling. In addition, communication for scaling, while
ostensibly a sub-component of the processes of scaling, is discussed separately
because of its foundational nature that allows all other scaling processes to be
achieved.
Within each of these dimensions are several elements, which serve as the
indicators at the focus of our analysis. These elements are shown in Table 1:

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Table 1: Dimensions and Elements of Scaling Up

Internal Strengthening External expansion

Tactics for scaling 1. Strong commitment among 1. Increased membership and

activists development of partnerships
and/or coalitions
2. Strong strategic plans 2. Engagement of external
third parties or international
actors
3. Diverse movement 3. Territorial spread
membership

4. Shared messages and 4. Engagement with

ideology government leadership
Processes of 1.Internal sharing of 1. Sharing information (use of
scaling information (use of media) media) externally
2. Educational programming 3. Educational programming
for activists for the broader community
3. Engaging ideas across
movements
Communication 2. .Strategic communication 2. Strategic communication
for scaling within the movement toward the broader community
Strategic framing

Methodology
In order to conduct this analysis, our research team compiled a database
consisting of 128 case studies of nonviolent campaigns as well as 59 manuals
written for/by movement activists. Our compilation focused on movement
campaigns that explicitly referenced nonviolent action or strategic nonviolent
tactics as a central component of their ideology. Moreover, in our search for
empirical case studies, we limited our search to include three types of
movements: those aimed at regime change (such as the collapse of the
Communist regime in Eastern Europe in late 80s, the unsuccessful revolutions
in Uzbekistan in 2005 and in Belarus in 2006, and the Arab Spring); those
focused on eliminating discrimination against certain population groups or at
producing structural changes (for instance, movements working in Apartheid
South Africa, and the US Civil Rights Movement); and movements focused on
the struggle for liberation from colonial rule, including nonviolent collective
campaigns for national independence (African countries, India, Palestinian
protests against Israeli occupation, etc.).
In other words, our analysis focused on nationally-focused movement
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campaigns (although we note that transnational processes of learning and

communication are characteristic of many of these) – not included within our
databases were empirical case studies focusing on issues related to nonviolent
action with an explicitly intentional transnational focus (such as within the
framework of the anti-globalization movement). We defined our unit of analysis
as cases discussed within academic publications, rather than the publication
itself. More specifically, cases were defined as a specific campaign or group of
campaigns occurring at a specific moment in time. For example, an analysis of
Palestinian resistance to the occupation during the First Intifada (1987-1991)
was defined as a separate case than an empirical analysis of Palestinian
resistance during the period of the 2nd Intifada period (starting in 2000).
To create our database of cases, we systematically searched academic journals in
the areas of social movement and civil resistance research (such as the Journal
of Resistance Studies; Research in Social Movements Conflict & Change;
Mobilization: An International Quarterly; Peace & Change; and the Journal of
Peace Research) for empirical case studies focused on nonviolent resistance
movements. We also conducted a broad search for cases using Web of Science
and Google Scholar, using the following search terms: nonviolence, nonviolent
resistance, nonviolent movements, nonviolent activism, nonviolent action, civil
resistance, and people power. Finally, we systematically reviewed academic
publications referenced in every entry in the Swarthmore Global Nonviolent
Action Database. We recognize that these sources are not comprehensive or
inclusive of more contemporary movement research and that this is a
consequent limitation of our analysis; however, we believe that the cases
reviewed reflect general patterns in academic scholarship in this field.
In addition to our analysis of empirical case studies, we also reviewed 59
manuals on strategic nonviolent action written by practitioners and activists,
which were a mix of step-by-step guides to nonviolent activism and manuals
focused on specifics aspects of scaling movement work. Manuals were obtained
directly from individuals affiliated with movements and social movement
organizations, as well as via broad web searches using terms such as: nonviolent
training, nonviolence manual, and resistance guide. Analysis of manuals was
undertaken in order to provide a comparison with empirical research on this
topic, enabling us to better assess similarities and differences in the ways
researchers and practitioners conceptualize and prioritize aspects of scaling up.
The review and entry of the 128 cases and 59 manuals into our database
occurred in multiple stages between January 2016 and January 2018. For each
case or manual, we determined whether any of the given parameters/indicators
were discussed, and how. Each time a case or manual mentioned a tactic of
scaling, this was noted as a binary "yes/no," with additional descriptive
information provided on how the indicator was addressed, if relevant. Initial
analysis of the database revealed the need to consolidate and/or reframe certain
components in order to better capture certain aspects of scaling up. Members of
the research team discussed each parameter until consensus was reached about
its definition and how to enter information about the parameter into the

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database for each case. Our analysis in the following pages systematically
explores these components of scaling as identified in our conceptual model.

Assumptions and limitations

Before discussing our analysis, it is important to clarify key assumptions and
goals relating to both our model and our analysis, as well as some of the
limitations of our work. First, in our model, we assume that there is no
hierarchy of indicators. That is, the tactics we discuss are assumed to be equally
important to the scaling process. Second, our analysis is focused on movements
with an ideological orientation toward nonviolent action, and as such, we do not
explicitly address a commitment to nonviolence as an internal tactic for scaling.
A commitment to nonviolence, rather, is incorporated into our broader
exploration of activist commitment as an element of internal scaling.
Furthermore, our analysis is based upon an understanding of the need to
identify gaps between researchers and practitioners’ understandings of how
movement strategies and actions impact success. However, it is important to
realize that the definition of “success” for movement endeavors is not
standardized for either academics or practitioners/activists, particularly with
respect to empirical case studies, and differs according to the positionality of
each author or set of authors. In other words, what is perceived as a successful
movement or campaign by one scholar or activist, may well be viewed
unsuccessful by others. Moreover, researchers’ reliance on post-hoc interviews
and/or secondhand accounts make defining the success of movements difficult
and probably empirically futile as the perception of a movement’s success shifts
relative to time and place. The Civil Rights movement in the USA is a prime
example of this: for a period of time, the Civil Rights movement was seen as a
success, but ongoing racial physical and structural violence in the United States
illustrate a lack of sustained change. Thus, in our analysis, we take a
metaphorical step back to critically analyze authors’ framework for retelling the
story of scaling up from the local to the national, while remaining cognizant of
their positionality and analytical approach.
Given this, our analysis does not enable us to empirically assess which
dimensions of scaling up are related to movement success. Moreover, it is
important to note the potential limitations of our analysis given our focus on
specific kinds of movement campaigns, as well as our reliance on English-
language literature and manuals (thus possibly introducing a Global
North/Western bias into our analysis). In addition, we note that some of the
manuals analyzed were written by and for activists in movements corresponding
to the kind of transnational initiatives that we did not include in our empirical
cases. This raises some questions about comparability across kinds of material
examined.
Despite these limitations, we believe that our analysis can challenge scholars to
expand their methods, approach, and scope of research when it comes to
movement impact. In particular, our comparison of empirical case studies and

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manuals in terms of how often elements of scaling are discussed as well as

associated with success allows us to better highlight the gaps between what
researchers define as being important and what activists actually do in
strategizing and planning actions. This comparison presents a starting point for
what we hope can be a fruitful collaboration between scholars and activists to
better understand how movement actions shape opportunities for scaling and
for movement impact.

Results
Of the 128 case studies and 59 manuals we examined, a majority included some
discussion of scaling up: 64% of case studies and 96% of manuals referenced at
least one of the indicators of scaling up included in our conceptual model. While
these were not necessarily discussed with the concept of scaling up in mind, this
suggests that scaling as a concept has entered the thinking – even if not explicit
– of both scholars and activists. Moreover, the difference between empirical
cases and suggests that pragmatically-oriented conceptualizations of how
scaling up occurs, and what researchers choose to focus on, are not entirely
aligned. This theme of theory versus practice is one that we will explore
throughout this analysis. Table 2 provides an overview of the analysis results.

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Table 2-Analysis of Scaling in Cases and Manuals

N % % of cases
Dimensions defined as
successful
by authors
Cases (Total Manuals (Total Cases Manuals
cases) manuals)
Tactics for
Scaling
Internal
Strengthening
Strong
Commitment 58 (128) 25 (59) 45.31% 41.67% 31.25%
among activists
Strategic 38 (59) 27.34% 64.41% 32.01%
35 (128)
Planning
Diverse 20 (59) 53.12% 33.90%` 57.14%
Movement 68 (128)
Membership
Shared Message 5.19%
11 (128) 32 (59) 8.59% 54.24%
and Ideology
External
Strengthening
Increased 34.74%
61 (128) 21 (59) 47.66% 55.54%
Membership
Territorial
21 (128) 3 (59) 16.41% 5.08% 19.48%
Spread
Development of
Partnerships 20 (59) 33.91% 44.15%
60 (128) 46.87%
and/or
Coalitions
Engagement of 18 (59) 55.19%
external third 77 (128) 39.84% 31.03%
parties
Engagement
with 82 (12 27.59%
16 (59) 64.06% 68.83%
Government 8)
Leadership
Process of
Scaling
Sharing 73 (128) 27 (59) 45.76%
Information
57.03% 37.66%
(through the
media)
Educational 36 (128)
16 (59) 28.12% 27.59% 33.76%
Programming
Communicati
on for Scaling
Strategic
Communication 42 (128) 57 (59) 32.42% 96.61% 29.5%
/ Framing

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Tactics for scaling – internal strengthening

The tactics for scaling that focus on internal strengthening include a strong
commitment (to the movement) among activists, strategic planning, diverse
movement membership, and building a shared message and ideology. A strong
commitment to the overall goal of the movement, and willingness of members
to act, are key to ensuring the movement’s sustainability and thus to scaling up.
The SOA Handbook for Nonviolent Action (1998) states that these reinforcing
mechanisms of internal strengthening or building “group culture” are,

characterized by the possibility to gain new skills, fostering of social relations,

sharing of competences and decision making (that is by consensus), and an
open leadership structure. Our groups and organizations need to be at the same
time empowering organizations — organizations that nurture empowerment
processes among their members or activists — and empowered organizations,
focusing on making use of power-to to achieve their campaigning objectives
(38).

Theoretical scholarship suggests that these tactics of internal strengthening are

mutually reinforcing and act as a foundation for scaling up nonviolent
movements (Dees 2004; Uvin 1995), even as it is important to note that
movements are not monolithic and can contain diversity in culture and
leadership style. These internal mechanisms support and are supported by
processes of external strengthening.

Strengthening the commitment of movement members

Approximately 53% of the case studies and 42% of manuals directly address
strengthening the commitment of movement members. Although increasing the
commitment of members is a core process for ensuring continued movement
activity, there are some differences in the ways the case studies and manuals go
about discussing how this does or should occur. The empirical case studies
primarily highlight tactics used to strengthen the commitment of existing
movement members. These include: using the politicization of high profile
figures, detainees or other “martyrs” to inspire activism; the use of strategic
framing and storytelling (Ackerman and Duval 2000); supporting detainees and
their families as a way to define and redefine community (Greene 2005); and
describing visits to nearby local or national groups as a sign of solidarity after
tragic events, in order to strengthen morale (Bartley 1999).
Like the case studies, the manuals generally argue that positive interactions and
relationship building between movement members during these acts of
solidarity and communication serve to strengthen movements (Nepstad 2011;
SOA 1998; War Resisters 2012). However, the manuals also address other
approaches to internal strengthening that in the case studies take a back seat to
the more aggrandized stories of martyrs, detainees, and special leadership

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inspiring change. Several manuals, for instance, focus on building relationships

among all movement activists through communication, dialogue, and shared
experience. The War Resisters (2014) manual provides a guide for resolving
internal conflicts (p. 94). Pt’Change (2005) takes this one step further and
provides a workshop outline for nonviolent communication, active listening,
and group dialogue for both internal and external strengthening (130-5). Boyd
(1999) takes an experiential approach, suggesting games and role playing to
“strengthen individual confidence” for activism outwardly, but also to create
and strengthen group bonds (p.20-26). These differences suggest that academic
scholarship could do more to address the concrete steps taken by movements to
strengthen activist commitment prior to the dramatic events that inspire
solidarity, so that we might better understand what grounds activists and
motivates their engagement to participate in such events in the first place.

Strategic planning (clear vision, capacity building, and M&E)

Strategic planning is important because it serves as an act of forward thinking,
but also because it creates space for dialogue, communication, and trust
building, which help movement organizations and/or coalitions build consensus
around tactics to be used in specific campaigns. The actual act of planning
together also builds ownership over the process of movement activity, making
plans more applicable for members to implement. It empowers group members
to define their own roles, makes them accountable to other members and can
foster deep emotional bonds.
Strategic planning was mentioned in 28% of the cases and 65% of the manuals
reviewed in our analysis. We identified three scenarios that could be used to
understand the lack of case study literature on strategic planning. First, case
study authors often analyze cases after events have taken place, rather than
assessing strategies in real time. Second, even when researchers may be present
in real time, the often-violent nature of regime change forces strategic decision
makers to limit strategizing and planning to a select leadership in fear of regime
infiltration (Nepstad 2001). A lack of information about movements’ strategic
plans may also indicate that nonviolent movements are either somewhat
spontaneous in their actions, or may hit a tipping point where planning is no
longer occurring under their control (Ransom and Brown 2013). In other words,
individuals or small groups may begin to act on their own initiative without
guidance from leaders. Discussion of strategic planning in the manuals, on the
other hand, paints a different picture of its importance. The manuals suggest
that creation of strategic plans rests on three pillars: a strong commitment
among activists (Harvey 2004), a shared message and ideology (War Resisters
International 2014; Popovic 2007), and good communication skills and dialogue
(Martin 2012). The manuals argue that without these mutually reinforcing
tactics, strategic planning is difficult and consensus cannot be established.
Specific components of strategic planning receive less emphasis in both the case
studies and manuals. For instance, only 27% of case studies and 44% of

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manuals mention the creation of a clear vision. Likewise, capacity building in

nonviolent movements – which provides members with the skills necessary to
perform nonviolent action and civil disobedience – is seen as an important
precursor to nonviolent action and is discussed in 50% of manuals, but is only
mentioned in 15% of the cases reviewed. This could indicate researchers’
inability to access information about planning processes, or potentially a lack of
methodological frameworks for studying these processes.
Finally, the extent of explicit discussion related to monitoring and evaluation
(M&E) tactics in nonviolent movements also suggests a potential lack of
theoretical and methodological frameworks for doing so. Less than 7% percent
of cases and only 24% of manuals reviewed mention M&E; the manuals that do
discuss M&E present fairly limited approaches to doing so. For instance, War
Resisters International Handbook for Nonviolent Campaigns (2009) provides a
brief section on evaluating action plans (p.142). Similarly, Ransom and Brown’s
The Grassroots Women’s Community Justice Guide suggests a set of questions
that can be used to evaluate what went well in a particular action or what might
be done better in the future. Amnesty International’s (2008) AIUSA Activist
Toolkit lists questions to use for monitoring internal dynamics while Ransom
and Brown (2013) provides a rudimentary outline of traditional monitoring and
evaluation techniques that focus on internal evaluation. The most
comprehensive tool discussed, in Moyer (1987), is a Movement Action Plan
(MAP) that “provides activists with a practical, how-to-do-it analytic tool for
evaluating and organizing social movements” that includes approaches for
monitoring some elements of both internal strengthening and external
expansion. However, none of the manuals include guidelines for assessing the
influence of issues such as strategic framing or internal consensus-building
tactics on movement success. In other words: while it is certainly possible –
indeed, likely – that assessment of movement activities happens in multiple
ways, systematic approaches using accepted best practices for evaluation are far
from prevalent. Such frameworks could be particularly helpful as a form of
record keeping that could reduce the metaphorical distance between the real
time actions of practitioners and the temporal restrictions facing researchers.

Diversifying movement membership

Diversification of movement membership refers to a broadening of the cross-
section of the population actively involved with movement activities. As scholars
have noted, diverse membership can serve to reduce the social distance between
the oppressors and oppressed (Bethke and Pinckney 2016; Chenoweth and
Stephan 2011, 2014; Galtung 1989). Nearly 58% of cases discuss diversification
in some form; however, often it is portrayed as a hurdle instead of an asset. For
instance, several authors suggest that diversifying the movement through the
incorporation of elites and members of the dominant groups can make the
movement open to cooptation (Buhlungu 2006; Marx and Useem 1971). This is
evident in the dynamics between white allies and blacks in the US Civil Rights
movement (Ackerman and Duval 2000; Fairclough 2008; Garrow 1989;

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Nepsted 2011).
Manuals, 34% of which discuss diversifying membership, tend to encourage
diversification and emphasize its usefulness in increasing the number and scope
of movement activists, but they also highlight the risks involved. Lakey et al.
(1995) note, “When resources inherent in different backgrounds and
perspectives are overlooked, a team’s effectiveness suffers. As a result, the team
is less likely to be able to navigate safely through the whitewater or to deal with
problems that crop up during everyday paddling” (p.36). However, the authors
go on to argue that diversification of the movement “is not simply a numbers
game of recruiting people different from you to support your own agenda” (p.
36). As is emphasized in many of the case studies, this and other manuals note
that when mismanaged, diversification can lead to cooptation.
A handful of the manuals provide tools for managing the complexity involved in
the internal dynamics of diversification, mostly focusing on integrating
individuals from the dominant or oppressor group into movement initiatives.
Coming to Ferguson: Building a Nonviolent Movement (2015), published by
the Deep Abiding Love Project, warns against unmonitored diversification and
cooptation by white allies, stating, “[I]f you’re coming to Ferguson with the idea
that you are going to engage with police, get a photograph taken, get more
Twitter followers, and/or write something for national publication, you’re
seeking a Movement High” (3). This warning indicates that as the number of
prospective members increases during peaks in movement activity, so do the
opportunities for those new members to coopt and change the goals and
strategies of the movement. To prevent this, the manuals offer a wide range of
tactics for handling the diversification process, such as using diversity
assessments or implementing sensitivity training using intersectionality,
strategic messaging, group dialogue, and the creation of movement specfiic
identity (Jay 1972; Lakey 1987; Burrowes 1996; Hunter and Lakey 2003). These
tools suggest that movement actors have a clear sense of both positive and
negative aspects of diversification; for scholars, they can serve as frameworks
for better understanding how this process is managed in practice.

The creation of a shared message or ideology

Finally, development of a shared message or collective understanding of
movement ideology is another major tactic for the internal scaling of
movements. This shared understanding is created through the collective
framing of the movement’s strategic vision, goals, and tactics within the group.
Only about 9% of the cases reviewed discuss the intentional creation of a shared
message or ideology. For example, Ackerman and Duval (2005) reference
Gandhi’s creation of a shared understanding, or ideology, of nonviolence that
helped scale up resistance to British Colonial India in 1946. In analysis of a
more contemporary group, Hallward and Shaver (2012) address the creation of
a shared sense of purpose and collective ideology among Students for Justice in
Palestine activists when pressuring the University of Berkeley to divest from

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Israeli companies.
While some cases discuss the importance of having a common message, they
shed limited light on the internal processes and strategies that movements
utilize to establish and maintain a shared message and ideology. However,
according to manuals analyzed – of which 55% discuss the creation of a
collective ideology – this can be done through a number of tactics, including
dialogue, storytelling, facilitated group strategizing, and community events
(Amnesty International 2008; Nepstad 2006; The Ruckus Society 2004; Sen
2003). Ransom and Brown (2013) encourage movement members to “visit
another group to share knowledge,” and learn about each other’s local practices.
They can involve visits between communities, towns and even nations” (p. 21).
We speculate that the gap between cases and manuals is, again, due to the
challenges of monitoring or accurately representing, post-hoc, the internal
dynamics of movement activists.

Outcomes of scaling – external expansion

Scholarship in the social movement and civil resistance fields highlights the
importance of increasing the size and scope of movements in order to influence
change (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 2014; Principe 2016). The size and
potential impact of a movement – what we refer to as external expansion –
depends on the ability of movement activists to communicate, frame, and
educate the broader public, including key influencers, the media, and
representatives of political institutions. Yet, both the literature and the manuals
worn against complexity of scaling up in numbers and scope too quickly, leaving
the movement open to cooptation by other movements and infiltration of
regime informants (Amnesty International 2008; Sen 2003; The Ruckus Society
2004). To reduce the negative effects of increasing movement membership,
manuals suggest an array of tactics and strategies. In our conceptual model, we
primarily emphasize four of these as dimensions of external expansion;
increased membership and development of partnerships/coalitions,
engagement with third parties and international actors, territorial spread, and
engagement with government leadership.

Increasing membership
Networking and building relationships with potential members – that is,
individuals actively involved in some way with movement activities – is key to
influencing social change. Nearly 48% of cases and 35% of manuals discuss
tactics used for increasing membership. The ebb and flow of recruitment was
cited in multiple cases as being dependent on external factors that change over
time. For instance, Garrow (1989) recounted an “ebb and flow” to the
recruitment process during the civil rights movement which fundamentally
resulted in too much diversification and the eventual fragmentation of the civil
rights movement (p. 80-83). Regional differences between the leadership and
group interests can also cause a breakdown in communication.
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Another factor in increasing membership is the ability to frame messages

strategically in order to increase interest in a movement’s work (we discuss
framing separately, below, as a process-oriented element of scaling up). In
some contexts, movements need to broaden their message in order to include a
broader populace. For example, Waite’s (2001) review of tactics used during the
Chicago Freedom Movement for civil rights suggests that the movement
attempted to capture multiple issues (rather than a single issue) in order to
“attract a broad constituency” (p. 178). Certain manuals provide insight into
strategically targeting movement messaging. One example is Popovic et al.’s
(2007) Canvas Core Curriculum; An Effective Guide to Nonviolent Struggle,
which provides a conceptual framework for understanding different types of
community members, what their roles are, and how they hold power in society,
in order to strategize and prioritize different messages. Through an exercise
linked to this framework (p. 101-110), movement members and leadership can
create targeted messaging to potential new membership.
On the case study side, Greene’s (2005) analysis of the civil rights movement in
Durham, North Carolina highlights the influence of women’s spaces,
particularly beauty parlors and clubs, as an avenue of recruitment and
information dissemination. The analysis suggests, as does the Canvas Core
Curriculum, that understanding the interests of potential new members can
help facilitate pathways, build shared messaging, and create new norms and
behaviors. Likewise, Bloch’s (2014) Training Function and Efficacy in Civil
Resistance Movements advocates a multi-level marketing strategy that
“depends on the personal relationship to recruit the individual” and “penetrate
sectors of society that hadn’t been reached before” (p. 20). As a whole, the case
studies suggest that understanding how to prioritize framing is important for
scaling. However, prioritizing multiple messages also increases the complexity
of movement endeavors and therefore the skills needed to control potential
conflict between various groups targeted by the messaging.

Territorialization
In addition to increasing the number of activists, movements can scale up in
size by increasing their geographical spread, a phenomenon sometimes referred
to as territorialization (Schock 2015). Movements with large numbers of
members confined to a single geographic region have limited influence and are
more open than other movements to repression from regime forces (Ackerman
and Duval 2000; Arenas 2015; Høigilt 2015; Shock 2015). The process of
territorialization can empower and protect marginalized groups that otherwise
might remain isolated and prone to repression and manipulation by the regime.
Expanding the territorial spread through increasing membership is dependent
on how well a movement is able to manage the diversification process.
Despite its conceptual emphasis, only 16% cases and 5% of manuals discuss how
movements expand territorially. Cases focused almost entirely on the
importance of incorporating rural communities, particularly in uprisings that

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originate in capital cities. As an example, Nepstad (2011) recounts the 1989

Tiananmen Square democracy movement and how the lack of mobilization in
rural areas made it much easier for outside soldiers to “crush the protests” in
Beijing (p. 37). Similarly, Ash (2002) highlight how different trade unions from
the cities teamed with farmers in the countryside to launch local strikes across
the country for economic reform during Polish Solidarity Revolution in 1981
that eventually led to demands for long-term political change.
Territorial spread is important to gaining legitimacy, diversifying the
movement, and recruitment of new membership, and yet both the cases and
manuals fall short in problematizing and strategizing how, where, and when to
expand territorially. The manuals provide limited tools for scaling territorially.
Herngren’s (2004) Path of Resistance: The Practice of Civil Resistance suggests
some strategies for the occupation of land and discourse on its expansion but
does not provide any clear frameworks. Ranson and Brown (2013) discuss the
importance of land tenure, housing, and owning property in creating nonviolent
communities and increasing women’s rights, but do not provide any tactics for
scaling. Furthermore, Helvey (2004) argues that land ownership is hierarchical
and is used to institutionalize classism. The heavy focus on localized land and
housing initiatives in both the cases and manuals suggests that neither
empirical scholarship nor practitioner-focused literature have framed
movement expansion geospatially, particularly in terms of scaling between local,
national, and global levels.

Partnership and coalition building

Numerous scholars (e.g. Chenoweth and Stephan 2014; Karatnycky and
Ackerman 2004; Zunes 1999) suggest that engaging external parties and
building partnerships across movements helps disseminate movements’
messages quickly and more efficiently by taking advantage of already formed
networks and relationships. Indeed, coalition building creates opportunities for
increasing a movement’s leverage and ability to persuade government actors
(Finnegan and Hackley 2008). Approximately 31% of cases and 61% of manuals
discuss partnerships and coalition building. Along with the emphasis on
partnerships and coalitions in the conceptual literature, this suggests an
awareness of the importance of this element of scaling. It is possible that the
relatively low percentage of empirical case studies discussing this issue is a
result of scholars’ focus on single movement campaigns rather than
relationships between movements, or between movements and other actors.
The diversification process that occurs when movements seek out partnerships
create a number of challenges to activists and movement leadership,
particularly when the partnership is an outsider from the community. Indeed,
both the empirical case studies and manuals analyzed stress the risk of
movements being co-opted by third parties who have their own interests and
agendas. The strong focus within empirical case studies on partnership failure
and not on the tactics used to build partnerships may suggest that even when

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this topic is addressed, researchers do not have a strong framework for

understanding successful coalition building process. For instance, Wolff (1970)
mentions multiple instances of partnerships being built between civil rights,
black power, and black Africanism movements in the United States. Although he
argues that these processes both strengthened and weakened the US civil rights
movement, Wolff does not provide a history of these partnerships, thus limiting
the potential for understanding what about them was beneficial and/or
challenging for movement dynamics
Although many of the manuals analyzed point to the potential benefits of
coalition- and partnership-building, several also warn of possible cooptation.
Rickett’s (2012) handbook for activists provides a full review of the pros and
cons of partnerships and alliances that is handy when considering movement
strategy (p. 51). For instance, Rickett notes that partnerships with international
organziations and/or governments may result in increased suspicion and
hostility from some members of the community, particularly given that
outsiders often have their own agenda and priority when supporting initiatives.
More critically, Miller’s (2006) training manual argues that outsider
intervention is often “unpredictable and hard to manage” (p. 113). This suggests
that movement leadership should retain a healthy level of skepticism when
approached by other organizations to partner or to build coalitions around a
certain goal or initiative.

Engaging external parties

A special kind of partnership occurs with third party, non-movement actors;
these linkages are important for movement scaling because of their potential for
bringing diverse support to the movement, as well as for the possibilities they
generate for obtaining information and resources, and for putting pressure on
government regimes (Dudouet 2008; Galtung 1989). The importance of third
party support can be seen in the degree to which it is reflected in empirical and
activist-oriented literature: this aspect of scaling is discussed in nearly half of
the empirical cases (48%) as well as in 61% of manuals analyzed. Table 3
provides a breakdown of the type of actors that movements engaged with in the
cases, including foreign governments, diaspora groups, local civil society and
faith-based groups, transnational solidarity movements, local nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), international nongovernmental organizations, and state
actors. As the table highlights, there seems to be a close relationship between
scholars’ perception of the importance of these engagements for movement
success and the degree to which relationships with different kinds of actors are
discussed. For instance, state actors (such as political parties) are the third-
party actor most referenced within the empirical case studies analyzed; the
cases where these relationships are discussed are also those that, according to
scholars’ perceptions, were successful most often. This re-emphasizes the
seeming focus in nonviolent movement and civil resistance scholarship on
exploring success rather than more holistically addressing possible areas of
(unintended and intended) movement impact.

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Table 3. Engaging Third Party Breakdown

Aspect of N % of Cases % of successful
Scaling cases
Foreign 4.69% 3.89%
6 (128)
Governments
Diaspora Groups 3 (128) 2.34% 1.29%
Local Civil Society,
Faith-based
15 (128) 11.72% 14.28%
Groups, Private
Sector Group
Transnational
Solidarity 3 (128) 2.34% 2.59%
Movements
Local NGOs 2 (128) 1.56% 2.59%
International
5 (128) 3.91% 6.49%
NGOs
International
Intergovernmenta 4 (128) 3.12% 1.29%
l Organizations
State Actors 36 (128) 28.12% 27.27%
Multiple 3 (128) 2.34% 1.29%

Likewise, many manual authors agree that engaging third parties is an

important aspect of scaling up, there are limited tactics presented for doing so.
Direct Action’s (1989) Pledge of Resistance Handbook is one of the few that
does: this manual discusses the importance of networking with third-party
actors and promotes the use of these networks as alert systems that can help
movements keep tabs on police, military, or other government actors. Several
manuals also suggest a system of retreats with third party actors to build
capacity, exchange ideas, and develop strategies (Pt’Chang 2005; Herngren
2004; Oxfam 2014; Ransom and Brown 2013).These tools are meant to help
movement leadership engage other groups to build consensus around shared
goals and to pool resources, yet we suggest that more can be done to highlight
concrete approaches for building relationships with external actors.

Engaging state leadership

Nearly 65% of case studies, but only 28% of manuals, discuss engaging
government leadership. Movement literature emphasizes that engaging state
leadership is fundamental to regime change and to changing oppressive legal
and political structures (Bartley 1999; Eik 2001; Fairclough 2008; Cockburn
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2014; Maguire 2003). Nonviolent movements often rely on the government

actors to gain information, advocate for the movement’s goals, and to create less
violent environments for civil disobedience. Dialogue, relationship building,
negotiations, and strategic messaging can help to scale up strategic nonviolent
action as part of civil resistance campaigns. However, when handled
improperly, engaging state leadership can be harmful and even dangerous.
Table 4 shows the breakdown of state leadership by type. The majority of cases
where this is discussed, approximately 25% of all cases analyzed, discuss
movement engagement with local, national, and military branches of
government.

Table 4. Engaging State Leadership Breakdown

Case Studies-
Engagement
with
Government
Leadership
Aspect of N % of Cases % of successful
Scaling cases
National 10 (128) 7.81% 7.79%
Local 15 (128) 11.72% 9.00%
National and 13 (128) 10.16% 11.60%
Local
Military 13 (128) 10.16% 10.38%
Local, National, 32 (128) 25. 00% 29.79%
and Military

Within the manuals where engagement with government leadership is

discussed, the primary focus is on tactics that can be used to deal with the threat
of violence from state structures (Kahn 1970; Lakey 1987; Litvinoff 2013). The
manuals place a strong emphasis on how these interactions can occur and on
tactics to help activists manage these relationships. Herngren’s (2004) manual
provides tactics on how to deal with police and military violence at protests as
well as suggestions for how activists should respond to arrest and interrogation.
Ransom and Brown (2013), on the other hand, suggest “Local-to-Local
Dialogue” that “helps grassroots groups engage local leaders and public
authorities” and “helps participants negotiate with and influence local
authorities (15-17). Similarly, Jay’s (1972) against the British government
suggests “preemptive diplomacy,” which includes seeking allies among
government officials and collecting information and support from them (p. 42-
46). These areas of emphasis, along with the relative lack of emphasis on this
aspect of scaling up, suggests a grassroots focus in the manuals analyzed that
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perhaps places greater emphasis on getting messages across at local levels than
achieving large-scale, societal change.

Processes of scaling
In the last section, we discussed the outcomes of internal and external scaling.
This section is focused on understanding how these outcomes occur, based on
our conceptual model. Processes of scaling are the basis for both internal
strengthening and external expansion; they are interconnected with outcomes
of scaling, and are often mutually reinforcing and aid in gaining momentum for
change.

Sharing information / use of media

Sharing information through the media, with both current and prospective
movement members, is key to collective action and social change. These
messages that movements disseminate can boost morale as well as provide
movements with an outlet to communicate alternative narratives (authors,
under review). From posters to social media, movements utilize multiple tools
at their disposal to communicate and create a shared ideology. Emphasis on this
issue in empirical case studies and manuals testifies to its significance: over 57%
of cases and 46% of manuals discuss how movements share information with
current and/or prospective members.
Approximately 31% of cases discuss movements engaging with local news
sources, while 18.75% report the use of multiple types of media at once. For
example, during the Civil Rights movement, activists used local newspapers and
radio to recruit new members and express the movement goals as well as the
reasoning behind certain actions (Garrow 1989; Sinclair 1998). Moreover,
international journalists and media helped to hold the U.S. government
accountable for beating and jailing protesters by broadcasting across the globe
and shaming the administration (Hallward 2012). As another example,
Ackerman and Duval (2000) describe how Dutch journalists openly discussed
how the German Reich was forcing them to publish specific content and control
the media, which helped to boost support of the resistance and increase
suspicion of the invading force during WWII. These different examples point to
the potential role of multiple media outlets for helping movements consolidate
their message and disseminate it widely to obtain support.
Table 5 shows the breakdown of media types discussed in the empirical case
studies analyzed, as well as how often these tactics were linked with perceived
success of movement endeavors.

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Table 5. Sharing Information (using Media) in Case Studies

Aspect of N % of Cases % of successful
Scaling cases
Local News 40 (128) 31.25% 31.11%
International 10 (128) 7.81% 3.8%
News
Social Media 2 (128) 1. 56% 1.29%
Multiple 24 (128) 18.75% 15.58%

As discussed earlier, there seems to be a strong relationship between discussion

of scaling elements and their perceived importance for movement success in
achieving its explicit goals. This further reinforces our argument that
scholarship in this area over-represents tactics that are linked to success, with
less emphasis on other strategies for scaling. Also important to note here is the
dearth of cases mentioning social media; the cases that do examine social media
(Golker 2011; King 2013; Tufekci and Wilson 2012) only superficially explore
use of this tool and do not differentiate between internal strengthening and
external scaling-up. However, we suggest this is largely due to the historical
nature of much of the literature examined and does not reflect a perceived lack
of importance.
In contrast with the case studies, which primarily highlight the role of media in
shaping movement messages, the manuals on nonviolent action and civil
resistance provide strategies and tips for engaging with media outlets (Canvas
2006; Direct Action 1989; MoveOn 2012), such as Helvey’s (2004) “seven
golden rules for dealing with the press.” A whole chapter in War Resisters
International’s (2014) manual focuses on media outreach, engaging with
different types of media, and how the media can be both helpful and harmful,
stating “it can be hard to interest the media in nonviolent direct action or civil
disobedience, because of course you often have to keep things secret until the
last minute” (p. 134). The differences in focus suggest a possible avenue for
further scholarly research to address the gap between manuals explaining how
movement activists should engage with media and case studies emphasizing the
impact of media use on movements. Specifically, further examination is needed
to understand the dynamics of how movement members are engaging with
media in order to disseminate their messages, particularly in the current context
of widespread social media and lack of centralized media messaging.

Educational programming
As a process, educational programming can be used both as a tool for
strengthening the work of existing movement activists, and as a way of
disseminating ideas externally to gain supporters and movement adherents.
Moreover, as membership increases and the diversification process introduces
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greater movement complexity, educational programming can help manage

hierarchical inequalities with movements and facilitate adoption of alternative
institutions and more equitable practices. These alternative systems foster
dialogue and build relationships between diverse membership, thus further
strengthening the commitment of members and scaling internally.
Moreover, 28% of cases discuss educational programming as a tactic for scaling
up, while only 6% of manuals do (although, of course, we can consider the
manuals themselves an example of educational programming). For instance,
Barkowsky (2013) explains how members of the nonviolent revolution in Poland
in 1860s provided educational programming through lectures, theatrical
performances, exhibitions and other forums. Educational programming is also
cited as being used in nonviolent movements across Eastern block Europe in
efforts to resist Russian and German advances (Laverty 2000). Moser-
Puangsuwan (2013) outlines the ways through which activists used parellel
educational instititions to the government’s in order to foster the collective
conciousness needed to resist colonial powers. Together, these cases suggest
that educational programs assist in external scaling by increasing public
awareness of the problems through framing and increasing membership.
Reasons for the lack of focus on educational programming in the manuals
examined are not clear to us, although we speculate that for the purposes of
organizers writing these manuals, educational programming may be intertwined
with other concepts and not addressed as a separate issue. In those manuals
that discuss educational programming, however, the focus is primarily on
internal scaling, as distinct from the external focus of discussion in the case
studies. Pt’Chang’s (2005) Nonviolence Training Project: Trainers Resource
Guide is an excellent training manual for teaching and creating a shared
ideology around nonviolent action through “popular education and experiential
learning” (p. 29). Several manuals suggest skilled facilitation as being
instrumental to educational and constructive programming (Coover, Esser, and
Deacon 1978; The Ruckus Society 2003; Sen 2003; Brown 2007; Miller 2006).
Coover, Esser, and Deacon (1978) take this further, suggesting the use of
Freire’s (1996) critical pedagogy to restructure education and recommending
the integration of nonviolent action into the entire education system. The
distinction between cases and manuals here seems to reflect an emphasis on
outcomes in the former, whereas in the latter, processes that can lead to scaling
are of primary focus.

Communication for scaling: strategic communication and

framing
Finally, as noted above, we discuss communication processes separately because
of their significance as a foundation for other scaling processes. In particular,
messaging and framing are both used to strengthen nonviolent movements
internally and helps to facilitate external scaling up. Frames – in the form of
messages that movements send, either through the media, through expressions

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of their demands and ideology that are presented at protests or demonstrations,

or perhaps via educational activities – can help, at an individual level, lead to
the process of cognitive liberation that is perceived as central to recruiting
movement activists (Nepstad 1997; Piven and Cloward 1977). Indeed, in social
movement scholarship, framing is perceived as central for movements to
highlight interests and challenge dominant actors (Benford and Snow 2000).
Of the literature reviewed, however, only 32% of cases discuss framing, while
96% of manuals address this topic. In both case studies and manuals, framing is
discussed as a tool to increase support, recruit new members, and build larger
coalitions, while others include proactive or reactive framing to more generally
addresses public discourse. Interestingly, both also focus on the how of framing,
with cases describing how campaigns used an array of outlets to spread
movement messages, and manuals addressing concrete strategies for doing so.
For instance, Harvey’s (2004) manual notes, “how you word or ‘frame’ a goal
can have a huge impact on its acceptance among the members of the group, and
potential allies and adversaries. It can be useful to test the suitability of your
goal using the following tool” (p. 52); the manual provides a chart for mapping
different types of messaging that is focused on the intended receiver. Likewise,
Popovic et al. (2007) provide an entire chapter on strategic communication and
framing techniques, arguing that framing messages is important for helping
people express their discontent, convey the vision and objectives of the
movement, provide information and facts that the opponent is hiding, and
influence public debate and perceptions of key players that support the
oppressive regime by conveying information to the media and international
community. On the case study side, Ackerman and Duval (2000) explain how
Gandhi's Satyagraha teachings were made into a manual that was used as a
symbol of change against the oppression of Great Britain; they also highlight
the use of framing as a strategy for gaining movement support in Poland during
unionization strikes in the 1980s. As they note, use of union imagery and
masculine attributes in the frames used by the anti-communist movement
allowed it to recruit new members who did not normally subscribe to liberal
ideals in rural Poland.
It is unclear why there is such a discrepancy between discussion of framing in
empirical case studies and manuals, especially given the relatively similar
emphasis on the significance and tools of framing where it is discussed. One
possibility raised earlier in the manuscript is that decisions about how to frame
movement messages may be made by a small cadre of movement leaders to
whom researchers do not have access. Another possibility may be the focus of
much empirical scholarship on actors and targets of change, rather than the
more amorphous communication processes that underlie engagement in
strategic action (Chabot 2012).

Using success to identify gaps in the research on scaling up

Of the case studies analyzed, 36% are described as successful. As noted above,

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there is no set definition for “success”; rather, its use to describe campaign
outcomes depends entirely on the perspective of the case study author(s). While
lack of a standardized definition may be problematic, it is also important for
helping identify gaps in existing scholarship about civil resistance and
nonviolent social change campaigns. In particular, our analysis allows us to
better understand gaps between what is emphasized in manuals preparing
activists for nonviolent action, and the aspects of scaling up that researchers
focus upon because of a perceived relationship to success. We visualize this gap
in Graph 1 below:

Graph 1. Research Focus on Aspects of Scaling in Empirical Cases

The graph compares the number of times each aspect of scaling up is discussed
in empirical case studies cases determined by the author to be successful, with
those described as unsuccessful, as well as the number of times these aspects are
discussed in the manuals and case studies analyzed. By formatting the graph in
descending order of number of successful cases described, we see that the
general trend for discussing aspects of scaling up in empirical literature
corresponds with how often those elements of scaling are linked to what are

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perceived to be “successful” campaigns. This indicates that case study authors

attribute similar aspects of scaling up to movement or campaign success;
however, in focusing primarily on these aspects, the authors miss a more
comprehensive understanding of how different dimensions of scaling can help
broaden movement impact in ways that are not linked to achieving explicitly
articulated goals or outcomes.
Comparing the cases studies to the manuals shows very specific gaps in existing
research. According to this analysis, the manuals suggest that strategic
communication and framing are particularly important, but these are not
addressed much in the case study literature. Similarly, neither strategic
planning nor the creation of a shared message or ideology are discussed in many
of the case studies or associated with success, even as these aspects of scaling
are heavily emphasized in the manuals. However, the reasons for these gaps are
unclear. It is possible that the trends point to epistemological differences among
scholars and practitioners – that is, differences in the way they understand
nonviolent movements. As discussed earlier, it is also possible that researchers
are not addressing these issues of scaling in their work due to methodological
challenges, e.g., access to internal discussions about movement strategy.

Conclusions and recommendations

Our hope is that this analysis opens the door to further discussion of the ways
we study nonviolent action in social movement campaigns, and how this
compares to the focus of practitioners and activists on the ground. Researchers
often struggle to embed themselves in movements and capture internal
dynamics in real time. As a result, scholarship on nonviolent activism has been
largely reliant on second hand and post-hoc sources of data about movement
actions, and these approaches have come to shape the methodological and
substantive focus of the field – but have also limited our understanding of the
dynamics that enable or mitigate success.
Our analysis sheds light on several avenues we believe warrant further
exploration. First, it is clear that aspects of internal strengthening, such as
strategic planning, are significantly under-researched in empirical case studies
of civil resistance. We question whether successful outcomes can occur if
foundational relationships and a strong, shared ideology are not already set in
place through dialogue, open and free communication, and trust. The majority
of empirical scholarship, however, fails to critically evaluate the process and
tools used to increase dialogue and relationship building (for exceptions, see
Chabot 2012; Finnegan and Hackley 2008; Wanis-St. John and Rosen 2017).
This limited focus means that it is not possible to explore the ways in which
internal dynamics can shape other dimensions and aspects of scaling up, and
vice-versa. Yet, activist-oriented manuals suggest that these particular areas are
significant and a core part of campaign planning. This demonstrates the need
for further research to tease out these mutually reinforcing processes and help
us understand success in more comprehensive ways..

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Given the overall lack of focus in empirical case studies on aspects of scaling
related to internal strengthening, we raise questions about the ability of scholars
to conduct meaningful research without witnessing movement strategizing
behind closed doors. Analysis of internal movement dynamics is crucial for
understanding movement scaling, especially if internal strengthening is the
foundation to scaling outwardly. It is true that our exploration of empirical case
studies (as discussed above) is limited in scope and does not reflect the full
range of movement scholarship, including more contemporary analyses.
However, the reliance on post-hoc accounts is concerning, as it reflects a
significant bias in how we aim to understand social movements and thus what
we can understand of them.
We also argue for further attention in both empirical scholarship and among
movement activists to certain aspects of scaling. For instance, capacity building
is a broad term and comprises multiple skills. However, researchers often do
not assess which skills are needed for scaling or what tactics have been used to
teach members of the movement these skills. As a result, there are limited
frameworks for monitoring and evaluating the work of nonviolent movements.
This limitation is evident within movement manuals as well, even as the need
for movement organizations and campaigns to critically assess each action is
crucial. Likewise, more research is needed to understand the role of social
media in scaling civil resistance and nonviolent movements. Our analysis
illustrates that social media can be used both for increasing membership by
engaging prospective activists, but also for communicating ideas and building
capacity and relationships among existing movement members. However, the
literature does not provide a conceptual framework for understanding social
media or methods for researching this scaling tool. Moreover, social media use
is not well defined within activist-focused manuals; when it is discussed, social
media is addressed broadly, without distinguishing between its many forms. As
social media use becomes an ever more significant organizing tool, the need for
both scholars and activists to assess its potential benefits and disadvantages is
clear.
Finally, territorialization is a topic that has been largely neglected within the
scholarly literature. Many of the case studies mention issues pertaining to rural
and urban outreach and how these geographies shape movement expansion, but
no framework exists that might help movement activists understand which
geographic areas to evaluate and target, particularly when scaling from the
national to the international level. Greater attention to territorial spread by
academic scholars can help activists aiming to scale their initiatives understand
whether and in what ways they should approach geographic dispersal.
Beyond this, our analysis highlights a general disconnect between the focus of
scholars working on issues of nonviolent action in social movements and civil
resistance, and that of activists working on the ground to pursue nonviolent
social change. Deeper integration across these two communities is important
for understanding the dynamics of nonviolent movements and ensuring that the
work of movement members is supported by best practices. Some of this might

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come in the form of greater attention to systematic self-focused research among

movement activists, who would likely greatly benefit from taking on an action
research or participatory action research approach to enable critical reflection
upon their work. We encourage practitioners and activists in the field to engage
more in structured practices that enable reflection on issues such as activist
commitment, systematic assessment of action impact, and clear analysis of skills
needed to build movement capacity. These practices might take the form of
regular (annual or semi-annual) meetings focused on systematic self-reflection,
or dissemination of surveys to committed members of an organization or
movement network, as a few possibilities.
Finally, we encourage scholars to engage in more real-time analysis of internal
movement dynamics, and for movement activists to draw upon frameworks in
the academic literature to more critically examine, and place greater attention to
specific elements of, their processes of strategic planning and engagement with
both third parties and government leaders. Our comparative methodological
approach could also be applied to strengthen the findings from more recent
analyses. Greater cross-fertilization across these groups will bring activists
closer to achieving long-term, sustainable change.

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About the authors

As a scholar and practitioner in Global Governance and Human Security and co-
founder of Refugees Welcome!, Charla Burnett has been studying the
intersection between migration, conflict, and resource management for over 8
years. She advises the Emerging Scholars and Practitioners in Migration Issues
Network and was named one of Forbes's 2016 Under 30 Scholars. As a Sidney
Topol Fellow at the Center of Peace, Democracy, and Development, Charla
works with a network of international scholars and activists in the field of
strategic nonviolence and civil resistance to reduce violent conflicts worldwide.
Her dissertation focuses on the use of public participatory processes and
geospatial decision-making to resolve natural resource conflicts in the
Caribbean. Primary affiliation: academic. Charla.burnett01 AT umb.edu
Karen Ross is an Assistant Professor of Conflict Resolution at the University of
Massachusetts, Boston, where her work focuses on conceptual and methodological
issues at the nexus of peace-building, education, and socio-political activism. She is
also a dialogue practitioner and trainer. Primary affiliation: academic. karen.ross AT
umb.edu

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Volume 12 (1): 591 – 615 (July 2020) Matthews, Social movements and (mis)use of research

Social movements and the (mis)use of research:

Extinction Rebellion and the 3.5% rule
Kyle R Matthews1

Abstract
The misuse of academic research can lead social movements to engage in
strategies that may be inefficient or misguided. Extinction Rebellion argues,
based on research by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), that once 3.5% of the
population of a state is mobilised in sustained protest, that success is
guaranteed. But the data this research is drawn from consists of campaigns
against autocratic regimes and occupying military forces, rather than the
liberal democratic contexts that Extinction Rebellion is engaged in. I argue
that Extinction Rebellion is misusing this research, and therefore focusing
upon mass, sustained disruption in capital cities, rather than alternative,
possibly more effective strategies. Through an exploration of how one social
movement misuses research by applying it to a context to which the data does
not apply, I argue for closer engagement between academics and the social
movements that they study. This engagement will improve our understanding
of the work of social change, provide social movements with insights to make
them more effective, and facilitate the accurate interpretation of academic
research in order to prevent its misuse.

Keywords
Extinction Rebellion, cognitive praxis, repertoires of contention, diffusion,
misuse, research, climate change, protest, strategy, tactics.

Introduction
Extinction Rebellion (XR), a climate change movement that launched in
November 2018, has quickly risen to prominence after engaging in highly visible
and disruptive actions. XR seeks to achieve its goals by both educating and
informing, but also disrupting ‘business as usual’, creating a sense of crisis, and
putting direct pressure on elected leaders to enact change quickly. XR’s
founders paid particular attention to social movement research when forming
XR and developing its strategies of change, seeking to make XR successful in
achieving its goals (Hallam, 2019a; The Economist, 2019). Since its launch XR
has spread worldwide, forming a significant part of the global climate

1The author would like to thank Karen Nairn, Sophie Bond, Amee Parker, fellow students in the
Writing for Publication in the Social Sciences course at the University of Otago, various
members of Extinction Rebellion Aotearoa New Zealand, and two anonymous reviewers for
their constructive feedback on this article.

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Volume 12 (1): 591 – 615 (July 2020) Matthews, Social movements and (mis)use of research

movement, with over 485 local groups in more than 60 countries (Iqbal, 2019;
Feder, 2019).
This article explores XR’s use of nonviolence research, particularly the ‘3.5%
rule’. The 3.5% rule is drawn from empirical research done by Chenoweth and
Stephan (2011) on resistance campaigns from 1990-2006. In the dataset
developed by Chenoweth and Stephan every campaign that mobilised at least
3.5% of the population in sustained protest was successful. However,
Chenoweth and Stephan’s data relates to state-wide systemic change, mainly
overthrowing autocratic governments, and does not apply to change in liberal
democratic states. Yet XR has adopted the 3.5% rule as being relevant to the
liberal democratic context that it operates in, spreading this understanding
throughout its global movement. I therefore argue that XR is misusing research
by applying it to a context that it does not relate to. This misuse has informed
XR’s strategy of mass mobilisation and disruptive actions, and led it away from
alternative strategies that may be more useful.
Through this case study focusing on XR, I seek to shed a light on how social
movements understand, diffuse, and use academic knowledge, and the
implications of that knowledge being misused. First, I will explore the literature
about social movement knowledge transfer and the misuse of academic
knowledge, arguing that what social movements ‘know’ about social movement
research informs the strategies that they adopt. Then I will take a deeper look at
the work of Chenoweth and Stephan which has led to the ‘3.5% rule’, indicate
why I believe this research is being misused by applying it to contexts to which it
does not apply, and the implications of this misuse by XR. Finally I conclude by
arguing that social movements and the researchers engaged with them need to
be aware of the limits of research and its application to new contexts, but that
this wariness should lead to more academic engagement with social movements
to successfully operationalise social movement knowledge.
I engage in this work as a supporter of, participant in, and researcher engaged
with XR. I am involved with XR at the local level through my membership and
research work with Extinction Rebellion Ōtepoti Dunedin, nationally with
Extinction Rebellion Aotearoa New Zealand, and globally as a member of the
wider climate change movement. My relationship with XR explicitly calls for
research that makes a valuable contribution to informing the goals and
processes of social change. This activist-scholar approach is my response to the
call by Meyer (2005) for social movements and their tactical choices to be
informed by quality research rather than anecdote and assumption. I pursue
this work through militant ethnography, a politically engaged and collaborative
form of participant observation carried out from within grassroots movements
(Juris, 2007). This positionality has enabled me to see the 3.5% rule diffuse
throughout XR and other social movements globally, analyse the impact of this
diffusion on discussions within XR about the best way to achieve social change,
and provided me with the knowledge to critique this rule within the XR context.
My approach therefore is not to damningly criticise XR and their work, but

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rather to engage constructively through sympathetic critique in order to make

its strategies more effective.

Knowledge, document analysis, cognitive praxis, repertoires

of contention, and diffusion
There is a substantial literature noting the significance of activist knowledge
systems and discussing the problems of academics ‘colonising’ this knowledge
for their benefit (see, for example Bevington and Dixon, 2005; Choudry, 2015;
Cox and Fominaya, 2009; Cox, 2014; Cox, 2015; Cox, 2018; Eyerman and
Jamison, 1991; Routledge, 2013). But it is less clear how social movements use
academic research on the strategies and goals of social movements. First, I will
define my understanding of knowledge and outline the document analysis
methodology that I have used in this research. I will then explore our lack of
understanding of how social movements use research by exploring how
knowledge is operationalised through cognitive praxis – the identities and
strategies of activists constructed through knowledge - and repertoires of
contention – the set of tools of social change that activists adopt. Then I will
investigate knowledge transfer via diffusion, and the small body of literature
that explores the diffusion of unsuccessful strategies of change.
A broad understanding of knowledge includes not only academic research, but
also the documents, discourses, and beliefs that help construct collective
understandings, as well as the experience and wisdom of individuals (Ward et
al., 2009). This broad understanding of knowledge encompasses not only what
is ‘known’ through research, but what is believed to be true, through
interpretation, custom, experience, and beliefs. It is this broader definition of
knowledge that I am using as I explore how research enters commonplace
understandings.
In this research I have used document analysis methodology to collect and
analyse relevant materials. Document analysis is ideal for investigating the
diffusion of knowledge around a global network, because documents have been
written with the adopting audience in mind, rather than moderated by
subsequent revision or retrospective assessments such as interviews (Bowen,
2009). In this way I am assessing documents for the purpose for which they
were written, and analysing whether and how they have been adopted by
receivers. Much of the source material by which I have assessed XR’s adoption
of the 3.5% rule is via documents produced by various XR groups, and also
prominent individuals in XR. Some documents are published by media
independent of XR, but in these instances the documents are either written by
an XR spokesperson and published by the media as an opinion piece, or
presented by an XR spokesperson during the course of an interview which is
available unedited. I am therefore confident that these materials represent the
unmediated opinion of representatives of XR. My document analysis is by no
means exhaustive, however in my research and involvement with XR I have
found only one instance of a significant challenge to accepting the 3.5% rule as

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relevant from within XR – a series of think pieces by XR spokesperson Rupert

Read that I will explore further below (Extinction Rebellion, 2019a). Other than
this, there seems to be widespread support and diffusion of the 3.5% rule as
both fact, and relevant to XR.2
In relation to the role of knowledge in social movements the concept of
‘cognitive praxis’ is useful (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991). Cognitive praxis is the
ways in which individual and collective identities and the strategies of social
movements are constructed by knowledge (Jamison et al., 1990; Eyerman and
Jamison, 1991). There has been considerable attention paid to social movements
and their processes of knowledge construction (see, for example Gillies, 2014;
Cox, 2018; Chesters, 2012; Cox, 2014; Choudry, 2015; Cox, 2015; Tarrow, 2011).
Social movements use knowledge to build their collective structures, support
their claims, and create strategies and tactics to pursue change. Activist
knowledge is often created through praxis, an understanding of knowledge and
social change that accepts that the two are inseparable, and that knowledge is
tested in encounters within movements and between movements and their
opponents (Cox, 2014; Foley, 1999; Rosewarne et al., 2014; Tilly, 2008;
Eyerman and Jamison, 1991). Social movements and the individuals in them
therefore construct meaning not only through defining themselves as activists
seeking social change, but in choosing, rejecting, and implementing strategies to
seek that change (Eyerman and Jamison, 1989). These choices are mostly
supported by theory, experience, and anecdote rather than systematic research,
and further developed and reinforced through training, group dynamics, and
collective activist experiences (Meyer, 2005; Ferree, 2003). Movements
therefore often become both organisationally committed to a cognitive praxis
that consists of opinions and feelings about ways of operating, and
understandings about why alternative approaches are wrong (Cox and
Fominaya, 2009).
A cognitive praxis helps to construct a ‘repertoire of contention’. Repertoires of
contention are the strategies and tactics that form part of the set of tools a
movement uses to overcome obstacles in their struggle (Tilly, 2008; Tilly, 1978;
Piven, 2006). Repertoires of contention operate in historical, social, and
cultural contexts, and are influenced by the dynamics of struggle between a
movement and its opponents (McAdam, 1983; Crossley, 2002; McCammon,
2003). What activists know and believe, and what others expect activists to do
influences the nature of a movement’s repertoire (Tarrow, 1993). As such
repertoires reflect not only what activists collectively believe are acceptable
methods of seeking change, but also what is believed to be most successful in
the context that they operate in (Soule, 1999; Soule, 1997). In exploring XR’s
adoption of the 3.5% rule I am therefore seeking to understand knowledge
transfer at the level of cognitive praxis – how a particular understanding of
research has led to the adoption of a repertoire of contention that views mass

2 I am aware of individuals outside of XR who have raised concerns with its use of the 3.5% rule
(see, for example, Ahmed, 2019 and Berglund, 2019).

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mobilisation as the best way to create social change in response to the climate
crisis.
Knowledge transfer has been studied extensively in social movements,
particularly the diffusion of knowledge. Diffusion is the spread of an idea or
innovation across social institutions and through social networks (Walsh-Russo,
2014; Rogers, 2001). In social movements innovative tactics, frames,
repertoires, and ideologies may all diffuse within and between movements
(Soule, 2007; Soule and Roggeband, 2018). Diffusion occurs via a dynamic
process in which both transmitters and adopters have agency. Transmitters may
be actively engaged in the transmission process as they promote their
knowledge and seek to push it into new contexts. Receivers may also facilitate
diffusion by actively seeking out an innovation, considering its value, the
context from which it came, how successful it has been, and its applicability to
their own context (Rogers, 2001; Soule and Roggeband, 2018; Roggeband,
2007). They will then reconceptualise elements of it based on their experience
and perceptions of differences between the transmitting and adopting contexts
(Roggeband, 2007; Soule and Roggeband, 2018). This often requires the
generalisation and abstraction of an idea from a particular reality into a general
frame that can be reapplied more globally (Tarrow, 2005). Diffusion can create
risks for social movements if an innovation is brought into a context where local
political culture, institutions, or the reaction of the wider population make the
innovation less successful or even dangerous (Soule and Roggeband, 2018).
Particularly relevant for my research is the risk that a strategy that is successful
in a transmitter’s context, may not be successful in the receiver’s context.
There are numerous factors that improve the likelihood that a repertoire will be
diffused: the similarity of the transmitter’s and adopter’s identity and context;
the nature of the repertoire and how modular and transferable it is; the
adopting movement being non-hierarchical and decentralised; structures and
networks that link the transmitter and adopter; positive media attention
highlighting the innovation; successful action on the part of the transmitter
using the repertoire; the innovation being particularly creative or ‘catchy’; and
the existence of a broker, an individual who helps translate and transmit
knowledge to make it more accessible (Walsh-Russo, 2014; McAdam and Rucht,
1993; Tarrow, 1993; Soule and Roggeband, 2018; Strang and Soule, 1998;
Morris, 1981; Strang and Meyer, 1993; Chabot, 2010; Wood, 2012). Brokers
often champion the adoption of an innovation by incorporating it into a broader
theory of change which assists diffusion by situating the innovation amongst
familiar cultural practices and knowledge (Strang and Meyer, 1993). When
transferring scientific knowledge to non-scientific groups the presence of an
individual with higher education in the receiving group improves their
satisfaction with knowledge transfer (Bunders and Leydesdorff, 1987).
What examples do we have of research that explores the diffusion of unsuitable
repertoires of contention in social movements? Soule (1999) explores the
diffusion of an unsuccessful innovation by American college activists in the anti-
apartheid divestment movement. In the mid-1980s, college activists’

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construction of replicas of South African shantytowns on American campuses

was a popular tactic that quickly spread throughout the divestment movement.
Yet colleges where shantytowns were employed as a tactic divested slower than
colleges where it was never used. Soule (1999) argues that shantytowns diffused
successfully because it was a tactic that was compatible with the values,
experiences, and needs of potential adopters. It met their understanding of
material conditions in South Africa, provided a visible and direct challenge to
colleges, and was visually and physically was similar to the sit-in, a tactic that
was well understood in the American context due to the civil rights movement.
It spread because of a social construction (by activist networks and media
attention) that it was an effective tactic. Students monitored other campuses for
cues on possible tactical innovations, assuming that it was successful because of
its immediate impacts upon the targeted campus and widespread media
attention, rather than assessing whether the tactic achieved the desired goal of
divestment (Rogers, 2001; Soule, 1999). The success of a tactic is difficult for
groups to measure, so social movements may instead use proxies for success
such as media attention or a lack of state repression when considering adoption
(Koopmans, 2004). The diffusion of repertoires to new contexts may therefore
say more about the internal dynamics of social movements and their need to
find strategies and tactics that are successful, than the quality of the repertoire.
These dynamics and the need to find answers to complex problems, I will argue,
have led to misuse by Extinction Rebellion.
I have built a picture of the diffusion of movement strategies and tactics,
particularly the diffusion of unsuitable repertoires, in the absence of an
extensive literature on the misuse of research by social movements. This picture
is based upon my conceptualisation of the work of social movements as
occurring within repertoires of contention that bound the strategies and tactics
that movements view as acceptable and effective, and cognitive praxis, the ways
in which activist identities and strategies of change are constructed by
knowledge through struggle. The knowledge that helps construct a cognitive
praxis diffuses between contexts through a number of means, particularly
knowledge brokers, who access, translate, and spread academic knowledge to
social movements. I have also outlined how a document analysis methodology
will be used to analyse these concepts in relation to XR. I will now explore the
cognitive praxis that informs XR’s repertoire of contention.

Nonviolence research and Why Civil Resistance Works

XR is an unusual social movement because as well as being informed by
research on climate science, it has paid close attention to social scientific
knowledge on the structures and strategies of social movements (Hallam,
2019a). This social movement research includes strategic issues such as
organisational structures and theories of change, but also practical issues such
as the best ways to welcome people to XR meetings and encourage them to
return. In particular the civil disobedience research by Chenoweth and Stephan
(2011) and their 3.5% rule has guided XR’s theories and strategies of change.

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However, the selection of research that supports preferred arguments, and the
construction of conclusions that are not supported by data are common risks in
the application of research. Research is a contested, political process, rather
than linear and value-free (Gillies, 2014; Tseng, 2012). In this section I will
provide an overview of Chenoweth and Stephan’s work before explaining why I
believe that XR is misusing this research by applying it to a context that it does
not relate to.
Despite the considerable influence of nonviolence theories on social change
movements, it was not until Chenoweth and Stephan published Why Civil
Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict that there was a
quantitative analysis of nonviolent movements which proved that they were
more successful than violent methods of social change, and suggested reasons
for this success. The nature and content of the Nonviolent and Violent Conflict
Outcomes (NAVCO 1) dataset developed by Chenoweth and Stephan for this
research is quite significant for my argument, so I will explore it in some depth.
The NAVCO 1 dataset comprised 323 resistance campaigns between 1900 and
2006 compiled from multiple sources. Resistance campaigns were defined as “a
series of observable, continuous tactics in pursuit of a political objective” that
fell into three categories: anti-regime, anti-occupation, and secessionist.
(Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008: 16) Cases were considered violent if they
committed a significant amount of violence and nonviolent if violence was an
insignificant part of the campaign. Campaigns were coded as having three levels
of success: success, limited success, and failure. For a campaign to be successful
it had to have achieved its stated objectives within two years of the end of the
campaign, and the campaign had to be judged to have had a discernible effect
on the outcome. Limited success occurred when a campaign obtained significant
concessions, but not its stated objectives. If a campaign did not meet its
objectives or achieve significant concessions, it was coded as a failure. The
dataset included other variables such as the size of the campaign at its peak,
whether the regime responded to the campaign violently, defections amongst
the regime’s security forces, external support for the resistance campaign and
the regime, the democratic extent of the regime, and duration of the conflict
(Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008).3
The results of this research were initially published in a journal article (Stephan
and Chenoweth, 2008), and then as a book (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011),
both entitled Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent
Conflict. The research reported a number of significant findings. Nonviolent
social change was twice as likely to be successful as approaches that primarily
used violence. The success rate for nonviolent campaigns improved over time,
rising from 40% in the 1940s to 70% in the early 2000s. Nonviolent social
change movements were much more likely to lead to democratic states than
violent ones in the long term. Some of the factors influencing the likelihood of
social change were also significantly different between the two methods.

3For more information on the NAVCO 1 dataset, including updated versions, see:
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/navco.

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Nonviolent campaigns were six times more likely to be successful in the face of
violent repression. Shifts in loyalty from the regime to the campaign by the
bureaucracy and/or military forces were significant in whether a campaign was
successful, but only if the campaign was nonviolent. Lastly, they concluded that
broad-based, diverse nonviolent campaigns were more successful because they
were more resilient and difficult to repress (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011;
Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008).
Further work on the dataset by Chenoweth in preparation for a workshop with
activists after the book was published led to the creation of the 3.5% rule.4 Using
the variable that measured participation, Chenoweth found that every campaign
in their dataset that mobilised at least 3.5% of the population in sustained
protest had been successful. She brought this conclusion to public attention in a
TED talk given in 2013.5 The 3.5% rule only relates to nonviolent campaigns,
because they do not create the moral and practical barriers to participation that
violent campaigns do, therefore making it possible for a significant proportion
and range of a population to mobilise (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011).
Chenoweth and Stephan’s work on civil disobedience has had considerable
influence on civil resistance and nonviolence studies. As the first piece of
quantitative evidence about the effectiveness and longstanding impacts of
nonviolent campaigns, it provided evidence to back up moral and theoretical
arguments for nonviolence. But the research has also been particularly
significant in social movements. A number of social movements have explicitly
or implicitly referred to the research findings and the 3.5% rule. Erica
Chenoweth’s TED talk has been viewed over 220,000 times since November
2013 and has been promoted by social movements in their social media and
communications. The TED talk video presentation has disengaged the research
conclusions from the data on which those conclusions are based, which are only
accessible in the book. This disengagement has made it easier to diffuse the
research into a context that is unsupported by that data.
A cognitive praxis guided by Chenoweth and Stephan’s research might
emphasise nonviolence, engaging in actions that are likely to attract repression
and loyalty shifts by state forces, and a focus on building a broad-based, diverse
mass movement. In particular, it would seek to build that mass movement
towards the sustained participation of 3.5% of the population in order to
guarantee success. But this cognitive praxis would miss important information
about how this research is focused on ‘maximalist’ campaigns seeking to
overthrow oppressive regimes, resist foreign occupation, or secede from a state.
Chenoweth and Stephan (2011: 13) outlined the limited context which their
research draws data from:

4See comments by Erica Chenoweth on her blog 31 July 2017

(https://rationalinsurgent.com/2013/11/04/my-talk-at-tedxboulder-civil-resistance-and-the-3-
5-rule/#comments).
5 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YJSehRlU34w.

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This study makes a further qualification. Nonviolent and violent campaigns are
used to promote a number of different policy objectives, ranging from increased
personal liberties to obtaining greater rights or privileges for an ethnic group to
demanding national independence. However this project is concerned primarily
with three specific, intense, and extreme forms of resistance: antiregime,
antioccupation, and secession campaigns.

A sample of partially successful or successful nonviolent campaigns in the data

will include many familiar to students of the history of nonviolence. Examples
include resistance to military occupation, such as Denmark and Norway during
World War II, and Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation in the first
intifada (1987-1991), countries freeing themselves from foreign control, such as
India (1947), Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia (1989), and East Timor (1999), and
countries overthrowing autocratic rulers, such as the Philippines (1986), Chile
(1989), and Serbia (2000).
The dataset contains no campaigns seeking social change in liberal, Western
democracies. There were no campaigns seeking democratic parliamentary
support for social justice or environmental issues, no labour unions going on
strike for better pay or conditions, and apart from anti-apartheid campaigns, no
civil rights campaigns seeking legal or democratic rights. The dataset does not
contain a single nonviolent campaign from the United States, United Kingdom,
Australia, New Zealand, France, or Italy, all states where XR is actively
campaigning. Other liberal democracies that appear in the dataset, such as
Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary either appear as a result of
foreign occupation in the first half of the twentieth century, or attempts to
overthrow the Soviet Union’s rule in the latter half of the twentieth century
(Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011).
It is therefore unclear what conclusions can be drawn from Chenoweth and
Stephan’s research by activists in liberal democracies seeking to force their
governments to implement laws and policies that substantially change their
nation’s approach to the climate crisis. In particular, it is unclear from this
research whether the 3.5% rule applies to liberal democracies. If a social
movement in a liberal democratic country was successful in mobilising such a
significant part of the population, it is unclear whether that would force the
government to take action, and what that government action would be. Erica
Chenoweth specifically acknowledged this in a radio interview in 2016, stating:

You know, if a nonviolent campaign is aiming for anti-war outcomes, or anti-

nuclear outcomes, or economic and social justice reforms, or gender rights and
things along those lines, indigenous rights. Do we see the same types of success
rates of violent and nonviolent action? The answer is we don’t know yet because
those types of data collection procedures are not yet fully developed. But it’s a
really important direction for understanding what people in democracies might
do, for example, to win their particular claims. (Saturday Morning, 2016).

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My analysis of the NAVCO 1 dataset, the research publications that arose out of
it, and the subsequent statement of one of the authors of that research, lead me
to conclude that the data relates to one type of context, that of campaigns
seeking to overthrow oppressive regimes, resist foreign occupations, and to
secede from a state. In those contexts we can have some confidence about the
accuracy of the conclusions drawn from the research, and the likelihood of the
3.5% rule being applicable. However the diffusion of this research to inform the
cognitive praxis of campaigns in liberal democratic states involves the risk that
the resulting repertoire of contention will not be effective in the new location.
This does not mean that the research has no value to those movements. It does,
for example, suggest that nonviolence is likely to be the best method of social
change in liberal democracies, that repression by state actors may make social
change more likely, and that broad-based, diverse movements are likely to be
more successful. However, it does not provide evidence for those conclusions. In
particular, it does not indicate whether a strategy of building a mass movement
to reach a threshold of 3.5% participation will lead to successful outcomes. Why
Civil Resistance Works therefore joins a body of nonviolence research that
informs the work of activists in a range of liberal democratic societies, but which
should be used with caution to develop strategies in those contexts.

Extinction Rebellion and Why Civil Resistance Works

Climate change activists are in the difficult position of seeking fundamental
social change against resistant political and economic structures in relation to
an issue that gets more urgent and difficult to resolve as time passes. Climate
change presents an existential crisis for humanity, involving increased drought,
sea levels, food shortage, forced migration, and conflict (IPCC, 2018). Resolving
the climate crisis requires fundamentally changing the systems of energy,
transport, farming, and consumption that define modern civilisation, and likely
the structures of capitalism itself (Klein, 2014; Foster, 2001). Despite decades of
scientific knowledge and climate activism raising these issues little progress has
been made to resolve the crisis (Climate Action Tracker, 2019). The looming
deadlines set by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to halve
(2030) and reach (2050) net carbon become closer and more challenging as
years pass with greenhouse gas levels in the atmosphere continuing to rise.
Setbacks such as deforestation in Brazil, significant forest fires in California and
Australia, and melting glaciers and arctic ice provide ongoing reminders of the
scale and impacts of the crisis. For activists the failure of their activism to
resolve a crisis that poses existential problems to humanity is a matter of
considerable frustration (Rosewarne et al., 2014; Read, 2019; Hallam, 2019b).
For XR, this frustration, combined with the belief that traditional methods of
climate change activism have failed, has led to a cognitive praxis that rejects
conventional campaigning, such as “sending emails, payments to NGOs and
more reports” as ineffective, instead promoting mass disruptive action (Hallam,
2019b).

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This section will describe how XR as an organisation, and significant individuals

within it, explicitly and implicitly use Chenoweth and Stephan’s research to
construct this cognitive praxis. I have begun by outlining how the climate crisis
influences XR’s approach to social change. I will now provide evidence for XR’s
adoption and diffusion of the 3.5% rule, presenting XR’s web pages and
publications, as well as media opinion pieces and interviews in support of my
argument. Lastly I will explore the significance of XR’s misuse of Why Civil
Resistance Works, particularly how this misuse drives XR towards a repertoire
of contention that may not be relevant to the context they are working in, and
away from alternatives that may be more useful. I argue that this indicates that
they have been selective in their use of research.
There are numerous references to the 3.5% rule in XR’s institutional outputs,
such as XR USA’s web pages:

This type of rebellion is premised on extensive research that shows conclusively

that if 3.5% of the population in any country is actively engaged in sustained
resistance over a concentrated period of time, governments inevitably concede or
collapse under the pressure. The research shows that governments simply can’t
endure this many people engaging in serious disruption if it lasts for an extended
period of time. (Extinction Rebellion US, 2019)

An XR video arguing for nonviolent direct action states that “social science
shows it’s twice as likely to succeed as violent campaigns and is achievable with
a relatively small percentage of the population”. The text “3.5% Participation =
Always Successful” appears on screen (Extinction Rebellion NYC, 2019).
A significant element of XR’s work is ‘the talk’, a public lecture given to outline
the nature of the climate crisis and encourage attendees to become involved
with XR and its actions. These talks are a significant part of XR’s public
information campaign and membership growth strategy. The talk explicitly
references Erica Chenoweth and the 3.5% rule, with speaker notes arguing that
“It turns out only about 1-3% of a population is needs [sic] to be mobilised to
bring about massive social change or the fall of a regime” (Extinction Rebellion
NZ, 2019). XR is therefore developing and diffusing a cognitive praxis which
argues that the 3.5% rule is relevant to XR as an institution and the countries
that it operates in to achieve social change.
Although Why Civil Resistance Works has influenced the strategies of XR
organisations institutionally, it has also influenced significant individuals within
the movement to act as brokers to assist diffusion of the 3.5% rule through XR
globally and public media discourses. XR founder Roger Hallam refers to Why
Civil Resistance Works in an opinion piece written for The Guardian:

Drawing on the groundbreaking research of Erica Chenoweth and Maria

Stephan… we came to the conclusion that the only way to overcome entrenched

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political power is through extensive campaigns of large-scale nonviolent direct

action. (Hallam, 2019b)

In a video Hallam predicts that the model that Chenoweth and Stephan have
explored in autocratic states will be successful in Western liberal democracies:

It’s not guaranteed, but to say it won’t happen is just completely social
scientifically illiterate. It happens over and over again. And what’s interesting
here of course is that it’s basically happening in a Western democracy for the first
time. (Extinction Rebellion, 2019b)

In this statement Hallam has presented an internally contradictory argument –

that social scientific evidence indicates that the 3.5% rule is correct, despite it
never having occurred in the context to which he is applying it.
Hallam is not the only prominent actor within XR to argue for a strategy of mass
mobilisation. XR co-founder Gail Bradbrook also argues for the relevance of the
Chenoweth and Stephan’s research to XR:

And we know from the research of Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan that you
need between 1 and 3.4% of the population to come together and to be willing to
support people to get on the streets and be on the streets themselves. (Democracy
Now, 2019)

Both Hallam and Bradbrook, as leaders of XR and individuals who have

engaged in postgraduate research, are acting as brokers to assist diffusion. Their
prominence as founders and spokespeople for XR combined with the cultural
capital associated with their academic knowledge assists with diffusion by
lending institutional and theoretical authority to their framing of the 3.5% rule
as relevant to XR’s struggle. The nature of the 3.5% rule, which is simple to
understand and presented by XR as applicable to all contexts, gives receivers
hope that it is a solution to the difficult problem of achieving fundamental
change in relation to how humans interact with their environment.
The 3.5% rule has diffused through the global XR network and into wider public
consciousness globally. It has appeared in media stories about XR around the
world. These include the BBC (Robson, 2019), Buzzfeed (Feder, 2019), and Stuff
(Aotearoa New Zealand’s main newspaper publisher) (Kirkeby, 2019). The 3.5%
rule has spread so effectively that it has transferred from XR to other, related
climate movements. The September 27th 2019 climate strike mobilised an
estimated 170,000 individuals in Aotearoa New Zealand – exactly 3.5% of the
population. Media stories on the event referred to Why Civil Resistance Works
when explaining why this number was significant (RNZ, 2019). Greenpeace NZ
posted on Facebook that “3.5% of the NZ population participated in the youth-

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led climate strikes two weeks ago. This is enough to change our world”
(Greenpeace NZ, 2019). Regardless of whether the 3.5% rule applies to a
context, or is useful for social movements engaged in a campaign, it has diffused
through social movements and wider public discourse as though it is.
The evidence above outlines the diffusion of a cognitive praxis that misuses
Chenoweth and Stephan’s research by advocating that the 3.5% rule applies to
liberal democratic contexts, rather than the autocratic states where the evidence
for the 3.5% rule came from. The research is used to justify this praxis by
claiming that evidence indicates that the strategy will always lead to success.
Activist adoption of this cognitive praxis promotes a repertoire of contention
that seeks to change society by mobilising 3.5% of the population to engage in
mass disruption. But successful and unsuccessful campaigns occur in particular
times and spaces, often through waves of contention in which social change
occurs in a complex web of social relations and interactions between
individuals, groups, social structures, and events (Koopmans, 2004). The 3.5%
rule may not apply to the liberal democratic context that XR is applying it to,
thus it is unclear whether a strategy of mass disruption will be successful. XR as
an institution and prominent individuals within it have diffused the 3.5% rule as
a simplistic solution to social change rather than recognising the complexity of
how this occurs.
In December 2019 XR spokesperson Rupert Read addressed a XR group in
Sheffield, UK, directly addressing the relevance of 3.5% rule to XR. His speech
further developed his thoughts raised in a pamphlet ‘Truth and its
Consequences’ published in August 2019 (Read, 2019). First Read noted that
the 3.5% rule has never played out in a Western industrial democracy. He takes
this argument one step further, believing that as XR moves further into the
unknown, historically-based social science becomes less relevant, and XR needs
to rely more on its creativity to resolve the climate crisis (Read, 2019). But
perhaps his most insightful conclusion was that the movements in the NAVCO 1
dataset that achieved the 3.5% rule were never aiming to achieve that threshold.
They were instead aiming to speak to a broad population of their country,
mobilise them to seek change, and to be successful in doing so. Achieving the
participation of 3.5% of the population should therefore not be the goal, but
instead a side-effect of successful social change (Extinction Rebellion, 2019a).
This insightful argument is the first significant sign I have seen within XR of a
challenge to the applicability of the 3.5% rule, and a consideration of how
mobilisation functions in successful movements – by social movements
speaking to the issues that engage people, and creating actions that are both
inclusive and successful.
Social movements should construct a cognitive praxis and develop a repertoire
of contention that is relevant to the context in which they are operating.
Autocratic governments have a limited set of tools to respond to social conflict
and are more likely to resort to repression to control a social movement (Carey,
2010). Repression of mass movements by autocratic governments oversteps the
fragile state of their rule and undermines their tenuous hold on power. This is

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the context in which mass mobilisation is most effective as a demonstration of

widespread opposition to autocracy (Koopmans, 2004; Sharp, 1973a; Sharp,
1973b). Liberal democratic governments have a broader and more flexible set of
tools available to respond to social conflict. They may use laws and public
discourse to restrict protest to ‘legitimate’ and/or ineffective methods, public
rather than corporate spaces, or limit the role of state in order to shrink the
spaces and topics of valid political engagement (Wilson and Swyngedouw,
2014). Social movements may feel compelled to engage in democratic
government processes in order to appear constructive, and find that their mass
nonviolent power is deflected into bureaucracy and/or technocracy (Martin,
1994). Democratic governments can engage with the challenges of social
movements by adoption, where they accept some of the demands of a social
movement in order to weaken their claims, or co-option where they weaken a
social movement by offering movement leaders positions in government or
other recognition. In this context, social movements are likely to be more
effective using a repertoire of contention informed by a cognitive praxis of
strategic and tactical diversity that activates a broad and diverse movement
(Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; McCammon, 2012; Wang and Soule, 2016). By
adopting a repertoire that focuses on mass mobilisation and disruption, XR are
choosing not to engage with this alternative cognitive praxis.
What would a repertoire of contention informed by a cognitive praxis of
strategic and tactical diversity look like? Mainstream political tactics rejected by
XR such as lobbying elites, supporting the work of mainstream NGOs, and
preparing reports are obvious examples. Climate activists globally have been
engaged in a campaign to get local bodies and state governments to declare a
climate emergency. As at 19 June 2020, 1,732 jurisdictions in 30 countries, with
a combined population of 820 million, have declared a climate emergency
(Climate Emergency Declaration, 2020). This grassroots strategy is intended to
raise the profile of climate change by having it discussed in communities, and
resolved via local actions (Salamon, 2019). Probably the most successful climate
activism over the past year has been the student strikes. Inspired by Greta
Thunberg sitting outside the Swedish parliament in 2018, student strikes grew
into a worldwide movement in just over a year, with over two million young
people walking out of school during a global strike in March 2019, and over
seven million people participating in September 2019 (Fridays for Future,
2019). Youth strikers have presented a considerable challenge and inspiration to
world leaders in relation to climate action (Guterres, 2019). I do not present
these alternatives as a complete list or as an endorsement. Indeed, some, such
as climate emergencies have been critiqued both by academics and social
movements (Cretney, 2019; Beaumont, 2019). However they demonstrate
alternatives to a cognitive praxis and repertoire of contention informed by the
3.5% rule.
Climate activists can explore strategies other than mass disruption while still
engaging in radical action, such as direct action against fossil fuel producers.
Whether direct action targeted at fossil fuel producers is more effective than
mass disruption of capital cities will depend on the context that social

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movements are operating in and the way that they develop and enact their
strategies of change. But these alternatives should not be abandoned because of
a cognitive praxis constructed through the misuse of research. In June 2019
activists from Ende Gelände (Here and No Further) occupied a large open-pit
coal mine in Germany, drawing worldwide attention to ongoing fossil fuel use
and closing the mine for several days (Cox, 2019; Swift, 2019). Climate activists
in Aotearoa New Zealand have recently blockaded petroleum and mineral
forums, a coal train, and occupied a deepsea drilling support vessel (Block,
2019; Todd, 2019a; Nightingale, 2018; Todd, 2019b; Mohanlall, 2019). These
direct actions seek to raise awareness of fossil fuel extraction and use, engage in
protest to prevent its extraction and distribution, and impair the businesses that
profit from fossil fuels. Rather than seeking to create widespread disruption
throughout society to bring governments to their knees, direct action against the
institutions that benefit from fossil fuels seeks change by disrupting their
business. A radical approach using diverse tactics and locations, combined with
civil disobedience could have a significant impact upon the climate crisis and
awareness of it. By ignoring these alternatives, and justifying a strategy based
upon the 3.5% rule, XR are ignoring alternative research-based strategies (eg.
Thomas et al., 2019; Bliuc et al., 2015; Haines, 1988).
Defenders of XR may respond to my criticism of the misuse of research by XR
by arguing that the strategy that XR has adopted is that of a social movement
positioning itself as a ‘radical flank’. Radical flank groups operate in a more
radical space as part of a broader social movement of multiple groups, often
acting as ‘muscle’ to enforce the demands of the more mainstream parts of the
movement (Ellefsen, 2018). Radical flanks can have significant influence on
processes of social change: creating space for mainstream discourses to be more
successful, creating a sense of crisis to force change, increasing funding and
support for more moderate groups, increasing government action on moderate
demands, and shifting public opinion (Haines, 1984; Haines, 1988; Ellefsen,
2018; Tompkins, 2015). XR is well positioned in the climate change movement
to act as a radical flank for more moderate groups such as 350 and the school
strikes.
However there is limited evidence of radical flank theory in the cognitive praxis
of XR. While XR argues that its radical strategies will shift public discourse and
opinions, its strategy is based on the assumption that radical action will lead to
the government succumbing to XR’s demands (Hallam, 2019a). Although
radical flank theory provides evidence of mainstream groups benefiting from
having a radical flank, it does not indicate that the radical flank’s goals will be
achieved. If XR is operating as a radical flank for more moderate climate
groups, it is not doing so as part of a research-informed cognitive praxis towards
social change.
XR and its founders Roger Hallam and Gail Bradbrook have made explicit and
implicit references to Chenoweth and Stephan’s research in XR’s web pages and
publications, as well as media opinion pieces and interviews. My analysis of
these documents demonstrates how Why Civil Resistance Works is being used

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to justify a repertoire of contention based on mass mobilisation and civil

disobedience that is informed by a cognitive praxis that argues for mobilising
3.5% of a population to resolve the climate crisis. However, Chenoweth and
Stephan’s research is being misused, applying it to a context to which the data
does not apply. This has led to XR adopting a repertoire of mass civil
disobedience that may be less effective than alternatives, such as lobbying elites,
campaigning for emergency declarations, student strikes, and direct action
against fossil fuel extraction, distribution and use.

Conclusion
In this article I have argued that the misuse of academic research by XR has
shaped its strategies in ways that may be unhelpful to achieving change. In
pursuit of this argument, I have explored research by Chenoweth and Stephan
that argues that once a campaign mobilises 3.5% of a population that it will
always be successful. While I recognise the significance of this research, I argue
that a close examination of the dataset that it is drawn from, key sections of the
text, and the statements of one of the authors, limits the possible contexts this
research can be applied to. It is therefore impossible to draw any conclusions as
to whether the 3.5% rule is relevant to XR’s campaigns seeking reform in
Western liberal democracies.
There is a wealth of research on social movements, their production and use of
knowledge, and the interaction between social movements and the academics
that research them (see for example Choudry, 2014a; Choudry, 2014b; Choudry
and Kapoor, 2010; Cox and Fominaya, 2009; Cox, 2014; Cox, 2015). However,
there is limited research seeking to understand how groups use or misuse social
movement research when designing their strategies. In the absence of this
literature I have situated this discussion in the literature of knowledge diffusion,
particularly the diffusion of a cognitive praxis that informs activists of the
strategies and tactics that are likely to be successful in seeking social change
(Soule, 2007; Soule, 1997; Soule and Roggeband, 2018). I have argued that the
complex nature of climate change activism and the urgency of the climate crisis
has encouraged XR to adopt and diffuse the 3.5% rule as applicable to the
Western liberal democratic context, providing hope of successful social change.
The adoption of this cognitive praxis has seen XR pursue a strategy of mass
disruption in capital cities and reject alternative strategies, yet this strategy is
based on the misuse of research.
This is not entirely a negative story however. There is a nascent trend of social
movements actively engaging with social movement research that social
movement researchers should actively embrace. Historically, activists have
often disengaged with social movement research because of its theoretical
abstraction and lack of practical application, and their suspicion about the
nature of the neoliberal university and the motivations of academics (Came et
al., 2015; Bevington and Dixon, 2005; Meyer, 2005). Perhaps more than any
other movement in history, climate change organisations and the activists

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within them are engaged with and informed by scientific knowledge. This is
particularly the case for XR which not only uses scientific knowledge to make
claims, but uses social scientific knowledge to construct a cognitive praxis which
informs its internal dynamics and strategies, including the 3.5% rule. The
example of XR should therefore be encouraging for researchers working with
and on social movements that their work has meaning to the subjects of that
research.
Amongst this enthusiasm, we need to remain wary about the limitations of
knowledge, its wider applicability, and reflect on how it is used by social
movements (Tseng, 2012; Orsini and Smith, 2010). The solution to these issues
is more, not less, engagement with social movements, in order to apply both
academic and activist knowledge to the development of an informed cognitive
praxis and effective repertoire of contention. This cognitive praxis and
repertoire will be informed by the diffusion of ideas from other contexts, but
should not be uncritically driven by them. I therefore echo calls for researchers
to engage with social movements, recognise knowledge created within
movements as valuable, and produce academic research relevant to the work of
social change (Choudry, 2014a; Choudry, 2014b; Choudry and Kapoor, 2010;
Cox and Fominaya, 2009; Cox, 2014). This work is inherently political, and
requires academics to consider the purpose of their work, the limited value of
knowledge that only circulates in the academic world, and how academia can
contribute to the work of social change (Cox, 2015). It will require a close
engagement with social movements to find answers to the questions that social
movements raise. Some obvious ones raised by this research and XR’s use of the
3.5% rule is how mass mobilisation affects the success of campaigns in liberal
democratic states, whether the 3.5% rule or something similar applies, and what
alternative strategies should social movements employ if there is no number
that can be mobilised for guaranteed success? Erica Chenoweth has begun this
work by creating a new database, NAVCO 3.0, which reports over 100,000 daily
resistance events in 26 countries from 1990-2011 (NAVCO Data Project, 2019).
This dataset, when analysed, may offer more useful knowledge to inform the
cognitive praxis and strategies of XR.
A greater understanding of how social movements interpret and operationalise
social movement research has the potential to further transform the
relationship between academics and social movements. Knowing how social
movements use research encourages academics to focus their work on topics
that support activism. This in turn should help social movements engage with
relevant research and use it to inform their work. However this interaction
requires an honest assessment of the limitations of the applicability of research
and frank assessments when research is being misused. Only then can research
be successfully operationalised by social movements engaged in the work of
social change. This work will reach beyond academic circles to impact upon
social movements, their campaigns, and significant social and political issues
such as the climate crisis and our responses to it.

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About the Author

Kyle Matthews is a PhD candidate at the University of Otago researching social
movements and radicalism in Aotearoa New Zealand. His research focuses on
engagement with social movements through ‘militant ethnography’, the
researching of social movements through activism, which he does through
membership of local 350 and Extinction Rebellion groups. Previous research
has focused on nonviolence theory and practice in the Aotearoa New Zealand
peace movement. He also works as a research assistant with the Marsden
funded project ‘Putting Hope into Action: What inspires and sustains young
people’s engagement in social movements?’ Contact the author at kyle.matthews
AT otago.ac.nz, or @jitsnz.

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Dignity, dreaming, and desire-based research

in the face of slow violence:
indigenous youth organising as
(counter)development
Levi Gahman, Filiberto Penados, Adaeze Greenidge,
Seferina Miss, Roberto Kus, Donna Makin,
Florenio Xuc, Rosita Kan, Elodio Rash

Abstract
This article provides an overview of an autonomous social movement
defending and struggling for Indigenous land, dignity, and self-determination
in Central America and the postcolonial Caribbean. More precisely, it
highlights how Maya communities in Toledo District, Southern Belize are
mobilising to protect and continue to breathe life into their culture, customs,
cosmovisión, and communities. In doing so, we introduce readers to three of
the primary organisations that partially constitute the social movement; the
Toledo Alcaldes Association (TAA), Maya Leaders Alliance (MLA), and Julian
Cho Society (JCS). In addition to historicising and profiling these groups, their
ground-breaking land rights victory, and the unity they have galvanised
amongst Maya villages, the piece demonstrates how Indigenous youth are
engaging in and actively redefining development within the region. We do this
by sharing a synopsis of an action camp that was organised by-and-for Maya
youth. Before describing the undertakings and outcomes of the camp, we detail
how the gathering was informed and shaped by calls being made for desire-
based research. To this end, we explain how our methods and field activities
were guided by decolonial, community-based, participatory-action, and
creative approaches. Ultimately, the piece reveals how dignity-anchored,
dream-driven, desire-based research that is animated and co-created by
Indigenous youth not only can contribute to building pathways out of
structural and slow violence–but also can at once counter and transform
development. Notably, Maya youth are co-authors.

Keywords
autonomy; decolonisation; desire-based research; development; dreaming;
Indigenous resurgence; social movements; slow violence; youth activism

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…the struggle of Indigenous people for their dignity is, at its core, a dream;
indeed, a very ‘Otherly’ dream.
Marcos (2001)

…it is crucial to recognize that our communities hold the power to begin shifting
the discourse away from damage––and toward desire.
Tuck (2009)

A welcome banner made by Maya youth hangs across the community and
presentation space at the Sounding of the Conch Shell (SOCS) Camp in Toledo
District, Southern Belize. The SOCS gathering (detailed in the sections to come)
was a holistic environment where Maya youth could come together to freely
express their thoughts and share perspectives about their joys, pains, and
dreams as Indigenous youth. It was also a space where Maya youth garnered
support from peers, elders, and village leaders as they–as youth–stressed the
importance of being involved in community decision-making, collective
mobilising, and building a better–alternative–future.

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Introduction: an indigenous, autonomous, radical movement

While most social movement and critical development scholars who focus on
land, autonomy, and resistance in Latin America and the Caribbean are familiar
with the Zapatistas, far fewer have afforded committed attention to the other,
parallel, Maya land rights struggle and movement in the region. Remarkably
enough, it is a struggle against the ‘coloniality of power’ (Quijano, 2000) that is
currently unfolding and uniquely situated in both the Caribbean and Central
America. Namely, it is the struggle for land and freedom of the Qʼeqchiʼ and
Mopan Maya communities of Toledo District, Southern Belize.
In 2015, the movement made history vis-à-vis the recognition of Indigenous
land rights by winning a victory against the Government of Belize (GoB) in the
Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ). The case affirmed that customary Maya land
tenure was equal to all other property rights protected under the Belizean
constitution (Caserta 2018). Yet even with their historic legal win over the GoB
in the CCJ, the movement realises that self-determination is not something that
can be secured through either the government or legal system, but rather, only
via the political agency and collective work of grassroots communities
themselves (Fanon, 1963). The movement recognises, as other targeted and
oppressed Indigenous communities do (Rivera Cusicanqui 2007), that the path
to freedom is one which will neither be carved nor offered by the state––but
only through their own emancipatory praxis. In realising this, the movement
has, since its genesis, been engaged in a wide array of diverse tactics and
strategies aimed at effecting ‘non-metaphorical decolonisation’ (Tuck and Yang,
2012) and Indigenous ‘sustainable self-determination’ (Corntassel, 2012).
More specifically, this article provides an overview of the Maya Leader’s Alliance
(MLA), Toledo Alcaldes Association (TAA), and Julian Cho Society (JCS), which
together with the 39 Maya communities of Toledo District (Southern Belize),
comprise a coalition and social movement fighting for autonomy. Henceforth,
we, in most instances, will refer to the coalition as the ‘MLA-TAA-JCS’ to
capture its symbiotic relationship and kaleidoscopic expression. Politically, the
coalition is an autonomous and radical (from Latin, radix, meaning ‘at the
roots’) Indigenous movement that is mobilising against Western institutions
(e.g. the state) and the driving forces of capital accumulation (e.g. extractive
corporations) (Shoman, 1994; Wainwright, 2011).
We explicitly use ‘radical’ to denote that the movement is attempting to get to
the root of the problem(s) (e.g. colonial-capitalist worldviews, domination,
exploitation, violence, oppression) and change things structurally. It is also,
rather distinctively, socio-culturally positioned in what is at once Central
America and the Caribbean (i.e. Belize, a former colony of the British Crown). In
addition to a synopsis of the Maya struggle in Toledo District, this piece will
primarily highlight how youth are contributing to and vitalising the movement’s
desire-based and dream-driven (counter)development in a context of ‘slow
violence’ (Nixon, 2012).

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A key takeaway from this piece and what we attempt to accentuate and offer is
an understanding and brief glimpse of how Indigenous youth are mobilising in a
historical-structural context that was expressly arranged to be hostile towards
the Maya’s very existence. In short, the focus will be on the political agency of
youth, not the colonial damage that has been and continues to be inflicted upon
their communities and lives. In illustrating this, we share a summary of a youth
camp organised in 2019 that encompassed heritage site tours, prefigurative
artistic expression, visual storytelling, photovoice, and dream-driven praxis. The
last section of the paper, which details the youth-coordinated ‘desire-based
research’ (Tuck 2009), direct action, and camp, is authored by Maya youth
themselves.

Political context: structural and slow violence vs. se’ komonil

To contextualise this research politically and conceptually, in Central American
and Caribbean countries like Belize (‘British Honduras’ until 1981) (Bolland,
2003), where relatively large groups of Indigenous peoples reside, national
economic development, often taking the form of industrial extraction, continues
at the expense of and frequently to the detriment of Indigenous communities
(Wainwright, 2011). Indigenous groups are being excluded and not equitably
benefitting from national-international development agendas. This is in
addition to non-consultation and violations of Free, Prior, and Informed
Consent they must contend with (Anaya and Puig, 2017). The adverse impacts
have been identified as, inter alia, lack of access to land and natural resources;
indigent forms of poverty; reduced options for sustainable livelihoods; negative
health effects; gender-based violence; destruction of heritage sites; ecosystem
damage; and loss of cultural identity (Munarriz, 2008).
The cumulative consequence of the aforementioned impacts is that Indigenous
people, especially women and girls, are among the most vulnerable groups to
external market volatility, economic shocks, climate change, extreme weather,
and disaster events (Gahman and Thongs, 2020; IACHR, 2017). According to
numerous human rights organisations and grassroots advocates, there is a
pressing need to provide greater (horizontal) support and solidarity to these
communities to further increase adaptive capacity and safeguard rights
(Marcos, 2018). A host of movement leaders and political activists also note
that, globally, Indigenous communities are at the forefront of responding to
these realties by confronting hostile forces and building pathways out of the
alienation and repression to which they are being exposed (Montoya, 2016;
Nunn, 2018). The MLA-TAA-JCS, inclusive of the youth who volunteer for the
coalition, is case in point. It is an Indigenous movement ‘from below’ that has
taken up the mantle of asserting dignity and demonstrating political agency in a
Global South/Majority World context of state-sanctioned structural and slow
violence (Kus and Miss, 2019; Grandia, 2009).

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Structural and slow violence

Structural violence can broadly be defined as exposure to premature death
(Galtung, 1969). It is characterised by the suffering and alienation––
experienced disproportionately by targeted and marginalised groups––created
by oft-unseen social forces and taken-for-granted cultural norms. It is ostensibly
invisible because it is deeply embedded within societal structures and
institutions (Farmer, 1996). Structural violence includes exclusion from full
participation in resource distribution and allocation, political decision-making,
education, healthcare services, the rights and entitlements afforded by
citizenship and residents with ‘legal’ status, etc (Gahman and Hjalmarson,
2019). It is related to social injustice yet also focuses on health-eroding forms of
cultural erasure and epistemic burial, as well as discursive (e.g. stigma,
ostracism, ‘othering’) and indirect (neglect, inaction, omission) violence.
Structural violence, in short, is the foreclosure of both life chances and
expectancies.
Structural violence also comprises institutionalised racism, sexism, xenophobia,
classism, heteronormativity, homophobia, ethno-nationalism, transphobia, etc..
For Maya communities in Belize, structural violence is identifiable in the
endemic poverty, land dispossession, loss of language speakers, forfeiture of
customs, intergenerational trauma, and internalised oppression that has and
continues to be generated by the historical trajectories of colonialism, state
repression, market-driven extraction, and governmental abandonment
(Common Struggles Gathering, 2017). Amidst this exploitative reality, the Maya
communities continue to view themselves as neither pitiable nor helpless.
Slow violence, comparably, whilst innately systemic, expands upon structural
violence and focuses on what is produced at the nexus of the global economy,
resource extraction, industrial production, environmental effluence, ecosystem
(ill)health (inclusive of human and non-human life), and risk (Nixon, 2011). It
often occurs hand-in-hand with environmental racism and state negligence and
refers to the chronic, protracted, and seemingly imperceptible debilitation of
communities and ecologies due to fallouts associated with environmental
degradation and toxicity (Pulido, 2017).
Examples of slow violence include commercial clear-cut logging; the leaching of
mining impurities; fossil fuel removal and burning; deforestation; the
commodification and depletion of wildlife; the unsanctioned and unregulated
disposal and dumping of pollutants; contaminant bioaccumulation; and the
aggregative human-induced causes and lasting upshots of disaster events and
extreme weather. For communities in Central American and circum-Caribbean
geographies, slow violence takes the form of illness and disease related to
tainted freshwater and polluted ecosystems; arable land loss from unsustainable
for-profit excavation; the destruction of cultural heritage; disruptions to
seasonal subsistence-farming due to climate change and rising sea levels; and
increased sexual exploitation from the presence of external corporations, etc.

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(Common Struggles Gathering, 2017; Fabricant, Gustafson, and Weiss, 2017;

Giardino, 2015).
Noteworthy here are that violations of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent
(FPIC) and non-compliance to internationally recognised human rights accords
are arguably two of the key immediate drivers of slow violence being
experienced by marginalised communities across Central America and the
circum-Caribbean as a result of the ongoing coloniality of racial capitalism
(Anaya and Puig, 2017). Both the GoB and corporate extractors are culpable for
multiple accounts of precisely just these types of violations and non-
compliances (Campbell and Anaya, 2008; COA, 2010; Cultural Survival, 2015;
OHRHC, 2007; Purvis, 2013)

Se’ komonil and self-determination

Amidst this avoidable yet imposed structural and slow violence, many Maya, as
countless have been doing for over five centuries, are responding with collective
resistance and a movement towards social change and transformation (Coc,
2015). Maya communities of Toledo District continue to engage in an unceasing
effort to carve out space for Indigenous ways of knowing, being, and living
under Western institutions and impositions of ‘modernity’ and ‘development.’
The MLA-TAA-JCS’s mandate, thus, has been to struggle to co-create
alternatives to the (neo)colonial social relations, economies, modes of
governance, and even maps that have been forced upon their communities for
generations (Wainwright and Bryan, 2009). This entails protecting and
revitalising their Maya lands, culture, languages, and cosmovisión. It also means
asserting and practicing their Indigenous conceptualisation of dignity and
togetherness, ‘se’ komonil.’
Se’ komonil is a deeply layered, intersubjective Maya term signifying
togetherness that roughly translates to ‘practicing a dignified life, collectively.’
When explained further, se’ komonil means ‘living a just and dignified life,
reciprocally, through a mutual recognition of worth, interdependency, and
intergenerational inter-connectedness that is woven into the spiritual, material,
human, and non-human world.’ Revealingly, for the Maya, both land and
heritage mutually constitute se’ komonil, i.e. dignity and unity. Hence,
reclaiming, recuperating, and revitalising both their lands and heritage sites
means doing the same for their dignity.
The MLA-TAA-JCS’s defence and assertion of se’ komonil in the face of
corporate extractivism and the consolidated power of a postcolonial capitalist
state has not come without consequence. Members of the movement, from its
genesis through the present moment, have been harassed, accosted, and
arrested. Moreover, several have been subjected to intimidation, vandalism, and
violence. In 2015, Cristina Coc, a Q'eqchi’ Maya woman, mother, and current
spokesperson of the MLA, was arrested, along with 12 other Maya land
defenders (‘The Santa Cruz 13’), whilst protecting a Maya heritage site from
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destruction (Penados, 2015). The government’s apprehension of the activists

promptly garnered international attention and intense scrutiny, not least of
which came from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights and U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples Victoria Tauli-Corpuz.
Tauli-Corpuz, in a public statement scolding the GoB issued from Geneva, noted
the incident demonstrated disturbing neglect for Maya property rights, which
‘the government must respect and protect.’ The U.N. Special Rapporteur went
on to assert that, vis-á-vis the state’s specious rationale for arresting the Maya
villagers and Coc, the ‘current situation of conflict and mistrust cannot be
allowed to persist’ (OHCHR, 2015). After nearly a year of equivocation and
defamation on the part of the GoB, all charges against Coc and the Maya
organisers were dropped. Parenthetically, the criminalization and attempted
humiliation of Indigenous human rights and land defenders has been and
continues to be a preferred tactic of governments from across Central and South
America (Guzmán Hormazábal, 2019; Mendez, 2018).
In short, what the Maya have been fighting for as Indigenous people historically,
and what the MLA-TAA-JCS are continuing to defend presently, is self-
determination and se’ komonil. That is, community, life, and dignity. Indeed, se’
komonil is at the heart of the Maya movement, as well as their Indigenous
interpretation of autonomy and formula for ‘development.’ A version of
development that equally undermines and counters orthodox notions of
development, which have been defined and demarcated, writ large, by colonial
worldviews, liberal Western modernity, and capitalist reason. Notably, youth
are a key part of the Maya people’s pursuit and process of dignity- and dream-
driven (counter)development.

History and structure: the TAA, MLA, and JCS

The TAA
The Toledo Alcaldes Association (TAA) is an association of 78 traditional
Indigenous leaders from the 39 Maya communities of Toledo District (UNDP,
2019). It is the main representative body and highest central authority of the
Maya people in Southern Belize. A cornerstone of the Maya communities, social
movement, and struggle, not to mention Maya culture, has been and remains
the Alcalde system. It is the traditional (non-state) governance system of the
Maya people. The Alcalde system, which was established and functioning in its
Indigenous form prior to Spanish and British contact in the region, is rooted in
the customary laws of the Maya villages and communities. Whilst not
exclusively non-hierarchical, the ever-evolving system was more decentralised
and dynamic than imperialist structures of authority (Mesh, 2017). Specifically,
the Alcalde system is a localised form of Maya governance in Belize that is
rooted in pre-Columbian modes of socio-political organisation, yet also has been
shaped by what Bolland (2003, 131) refers to as ‘the dialectic of colonization and
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resistance.’ Meaning, the Maya had complex systems of governance which, as

Rugeley (1995) notes in the case of the Yucatán, were disordered and eroded
away at given that Spanish colonisers reduced the influence of Maya
organisations down to the local level and community affairs. Despite the
colonial distortions and co-optations, Maya elements such as the batabs (village
chiefs, town caciques) along with the a cuch cab (councils), i.e. ‘those who carry
the burden,’ and the ah kulels (delegates, representatives, mediators) survived.
These features were adopted by the Spaniards in their attempts at indirect rule
(Farriss, 1984), as well as serve as the foundation of contemporary Maya
governance systems, which are regulated by customary law but discharge
elements of statutory law (Penados, 2018).
Presently, each Maya community has two elected Alcaldes, resulting in a total of
78 Alcaldes across Toledo District (given there are 39 distinct communities).
The lead up to the selection of Alcaldes involves neither campaigns nor
elections. Being chosen to be an Alcalde is a result of building a track record of
commitment to the community and dedication to the Maya people. In fact,
most, if not all, of the men and women who become Alcaldes are farmers,
workers of the land, and village and/or family members themselves, i.e. there
are no career politicians, campaign managers, or distant elected officials in the
Alcalde system (MLSB, 2019). When selected, Alcaldes for each respective
community place themselves in the service of the people. That is, they take on
both (non-state) judicial and administrative responsibilities. The duties
associated with becoming an Alcalde are effortful and time-consuming. In many
respects, the obligations of an Alcalde can best be thought of as weight or ‘cargo’
that must be figuratively ‘picked up and carried.’ Meaning, the position more
accurately signifies that one has a burden of responsibility than it does they
‘won an election’ (MLSB, 2019).
In practice, Alcaldes guide and manage the use and occupancy of village lands,
render decisions on disputes that arise between villagers, and issue resolutions
on how discord and wrongdoings can be rectified and repaired. The Alcalde
system is the ‘only legitimate Maya governance body that represents the Maya
people collectively, with the TAA being the highest arbiter and custodian for
Maya customary law’ (MLSB, 2019). In addition to nurturing the health and
spirit of the community, Alcaldes organise and oversee fajinas. A fajina is a
customary Maya practice of collective work that involves village members
coming together to communally clean and perform upkeep of village lands
(Willoughby, 2019). The fajinas, rather than merely being a chore or task to be
completed, carry deep meaning for Maya communities. They are significant
because they are at once a practice of communal cultural heritage, a traditional
rite of passage, and a means for village members to register their interest in and
ultimately be able to occupy and use a parcel of land for one’s family and
subsistence.
The role of the Alcaldes, in short, is to cultivate peaceful, harmonious, and
respectful social relations within their respective communities based upon time-

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honoured ways of Maya organising, conflict-resolution, and customary law.

Unsurprisingly, under the shadow of a Westminster modelled state and its
attendant hierarchy, the Alcalde system has been a key target of government-
sanctioned provocation and disavowal for years (Bolland, 2003; Penados,
2018).

The MLA
The Maya Leaders Alliance advocates for over 21,000 Maya people across 39
Maya communities that reside in the hinterland of Toledo District, Southern
Belize. As a mutable grassroots alliance, it is comprised of members from the
JCS, TAA, and rural villages. Broadly, the MLA is struggling to build, much like
the Zapatistas (who are also guided by Maya cosmovisión)––‘a world where
many world’s fit’ (Gahman, 2019; Mora, 2017). The MLA is advancing this
ambition in the face of both neoliberal extractivism and a repressive
postcolonial state. Although the alliance was officially formed in 1999, its
members have been involved in community outreach and mobilising for nearly
30 years. The MLA embodies the Maya people’s ongoing collective resistance,
intergenerational spirit of revolt, and hopeful outlook for ‘another world’
(McNally, 2006), which dates back centuries (Bolland, 2003). The MLA also
represent the 39 Maya communities of Toledo District nationally, regionally,
and internationally on issues related to human rights violations, environmental
racism, border conflicts, heritage destruction, and threats to cultural survival
(ELAW, 2015).
With respect to organisational structure, the MLA is governed by a collective
board known as the Maya Steering Committee. The steering committee’s
function is to guide, advise, and ground the work of MLA on behalf of Maya
villages. Meaning, the Maya communities dictate the work and efforts of the
MLA rather than vice versa. The structure and character of the movement is at
once reciprocal, interdependent, and relational. Steering committee members of
the MLA include current Alcaldes (traditional democratically selected
community leaders) from the TAA; a union of former Alcaldes; and other Maya
member organisations and representatives inclusive of village activists and
advocates (Gahman, Greenidge, and Penados 2020).
Board members of the MLA volunteer their time and actively seek commitment
from Indigenous community leaders and Elders to maintain stewardship of the
MLA’s mission. The MLA is located in Punta Gorda, Toledo District, Belize and
often collaborates with a range of international universities, NGOs, and
researchers to conduct engaged, culturally safe, participatory research. The
research is subsequently put in the service of Maya communities in struggle, as
well as partially provides the resources necessary to advance the MLA’s rights-
based and anti-racist work.
In short, the MLA blossomed in the early 2000s partly in response to the state’s
demand for a single interlocutor at a time when there were several disparate
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Maya non-governmental organisations doing advocacy work and the TAA was
temporarily not as potent of a community force as it had once been.
Consequently, the MLA surfaced and grew in strength in order to serve as a
vehicle for concerted action by the loose coalition of Maya NGOs that were
operating at the time. Since the early-mid 2000s, then, the Maya have
transformed and reshaped the MLA in response to the changing character of
their struggle. As the TAA became stronger over the decade-plus that followed,
the MLA became a mechanism through which past Alcaldes––leaders who have
a long history of involvement in the struggle––could continue to be involved.
The MLA, in turn, was transformed into a mechanism and forum where elders
and other wisdom-bearers of the Maya struggle could remain active and
involved. Today, rather than viewing and parcelling them off as separate
entities, the Maya often refer to the MLA-TAA conjointly when speaking of
organising.

The JCS
The Julian Cho Society emerged in 2004 as a way of honouring and carrying
forward the legacy of its namesake, Julian Armando Cho, a Mopan Maya
schoolteacher born in the rural village of San Jose, Toledo District. Cho began a
peaceful social movement in response to increasing encroachments upon Maya
ancestral territories by logging and oil companies that were being granted
concessions by the state (Anaya, 2008). In order to protect marginalised Mopan
and Q’eqchi’ Maya communities, livelihoods, culture, and bioregional
ecosystems, Cho began organising to secure rights to traditional Maya lands.
His untimely death in December 1998 was an enormous loss for the Maya
people and the defence of their lands and resources.
The precise details surrounding the passing of Cho remain conspicuously both
beclouded and unconfirmed (Duffy, 2002). Incidentally, his loss occurred just
weeks after he received death threats resulting from the suspension of corporate
logging in Southern Belize. Cho, as a vocal defender of human rights and
outspoken land rights activist, had been demonstrating against the state-
sanctioned concessions afforded to multinational private companies
(Wainwright and Bryan, 2009). Noteworthy here is that the broader Central
American region remains one of the most dangerous places in world apropos
the targeting, suppression, and assassination of Indigenous land defenders
(Jaitman, et al, 2017; LRAN, 2018).
In turn, the JCS, alongside its partner organisations the TAA and MLA,
continue to honour and give continuity to the legacy of Cho. The coalition
breathes life into Cho’s memory by carrying on advocacy for both land and
human rights in and across Toledo District. The emphasis of the movement’s
struggle, which endeavours to engender the principles and spirit of Cho,
remains centred on social justice, environmental defence, self-determination,
grassroots sustainable development, and the assertion of Indigenous dignity. In
staying true to Cho’s conviction for critically conscious and politically educated
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young people, the JCS also provides scholarships and avenues for Maya youth to
be involved in the movement. This is in addition to research internship
opportunities they offer to non-Q’eqchi,’ non-Mopan, and non-Maya
international sympathisers and domestic allies.
In practice, the MLA and TAA are community partner organisations with JCS.
The MLA’s role in this solidaristic and mutually interdependent relationship is
to bring together community partners that are working on Indigenous and
human rights issues. This fosters collective visioning, synergy of efforts, and a
concerted holistic approach to pursuing the long-term aspirations and dreams
of the Maya people. Both the TAA and the MLA organise and operate based
upon traditional Maya processes of decision making and Indigenous governance
protocols (Willoughby, 2019). In the same vein, the JCS, much like the MLA,
whilst never abandoning its initial mission has been transformed by the Maya
people given the evolving nature of their struggle. The JCS, thus, has become
the formalised (state-registered) non-governmental arm of the MLA-TAA. This
allows the MLA and TAA to at once adopt and maintain Indigenous leadership,
exist as independent organisations outside of the constraints of Westminster
style state laws, and remain beholden to Maya cosmovisión and cultural
protocols.
In sum, the diverse Maya constituency of MLA-TAA-JCS and the 39
communities comprise the Maya movement. The reciprocal relationship that
exists amongst the coalition and villages ensures that the MLA––the point
organisation for the majority of the political work conducted by the movement–
–operates in response to the needs and realities of the Maya people as a whole,
across the entirety of Southern Belize. Notably, the Maya youth who co-
authored this article and coordinated the camp detailed in sections to come are
volunteers with the JCS.

Desire-based research
Our research served as an intervention into and exploration of the in-situ
development challenges the Maya of Toledo District are experiencing.
Practically and methodologically, the camp included a photovoice project, art-
based envisioning exercises, processes of consensus-based decision making,
transverse walks, heritage site visits, envisioning sessions, speaker
presentations, interactive games, and leisure time. Theoretically, the camp was
a creative, engaged, and collective process of identifying and detailing the
differing joys, pains, dreams, and desires held by Maya youth in an agrarian,
postcolonial, Global Southern-Majority World context. Conviviality and critical
consciousness served as key goals and watchwords for the camp’s spirit and
ethos (Freire, 2018; Illich, 1973).
The research practices, in turn, took a variety of flexible, semi-structured, and
non-rigid forms, which included photography, narrative-writing, artistic
expression, go-along interviews, communal dialogue sessions, and
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prefiguration. Of note, is that the youth camp was primarily organised and
coordinated by Maya youth themselves, many of whom are co-authoring of this
article. In connecting the camp to academic literature, the research activities
conducted by the youth were qualitative, community-based participatory-action
methods, which took their cue from decolonial praxis (Atallah, 2018; Tuck and
Yang, 2012). The design was further guided by principles being used within
‘desire-based’ research frameworks (Tuck, 2009). In addition, the fieldwork
activities and processes of data collection were heavily influenced by decolonial
(de Sousa Santos, 2015; Smith, 2013), anti-racist (Mohanty, 2013), and
intersectional-feminist (Collins, 2016; Spivak, 2008) ethics and epistemologies.

Maya youth organisers, camp attendees, and advisors from the MLA-TAA-
JCS, alongside non-Indigenous and international accomplices and co-
researchers, gather together to discuss, co-create, and plan the field activities
for the youth gathering in Punta Gorda, Toledo District.

Overall, then, what this eclectic, collaborative, and even playful research
represents is documentation and evidence of Maya notions and practices of
(counter)development (Penados and Chatarpal, 2015) and non-metaphorical
decolonisation (Tuck and Yang, 2012). Furthermore, it highlights how these
Maya notions and practices are anchored in––as well as being driven by––se’

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komonil, i.e. togetherness, dignity, and the pluralistic yet shared dreams and
desires of Indigenous community members themselves, inclusive of youth.
The overarching design of the project was inspired by Eve Tuck’s (2009)
proposal that communities in struggle, particularly research conducted with
marginalised Indigenous and negatively racialised communities, eschew
‘damage-centred’ research and move towards research that is ‘desire-based.’
Her proposal to focus on desire over damage is neither meant to insinuate that
the aftermaths and wounds of colonialism are ‘over,’ nor does Tuck argue that
they should be denied or go unspoken of. Rather, Tuck is offering desire-based
research as an ‘epistemological shift ‘and ‘antidote’ towards the danger posed by
damage-centred research, namely, ‘that it is a pathologizing approach in which
the oppression singularly defines a community’ (Tuck, 2009, 413).

Maya youth, along with their collaborators and co-researchers, listen to

spokesperson of the MLA, Cristina Coc, discuss Maya technology, biocultural
heritage, innovation, and the significance of aj ralch’ooch (‘Children of the
Earth’)––Maya identity.

In further explaining the implications of damage-based research, particularly

that which does not attend to the historical, structural, and ongoing practices
and processes of racialisation and colonial power, Tuck writes:

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…as I have noted, damage-centred research involves social and historical

contexts at the outset, the significance of these contexts is regularly
submerged. Without the context of racism and colonization, all we’re left
with is the damage, and this makes our stories vulnerable to pathologizing
analyses. Our evidence of ongoing colonization by research—absent a
context in which we acknowledge that colonization—is relegated to our
own bodies, our own families, our own social networks, our own
leadership. After the research team leaves, after the town meeting, after
the news cameras have gone away, all we are left with is the damage.

Tuck’s analysis here lucidly illustrates the fraught nature of damage-centred

research, even that which is well-intentioned, that focuses upon or defines
communities solely by what they are perceived to be lacking, deprived of, or are
‘bleeding from.’ In elaborating, Tuck argues research that asks or even demands
communities and community members to ‘show us your wounds’ is as
poisonous as it is hostile.
Of significance is Tuck avowal that desire-based research neither be viewed as
an antonym nor polar opposite of damage-based research. That is, damage and
desire are not mutually exclusive, but researching either requires a great deal of
(pre)caution, reflection, and community consultation. In particular, with respect
to what anticipated or unintended outcomes, either positive or negative, might
emerge. The point Tuck asserts is not that research should forget or negate the
historical and continued trauma inflicted by colonialism. More readily, she is
contending that researchers must be discerning, circumspect, and deliberate
about avoiding the pathologising tendencies that arise in research which focuses
on damage. Here, Tuck notes that priority given to desire does not shy away
from wrestling with pain but takes action against it by highlighting the
intricacies and nuances of social action, empowerment, self-determination,
sovereignty, and agency––as complex and paradoxical as all of these things can
sometimes be.

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Juanita Ical, TAA Executive Member and Second Alcalde of her village,
addresses the youth on gender and power relations, the importance of women
being in leadership roles, and the key part women play in the Maya
movement’s resistance, resilience, and overall struggle.

Tuck’s (2009) call to desire-based practice pushes us to ask what might research
produce if it looks beyond what is/who are being framed as broken, conquered,
and despairing; and towards identifying where there is––as well as who is
imbued with––wisdom, hope, joy, and dreams. In offering a cogent summary of
a desire-based framework’s ability to at once cast light upon hostile forces and
explain injurious historical-contemporary contexts whilst doing depathologising
work and celebrating ‘survivance’ (Vizenor, 1994), regeneration (Alfred, 2005),
and resurgence (Simpson, 2016)––Tuck succinctly states of desire-based
research: ‘Desire is involved with the not yet and, at times, the not anymore.’
With this methodological awareness of desire-based research in tow, our co-
designed and collaborative project advanced with the goal of amplifying the
voices and visions of Indigenous youth. And more precisely, we set out to
illustrate how youth in Toledo District are mobilising to co-create the social,
cultural, and economic relations––as well as political movement and Maya
future––of their desire and dreams.

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Maya youth organisers and non-Indigenous co-researchers play games

together to break the ice, familiarise themselves with the places each are from,
and set a convivial tone for the site visits, photovoice project, and dream-based
envisioning activities to come.

Maya youth organising and authorship1

The ‘Sounding of the Conch Shell’ youth camp
The ‘Sounding of the Conch Shell’ (SOCS) youth camp was conceived by a group
of Maya youth organisers who work and volunteer for the JCS committed to
bringing Indigenous youth together and moving society forward. As Maya youth
organisers, we are seeking to build a space of encounter and community for
Maya youth of Southern Belize. Included in the camp were 15 JCS youth
scholarship recipients, nine young women and six young men, whose ages
ranged from 14-17. The SOCS camp aspired to create a space where Maya youth
could begin to participate in dialogues on issues affecting their communities,
develop their Indigenous leadership capacities, and highlight the importance of

1This section and its corresponding subheadings are by the Maya youth. Namely, members of
the JCS Youth Planning Team, including: Seferina Miss, Roberto Kus, Donna Makin, Florenio
Xuc, Rosita Kan, and Elodio Rash. A non-refereed shorter version of this section is at: Cultural
Survival (Creative Commons): https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/koef-grant-partner-
spotlight-sounding-conch-shell-youth-camp
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community engagement––all while being cognisant of the crucial role women

play in traditional Maya governance.
The conch shell, for which the camp is named, is a tool that has been used by the
Maya for generations to invite people to attend community meetings. The conch
is sounded by a designated person appointed by a village Alcalde (traditional
Maya leader). When the reverberations of the conch shell are heard, villagers
are signalled to attend a gathering (referred to as an ‘ab’ink’) where they may
express their concerns towards any public issues that arise at the meeting. This
practice of sounding the conch shell to call people together to an ab’ink is what
we symbolically adapted for the initial SOCS youth camp. More specifically,
ab’ink is a Maya term referring to a communal meeting comprised of listening,
dialogue, and collective participation. In short, an ab’ink involves coming
together to join hearts and minds in order to create. Notably, the ab’ink is part
of the Maya creation story told in the Popul Vuh (MLA-TAA-JCS, 2019).

Maya youth, with collaborators and co-researchers, gather in Laguna Village

for the SOCS gathering. The resilience, energy, and commitment of the Maya
youth is an essential element in the continued development of hard working,
peaceful, and self-governing communities.

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Overall, the SOCS gathering, iterations of which will occur in the future, was a
place for concerned Maya youth to meet each other and create. We also saw it as
part of a process (rather than one-time event) and essential first step towards
generating what will be an ongoing series of youth assemblies. SOCS served as a
call for and concrete effort in Maya youth participating in the co-crafting of their
futures. Moreover, it was a space of encounter where we, as Indigenous youth,
could discuss our joys, pains, and aspirations, and develop action plans to
address any pressing issues we identified as being in need of intervention or
resolution.

Why did we organise the SOCS youth camp?

The sharing and transmission of traditional Maya knowledge from one
generation to the other is of grave concern to youth as we are beginning to
realise we are losing part of our culture, our heritage, our identity, and
ultimately our knowledge. The SOCS was thereby created not only to be a space
where youth could gather to regain traditional knowledge, but also a space
where they become acquainted with other likeminded youth to start to hone
their leadership capacities, and begin addressing concerns they have about their
communities and experiences as youth.

Maya youth reconvene inside to listen together, share and present their
narratives, and describe photographs they have taken after an outdoor transect
walk that constituted a pilot run-through and practice round of the photovoice
project.

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The dissemination of both traditional knowledge and leadership capability to

Maya youth from Elders and older youth activists and organisers was a key focal
point for the SOCS gathering. The participation of youth in the development of
their communities was another area the SOCS gathering set out to address.
In turn, the SOCS gathering was organised with the hope and goal of inspiring
Maya youth to become enthusiastically involved in shaping the future of their
communities. That is, the youth camp was structured to build the confidence
and courage of youth so they would feel empowered to confront complex
challenges and sensitive issues within their respective communities head on.
Moreover, it was a place for them to see and learn more about Maya heritage. To
collectively dream together about and discuss the future they desire to be a part
of––and would like to co-create. The definitive goal of the SOCS camp, then,
was to inspire youth to contribute to the construction of peaceful, united, hard-
working, and self-governing Maya communities.

What did we do at the SOCS youth camp?

A Maya spiritual leader begins the SOCS gathering with a traditional Maya
ceremony to ask for protection and wisdom. Maya spiritual ceremonies are a
means of connecting us to both our spiritual realm and inner spirituality with

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the pinnacle point of the ceremony being the harmonisation of our ancestors’
spirits with our present struggles and undertakings.

The initial SOCS gathering was a one-week camp facilitated by the Maya youth
organisers in partnership with the University of Manitoba’s (Canada)
Community Service Learning Programme in collaboration with the Center for
Engaged Learning Abroad (Belize); Aboriginal Youth Opportunities (AYO) of
Manitoba, Canada; and the University of Liverpool’s Power, Space, & Cultural
Change Unit (United Kingdom), which represent three groups with pluralistic
commitments to decolonial praxis, global solidarity, local community action,
and grassroots social movements. Each organisation also includes select
members who have connections with activists from the MLA and JCS, making
the joint collaboration an easy fit. We began the camp with a traditional Maya
ceremony. Maya spirituality is of great significance to our culture. It is a way to
communicate with our ancestors, spirits, and Creator to ask for guidance,
wisdom, and protection. Hence, it was only fitting that we launched the SOCS
gathering by asking our ancestors for guidance and wisdom as we embarked on
dreaming about a sustainable and just future for both our generation and
generations yet to come.
To set the tone and open the minds of the youth, keynote presentations were
given by Indigenous leaders inclusive of Maya Alcaldes (both men and women),
Indigenous rights activists (both local and international), Maya spiritual
leaders, and other supporters, sympathisers, and associates. In addition, youth
speakers from the grassroots movement AYO, of Cree and Anishinaabe nations
respectively, shared their personal stories of youth organising and involvement.
This stimulated the 15 Maya youth participants to realise the necessity and
importance of amplifying and centring Indigenous voices, as well as building
solidarity and supporting one another as part of a youth movement. The week-
long SOCS camp also included field visits to Maya heritage sites.

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Maya youth, alongside non-Indigenous co-researchers, break to eat homemade

lunch during their heritage site visits and village walks as part of the field
activities and photovoice project.

The camp was divided into three key segments: 1) a photovoice project; 2) an
arts-based dreaming session; and 3) the conception and development of an
action plan that would later be implemented by the Maya youth attendees. For
the photovoice project, the 15 youth participants were given cameras to capture
images from differing Maya communities throughout Toledo District. The
primary aim was to encourage the youth to take photographs of sites, places,
and things that resonated within them; in particular, the joys, pains, and
dreams they have and experience as both Maya people and as youth.
The ‘Dreaming of Our Future’ exercise was conducted to provide a medium
through which Indigenous youth could share their hopes and aspirations. The
third key activity was drafting an action plan, which included themes identified
in the photovoice and arts-based envisioning exercises. The camp culminated by
assembling Maya Elders, men, women, and spiritual healers to listen to the
voices of Maya youth. The closing event was one we especially wanted to

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resonate with our elders, namely the TAA Executive and other Maya elders who
were invited as special guests on the final day. At the closing, which included
traditional Maya song, dance, attire, and food, we communicated our action
plan. The action plan was presented by Maya youth to the TAA Executive and
Elders to demonstrate that the youth have genuine concerns for their
communities, and are motivated to contribute to shaping peaceful, more united,
and resilient Maya communities.

Maya youth present their photovoice images and dreams on the final day of the
gathering to community members before enjoying traditional Maya fare, song,
and dance. ‘Togetherness’––‘Se’ Komonil’––is embedded in our culture. It is by
working together with our leaders, elders and youth we will be successful in
maintaining our traditions, knowledge, and philosophy.

The closing of the SOCS gathering culminated with a traditional Maya ceremony
at Nim Li Punit, a Maya Temple and heritage site. During the ceremony we
offered our thanks to the creator and our ancestors for their guidance, wisdom,
and protection throughout the initial SOCS gathering, as well as asked for
further wisdom as we continue our journey.

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What were the research activities of the SOCS youth camp?

Photovoice
The photovoice project challenged the youth to fully immerse themselves in
their communities and to connect with their joys, pains, and dreams.
Participants were separated into teams to travel along differing routes across
Southern Belize Maya visiting multiple Maya communities. The mobile method
was as a means that enabled the youth to see more villages and heritage sites
than usual whilst capturing photos and drafting narratives they would like to
share with their peers and Elders. The youth, armed with cameras, were able to
take photos related to the strengths, challenges, opportunities, and threats that
are being experienced by Maya communities and culture. During the photovoice
reflection, one team spoke on the significance of embracing culture and
heritage, another addressed the importance of education in liberating one’s
mind, and one team highlighted the importance of protecting the Earth and the
resources She provides.

Photo taken by Maya youth participant as part of the photovoice project

(narrative below):
‘The cocoa tree is an important element to the Maya life. The cocoa drink is a
channel for youth to reconnect with our ancestors to maintain our traditions.
Us youths may well accomplish this by gathering with our Elders to enable the
continuity of traditional oral knowledge.’

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The youth’s stance on cultural revival, gender equality, and environmental

protection was adamant. These were themes that continually re-emerged
throughout the week-long SOCS camp. In addition, the youth were particularly
enthusiastic when they realised their peers had photographed and spoke about
similar themes and held concerns in common––they saw they were not the only
ones thinking about cultural revival, environmental protection, and being
involved. That is, Maya youth at once realised the potential they possess and the
change they can bring about if they unit and continue to share their collective
thoughts, dreams, and desires about what type of communities, and world, they
would like to live in.

Dreaming of Our Future

The ‘Dreaming of Our Future’ exercise solicited youth for aspirations about their
communities and futures. The SOCS gathering and the ‘Dreaming of Our
Future’ envisioning activities were constitutive components of a larger ongoing
initiative by the movement to articulate a dream and course of alternative
development for both Maya communities and the land. The dreaming exercise
involved art-based methodologies that are informed by communal practices that
are part of the Maya ab’ink. Participants were posed with the question: ‘Where
do you see your community in the next 5-10 years?’ They were then handed a
clean canvas to illustrate, paint, and cast their dreams upon. The dreams shared
by the youth throughout the exercise are dreams Maya people have
continuously envisioned over the course of our historical and present-day
struggles.

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Maya youth, after their arts-based envisioning session, organise drawings and
stories into themes and action items. The ‘Dreaming of Our Future’ exercise was
modelled after the Maya ab’ink and provided youth the opportunity to share
their joys, pains, and dreams.

The envisioning exercise produced colourful drawings of future dreams about

living in peace, taking care of the environment, and practicing Maya culture. In
addition, many of the youth drew and coloured scenes recognising the
importance of good health, gender just social relations, and the value of critical
education. A few drawings also represented the significance of continuing and
passing down Maya traditional knowledge and customs. In short, they were
dreams of Indigenous resurgence and flourishing.
From the dreaming exercise we, along with the other Maya youth participants,
identified six themes for promotion and continued action: 1) Maya youth
leadership; 2) Land; 3) Education; 4) Gender Equality; 5) Identity, culture and
traditional knowledge; and 6) Health. Using these themes as inspiration, the
youth developed action points that proposed ways to either enhance their joys
or remedy their pains, as well as achieve the dreams and desired activities they
intend to carry out in 2020. The Maya youth, via the envisioning exercise, made
clear their awareness of issues faced by their communities and demonstrated
they are willing to continue the struggle for Maya rights, recognition, and
resurgence.

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Photo taken by Maya youth participant as part of the photovoice project

(narrative below):
‘This picture creates happiness within me, seeing individuals encouraging
women to become leaders in their community, because they can be anything. In
my mom’s generation, she said that females can’t just do anything without the
father or husband’s permission or can’t voice their opinions too. Women now
attend community meetings, can voice their opinions and become leaders.
Sometimes, women execute better than men. To further improve the current
situation more spaces need to be created for women. To engage women because
being a leader may appear as male work… but men and women have equal
rights, so women can be leaders.’

Action plan and future mobilising

The youth were grouped to initiate conversation on how they could begin to
address the concerns pinpointed in the envisioning exercise. From the six
themes identified, the Maya youth further narrowed down to three that they felt
needed the utmost attention, the three themes they selected are: 1) Identity,
Culture and Traditional Knowledge 2) Maya Youth Leadership and 3) Gender
Equality.

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Maya youth gather with family members, Alcaldes, and village members to
share their action plans and perspectives on a sustainable and just future from
their arts-based dreaming exercise. The amplification of young people voices
will be beneficial to the future is heard in every corner of the world. However,
this is even more authentic for Maya youths. Their energy and spirits are
radiating with the desire to be productive Maya people, anchored in Maya
philosophy.

A group felt that the way to build the youth leadership skills of the present Maya
youth was for them to collectively learn from their elders. They expressed the
need for exemplary leadership in their communities and further stressed on the
need for the youth to be taught the skills that will make them morally grounded,
committed and full of integrity. They stated they would like to have another
gathering focusing solely on what it takes to be an impeccable traditional leader.
Another group’s action point focussed on gender equality - they thought that
they should sensitise the youth on the importance of women in traditional Maya
governance and they felt that this should be done through the mediums of
workshops inclusive of youths, elders and traditional leaders. They wish to
empower young women to become actively involved in the affairs of their
communities and inform young men on the importance of giving respect to
women. A third group reasoned that they could identify elders in their
respective communities who they could invite to give them teachings on various
traditional practices, ensuring the passing on of knowledge from one generation
to another. It will be the hub to build connections between the young and elder.
These workshops will be spanned across the year 2020 and will have the youth
learning traditional practices and knowledge they may have not had the chance
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to learn growing up, honouring our ancestors in the process and ensuring that
traditional knowledge survives in this generation and for generations to come.

Youth visiting the sacred temple and heritage site at Nim Li Punit to raise the
Maya flag during the photovoice project of the SOCS gathering. (narrative
below)
‘The SOCS gathering was consistent in character with the larger Maya struggle
in revitalising our culture and ensuring the protection of our land rights and
human rights as Indigenous people. The ethos of the gathering was one of
harmony, illumination, and respect among youth, with all expressing the
importance of such spaces in joining their thoughts, words, and dreams.’

What comes next?

The Maya youth have spoken. They need to be a part of decision-making
processes, even if it is just to be informed about new developments within and
across their communities. They have made their mandate. In light of this, what is
beyond the initial SOCS camp? Common ground related to the joys, pains, and
dreams of the youth has been established. Maya youth organisers are now
pursuing the action plans they developed fervently and are willing and hoping to
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collaborate with other Indigenous groups to create their own versions of SOCS,
and endeavouring to hold an annual SOCS camp in Southern Belize. The Maya
youth organisers are also continuing to actively seek guidance from their mentors
and elders in the MLA-TAA-JCS. For the reason that, as the Maya voice, it is by
se’ komonil––togetherness––that we conquer every challenge we have––
particularly neo-imperialism and capitalism.
Progressive work has already begun on calibrating the ideas generated by the 15
youth who attended the SOCS camp. Holding events developed from the action
plan throughout the rest of 2020 are on the Maya youth agenda. Issues related
to gender equality, primarily shedding light on women in governance,
masculinity, women’s rights, and gender stereotyping, have all been made
priorities. Secondly, an emphasis on Maya youth leadership and future
mobilising was stressed. Meaning, we identified the need for youth to be present
at every Alcaldes Assembly and on the Alcaldes Steering Committee. We feel it
crucial that youth collaborate with the TAA, and that every community meeting
conducted by Alcaldes be more inclusive of youth and women. Thirdly, we
identified Traditional Knowledge and Practices as a topic of importance. Our
aim going forward is to see youth be informed, included, and even contribute to
upcoming projects and workshops that will ensure that Maya knowledge and
cosmovisión are both revered and transferred.
In sum, the initial SOCS was a success. The projection of another SOCS
gathering next year with a different goal to tackle or build upon what was
started at this year’s camp is now being planned. The Sounding of the Conch
Shell camp, which was led and organised by Maya youth, will contribute to the
construction of peaceful, united, hard-working and self-governing Maya
communities through the continued assembling and mobilising of Maya youth.

Conclusion
To end, the Sounding of the Conch Shell was an apt name for the gathering. It
provided space for Maya youth to engage with each other, the reality(ies) of
their communities, and to dream of the sustainable and just future(s) they
desire, would like to live in, and will co-create. And, just as it has for
generations, the conch shell continues to echo through Maya villages and across
the landscape of Belize. It reverberates to call community members together for
an ongoing ab’ink.
The SOCS gathering, in turn, was an ab’ink where Maya youth could come
together to discuss challenges, strengths, problems, assets, threats, conflicts,
joys, pains, happiness, hardships, solutions, and their respective gifts and plans
of action related to their dreams. Notably, the conch shell is traditionally
sounded by the Alcalde or a person assigned by the Alcalde. And in the case of
the SOCS gathering, the Maya youth were handed the conch, afforded the
opportunity to come together, and asked to share their vision. In turn, youth
directly involved with the MLA-TAA-JCS took up the mantle and sounded the
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conch. Markedly, Maya youth across Toledo District responded, as did several of
their comrades, compañer@s, and accomplices, both Indigenous and otherwise.
What can be taken from the SOCS gathering, then, is confirmation that Maya
youth––Indigenous youth––are mobilising under the shadow of state power
and directly in front of capitalist threat, unapologetically, to create spaces for
engagement. The ab’ink of the Maya youth has begun, their place of listening
has been cultivated, and they are already listening to each other. And as they
listen and share, they are demonstrating their capacity as Indigenous youth to at
once imagine and build an(Other) world––a world that honours the past and
opens up to the future. A world that is rooted in Maya heritage, culture, and
cosmovisión, but also a world that welcomes and provides space for Other
worlds and––to call back to the Zapatista quote that opened this article––
‘Otherly’ dreams.
Indeed, in the face of state, structural, and slow violence the Maya youth have
responded with dreams, agency, action, and an assertion of their dignity. They
have also responded by collectively breathing life into se’ komonil––community
and togetherness. Undeniably, the message the youth have sent is that the Maya
are neither static nor to be pitied, but that they have survived, are resurgent,
and beginning to build the sustainable and just future they both desire and
deserve.

Funding acknowledgement
This work was supported by a Heritage, Dignity, and Violence Programme grant
from the British Academy (Award: HDV190078), which is part of the U.K.’s
Global Challenges Research Fund. It was also partially made possible by an ODA
Research Seed Fund Grant from the University of Liverpool (ID: NCG10142).

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About the authors

• Levi Gahman is the author of Land, God, and Guns (Zed Press) and
lecturer with the University of Liverpool focusing on anti-racist and anti-
colonial praxis, gender justice, and autonomous social movements.
Email: levi.gahman AT gmail.com
• Filiberto Penados is the founding advisor of the Center for Engaged
Learning-Belize with a research focus on decolonial praxis, participatory
Indigenous methods, and community-based alternative development.
Email: fpenados AT gmail.com
• Adaeze Greenidge is an independent researcher and community
volunteer from Trinidad and Tobago focusing on anti-colonial resistance,
social change, and the relationship between nature and well-being.
Email: adaeze.greenidge AT gmail.com
• Seferina Miss, Roberto Kus, Donna Makin, Florenio Xuc, Rosita Kan, and
Elodio Rash are Maya organisers from Toledo District, Belize and
members of the Julian Cho Society Youth Planning Team. Email:
communityradioproducer AT gmail.com

651
Interface: a journal for and about social movements Book reviews
Volume 12 (1): 652 – 683 (July 2020)

Book Reviews: Interface, 12 (1)

Reviews editor: Dawn M. Paley

Books reviewed in this issue:

Yasser Munif, 2020, The Syrian Revolution: Between the Politics of
Life and the Geopolitics of Death. London, Pluto Press. £19.99, 208
pp.
Review Author: Isaac K. Oommen

Masao Sugiura, 2019, Against the Storm: How Japanese Printworkers

Resisted the Military Regime, 1935–1945, edited by Kaye Broadbent,
translated by Kaye Broadbent and Mana Sato. Melbourne:
Interventions. AU$25, 164 pp.
Review Author: Alexander James Brown

Samir Gandesha (Ed.), Spectres of Fascism. Historical, Theoretical

and International Perspectives. London: Pluto Press. $33, 304 pp.
Review Author: Rogelio Regalado Mujica (in Spanish)

Daniel Ozarow, 2019, The Mobilization and Demobilization of Middle-

class Revolt. Comparative Insights from Argentina. New York:
Routledge. $155, 271 pp.
Review Author: Agnes Gagyi

Andy Blunden, 2019, Hegel for Social Movements. Brill: Leiden,

Boston. $28.00, 289 pp.
Review author: Cameron Shingleton

Cas Mudde, 2019, The Far Right Today. Cambridge: Polity. £14.99,
205 pp.
Review author: Patrick Sawyer

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Interface: a journal for and about social movements Book reviews
Volume 12 (1): 652 – 683 (July 2020)

Alyshia Gálvez, 2018, Eating NAFTA: Trade, Food Policies and the
Destruction of Mexico. Oakland, California: University of California
Press. $29.95, 269pp.
Review author: Dawn Marie Paley.

653
Interface: a journal for and about social movements Book reviews
Volume 12 (1): 652 – 683 (July 2020)

Book Review: Yasser Munif, The Syrian Revolution: Between

the Politics of Life and the Geopolitics of Death

Review Author: Isaac K. Oommen

Yasser Munif, 2020, The Syrian Revolution: Between the Politics of

Life and the Geopolitics of Death. London, Pluto Press. £19.99, 208
pages.

The war in Syria is perhaps the most complicated ongoing conflict in the world.
While a myriad of commentators and random uncles appear to have their
analysis down pat, the sheer numbers of factions and changing alliances makes
the conflict hard to understand.
Even while following a number of Syrian on-the-ground analysts, this reviewer
found it next to impossible to figure out who is the villain, particularly as more
external actors, the latest of which is Turkey, get involved.
Perhaps the toughest part of the equation to pull apart is which of the many
factions enjoy popular support. As Arundhati Roy mentioned in her analysis of
Kashmir in Listening to Grasshoppers, one becomes resigned to the fact that
the situation is too complicated to simplify for analysis.
Yasser Munif’s attempt to untangle this web in Syria is one that is laser-focused
on struggles on the ground, and the regime’s response to the popular uprising.
In a country that is seeing fights between rebel factions –including the Free
Syria army as well as various actors like Al Qaeda, ISIS/Daesh, Turkey, Russia,
Kurdish forces, Druze forces, tribal fighters and of course the Syrian state–
Munif analyzes the competing nationalisms at play, and the many uses of power.
In an effort to have a well-rounded view of the revolution, Munif interviews
activists in multiple cities (since each city is a microcosm of revolution) and
visits several areas himself.
Central to The Syrian Revolution: Between the Politics of Life and the
Geopolitics of Death is an analysis of the different nationalisms at play.
Acknowledging from the first page the kind of factioning that happens among
those discussing the situation in Syria (he uses the example of regime loyalists
attacking a World Social Forum panel he organised), Munif separates organic
nationalism that grew in Syria (and elsewhere in the Arab world) against the
regime, from the nationalism manufactured by the Syrian state (currently under
President Bashar al-Assad, whose father and grandfather preceded him in ruling
the area).
The Syrian Revolution looks at the nationalism of popular movements in Syria
–the ones that led to the temporary freedom of cities like Aleppo from the
regime– as continuations of the Arab nationalism that fuelled the independence

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movements that were abandoned after the 1967 war with Israel. This kind of
nationalism emerged in opposing French colonialism, and had an openness to
the definition of Syrian-ness and Arab-ness that allowed many groups to come
together to fight the colonisers.
The nationalism of the Syrian state, on the other hand, is one Munif calls
“authoritarian, exclusive and neo-colonial” (pp. 105), a nationalism made to
maintain the grip of the state. According to Munif, then, the core of the conflict
in Syria is one in which “two nationalisms are competing for dominance” (pp.
106).
It is through this comparison of nationalisms that Munif untangles the
differences between the regime, revolutionaries and armed actors such as ISIS.
The regime has created a rigid definition of nationalism that pushes aside
groups such as Kurds and Palestinians.
ISIS hence falls into the same category as the state, imposing their strict
ideology on the populace.
Though ISIS does mirror the state in this strict perception and enforcement of
nationalism, Munif notes the difference in the two actors’ meting out of violent
control: ISIS performs said violence in a highly visible way, wheas the Syrian
government does so in a manner that makes them invisible while the actions
stay highly visible.
ISIS performs beheadings before high-resolution cameras; however, Assad’s
forces imprison people out of sight and use snipers to kill others, leaving no
marks of their presence bar the marked bodies.
Finally, there’s the popular movements that began the revolution, who instead
push for inclusivity to bring together Christians, Druze, Shia, Sunni and other
groups.
The analysis of violence and control is also central to The Syrian Revolution,
helping to unravel the complicated narratives about the conflict in Syria. From
the use of sniper-guarded check-points and punitive bomb strikes to controlling
the production of bread; death and population control are the macabre
signatures of Assad’s regime.
Whereas revolutionaries tried to peacefully protest, such as during the Volcano
of Aleppo shopkeeper strikes in March of 2011, the regime countered with a
lethality practiced over decades. Control of industries such as bakeries was
tightly implemented so that revolutionaries found it hard to move these
businesses outside the state domain.
Imprisonment was (and continues to be) operated at a loss in order to maximise
suffering. Bombing, snipers, foreign militias and tribes are deployed by the
regime to control and kill populations. These tools are sometimes utilised to
enact collective punishment as an example to other areas. The general idea
through all of the above is that the regime is demonstrating to everyone that a
post-Assad Syria is not possible.

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Perhaps one of the most chilling ideas explored in The Syrian Revolution is that
in this killing zone is that in Assad’s Syria, life has no value at all. “A Syrian
citizen is not essential to the regime, and as such can be disposed of,” writes
Munif (pp. 27).
Almost as chilling is the accusation of western complicity in the regime’s
machinations, from essentialist think-tank analyses, to Eurocentric news
coverage and even UN complicity in working with the regime (delivering
medicine to the Syrian government and hence making it unavailable to
revolutionary-held areas). The sum of the above is a growing acceptance of the
genocide in Syria by the rest of the world.
The only thing holding back Munif’s analysis is the age-old hiccough of passive
actions. Like many analysts, he notes that areas “were bombed” or that people
“were killed” without naming those perpetrating the actions. Perhaps this form
of writing too falls victim to the machinations of Assad’s regime, where the
result is seen, but the actor too often, remains hidden.
The Syrian Revolution is extensive within just a couple of hundred short pages
in that it explores the varied ethnic, tribal and factional dimensions of the
revolution while targeting state repression and PR efforts. Though complicating
the narrative of the revolution, it brings essential clarity to state apparatuses in
the combating of what would have been a democratic, people-centred
revolution.

References
Roy, Arundhati. 2010. Listening to Grasshoppers: Field Notes on Democracy.
New York: Penguin.

About the review author

Isaac K. Oommen is based out of South India and Vancouver, BC. He is a post
secondary educator and Co-founder of Solid State Youth Co-op, as well as a
freelance journalist.

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Book review: Masao Sugiura, Against the Storm

Review author: Alexander James Brown

Masao Sugiura, 2019, Against the Storm: How Japanese

Printworkers Resisted the Military Regime, 1935–1945, edited by
Kaye Broadbent, translated by Kaye Broadbent and Mana Sato.
Melbourne: Interventions. AU$25, 164 pp.

From the commencement of Japan’s Fifteen Year War in 1931, when the
Japanese Kwantung Army staged a bomb attack on the Manchurian Railway in
order to justify the invasion of Manchuria, until Imperial Japan’s surrender to
the Allies in 1945, labour organising and anti-war resistance in mainland Japan
was subject to fierce repression by the military and civilian police. With some
notable exceptions, most Marxists and labour organisations capitulated to
expansionist Japanese nationalism, either recanting their views or joining in
class-collaborationist projects such as the Patriotic Industrial Association (PIA),
which compulsorily absorbed labour organisations and mobilised them for the
war effort.
The new English translation of Against the Storm, Masao Sugiura’s account of
labour organising in the Tokyo printing and publishing industry, demonstrates
that in spite of widespread capitulation and ruthless repression, pockets of
labour and anti-war resistance did continue throughout Japan’s darkest period.
In doing so it also helps to explain how Japan’s labour and socialist movements
bounced back so quickly in the wake of the defeat. The introduction of more
favourable labour policies by the Occupation authorities was followed by an
explosion in union membership and strike activity and the election of the first
short-lived socialist-led coalition government in 1947, as has been documented
in English by Joe Moore (2003).
This English edition of Against the Storm is a translation of Masao Sugiura’s
insider’s account of the Shuppankō Kurabu (Print and Publishing Workers
Club), whose precursors emerged in the Tokyo printing industry in 1934 and
remained active until 1948, when it was disbanded following the establishment
of a strong national printworkers union. The original text, Wakamono wa
arashi ni makenai (Young People Will Not Give into the Storm) was published
in Japan in 1982 based on an earlier 1964 version. Kaye Broadbent edited
Against the Storm and translated the source text together with Mana Sato.
Broadbent also provides an introductory essay which summarises the
development of the socialist and workers movements in Japan in the early
twentieth century and describes the deepening economic and social crisis of
Japanese society in the 1930s. Against the Storm is rounded out with a short
interview Broadbent conducted with Sugiura at his home outside Tokyo in 2016,

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when he was 102 years old. A useful glossary contains definitions for the many
terms which will be unfamiliar to non-specialist readers. The book is published
in Australia by Interventions, a new not-for-profit socialist publishing initiative
established in 2015 as a continuation of the earlier Jeff Goldhar Project. In
Australia’s limited publishing marketplace, independent publishing ventures
with an explicit political objective are a welcome intervention into the liberal
mainstream.
In the preface, Broadbent describes how she came across the 1964 Japanese text
in the library of the Ohara Institute for Social Research, Japan’s leading
research institute for labour history, while conducting research for an essay on
wartime labour activism (Broadbent & O’Lincoln 2015). Like Broadbent, I have
had a longstanding interest in the untold stories of resistance to Japanese
militarism during the war. However, the existing English sources on this history
are limited. The publication of a primary-source document of this nature in
English therefore significantly expands the information available to labour
historians who seek to reclaim Japanese traditions of grassroots resistance in
order to counter the continuing stereotypical portrayals of Japan as a nation of
conformists who are incapable of standing up to their government.
Against the Storm takes us inside the lifeworld of working-class printworkers in
1930s Tokyo. Sugiura helps us to understand the poverty and harsh working
conditions they endured, with long hours and often only two days off per month.
The workforce was divided between an elite of full-time printworkers and an
army of temporary workers who had no job security and even worse pay.
Sugiura shows us how the seeds of working-class culture took root in this
environment. On his rare days off, he would attend performances at the Tsukiji
Small Theatre, where the police would be in attendance to haul off members of
the audience who broke out with the Internationale as the performers on stage
acted out socialist realist plays about corrupt bosses and workers going on
strike. As Sugiura notes, while mostly of working-class background and
therefore unschooled in the elite Marxism popular among middle-class
intellectuals of the day, the typesetters and printing workers needed an above-
average level of education and literacy in order to do their jobs printing
Japanese-language texts, which use thousands of Chinese kanji characters.
The Print and Publishing Workers Club’s first incarnation was as a literary circle
called Ayumi. By publishing and distributing a magazine of the same name,
organisers were able to make contact with workers in different factories and talk
about labour issues. This formed the basis of their later organising. Following a
1935 strike at Tokyo Printing, Ayumi formed the kernel of a labour organisation
and helped to raise strike funds and support striking workers. While the strike
was ultimately defeated, the strike committee and literary circle continued to
organise, forming a society which was formally established as the Print and
Publishing Workers Club in 1937.
The Club tried to help the newly unemployed printworkers find jobs, an activity
which forced them to confront corrupt labour hire practices in the industry.

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Organisers of the Club had a background in the union and communist

movements, but they argued that the workers needed a different type of
organisation that would nurture a culture of solidarity among the workers that
would in turn help build class-consciousness and open up avenues for further
organising.
The Club’s focus on grassroots networking and developing the cultural life of its
members helps to explain why their resistance remains relatively unknown.
Rather than focusing on explicit union demands and risking almost certain
arrest and repression, the club focused on building solidarity among the
workers in different factories and the publishing industry more broadly. This
kind of activity is less likely to leave a trace in the historical record than strikes
and other more visible forms of labour activism.
The Print and Publishing Workers Club built connections between workers
which enabled them to survive the hardships of their daily lives by organizing as
a social club. Their activities included publishing a haiku journal, organizing
sporting competitions and organising hiking expeditions to the mountains.
During the summer months, the club rented a house at the beachside to provide
rest and recreation opportunities for the members. The group also operated a
lending library including both novels and popular literature alongside Marxist
and other socialist texts. These social activities gave them a veneer of legitimacy
and helped to minimize police surveillance and repression.
As the Japanese state increased its repression of labour organizing following the
intensification of the conflict in China after 1937, labour organisations and the
still-legal proletarian parties began to take the increasingly class collaborationist
line of supporting the nation in a time of crisis. Unions were forced to disband
and joined the Patriotic Industrial Association (PIA), a body established by the
government and conservative union leadership to support the war effort. Due to
its unique organizational structure, the Club continued to organize at the
grassroots, avoiding open confrontation with bosses. They prepared to go
underground by dividing their activities into separate organisations, such as
haiku circles, sporting clubs and women’s groups.
The Club was formally dissolved in the presence of Special Police witnesses in
line with the directive for all labour unions. While this enabled the organisation
to operate covertly, its networks began to fray as conditions worsened and
members were sent to the front or transferred to munitions factories. In 1942
the author, Sugiura and leading organiser Shibata Ryūichi were both
imprisoned under the repressive Peace Preservation Law and brutally tortured
by the police before being sent to prison, where they remained for the
remainder of the war. Shibata died in prison in 1945, just months before Japan’s
surrender, but Sugiura survived and was released in October 1945, along with
other political prisoners. He immediately joined the now-legal Japan
Communist Party and began organising in the print industry, helping to found
the All Japan Printing and Publishing Trade Union in 1946.

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In making Against the Storm available for an Anglophone audience, Broadbent

and Sato have given us new insight into the world of cultural activism and
underground organizing during the darkest period for the labour and socialist
movement in Japan’s history. Today, far-right forces within the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party are gaining confidence in their quest to rewrite the history of
the Fifteen Year War, denying Japanese atrocities and minimizing the
repressive nature of the wartime regime as they seek to rearm Japan so that it
can play a greater role in foreign military conflicts.
Today, Prime Minister Shinzō Abe openly seeks to revise Article 9 of the
Japanese Constitution, the so-called peace clause which outlaws war as a means
of solving international disputes. In their defence of the constitution, the
democratic forces in Japan often point to the terrible violence committed by the
Japanese military overseas and the repression carried out against the labour
movement at home. However, this pamphlet reminds us that as well as
remembering the crimes of the militarist part, it is also important to remember
Japan’s own traditions of resistance. The model of grassroots organizing,
cultural resistance and industrial militancy the Club provides can give us
confidence that even as fascism gains strength, it is possible to resist and in
doing so to build the foundations of a democratic, peaceful culture.

References
Brodbent, Kaye and Tom O’Lincoln 2006. “Japan: Against the Regime.” Pp.
655–702 in Fighting on All Fronts: Popular Resistance in the Second World
War. London: Bookmarks.
Moore, Joe 1983. Japanese Workers and the Struggle for Power, 1945–1947.
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

About the review author

Alexander Brown is a Japan Society for the Promotion of Science International
Research Fellow at Japan Women’s University and an Honorary Associate at
University of Technology Sydney. His research focuses on anti-nuclear activism
in Japan and Australia. He is the author of Anti-nuclear Protest in Post-
Fukushima Tokyo: Power Struggles (Routledge 2018). Alexander is also a
translator of Japanese social science, most recently of Shimizu Hiromu’s
Grassroots Globalization: Reforestation and Cultural Revitalization in the
Philippine Cordillera (Trans Pacific Press and Kyoto University Press, 2019). He
can be contacted at abrown AT kemblatranslations DOT com.

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Book review: Samir Gandesha (Editor), Spectres of Fascism.

Review author: Rogelio Regalado Mujica

Samir Gandesha (Ed.), Spectres of Fascism. Historical, Theoretical

and International Perspectives. London: Pluto Press. $33, 304 pp.

El panorama sociopolítico contemporáneo ha desbordado los paradigmas

establecidos por la globalización neoliberal y su triunfalismo temprano en los
años 90’s, dando paso a una reconfiguración del terror que
desenmascaradamente se dispersa por el mundo.
Las fuerzas políticas que, con diversos matices tanto a nivel del Estado como en
el campo social, han sostenido una agenda caracterizada por la violencia en
múltiples acepciones, genera que desde distintos sitios se activen fuerzas, tanto
por parte de activistas como de intelectuales y académicos, que intentan no
solamente capturar su dinámica sino confrontarla. Este es el caso de Spectres of
Fascism, una obra que se destaca inicialmente por su capacidad de hacer frente
al fenómeno al que alude su título.
Desde los años 30’s y sobre todo tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial, la producción
académica con respecto al tema ha sido sumamente prolífica, centrándose
principalmente en el caso europeo que ha acaparado la mayoría de esfuerzos por
múltiples razones, eclipsando el conocimiento de otros espacios. Aún con la
gran cantidad de información y análisis que existen, una pregunta sigue siendo
pertinente: ¿por qué necesitamos otro libro sobre fascismo?
Tan abierta como se pronuncia, las respuestas pueden ser múltiples,
comenzando quizá por la necesidad de comprender las variables que se han
manifestado actualmente y que justifica la mayoría de trabajos contemporáneos.
Sin embargo, si la pregunta se efectúa particularmente a Spectres of Fascism, la
respuesta resulta tan particular como enriquecedora. El texto editado por
Gandesha nos ofrece la posibilidad de romper con el cerco disciplinario
tradicional que aborda las problemáticas de manera hermética, mostrando una
capacidad de desenvolverse de manera no segmentada, al menos no en la obra
como totalidad, por los estudios sociales y las humanidades, lo que
precisamente corresponde a las exigencias que el fenómeno presenta.
En otras palabras, el pensamiento positivo fragmentario sirve solo para capturar
la imagen estática del fascismo sin que esto contribuya a su disolución: Spectres
of Fascism, inspirado en los desafíos esgrimidos por la Escuela de Frankfurt,
constituye una crítica importante a dichas aproximaciones y lo hace a partir de
su propio movimiento.
El título presenta ya una interpretación original del problema: los espectros del
fascismo (spectres of fascism), como concepto, se distingue de las

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consideraciones recientes sobre el neofascismo o el posfascismo al indicar que

no se trata de un retorno de esta fuerza, sino más bien de su aparición
fantasmagórica. Hace eco de las voces de Freud y Adorno, que ha atravesado los
puertos migratorios de Europa, donde según el autor nació, y que se desplaza
por el mundo familiarmente al hacer evidente el lado barbárico de la civilización
que lo caracteriza.
El punto de partida de estos espectros que Gandesha advierte en la
introducción, está marcado principalmente por dos acontecimientos del siglo
XXI: el ataque a Estados Unidos del 9/11 y el colapso financiero del 2008. En
realidad, estos acontecimientos, como base material contemporánea, se
comprenden vinculados a los procesos de acumulación de capital expresados
por el neoliberalismo, donde el fascismo se ubica como una contra-revolución
cuyo relato expresa la crisis de la modernidad misma en su confrontación con la
democracia liberal.
A lo largo de Spectres of Fascism se sostiene el vínculo con el neoliberalismo, la
democracia liberal y los acontecimientos del 9/11 y 2008, además de otro
elemento que deambula por la totalidad del texto: el papel de la tecnología.
Nuevamente, recuperando la importancia de la Teoría Crítica, en este caso a
Benjamin, el libro pone especial interés en el papel de las plataformas digitales y
la reformulación que suponen a la industria cultural. Destacar esto es
importante porque da paso a la comprensión de la estrategia propagandística
del fascismo hoy en día y, al mismo tiempo, advierte los nuevos campos en
disputa que pueden ser tomados en cuenta por los paradigmas emancipatorios.
Spectres of Fascism está compuesta por tres apartados: el histórico, el teórico y
el que aborda los horizontes contemporáneos. Las diversas fuentes que lo
nutren se anclan a corrientes críticas europeas. Por el texto vemos la influencia
de Trostky, Schmitt, Gramsci, Deleuze, Gattari, Lacan, Adorno, Benjamin,
Horkheimer y obviamente a Marx y Freud. Esto resulta interesante, porque la
obra en general no se concentra en los autores que tradicionalmente aparecen
en el panorama de los estudios de fascismo contemporáneos, a reserva de la
Escuela de Frankfurt a la que al menos se le suelen hacer guiños en casi
cualquier discusión al respecto.
Sin embargo, tal como se apela a la diversidad disciplinaria para el enfoque
crítico, resultaría pertinente encontrar en la obra la misma diversidad
teórica/epistemológica. Otras corrientes críticas de pensamiento no europeas,
seguramente podrán levantar la mano tras leer el libro y presentar otras líneas
de entendimiento que nutra el análisis contra el despliegue del fascismo.
La primera parte de Spectres of Fascism se denomina ‘Historia’ y la componen
las aportaciones de Ingo Schmidt, Jaleh Mansoor, Alec Balasescu y Tamir Bar-
On y sostiene un ánimo crítico que ronda la historia del arte, la arquitectura y
las plataformas digitales, consiguiendo una sutil perspectiva histórica.
El trabajo de Schmidt nos ofrece una mirada a las luchas contra el fascismo en
la Alemania de los años 20’s y 30’s a partir de la crítica al Estado, el capital, las
relaciones de clase y la psicología social. Mansoor, desde la historia del arte y la

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teoría crítica, especialmente recuperando a Benjamin, propone la comprensión

del futurismo italiano vinculado al fascismo, mostrando la potencia de la
estética. En este mismo tenor, el trabajo de Balasescu nos propone la forma en
que la pureza constituye un pilar para el totalitarismo y cómo, a través de la
estética de la salvación, se activa políticamente el discurso contra la impureza.
Tamir Bar-On ofrece un análisis comparativo del movimiento Alt-Right y la
Nueva Derecha Francesa que se desenvuelve en una perspectiva politológica. El
enfoque de Bar-On, a diferencia de los otros capítulos, pierde un poco del perfil
crítico que se venía presentando, aunque es el que con más énfasis nos ayuda a
entender el papel contemporáneo de las plataformas digitales con su análisis del
movimiento Alt-Right.
La segunda parte de Spectres of Fascism corresponde a la ‘Teoría’ y comprende
los trabajos de Am Johal, Laura U. Marks, Samir Gandesha, Hilda Fernández
Álvarez y Gary Genosko. Tiene como objetivo específico presentar
interpretaciones teóricas que conformen una constelación capaz de ofrecer
claves abstractas para el abordaje del fascismo contemporáneo.
De esta manera, el trabajo de Am Johal basa su texto en el uso político del
trabajo de Carl Schmitt por parte de la izquierda en Estados Unidos. Aunque
Johal propone un desarrollo crítico, a ciertos momentos se entrampa en las
categorías burguesas que explora, de manera que obstaculiza la posibilidad de
plantear otra gramática que desborde la clásica división politizadora entre
amigo/enemigo.
El aporte de Laura U. Marks constituye una muy potente interpretación de la
relación entre fascismo y misoginia, lo que resulta fundamental para los análisis
actuales. La autora ofrece una interpretación del trabajo Male Fantasies de
Klaus Theweleit, haciendo evidente las relaciones de violencia, especialmente
con respecto a la mujer, en el escenario contemporáneo.
No solo se puede leer en clave de denuncia, sino como propuesta de resistencia y
emancipación, lo que definitivamente contribuye al perfil crítico de la obra. El
trabajo de Marks tiene similitudes con los planteamientos de Rita Segato, por lo
que puede ser interesante establecer puentes entre su texto y la obra de la
pensadora latinoamericana.
El editor del libro, Samir Gandesha, aborda la propaganda fascista en una
discusión con Adorno y a la luz del clima político estadounidense. Una de las
cuestiones más importantes de este capítulo es que pone al centro el problema
de la identidad, crucial para comprender la dinámica del fascismo, además de
que se desenvuelve hábilmente entre el plano abstracto y material, lo que nos da
una posibilidad más potente de comprender la naturaleza del fenómeno.
El siguiente texto nos conduce por la teoría psicoanalítica clínica, mostrándonos
la forma en que el subconsciente tiene participación en el ámbito político,
especialmente explicándolo a través de la concepción de la compulsión por
repetición. Hilda Fernández Álvarez nos ofrece otra clave teórica al introducir a
Lacan en la obra, especialmente con el “significante-maestro” y cómo este se
vincula al despliegue tanto del fascismo como al discurso de la izquierda.

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El texto de Gary Genosko retoma a Deleuze y Guattari, especialmente el efecto

del agujero negro y la resonancia, para mostrarnos la manera en que operan los
micro fascismos que teje con el caso estadounidense. El capítulo es importante
porque hace evidente la adaptabilidad del fascismo y la manera en que este se
ajusta al espacio social, como lo muestra con su explicación sobre los subreddit,
las comunidades virtuales específicas ligadas a la plataforma de medios sociales
‘Reddit’.
El último apartado de Spectres of Fascism, denominado ‘El horizonte
contemporáneo’, revisa cuatro locaciones geográficas: Brasil, Canadá, Estados
Unidos e India. Los capítulos no plantean un estudio de caso de estos Estados
nacionales, sino que los presenta como espacios que ejemplifican, desde
distintas perspectivas, el recorrido del espectro del fascismo.
Vladimir Safatle, comienza trazando el panorama latinoamericano y explica
cómo las dictaduras en la región sirvieron como laboratorio para el despliegue
del neoliberalismo. Precisamente frente a la crisis del modelo neoliberal y el
fracaso que significó el intentar incrustarle un rostro humano, como lo
ejemplifica el caso de la Francia de Macron, nuevamente América Latina,
específicamente Brasil, vuelve a ser laboratorio mundial, esta vez para mostrar
la potencia fascista del neoliberalismo que el autor denomina “con rostro
inhumano”.
Luego, Patricia Barkaskas muestra la relación entre colonialismo y fascismo.
Aunque no presenta una identidad entre estas dos formas, su abordaje sobre la
situación de las comunidades indígenas canadienses, nos convoca a desafiar los
discursos dominantes desde la teoría de resistencia indígena.
Aunque ha rondado buena parte de Spectres of Fascism, lo que quizá se explica
por su capacidad mediática, el capítulo escrito por Joan Braune, remueve
nuevamente el aire americano. Sin embargo, esta ocasión destaca porque no
hace un análisis de la personalidad de Trump, sino que se introduce en el
corazón de la maquinaria política del fascismo estadounidense a través del
análisis de Steve Bannon y la influencia de la Teoría Generacional y el
Tradicionalismo en su actividad política.
Ajay y Vijay Gudavarthy escriben el capítulo correspondiente a la India. La
profundidad con la que desarrollan su texto, especialmente para los lectores no
relacionados con el contexto indio, es la primera cuestión a resaltar. Exploran la
relación entre fascismo y desarrollo tejida en la concepción del populismo bajo
una importante influencia de los estudios gramscianos.
El horizonte contemporáneo que muestra Johan Hartle para cerrar Spectres of
Fascism, está basado en el arte y la Situacionista Internacional, especialmente
concentrándose en el concepto de ‘espectáculo’ que le permite realizar una
crítica a la izquierda porque su desenvolvimiento, al menos en el ambiente
artístico, ha quedado encerrado en las claves liberales, lo que deja la puerta
abierta para la emergencia del fascismo.

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Spectres of Fascism ofrece una ventana distinta para quienes quieran

aproximarse al estudio del fascismo más allá de los esquemas politológicos
tradicionales.
Su capacidad de analizar el fenómeno a partir de la psicología, la estética, el arte
o el derecho, nos otorga una dimensión profunda del problema que rememora
los esfuerzos de la primera generación de la Escuela de Frankfurt.
Aunque la obra fue concebida principalmente a través de una red de académicos
que se conecta en Norteamérica y que se mueve principalmente con la
epistemología occidental, es un esfuerzo considerable por trasgredir la
concepción del fascismo incrustado exclusivamente en Europa, como lo apela el
concepto que da título al libro.
No obstante, corresponde a los próximos estudiosos ensanchar la senda que
abren Gandesha y los colaboradores de la obra e incorporar otras latitudes,
experiencias y reflexiones que, siguiendo la intención crítica, no se dedique más
a la simple acumulación de material sobre el fascismo, sino que contribuya al
posicionamiento contra el mismo que alumbre posibilidades emancipatorias.

About the review author

Rogelio Regalado is professor in the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences at the
Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla and a doctoral student in
sociology in the “Alfonso Vélez Pliego” Institute for Social Science and Hisotry
(ICSyH-BUAP).

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Book review: Daniel Ozarow, The mobilization and

demobilization of middle-class revolt

Review Author: Agnes Gagyi

Daniel Ozarow, 2019, The Mobilization and Demobilization of

Middle-class Revolt. Comparative insights from Argentina. New
York: Routledge (271 pp.)

Daniel Ozarow’s new book The Mobilization and Demobilization of Middle-

class Revolt is a longitudinal study of middle class mobilization and
demobilization in Argentina since 2001, when debt default pushed Argentina’s
GDP down by one-fifth. Unemployment reached 25 percent, poverty soared to
54 percent. As millions of highly educated citizens became impoverished, the
middle class was virtually extinguished overnight.
In December 2001 and throughout 2002, an enormous protest movement shook
the country, where middle classes joined workers and the urban poor in a
movement that came to be known by the slogan que se vayan todos (get rid of
all of them).
Demonstrators’ deep dissatisfaction with the political system, occupations of
public spaces, experiments in direct democracy and horizontal decision-making,
as well as a proliferation of neighborhood assemblies, collective self-help, and
various models of alternative solidarity economy solutions made this movement
a significant model for worldwide movements that reacted to the 2008 crisis.
Ozarow offers his study of mobilization and demobilization as a contribution
that can orient our thought about the future of post-2008 movements.
Following their initial successes (like removing four presidents in two weeks in
December 2001), the 2001-2002 movements in Argentina were demobilized
and co-opted by the Kirchner governments. Building on the corporatist tradition
of Peronism, this regime carried out a reorganization to post-neoliberal
developmentalism. The government took over and implemented some of the
demands and practices of the movement – it supported the formation of
cooperatives, included participative budgeting, nationalized some key
industries, and provided significant state aid to the poorest strata in the
framework of a “consumption pact” that helped grow economic demand.
These concessions were part of a regime of world-economic integration where
the Argentine state made significant efforts to protect national capital’s
development, and meanwhile sustained a reorganization of dependent
integration through commodity exports, based on extractivist industries. This
model implied new concessions to export targets like China, or to multinational
companies like Monsanto or Chevron, in turn sparking new conflicts with
Indigenous groups hurt by the industrial expansion.

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According to Ozarow’s study, compared to significant state aid to poorer strata,

the impoverished middle class started to feel neglected and disregarded. Parallel
to the demobilization of protest, the links of solidarity to poorer strata built out
during the 2001-2002 protests started to disintegrate. Competition for the same
jobs, the lack of targeted state aid, or occasions like piquetero actions where
roads were blocked by the urban poor, obstructed middle class workers’
commute set the two groups against each other.
In The Mobilization and Demobilization of Middle-class Revolt, Ozarow shows
how ideas of solidarity and belief in collective action gave place to political
disillusionment, anti-poor sentiments, and a crisis of middle-class values tied to
hard work, upward mobility and meritocracy. The Kirchner governments
(2003-2015) came to be seen as corrupt, nepotistic, a power that rests on free
aid to the unemployed, supported by the taxes of the struggling middle class
neglected by the state.
In expressions of these feelings, long-term patterns of race-class divisions were
activated that distinguished between white upper and middle classes of
European origin, and Mestizo and immigrant workers and peasants – a division
known in Argentinian politics as la grieta (the crack).
In a Freudian projection, diminishing differences between impoverished middle
class and poor workers’ positions were overemphasized in symbolic differences
like race and moral values. Memories of 2001-2001 protests were rewritten in a
negative light. If the significance of middle-class politics in 2001-2002 was
manifested in the break of previous neoliberal policies and the installation of a
left government through a social alliance with workers and the poor, the new
anti-government protests that broke out in 2012-2013 contributed to the
coming to power of the conservative and business-oriented government of
Mauricio Macri in 2015.
These protests, contrary to those of 2001-2002, did not speak of material
claims, but about values: corruption and the lack of meritocracy. Ozarow sees
this cycle as a warning sign that progressive middle class movements can
degenerate into passivity, moralization and voting for the “lesser evil.” In the
case of Argentina, this enabled political alliances with upper classes that, from
the perspective of the material conditions of the struggling middle class, Ozarow
interprets as a form of false consciousness.
During the Macri government, the economic growth promised in the campaign
as a result of new foreign direct investment did not happen, while a new
monetary crisis resulted in one of the largest IMF loans so far. Ozarow asks
whether the new wave of multisectoral protest gaining strength in face of the
new economic difficulties could result in a new que se vayan todos type of
movement.
Building on longitudinal survey data and interviews with people sampled from
surveys carried out between 2002 and 2016, The Mobilization and
Demobilization of Middle-class Revolt looks at how changes in economic status,

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participation in collective action, and broader conditions of political opportunity

and macroeconomic context relate to each other.
Contrary to the tenet of resource mobilization theory that correlates
movements’ power with the robustness of their organizational structure,
Ozarow points out that the Argentinian movements relied on informal modes of
organization that did not build up into broader structures: assemblies acted as
“nerve systems” of the protests, solidarity economy worked as a site for social
mixing that enabled solidarities, and workplaces where proletarianized middle
class workers met each other acted as catalysts of collective action.
The Mobilization and Demobilization of Middle-class Revolt finds that previous
experience in collective forms of organization strengthened participation. The
author confirms the theory of J-curve and relative deprivation, which expects
rebellion to break out when expectations for improvement are suddenly busted:
in 2001-2002, the swiftness of economic downward mobility in his data
correlates with the propensity to protests.
He shows that the change from individual coping solutions of the 1990’s to the
political protest of 2001-2002 was due both to the sudden economic collapse
and the lack of the regime’s political legitimacy, which allowed for middle class
sentiments of individual failure to be reorganized as political struggle against an
external cause of their misery.
Ozarow closes The Mobilization and Demobilization of Middle-class Revolt
with a series of recommendations. He advises movements to avoid what he
describes as losing sight of their systemic aim, being co-opted by top-down
reforms, and then turning against their former allies through an alliance with
elites.
Instead, contrary to the Argentinian movements’ reluctance to build structured
political organizations, movements should sustain structures of mobilization:
they should be able to have mobilizing vehicles, tools to influence politics, and
autonomous solidarity economy structures that sustain movement capacities
and allow for social mixing. They should avoid forms of false consciousness that
allure them to ally with upper classes, and maintain solidarities with workers.
The single point where I had questions was the relation between middle class
claims and capitalist integration. From what I understand, Ozarow says that
middle classes and poor workers share the same anti-systemic interest, and
middle class politics that thinks otherwise is a result of false consciousness. In
terms of long-term anti-systemic aims this of course makes sense, however in
terms of analyzing more short-term dynamics of middle class politics, it
obscures the limitations of semi-peripheral middle class development, and the
resulting competition for state help.
Within the conditions of systemic integration, the short term interest of the
middle classe does not necessarily include solidarity with the poor. This is
rather a characteristic of politicization reacting to crises, typically followed by a
competition against poorer strata for state resources (e.g. Silver and Slater 1999,
Janos 2000).

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The Mobilization and Demobilization of Middle-class Revolt does not make

clear whether by progressive aims he means full anti-systemic struggle, or
rather the broadening of social benefits within the conditions of capital
accumulation. At points (pp. 253) it seems like he promotes the fulfillment of
middle class desires for upward mobility together with an increased mobility of
the poor.
Within contemporary hierarchies of global accumulation, the social democratic
success of the latter version is impossible not only in semi-peripheral regions,
but also in former welfare states of the core. Moreover, if we are to use the force
of movements to destroy contemporary forms of accumulation in order to make
survival possible in the face of climate crisis, encouraging movements and
parties to reassure middle classes that based on their values, they deserve the
fulfillment of their desires (pp. 254-256) seems counterproductive.
Middle classes’ desire for upward mobility has been a key vehicle of systemic
integration; in order to get rid of the system that is threatening to kill us all,
middle classes, too, need to disengage with desires linked to systemic stakes.
Ozarow’s proposals for autonomous infrastructures of solidarity economy where
middle classes can mix with other strata and create new common
understandings and practices seem more promising in this respect.
On the whole, The Mobilization and Demobilization of Middle-class Revolt is
an important resource for middle class self-understanding in the context of an
escalating global economic and political crisis. Instead of universalizing
moments of middle class progressive politics, it shows how these can give in to
systemic pressures, and gives practical recommendations for how to avoid such
effects by building autonomous structures of solidarity.
At the beginning of a new global crisis sparked by the COVID-19 pandemic, as
we see the rise of new wave of solidarity response, this warning could help us
focus our attention to sustaining and broadening new structures of solidarity as
a means of systemic disengagement and anti-systemic struggle in face of the
climate crisis, instead of treating them as temporary measures before everything
returns back to normal.

References
Janos, Andrew C. 2000. East Central Europe in the modern world: the politics
of the borderlands from pre-to postcommunism. Redwood City, CA: Stanford
University Press.
Silver, Beverly and Eric Slater. 1999. “The social origins of world hegemonies.”
Pp 151-216 in Chaos and governance in the modern world system, edited by
Giovanni Arrighi. Minneapolis, CH: University of Minnesota Press.

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About the review author

As a social movement researcher, Agnes Gagyi works on East European politics
and social movements in the context of the region’s long-term world-economic
integration. As an activist, she is part of the Solidarity Economy Center
Budapest. Email: agnes.gagyi AT gu DOT se.

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Book Review: Andy Blunden, Hegel for Social Movements

Review author: Cameron Shingleton

Andy Blunden, 2019, Hegel for Social Movements. Brill: Leiden,

Boston. $28.00, 289 pp.

If I had to pull a figure out of the air, based on my years teaching undergraduate
philosophy, I would guess that approximately half of students who ever try
reading the 19th Century German philosopher Hegel are put off by the
philosopher’s dense, sometimes turgid, prose.
Coming to Hegel for the first time, it’s hard not to feel that at least some of
Hegel’s problems might cease to seem problematic if Hegel had chosen to be
clearer about the meaning of the basic terms he was using.
However at a guess I’d say many of the remaining half of first-time readers fall
at a different hurdle: Hegel’s apparently relentless intellectualism. Big concepts,
rather than more immediately recognisable forms of knowledge or experience,
seem to be front and centre of Hegel’s thinking.
Perhaps a third troubling factor, for readers who get a bit further, is what we
could call Hegel’s programmatism. Hegel’s urge to fit everything together into a
grand system, with Hegel’s own philosophy sitting at the top of the whole
edifice, at times seems to be pursued for its own sake.
Like any good philosopher, Hegel himself was of course not unaware of these
potential difficulties. One can easily imagine him returning from the dead after
200 years and explaining why everything in the vast intellectual edifice of
Hegelian thought had to be the way it is and no other.
In Hegel for Social Movements, author Andy Blunden’s main concern is with
the second issue I’ve mentioned: how to show that Hegel’s framing of problems
is practical, and decidedly political, in an unlikely sense.
The aim of Hegel for Social Movements is to take the reader step by step
through Hegel’s work, with periodic pauses for really committed students to
read Hegel’s own words. While not quite a representative sample of Hegel’s
work, Blunden’s selections are intended to help readers to appreciate Hegel’s
contribution as a social thinker.
Blunden’s central argument in the book is that Hegel’s dynamic, dialectical,
holistic understanding of concepts makes his work particularly suited to
addressing many types of real world problems, particularly the challenges of
social activism, which are clearly the author’s passionate intellectual concern.
Probably the most novel interpretative manoeuvre in support of this is the claim
that the core interest of Hegel for social activists lies in his logic: that

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thunderous super-structure of ideas and thought movements leading from the

categories of Being, Nothing and Becoming, up through Essence/Reflection, up
to what Hegel’s translators call variously the Concept or the Notion.
In interpretative terms, this means Blunden de-emphasises Hegel’s first main
work, The Phenomenology of Spirit, in particular the role of the well-known
Master-Servant dialectic. Blunden makes clear that he thinks Phenomenology is
the wrong place to start for Hegel beginners and shows why, though not without
interest, the Master-Slave dialectic has become something of a fetish of 20th
Century European thought.
The interpretative framework of Hegel for Social Movements also entails re-
interpreting the very concept of the Hegelian Concept. Blunden is at pains to
demonstrate that Hegelian concepts are fundamentally forms of activity or
practice. This opens the door to the wider claim that when Hegel shows us
concepts dialectically emerging from one another, coming into contact, falling
into contradiction, being opened out and split apart and re-emerging in richer,
more complex forms; he can also be taken to be describing the way social
movements form, struggle, evolve, devolve, win their struggles through
revolutionary action or piecemeal reform, or fade into the background, by being
superseded by other movements, through outright failure or by being
successfully institutionalised.
With the raw logical mechanics on the table, and their relevance for real world
political activity set out, Blunden can then cast new light on Hegel’s Philosophy
of Right (1820), where the philosopher addresses himself more directly to social
and political questions.
Blunden takes his readers step-by-step through Hegel’s Encyclopaedic Logic
(1830) and his Science of Logic (1816), then through the Philosophy of Right, at
every point trying to dispel the fog of Hegel’s style. He introduces relevant
examples and provides common sense explanations, together with short case
studies from the history of left-wing political movements, all with a view to
bringing Hegel down to earth.
Many of the better-known watchwords of Hegel’s system are singled out for
specific elaboration. If you have heard but never really seen the point of Hegel’s
famous quip about Napoleon (famously apostrophised as the “World Spirit on
horseback”) or failed to grasp his rather less vivid idea that “the Rational is the
Real and the Real is the Rational,” Hegel for Social Movements provides a neat
refresher.
The main strengths of Blunden’s book lay in its clear-minded exposition, or, to
put it another way, in the author’s ability to bring just the right amount of detail
(what Hegelians would call “concrete particularlity”) to bear on Hegel’s rather
ephemeral thought structures.
Another strong point of the book is the author’s refusal to gloss over moments in
the conceptual journey where Hegel seems sketchy, or where his theories have
been invalidated by later scientific or historical developments, or where he is
deemed to have been a victim of the ideological prejudices of his time. One of

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the more amusing passages in the book comes when Blunden comments on
Hegel’s blinkered view of family life:

When you read the Philosophy of Right, I think, insofar as you can follow Hegel’s
arcane manner of writing, and tolerate his occasional rants against his
contemporaries, everything makes abundant sense. . . until you get to the section
on the Family. Suddenly one finds oneself confronted by such an atrocious,
paternalistic, misogynist prig that one could be forgiven for tossing the book away
and having nothing more to do with Hegel (p. 183).

Blunden is good at explaining the often counter-intuitive or unconventional

sense of many of Hegel’s basic terms, another potential hurdle for readers
approaching the philosopher’s work for the first time.
Take, for example, Hegel’s slightly unnerving habit of talking about the truth of
concepts, rather than the truth of propositions or sentences, or his knack of
revealing one concept as the “truth” of another concept. Or take Hegel’s even
more unnerving habit of performing the same manouevre at a meta-textual
level, for instance in claiming that his own logic is “the truth of” his
phenomenology. Blunden comments clearly and incisively on this latter obiter
dictum:

When Hegel says something is “the truth of” some process, he means: this is what
the process turned out to be in the end. In the case [of the Phenomenology of
Spirit], consciousness develops up to the point of absolute knowing (“absolute”
because it is secure knowledge, not liable to fall into contradiction with itself
when it passes some limit) where it comes to know itself as a necessary process of
development, as the work of Spirit, he would say. (p. 68-69).

Hegel’s talk of “the Absolute”, which might, to the unschooled reader, have
sounded like a vaguely totalitarian exercise in concept-mongering, appears
instead as a not uninteresting exploration of the limits of ideas in a non-
standard, thought-challenging idiom. In fact, Blunden’s book abounds in clear-
minded, low-key explanations of this sort.
Hegel for Social Movements shares some of the flaws of Hegel’s own work,
particularly a tendency to grand systematising that makes the reader feel at
times that the phenomena of thought and history are being shoe-horned into an
overall conceptual scheme, rather than the conceptual architecture genuinely
taking shape from out of the thought or history under discussion.
The relevance of Hegel’s concepts to the dilemmas and challenges of social
activism is at times asserted rather than shown. And crucially, there is no
detailed attempt to outline a distinctively Hegelian approach to contemporary
problems of social activism.

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There is no mention, for instance, of the hyper-mediated world of the Internet

and the dilemmas it raises for activists trying to initiate open-minded debate or
get out the vote or organise politically effective street protests: a pity, given that
“mediation” is one of the strongest and most persuasive of Hegel’s conceptual
themes. Likewise, Hegel for Social Movements makes no mention of the
dialectics of the environment and the economy that are so often posed in
shallow terms by the mainstream media, though one can well imagine
contemporary climate activists of an Hegelian bent having a much more telling
take.
In his exposition of the Philosophy of Right, and particularly Hegel’s logic,
Blunden’s book is organized into sections which begin with slightly formulaic
phrases (“And so we come to the concept of X. . .”). At times, the reader may feel
that the connection between the new logical or social theoretic category and the
one that has preceded it is more rhetorical than substantial, let alone a matter of
logically unfolding concepts out of themselves. Though again, this is a failing
that many readers will encounter when reading Hegel’s work itself.
At times, Blunden really does find himself between the rock of ideas and the
hard place of Hegel’s style - a perennial problem with much continental
philosophy generally. There is a sense that Hegel, and Blunden following him,
seems at times to be taking rather simple thoughts or ideas that don’t go more
than one or two steps beyond the meanings implicit in our basic conceptual
vocabulary, and dressing them up in grandiose philosophical clothes. In some
cases, Hegel simply seems to garble common sense for the sake of sounding
profound and difficult. Thus it is to some extent with his discussion of the
categories of “purpose” and “intent” in the Philosophy of Right, glossed by
Blunden in his chapter on Hegel’s Theory of Action.
Hegel for Social Movements makes a brief attempt to deal with a major
methodological objection to Hegel’s dialectical idealism in a short section on
logic and history. The problem is essentially that deriving the major concepts of
social theory such as class or the legal system or the state through a method of
quasi-logical deduction gives the concepts far from satisfactory historical or
empirical or practical purchase.
There is no denying that Hegel took a fairly high-handed approach to this issue.
He states, for example, in the Philosophy of Right:

The historical origin of the judge and his court may have had the form of a
patriarch’s gift to his people or of force or of free choice; but this makes no
difference to the concept of the thing. . . [Similarly] if we ask what is and has been
the historical origin of the state. . . all these questions are no concern of the Idea
of the State. (Philosophy of Right, 258n, 219n, quoted in Blunden, p. 189 - 90)

Objections to this way of proceeding essentially come from two quarters. First
from non-Hegelian Marxists, who tend to argue that Hegel’s concept of both the
state and of class were simply too thin for the purpose of either interpreting or

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changing the world of bourgeois modernity. The second come from Weberian
sociologists, who point out that without due attention to the historical forms
that the exercise of state power has taken, without specific historical studies of
the way different forms of state power are legitimised, one’s concept of the state
is likely to forfeit a great deal of explanatory heft. Again, because Blunden’s aim
is to provide a kind of advanced primer, rather than a definitive answer to
Hegel’s most sophisticated critics, the depth and interest of these debates can
hardly be broached.
The most notable shortcoming of Hegel for Social Movements, however, is that
Blunden doesn’t quite succeed in showing that Hegel, let alone Hegel’s logic, is
an indispensible manual of progressive politics.
Helping social activists make sense of Hegel is rather different from showing
that Hegel can or should be considered an “operational manual” of social
activism, whenever activists are dealing with a group of people organised
around an idea or a social project of any kind. Likewise, digging up novel lines of
Hegel interpretation in terms of the notions of activity and praxis, or, as in the
final phases of Blunden’s book, in the work of Hegel’s latter-day Soviet
exponents, though in itself a worthwhile intellectual exercise, hardly seems
guaranteed to enhance social activists’ ability to change the world. (One notes
that, apart from in these later sections of the book, Blunden makes little
reference to the voluminous history of Hegel studies: a reasonable omission,
given that the book aims to speak to an audience of politically active beginners.)
Does Blunden succeed in bringing clarity to Hegel’s work for first time readers
or, say, readers who have given Hegel a go in the past and been beaten back by
all those teutonic abstract nouns? The short answer is yes.
Does Blunden succeed in showing readers that Hegel is indispensible for anyone
trying to understand how politically committed social action works? The short
answer here is not quite.
In order to have done so, Blunden would have had to do more than
contextualise the inchoate (and at times downright objectionable) features of
Hegel’s philosophy. But is there any getting around the fact that Hegel is almost
infinitely interpretable, and hence very difficult to take in the tangible sense
required for finite action in the social/political world?
That said, Hegel for Social Movements, in spite of its limitations, is a
fundamentally sound and interesting work of Hegel interpretation. Blunden
does indeed make a strong case for suggesting that Hegel can be of assistance to
activists in understanding, if not exactly solving, the “wicked problems” that are
the main object of their struggles.
In a way, Hegel emerges from Blunden’s interpretation in a positive light, but
not one that is all that different from other great thinkers. Hegel’s achievement
is not so much the (always ambiguous) one of changing the world, but the
equally interesting feat of deepening and widening the very possibilities of
change.

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And in opening out Hegel’s achievements to first-time readers of a progressive

political bent, Hegel for Social Movements has succeeded in making those
possibilities accessible in a world in which sophisticated frameworks for
conceptualising politics are just as necessary as ever.

About the review author

Dr. Cameron Shingleton is a member, and former Head, of the Melbourne
School of Continental Philosophy. His research interests include the history of
philosophy, ethics, aesthetics and the philosophy of technology.

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Book review: Cas Mudde, The Far Right Today

Review author: Patrick Sawyer

Cas Mudde, 2019, The Far Right Today. Cambridge: Polity (205 pp.,
£14.99 paperback)

Thirteen years ago, Cas Mudde wrote in the introduction of his classic text on
Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe that the radical right party family was
still a “relatively marginal electoral force in the vast majority of European
countries” which would often leave his students in disbelief (Mudde 2007, pp. 1-
2).
As history has shown, much has changed since then, giving a new sense of
urgency to the question of the far right in the 21st century. The objective of The
Far Right Today, Mudde’s most recent publication, is to take into account these
new changes and provide a condensed, easy to read manual summing up
decades of research on the far right.
In The Far Right Today, Mudde develops his thesis of the “fourth wave” of the
far right. The fourth wave pertains to the mainstreaming and normalization of
far right politics in the modern day. Events such as the 9/11 attacks, the great
recession, and the refugee “crisis” (Mudde disagrees with this framing) helped
bring far right politics into the mainstream by way of journalists and politicians
who increasingly discussed the issues, adopted the frames, and pursued the
policies once exclusive to the radical right.
This contrasts with the previous three waves in Europe, wherein far-right
politics had generally been seen as out-of-bounds (with some exceptions) for
mainstream parties and politicians and their parties were left to inhabit the
political space at the margins. In the fourth wave, the borders between the far
right and the mainstream become increasingly difficult to distinguish.
Drawing on his own and others’ research, Mudde lays out several shifts that are
currently underway among right wing parties during the fourth wave. First, he
argues, it is becoming increasingly acceptable, or even unavoidable, for
mainstream parties on both the national and local level to enter into coalitions
with radical right parties as many cases from Italian and Austrian electoral
history demonstrate.
As far right parties gain in the polls, the feasibility of reacting to them with a
policy of demarcation or an official cordon sanitaire becomes less tenable, as
the incentives for mainstream parties to cooperate with them increase. An
example of this can be seen in the recent scandal in Thuringia, Germany when
the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) was condemned for
collaborating with the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party in
order to undermine a coalition government headed by Die Linke.

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A second, parallel phenomenon is the emergence of successful radical right

politicians from within traditionally conservative parties, such as with Trump in
the United States, as well as the complete transformation of conservative parties
into fully fledged radical right parties, as with Fidesz in Hungary and Law and
Justice (PiS) in Poland.
These events testify not only to the relative success of radical right politics in the
contemporary era, but also to the extent to which traditional conservative
parties have moved rightward. Under their leadership, the parties of Sebastian
Kurz in Austria, Nicolas Sarkozy in France, and Teresa May in the UK all
witnessed significant shifts to the right on issues like immigration, integration,
and terrorism.
As the parties themselves change, so do their voters. The Far Right Today
argues that the electoral base of the far right is becoming more diversified and
that the bloc of “typical” moderately-educated white male voters once believed
to be the linchpin of the far right base in the 1980s, is becoming less of a reality
today.
Part of the explanation for this lies in several Western European radical right
parties, such as the French Front National (FN) and Austrian Freedom Party
(FPÖ), positioning themselves as “worker’s parties” in the midst of the social
democratic parties’ move towards “third way” politics, which allowed them to
pick up votes from the broader working and middle classes who felt alienated by
this 'betrayal'.
Aside from an overview of emerging trends over the past decade, anti-fascist
and anti-racist activists will find that The Far Right Today has much to offer in
terms of strategies of resistance to far right parties and movements.
While Mudde himself admits that the academic literature has not pointed to a
definitive “silver bullet” to stopping the rise of these parties, he posits that a
number of strategies have been successful in certain national contexts. Insofar
as the state is concerned, a straightforward ban on more extremist parties has
shown to be effective in many cases, though Belgium's Vlaams Blok, which had
been found guilty of violating anti-racist legislation in 2004, simply bypassed
this by forming a slightly more moderate party, the Vlaams Belang, only several
weeks after.
Some success in fighting the far right can be had with a policy of demarcation,
wherein all parties decide to ignore the radical right party and forbid their
members to cooperate or engage with them, thus refusing them the possibility
of presenting themselves as a respectable opposition party. Given national
contexts in which radical right parties are still small in size and where all
political parties and major media outlets agree to the strategy, the rise of the
radical right can be limited to some extent. That being said, the Vlaams Belang
and the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) are notable exceptions of cases
where these parties have only increased in prominence despite a formal cordon
sanitaire.
While there is a brief mention in The Far Right Today of the impact that civil

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society actors and anti-racist movements have had on the rise of the far right,
much of this focused only on a small sub-set of activities.
Other successful community efforts to resist the far right, unfortunately, were
passed over for a focus on the more media-friendly anti-fascist demonstrations
which turn violent.
The online activist group Sleeping Giants, for example, has led an incredibly
successful campaign targeting Breitbart News’ advertising pool, which Steve
Bannon himself has admitted had greatly damaged the business model of the
“home of the Alt-Right.”
Moreover, the work done by anti-racist activists to reveal the extremist views
held by members of the far right (the work of the Southern Poverty Law Center
comes to mind) and put pressure on their employers and administrators of the
social media platforms that host their content are also of importance in the
struggle against the far right.
That being said, The Far Right Today was never meant to be a Rules for
Radicals-style manuel for anti-racist activism. The large number of anti-racist
actions excluded from consideration is of course understandable if it is seen as a
way to avoid distracting from the main message the book has to offer.
Another surprising exemption from the chapter on the repertoire of responses
to the radical right is any mention of his colleague Chantal Mouffe’s (2018)
theories concerning the role that left or “inclusive” populism may have in
stemming the ascent of the radical right and fostering a democratic
reinvigoration. An engagement with these ideas and the way in which Mudde’s
theories diverge from Mouffe’s could have been a rather fruitful addition to the
book.
The Far Right Today ends with twelve theses on the fourth wave that
summarise the mountains of research accrued on this topic over the past two
decades. That the rise of the far right is once again a major issue confronting
democratic societies today testifies to the importance of this book.

References
Mouffe, Chantal. 2018. For a Left Populism. London: Verso.
Mudde, Cas. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge
University Press.

About the review author

Patrick Sawyer is a PhD student at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow
and a researcher in the Laboratory for Monitoring the Risks of Socio-political
Destabilization. His research interests include social movements, populism, the
radical right, and conspiracism. He can be contacted at Psawyer AT hse.ru.

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Book review: Alyshia Gálvez, Eating NAFTA

Review author: Dawn Marie Paley

Alyshia Gálvez, 2018. Eating NAFTA: Trade, Food Policies and the
Destruction of Mexico. Oakland, California: University of California
Press. $29.95, 269pp.

Alyshia Gálvez’ 2018 book Eating NAFTA: Trade, Food Policies and the
Destruction of México approaches changes in foodways in the country since the
infamous North American free trade ageement was signed in 1994. It looks
primarily at the transformations in the ways Mexicans eat, but also at the
systems of food production, distribution and marketing and how they’ve
changed over the past decades.
In Eating NAFTA, Gálvez calls on fieldwork carried out between rural areas in
the central Mexican state of Puebla and the state of New York; she reflects on
inequality and high-end dining; and she dives into statistics regarding food-
related illness among Mexicans in Mexico and among those who have migrated
to the United States.
Eating NAFTA begins with the story of Aura, a woman from a small town in
Puebla who lived for years in New York City. While in the US, Aura slowly
stopped eating the “beans, tortillas, eggs, squash, herbs and occassionally meat
or chicken” she grew up with, and began to increase her consumption of meat
and soft drinks (pp. xi). After returning back to her village with a fair amount of
savings, Aura opened a convenience store. But instead of enjoying economic
stability later in her life, she found herself battling diabetes and fearing for the
health of her son.
Gálvez makes clear that Aura’s story is far from exceptional. Throughout the
book, Gálvez does an excellent job of shifting the narrative away from blame and
individual choices towards the systems that determine the availability and
accessibility of healthy food for Mexicans at home and in the United States.
She writes: “Economic transformation has not only entailed development in the
broad sense but has also specifically promoted the market penetration and
affordability of processed foods while simultaneously stunting the market reach
and affordability of basic subsistance, minimally processed, and locally
produced foods” (pp. 100).
Diabetes and other diet related illnesses have increased worldwide in past
decades. Eating NAFTA makes the case that Mexico has been particularly hard
hit. This is, of course, of particular interest in the context of the coronavirus

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pandemic, as many of the complicating factors for those who become extremely
ill and even die from COVID-19 are related to diet.
Gálvez convincingly proposes that we “...consider the massive proliferation of
diet-related illness as a kind of structural violence–a result of policy decisions
and priorities” (pp. 6). She goes on to make a compelling argument that this
structural violence makes it more difficult for people and comunities to make
demands regarding the economy and the political system.
The transnationalization of Mexican foodways, which has tended to pull the
poorest people away from healthy, locally grown food while flooding the market
with imported and processed food, undermines not only community health, she
writes, but also local autonomy.
The centrality of corn to traditional diets in Mexico provides the consummate
example of this transformation, and is a major theme of Eating NAFTA.
Gálvez describes how the concentration of the production of tortillas and
cornmeal, as well as massive corn imports from the United States, have meant
“Older methods for processing and distributing corn are no longer practical or
the norm for most people” (pp. 41).
Among other things, this means landrace (criollo) corn is increasingly under
threat in Mexico, which now imports 40 per cent of its corn from its northern
neighbor.
The diet related implications of importing so much corn from the US go beyond
the partial destruction of Mexico’s food sovereignty. “...what we see as a result of
increased US corn in the Mexican market is increased consumption of processed
foods that use corn byproducts (mostly syrups and starches) accompanying a
decline in consumption of tortillas” (pp. 51).
According to Gálvez, “The idea that Mexican corn is inherently inefficient is a
recurring theme, traceable back to the conquest era –but in the last few decades
it is US corn production that provides the counterpoint to Mexico’s, shaping
ideas about progress and modernity” (pp. 68).
Eating NAFTA points out that the labor time needed to produce a ton of corn in
the United States is 1.2 hours, while in Mexico it is 17.8 days. That said, most of
the corn grown in the US “cannot be consumed directly, the way Mexican corn
can be eaten fresh (elotes and esquites) and for grain (in the form of masa for
tortillas or tamales)” (pp. 68-69). Eating NAFTA goes on to examine in some

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detail how arguments around productivity and efficiency lead to a kind of faulty
logic regarding where corn should be grown and by who.
One of the most original sections in Eating NAFTA is about the Pujol paradox,
named after Pujol, chef Enrique Olvera’s elite México City restaurant.
I will admit to sometimes waking up at night thinking about Pujol’s mole
madre, which I tried when a friend visiting from New York City took me to the
fancy Polanco restaurant.
Our meal at Pujol that day cost nearly $600, well above the monthly minimum
wage in Mexico. Gálvez suggests that the elevation of corn-based cuisine “can
only attain such a high value globally by being lost to those who customarily ate
it” (pp. 30).
Her argument that the erosion of ancestral foodways via land concentration and
industrialization are necessary precursors for traditional foods to be prepared
by elite chefs is persuasive. These chefs, she writes, “rationalize their
stratospheric prices as the cost of their salvage of methods and ingredients that
would otherwise be unappreciated and in the process of slipping away” (193).
Another section of the book is devoted to understanding how food technologies
and processed food connect to women’s reproductive labor (which also tends to
be invisibilized through the celebration of world renowned, often male, chefs).
“The production of tortillas for an average household prior to the mechanical
grinding of corn required about forty hours of labor per week, including the
nixtamalization of corn with mineral lime, grinding of corn, kneading of masa,
and hand shaping and cooking of tortillas,” writes Gálvez (pp. 153). Thus, the
mechanization of tortilla production was “a linchpin for the imagined liberation
of middle-class women” in Mexico (pp. 153), although of course, the reality for
many women in Mexico today looks quite different.
The overall tenor of Eating NAFTA is one of terrible loss; even the subtitle
suggests the book is about the “destruction of Mexico.” But at times it seems
Gálvez glosses over the resilience and ongoing presence of non-corporate food
systems that reach back hundreds of yaers, especially in urban environments
like the city of Puebla.
Her descriptions of Puebla as a super modern city bearing a “striking
resemblance to Los Angeles, California” where citizens use cards to pay for
everything and “the car is king” (pp. 92) are specific to the city’s exclusive south
(especially Angelopolis and Lomas de Angelopolis), though that is not made
clear. Rather, Gálvez seems to suggest that beyond Puebla’s colonial old city,
wealthy areas make up most of the urban area. This is a far cry from what things
look like on the ground in the metropolitain area of over two million.
While indeed Puebla does have gated, upscale suburbs and a massive esplanade
featuring exclusive, US style malls, it is also home to huge amounts of social
housing and low and middle income highrises and walk-ups, as well as dozens
of markets and outdoor tianguis that bring together fruit and vegetable venders,

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butchers, fishmongers and food vendors in cash-only settings, sometimes

outside the purview of state and local governments.
A much richer and more textured account of popular life and especially the
organization of food markets in the city of Puebla is Sandra C. Mendiola Garcia’s
2017 book Street Democracy: Vendors, Violence and Public Space in Late
Twentieth Century Mexico, which is surprisingly absent from Gálvez’
bibliography.
There were two moments while reading Eating NAFTA that I felt less than
sated, desiring that the author provide more explanation and deeper detail. Both
came as Gálvez used the same formulation to shyly advance two of her most
provocative ideas.
First, she writes, “It is possible that the countries the United States has
interfered in the most, with the highest level of migration to the United States
and the highest levels of foreign direct investment, will demonstrate the highest
rates of diet related illness” (pp. 96).
Later, she goes on to note, “It’s possible that being treated as Mexican in the
United States is as detrimental to health as any potential genetic predisposition,
as time in the US is a predictor for the onset of disease” (pp. 164).
Further development of these hypotheses is crucial, but unfortunately Eating
NAFTA doesn’t pursue either. That said, Gálvez’ strong arguments and the data
she presents about politics, economics, migration and the transformation of
foodways; as well as her explorations into many other aspects of food in Mexico,
make the book well worth reading.
“We can see that the aftermath of NAFTA is not just a changed food system, but
in fact a revision of the relationship between the state and its people,” writes
Gálvez. This quote provides a powerful example of Eating NAFTA’s synthetic,
accessible, and critical scholarship, which doubles as a call to action for
researchers and activists to consider food and diet as an integral part of Mexican
political economy.

References:
Mendiola Garcia, Sandra C. Street Democracy: Vendors, Violence and Public
Space in Late Twentieth-Century Mexico. Nebraska: Univeristy of Nebraska
Press, 2017.

About the review author:

Dawn Marie Paley is author of Drug War Capitalism. She’s lived in Puebla since
2014.

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