Lessons after the Romanian Army’s “Liberation Campaign of Bessarabia”, 1941

”Învățămintele” campaniei de eliberare a Basarabiei din anul 1941

Mihai Modrea-Marin, drd. anul II

Ph.D. Student, II-nd year, “Stefan cel Mare” University, Suceava
Email: [email protected]

Abstract
In this short study I will try to comment upon the lessons which the Romanian Army had
addressed after the first month of war – 22.06.1941 – 26.07.1941. The booklet has been kept in the
Military Archives, which I have accessed. The document written at the request of General Ion Antonescu
– the Leader of the State – comprised considerations regarding the Soviet forces and their battle tactics, as
well as advices for the Romanian Army; it was compiled while the Romanians were still fighting.

Rezumat
În acest studiu voi încerca să comentez învățămintele pe care Armata Română le-a tras după
prima lună de război – 22 iunie-26 iulie 1941. Documentul este accesibil în Arhivele Militare Române
(CSPAMI Pitești). Broșura întocmită la cererea generalului Ion Antonescu – “Conducătorul Statului” –
cuprindea diverse considerații asupra Armatei Sovietice și a tacticilor folosite de aceasta, precum și
învățăminte pentru Armata Română; a fost alcătuită în timp ce trupele române încă luptau.

Keywords: Liberation Campaign, Bessarabia, Romanian Army, German Army, General

Antonescu, World War II.
Cuvinte-cheie: campanie de eliberare, Basarabia, Armata Română, Armata Germană, generalul
Ion Antonescu, cel de-al doilea Război Mondial.

In the wake of the liberation campaign Army edited a booklet1 with “observations and
of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina (finalized lessons” after the first month of war. It is
officially on July 26-th, 1941), the Romanian
1
Centrul de Studiere şi Păstrare a Arhivelor Militare
Istorice (CSPAMI), fond Flotila I Vânătoare, dosar 50,
p. 168.
interesting to observe the haste manifested in the of the high morale or nationalism (the latter
making of this document, given the fact that the being considered by the Romanian intelligence
Romanian forces were still fighting (the 4-th officers as non-existent). What drove the Soviets
Army was beginning the long and costly siege of on to fighting was “the terror instilled by the
Odessa and many other forces were advancing Political Commissars of the Military Police
alongside the Wehrmacht, east of the Dniester). formations waiting behind the combat troops”.
It probably had to be stressed that Romania had Anyway, “like the Tsarists”, the Soviet forces
already reached its goals in the conflict – were “familiar and trained” with long-distance
liberating the territories occupied by the Soviet retreats. “The inferior commanders of the rear-
Union in 1940, thus it was necessary to reach guards have shown courage, initiative and skills
some conclusions even before the fights were in leading their units. They have lost few men
properly finalized or the soldiers returned to the and materials, they had retreated methodically,
country. We shall return to this particular aspect during the night-time – and counter-attacked
later on. energetically”. If “the small units are skillfully
In this booklet we find interesting led”, the enemy is considered inferior in the
reflections: the Soviet Army was considered to field of lacking strategic initiative, moral force
be a serious opponent, with units that were well and superior leadership2.
organized, trained, equipped and prepared for Concerning the equipment of the Red
war. (Nota Bene: in the very first days of the Army, we are told that all the inferior-level units
conflict, in the sectors where the main attack had met by the Romanians were well-equipped with
been executed by the German forces, the Soviet weapons, including the automatic-type. What is
resistance quickly crumbled, allowing the more, “even the Romanian-nationality soldiers
Germans to advance at an unexpected pace and (from Bessarabia and Bukovina) were equipped
to capture countless supplies and weaponry) with new uniforms and foot gear. The material
Quote: “the Soviet infantry resisted is, however, of low-quality. It is noticed the
tenaciously” to the attacks; also, “they were shortage of the so-called «small equipment»
shooting well at medium and small distances, (underwear)”. Regarding food, the bread found
but were not aiming well”. Much like the on the Soviet prisoners or in the captured
soldiers of the old Tsarist Army, who had fought supply-depots was of good quality, but meat was
alongside the Romanians during the Great War, scarce. There also were captured Soviet soldiers
the Soviet soldiers “were quick in digging who declared that they came short of food for a
foxholes and they were very careful in few days3.
organizing the terrain” (camouflage, most
likely). Their tenacity, however, was not the
2
Ibidem.
result of some remarkable instruction process, or 3
Ibidem.
 The Red Army used tanks quite often between 20% and 65% of the necessary 5. So we
against the Romanian forces, “both to maintain might believe that Soviet armored cars (BA-10
contact and to mount counterattacks. There were or later in the war the new BA-64) were “listed”
no meetings with important masses of armored by the gunners as tanks; we note that this
forces”. According to what was deemed occurred on other fronts, with other armies and
necessary by the enemy commanders, the at another moments during the war.
number of tanks involved in counterattacks The document mentions, though, that
varied from two-three tanks (a tank platoon had it was not enough for our units to be well-
the nominal strength of three tanks) up to a equipped, but it was also necessary to “take all
company. In these first weeks, the Soviet forces the measures needed for the units not to be
ripostes consisted only in limited, yet frequent surprised”. It is given the example – although
counterattacks, made by “combined arms units without mentioning specific details, such as
(infantry, cavalry, artillery, tanks, many times number of the division or names of the
with air support), with waste of ammunition, commanding officers – of the 35 Infantry
against the attacking flanks”. The document also (Reserve) Division and its failure at Vărzăreşti:
states that “our units are very well equipped with a column of two regiments (infantry and
anti-tank artillery and these weapons proved artillery) which “executed a march in peace-time
extremely efficient against the Russian tanks, conditions, without any precautionary measures,
which in most cases were destroyed or scattered although every probability indicated that
away”. It is admitted that “it was not mentioned meeting the enemy was almost certain. The
on our front – up to date – the presence of heavy column’s vanguard forces, entering a trap laid
tanks, of 30 or 50 tons” 4. This must be read by the Soviet forces, alongside the Bessarabian
“cum grano salis”, because the standard anti- inhabitants of a village, were completely
tank artillery of the Romanian Infantry divisions surprised and [were] counterattacked; they
consisted of the 37mm. antitank gun, with a low panicked [and fled] and exposed the artillery and
power of armor penetration. The regular anti- the main forces behind. This resulted in
tank weapons were: a platoon (6 guns) of 37mm. unnecessary losses, which could have been
Bofors guns at each infantry regiment and of 12 prevented if the most elementary precautionary
47 mm. guns (Boehler, Breda or Schneider) at measures would have been taken, measures
division level (Anti-tank divisional guns). In which were mentioned in each and every
March 1941 the 37mm. guns were present in just military regulation. It can be thus said that this
70% of their required numbers and the 47mm. column has been defeated by its very
ones in only about 40%. What is more, the commanding officer, who did not take the
ammunition for them was scarce – ranging
4 5
Ibidem. CSPAMI, Fond 948, dosar 565, p. 25.
necessary safety measures which were imposed beginning of the “Operation Barbarossa” on
6
by the situation” . June 22-nd.
Concerning the enemy air forces, they A particular focus is shed by this
were “timid in their important actions”, document on the “different ruses” used by the
sustaining a high rate of losses. The shells that Soviet soldiers to entrap, demoralize and to
were used had exploded only “in reduced cause losses to our troops; it is stated that “this
quantities”. One of their preferred tactics was to system is not new, being a favorite tactic of the
fly low and shoot their machine guns at the ancient Mongols”. It is presented the situation of
Romanian and German soldiers, but also at the a German unit which tried to occupy a village:
peasants working in the fields. (Again, as far as “after the first echelons had passed, they were
it is known, the civilians were previously received with automatic gunfire from the
evacuated from the conflict areas, so the weapons hidden inside the houses, trees, attics”.
“peasants shooting” might be an exaggeration, The examples go on: “a reconnaissance patrol
deemed to present the Soviets as even more was allowed to close in to a distance of meters
sadistic and careless than they actually were). away from a crop in which the Russians were
What is more, “it is ascertained an insufficiency perfectly hidden and they had fired, producing
of the commanders, which had not initiated any losses […] Russian soldiers lift their hands up,
7
coherent, well-prepared, large-scale action” . signaling surrender, but at 100-200 meters away
The Soviet Danube naval forces “have to open fire with concealed automatic weapons.
judiciously used their available fluvial ships. Soldiers pretend to be dead, just to open fire by
The Russian naval actions have had a lot of surprise at close quarters. It is also mentioned
activity, offensive spirit and close camouflage. It that Soviet sharpshooters and certain special
has been noted a strong connection between the teams are carefully watching for officers and fire
naval activity and those of air forces and land- at them. As a consequence, the officers at the
based forces. The Soviet had useful information frontline shall avoid appearing as targets and
in the Danube sector because of the presence of shall try to hide their distinctive markings” 9. One
the Russian-speaking Lippovan population in must not understand that the commanders of
the Danube Delta”8. We note that the offensive smaller units would remain behind the frontline,
movements of the Soviets in the Danube Delta as their place was alongside the soldiers.
are pretty much consistent with the theory of a The Soviets were using a “special and
planned Soviet attack which had not been called somewhat ingenious method”, which consisted
off in due time, attack rendered useless by the of using “connected boats, armed with machine
guns”, in the water areas.
6
CSPAMI, fond Flotila I Vânătoare, loc. cit.
7
Ibidem.
8 9
Ibidem. Ibidem.
 All these ways of Soviet warfare were company, which were difficult to handle”. The
to be thoroughly studied by the Romanian rank transmissions were also down: the regiments of
and file, so as to “take the necessary cautionary the division were linked neither to their
measures imposed, especially when from subordinate units, nor to the division’s
interrogating the wounded, it turns out that a command; if there had appeared a critical
large part of our losses is due to the skill of the situation, no calls for help could have been
enemy’s using deceitful fighting tactics and, of issued. But perhaps the most striking aspect was
course our troops’ «greenness»”10 (lack of noticed at the “ground level”, among the ranks:
experience, gullibility – n.n.) “in the crossing area, the infantry units were
The second part of the booklet is also amassed instead of being dispersed into an
of interest, as it briefly depicts the Romanians’ articulated, camouflaged formation; yells and
fighting manner, but it stresses mainly the loud-voiced commands were accompanying the
mistakes and the blunders that were perpetrated. operation, although the enemy shore was at a
“Some units went directly to the frontal attack of distance of 100-200 meters. The soldiers, who
the organized enemy resistance points, seeking had been on march the whole night, hadn’t have,
to pass through the enemy fire barrage, thus until the moment of crossing, more than one or
causing unnecessary losses. Every time when it two hours of sleep and had only eaten a quarter
is possible, such resistance points ought to be of bread, as the field kitchens hadn’t arrived
maneuvered and passed-by”. When crossing the yet”11. To conclude, this action had been
Prut River, a large Romanian unit has made a unprepared. It succeeded only because the
series of blunders, any of them not allowed at enemy wasn’t there; if the enemy had resisted
crossing a wide river. There was no aerial even the least, the operation, in the way it had
protection, “although there were important air been planned and executed, would have been a
forces available, without another mission” and complete and utter failure”12.
the anti-aircraft artillery which was earmarked Another case, in this instance with
for protecting the crossing was not yet ready. consequences, had been that of a large unit
Then, “from the field guns and the heavy guns, which was temporary assuming a defensive
in the moment of crossing, there were ready to position. “Although possessing abundant and
fire only a single battery of heavy artillery and a timely information indicating with precision the
battalion of field guns”. The specialized moment and place of an enemy attack, the unit
pioneers’ battalion (which had river crossing took on the brunt of the air force bombing raid
equipment – “assault bridges”) had not been and of the artillery barrage on the very place it
used, because it had not arrived on time. So “the was settled – and then counterattacked. In
crossing was made with the boats of the bridging
11
Turturică, 2012, pp. 138-139.
10 12
Ibidem. Ibidem.
similar situations, it is recommended to proceed this stirring, unknown even for the commanders
as such: withdraw the troops from the attacked from the rear, beyond the fact that the soldiers
area, creating thus an empty space in front of the and the animals are exhausted up to being unfit
enemy; when the enemy enters that space, it for duty, the rear columns and the services’
should be suddenly attacked from both flanks“13. sections could very easy panic at the first signs
Regarding the organization of the rear of an artillery fire or of an air raid; or they can
services (behind the frontline), the situation was be victims of sabotage acts coming from enemy
even worse. Here, general Antonescu discovered elements remaining behind the frontline”14.
“a complete lack of method and discipline”. The We note that the commander of 5-th
transports (both by horse and auto) were Army Corps, of which the aforementioned
working without respecting the wartime division belonged (The Guard Division) had
regulations, without any measures of safety or been relieved of command following general
camouflage. The trucks were used at the Antonescu’s tour of inspection on the frontline.
pleasure of the commanding officers, for minor The commander of the 4-th Romanian Army,
transports. Even more, individuals were bustling General Nicolae Ciupercă, has afterwards
around everywhere, over the fields, on the roads, provided some pertinent explanations for the
without any precise assignment”. Also, there “bustling individuals”: he said that “Behind this
were daily observed carts and trucks loaded with large unit (The Guard Division – n.n.), in a
stuff which was not necessary for the frontline sector of only 6 kilometers, there were fifteen
operations: tables, chairs, or other household field artillery battalions and four heavy artillery
items. In an area occupied by a division, “all the battalions [...] so one shouldn’t be surprised of
regimental supply trains and the services’ the rather impressive crowd [...] which seemed
formations were scattered around in a cultivated untidy”15.
area of a few hundreds of hectares. All the plants An enlightening characterisation of
were trampled and destroyed by the horses Antonescu’s behaviour during the inspection
which were allowed to graze unhindered, tour is given in the memories of general Ion
leading to the ruination of the cultivated fields, Gheorghe: „frequent and unforeseen controls
labored with great toil by the local peasants – and harsh punishments resulted in the
and, implicitly, of the national wealth. The paralisation of the initiative and finally made the
respective commanders, of lesser or greater frontline commanders lose confidence in their
ranks, were carelessly watching «the show», own abilities”16.
without addressing any of the problems”.
Finally, the conclusion: “with this deficiency in
method and the disturbances in traffic and with 14
Turturică, 2012, p. 140.
15
Duțu, 2005, pp. 45-46.
13
CSPAMI, fond Flotila I Vânătoare, loc. cit. 16
Gheorghe, 1996, p. 195.
 We can go on quoting from the war”: we simply didn’t have the manpower, the
analysis made by the General Staff of the Guard logistics or the resources to lead a war of the
Division after the first week of war. They new “total” kind, against the Soviet Union.
observed the difficulties provoked by an
“insufficient neutralization of the enemy’s Epilogue: General Antonescu had not
artillery, by not properly identifying the Soviet even waited for the siege of Odessa to be
pillboxes and strong points. Also the lack of concluded in order to get the rank of Marshall –
teams specialized in assaulting and destroying which he actually decided to bestow upon
pillboxes, equipped with specialized devices and himself, as “Conducator”, the supreme executive
the lack of combined arms support (artillery and leader of the country. The ceremony took place
aerial – especially dive-bombers) is noted” 17. It on August 22-nd, after he had been advanced in
is a distinct possibility that the other Romanian rank in March 1941 as Army General (highest
divisions have met similar shortages, given the rank in the Romanian military in times of peace)
fact that The Guard Division and The Armored and awarded with the German “Iron Cross”, in
Division were regarded as “top units” of the the rank of Knight (on August 6-th) and with the
Romanian Army. “Mihai Viteazu” Order, I-st and II-nd Class, on
To conclude, many of the problems August 21-st.
faced by the liberating (or “attacking”, by the
Soviet terminology) army were actually
recorded and duly reported. But a number of
objective causes have prevented their
remediation: the most important (which also
prevented a better reforming and rearming
during the first months of general Antonescu’s
regime) was that in times of war the modern
equipment was very difficult to find; another
reason was that in spite of many opinions, the
war wasn’t over yet, not even for the Romanian
soldiers: the siege of Odessa was to last until
mid-October and quite a number of Romanian
units continued advancing alongside the
Wehrmacht, both East of the Dniester and in
Crimea; last, but not least, there was the simple
truth that our army was “too small for such a big
17
Duțu, Retegan, 1999, p. 195.
 References

Centrul de Păstrare și Studiere a

Arhivelor Militare Istorice, Pitești:
- Fondul 948;
- Fondul Flotila I Vânătoare.

Alesandru Duțu, Țiganca – drama de

pe Prut, în revista CUGETUL, nr. 3/2005, pp.
45-46.
Alesandru Duțu, Mihai Retegan
(coordonatori) – Eliberarea Basarabiei şi a
nordului Bucovinei. 22 iunie–26 iulie 1941,
Bucureşti, Editura Fundaţiei Culturale Române,
1999.
Ion Gheorghe – Un dictator nefericit:
Mareşalul Antonescu (Calea României spre
Statul satelit), ediţie şi studiu introductiv de
Stelian Neagoe, Bucureşti, Editura Machiavelli,
1996.
Sorin Turturică (cu contribuţia
generalului-locotenent r. av. Ioan Di Cesare) –
Cruciaţi ai înălţimilor: Grupul 7 vânătoare de
la Prut la Odessa, Bucureşti, Editura Militară,
2012.