540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining

Company

No. L-21601. December 28, 1968.

NIELSON & COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs.

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY,
defendant-appellee.

Pleading and practice; Appeal; Change of theory on appeal not

allowable.—It is the rule, and the settled doctrine, that a party
cannot change his theory on appeal—that is, that a party cannot
raise in the appellate court any question of law or of fact that was
not raised in the court below or which was not

541

VOL. 26, DECEMBER 28, 1968 541

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining

Company

within the issue made by the parties in their pleadings (Sec. 19,
Rule 49, old Rules of Court; Sec. 18 of Revised Rules of Court;
Hautea v. Magallon, L-20345, Nov. 28, 1964; Northern Motors,
Inc. v. Prince Line, L-13884, Feb. 29, 1960; American Express Co.
v. Natividad, 46 Phil. 207; Agoncillo v. Javier, 38 Phil. 424;
Molina v. Somes, 24 Phil. 49).
Civil Law; Contracts; "Agency" and "lease of service"
compared and distinguished.—In both agency and lease of
services one of the parties binds himself to render some service to
the other party. Agency, however, is distinguished from lease of
work or services in that the basis of agency is representation,
while in the lease of work or services the basis is employment.
The lessor of services does not represent his employer, while the
agent represents his principal. Agency is a preparatory contract,
as agency "does not stop with the agency because the purpose is to
enter into other contracts." The most characteristic feature of an
agency relationship is the agent's power to bring about business
relations between his principal and third persons. "The agent is
destined to execute juridical acts (creation, modification or
extinction of relations with .third parties). Lease of services
contemplate only material (non-juridical) acts." (Reyes & Puno,
An Outline of Philippine Civil Law, Vol. V, p. 277).
Same; Obligations and contracts; Moratorium law; Republic
Act No. 342 not applicable to debts contracted during the war.—
Republic Act No. 342 does not apply to debts contracted during
the war and did not lift the moratorium in relation thereto (Uy v.
Kalaw Katigbak, L-1830, Dec. 31, 1949; Sison v. Mirasol, L-4711,
Oct. 3, 1952; Compañia Maritima v. Court of Appeals, L-14949,
May 30, 1960). Said Rep. Act No. 342, however, modified
Executive Order No. 32 as to pre-war debts, making the
protection available only to debtors who had war damage claims
(Sison v. Mirasol, L-4711, Oct. 3, 1952, cited in Abraham, et al. v.
Intestate Estate of Ysmael, et al., L-16741, Jan. 31, 1962).
Corporation law; Shares of stock; Consideration for which
shares of stock may be issued; A share of stock coming from stock
dividends declared cannot be issued to one who is not a
stockholder of a corporation.—From the provision of Section 16 of
the Corporation Law, the consideration for which shares of stock
may be issued are: (1) cash; (2) property; and (3) undistributed
profits. Shares of stock are given the special name "stock
dividends" only if they are issued in lieu of undistributed profits.
If shares of stocks are issued in exchange of cash or property then
those shares do not fall under the category of "stock dividends". A
corporation may legally issue shares of stock in consideration of
services rendered to it by a person not a stockholder, or in
payment of its indebtedness. It is the shares

542

542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining

Company

of stock ,that are originally issued by the corporation and forming

part of the capital that can be exchanged for cash or services
rendered, or property; that is, if the corporation has original
shares of stock unsold or unsubscribed, either coming from the
original capitalization or f rom the increased capitalization. Those
shares of stock may be issued to a person who is not a
stockholder, or to a person already a stockholder in exchange for
services rendered or for cash or property. But a share of stock
coming from stock dividends declared cannot be issued to one who
is not a stockholder of a corporation.
Under Section 16 of the Corporation Law stock dividends can
not be issued to a person who is not a stockholder in payment of
services rendered.
Same; "Stock dividend"; "Dividend"; Concept and nature.—A
"stock dividend" is any dividend payable in shares of stock of the
corporation declaring or authorizing such dividend. It is, as what
the term itself implies, a distribution of the shares of stock of the
corporation among the stockholders as dividends. A stock
dividend of a corporation is a dividend paid in shares of stock
instead of cash, and is properly payable only out of surplus profits
(Sec. 16, Corporation Law). So, a stock dividend is actually two
things: (1) a dividend, and (2) the enforced use of the dividend
money to purchase additional shares of stock at par. (Words and
Phrases, p. 270). When a corporation issues stock dividends, it
shows that the corporation's accumulated profits have been
capitalized instead of distributed to the stockholders or retained
as surplus available f or distribution, in money or kind, should
opportunity offer. Far from being a realization of profits for the
stockholder, it tends rather ,to postpone said realization, in ,that
the fund represented by the new stock has been transferred from
surplus to assets and no longer available for actual distribution
(Fisher v. Trinidad, 43 Phil. 973). Thus, it is apparent that stock
dividends are issued only to stockholders. This is so because only
stockholders are entitled to dividends. They are the only ones who
have a right to a proportional share in that part of the surplus
which is declared as dividends. A stock dividend really adds
nothing to the interest of the stockholder; the proportional
interest of each stockholder remains the same (Towne v. Eisner,
62 L. Ed. 372). If a stockholder is deprived of his stock dividends
—and this happens if the shares of stock f orming part of the
stock dividends are issued to a nonstockholder—then the
proportion of the stockholder's interest changes radically. Stock
dividends are civil fruits of the original investment, and to the
owners of the shares belong the civil fruits (Art. 441, Civil Code).
The term "dividend" both in the technical sense and its ordinary
acceptation, is that part or portion of the profits of the enterprise
which the corporation, by its governing agents,

543

VOL. 26, DECEMBER 28, 1968 543

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining

Company
sets apart for ratable division among the holders of the capital
stock. It means the fund actually set aside, and declared by the
directors of the corporation as a dividend, and duly ordered by the
directory, or by the stockholders, at a corporate meeting, to be
divided or distributed among the stockholders according to their
respective interests (7 Thompson on Corporations 134135).

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a Supreme Court

decision.

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

*
RESOLUTION

ZALDIVAR, J.:

Lepanto seeks the reconsideration of the decision rendered

on December 17, 1966. The motion for reconsideration is
based on two sets of grounds—the first set consisting of
four principal grounds, and the second set consisting of five
alternative grounds, as follows:

Principal Grounds:

1. The court erred in overlooking and failing to apply the

proper law applicable to the agency or management
contract in question, namely, Article 1733 of the Old Civil
Code (Article 1920 of the new), by virtue of which said
agency was effectively revoked and terminated in 1945
when, as stated in paragraph 20 of the complaint,
"defendant voluntarily x x x prevented plaintiff from
resuming management and operation of said mining
properties."
2. The court erred in holding that paragraph II of the
management contract (Exhibit C) suspended the period of
said contract.
3. The court erred in reversing the ruling of the trial judge,
based on well-settled jurisprudence of this Supreme Court,
that the management agreement was only suspended but
not extended on account of the war.
4. The court erred in reversing the finding of the trial judge
that Nielson's action had prescribed, but considering only
the first claim and ignoring the prescriptibility of the
other claims.

_______________
 * Editor's Note: See decision in 18 SCRA 1040.

544

544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

Alternative Grounds:

5. The court erred in holding that the period of suspension of

the contract on account of the war lasted from February
1942 to June 26, 1948.
6. Assuming arguendo that Nielson is entitled to any relief,
the court erred in awarding as damages (a) 10% of the
cash dividends declared and paid in December, 1941; (b)
.the management fee of P2,500.00 for the month of
January, 1942; and (c) the full contract price for the
extended period of sixty months, since these damages
were neither demanded nor proved and, in any case, not
allowable under the general law of damages.
7. Assuming arguendo that appellant is entitled to any relief,
the court erred in ordering appellee to issue and deliver to
appellant shares of stock together with fruits thereof.
8. The court erred in awarding to appellant an undetermined
amount of shares of stock and/or cash, which award
cannot be ascertained and executed without further
litigation.
9. The court erred in rendering judgment for attorney's fees.

We are going to dwell on these grounds in the order they

are presented.
1. In its first principal ground Lepanto claims that its
own counsel and this Court had overlooked the real nature
of the management contract entered into by and between
Lepanto and Nielson, and the law that is applicable on said
contract. Lepanto now asserts for the first time—and this
is done in a motion for reconsideration—that the
management contract in question is a contract of agency
such that it has the right to revoke and terminate the said
contract, as it did terminate the same, under the law of
agency, and particularly pursuant to Article 1733 of the
Old Civil Code (Article 1920 of the New Civil Code).
We have taken note that Lepanto is advancing a new
theory. We have carefully examined the pleadings filed by
Lepanto in the lower court, its memorandum and its brief
on appeal, and never did it assert the theory that it has the
right to terminate the management contract because that
contract is one of agency which it could terminate at will.
While it is true that in its ninth and tenth special
affirmative defenses, in its answer in the court below,
Lepanto pleaded that it had the right to terminate the
545

VOL. 26, DECEMBER 28, 1968 545

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

management contract in question, that plea of its right to

terminate was not based upon the ground that the relation
between Lepanto and Nielson was that of principal and
agent but upon the ground that Nielson had allegedly not
complied with certain terms of the management contract. If
Lepanto had thought of considering the management
contract as one of agency it could have amended its answer
by stating exactly its position. It could have asserted its
theory of agency in its memorandum for the lower court
and in its brief on appeal. This, Lepanto did not do. It is the
rule, and the settled doctrine of this Court, that a party
cannot change his theory on appeal—that is, that a party
cannot raise in the appellate court any question of law or of
fact that was not raised in the court below or which was not
within the issue made by the parties in their pleadings
(Section 19, Rule 49 of the old Rules of Court, and also
Section 18 of the new Rules of Court; Hautea vs. Magallon,
L-20345, November 28, 1964; Northern Motors, Inc. vs.
Prince Line, L-13884, February 29, 1960; American
Express Co. vs. Natividad, 46 Phil. 207; Agoncillo vs.
Javier, 38 Phil. 424 and Molina vs. Somes, 24 Phil 49).
At any rate, even if we allow Lepanto to assert its new
theory at this very late stage of the proceedings, this Court
cannot sustain the same.
Lepanto contends that the management contract in
question (Exhibit C) is one of agency because: (1) Nielson
was to manage and operate the mining properties and mill
on behalf, and for the account, of Lepanto; and (2) Nielson
was authorized to represent Lepanto in entering, on
Lepanto's behalf, into contracts for the hiring of laborers,
purchase of supplies, and the sale and marketing of the
ores mined. All these, Lepanto claims, show that Nielson
was, by the terms of the contract, destined to execute
juridical acts not on its own behalf but on behalf of Lepanto
under the control of the Board of Directors of Lepanto "at
all times". Hence Lepanto claims that the contract is one of
agency. Lepanto then maintains that an agency is
revocable at the will of the principal (Article
546

546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

1733 of the Old Civil Code), regardless of any term or

period stipulated in the contract, and it was in pursuance
of that right that Lepanto terminated the contract in 1945
when it took over and assumed exclusive management of
the work previously entrusted to Nielson under the
contract. Lepanto finally maintains that Nielson as an
agent is not entitled to damages since the law gives to the
principal the right to terminate the agency at will.
Because of Lepanto's new theory We consider it
necessary to determine the nature of the management
contract—whether it is a contract of agency or a contract of
lease of services. Incidentally, we have noted that the lower
court, in the decision appealed from, considered the
management contract as a contract of Iease of services.
Article 1709 of the Old Civil Code, defining contract of
agency, provides:

"By the contract of agency, one person binds himself to render

some service or do something for the account or at the request of
another."

Article 1544, defining contract of lease of service, provides:

"In a lease of work or services, one of the parties binds himself to

make or construct something or to render a service to the other
for a price certain."

In both agency and lease of services one of the parties binds

himself to render some service to the other party. Agency,
however, is distinguished from lease of work or services in
that the basis of agency is representation, while in the
lease of work or services the basis is employment. The
lessor of services does not represent his employer, while the
agent represents his principal. Manresa, in his
"Commentarios al Codigo Civil Español" (1931, Tomo IX,
pp. 372-373), points out that the element of representation
distinguishes agency from lease of services, as follows:

" "Nuestro art. 1.709 como el art. 1.984 del Código de Napoleón y
cuantos textos legales citamos en las concordancias, expresan
claramente esta idea de la representación, 'hacer alguna cosa por
cuenta o encargo de otra' dice nuestro Código; 'poder de hacer
alguna cosa para el mandante o en su nombre' dice el Có-

547

VOL. 26, DECEMBER 28, 1968 547

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

digo de Napoleón, y en tales palabras aparece vivo y luminoso el

concepto y la teoria de la representación, tan fecunda en
enseñanzas, que a su sola luz es como se explican las diferencias
que separan el mandato del arrendamiento de servicios, de los
contratos inominados, del consejo y de !a gestión de negocios.
"En efecto, en el arrendamiento de servicios al obligarse para
su ejecución, se trabaja, en verdad, para el dueño que remunera la
labor, pero ni se le representa ni se obra en su nombre x x x."

On the basis of the interpretation of Article 1709 of the old

Civil Code, Article 1868 of the new Civil Code has defined
the contract of agency in more explicit terms, as follows:

"By the contract of agency a person binds himself to render some

service or' to do something in representation or on behalf of
another, with the consent or authority of the latter."

There is another obvious distinction between agency and

lease of services. Agency is a preparatory contract, as
agency "does not stop with the agency because the purpose
is to enter into other contracts." The most characteristic
feature of an agency relationship is the agent's power to
bring about business relations between his principal and
third persons. "The agent is destined to execute juridical
acts (creation, modification or extinction of relations with
third parties). Lease of services contemplate only material
(non-juridical) acts." (Reyes and Puno, "An Outline of
Philippine Civil Law," Vol. V, p. 277).
In the light of the interpretations we have mentioned in
the foregoing paragraphs, let us now determine the nature
of the management contract in question. Under the
contract, Nielson had agreed, for a period of five years, with
the right to renew for a like period, to explore, develop and
operate the mining claims of Lepanto, and to mine, or mine
and mill, such pay ore as may be found therein and to
market the metallic products recovered therefrom which
may prove to be marketable, as well as to render for
Lepanto other services specified in the contract. We gather
from the contract that the work undertaken by Nielson was
to take complete charge, subject at all times to the general
control of the Board of Directors
548

548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

of Lepanto, of the exploration and development of the

mining claims, of the hiring of a sufficient and competent
staff and of sufficient and capable laborers, of the
prospecting and development of the mine, of the erection
and operation of the mill, and of the beneficiation and
marketing of the minerals found on the mining properties;
and in carrying out said obligation Nielson should proceed
diligently and in accordance with the best mining practice.
In connection with its work Nielson was to submit reports,
maps, plans and recommendations with respect to the
operation and development of the mining properties, make
recommendations and plans on the erection or enlargement
of any existing mill, dispatch mining engineers and
technicians to the mining properties as from time to time
may reasonably be required to investigate and make
recommendations without cost or expense to Lepanto.
Nielson was also to "act as purchasing agent of supplies.
equipment and other necessary purchases by Lepanto,
provided, however, that no purchase shall be made without
the prior approval of Lepanto; and provided further, that
no commission shall be claimed or retained by Nielson on
such purchase"; and "to submit all requisition for supplies,
all contracts and arrangement with engineers, and staff
and all matters requiring the expenditures of money,
present or future, for prior approval by Lepanto; and also to
make contracts subject to the prior approval of Lepanto for
the sale and marketing of the minerals mined from said
properties, when1
said products are in a suitable condition
for marketing."
It thus appears that the principal and paramount
undertaking of Nielson under the management contract
was the operation and development of the mine and the
operation of the mill. All the other undertakings mentioned
in the contract are necessary or incidental to the principal
under-taking—these other undertakings being dependent
upon the work on the development of the mine and the
operation of the mill. In the performance of this principal
undertaking Nielson was not in any way executing juridical
acts
_______________

1 Annex A to complaint, pp. 48-46, R.A., Also Exhibit ('.

549

VOL. 26, DECEMBER 28, 1968 549

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

for Lepanto, destined to create, modify or extinguish

business relations between Lepanto and third persons. In
other words, in performing its principal undertaking
Nielson was not acting as an agent of Lepanto, in the sense
that the term agent is interpreted under the law of agency,
but as one who was performing material acts for an
employer, for a compensation.
It is true that the management contract provides that
Nielson would also act as purchasing agent of supplies and
enter into contracts regarding the sale of mineral, but the
contract also provides that Nielson could not make any
purchase, or sell the minerals, without the prior approval
of Lepanto. It is clear, therefore, that even in these cases
Nielson could not execute juridical acts which would bind
Lepanto without first securing the approval of Lepanto.
Nielson, then, was to act only as an intermediary, not as an
agent.
Lepanto contends that the management contract in
question being one of agency it had the right to terminate
the contract at will pursuant to the provision of Article
1733 of the old Civil Code. We find, however, a proviso in
the management contract which militates against this
stand of Lepanto. Paragraph XI of the contract provides:

"Both parties to this agreement fully recognize that the terms of

this Agreement are made possible only because of the faith or
confidence that the Officials of each company have in the other;
therefore, in order to assure that such confidence and faith shall
abide and continue, NIELSON agrees that LEPANTO may cancel
this Agreement at any time upon ninety (90) days written notice,
in the event that NIELSON for any reason whatsoever, except
acts of God, strike and other causes beyond its control, shall cease
to prosecute the operation and development of the properties
herein described in good faith and in accordance with approved
mining practice."

It is thus seen, from the above-quoted provision of

paragraph XI of the management contract, that Lepanto
could not terminate the agreement at will. Lepanto could
terminate or cancel the agreement by giving notice of
termination ninety days in advance only in the event that
Nielson should prosecute in bad faith and not in accordance
with approved mining practice the operation and develop-
550

550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs; Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

ment of the mining properties of Lepanto. Lepanto could

not terminate the agreement if Nielson should cease to
prosecute the operation and development of the mining
properties by reason of acts of God, strike and other causes
beyond the control of Nielson.
The phrase "Both parties to this agreement fully
recognize that the terms of this agreement are made
possible only because of the faith and confidence of the
officials of each company have in the other" in paragraph
XI of the management contract does not qualify the
relation between Lepanto and Nielson as that of principal
and agent based on trust and confidence, such that the
contractual relation may be terminated by the principal at
any time that the principal loses trust and confidence in
the agent. Rather, that phrase simply implies the
circumstance that brought about the execution of the 2
management contract. Thus, in the annual report for 1936 ,
submitted by Mr. C. A. Dewit, President of Lepanto, to its
stockholders, under date of March 15, 1937, we read the
following: "To the Stockholders:

x x x      x x x      x x x
"The incorporation of our Company was effected as a result of
negotiations with Messrs. Nielson & Co., Inc., and an offer by
these gentlemen to Messrs. C. I. Cookes and V. L. Lednicky, dated
August 11, 1936, reading as follows:
'Messrs. Cookes and Lednicky,
'Present
'Re: Mankayan Copper Mines.
'GENTLEMEN:
'After an examination of your property by our engineers, we
have decided to offer. as we hereby offer to underwrite the entire
issue of stock of a corporation to be formed for the purpose of
taking over said properties, said corporation to have an
authorized capital of P1,750,-000.00, of which P700,000.00 will be
issued in escrow to the claimowners in exchange for their claims,
and the balance of P1,050,000.00 we will sell to the public at par
or take ourselves.

_______________

2 Exhibit A.

551

VOL. 26, DECEMBER 28, 1968 551

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

'The arrangement will be under the following conditions:

'1. The subscriptions for cash shall be payable 50% at time of

subscription and the balance subject to the call of the
Board of Directors of the proposed corporation.
'2. We shall have an underwriting and brokerage commission
of 10% of the P1,050,000.00 to be sold for cash to the
public, said commission to be payable from the first
payment of 50% on each subscription.
'3. We will bear the cost of preparing and mailing any
prospectus that may be required, but no such prospectus
will be sent out until the text thereof has been first
approved by the Board of Directors of the proposed
corporation.
'4. That after the organization of the corporation, all
operating contract be entered into between ourselves and
said corporation, under the terms which the property will
be developed and mined and a mill erected, under our
supervision, our compensation to be P2,000.00 per month
until the property is put on a profitable basis and
P2,500.00 per month plus 10% of the net profits for a
period of five years thereafter.
'5. That we shall have the option to renew said operat-ing
contract for an additional period of five years, on the same
basis as the original contract, upon the expiration thereof.
'lt is understood that the development and mining operations
on said property, and the erection of the mill thereon, and the
expenditures therefor shall be subject to the general control of
the Board of Directors of the proposed corporation, and, in case
you accept this proposition, that a detailed operating contract
will be entered into, covering the relationships between the
parties.

Yours very truly,

(Sgd.) L. R. Nielson'"
 "Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this offer,
Messrs. Nielson & Co., took subscriptions for One Million Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P1,050,000.00) in shares of our Company and
their underwriting and brokerage commission has been paid.
More than fifty per cent of these subscriptions have been paid to
the Company in cash. The claimowners have transferred their
claims to the Corporation, but the P700,000.00 in stock which
they are to receive therefor, is as yet held in escrow.
"Immediately upon the formation of the Corporation Messrs.
Nielson & Co., assumed the Management of the property under
the control of the Board of Directors. A modification in the

552

552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

Management Contract was made with the consent of all the then
stockholders, in virtue of which the compensation of Messrs.
Nielson & Co., was increased to P2,500.00 per month when mill
construction began. The formal Management Contract was not
entered into until January 30, 1937."
X      X      X      X
"Manila, March 15, 1937
(Sgd.) "C. A. DeWitt
"President"

We can gather from the foregoing statements in the annual

report for 1936, and from the provision of paragraph XI of
the Management contract, that the employment by
Lepanto of Nielson to operate and manage its mines was
principally in consideration of the know-how and technical
services that Nielson offered Lepanto. The contract thus
entered into pursuant to the offer made by Nielson and
accepted by Lepanto was a "detailed operating contract". It
was not a contract of agency. Nowhere in the record is it
shown that Lepanto considered Nielson as its agent and
that Lepanto terminated the management contract because
it had lost its trust and confidence in Nielson.
The contention of Lepanto that it had terminated the
management contract in 1945, following the liberation of
the mines from Japanese control, because the relation
between it and Nielson was one of agency and as such it
could terminate the agency at will, is, therefore, untenable.
On the other hand, it can be said that, in asserting that it
had terminated or cancelled the management contract in
1945, Lepanto had thereby violated the express terms of
the management contract. The management contract was
renewed to last until January 31, 1947, so that the contract
had yet almost two years to go—upon the liberation of the
mines in 1945. There is no showing that Nielson had
ceased to prosecute the operation and development of the
mines in good faith and in accordance with approved
mining practice which would warrant the termination of
the contract upon ninety days written notice. In fact there
was no such written notice of termination. It is an admitted
fact that Nielson ceased to operate and develop the mines
because of the war—a cause beyond
553

VOL. 26, DECEMBER 28, 1968 553

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

the control of Nielson.

Indeed, if the management contract in question was
intended to create a relationship of principal and agent
between Lepanto and Nielson, paragraph XI of the contract
should not have been inserted because, as provided in
Article 1733 of the old Civil Code, agency is essentially
revocable at the will of the principal—that means, with or
without cause. But precisely said paragraph XI was
inserted in the management contract to provide for the
cause for its revocation. The provision of paragraph XI
must be given effect.
In the construction of an instrument where there are
several provisions or particulars, such a construction
3
is, if
possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all, and if some
stipulation of any contract should admit of several
meanings, it shall be understood as bearing 4
that import
which is most adequate to render it effectual.
It is Our considered view that by express stipulation of
the parties, the management contract in question is not
revocable at the will of Lepanto. We rule that this
management contract is not a contract of agency as defined
in Article 1709 of the old Civil Code, but a contract of lease
of services as defined in Article 1544 of the same Code.
This contract can not be unilaterally revoked by Lepanto.
The first ground of the motion for reconsideration
should, therefore, be brushed aside.
2. In the second, third and fifth grounds of its motion for
reconsideration, Lepanto maintains that this Court erred,
in holding that paragraph II of the management contract
suspended the period of said contract, in holding that the
agreement was not only suspended but was extended on
account of the war, and in holding that the period of
suspension on account of the war lasted from February,
1942 to June 26, 1948. We are going to discuss these three
grounds together because they are inter-related.
In our decision we have dwelt lengthily on the points

_______________

3 Sec. 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

4 Article 1373 of the (new) Civil Code,

554

554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

that the management contract was suspended because of

the war, and that the period of the contract was extended
for a period -equivalent to the time when Nielson was
unable to perf orm the work of mining and milling because
of the adverse effects of the war on the work of mining and
milling.
It is the contention of Lepanto that the happening of
those events, and the effects of those events, simply
suspended the perf ormance of the obligations by either
party in the contract, but did not suspend the period of the
contract, much less extended the period of the contract.
We have conscientiously considered the arguments of
Lepanto in support of these three grounds, but We are not
persuaded to reconsider the rulings that We made in Our
decision.
We want to say a little more on these points, however.
Paragraph II of the management contract provides as
follows:

"In the event of inundation, flooding of the mine, typhoon,

earthquake or any other force majeure, war, insurrection, civil
commotion, organized strike, riot, fire, injury to the machinery or
other event or cause reasonably beyond the control of NIELSON
and which adversely affects the work of mining and milling;
NIELSON shall report such fact to LEPANTO and without
liability or breach of ,the terms of this Agreement, the same shall
remain in suspense, wholly or partially during the terms of such
inability." (Italics supplied)

A reading of the above-quoted paragraph II cannot but

convey the idea that upon the happening of any of the
events enumerated therein, which adversely affects the
work of mining and milling, the agreement is deemed
suspended for as long as Nielson is unable to perform its
work of mining and milling because of the adverse effects of
the happening of the event on the work of mining and
milling. During the period when the adverse effects on the
work of mining and milling exist, neither party in the
contract would be held liable f or non-compliance of its
obligation under the contract. In other words, the operation
of the contract is suspended for as long as the adverse
effects of the happening of any of those events had im-
555

VOL. 26, DECEMBER 28, 1968 555

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

peded or obstructed the work of mining and milling. An

analysis of the phraseology of the above-quoted paragraph
II of the management contract readily supports the
conclusion that it is the agreement, or the contract, that is
suspended. The phrase "the same" can refer to no other
than the term "Agreement" which immediately precedes it.
The "Agreement" may be wholly or partially suspended,
and this situation will depend on whether the event wholly
or partially affected adversely the work of mining and
milling. In the instant case, the war had adversely affected
—and wholly at that—the work of mining and milling. We
have clearly stated in Our decision the circumstances
brought about by the war which caused the whole or total
suspension of the agreement or of the management
contract.
LEPANTO itself admits that the management contract
was suspended. We quote from the brief of LEPANTO:

"Probably, what Nielson meant was, it was prevented by Lepanto

to assume again the management of the mine in 1945, at the
precise time when defendant was at the feverish phase of
rehabilitation and although the contract had already been
suspended." (Lepanto's Brief, p. 9).
"x x x it was impossible, as a result of the destruction of the
mine, for the plaintiff to manage and operate the same and
because, as provided in the agreement, the contract was
suspended by reason of the war." (Lepanto's Brief, pp. 9-10).
"Clause II, by its terms, is clear that the contract is suspended
in case fortuitous event or force majeure, such as war, adversely
affects the work of mining and milling." (Lepanto's Brief, p. 49).
Lepanto is correct when it said that the obligations under
the contract were suspended upon the happening of any of
the events enumerated in paragraph II of the management
contract. Indeed, those obligations were suspended because
the contract itself was suspended. When we talk of a
contract that has been suspended we certainly mean that
the contract temporarily ceased to be operative, and the
contract becomes operative again upon the happening of a
condition—or when a situation obtains—which warrants
the termination of the suspension of the contract.
556

556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

In Our decision We pointed out that the agreement in the

management contract would be suspended when two
conditions concur, namely: (1) the happening of the event
constituting a force majeure that was reasonably beyond
the control of Nielson, and (2) that the event constituting
the force majeure adversely affected the work of mining
and milling. The suspension, therefore, would last not only
while the event constituting the force majeure continued to
occur but also for as long as the adverse effects of the force
majeure on the work of mining and milling had not been
eliminated. Under the management contract the happening
alone of the event constituting the force majeure which did
not affect adversely the work of mining and milling would
not suspend the period of the contract. It is only when the
two conditions concur that the period of the agreement is
suspended.
It is not denied that because of the war, in February
1942, the mine, the original mill, the original power plant,
the supplies and equipment, and all installations at the
Mankayan mines of Lepanto, were destroyed upon order of
the United States Army, to prevent their utilization by the
enemy. It is not denied that for the duration of the war
Nielson could not undertake the work of mining and
milling. When the mines were liberated from the enemy in
August, 1945, the condition of the mines, the mill, the
power plant and other installations, was not the same as in
February 1942 when they were ordered destroyed by the
US army. Certainly, upon the liberation of the mines from
the enemy, the work of mining and milling could not be
undertaken by Nielson under the same favorable
circumstances that obtained before February 1942. The
work of mining and milling, as undertaken by Nielson in
January, 1942, could not be resumed by Nielson soon after
liberation because of the adverse effects of the war, and
this situation continued until June of 1948. Hence, the
suspension of the management contract did not end upon
the liberation of the mines in August, 1945. The mines and
the mill and the installations, laid waste by the ravages of
war, had to be reconstructed and rehabilitated, and it can
be said that it was only on June 26, 1948 that the
557

VOL. 26, DECEMBER 28, 1968 557

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

adverse effects of the war on the work of mining and

milling had ended, because it was on that date that the
operation of the mines and the mill was resumed. The
period of suspension should, therefore, be reckoned from
February 1942 until June 26, 1948, because it was during
this period that the war and the adverse effects of the war
on the work of mining and milling had lasted. The mines
and the installations had to be rehabilitated because of the
adverse effects of the war. The work of rehabilitation
started soon after the liberation of the mines in August,
1945 and lasted until June 26, 1948 when, as stated in
Lepanto's annual report to its stockholders for the year
1948, "June 28, 1948 marked the official return to
operation of this company at its properties at Mankayan,
Mountain province, Philippines" (Exh. F-1).
Lepanto would argue that if the management contract
was suspended at all the suspension should cease in
August of 1945, contending that the effects of the war
should cease upon the liberation of the mines from the
enemy. This contention cannot be sustained, because the
period of rehabilitation was still a period when the physical
effects of the war—the destruction of the mines and of all
the mining installations—adversely affected, and made
impossible, the work of mining and milling. Hence, the
period of the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the mines
and the installations must be counted as part of the period
of suspension of the contract.
Lepanto claims that it would not be unfair to end the
period of suspension upon the liberation of the mines
because soon after the liberation of the mines Nielson
insisted to resume the management work, and that Nielson
was under obligation to reconstruct the mill in the same
way that it was under obligation to construct the mill in
1937. This contention is untenable. It is true that Nielson
insisted to resume its management work after liberation,
but this was only for the purpose of restoring the mines,
the mill, and other installations to their operating and
producing condition as of February 1942 when they were
ordered destroyed. It is not shown by any evidence in the
record, that Nielson had agreed, or would
558

558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

have agreed, that the period of suspension of the contract

would end upon the liberation of the mines. This is so
because, as found by this Court, the intention of the parties
in the management contract, and as understood by them,
the management contract was suspended for as long as the
adverse effects of the force majeure on the work of mining
and milling had not been removed, and the contract would
be extended for as long as it was suspended. Under the
management contract Nielson had the obligation to erect
and operate the mill, but not to re-erect or reconstruct the
mill in case of its destruction by force majeure.
It is the considered view of this court that it would not
be fair to Nielson to consider the suspension of the contract
as terminated upon the liberation of the mines because
then Nielson would be placed in a situation whereby it
would have to suffer the adverse effects of the war on the
work of mining and milling. The evidence shows that as of
January 1942 the operation of the mines under the
management of Nielson was already under beneficial
conditions, so much so that dividends were already
declared by Lepanto for the years 1939, 1940 and 1941. To
make the management contract immediately operative
after the liberation of the mines from the Japanese, at the
time when the mines and all its installations were laid
waste as a result of the war, would be to place Nielson in a
situation whereby it would lose all the benefits of what it
had accomplished in placing the Lepanto mines in
profitable operation before the outbreak of the war in
December, 1941. The record shows that Nielson started its
management operation way back in 1936, even before the
management contract was entered into. As early as August
1936 Nielson negotiated with Messrs. C. I. Cookes and V.
L. Lednicky for the operation of the Mankayan mines and
it was the result of those negotiations that Lepanto was
incorporated; that it was Nielson that helped to capitalize
Lepanto, and that after the formation of the corporation
(Lepanto) Nielson immediately assumed the management
of the mining properties of Lepanto. It was not until
January 30, 1937 when the management contract in
question was entered into between Lepanto and
559

VOL. 26, DECEMBER 28, 1968 559

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

Nielson (Exhibit A ).
A contract for the management and operation of mines
calls for a speculative and risky venture on the part of the
manager-operator. The manager-operator invests its
technical know-how, undertakes back-breaking efforts and
tremendous spade-work, so to say, in the first years of its
management and operation of the mines, in the expectation
that the investment and the efforts employed might be
rewarded later with success. This expected success may
never come. This had happened in the very case of the
Mankayan mines where, as recounted by Mr. Lednicky of
Lepanto, various persons and entities of different
nationalities, including Lednicky himself, invested all their
money and failed. The manager-operator may not strike
sufficient ore in the first, second, third, or fourth year of
the management contract, or he may not strike ore even
until the end of the fifth year. Unless the manager-operator
strikes sufficient quantity of ore he cannot expect profits or
reward for his investment and efforts. In the case of
Nielson, its corps of competent engineers, geologists, and
technicians begun working on the Mankayan mines of
Lepanto since the latter part of 1936, and continued their
work without success and profit through 1937, 1938, and
the earlier part of 1939. It was only in December of 1939
when the efforts of Nielson started to be rewarded when
Lepanto realized profits and the first dividends were
declared. From that time on Nielson could expect profit to
come to it—as in fact Lepanto declared dividends for 1940
and 1941—if the development and operation of the mines
and the mill would continue unhampered. The operation,
and the expected profits, however, would still be subject to
hazards due to the occurrence of fortuitous events, fires,
earthquakes, strikes, war, etc., constituting force majeure,
which would result in the destruction of the mines and the
mill. One of these diverse causes, or one after the other,
may consume the whole period of the contract, and if it
should happen that way the manager-operator would reap
no profit to compensate for the first years of spade-work
and investment of efforts
560

560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

and know-how. Hence, in fairness to the manager-operator,

so that he may not be deprived of the benefits of the work
he had accomplished, the force majeure clause is
incorporated as a standard clause in contracts for the
management and operation of mines.
The nature of the contract for the management and
operation of mines justifies the interpretation of the force
majeure clause, that a period equal to the period of
suspension due to force majeure should be added to the
original term of the contract by way of an extension. We,
therefore, reiterate the ruling in Our decision that the
management contract in the instant case was suspended
from February, 1942 to June 26, 1948, and that from the
latter date the contract had yet five years to go.
3. In the fourth ground of its motion for reconsideration,
Lepanto maintains that this Court erred in reversing the
finding of the trial court that Nielson's action has
prescribed, by considering only the first claim and ignoring
the prescriptibility of the other claims.
This ground of the motion for reconsideration has no
merit.
In Our decision We stated that the claims of Nielson are
based on a written document, and, 5
as such, the cause of
action prescribes in ten years. Inasmuch as there are
different claims which accrued on different dates the
prescriptive periods for all the claims are not the same. The
claims of Nielson that have been awarded by this Court are
itemized in the dispositive part of the decision.
The first item of the awards in Our decision refers to
Nielson's compensation in the sum of P17,500.00, which is
equivalent to 10 % of the cash dividends declared by
Lepanto in December, 1941. As We have stated in Our
decision, this claim accrued on December 31, 1941, and the
right to commence an action thereon started on January 1,
1942. We declared that the action on this claim did not
prescribe although the complaint was filed on February 6,
1958—or after a lapse of 16 years, 1 month and

_______________

5 days—because of the operation of the moratorium law. Section 43,

par. 1, Act 190.

561

VOL. 26, DECEMBER 28, 1968 561

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

We declared
6
that under the applicable decisions of this
Court the moratorium period of 8 years, 2 months and 8
days should be deducted from the period that had elapsed
since the accrual of the cause of action to the date of the
filing of the complaint, so that there is a period of less than
8 years to be reckoned for the purpose of prescription.
This claim of Nielson is covered by Executive Order No.
32, issued on March 10, 1945, which provides as follows:

''Enforcement of payments of all debts and other monetary

obligations payable in the Philippines, except debts and other
monetary obligations entered into in any area after declaration by
Presidential Proclamation that such area has been freed from
enemy occupation and control, is temporarily suspended pending
action by the Commonwealth Government." (41 O.G. 56-57; Italics
supplied)

Executive Order No. 32 covered all debts and monetary

obligation contracted before the war (or before December 8,
1941) and those contracted subsequent to December 8,
1941 and during the Japanese occupation. Republic Act No.
342, approved on July 26, 1948, lifted the moratorium
provided for in Executive Order No. 32 on pre-war (or
preDecember 8, 1941) debts of debtors who had not filed
war damage claims with the United States War Damage
Commission. In other words, after the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 342, the debt moratorium was limited: (1)
to debts and other monetary obligations which were
contracted after December 8, 1941 and during the Japanese
occupation, and (2) to those pre-war (or pre-December 8,
1941) debts and other monetary obligations where the
debtors filed war damage claims. That was the situation up
to May 18, 1953 when7 this Court declared Republic Act No.
342 unconstitutional. It has been held by this Court,
however, that from March 10, 1945 when Executive Order
No. 32 was issued, to May 18, 1953 when Republic Act No.
342 was declared unconstitutional—or a period of 8 years,
2 months and 8 days—the debt moratorium was in

_______________

6 Tiosejo vs. Day, et al., L-9944. April 30, 1937: Levi Hermanos, Inc. vs.
Perez, L-14487 April 29 1960.
7 Rutter vs. Esteban. 93 Phil. 68.

562

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 562

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

force, and had8

the effect of suspending the period of
prescription.
Lepanto is wrong when in its motion for reconsideration
it claims that the moratorium provided for in Executive
Order No. 32 was continued by Republic Act No. 342 "only
with respect to debtors of pre-war obligations or those
incurred prior to December 8, 1941," and that "the
moratorium was lifted and terminated with 9
respect to
obligations incurred after December 8, 1941,"
This Court has held that Republic Act No. 342 does not
apply to debts contracted during the war 10
and did not lift
the moratorium in relations thereto. In the case of
Abraham, et al. vs. Intestate Estate of Juan C. Ysmael, el
al., L-16741, Jan. 31, 1962, this Court said:

"Respondents, however, contend that Republic Act No. 342, which

took 'effect on July 26, 1948, lifted the moratorium on debts
contracted during the Japanese occupation. The court has already
held that Republic Act No. 342 did not lift the moratorium on
debts contracted during the war (Uy vs. Kalaw Katigbak, G.R. No.
L-1830, Dec. 31, 1949) but modified Executive Order No. 32 as to
pre-war debts, making the protection available only to debtors
who had war damage claims (Sison v. Mirasol, G.R. No. L-4711,
Oct. 3, 1952)."

We therefore reiterate the ruling in Our decision that the

claim involved in the first item awarded to Nielson had not
prescribed.
What we have stated herein regarding the non-
prescription of the cause of action of the claim involved in
the first item in the award also holds true with respect to
the second item in the award, which refers to Nielson's
claim for management fee of P2,500.00 for January, 1942.
Lepanto admits that this second item, like the first, is a
monetary obligation. The right of action of Nielson
regarding this claim accrued on January 31, 1942.

_______________

8 Tiosejo vs. Day, supra; Levi Hermanos Inc. vs. Perez supra.
9 Motion for reconsideration, p. 60.
10 Uy v. Kalaw Katigbak, G.R. No,' L-1830, Dec. 31, 1949 ; Sison v.
Mirasol, L-4711, Oct. 31, 1962; Compañia Maritima v. ( Court of Appeals,
L-14949, May 30 1960

563

VOL. 26, DECEMBER 28, 1968 563

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

As regards items 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 in the awards in the

decision, the moratorium law is not applicable. That is the
reason why in Our decision We did not discuss the question
of prescription regarding these items. The claims of Nielson
involved in these items are based on the management
contract, and Nielson's cause of action regarding these
claims prescribes in ten years. Corollary to Our ruling that
the management contract was suspended from February,
1942 until June 26, 1948, and that the contract was
extended for five years from June 26, 1948, the right of
action of Nielson to claim for what is due to it during that
period of extension accrued during the period from June
26,1948 till the end of the five-year extension period—or
until June 26, 1953. And so, even if We reckon June 26,
1948 as the starting date of the ten-year period in
connection with the prescriptibility of the claims involved
in items 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the awards in the decision, it is
obvious that when the complaint was filed on February 6,
1958 the ten-year prescriptive period had not yet lapsed.
In Our decision We have also ruled that the right of
action of Nielson against Lepanto had not prescribed
because of the arbitration clause in the Management
contract. We are satisf ied that there is evidence that
Nielson had asked for arbitration, and an arbitration
committee had been constituted. The arbitration
committee, however, failed to bring about any settlement of
the differences between Nielson and Lepanto. On June 25,
1957 counsel for Lepanto definitely advised Nielson that
they were not entertaining any claim of Nielson. The
complaint in this case was filed on February 6, 1958.
4. In the sixth ground of its motion for reconsideration,
Lepanto maintains that this Court "erred in awarding as
damages (a) 10% of the cash dividends declared and paid in
December, 1941; (b) the management fee of P2,500.00 for
the month of January 1942; and (c) the full contract price
for the extended period of 60 months, since the damages
were never demanded nor proved and, in any case, not
allowable under the general law on damages."
We have stated in Our decision that the original agree-
564

564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

ment in the management contract regarding the

compensation of Nielson was modif ied, such that instead of
receiving a monthly" compensation of P2,500.00 plus 10%
of the net profits from the
11
operation of the properties for
the preceding month, Nielson would receive a
compensation of P2,500.00 a month, plus (1) 10 % of the
dividends declared and paid, when and as paid, during the
period of the contract, and at the end of each year, (2) 10%
of any depletion reserve that may be set up, and (3) 10% of
any amount expended during the year out of surplus
earnings for capital account.
It is shown that in December, 1941, cash dividends 12
amounting to P175,000.00 was declared by Lepanto. Niel-
son, therefore, should receive the equivalent of 10% of this
amount, or the sum of P17,500.00. We have found that this
amount was not paid to Nielson.
In its motion for reconsideration, Lepanto inserted a
photographic copy of page 127 of its cash disbursement
book, allegedly for 1941, in an effort to show that this
amount of P17,500.00 had been paid to Nielson. It appears,
however, in this photographic copy of page 127 of the cash
disbursement book that the sum of P17,500.00 was entered
on October 29 as "surplus a/c Nielson & Co. Inc." The entry
does not make any reference to dividends or participation
of Nielson in the profits. On the other hand, in the
photographic copy of page 89 of the 1941 cash
disbursement book, also attached to the motion for
reconsideration, there is an entry for P17,500.00 on April
23, 1941 which states "Accts. Pay. Particip. Nielson & Co.
Inc." This entry for April 23, 1941 may really be the
participation of Nielson in the profits based on dividends
declared in April 1941 as shown in Exhibit L. But in the
same Exhibit L it is not stated that any dividend was
declared in October 1941. On the contrary it is stated in
Exhibit L that dividends were declared in December 1941.
We cannot entertain this piece of evidence for several
reasons: (1) because this evidence was not pre-

_______________

11 Par. V of Management Contract, Exhibit C.

12 Page ?,. Exhibit L, Report for 1954.

565

VOL. 26, DECEMBER 28, 1968 565

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

sented during the trial in the court below; (2) there is no

showing that this piece of evidence is newly discovered and
that Lepanto was not in possession of said evidence when
this case was being tried in the court below; and (a)
according to Exhibit L cash dividends of P175,000.00 were
declared in December, 1941, and so the sum of P17,500.00
which appears to have been paid to Nielson in October
1941 could not be payment of the equivalent of 10% of the
cash dividends that were later declared in December, 1941.
As regards the management fee of Nielson
corresponding to January, 1942, in the sum of P2,500.00,
We have also found that Nielson is entitled to be paid this
amount, and that this amount was not paid by Lepanto to
Nielson. Whereas, Lepanto was able to prove that it had
paid the management
13
fees of Nielson for November and
December, 1941, it was not able to present any evidence to
show that the management fee of P2,500.00 for January,
1942 bad been paid.
It having been declared in Our decision, as well as in
this resolution, that the management contract had been
extended for 5 years, or sixty months, from June 27, 1948
to June 26, 1953, and that the cause of action of Nielson to
claim for its compensation during that period of extension
had not prescribed, it follows that Nielson should be
awarded the management fees during the whole period of
extension, plus the 10% of the value of the dividends
declared during the said period of extension, the 10% of the
depletion reserve that was set up, and the 10% of any
amount expended out of surplus earnings for capital
account.
5. In the seventh ground of its motion for
reconsideration, Lepanto maintains that this Court erred
in ordering Lepanto to issue and deliver to Nielson shares
of stock together with fruits thereof.
In Our decision, We declared that pursuant to the
modified agreement regarding the compensation of Nielson
which provides, among others, that Nielson would receive

_______________

13 Exhibit 1.

566

566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

10% of any dividends declared and paid, when and as paid,

Nielson should be paid 10% of the stock dividends declared
by Lepanto during the period of extension of the contract.
It is not denied that on November 28, 1949, Lepanto
declared stock dividends worth P1,000,000.00; and on
August 22, 1950, it declared stock dividends worth
P2,-000,000.00. In other words, during the period of
extension Lepanto had declared stock dividends worth
P3,000,-000.00. We held in Our decision that Nielson is
entitled to receive 10% of the stock dividends declared, or
shares of stock worth P300,000.00 at the par value of P0.10
per share. We ordered Lepanto to issue and deliver to
Nielson those shares of stocks as well as all the fruits or
dividends that accrued to said shares.
In its motion for reconsideration, Lepanto contends that
the payment to Nielson of stock dividends as compensation
for its services under the management contract is a
violation of the Corporation Law, and that it was not, and
it could not be, the intention of Lepanto and Nielson—as
contracting parties—that the services of Nielson should be
paid in shares of stock taken out of stock dividends
declared by Lepanto. We have assiduously considered the
arguments adduced by Lepanto in support of its contention,
as well as the answer of Nielson in this connection, and We
have arrived at the conclusion that there is merit in the
contention of Lepanto.
Section 16 of the Corporation Law, in part, provides as
follows:
"No corporation organized under this Act shall create or issue
bills, notes or other evidence of debt, for circulation as money, and
no corporation shall issue stock or bonds except in exchange for
actual cash paid to the corporation or for: (1) property actually
received by it at a fair valuation equal to the par or issued value
of the stock or bonds so issued; and in case of disagreement as to
their value, the same shall be presumed to be the assessed value
or the value appearing in invoices or other commercial documents,
as the case may be; and the burden or proof that the real present
value of the property is greater than the assessed value or value
appearing in invoices or other commercial documents, as the case
may be,

567

VOL. 26, DECEMBER 28, 1968 567

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

shall be upon the corporation, or for (2) profits earned by it but not
distributed among its stockholders or members; Provided,
however, That no stock or bond dividend shall be issued without
the approval of stockholders representing not less than two-thirds
of all stock then outstanding and entitled to vote at a general
meeting of the corporation or at a special meeting duly called for
the purpose.
x      x      x      x
"No corporation shall make or declare any dividend except from
the surplus profits arising from its business, or divide or distribute
its capital stock or property other than actual profits among its
members or stockholders until after the payment of its debts and
the termination of its existence by limitation or lawful dissolution:
Provided, That banking, savings and loan, and trust corporations
may receive deposits and issue certificates of deposit, checks,
drafts, and bills of exchange, and the like in the transaction of the
ordinary business of banking, savings and loan, and trust
corporations." (As amended by Act No. 2792, and Act No. 3518;
Italics supplied.)

From the above-quoted provision of Section 16 of the

Corporation Law, the consideration for which shares of
stock may be issued are: (1) cash; (2) property; and (3)
undistributed profits. Shares of stock are given the special
name "stock dividends" only if they are issued in lieu of
undistributed prof its. If shares of stocks are issued in
exchange of cash or property then those shares do not fall
under the category of "stock dividends". A corporation may
legally issue shares of stock in consideration of services
rendered to it by a person not a stockholder, or in payment
of its indebtedness. A share of stock issued to pay for
services rendered is equivalent to a stock issued in
exchange14 of property, because services is equivalent to
property. Likewise a share of stock issued in payment of
indebtedness is equivalent to issuing a stock in exchange
for cash. But a share of stock thus issued should be part of
the original capital stock of the corporation upon its
organization, or part of the stocks issued when the increase
of the capitalization of a corporation is properly authorized.
In other words, it is the shares of stock that are originally
issued by the corporation and forming part

_______________

14 Sec. 5187, 11 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law on Private

Corporations, p. 422.

568

568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

of the capital that can be exchanged for cash or services

rendered, or property; that is, if the corporation has
original shares of stock unsold or unsubscribed, -either
coming from the original capitalization or from the
increased capitalization. Those shares of stock may be
issued to a person who is not a stockholder, or to a person
already a stockholder in exchange for services rendered or
for cash or property. But a share of stock coming from stock
dividends declared cannot be issued to one who is not a
stockholder of a corporation.
A "stock dividend" is any dividend payable in shares of
stock of the corporation declaring or authorizing such
dividend. It is, what the term itself implies, a distribution
of the shares of stock of the corporation among the
stockholders as dividends. A stock dividend of a corporation
is a dividend paid in shares of stock instead of15 cash, and is
properly payable only out of surplus profits. So, a stock
dividend is actually two things: (1) a dividend, and (2) the
enforced use of the dividend
16
money to purchase additional
shares of stock at par. When a corporation issues stock
dividends, it shows that the corporation's accumulated
profits have been capitalized instead of distributed to the
stockholders or retained as surplus available for
distribution, in money or kind, should opportunity offer.
Far from being a realization of profits for the stockholder, it
tends rather to postpone said realization, in that the fund
represented by the new stock has been transferred from
surplus to 17assets and no longer available for actual
distribution. Thus, it is apparent that stock dividends are
issued only to stockholders. This is so because only
stockholders are entitled to dividends. They are the only
ones who have a right to a proportional share in that part
of the surplus which is declared as dividends. A stock
dividend really adds nothing to the interest of the
stockholder; the proportional interest of each stockholder
re-

________________

15 Sec. 16, Corporation Law.

16 Words and Phrases, p. 270.
17 Fisher vs. Trinidad, 43 Phil. 973,

569

VOL. 26, DECEMBER 28, 1968 569

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

18
mains the same. If a stockholder is deprived of his stock
dividends—and this happens if the shares of stock f orming
part of the stock dividends are issued to a non-stockholder
—then the proportion of the stockholder's interest changes
radically. Stock dividends are civil fruits of the original
investment,
19
and to the owners of the shares belong the civil
fruits.
The term "dividend" both in the technical sense and its
ordinary acceptation, is that part or portion of the profits of
the enterprise which the corporation, by its governing
agents, sets apart for ratable division among the holders of
the capital stock. It means the f und actually set aside, and
declared by the directors of the corporation as a dividends,
and duly ordered by the director, or by the stockholders at
a corporate meeting, to be divided or distributed among
20
the
stockholders according to their respective interests.
It is Our considered view, therefore, that under Section
16 of the Corporation Law stock dividends can not be
issued to a person who is not a stockholder in payment of
services rendered. And so, in the case at bar Nielson can
not be paid in shares of stock which form part of the stock
dividends of Lepanto for services it rendered under the
management contract. We sustain the contention of
Lepanto that the understanding between Lepanto and
Nielson was simply to make the cash value of the stock
dividends declared as the basis for determining the amount
of compensation that should be paid to Nielson, in the
proportion of 10% of the cash value of the stock dividends
declared. And this conclusion of Ours finds support in the-
record.
We had adverted to in Our decision that in 1940 there
was some dispute between Lepanto and Nielson regarding
the application and interpretation of certain provisions of
the original contract particularly with regard to the 10%
participation of Nielson in the net profits, so that some

_______________

18 Towne vs. Eisner, 02 L. Ed. 372.

19 Art. 441. Civil Code of the Philippines.
20 7 Thompson on Corporations 134-135.

570

570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

adjustments had to be made. In the minutes of the meeting

of the Board of Directors of Lepanto on August 21. 1940,
We read the following:

"The Chairman stated that he believed that it would be better to

tie the computation of the 10% participation of Nielson &
Company, Inc. to the dividend, because Nielson will then be able to
definitely compute its net participation by the amount of the
dividends declared. In addition to the dividend, we have been
setting up a depletion reserve and it does not seem fair to burden
the 10% participation of Nielson with the depletion reserve, as the
depletion reserve should not be considered as an operating
expense. After a prolonged discussion, upon motion duly made
and seconded, it was—
"RESOLVED, That the President, be, and he hereby is,
authorized to enter into an agreement with Nielson & Company,
Inc., modifying Paragraph V of management contract of January
30, 1937, effective January 1, 1940, in such a way that Nielson &
Company, Inc. shall receive 10% of any dividends declared and
paid, when and as paid during the period of the contract and at
the end of each year, 10% of any depletion reserve that may be set
up and 10% of any amount expended during the year out of
surplus earnings for capital account." (Italics supplied.)
From the sentence, "The Chairman stated that he believed
that it would be better to tie the computation of the 10%
participation of Nielson & Company, Inc. to the dividend,
because Nielson will then be able to definitely compute its
net participation by the amount of the dividends declared"
the idea is conveyed that the intention of Lepanto, as
expressed by its Chairman C. A. DeWitt, was to make the
value of the dividends declared—whether the dividends
were in cash or in stock—as the basis for determining the
amount of compensation that should be paid to Nielson, in
the proportion of 10% of the cash value of the dividends so
declared. It does not mean, however, that the compensation
of Nielson would be taken from the amount actually
declared as cash dividend to be distributed to the
stockholder, nor f rom the shares of stocks to be issued to
the stockholders as stock dividends, but from the other
assets or funds of the corporation which are not burdened
by the dividends thus declared. In other words, if, for
example, cash dividends of P300,000.00 are
571

VOL. 26, DECEMBER 28, 1968 571

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

declared. Nielson would be entitled to a compensation of

P30,000.00, but this P30,000.00 should not be taken from
the P300,000.00 to be distributed as cash dividends to the
stockholders but from some other funds or assets of the
corporation which are not included in the amount to
answer for the cash dividends thus declared. This is so
because if the P30,000.00 would be taken out f rom the
P300,-000.00 declared as cash dividends, then the
stockholders would not be getting P300,000.00 as dividends
but only P270,000.00. There would be a dilution of the
dividend that corresponds to each share of stock held by
the stockholders. Similarly, if there were stock dividends
worth one million pesos that were declared, which means
an issuance of ten million shares at the par value of ten
centavos per share, it does not mean that Nielson would be
given 100,000 shares. It only means that Nielson should be
given the equivalent of 10% of the aggregate cash value of
those shares issued as stock dividends. That this was the
understanding of Nielson itself is borne out by the fact that
in its appeal brief Nielson urged that it should be paid
"P300,000.00 being 10% of the P3,000,000.00 stock
dividends declared
21
on November 28, 1949 and August 20,
1950 x x x,"
We, therefore, reconsider that part of Our decision
which declares that Nielson is entitled to shares of stock
worth P300,000.00 based on the stock dividends declared
on November 28, 1949 and on August 20, 1950, together
with all the fruits accruing thereto. Instead, We declare
that Nielson is entitled to payment by Lepanto of
P300,000.00 in cash, which is equivalent to 10% of the
money value of the stock dividends worth P3,000,000.00
which were declared on November 28, 1949 and on August
20, 1950, with interest thereon at the rate of 6% from
February 6, 1958.
6. In the eighth ground of its motion for reconsideration
Lepanto maintains that this Court erred in awarding to
Nielson an undetermined amount of shares of stock and/or
cash, which award can not be ascertained and

_______________

21 p. 115, Nielson's Appeal Brief.

572

572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Nielson & Company, Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company

executed without further litigation.

In view of Our ruling in this resolution that Nielson is
not entitled to receive shares of stock as stock dividends in
payment of its compensation under the management
contract, We do not consider it necessary to discuss this
ground of the motion for reconsideration. The awards in the
present case are all reduced to specific sums of money.
7. In the ninth ground of its motion for reconsideration
Lepanto maintains that this Court erred in rendering
judgment or attorney's fees.
The matter of the award of attorney's fees is within the
sound discretion of this Court. In Our decision We have
stated the reason why the award of P50,000.00 for
attorney's fees is considered by this Court as reasonable.
Accordingly, We resolve to modify the decision that We
rendered on December 17, 1966, in the sense that instead
of awarding Nielson shares of stock worth P300,000.00 at
the par value of ten centavos (P0.10) per share based on the
stock dividends declared by Lepanto on November 28, 1949
and August 20, 1950, together with their fruits, Nielson
should be awarded the sum of P300,000.00 which is an
amount equivalent to 10% of the cash value of the stock
dividends thus declared, as part of the compensation due
Nielson under the management contract. The dispositive
portion of the decision should, therefore, be amended, to
read as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS,
We hereby reverse the decision of the court a quo and enter
in lieu thereof another, ordering the appellee Lepanto to
pay the appellant Nielson the different amounts as
specified hereinbelow:

(1) Seventeen thousand five hundred pesos

(P17,500.00), equivalent to 10% of the cash
dividends of December, 1941, with legal interest
thereon f rom the date of the f iling of the
complaint;
(2) Two thousand five hundred pesos (P2,500.00), as
management fee for January, 1942, with legal
interest thereon from the date of the filing of the
complaint;
(3) One hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150.000.00),

573

VOL. 26, DECEMBER 28, 1968 573

Infantado vs. Liwanag

representing management fees for the sixty-month

period of extension of the management contract,
with legal interest thereon from the date of the f
iling of the complaint;
(4) One million four hundred thousand pesos (?
1,400,000.00), equivalent to 10% of the cash
dividends declared during the period of extension of
the management contract, with legal interest
thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint;
(5) Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00),
equivalent to 10% of the cash value of the stock
dividends declared on November 28, 1949 and
August 20, 1950, with legal interest thereon from
the date of the filing of the complaint;
(6) Fifty three thousand nine hundred twenty eight
pesos and eighty eight centavos (P53,928.88),
equivalent to 10% of the depletion reserve set up
during the period of extension, with legal interest
thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint;
 (7) Six hundred ninety four thousand three hundred
sixty four pesos and seventy six centavos
(P694,364.76), equivalent to 10% of the expenses for
capital account during the period of extension, with
legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of
the complaint;
(8) Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's
fees; and
(9) The costs.

It is so ordered.

       Concepcion, CJ., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,

Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
     Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo. JJ.,
did not take part.

Decision reversed.

______________

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