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Case Digest - Aldovino Vs Comelec

The COMELEC ruled that Wilfredo Asilo's 90-day preventive suspension in 2005 interrupted his 2004-2007 term as city councillor of Lucena City. However, the Supreme Court disagreed for three key reasons: 1. A term refers to a fixed period of time that an official holds office - three years for local positions. Preventive suspension does not end an official's term, only bars them temporarily from duties. 2. Preventive suspension protects government services by suspending officials facing charges, but does not vacate the position. Officials resume duties when suspension is lifted. 3. Term limits and preventive suspension address different issues - the former limits consecutive terms, while
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
86 views

Case Digest - Aldovino Vs Comelec

The COMELEC ruled that Wilfredo Asilo's 90-day preventive suspension in 2005 interrupted his 2004-2007 term as city councillor of Lucena City. However, the Supreme Court disagreed for three key reasons: 1. A term refers to a fixed period of time that an official holds office - three years for local positions. Preventive suspension does not end an official's term, only bars them temporarily from duties. 2. Preventive suspension protects government services by suspending officials facing charges, but does not vacate the position. Officials resume duties when suspension is lifted. 3. Term limits and preventive suspension address different issues - the former limits consecutive terms, while
Copyright
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ALDOVINO VS.

COMELEC
December 23, 2009

Facts: The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is an
effective interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide complete
service for the full-term, thus, such term should not be counted for the purpose of the term limit rule.

The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councillor of Lucena City for three consecutive
terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during
his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with
a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayan’s suspension
order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term.

In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners Simon
B. aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course
to Asilo’s certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and served for
three terms;

Issue: 1. Whether or not there was an interruption of term

Held: NO. As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an
elective official’s stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the
rule embodied in Section 8, Article X. Significantly, this provision refers to a “term” as a period of time –
three years – during which an official has title to office and can serve.

The word “term” in legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law
describes that an officer may hold an office. According to Mechem, the term of office is the period
during which an office may be held. Upon expiration of the officer’s term, unless he is authorized by law
to holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease. In the law of public
officers, the most and natural frequent method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by the
expiration of the terms for which he was elected or appointed. A later case, Gaminde v. Commission on
Audit, reiterated that “The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of
right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another.

Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing
the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose
title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or
liability. Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closely-controlled conditions
and gives a premium to the protection of the service rather than to the interests of the individual office
holder. Even then, protection of the service goes only as far as a temporary prohibition on the exercise
of the functions of the official’s office; the official is reinstated to the exercise of his position as soon as
the preventive suspension is lifted. Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results,
no position is vacated when a public official is preventively suspended. This was what exactly happened
to Asilo.

Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly different aspects of an elective
officials’ service in office and they do not overlap. As already mentioned above, preventive suspension
involves protection of the service and of the people being served, and prevents the office holder from
temporarily exercising the power of his office. Term limitation, on the other hand, is triggered after an
elective official has served his three terms in office without any break. Its companion concept –
interruption of a term – on the other hand, requires loss of title to office. If preventive suspension and
term limitation or interruption have any commonality at all, this common point may be with respect to
the discontinuity of service that may occur in both. But even on this point, they merely run parallel to
each other and never intersect; preventive suspension, by its nature, is a temporary incapacity to render
service during an unbroken term; in the context or term limitation, interruption of service occurs after
there has been a break in the term.

Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to render service, is
disallowed by the Constitution as an effective interruption of a term. It is therefore not allowed as a
mode of circumventing the three-term limit rule. Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve
an effective interruption of a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term
limitation. It can pose as a threat, however, if we shall disregard its nature and consider it an effective
interruption of a term.

To recapitulate, Asilo’s 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by its Sandiganbayan-imposed


preventive suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective official’s term.

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