A Brief History of (Second-Order) Cybernetics

Louis H. Kauffman & Stuart A. Umpleby

1. The field of cybernetics had its origins in a series of conferences sponsored by the
Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation from 1946 to 1953. The title of the conferences was “Circular
Causal and Feedback Mechanisms in Biological and Social Systems.” After Norbert Wie-
ner (1948) published his book, Cybernetics; or, Control and Communication in the Animal
and the Machine, the Macy conferences were called the conferences on cybernetics (Pias
2003). During World War II scientists had worked on a wide range of problems – shipping
supplies safely and efficiently across the North Atlantic, building radar-guided anti-aircraft
guns, coding and decoding messages, conducting psychological warfare operations, and
maintaining families when the men were away and women were working in factories.
Scientists who had worked on projects during the war wanted to discuss their experiences
and what they had learned. Wiener had expanded the discussion considerably and included
other mathematicians and scientists in the conversation such as the Mexican researcher,
physician and physiologist Arturo Rosenblueth. Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead,
two anthropologists, felt that in the course of solving these problems interesting ideas, in
particular circular causality, had been developed by engineers and mathematicians. They
hoped that the conferences would introduce these ideas to social scientists. Together with
the conference chairman, Warren McCulloch, they worked to coach the participants in
the meetings on how to talk with one another despite very different disciplinary frames of
reference (Kline 2015).
2. Circular causality has long been a difficult topic for scientists to deal with. One of
the informal fallacies is a caution to writers to avoid circular reasoning. Statistical meth-
ods, which are used to establish the confidence we have in causal relations, usually assume
linear causal relations. However, circular causality is essential in any regulatory process.
A thermostat regulating the heat in a room, a driver steering a car on a road, or a manager
working to maintain the profitability of a firm are all engaged in a circular process. In each
case the regulator affects the system being regulated, observes the results of actions and
then formulates another course of action. Note that this sequence of observation and for-
mulation is not only circular, it is more simultaneous than sequential.
3. Circular causality is essential in biology. Biological organisms survive due to the
process of homeostasis. The body consists of many circular processes. We become hungry,
so we eat. We become thirsty, so we drink. The body is satisfied for a time, but then the
cycle repeats. The iris in the eye regulates the amount of light entering the eye. When the
body becomes too hot, it sweats, and evaporation cools it. Biological survival is possible
due to a large number of circular causal processes (Cannon 1939). Similarly, the work of

01 Prologue.indd 3 03-07-17 9:34:47 AM

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McCulloch and Pitts (1943) engaged for the first time models of cognition based on circu-
larly interconnected models of logical neurons.
4. Just as biological systems depend on circular processes, social systems do as well.
In commercial transactions and in families communication is fundamental. Each party
seeks to influence the decisions and actions of others. The existence of complex organiza-
tions such as business firms requires many ongoing circular causal processes (Beer 1972).
A business firm must continually recruit, hire, and train workers as the company grows
and as current workers retire. Finding and working with customers and suppliers entails
communication back and forth. Employees continually monitor and modify the internal
processes in a firm – advertising, production, purchasing materials and maintaining equip-
ment.
5. Governments also require many kinds of feedback, a circular process (Deutsch
1963). Ideally governments serve the interests of citizens and citizens control the opera-
tions of government through voting, lobbying, oversight by the press, and occasional law
suits. The decisions of lower courts can be reviewed by higher courts and even a constitu-
tion can be changed by amendment. Given the vital role that circularity plays in biological
and social systems, it is surprising that so much of science focuses on linear causal rela-
tions. Probably this happens because scientists seek certainty in their knowledge. They
want to know what confidence they should have in a particular result of research. But
statistical confidence intervals work with measurements (e.g., standard deviation) and lin-
ear causal relations. Circular causal relations are more challenging and usually rely on
comparing results from a model with time series data.
6. Looking at circular causal processes has proven to be quite fruitful. For example,
Humberto Maturana, Francisco Varela and Ricardo Uribe created the theory of autopoiesis,
or self-production, to explain living systems (Maturana & Varela 1980). They noted that a
living system has parts that engage in processes that result in new parts engaging in similar
processes. There is some variation in the parts and processes produced, which enables
evolution.
7. Because cyberneticians were interested in cognition, a biological process, they
were interested in the role of the observer in scientific research. Although scientists sought
for many years to exclude the observer in an effort to be unbiased and objective, cyberneti-
cians noted that every statement made is made by an observer to an observer. That is, the
observer has purposes within a social context and a history that includes national culture
and academic training. Hence, observations independent of the characteristics of the ob-
server are not physically possible. Second-order cybernetics has been an effort to incorpo-
rate this realization into cybernetics. The early work in cybernetics focused on the design
of control devices. Second-order cybernetics was an effort to apply the same ideas to the
observer or designer of control devices, hence to cognition (Foerster 2003).
8. A further development in cybernetics has been to reconsider social systems as col-
lections of purposeful systems – individuals and organizations. Much of social science
research has treated social systems as collections of interacting variables. This is possible
only if one makes certain assumptions about the elements of social systems, for example
the Efficient Market Hypothesis assumes that economic actors are rational, self-interested
profit maximizers who all have the same information and complete information. Recently
more attention has been given to the often improbable assumptions that scientists make in
constructing their models. One assumption that has been carried over from the natural sci-
ences to the social sciences is that theories do not alter the system observed. Although we

01 Prologue.indd 4 03-07-17 9:34:47 AM

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assume that physical objects do not change their behavior when scientific theories change,
social systems do change their behavior depending on which theory is guiding actions, for
example the theories of Adam Smith, Karl Marx, John Maynard Keynes, or Milton Fried-
man.
9. The latest developments in cybernetics have been theories of reflexivity. Vladimir
Lefebvre (1982) suggests that there are two systems of ethical cognition depending on
whether one believes the end justifies the means or the end does not justify the means.
George Soros (1987) has pointed out that people in societies, including scientists, not only
observe, they also participate. The fact that the elements of social systems are both ob-
serving and participating greatly increases uncertainty about future events within society
and explains the fallibility of our predictions. Heinz von Foerster proposed that since our
knowledge of the social world is limited by our experiences, we need other people, whose
experiences are different from ours, to support or challenge our perceptions and conclu-
sions. Karl Müller (Müller & Riegler 2014) has suggested that meta research involves a
kind of reentry or reconsideration of previous findings. Louis Kauffman (2016 and this
volume) has described science as a search for invariances in our contextual descriptions
and the production/observation of objects through these invariances.
10. The contributions in this book illustrate that cybernetics is an important contri-
bution to contemporary science. Physics and chemistry provide a theory of the material
domain by explaining matter and energy processes. Cybernetics offers a theory of less tan-
gible phenomena by explaining processes of communication and control (Umpleby, 2007).
The cybernetics domain is different because both observers and theories influence what
happens in social systems, and it is through social systems that all living science occurs.
The contributions in this book suggest several possible future directions for cybernetics.
They describe how science is changing and propose a unified point of view for classical
and second-order science (Umpleby 2014).

References
Beer S. (1972) Brain of the firm. Herder and Herder, New York.
Cannon W. B. (1939) The wisdom of the body. W.W. Norton, New York.
Deutsch K. W. (1963) The nerves of government: Models of political communication and control.
Free Press of Glencoe, London.
Foerster H. von (2003) Understanding understanding. Springer, New York.
Kauffman L. H. (2016) Cybernetics, reflexivity and second-order science. Constructivist
Foundations 11(3): 489–497. http://constructivist.info/11/3/489
Kline R. (2015) The cybernetics moment: Or why we call our age the information age. Johns
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
Lefebvre V. (1982) Algebra of conscience: A comparative analysis of Western and Soviet ethical
systems. Reidel, Boston MA.
Maturana H. R. & Varela F. J. (1980) Autopoiesis and cognition: The realization of the living.
Reidel, Boston MA.
McCulloch W. & Pitts W. (1943) A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity.
Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics 5: 115–133.
Müller K. H. & Riegler A. (2014) Second-order science: A vast and largely unexplored science
frontier. Constructivist Foundations 10(1): 7–15. http://constructivist.info/10/1/007
Pias C. (2003) Cybernetics: The Macy conferences 1946–1953. Diaphanes, Zurich.

01 Prologue.indd 5 03-07-17 9:34:47 AM

 6

Soros G. (1987) The alchemy of finance: Reading the mind of the market. Simon and Schuster, New
York.
Umpleby S. (2007) Physical relationships among matter, energy and information. Systems Research
and Behavioral Science 24(3): 369-372. http://blogs.gwu.edu/umpleby/recent-papers/
Umpleby S. A. (2014) Second order science: Logic, strategies, methods. Constructivist Foundations
10(1): 16-23. http://constructivist.info/10/1/016
Wiener N. (1948) Cybernetics: Or control and communication in the animal and the machine. MIT
Press, New York.

01 Prologue.indd 6 03-07-17 9:34:47 AM

 Mapping the Varieties of Second-Order Cybernetics
Karl H. Müller & Alexander Riegler

Introduction
1. In his impressive study on the cybernetic moment, Ronald Kline (2015) claims that
the move from first-order to second-order cybernetics was a dead end that did not produce
long-lasting impacts for other disciplines. As such, it did not leave any significant traces.
Similarly, Robert Martin (2015) maintains that second-order cybernetics (SOC) has failed
to affect its scientific neighboring disciplines. These two general assessments on the inter-
nal and external weaknesses of second-order cybernetics form the central hypothesis we
want to address in this editorial:
Kline-Martin-Hypothesis: As a research program, second-order cybernetics was
a. insufficiently developed,
b. has had no sustainable consequences for other scientific disciplines in the past, and
c. will remain mostly irrelevant in the future as well.
Thus, second-order cybernetics will fail miserably to meet the constructivist challenges
(as defined by Riegler 2005, 2015), and researchers should bid their farewell to radical
constructivism altogether (as claimed by Schmidt 2003) as an increasingly marginalized
side-stream endeavor (see the contributions in Quale & Riegler 2010).
2. One of the goals of this editorial is to collect enough argumentative material to
either support or reject each of the three parts of the Kline-Martin-hypothesis.
3. Another goal of this editorial and of this volume on second-order cybernetics is
to continue and end an experiment that started with the special issue of Constructivist
Foundations on second-order science (Riegler & Müller 2014). While the majority of the
contributions in that issue saw second-order science (SOS) as mainly linked with the inclu-
sion of an observer, a smaller part, including the editors, viewed second-order science as
a genuinely new research domain operating with building blocks from first-order science
in an analytical and reflexive manner and as significantly different and independent from
inclusions or exclusions of observers (Müller & Riegler 2014).
4. In contrast to the 2014 issue, we now want to explore what has become of second-
cybernetics (SOC), which emerged in the late 1960s by adding reflexivity to the first-
order cybernetics of observed systems, which made it a “cybernetics of observing systems”
(Foerster 1974). This reflexive turn in cybernetics deserves a closer look and should be
evaluated using the following questions:

02 Muller Riegler.indd 7 16-08-17 4:57:38 PM

 8

ƒƒ What are the similarities and differences in the current approaches to SOC?
ƒƒ What are the relations between contemporary SOC and other scientific disciplines?
ƒƒ Given its age, are there new perspectives for contemporary cybernetics available,
transcending the original SOC?
ƒƒ What are the relations between SOC and second-order science and what could be
possible functions and roles of cybernetics for second-order science?
5. With the answers to these questions, we expect to be able to offer several maps on:
ƒƒ The current frameworks of SOC
ƒƒ The significant differences and/or similarities between SOC and the domains of
second-order science.

Reconstructing SOC
6. Let us start with a historical journey to construct a map of SOC that transforms an
implicit order on its scope and dimensions into an explicit one. The starting point for this
journey is Heinz von Foerster,1 who on the occasion of his 90th birthday gave an interview
in which he presented a selection of his five most important publications:2
a. Das Gedächtnis. Eine quantenmechanische Untersuchung [Memory. A Quantum-
Mechanical Investigation] (Foerster 1948)
b. “Some Remarks on Changing Populations” (Foerster 1959)
c. “Doomsday: Friday, November 13, AD 2026” (Foerster, Mora & Amiot 1960)
d. “Objects: Tokens for Eigenbehaviors” (Foerster 1976)
e. “Ethics and Second-Order Cybernetics” (Foerster 1992)
7. At first, von Foerster’s selection is quite surprising because only two of them –
“Objects” and “Ethics,” are included in his representational collection of papers, Under-
standing Understanding (Foerster 2003). We could be tempted to dismiss his peculiar
choice and attribute it to his age or to other constraining factors. But on closer reflection, it
becomes clear that his selection offers a new view on the scope and the main characteristics
of SOC, which have been mostly ignored until recently.
8. Von Foerster’s five most important publications can be separated into 3 categories:
Category 1 comprises only his unique monograph on memory. Von Foerster selected it
because this publication helped him to move from post-war Austria, where he had no
hopes for an academic career, to the core of one of the most productive and energetic
science circles around Warren McCulloch’s Macy conferences and to the American
university and research system.

1. It must be emphasized that approaches similar to Heinz von Foerster’s perspective on second-
order cybernetics were built by Humberto Maturana (1970), Maturana & Francisco Varela (1980,
1987), Gordon Pask (1975a, 1975b, 1976) and others, but were not included in this editorial due
to its focus on the contemporary varieties of second-order cybernetics.
2. “90 Jahre Heinz von Foerster – Die praktische Bedeutung seiner wichtigsten Arbeiten. [90 years
Heinz von Foerster – The practical relevance of his most important publications],” DVD directed
by Maria Pruckner, 2001. Malik Management Zentrum, St. Gallen, Switzerland.

02 Muller Riegler.indd 8 03-07-17 12:02:02 PM

 9

Category 2 contains two articles on population dynamics. The first one discusses the dy-
namics of leucocytes, the second the long-term evolution of human populations. Both
articles are based on a particular hyperbolic equation, which was later characterized
as the “von Foerster-equation,” to which von Foerster himself attributed quite some
significance.
Category 3 includes von Foerster’s articles on objects and ethics. While the former seems
well justified, choosing the latter appears to be rather ill-founded because it seems to
ignore many more obvious choices such as the articles on self-organizing systems and
their environments (Foerster 1960), on computation in neural nets (Foerster 1967) and
on constructing a reality (Foerster 1973). In particular, the last one has been reprinted
many times.
9. The publications in the first two categories seem justified because the first publica-
tion fulfilled a vital function for von Foerster himself, and the papers in the second category
offer a general diffusion formalism for his views on describing the dynamics of popula-
tions, which can be applied to self-organizing systems with very heterogeneous composi-
tions, ranging from leucocytes to humans.
10. The third category, however, remains an enigma because the two articles it con-
tains cover very different ground. The paper “Ethics and Second-Order Cybernetics” is
based on a lecture that was held without using any formalisms. The article on objects,
however, offers a highly formal account of the necessary emergence of eigenforms in re-
cursively closed systems.
11. Fortunately, we can offer several arguments showing that the two articles in the
third category must be considered as the foundations of SOC in particular and of a new
perspective on the general methodology of science.
12. In order to find the particular points of relevance of the first of these two articles,
we need to look to another publication from the same period, i.e., “Through the Eyes of the
Other” (Foerster 1991). In both articles, von Foerster develops a general epistemic distinc-
tion on interacting with one’s environment (or world) in two fundamentally different ways.
This distinction was further elaborated during a week-long conversation in 1997.3 There,
von Foerster asked a question that gives rise to this fundamental epistemic differentiation:
Am I an observer who stands outside and looks in as God-Heinz or am I part of the world,
a fellow player, a fellow being? (Foerster 2014: 128)4

13. This epistemic split led to a specific terminology for these two very different epis-
temic modes, i.e., the endo-mode and the exo-mode (Müller 2016a).5 His distinction of the
two epistemic modes is also relevant for cybernetics itself as he links it to the distinction
between first- and second-order cybernetics. This distinction…

3. This conversation formed the basis of Foerster (1997), which was translated to English in 2014.
4. Von Foerster developed a very intriguing list of the characteristics of these two fundamentally
different epistemic modes towards one’s world or environment; see Umpleby’s contribution to
this volume, in which he offers a detailed account of this epistemic split between “being apart” or
“being a part” (For more details, see Müller 2016a: 161–186).
5. A similar distinction can be found in Otto Rössler’s 1992 book on endo-physics. However, our
distinction between exo and endo differs significantly from Rössler’s and others (such as Atmans-
pacher & Dalenoort 1994) who assume a two-level structure of reality.

02 Muller Riegler.indd 9 03-07-17 12:02:02 PM

 10

is nothing else but a paraphrase of […] the two fundamentally different epistemological,
even ethical, positions, where one considers oneself, on the one hand, as an independent
observer who watches the world go by; or on the other hand, as a particular actor in the
circularity of human relations. (Foerster 2003: 303)

14. So according to von Foerster, the following equivalences can be established:

ƒƒ First-order cybernetics ≡ cybernetics in an exo-mode (from without) ≡ cybernet-
ics of systems observed
ƒƒ Second-order cybernetics ≡ cybernetics in an endo-mode (from within) ≡ cyber-
netics of observing systems.
15. In our interpretation, this split into epistemic modes transcends cybernetics itself
and can be generalized in the following way across science.
ƒƒ Endo-mode ≡ exploring the world from within ≡ endo-science
ƒƒ Exo-mode ≡ exploring the world from without ≡ exo-science.
16. Unfortunately, von Foerster’s shift of first- and second-order cybernetics to dif-
ferent epistemic modes was never fully appreciated by the cybernetic (nor the radical con-
structivist) community. In any case, we are convinced that the importance von Foerster
attributed to this shift was the main reason why von Foerster selected the ethics paper as
one of his five most important and influential publications. Although first-order cybernet-
ics focuses on technology and goal-directed machines and SOC on living or observing
systems, the scientific disciplines they are dealing with are not the key difference between
them. It is rather the epistemic mode, exo or endo, that distinguishes them.
17. Aside from these few publications, von Foerster never produced a detailed ac-
count of the endo-mode as a new general methodology for science. He only insisted that
SOC should and must be organized with a shift to the endo-mode in which the I of ob-
servers or researchers was to be an intrinsic element of the research process itself, which
requires profound methodological changes. This becomes very clear in his statement, “I
am the observed relation between myself and observing myself” (Foerster 2003: 257),
where “I” invites a host of additional notions such as self-reference, self-observing, self-
reflexivity and the like, as well as a long history of paradoxes based on the notions of I,
self and reference, such as the paradoxes by Epimenides, Russell or Nelson and Grelling.
18. The embeddedness of SOC within a specific epistemic mode offers a new perspec-
tive, which we will apply to the contributions in this volume by grouping them into three
categories.
Category 1: Here, SOC is considered an instance of building a new and general method-
ology of science that is not linked exclusively to cybernetics but that can be utilized
across all scientific disciplines and for a variety of applied disciplines, and that can
be extended to cover the arts as well. The articles by Louis Kauffman and Stuart
Umpleby fall into this category, and our editorial provides supplementary material.
Category 2: The articles focus on instances of working with and in SOC within special
scientific disciplines and domains. They comprise Diana Gasparyan’s article, which
links SOC with consciousness studies, and Bernard Scott’s, which uses SOC to pro-
vide foundations for psychology.

02 Muller Riegler.indd 10 03-07-17 12:02:02 PM

 11

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domain of investigation and (3) a common language, grammar, rule system or, more generally,
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02 Muller Riegler.indd 11 03-07-17 12:02:02 PM

 12

ƒƒ a scientific knowledge base that includes, among other things, theories, models,
rule-systems, research designs, etc.
22. This special type of research organization can and must lead to eigenforms of vari-
able forms and nature (see von Foerster’s article on “objects”). These eigenforms emerge
as a recursive consensus formed among all three nodes in the triadic research network
involved.
23. In his contribution to this volume, Kauffman presents a detailed account of such
an endo-methodology for science that covers all the necessary elements in research pro-
cesses, including observations, experiments and data-collections. It also describes these el-
ements in a significantly different way than in the established science methodology, which
stands on objectivity, truth and, as its underlying epistemology, hypothetical realism. What
has been presented by us as the epistemic mode from within is analyzed by Kauffman as a
reflexive domain in which a community of researchers also become actors. While we will
not replicate all the details of Kauffman’s article here, we want to point out two highly
relevant features of his perspective on endo-methodology.

Feature 1
24. Contrary to the established understanding of physics that considers physical ex-
periments as a way to confirm objective, “real” or “true” features of the world, Kauffman
offers a radically different account of physical experiments. This account is based on the
Church-Curry fixed point theorem and states that for any reflexive domain D and any com-
ponent C in D there is an element X in D such that X becomes a fixed point for C: CX = X and
X is, thus, the eigenform for C (see also Kauffman 2005, 2009). For physical experiments
E that are conducted by a single researcher or a group of researchers R, there is a necessary
element X so that E(R, X) = X. An interesting shift occurs here from the realist account of
experiments as a search for objective features of nature and reality to the composition of
researchers conducting physical experiments. In this endo-perspective, physical experi-
ments can be reproduced again and again with identical results X because these experi-
ments E become invariant under different compositions of R. Different researchers R with
different age and gender, with different regional and cultural backgrounds, with different
research designs, etc. will end in the eigenform-configuration of E(R, X) = X. Obviously,
experiments can fail under different compositions of R, they can be disconfirmed and yield
a new X, which can be rejected again, etc. But the main emphasis in an endo-methodology
lies on the researchers themselves and their changing compositions over time. E(R, X) = X
states that a special outcome X becomes invariant over time with respect to the possible
configurations of researchers R.

Feature 2
25. The endo-methodology offers a stringent interpretation of several seemingly
strange ideas formulated by von Foerster on self-writing theories such as the following
proposition:
The laws of physics, the so-called ‘laws of nature,’ can be described by us. The laws of
brain functions – or even more generally – the laws of biology, must be written in such
a way that the writing of these laws can be deducted from them, i.e., they have to write
themselves. (Foerster 2003: 231)

02 Muller Riegler.indd 12 03-07-17 12:02:03 PM

 13

26. Additionally, von Foerster points to the special status of any theory of the brain,
which must be written by a brain:
It is clear that if the brain sciences do not want to degenerate into a physics or chemistry of
living – or having once lived – tissue they must develop a theory of the brain: T(B). But,
of course, this theory must be written by a brain: B(T). This means that this theory must be
constructed in a way as to write itself: T(B(T)). (Foerster 2003: 195)

27. In reflexive domains, the theories T of the brain, of biology, or of nature, can
actually write themselves, which can be described by the same formalism for eigenforms:
T(R, X) = X.
28. It was one of the unexpected surprises of editing this volume that Kauffman pre-
sented such a concise perspective for a SOC-inspired endo-methodology, and that Umple-
by presented an outline of such an endo-methodology for the social sciences together with
a rich agenda to be pursued in the future.7
29. We can now formulate our mappings of the articles in this volume and their spe-
cific cognitive family resemblances within the framework of SOCE as cybernetics from
within or as endo-cybernetics as a comprehensive research agenda with five large-scale
domains that corresponds with the contributions in this volume.8

Agenda I: Building an alternative general scientific methodology

30. This line of investigation was forcefully pursued by Kauffman. His article con-
tains the special building blocks of such a general methodology that potentially covers a
variety of disciplines, including quantum physics, the life sciences, the cognitive sciences,
the social sciences and the technical sciences. Therefore, we suggest that it would be very
productive to broaden and diversify Kauffman’s approach into a larger survey publica-
tion (or “handbook” if you will) that offers a contemporary account of the status of endo-
research across various scientific disciplines and focuses also on the interactions between
theories and their diffusion across society and nature.

Agenda II: Building specialized endo-methodologies for different scientific

disciplines
31. The second agenda is reflected in Umpleby’s article, which offers the appropriate
elements of an endo-methodology for the main areas of Umpleby’s work in management
science, sociology and social policy. At present, scientific disciplines such as management
science or sociology use methodologies that are still framed in an exo-mode and it be-
comes, thus, a challenging and comprehensive task to transform these exo-methodologies
into suitable endo-methodologies. A state of the art summary of an exo-methodology of
empirical social research such as that by Jürgen Bortz and Nicola Döring (2015) can be

7. Many crucial in-depth explorations of the endo-methodology are still missing, such as a study
of observer effects across academic disciplines, or the actual differences in outcomes between
research in endo- and exo-mode. However, the current volume has already assembled some of the
ingredients that will help to undertake these investigations.
8. To our knowledge, Glanville was the only scholar in recent years who worked simultaneously on
all five agendas of SOCE while interacting with heterogeneous groups in Europe, Australia, China
and the US.

02 Muller Riegler.indd 13 03-07-17 12:02:03 PM

 14

challenged by a comprehensive endo-methodology that gives rise to additional debates on

the comparative advantages and disadvantages or on the differences in the actual empiri-
cal outcomes of these exo- and endo-approaches. Additionally, the second agenda should
also undertake in-depth comparative studies between the endo-mode, other non-traditional
methodologies and the exo-mode with respect to their research organization, their dialogi-
cal and consensus-building capacities, their ethical commitments, their types of interven-
tions and, finally, their empirical outcomes.In his contribution, Umpleby makes the strong
point that the view from within can give rise to a much broader range of problem solutions
and can also lead to a more active role of researchers in changing their environments, not
only interpreting it.

Agenda III: Offering foundational frameworks as well as reframing and

contextualizing research problems across all scientific disciplines
32. The third agenda is exemplified by the respective articles of Scott and Gasparyan.
The former presents a foundational outline for psychology, using a well-known framework
from SOCE, namely Pask’s conversation theory (Pask 1975a, 1975b, 1976). The latter of-
fers a new perspective on reframing notorious problems in consciousness studies with the
help of building blocks from SOCE. Recently, Michael Lissack (2016a, 2016b) has empha-
sized the importance of contextualizations of debates, controversies and models within sci-
ence, which could become yet another task for this agenda. It enables an in-depth analysis
of researchers, their cultural and cognitive backgrounds, their interaction patterns and their
lines of conflicts.

Agenda IV: Creating reflective circular practices within applied disciplines

33. The fourth agenda addresses a large number of applied disciplines, including
design, architecture, education science (Scott 2014), public administration and the large
number of therapeutic and consulting domains. Here, SOCE can become a constant source
of inspiration for the re-organization of research activities and practical work in the general
format of recursively closed reflexive circles, as shown in Sweeting’s article.

Agenda V: Building special circular reflexive approaches for special niches within
artistic domains
34. The fifth agenda carries SOCE into those artistic domains in which the organiza-
tion of recursively closed reflexive circles and eigenforms can lead to new innovative art.
While this agenda may be restricted to certain niches in the artistic domain, Scholte’s paper
shows that it can at least be applied to the world of theaters and theater performances.

Summary
35. Cybernetics is a transdisciplinary scientific discipline that brought goals and cir-
cularity into the domain of scientific investigations. Initially, this was accomplished in the
1940s and 1950s through notions such as feedback mechanisms, feed-forward, purpose
and control. Between the late 1960s and 1970s, cybernetics expanded to promote circular
research designs and reflexive investigations that include the researchers or the observers
as a necessary component. So far, this second-orderE cybernetics has fallen short of reach-

02 Muller Riegler.indd 14 03-07-17 12:02:03 PM

 15

ing its full potential. Despite promising attempts such as that by Bruce Clarke (2009), the
agenda of SOCE has not been significantly pursued by a large number of researchers, and
a large potential still awaits its use, with highly innovative gains not only for cybernetics
itself but for all of science.

Towards a map of second-orderE cybernetics and of second-order

science
36. The differentiation of cybernetics as cybernetics from without or first-order cyber-
netics and cybernetics from within or SOCE raises the question as to the relations between
SOCE and second-order science. The immediate response would most probably locate
SOCE as just another instance of second-order science or of science from within.
37. Although this initial response suggests itself, we will propose quite a different an-
swer that may appear counter-intuitive and even paradoxical at first. We propose that SOCE
as cybernetics from within or as endo-cybernetics is not included in the domains of second-
order science. The reason for this complete split is grounded in a basic difference between
two strictly separate contexts for the concept of second-order itself, which is already hinted
at in von Foerster’s Cybernetics of Cybernetics (Foerster 1974).
38. Firstly, the cover of Cybernetics of Cybernetics presents cybernetics situated at
two different mutually linked levels:
Cybernetics
of

of

Cybernetics

39. This format of SOC not only follows Margaret Mead’s article on cybernetics of
cybernetics (1968), it is further extended by von Foerster to the control of control and to
the communication of communication (Foerster 1974: III), and generalized by him through
Lars Löfgren’s (1979, 1992) notion of autological concepts (Foerster 1984), i.e., concepts
that can be applied to themselves such as understanding understanding, control of control,
learning about learning, functions of functions, geometry of geometry, model of models
(see also Müller 2007).
40. In Müller & Riegler (2014) and Müller (2016a), this first line of second-order
concepts has recently been advanced and systematized to differentiate between first-order
science and second-order science, separated by their different levels and linked through a
dense set of bottom-up and top-down links: any first-order discipline, due to its enormous
research output, can be linked to a potential second-order discipline, studying these out-
puts in comparative detail. Examples are first-order sociology and second-order sociology,
first-order psychology and second-order psychology, first-order economics and second-
order economics, first-order physics and second-order physics or first-order cybernetics
and second-order cybernetics.
41. Secondly, page 1 of Cybernetics of Cybernetics presents the well-known defini-
tions of first-order cybernetics as the cybernetics of observed systems, and of second-order
cybernetics as the cybernetics of observing (systems). This distinction based on observed
and observing was further elaborated by von Foerster in the paper on objects (Foerster
1976) and the related paper “In the Eyes of the Other” (Foerster 1991), emphasizing the
new epistemic mode of exploring the world from within.

02 Muller Riegler.indd 15 03-07-17 12:02:03 PM

 

Exo-mode (“from without”) Endo-mode (“from within”)

(VWDEOLVKHGVFLHQFHDFFRXQWV )LUVWSHUVRQDSSURDFKHV,ZHSDUWLFLSDWRU\
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WKLVYROXPHDQGZDVVXPPDUL]HGDVWKHPRGHIURPZLWKLQDVWKHHQGRPRGHDQGDVWKH
PRGHWKDWWUDQVIRUPVWKHRSHUDWLRQVLQGLVFLSOLQDU\UHVHDUFKDQGOHDGVWRQHZGLVFLSOLQHV
WKLVWLPHLQWKHIRUPRIHQGRVRFLRORJ\DVRSSRVHGWRHVWDEOLVKHGH[RVRFLRORJ\WRHQGR
SV\FKRORJ\LQFRQWUDVWWRH[RSV\FKRORJ\WRHQGRHFRQRPLFVYHUVXVH[RHFRQRPLFVWR
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ZLWKLQ
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OHYHODQGWKXVZLWKVHFRQGRUGHUVFLHQFH6HFRQGRUGHU( cybernetics is the focus of this
YROXPHLQZKLFKVHFRQGRUGHULF\EHUQHWLFVLVRQO\PDUJLQDOO\SUHVHQW7KLVHGLWRULDOE\
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RIVHFRQGRUGHU( approaches.
7DEOHSUHVHQWVDPDSFRPSDULQJWKHYDULHWLHVRI¿UVWDQGVHFRQGRUGHUVFLHQFH
ZLWKWKHWZRHSLVWHPLFPRGHVIURPZLWKRXWDQGIURPZLWKLQ,WVKRZVWKDWVHFRQGRUGHU(
F\EHUQHWLFVDQG¿UVWRUGHUF\EHUQHWLFVRUF\EHUQHWLFVIURPZLWKRXWEHFRPHGL൵HUHQWF\
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science can be pursued, in principle, in both modes.
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02 Muller Riegler.indd 16 03-07-17 12:02:03 PM

 17

Exo-mode (“from without”) Endo-mode (“from within”)

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order (e.g., established empirical) JHQHUDOHQGRPHWKRGRORJ\RIFRQVHQVXVIRUPDWLRQV
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science
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02 Muller Riegler.indd 17 03-07-17 12:02:03 PM

 18

Second-order science in Riegler & Müller (2014)

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9|ONHU 6FKROO )RFXVRQPHWDDQDO\VHV
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into a full research program.
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investigations.
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RFFXSLHVWKHGRPDLQVRIWKHVHFRQGRUGHUOHYHOZKLOH62&( retains its status as a
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LQ626LZLOOOHDYH62&(XQD൵HFWHGDQGYLFHYHUVD

02 Muller Riegler.indd 18 03-07-17 12:02:03 PM

 19

d. Finally, both SOCE and SOSL also become drivers towards higher levels of re-
flexivity in science. Second-orderL science becomes reflexive with respect to first-
order science and second-orderE cybernetics operates in reflexive domains and in
circles of actions and reflections, and turns reflexive with respect to researchers
and their domain of investigation.
50. Tables 1 to 4 offer a novel way for recombining second-orderE,L dimensions into
a new architecture of science and into a rich and diversified research agenda for second-
orderL science on the one hand and second-orderE cybernetics on the other (see also Müller
2016a).

The Kline-Martin-Hypothesis revisited

51. Based on what we have presented so far, the Kline-Martin hypothesis, which we
introduced at the beginning, can be accepted in two of its three parts, but must be rejected
in its third part:
Confirmed: During recent decades, SOC has been developed insufficiently as a research
program.
Confirmed: SOC has exhibited no or very limited sustainable consequences for other
scientific disciplines. In essence, SOC has become limited to the activities of small
circles of socio-cyberneticians and second-order cyberneticians.
Rejected: SOC will remain mostly irrelevant in the future. This assumption must be re-
jected and this rejection is not based on the uncertain status of predictions in general,
but on two significantly different arguments:
a. SOCE as presented by the authors in this volume and summarized in this editorial
has an innovative agenda to pursue. To our knowledge, for the first time, SOCE has
been recreated here in a systematic way as a comprehensive and transdisciplinary
research program.
b. SOCE must be credited for its role in promoting reflexivity in science. The title
of Umpleby’s article “Second-Order Cybernetics as a Fundamental Revolution in
Science” already points in this direction and this argument will become even stron-
ger in the future due to a strong movement towards higher levels of reflexivity in
science.
52. So after almost seventy years of existence, cybernetics can finally pursue a rich
research agenda that consists of classical or first-order cybernetics, SOCE as cybernetics
from within and the new post-cybernetics agenda as a second-order science discipline that
reflects on reflections on reflections as in the instance of a second-orderL study that is based
on second-orderL studies of lower order (Müller 2016b).
53. Moreover, the present issue with its shift to and its emphasis on a new general
science methodology should put an end to the sterile philosophical battles between the
proponents of radical constructivism and those of scientific realism. Second-orderE cyber-
netics can move away from these battles into the core of science by offering general and
special methodologies for research and new instruments for reframing and contextualizing
research problems across all scientific disciplines.

02 Muller Riegler.indd 19 03-07-17 12:02:03 PM

 20

Conclusion
54. As a concluding point, we would like to offer additional contextual information on
the current shifts and transformations in science that have formed the background for our
experiment with second-order science and second-order cybernetics.
55. In the rapidly growing role of reflexivity in science (Umpleby 2007, 2010), reflex-
ivity can arise in three different contexts.
Context 1: Reflexivity can be characterized as a fundamental feature of actor-based sys-
tems or networks, as shown in the works of Vladimir Lefebvre (1977, 1982), George
Soros (1994) and many others. These publications are presented in detail in Müller
(2015a, 2015b).
Context 2: Reflexivity can also become a core ingredient for science and research, which
was the topic of the collection of articles edited by Frederick Steier more than 25
years ago (Steier 1991), by anthropologists such as Clifford Geertz (1983, 2000) and
by sociologists such as Margaret Archer (2007, 2012), Ulrich Beck (Beck, Giddens &
Lash 1994) and Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1977, 1990; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992).
Context 3: But reflexivity can also arise due to a new epistemic mode from within be-
tween researchers, their domains of investigation and their descriptive or explanatory
accounts, which become relevant for all scientific disciplines, not just for the social
sciences.
56. In our previous editorial on second-order science (Müller & Riegler 2015), we
suggested that second-order science should be characterized as a “vast and largely unex-
plored science frontier” and as a new and significant reflexive component for the general
science system itself, where second-order science becomes a reflexive scientific study of
scientific inputs or outputs of first-order science. However, this revolution in reflexivity is
just one of several elements that fundamentally transform the architecture of contempo-
rary science. The revolution of reflexivity is accompanied by a revolution in complexity
(Hollingsworth & Müller 2008) and by a revolution in information and communication
technologies, which transform the scientific work spaces into digital work spaces and the
scientific knowledge base into a digital knowledge base. The last two transformations in
work spaces and knowledge bases can be summarized as a phase transition from it-science
to bit-science following John Wheeler’s dictum “it from bit” (Wheeler 1994) and Nicholas
Negroponte’s slogan “from atoms to bits” (Negroponte 1996), or as the transition from ma-
terial books, libraries and journals to digital media, e-books and digital knowledge bases.
57. We would like to end our editorial by returning to von Foerster, who suggested
that scientific research programs and research traditions do not disappear at a point when
they no longer function properly, but rather at their peak. The Copernican revolution re-
placed the Ptolemaic system “at its height as to accuracy of its predictions” (Foerster 2003:
284). This point is also well-reflected in innovation theory, which claims that old tech-
nologies are replaced at their state of perfection (Utterback 1994). A second Copernican
revolution is well under way and about to change science from its established forms and
operations (Science I) to new contexts and configurations (Science II) where SOCE could
play a significant role.

02 Muller Riegler.indd 20 03-07-17 12:02:03 PM

 21

Afterword: Ranulph Glanville’s contributions to second-order

cybernetics
58. This volume would not have been possible without the inspirations from Ranulph
Glanville, who had acted as a driving force behind this volume since 2013. Tragically, he
died on 20 December 2014. Since Glanville could not contribute to this volume with a
target article, we will highlight his perspectives on SOC, which in our view constitutes a
highly innovative yet barely appreciated research program for SOC.
59. Glanville’s general framework is documented in three volumes with the common
title “The Black B∞x” (Glanville 2009, 2012, 2014), from which we extract three key as-
pects that characterize his work (for further details, see Müller 2015c).

Aspect 1: Glanville’s approach to SOC

60. Glanville viewed himself as being in a position that offers the necessary gener-
alizations and abstractions of what his intellectual in-group within SOC produced: “My
work might be thought of as a generalization of the work of others” (Glanville 2012: 192).
61. In another version, Glanville saw himself in the role of the principal designer, who
produces the possibilities for others to pursue their cybernetic work:
Many of us watch games. Some play, others umpire or referee. Still others govern games
and make/remake the rules. There are some who create the field of play, mark and maintain
it. The potential (Gibson’s affordance) is not however, limited to games: others may use
the ground in a completely unanticipated way, unintended by those who set up the ground.
Behind all these is the person who creates the possibility of the blank field on which all this
potential can be expected. That person is me, and that is my work: I create the unformed,
empty field. (Glanville 2012: 35)

62. Still in another variation, he placed his work at the level n + 1, under the assump-
tion that level n was the highest and most general level explored by the rest of second-order
cyberneticians:
Cybernetics is often considered a meta-field. The Cybernetics of Cybernetics is, thus, a
meta-meta-field. My work is, therefore, a meta-meta-meta-field. (Glanville 2012: 192)

63. Aside from being most general by necessity, Glanville described the central re-
search question as follows:
My major initial concern was to develop a set of concepts that might explain how, while
we all observe and know differently, we behave as if we were observing the same ‘thing.’
What structure might support this? (Glanville 2012: 192).

64. Thus, the crucial research problem for Glanville was transcendental in nature be-
cause he was searching for the conditions of the possibility for observing, knowing, com-
municating, etc. and operated, therefore, on a very special level of abstraction.
65. Due to this unusual abstraction level, Glanville also abolished a separation that
has become almost trivial and self-evident in the course of the long-term evolution of
science, i.e., the separation between scientific problems on the one hand and problems in
artistic or in applied domains such as education, architecture or design on the other hand.
Glanville offered a general framework that is so much broader or wider than the normal
scope of established research programs. His framework covers very heterogeneous territo-

02 Muller Riegler.indd 21 03-07-17 12:02:03 PM

 22

ries and crosses easily the borders and boundaries between basic science, applied science,
technology, design or arts.

Aspect 2: Glanville’s circles of doing and reflecting

66. Volume 1 of Glanville’s “Black B∞x” series, “Cybernetic Circles” (Glanville
2012), contains five major sections, namely cybernetics, objects, black box, distinction and
variety. Volume 2, “Living in Cybernetic Circles” (Glanville 2014), is composed of five
chapters: design, representation, knowing, education and others (the last chapter contains
mainly tributes to Pask, von Foerster, Gerard de Zeeuw, Alfred Locker, Ernst von Glasers-
feld and Richard Jung).
67. From the differentiation in the two volumes, one could conclude that Glanville
established the theoretical foundations of his transcendental framework in volume 1 and
applied it to areas such as design and education in the second volume. But this would miss
the special form in which Glanville organized his theoretical or analytical production on
the one hand and his practical work on the other hand. Whatever he did, Glanville arranged
it in a permanent circle of theory and practice or doing and reflecting. In this, he followed
Donald Schön’s concept of the reflective practitioner, in which Schön defined reflection
in a circular manner as an action that leads to new actions (Schön 1983, 1987, 1991). The
action-reflection circle can be described as a circular organization between two contexts:
a. The context of production, where a problem solution is reached, an artistic object
is created or a technological system is constructed.
b. The context of reflection, which, on the other hand, deals with the consequences,
including ethical issues, further implications or modifications of the finished prod-
uct, future developments, etc.
68. Glanville lived constantly within these production-reflection circles and shifted
positions frequently, taking circularity seriously and as a stable form for theoretical or
practical action.

Aspect 3: Glanville as reflexive author

69. In much of what has been written about second-order cybernetics and observers,
the authors of those texts remain in the shadows, i.e., practically implicit. Here, Glanville
differed radically from most of the usual observer-inclusive accounts. He was constantly an
explicit element in the texts he produced and followed the model of a reflexive author. For
decades, he worked as a pioneer, exploring the ramifications of observing from within in
defining concepts, in developing models, in designing, in learning interactions, etc. In his
publications, his co-presence as an author or observer is always explicit and never implicit.
70. These three aspects characterize Ranulph Glanville, who had vigorously promot-
ed SOC since the late 1960s. Since he was a genuinely transdisciplinary scholar, he was
also the “tragic hero” of SOC, as he pursued a highly complex research agenda covering
architecture, communication theory, cybernetics, design and music. This, due to its scope,
complexity and diversity, was too often hardly understood and barely recognized by his
disciplinarily thinking peers.

02 Muller Riegler.indd 22 03-07-17 12:02:03 PM

 23

Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Anthony Hodgson, Bernard Scott and Stuart Umpleby for their
insightful criticism and comments.

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 Second-Order Cybernetics
as a Fundamental Revolution in Science
Stuart A. Umpleby

Introduction
1. Heinz von Foerster published in a variety of disciplines, including on the mech-
anism of memory (Foerster 1948), population growth (Foerster, Mora & Amiot 1960),
self-organization (Foerster 1960), constructivist philosophy (Foerster 2003d), and ethics
(Foerster 2003c). However, von Foerster also made a more fundamental contribution by
showing how to expand the scientific enterprise with a new way of operating scientifically.
My goal in this target article is to explain how von Foerster did that, and how that work
has developed. This is about a scientific revolution not only in cybernetics but in the way
science is done. It involves advances in the practice of science, and it leads to major shifts
in our conception of the goals of science.
2. In order to make von Foerster’s intended fundamental revolution for the science
system more intelligible, I will proceed in five stages: first, by offering a short history of
second-order cybernetics; second, by analysing the major contents of von Foerster’s funda-
mental revolution in science; third, by describing an institute that acted for decades in ac-
cord with this new approach; fourth, by showing the advantages of this unfinished revolu-
tion; and fifth, by suggesting some new directions for research in second-order cybernetics.

Part 1: A short personal history of second-order cybernetics

3. After World War II there was excitement about the utility of applied science. One
outgrowth of that excitement was the Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation conferences in New York
City between 1946 and 1953. They were chaired by Warren McCulloch. Gregory Bateson
and Margaret Mead were influential in starting them and continuing them. The title of those
conferences was “Circular Causal and Feedback Mechanisms in Biological and Social Sys-
tems” (Pias 2003). After Norbert Wiener published his 1948 book Cybernetics: or Control
and Communication in the Animal and the Machine, the conferees began to call the meet-
ings the “Macy conferences on cybernetics.”
4. As a student, when I first heard von Foerster talking about the role of the observer,
it sounded to me very similar to what Thomas Kuhn said in The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, which was popular at the time. In a well-known passage, Kuhn writes that
[…] the proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in different worlds. One
contains constrained bodies that fall slowly. The other, pendulums that repeat their motions
again and again […] Practicing in different worlds, the two groups of scientists see differ-
ent things when they look from the same point in the same direction. Again, that is not to
say they can see anything they please. Both are looking at the world, and what they look at

29

03 Umpleby.indd 29 03-07-17 1:51:43 PM

 30

has not changed. But in some areas they see different things, and they see them in different
relations one to the other. That is why a law that cannot even be demonstrated to one group
of scientists may occasionally seem intuitively obvious to another. Equally it is why before
they can hope to communicate fully, one group or the other must experience the conversion
that we have been calling a paradigm shift. (Kuhn 1962: 150)

5. However, when I showed this passage to von Foerster, he told me that was not
what he meant by including the observer in science. After he published the article “On
Constructing a Reality” (Foerster 2003d), which described a number of neurophysiological
experiments, I realized what he had in mind. I thought von Foerster was proposing a third
view of the scientific enterprise – not the normative view of Popper or the sociological
view of Kuhn but a biological view that included awareness of how the brain functions. I
felt von Foerster’s idea offered an opportunity to make a scientific revolution (Umpleby
1974). See Table 1 for a comparison of the respective epistemologies of Popper, Kuhn, and
von Foerster.1
6. There are many neurophysiological examples dating back at least to the 1960s and
1970s that support von Foerster’s article, including: the well-known cocktail-party effect
(one can focus on a single conversation among many conversations going on at a party);
the physiological fact that even though images on the retina are bottom-up we still see
things upright; the existence of the blind spot on the retina, which is not perceived as a gap
since the brain fills in this space with the sensation that surrounds it; and Richard Held and
Alan Hein’s (1963) reports on an experiment with kittens showing that the brain constructs
three dimensional space by coordinating signals from both muscles and eyes.
7. These experiments illustrate that the brain works in ways that we are not aware of.
The brain seems to “construct a reality” based on sensory input. Since people have differ-
ent experiences – language, home life, culture, religion, academic training, and job experi-
ences – each person’s “reality” is in some respects unique, though our knowledge of the
physical and social world has many common features. To the usual philosophical critique
of science, second-order cybernetics adds a scientific critique of philosophy
8. These and many more neurophysiological experiments provide the biological foun-
dation of second-order cybernetics. The experiments are essential for second-order cyber-
netics because they show that “observations independent of the characteristics of the ob-
server” are not physically possible. This is quite a different view from what is assumed in
the usual methodology of science. As Humberto Maturana and von Foerster have pointed
out, “Anything said is said by an observer” and “Anything said is said to an observer”
(Foerster 2003a: 283) or “Everything said is said by an observer to another observer, who
can be himself or herself” (Maturana 1978: 31). Our experiences are interpreted using
conclusions we have drawn from earlier experiences (Maturana & Varela 1992). Francisco
Varela and Wolf Singer (1987) provided empirical support for the prediction that only
about 20% of neurones to the visual structure of the brain are from the retina, while at least
40% come from the visual cortex. Visual interpretations seem to be based more on past
experiences than on present sensations.

1.  This was first presented in my presentation “Unifying epistemologies by combining world, de-
scription and observer” at the annual meeting of the American Society for Cybernetics, Urbana,
Illinois, 29 March–1 April 2007. An early description of the three points of view is given in a
table, “Three Versions of Cybernetics,” in Umpleby (1997).

03 Umpleby.indd 30 03-07-17 1:51:43 PM

 31

Popper Kuhn von Foerster

A normative view A sociological view A biological view
RIHSLVWHPRORJ\KRZVFLHQWLVWV RIHSLVWHPRORJ\KRZJURXSV RIHSLVWHPRORJ\KRZWKHEUDLQ
should operate of scientists operate functions
Non-science vs. science Steady progress vs. revolutions Realism vs. constructivism
Explain turmoil in original
6ROYHWKHSUREOHPRILQGXFWLRQ Include the observer within the
records vs. smooth progress
conjectures and refutations domain of science
in textbooks
How science as a picture of How paradigms are developed How an individual constructs
reality is tested and grows and then replaced a “reality”
6FLHQWL¿FNQRZOHGJHH[LVWV Even data and experiments are Ideas about knowledge should
independent of human beings interpreted be rooted in neurophysiology
We can know what we know If people accept this view, they
Science is a community activity
and do not know will be more tolerant

Table 1. Three philosophical positions.

9. 5HÀHFWLQJ RQ WKH REVHUYHU DQG WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ KDYH ORQJ EHHQ
themes in philosophy, the humanities in general, and occasionally in science. However,
LQWKHSRVW:RUOG:DU,,SHULRGLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVVFLHQWLVWVVRXJKWWRHPSKDVL]HWKH
objectivity of science and to condemn any suggestion of subjectivity as antiquated, inap-
SURSULDWH XQLQIRUPHG DQG ZURQJ (YHQ LQ WKH GH¿QLWLRQ RI VFLHQFH VFLHQWL¿F PHWKRGV
were described as a way of eliminating observer bias.
10. ,QYRQ)RHUVWHUXVHGWKHWHUP³VHFRQGRUGHUF\EHUQHWLFV´IRUWKH¿UVWWLPHDW
a meeting of the American Society for Cybernetics in Philadelphia (Foerster 2003a). In the
same year, the book Cybernetics of Cybernetics was published, which mentioned “second-
RUGHUF\EHUQHWLFV´DVWKH³F\EHUQHWLFVRIREVHUYLQJV\VWHPV´LQFRQWUDVWWR¿UVWRUGHUF\-
EHUQHWLFVDVWKH³F\EHUQHWLFVRIREVHUYHGV\VWHPV´)RHUVWHU%\WKLVWLPHWKHUH
ZHUHDQXPEHURIWKHRUHWLFDODFKLHYHPHQWVLQWKH¿HOGRIF\EHUQHWLFV0F&XOORFK
KDGGH¿QHGDQGGHYHORSHGH[SHULPHQWDOHSLVWHPRORJ\%DWHVRQZDVGRLQJZRUN
on schizophrenia and the double bind and had published Steps to an Ecology of Mind;
Wiener’s (1948) concept of a second industrial revolution was widely known; comput-
ers and robotics were advancing rapidly; there was some work being done by artists and
composers (Reichardt 1968; Brün 2004); Maturana’s concept of autopoiesis was attract-
ing considerable attention as a way of explaining the organization and operation of living
systems (Maturana 1975). Work on second-order cybernetics was just beginning when
IXQGLQJIURPJRYHUQPHQWUHVHDUFKJUDQWVFHDVHGGXHLQSDUWWRWKH0DQV¿HOG$PHQGPHQW
11. ,QWKHHDUO\VWKHUHZDVWXUPRLORQFROOHJHFDPSXVHVLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
and Congress wanted to cool the campuses. One of the causes of the turmoil was that much
research on campuses was funded by the Department of Defense (DOD). At the same time,
VWXGHQWVZHUHRSSRVHGWRWKH9LHWQDP:DU6R0LNH0DQV¿HOGDOLEHUDO'HPRFUDWDQG
6HQDWH 0DMRULW\ /HDGHU SURSRVHG WKH 0DQV¿HOG$PHQGPHQW ,W UHTXLUHG WKDW DOO '2'
funding have a military mission. That meant that von Foerster, who was being funded
E\WKH$LU)RUFH2൶FHRI6FLHQWL¿F5HVHDUFKDQGWKH2൶FHRI1DYDO5HVHDUFKKDGWR
declare the military mission of his research. He said the research had no military mission.

03 Umpleby.indd 31 03-07-17 1:51:43 PM

 32

Consequently, he could no longer receive funding from the people who had been funding
his research (Umpleby 2003). In contrast, people in the artificial intelligence (AI) labs at
MIT, Stanford, and Carnegie Mellon, when asked about the military implications of AI,
invented the concept of an electronic battlefield. That justification was very well received,
both at the Pentagon and in Congress, because it held the promise of fewer American casu-
alties in wars. The result was that the flow of federal money shifted from both cybernetics
and AI to just AI and robotics.
12. The Biological Computer Laboratory (BCL) at the University of Illinois in Ur-
bana-Champaign had been a leading center for cybernetics research since it was founded
by von Foerster in 1958. There were efforts to find other funding for BCL, but they were
not successful in achieving the previous level of support. So the laboratory was closed in
1975 when von Foerster retired and moved to California. Those interested in cybernetics
then did not have a laboratory in the US dedicated to cybernetics research, since Warren
McCulloch and Norbert Wiener, both at MIT, had died in the 1960s. In the late 1970s, to
continue our conversations about cybernetics among the scholars who visited BCL, includ-
ing Maturana, Varela, Lars Löfgren, Stafford Beer, Gordon Pask, Ranulph Glanville, and
others, we moved the BCL network into cyberspace. This period was the early days of
experiments with digital messaging. Murray Turoff had created the Electronic Information
Exchange System (EIES) at New Jersey Institute of Technology in Newark. The National
Science Foundation was funding several experimental trials on small research communi-
ties, using EIES. I received one of nine grants for these experimental trials. I invited the
former BCL people to communicate with each other using this new medium (Umpleby
1979; Umpleby & Thomas 1983).
13. The American Society for Cybernetics (ASC), which was founded in 1964, had
passed through a period of inactivity in the mid 1970s due to personality conflicts. The
conflicts were resolved and ASC was revived by Barry Clemson, Doreen Steg, Larry Hei-
lprin, and Klaus Krippendorff (Krippendorff & Clemson 2016). In addition to electronic
messaging and collaboration via EIES, we resumed holding annual conferences in 1980
(Umpleby 2016). Usually, on the first day of these conferences, we held a tutorial for those
new to the field. The tutorials covered both first- and second-order cybernetics. We felt
we were beginning a scientific revolution in the field of cybernetics. The field had always
had two orientations, which were becoming more well-defined (Corona & Thomas 2010).
There were those who wanted to design electrical and mechanical equipment and those
who wanted to understand human cognition. For the engineers, good work meant building
something. For the biologists, philosophers, and social scientists, good work was a con-
tribution to knowledge. These different goals led to some harsh exchanges and a further
separation between the technical and philosophical branches of cybernetics.
14. We also conducted tutorials for the European Meetings on Cybernetics and Sys-
tems Research (EMCSR) in Vienna, Austria, the Dutch Systems Group in Amsterdam, and
a few other conferences. Pask, Glanville, and Gerhard de Zeeuw organized symposia for
the Vienna and Amsterdam conferences. Von Foerster, Maturana, Varela, and Ernst von
Glasersfeld were invited as keynote speakers. We were working on the introduction of
the notion of second-order cybernetics and related ideas. Several definitions of first and
second-order cybernetics were created (see Table 2).
15. Ronald Kline ends his 2015 book The Cybernetics Moment with the assessment
that the cybernetics movement ended in the mid 1970s, the moment when second-order
cybernetics was invented. The great majority of US scientists thought that paying atten-

03 Umpleby.indd 32 03-07-17 1:51:44 PM

 33

Author First-order cybernetics Second-order cybernetics

von Foerster The cybernetics of observed systems The cybernetics of observing systems

Pask The purpose of a model The purpose of a modeler

Varela Controlled systems Autonomous systems

Interaction among the variables Interaction between observer and
8PSOHE\
in a system observed
Theories of the interaction between ideas
8PSOHE\ Theories of social systems
and society

Table 2. Varieties of second-order cybernetics in the 1970s and 1980s.

tion to the observer was a return to a subjectivist epistemology, which they regarded as a
fundamental error. Von Foerster, Maturana, and other second-order cyberneticians thought
that not including the observer was inconsistent with an understanding of neurobiology.
7KHWUDQVLWLRQIURP¿UVWRUGHUF\EHUQHWLFVWRVHFRQGRUGHUF\EHUQHWLFVLVDIXQGDPHQWDO
transition, as I will discuss in the next part.

Part 2: Von Foerster and a revolution of the general scientific method

16. In order to discuss in more detail the new perspective that was developed by von
Foerster from the late 1960s onwards under the name of second-order cybernetics, I will
DGGUHVVWKHIROORZLQJTXHVWLRQV
ƒ :KDWDUHWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVWKDWVHSDUDWH¿UVWRUGHUIURPVHFRQGRUGHUF\EHUQHWLFV"
ƒ :KHUHGRWKHDGYDQWDJHVRIVHFRQGRUGHUF\EHUQHWLFVOLHZKHQFRPSDUHGWR¿UVW
RUGHUF\EHUQHWLFV"
ƒ And why should second-order cybernetics be considered as a general model for
QHZVFLHQWL¿FRSHUDWLRQVLQRWKHUGLVFLSOLQHVDQGIRUDQDOWHUQDWLYHPHWKRGRORJ\
RIVFLHQFH"
17. 9RQ)RHUVWHU¶VGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ¿UVWRUGHUDQGVHFRQGRUGHUF\EHUQHWLFVLVWKH
GL൵HUHQFH EHWZHHQ H[FOXGLQJ WKH REVHUYHU IURP H[SOLFLW PHQWLRQ DQG LQFOXGLQJ WKH RE-
server. Including what had previously been neglected makes for a larger conception of sci-
ence, a conception that can deal with a wider range of phenomena. In terms of the Law of
Requisite Variety (Ashby 1952), second-order cybernetics expands the variety in science
and hence the variety in the world that scientists can describe.
18. One answer to these questions would be that von Foerster was adding a new di-
mension, namely the amount of attention paid to the observer. This change would not be
OLPLWHGRQO\WRF\EHUQHWLFVEXWZRXOGSRWHQWLDOO\D൵HFWDOORIVFLHQFH8PSOHE\
19. However, certainly in his later years, von Foerster did not intend merely to under-
stand cognition and to pay more attention to observers, but to replace the traditional meth-
odology with a new one and with new ways of practicing science. Von Foerster wanted to
FKDQJH WKH HVWDEOLVKHG RU WUDGLWLRQDO VFLHQWL¿F PHWKRGRORJ\ DVZHOO DV WKH FRQYHQWLRQDO

03 Umpleby.indd 33 03-07-17 1:51:44 PM

 34

ways of practicing science, which, in due course, were to be reduced to small niches only.
In one lecture, von Foerster described his approach as a demolition.
Everywhere, in the United States too, the oldest and most beautiful houses are nowadays
being demolished and instead steel-and-glass skyscrapers with 36 stories are being con-
structed. I want to emphasize the reverse process. I start with a 36-story steel-and-glass
skyscraper and demolish it. But I am not building a baroque castle instead, but something
completely different: maybe a beetle, maybe an ant colony, maybe a family. (Foerster 1988:
20, my translation)

20. The metaphor of the steel-and-glass skyscrapers applied to the accepted scientific
method becomes clear in von Foerster’s lecture on “Cybernetics of Cybernetics.” In these
short lecture notes, von Foerster characterizes second-order cybernetics as a fundamen-
tal paradigm change, which he did not attribute, as Kuhn suggested, to anomalies and to
defects in the older paradigm, but rather to its very “flawlessness” (Foerster 2003a: 284).
Von Foerster points to two historical instances in science of elimination of a paradigm by
success or perfection. The first case was the Copernican Revolution resulting from “the
novel vision of a heliocentric planetary system” (ibid: 284) even though “the Ptolemaeic
geocentric system was at its height in the accuracy of its predictions” (ibid: 284). For
von Foerster, the second instance was the accepted, hegemonic scientific method with its
“flawless, but sterile path that explores the properties seen to reside within objects.” The
Ptolemaic geocentric system was replaced between the 15th and the 17th centuries. And,
according to von Foerster, the hegemonic scientific method we know today is to be re-
duced significantly in the years and decades ahead and substituted with an alternative, with
second-order cybernetics as its prime example.
21. The replacement of scientific methodology was not intended as a nostalgic move
towards premodern forms. Several elements of scientific methods, such as the production
of hypotheses or theories, experiments, collection of relevant data, the production of new
instruments, or empirical testability and falsifiability, need not be changed. But a general
replacement of the current method is required for two reasons.
ƒƒ First, researchers or observers as necessary components in any research process
are included in the prevailing research method only in an implicit and hidden way.
ƒƒ Second, the current research process has the goal of removing this implicit in-
clusion so that objective accounts can emerge that are strictly independent of
researchers or observers. Observer effects, subjective biases, or personal prefer-
ences, while recognized and necessary initially, are to be excluded from accounts
of the research process as much as possible.
22. Eric Kandel summarizes the traditional scientific method and its emphasis on ob-
jectivity in the following way.
Scientists make models of elementary features of the world that can be tested and refor-
mulated. These tests rely on removing the subjective biases of the observer and relying on
objective measurements and evaluations. (Kandel 2012: 449)

23. Thus, von Foerster describes the traditional scientific method as “a particular de-
lusion within our Western tradition,” which he characterized by the postulate of objectivity:
The properties of the observer shall not enter the description of his observations. (Foerster
2003a: 285).

03 Umpleby.indd 34 03-07-17 1:51:44 PM

 35

Traditional New
Appearance Function
:RUOGDQG,VHSDUDWHG :RUOGDQG,RQH
Schizoid Homonoid
Monological Dialogical
Denotative Connotative
Describing Creating
You say how it is It is how you say it
Cogito, ergo sum Cogito, ergo sumus

Table 3. Two paths for interactions with the world/environment.

24. The fear has been that allowing the properties of observers to be included in their
descriptions would open the door to subjectivism, biases, and irrationality. Wild pluralisms
would be the mildest symptoms in science if researchers and their properties were admit-
ted without further constraints. Nevertheless, human observers are biological organisms.
Not to incorporate an understanding of the biology of cognition in our practice of science
requires discarding relevant experience and knowledge.
25. $WWKLVSRLQWDVSHFL¿FDWLRQRIWKHIRXQGDWLRQVIRUWKHQHZVFLHQWL¿FPHWKRGLV
needed. In the paper “Ethics and Second-Order Cybernetics” von Foerster develops a dis-
tinction between two attitudes towards one’s environment or world.
‘Am I apart from WKH XQLYHUVH"¶ 0HDQLQJ ZKHQHYHU , look, I’m looking as if through a
peephole upon an unfolding universe; or ‘Am I part ofWKHXQLYHUVH"¶0HDQLQJZKHQHYHU,
act,¶PFKDQJLQJP\VHOIDQGWKHXQLYHUVHDVZHOO)RHUVWHUF

26. Von Foerster re-iterated the dualism of apart/a part in the form of the following
TXHVWLRQ±³$P,DQREVHUYHUZKRVWDQGVRXWVLGHDQGORRNVLQDV*RG+HLQ]RUDP,SDUWRI
WKHZRUOGDIHOORZSOD\HUDIHOORZEHLQJ"´)RHUVWHU)URPWKHUHKHH[SDQGHG
WKLVGLVWLQFWLRQWRDQLQWULJXLQJOLVWRIFKDUDFWHULVWLFGL൵HUHQFHVEHWZHHQWZRIXQGDPHQWDOO\
GL൵HUHQWZD\VRILQWHUDFWLQJZLWKDQHQYLURQPHQWRUWKHZRUOGLQJHQHUDO
27. 9RQ)RHUVWHUHPSKDVL]HVRQHGLVWLQFWLRQIURP7DEOHDVEHLQJYHU\VLJQL¿FDQW
For me the most important distinction in the table is between ‘Say how it is’ versus ‘It is
KRZ\RXVD\LW¶7KHVHIRUPHDUHWKHUHDOO\IXQGDPHQWDOGL൵HUHQFHVEHWZHHQµVWDQGLQJ
RXWVLGH¶DQGµVWDQGLQJLQVLGH¶±DQGKHUHRIFRXUVHV\QWD[¿WVDVWKHVHWRIUXOHV\RXFDQ
see from the outside. Semantics, however, is like a roast that is being prepared and will
VRRQEHVHUYHG)RHUVWHU

28. The dichotomy of “standing outside” or “standing inside” can be transferred to

the domains of science methods, where the traditional and still hegemonic method follows
the practice of science from outside whereas the new alternative corresponds to a science
from within.
29. These two epistemic modes of doing science from outside or inside belong to the
group of undecidable questions. For von Foerster, analytical questions, such as mathemati-

03 Umpleby.indd 35 03-07-17 1:51:44 PM

 36

cal proofs, are already decided, so we cannot decide them. Undecidable questions, such as
values or goals, are up to us. Von Foerster characterized undecidable questions with two
propositions.
Only those questions that are in principle undecidable, we can decide […] We can choose
who we wish to become when we have decided on an in principle undecidable question.
(Foerster 2003b: 293, emphasis in the original)

30. The new general scientific method as an alternative modus operandi and as scien-
tific practices from inside involves activities that are highly interactive and recursive. Louis
Kauffman’s contribution for the present volume describes the configuration from inside,
with researchers as interactive units in reflexive domains. He points out the decisive role of
consensus-formation and of the emergence of eigenforms within these reflexive domains.
He also provides a fascinating re-invention or re-construction of the scientific method from
within. Kauffman’s article makes clear that solipsism or subjectivism are not necessary
outcomes of operating from within.
31. Finally, von Foerster is quite explicit that the epistemic distinction of doing sci-
ence from without and practicing science from within refers also to the separation between
first-order and second-order cybernetics. The short description of first-order cybernetics as
the “cybernetics of observed systems” and of second-order cybernetics as the “cybernetics
of observing systems”
is nothing else but a paraphrase of […] the two fundamentally different epistemological,
even ethical, positions, where one considers oneself, on the one hand, as an independent
observer who watches the world go by; or on the other hand, as a particular actor in the
circularity of human relations. (Foerster 2003c: 303)

Thus, first-order cybernetics becomes the study of cybernetics from without whereas sec-
ond-order cybernetics becomes cybernetic analysis from within. Any scientific field can
be studied in two significantly different epistemic modes, where researchers play highly
active roles in the mode “from within” or, as Karl Müller (2016) has described it recently,
in an endo-mode as opposed to the still dominant exo-mode of the traditional scientific
method. Any scientific observation is addressed to a community of observers.
32. In the decades between von Foerster’s introduction of the concept of second-order
cybernetics in 1974 and his distinction between two epistemic modes of scientific world-
making several years later, the science system was transformed significantly (Gibbons
et al. 1994; Hollingsworth & Müller 2008). Science became more diversified, complex,
and open to new alternatives. Approaches from within, while still not widespread today,
emerged especially in the social sciences, in feminist theorizing (Haraway 1988, 1991), in
the diffusion of participatory methods (Cooperrider & Whitney 2005; Christakis & Bausch
2006; Umpleby & Oyler 2007), and in the environmental sciences.
33. In the next section, I will focus on a specific institute for social and community
research that operated since its beginnings in the 1950s in a mode from within. The next
step is important because it shows that the perspective from within is neither utopian nor
does it lead to an unrestricted subjectivism, but becomes a feasible way of exploring the
social world in a significantly different manner than traditional sociologists are used to.

03 Umpleby.indd 36 03-07-17 1:51:44 PM

 37

Part 3: An example of practicing social research from within

34. My goal in this section is to describe a way of doing social research, or second-
order socio-cybernetics, that is compatible with an epistemic mode from within. I describe
the work of the Institute of Cultural Affairs (ICA) and contrast its work with the usual
social science research, which still operates in a conventional mode from outside.
35. In the 1950s, a group of people trained in the ministry had been working with
people in the suburbs on “church renewal,” encouraging members of the church to take a
larger view of the community and to become more involved in community projects. After a
few years, they decided to work themselves with people in poor communities. They chose
a community on the West Side of Chicago. The financing came from Head Start. One
member of a couple would work on the Head Start project and the other person would work
on community organizing. When Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated in 1968, they
were burned out. Rather than give up, they decided to try again. They organized a meeting
of a diverse group of people from the community along with a few business people and
government officials.
36. They held a week-long conference using facilitation methods. Each day they
asked members of the community to answer a question. On the first day: What is your
vision for the future of your community? On the second day: What are the obstacles to
achieving that vision? Why is it not already present? On the third day: What are some
strategies that would remove the obstacles? On the fourth day: What tactics are needed to
advance the strategies? On the fifth day: What actions should be taken to implement the
tactics? That is, who will do what, when, and how to implement the tactics? At the end of
the conference they had a set of plans and committees that worked to implement the plans
in the subsequent months. Periodically, at least every 6 or 12 months, they would review
what they had planned to do, compare the plans with what had been accomplished, reflect
on what they had learned, and then generate a new set of plans.
37. This procedure worked very well in Chicago and a great deal was accomplished.
They wondered whether the same methods would work in a developing country. Through
contacts in the World Council of Churches, they decided to do a second Human Develop-
ment Project in the Marshall Islands. Again there was notable success. So, they decided
to do 24 projects, approximately one in each time zone around the world. Model villages
would serve as examples of what could be achieved. After the first set of projects was done,
they decided to do a second set of 24 projects (Umpleby & Oyler 2007).
38. During this time, the people in the Institute of Cultural Affairs (ICA) were also
doing other projects. They organized Town Meetings, a one-day event, one in each county
in each country having a Human Development Project. They had a program called Global
Women’s Forum, which brought together women at the local level to share problems and
possibilities. Finally, they received a grant from the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to bring together people from many Non-Govern-
mental Organizations (NGOs) to share reports on their most successful projects. The final
meeting was held in New Delhi, India in 1983. The reports were published in a set of vol-
umes under the title Approaches that Work (Burbidge 1988).
39. Many NGOs and church organizations do projects in developing countries. Usu-
ally they have a specific focus. They may dig water wells, build churches, build schools,
improve housing, or work on specific diseases such as malaria or dysentery. ICA had a
different approach. They taught participatory methods, so people would learn how to work

03 Umpleby.indd 37 03-07-17 1:51:44 PM

 38

together to define their needs, invent solutions, and cooperate with nearby people who had
resources. They created village institutions, usually a farmer’s cooperative, a business-
man’s cooperative, a preschool for children, and a parent-teacher association. Depend-
ing on what village businesses already existed, they encouraged the opening of additional
small businesses, such as a restaurant, a laundry, a hair-dressing salon, a bakery, and a
baby-sitting service. Depending on local needs, they helped to organize sports teams for
teenagers and weekly card games for seniors. They organized a weekly market where pro-
duce would be sold and people from neighboring communities could see the changes that
were happening and sometimes adopt similar initiatives.
40. Each summer, the people in ICA would return to Chicago to discuss the past year
and define programs for the coming year. In the fall, they would go to communities around
the world to implement the programs they had designed. Local contacts and resources were
suggested by members of the World Council of Churches. The next summer, they would
return to Chicago for reading and study. They would reflect on what worked and what did
not and adopt or invent new approaches.
41. The financial model was that in each project there were two or three couples.
One person in a couple would teach in an embassy school; the other would work full-time
on community development. In this way they were largely self-supporting, though at a
very low income level. Donations to ICA paid for international travel. They recruited ag-
ricultural and business advisers from nearby universities and sought donations or loans of
labor and equipment to dig wells, install irrigation pipes, provide books for children, etc.
Many consultants today use group facilitation methods with clients and continually seek to
improve their methods (Cooperrider & Whitney 2005; Bausch & Christakis 2015). To my
knowledge ICA was unique in the scale of its work with poor communities. They outgrew
their financial resources, and after 1984 the organization devolved into country-based ICA
organizations.
42. It is interesting to compare the work that ICA was doing with the way that social
science research is done in universities. Currently, the objective in social science research
is to test a theory by collecting and analysing data. Experiments should be replicable by
others. The researcher conducts the research but otherwise is not mentioned. Research is an
effort to find causal relationships among variables at a high level of statistical significance.
The goal is reliable theoretical knowledge, not social change or societal improvements
directly. Success is measured by number of papers in leading academic journals.
43. ICA did research differently. They read widely, for example Kenneth Boulding,
Margaret Mead, Paul Tillich, Ivan Illich, and E. F. Schumacher. They would start with cur-
rent knowledge and learn by doing. They would change methods as needed and use suc-
cessful methods with additional communities. Many forms of communication were used
– celebrations, a weekly market, a newsletter, signs, and posters. The goal was to improve
the quality of life – health, income, and education – as quickly as possible by using avail-
able knowledge and expertise (e.g., nutrition advice, irrigation, new crops, fertilizer, and
business practices). Success was measured by higher standards of living and the spread of
participatory methods to nearby communities. Networks of supportive people were created
and maintained.
44. When reflecting on the success of the very practical, grass-roots work of ICA, it
is interesting to ask why social science research is so detached from societal problems to-
day. Currently, universities exist around the world and thousands of people are engaged in
education and research on social systems. But in the traditional “mode from without,” they

03 Umpleby.indd 38 03-07-17 1:51:44 PM

 39

work with data and statistical methods rather than with people in communities. And they
produce articles with theoretical knowledge without exploring the possibilities of imple-
menting it. I will address these problems again in the final part of this article.
45. The ICA people were deeply involved in communities – living and working side-
by-side on a daily basis. They worked to resolve conflicts within the community. They
paid attention to emotions, spiritual feelings, cultural beliefs and practices and they worked
from within to create – through stories, songs, and symbols – a shared concern for the com-
munity and the world, not just individual advancement. In short, they operated as second-
order socio-cyberneticians, although the name of the field socio-cybernetics as well as the
concept of second-order would be unfamiliar to them.

Part 4: Important consequences of doing science from within

46. For a variety of reasons, second-order cybernetics as cybernetics from within has
not been developed to its full potential, especially in social, biological, or cognitive scienc-
es. The early pioneers of second-order cybernetics lost their momentum and did not pro-
duce a sufficient number of paradigmatic examples to guide further work. From the 1980s
onwards, von Foerster was situated far from laboratories and focused on lecture activities
around the world. Glanville provided a transcendental framework for second-order cyber-
netics (as discussed in Müller 2015), but co-operated mainly with designers and architects.
Maturana did not develop his observer-focused autopoietic approach in the direction of
scientific methodology, Niklas Luhmann (1997) and Dirk Baecker (2013) concentrated
on an abstract framework of second-order observations and societal differentiations in an
exo-mode, and other leading figures such as Pask, Varela, and Beer died between 1996 and
2002. In my view, second-order cybernetics as a mode of research from within still has a
significant future, especially in the social sciences, the life sciences, and cognitive science.
47. In the fourth part of my article, I show that the new science configuration from
within, which was initiated by von Foerster under the name of second-order cybernetics, is
part of a continuing evolution of science and produces significant advantages in relation to
the traditional approaches from without. In this part, I focus on four consequences of this
on-going transformation from exo- to endo-science that are not visible at first sight, but that
are important for further research in second-order cybernetics.
48. For the science system in general, the reflexive turn to a mode from within, or an
endo-mode, can yield at least four groups of new opportunities, namely
ƒƒ the expansion of types of scientific problems and problem solutions
ƒƒ a stronger emphasis on scientific knowledge production in applications and imple-
mentations and in translational or extension activities
ƒƒ more diversified and more societally-oriented career paths for individual research-
ers
ƒƒ new possibilities for linking scientific research with ethical considerations.
49. In all four areas, second-order cybernetics can play significant new roles in pro-
moting these various shifts and can build a new cybernetic research agenda across different
disciplines in the natural and the social sciences.

03 Umpleby.indd 39 03-07-17 1:51:44 PM

 40

Diversification of scientific problems

50. The example of the ICA in the previous section and its operating mode from
within makes it clear that the domain of scientific problems and scientific problem solu-
tions is becoming more diversified and complex. Operating within this new general science
method from within will be accompanied by a widening of scientific problems and problem
solutions from a predominantly theoretical focus to a mixed form of theoretical and practi-
cal problems, where problem solutions are aimed at eliminating or significantly reducing
societal or environmental problems. The theoretical background for this type of practical
problem-solving goes back to the 1950s and 1960s, where a new approach under the name
of “action research” was propagated, especially within Latin America (Fals Borda 1978).
Since then, action research has institutionalized itself, albeit in rather marginal proportions
(Greenwood & Levin 2007; Reason & Bradbury 2001).
51. Under the old regime of the traditional scientific method, a societal problem was
solved once this problem was successfully modelled or explained. The theoretical problem
solution could allow for additional features such as forecasts or scenarios. Practical prob-
lem solutions require the reduction or elimination of a societal or environmental problem,
and this practical problem solution must have observable and positive consequences for
the well-being of affected groups or communities. Practical problem solutions come about
through co-operation and interaction between target groups and scientists until the goal of
problem elimination or reduction is reached. Obviously, practical problem solutions will
not replace theoretical ones in the years ahead, but practical problem solutions will gain in
importance and ideally will be seen as a viable alternative to purely theoretical accounts
of system behavior.
52. Table  4 presents an overview of the main differences between theoretical and
practical types of societal problems and problem solutions. Under the traditional regime
from without, only the left column was admitted for (first-order) socio-cyberneticians. In
the alternative mode from within, both types of problems and problem solutions can be
pursued by endo-social scientists.
53. Second-order social cyberneticians can focus their work on new methods, instru-
ments and heuristics for the practical solution of societal, environmental, medical, or tech-
nological problems and can create new methods for more participatory and more active
types of science.

Advances in the knowledge of implementation

54. A second advantage of doing science from within is to improve our knowledge of
implementation. Von Glasersfeld (2005) described knowledge as a combination of theo-
retical elements together with the know-how of their applications. In recent decades, many
research facilities have been established worldwide as applied universities, as faculties
or institutes for social work, for education, for management science, and for other ap-
plied fields. Under the traditional scientific regime, these institutes, faculties, or universi-
ties were considered as second-rate compared to the research universities, with their focus
on basic research. The traditional scientific method emphasizes theoretical advancements
and views applied work as lying outside science. If implementations were not progressing
well, that was not a scientific problem. In addition, the interactions between basic and ap-
plied science were not strongly developed, due to the complex multi-disciplinary nature

03 Umpleby.indd 40 03-07-17 1:51:44 PM

 41

Theoretical: Research problems (RP) Practical: Societal or environmental problems (SEP)

Mode from without Mode from within
(objectivity, observer-free) (observer participation)
Building a theoretical model/ framework Assessing SEP
for RP (history, problem solutions in the past, target groups)
Collecting relevant data Establishing and carrying out a work plan
Building a workforce and procedures for solutions of
Theory or model-testing
SEP
Explanatory account for RP (൵HFWLYHUHGXFWLRQRUHOLPLQDWLRQRI6(3
Success through publications and Success by client groups acquiring skills for self-
VFLHQWL¿FLPSDFW improvement of quality of life
Reliable theoretical knowledge Robust practical knowledge

Table 4. 7ZRW\SHVRIVFLHQWL¿FSUREOHPVDQGSUREOHPVROXWLRQV

of applied problems relative to theoretical research. In the old regime, the applied work
remained under-developed and practical problem solutions seemed outside the realm of
science.
55. Many societal or environmental problems are solved, in principle, in their scien-
WL¿F GLPHQVLRQV EXW ODFN FRUUHVSRQGLQJ LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ VWDJHV$ GHYHORSPHQWDO VWXG\
showed, for example (Suri 2008), that the problem of global poverty and hunger does not
QHHGHQRUPRXV¿QDQFLDOWUDQVIHUVIURPWKH1RUWKWRWKH6RXWK7KHFUXFLDOPLVVLQJHOHPHQW
is local knowledge and adequate knowledge distribution with respect to seeds, farming,
and marketing. In the new regime of a science from within, agricultural universities, facul-
ties, and research institutes worldwide could develop a global program of poverty reduc-
WLRQWKURXJKNQRZOHGJHGL൵XVLRQDQGFRQFHUWHGWUDQVODWLRQH൵RUWVZRUOGZLGH
56. The present time is characterized by an abundance of societal and environmen-
tal problems locally, nationally, and globally, where a high accumulation of theoretical
VFLHQWL¿FNQRZOHGJHLVDFFRPSDQLHGE\DGHHSGH¿FLHQF\LQH[WHQVLRQLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
RUWUDQVODWLRQDONQRZOHGJH7RDVLJQL¿FDQWGHJUHHWKHFXUUHQWOHJLWLPDWLRQFULVLVLQVFL-
ence (Nowotny, Scott & Gibbons 2001) is connected to the problem of under-developed
implementation of new and avant-garde knowledge and technologies. This asymmetry can
be attributed partly to the once-dominant mode from without and to the resulting lack of
practical solutions.
57. Second-order cybernetics in particular can become a vital element in pursuing
UHVHDUFKWRFORVHWKHVHDV\PPHWULHVDQGGH¿FLHQFLHVDQGWRFUHDWHDQDEXQGDQFHRIQHZ
EULGJHVIRUWUDQVIHUVEHWZHHQEDVLFDQGDSSOLHGUHVHDUFKDQGIRUWKHUDSLGGL൵XVLRQRIQHZ
technologies in areas such as health, information, or industry.

Strengthening and diversifying science curricula

58. A third advantage of pursuing research from within is to transform the curricula,
especially in the social or the environmental sciences, and to build these curricula on two

03 Umpleby.indd 41 03-07-17 1:51:44 PM

 42

Political Social Public

Economics Sociology science psychology opinion
1949/50 5.7 24.1 2.6 22.0 43.0
1964/65 32.9 54.8 19.4 14.6 55.7
1979/80 28.7 55.8 35.4 21.0 90.6
1994/95 42.3 69.7 41.9 49.9 90.3

Table 5. The rise of survey research from 1950 to 1995, in percent

IURP6DULV *DOOKRIHU

GL൵HUHQWSLOODUV6KLIWLQJWRDPRGHIURPZLWKLQZLOODGGWRWKHFRJQLWLYHGLYHUVLW\LQWKHVH
¿HOGVLQVLJQL¿FDQWZD\V
a. Researchers in the social or the environmental sciences are currently losing their
GLUHFW FRQWDFW ZLWK WKHLU ¿HOGV RI LQYHVWLJDWLRQ 7KH SUHGRPLQDQW PHWKRG RI UH-
search used in journal articles in areas such as sociology, psychology, or political
science is now based on survey data. Table 5 shows that during the period from
1950 to 1995, articles in high-quality journals for economics, sociology, political
science, social psychology, or public-opinion research are based more and more
on the analysis of survey data. A mixed approach of dealing with theoretical and
practical problems provides much richer perspectives on societies and their envi-
ronments than an almost exclusive focus on survey data.
b. Students and future scientists, as knowledge producers, will gain in their under-
standing of societies if they can shift between theoretical and practical work and
FDQDYRLGWRTXRWH/XGZLJ:LWWJHQVWHLQ³DRQHVLGHGGLHW´:LWWJHQVWHLQ
§593). Science from within and its variety of problems and problem solutions as
well as its strong emphasis on implementation knowledge should allow more cog-
QLWLYHO\GLYHUVL¿HGFDUHHUSDWKVLQUHVHDUFKZRUN
c. $ PRUH GLYHUVL¿HG DQG FRPSOH[ SHUVSHFWLYH RQ VRFLHW\ DQG WKH HQYLURQPHQW
VKRXOGKDYHDSRVLWLYHH൵HFWRQWKHWKHRUHWLFDORUWKHLQWHUSUHWLYHZRUNRIVRFLDO
or environmental scientists. Due to the more complex nature of practical problems
and solutions, it can be expected that in the long run, theories or models will be-
come more practical and the implementation or extension work will become more
theoretical.
59. $JDLQVHFRQGRUGHUF\EHUQHWLFVFDQSOD\DVLJQL¿FDQWQHZUROHLQWKHPHGLDWLRQ
of theoretical and practical problem solutions in the social and the environmental sciences,
DQGLQ¿QGLQJLQWHOOLJHQWQHZPL[HVLQWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIFXUULFXODDQG3K'SURJUDPVLQ
WKHVH¿HOGV

Recombining science and ethics

60. 7KHIRXUWKDGYDQWDJHRIWKHVFLHQFHPRGHIURPZLWKLQLVWKDWLWPDNHVVFLHQWL¿F
operations more dependent, aside from the goals of researchers, on urgent societal prob-

03 Umpleby.indd 42 03-07-17 1:51:44 PM

 43

lems, on the needs of different groups and populations, or on local or national values. Here,
science from within becomes significantly more negotiable and open to different normative
contexts and more sensitive and receptive to ethical considerations.
61. Without losing its scientific credentials, second-order cybernetics could become
a new instrument for fine-tuning successful theoretical and practical problem solutions
and the adaptation to local or national needs. In this way, second-order cybernetics could
operationalize von Foerster’s ethical imperative:
Act always so as to increase the number of choices. (Foerster 2003d: 227)

62. Following this general direction of an expansion in the number of choices, sec-
ond-order cybernetics as cybernetics from within could develop a new function as a lever
for humanizing science in a significant and sustainable manner.

Part 5: New horizons for second-order cybernetics

63. The research agenda for second-order cybernetics has been restricted so far to
the transformation from exo-science to endo-science and to special niches within these
transformation processes.
64. But second-order cybernetics as a trans-disciplinary field for the study of commu-
nication and control from within can be advanced in a more general and systematic way.
Here I will mention four broad domains with new objectives for second-order cybernetics
that can be reached independently and outside the four areas in the previous section. These
four general targets constitute new long-term research paths that could be undertaken in the
years and decades ahead, namely:
a. shifting from the traditional epistemology of cybernetics and radical constructiv-
ism to the building of more advanced epistemic frameworks
b. providing the foundations for actor-based disciplines such as psychology, manage-
ment, and the social sciences
c. widening of methodologies, especially for the cognitive, the social, and the bio-
logical sciences
d. recognizing a multiplicity of scientific contexts, their differences, their implicit
status, and the need for mediations.
These four general and systematic domains for contemporary second-order cybernetics
research and development can be described in the following manner.

Building viable epistemologies for radical constructivism

65. The epistemology of radical constructivism as a research tradition that includes
second-order cybernetics (Müller 2010) is mostly understood as being another variant of
social constructionism or postmodernism. Among the group of radical constructivists, von
Glasersfeld probably moved closest to philosophical domains. He established a radical
constructivist epistemology directed against scientific realism, against an objective and
observer-free reality, with an emphasis on the active role of observers in constructing their
realities, and, finally, with viability as an alternative criterion for the contingent acceptance
of statements, hypotheses, or theories (see Glasersfeld 2007; Müller 2011; Steffe 2007).

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 44

In sum, second-order cybernetics and radical constructivism have so far relied on an epis-
temology that appears less refined when compared to the highly sophisticated approaches
within contemporary epistemologies.
66. As a research program on cognition, second-order cybernetics, as well as radical
constructivism, offered various empirical explanations of the stability of reality construc-
tions, especially through von Foerster’s postulate of epistemic homeostasis:
The nervous system as a whole is organized in such a way (organizes itself in such a way)
that it computes a stable reality. (Foerster 2003b: 244)

67. But the relations between radical constructivism as an empirical research program
and scientific realism as a hegemonic epistemological paradigm have been restricted to a
non-dialogue that can be summarized in a slightly paradoxical manner: radical constructiv-
ism provides an explanatory account of why realism seems so natural or obvious, while
scientific realism continues to argue for the fallibility of radical constructivist arguments.
68. But a future epistemology for second-order cybernetics or radical constructivism
should be linked to at least two recent epistemological approaches, going by the names of
social epistemology (Goldman & Blanchard 2015) on the one hand and epistemological
contextualism (Rysiew 2016) on the other hand. These were advanced without explicit
references to second-order cybernetics or to radical constructivism and deal with a variety
of problems also relevant for the traditional approach by von Glasersfeld.
69. As a challenging future objective, second-order cybernetics as cybernetics from
within should produce new state of the art epistemologies that include elements from social
and contextualist epistemologies and that produce more refined new conceptual frame-
works for dealing with epistemological issues within the tradition of radical constructiv-
ism.

Providing foundations for actor-based disciplines

70. A very large task for second-order cybernetics lies in its role as a founder of last
resort for academic disciplines with strong involvements of observers, namely for the so-
cial sciences, for the life sciences, or for the cognitive sciences. This task may seem far-
fetched and beyond the scope of second-order cybernetics, but Bernard Scott (this volume)
has provided an intriguing example for the foundations of psychology.
71. Scott characterizes second-order cybernetics as cybernetics of the observer and
presents a study in second-order cybernetics on the foundations of psychology. He uses the
framework of Pask’s Conversation Theory (Pask 1975a, 1975b), with its differentiation of
psychosocial P-individuals and biomechanical M-individuals and a variety of interaction
patterns between these two units. This type of study could be undertaken by second-order
cyberneticians for a variety of academic disciplines, including my own discipline of man-
agement.
72. Another example for fruitful future work for second-order cybernetics lies in the
foundations of the cognitive sciences, where second-order cybernetics could emphasize
three necessary requirements for cognitive science investigations that should be fulfilled
simultaneously.
a. Studies on cognition should be based on von Foerster’s unity of cognition postu-
late, where cognition is conceptualized with a multiplicity of faculties that cannot
be isolated functionally or locally (Foerster 2003e: 105). These faculties go well

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 45

beyond the domains of perception, memory, or inferring (Foerster & Müller 2003)
and also include learning, evaluating, and movements.
b. In Varela’s afterword to The Tree of Knowledge (Maturana & Varela 1992), enac-
tion was promoted as the middle ground between solipsism and representational-
ism, and a variety of e-properties such as embedded, embodied, enacted, environ-
ment, etc. have become essential building blocks for cognitive science studies (see
also Vörös, Froese & Riegler 2016).
c. First person approaches should not be excluded but must become a significant and
necessary element in the study of cognitive processes. This line of research was
already pursued by Varela, who argued vigorously for the necessity of these first-
order approaches, especially in studies of consciousness (Varela & Shear 1999).
73. Second-order cybernetics can provide new and more complex frameworks for
cognitive science and can become a constant reminder that the foundations of the cognitive
sciences are best developed in a way that remains consistent with these three requirements,
which seem to get lost more and more in the wider stream of contemporary cognitive sci-
ence research and publications.

Creating methods for endo-research across disciplines

74. A particularly fruitful task for second-order cybernetics in the future lies in the
reconfiguration of available methodologies, especially in the social sciences, the life sci-
ences, and the cognitive sciences, from their traditional exo-designs to new endo-designs.
75. Over the last few decades, I have worked on a number of methods for quality im-
provement, for process improvement, and for service learning that were organized largely
in an exo-mode and that belong to the methodology of management science. Second-order
cybernetics can interpret these and other methods in an endo-format across a broad range
of academic fields and can focus on the comparative advantages of these changes. This
work would be consistent with the current interest in teams.
76. The tasks ahead in the fields of methods and methodologies are challenging. The
primary objective lies in a stream of studies that use the revised endo-methods and endo-
methodologies. In this way, the potential strengths of these reinterpreted methods can be
specified concretely and multiple comparisons between the new endo-methods and the old
approaches can be undertaken.

Mediating between different contexts in science

77. An important research field for second-order cybernetics as cybernetics from
within lies in an enrichment of contextual differences, due to a new transparency of explicit
differences in the goals of researchers, their academic specializations, and their cultural
backgrounds, especially because differences in contexts have been rather ignored so far
(Lissack & Graber 2014).
78. I have conducted this type of research since the 1980s, when I worked to facilitate
communication between cyberneticians and systems scientists in the United States and the
Soviet Union (Umpleby 1987). During this period, a very important theoretical framework
was established by Vladimir Lefebvre (1982, 2001) under the name of reflexive control. It
described two different ethical systems that characterized the United States and the Soviet
Union.

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 46

79. The variety of issues in contextualizing science will produce challenging new
research tasks for second-order cybernetics, which can become a mediator across different
contexts and across different fields of scientific research. Currently, the ASC has moved
the problems of contexts and contextualizations to its primary agenda, so this work is being
conducted already.
80. In my view, these four roads ahead for second-order cybernetics offer a rich and
diverse research program that can be undertaken beyond the frameworks and approaches
inherited from the pioneers of second-order cybernetics.

Conclusion
81. Early work in cybernetics provided a theory of circular causal, regulatory phe-
nomena that occur in biological and social systems and in some machines. It offered a way
of explaining goal-seeking and goal-formulation. A general theory of perception, learning,
cognition, and adaptation was created that influenced many fields and that helped to create
the information age. This first wave of cybernetics ended around 1975 (Kline 2015).
82. Second-order cybernetics pursued a more ambitious goal that has not yet been tak-
en up by the broader scientific community or, more paradoxically, by second-order cyber-
neticians either. As I have described, second-order cybernetics has attempted to establish a
new way of operating scientifically from within, by noting that observing systems observe
systems from within, as opposed to the traditional scientific approach from without.
83. By proposing the idea of second-order cybernetics, von Foerster challenged a key
assumption in the methodology of science, namely the goal of objectivity to be achieved
by eliminating observer-effects. He showed that scientific disciplines or fields in general
can be organized in two ways. Many scientific fields still use the traditional approach of
observing from outside. Second-order cybernetics questioned this orthodoxy vigorously.
In doing so, von Foerster initiated a still-unfinished revolution in science. The new general
methodology of science from within changes the status of the researcher from a hidden fac-
tor to an active participant within a highly interactive system. Some fields, such as physics,
will retain their traditional methodology due to the focus on inanimate objects in the case of
physics. But many scientific fields can gain significantly by shifting to a mode of observing
from within. In this sense, second-order cybernetics provides a role model for operating
scientifically in a new way that offers advantages in terms of problem solutions, knowledge
production, and robust scientific outcomes.
84. Finally, second-order cybernetics can expect a bright future by moving along the
four new roads outlined above towards an advanced epistemology, to foundations and en-
do-methodologies for the social, the biological, or the cognitive sciences as well as towards
contextualizing science. In this way, second-order cybernetics can still act as an avant-
garde model for humanizing science and for making science more receptive to societal
needs at the local, national, and global levels.

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 47

Acknowledgement
This article benefited from many conversations with Karl H. Müller. Whereas I
worked with von Foerster during the early years of second-order cybernetics, the 1970s
and 1980s, Karl worked more closely with von Foerster during the 1990s and 2000s.

Open Peer Commentary:

Obstacles and Opportunities in the Future of Second-
Order Cybernetics and Other Compatible Methods
Allenna Leonard

1. In this commentary, I would like to broaden the context of Stuart Umpleby’s target
article to look at some of the other political, economic and social factors that have had an
impact on the take-up of both first- and second-order cybernetics and on parallel develop-
ments in contiguous fields. The promise of second-order science in the social and behav-
ioural sciences and the potential for it to address issues of implementation or enaction is
constrained by the general lack of comprehensive social science research and by the lower
sense of common values that, to a greater or lesser extent, now characterizes our communi-
ties and nations.
2. The challenges of post-war reindustrialization and the introduction of computers
and other machines drew heavily on the contributions of cybernetics, operations research,
psychology and human factors analysis that had been effectively utilized during World
War II, particularly in the US and the UK. It received funding from governments and from
industry that also included action research, research on the human/computer interface and
communications as well as concerns about the impact of technology and the quality of
working life. In addition to those associated primarily with cybernetics (Norbert Wiener,
Ross Ashby, Warren McCulloch, Gregory Bateson, Heinz von Foerster, Stafford Beer, Gor-
don Pask, Jay Forrester, Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela), there were others who
were more associated with the general systems community, who included, among others,
Kenneth Boulding, C. West Churchman, Russell Ackoff, Chris Argyris and Donald Schön.
Almost all of them sounded alarms about the consequences of the social and economic
trends that were perceived from Wiener’s Human Use of Human Beings (1950) onwards.
3. Von Foerster’s description of second order cybernetics was, perhaps, the most el-
egant and rigorous, as it was firmly based in neurophysiology, but the appreciation of
perspective was evident in other fields as well. George Kelly’s personal construct theory
was published in 1955; Argyris and Schön’s Theory in Practice was published in 1974. The
maxim “where you stand depends on where you sit,” otherwise known as “Miles’ Law”
appeared in Public Administration Review in 1978. In addition to the community develop-
ment work of the Institute for Cultural Affairs, the work on socio-technical systems theory
of Eric Trist, Fred Emery, Enid Mumford and others associated with the Tavistock Institute
worked with group process and multiple perspectives. Since then, a number of group pro-
cesses have been developed and used that have been very effective in improving equity,
reducing risk and generally increasing inclusion.

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 48

4. All of these approaches have one thing in common: they allow for multiple con-
structs of stakeholder positions, cultural and social contexts and time sensitive frameworks.
And they challenge the status quo of existing power relationships. To relate one anecdote,
colleagues of mine who were offering to do a syntegration (Beer 1994) had convinced
middle management that the challenges their company faced could best be addressed by a
planning process that would bring the multiple perspectives and collective knowledge of
the group together. The president of the company rejected the proposal on the grounds that
he did not want to establish the precedent of listening to his employees. Beer himself had
many comparable stories from his years in the steel industry and consulting. His experi-
ence was that many people in charge of companies would rather go out of business than
relinquish management prerogatives or even instigate improvements if the suggestions had
come from the shop floor.
5. If we look to the present, the challenges faced by second-order (and first-order)
cybernetics are part of a larger problem with science as a whole. These are times when even
Karl Popper’s “Science One” is under attack if the conclusions reached challenge eco-
nomic or political interests. We see this most publically in the denial of climate change and
environmental damage from pollution, but there have been many others. Even the evidence
that smoking is bad for one’s health was disputed for many years by tobacco companies.
We have also seen the United States Congress pass legislation forbidding the Center for
Disease Control from engaging in research on gun violence in the United States – a clear
example of unwarranted and damaging interference.
6. Answers to Umpleby’s questions about the characteristics separating first- and sec-
ond-order cybernetics and the advantages of second- over first-order cybernetics depend
on the context. After the perspective of the observer/researcher is made explicit, there will
be differences depending on whether or not the researcher is a participant observer. When
the subject of the research is not one where the observer has any direct contact or influ-
ence or where the researcher is fulfilling a specific contract, the process may be closer to
first- than second-order cybernetics. However, the extension into new areas of research
on implementation will necessarily incorporate more second-order characteristics. In both
cases, hypotheses, data collection and interpretation and falsifiability come into play, but
in somewhat different ways. The one aspect of the traditional approach to science that is
very difficult if not impossible to achieve when researching implementation projects is
reproducibility. There is too much variety in human social activities.
7. The backlash against the universities that led to the closing of von Foerster’s Bio-
logical Computer Laboratory was part of a process that saw, over time, reduced govern-
ment funding for universities and university research across the board and a corresponding
increase in the percentage of costs paid for by tuition and fees. A majority of undergraduate
courses are now taught by adjunct faculty who are no less qualified than their predecessors
but who must make do with short-term contracts – sometimes assembling a portfolio of
courses in different universities. Such faculty members have little or no job security and
are seldom in a position to commit the time to do or assume the costs of doing field work.
Surveys and correlations based on publically available data are essentially the only af-
fordable means of doing publishable research. Implementation falters as well: it is not the
knowledge that is missing; it is the resources and the political will to use that knowledge
that are lacking.
8. It must be noted that without sponsorship, the research conducted by individuals is
necessarily limited in its scope. Sponsored research, whether sponsored by governments or

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 49

foundations, usually has very specific goals and criteria. My own experience of working in
a university development office and later as a volunteer in an environmental organization
has been that a proposal’s likelihood of success is directly linked to how closely it mirrors
the funder’s criteria. In turn, funding agencies, especially in government, favour projects
with straightforward measures that are easy to defend against charges of wasting taxpayer
money. Needless to say, the higher the variety of an issue or problem, the more difficult it
is to achieve unambiguous or apolitical results.
9. As the 21st century finds its feet, the need for more use of cybernetic and systems-
based approaches will become clear as the unsustainability of current practices becomes
more and more evident. Indicators of ecological, social and economic instability are al-
ready apparent. It is to be hoped that it will be possible to mobilize to meet those threats to
human life as effectively as it was possible to mobilize for war. Appreciation of that risk
could become enough of a common value to move forward.
10. If and when that happens, a continuum between first- and second-order cybernetic
approaches will be needed; although looked at broadly, almost all applications that are not
mechanical will fall somewhere along the line toward a second-order approach. Any con-
struction of a cybernetic model is going to select some variables and ignore others, based
on the purposes of those constructing or commissioning the model and the goal of the re-
search. In most applications, whether designated as first- or second-order approaches, there
are preliminary discussions regarding the scope of the model and the assumptions made
about the situation and the variables that are relevant. Constraints may be imposed by time,
resources or the boundaries of the client’s concerns. If the context is complex or in flux,
periodic reexamination of the project goals and model fitness is or should be done and fur-
ther discussions held. Whether the modeler stands “outside” or “inside” may also depend
on perspective. If one is using a model to predict possible consequences of a government
program that will have an effect on the modeler or the modeler’s client, that person may be
“endo” with respect to their own interest in the outcome but “exo” with respect to the actors
who designed and will carry out the program.
11. As Umpleby notes, there is a great deal of research to be done regarding the fur-
ther development of second-order science. Some is based in cognitive science and could
explore the distinctions that we share as human beings and the dimensions of their indi-
vidual perceptions. As we accept the neurophysiological components of individuals, we
need to know more about how these individual perceptions and constructs become shared.
The case of the Institute for Cultural Affairs that Umpleby describes is interesting because
it began with a primary emphasis on implementation. Theory was explored to inform the
doing. This approach has the advantage of incurring very modest additional costs and be-
ing relatively insulated from other agenda. That would be a particularly valuable change as
it would not only extend the reach of issues addressed by science but would also be much
more inclusive with respect to the type of researchers who would become involved.

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 50

Open Peer Commentary:

Connecting Second-Order Cybernetics’
Revolution with Genetic Epistemology
Gastón Becerra

1. In this commentary, I will discuss Stuart Umpleby’s target article about the “scien-
tific revolution” he attibutes to Heinz von Foerster’s work. I will draw some parallels with
another constructivist stream that the author does not mention, at least not in the references
listed in §46. I am referring to Jean Piaget’s genetic epistemology, both in its original
version (preceding the radical and cybernetic constructivism) as well as the most recent
reformulation, proposed by Rolando García.
2. A few words are necessary to introduce this last author. García (1919–2012) was an
epistemologist who collaborated with Piaget at the end of his work (e.g., Piaget & García
1982, 1988). After Piaget’s death, García sought to create a new synthesis that could orga-
nize the different aspects considered by genetic epistemology (García 1987, 1992, 1999,
2000) as well to expand its scope by presenting it as a tool to interpret current problems
and challenges of science (García 1997, 2006). In my understanding, Umpleby has similar
intentions towards von Foerster’s work.
3. Here, I seek to broaden both the context and the image of the revolution that
Umpleby offers. Specifically, I will show that the movement propelling it was a more
comprehensive constructivism than the cybernetic-radical tradition. I also suggest that the
different philosophical assumptions from these variants of constructivism continue to con-
dition its achievements and challenges when it comes to reflecting on science. All this will
allow me to introduce García’s work to the readers of Constructivist Foundations.

A broader approach towards epistemology

4. In Table 1 and §5, Umpleby situates von Foerster’s view on science versus the more
classical view in its normative (Karl Popper) or sociological (Thomas Kuhn) aspects. The
main element of this “revolution,” in the author’s opinion, is the inclusion of the question
of “how an individual constructs a reality,” which von Foerster addresses by reflecting on
neurophysiological research from the 1960s. If we go back to the program posed by Piaget,
this is where we can draw the first parallel.
5. As is well-known, the main focus of Piaget’s work is epistemological:
Genetic epistemology attempts to explain knowledge, and in particular scientific knowl-
edge, on the basis of its history, its sociogenesis, and especially the psychological origins
of the notions and operations upon which it is based. (Piaget 1970: 1)

For Piaget, such a project entails integrating several disciplines and methods: on the one
hand, it resorts to formalizing analysis to deal with matters of knowledge validity, and on
the other, to historical-critical and genetic analysis in the fields of history of science and
developmental psychology to deal with the issue of knowledge constitution. Genetic epis-
temology holds that the explanations constructed around the development of individual
knowledge can shed light on the development of scientific knowledge. The core hypoth-
esis is that there is a “functional continuity” between both domains that would enable

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 51

their transformation to be explained by resorting to the same constructivist processes and

mechanisms (Piaget & García 1982: 31).
6. The underlying question furthering Piaget’s project can be grasped via a termino-
logical clarification. As García (2000: 25f) recalls, Piaget used the term “épistémologie”
in its French sense, which designates the critical study of scientific knowledge, i.e., the
analysis of its logical foundations and fields of action. The definition of genetic episte-
mology maintains this original sense of the term although it traces its genesis back all the
way to the most elementary individual forms, thus broadening the term’s sense towards a
general theory of knowledge. In García’s opinion, this move deserves to be described as
“revolutionary.” Such clarification is important for us because it shows how different ob-
jectives that are usually grouped under the same “epistemology” tag are connected. Jeremy
Burman (2007: 722) provides a clear summary when, turning away from the ambiguity of
such a tag, he suggests understanding Piaget as a “meta-epistemologist” or a “philosopher
of knowledge” who, based on the empirical consideration of cognition, is interested in
making philosophy of science a scientifically informed analysis.1
7. The parallels between Piaget’s and von Foerster’s project can be found not only in
their respective views on science but also in their concurrence on some questions regarding
the theory of knowledge, something that both authors acknowledged (see von Foerster’s
1981 contribution to Piaget’s festschrift and the honoree’s answer in Inhelder, García &
Voneche 1981). This basic concurrence is found in the common denominator of “construc-
tivism of the epistemic and cognitive theory,” which could also be applied to Ernst von
Glasersfeld, Humberto Maturana, Francisco Varela and Siegfried Schmidt, to name the au-
thors pointed out by Karin Knorr-Cetina (1989) and Niklas Luhmann (1990), from whom
I am adopting the denomination. All of them made their contribution in a wider movement
in favor of the “naturalization” of epistemology and science analysis.
8. In considering this wider constructivist tradition, I do not want to ignore the sig-
nificant differences that can be found in terms of philosophical assumptions, such as the
characterization of the cognizant subject or they way they understand society. Here, it is
my interest to suggest these assumptions should be considered when evaluating the con-
structivist philosophies of sciences’ accomplishments and challenges. Specifically, by in-
cluding two professed realists such as Piaget and García, I seek to introduce a difference
in Umpleby’s considerations, whose analysis seems to focus only on the less conflictive
dialogue between von Foerster and radical constructivism authors.

Challenges and achievements

9. Among the “significant advantages in relation to the traditional approaches” to
analyzing science, Umpleby points out that there is a preeminence of the social aspect:
§50 deals with shifts from theoretical problems to “practical” ones – e.g., social and en-
vironmental ones – as well as with “action research”; §§56f address the social contexts

1.  Coincidentally, there are reasons to believe Thomas Kuhn also used “epistemology” in an analo-
gous sense, associated to the theory of knowledge (see, e.g., Kuhn 1970: 96, 126), although, instead
of a constructivist standpoint, a certain empiricism and psychological behaviorism can be observed
(Becerra & Castorina 2015). In any case, what distinguishes epistemologists such as Piaget, Ernst
von Glasersfeld or von Foerster from philosophers of science such as Kuhn and Popper is that the
former thematize cognitive mechanisms, which would eventually influence how the “social” dimen-
sion is understood.

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of applied knowledge; §59 calls for giving academic value to these operations; §61 calls
for contemplating the ethical dimension of research. Such preeminence is sustained in the
“new horizons” the author sets out for second-order cybernetics: in §76, the step towards
endo-research that is referred to can be understood as considering the context of knowledge
production; and §77 points out the importance of comparing objectives and assumptions to
evaluate prospective dialogues and risks when integrating “contexts and disciplines.” This
is where we can draw a second parallel with genetic epistemology.
10. In Psychogenesis and the History of Science, Piaget & García (1982) sought to
reevaluate the role that social context plays in the field of knowledge. In their conclu-
sions, they propose the existence of invariant mechanisms explaining the emergence of
knowledge, along with social, cultural and historical contexts of meaning conditioning
the directionality these mechanisms take. Piaget & García refers to this conditioning as
an “epistemic framework” (1982: 228). In his later works, García re-defined the epistemic
framework as the “boundary conditions” modulating the intrinsic activity of a cognitive
system (García 1992: 31). According to this view, knowledge evolves by reorganizations
fed by the exchanges between the (cognitive) system and its (social) environment (García
1999: 179).
11. Eventually, with García’s revision (2000), the scope of his analysis of constructiv-
ist theory was widened, which makes it possible to state different ways of analyzing the
“epistemic framework” (Becerra & Castorina 2015).
12. A first type of analysis is the one Piaget & García (1982) called “sociogenetic,”
which is intended for the history of science field. Here, the epistemic framework refers
to a worldview (Weltanschauung) resulting from philosophical, religious and ideological
factors that influence the contents of theorization by enabling or inhibiting our questions
(Piaget & García 1982: 228–234). García provided an example:
Ohm, in Germany, discovered the first quantitative law in electricity … The reaction of
the Naturphilosophers was very consistent: What was the point of measuring such phe-
nomena? Electricity is something very immaterial – how can one measure it? Experiments
and mathematics were considered entirely irrelevant to obtaining a true understanding of
Nature. … This was the Weltanschauung involved in the Romantic movement … In this
case, a particular cultural pattern enters in a very concrete way into the shaping of science
in a particular society at a particular time. In the case we are considering, it acts as an epis-
temological obstacle, to use Gaston Bacherlard’s expression. Here, the social component is
not merely providing directionality to scientific research; it enters deeply into the concep-
tualization of science. (García 1987: 136)

This raises the question of whether a similar conceptualization has been developed by
second-order cybernetics.
13. A second analysis relates to the “psychogenetic” field covering the development
of knowledge from childhood to adult thinking. The epistemic framework here refers to
the social meaningfulness and cultural practices that make certain phenomena or objects
visible or invisible in a shared social world (for a similar idea, see Overton 1994). Surpris-
ingly, Umpleby has not given further consideration to social context and social meaning-
fulness when arguing about the cognitive sciences (§§72f).
14. Two further analyses may be more in line with the Umpleby’s intentions. One of
them is the metatheoretical analysis, i.e., the analysis of assumptions underlying a theory,
which Piaget (1979) used to include in the “internal epistemology” of the sciences. The
epistemic framework lies here in the history of a specific theoretical or disciplinary field,

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which conditions future developments through the dialectic relations among the different
levels of theorization, data selection and interpretation, explanatory models, etc. This type
of analysis can also be applied to contemporary scientific problems, thus becoming a fun-
damental tool for enabling interdisciplinary research of “complex issues” such as the soci-
etal and environmental ones (for a brief review of these research programs in contact with
the sociocybernetics approach, see Becerra & Amozurrutia 2015). The epistemic frame-
work here is expressed through the researchers’ set of social and political values making up
the multidisciplinary team, say, in the way the social and political need emerges, marking
off the intervention direction (García 2006). Only recently, the interdisciplinary literature
has started to consider the sociopolitical element as a key factor in succeeding in this type
of endeavor (Boix-mansilla 2006). I think these projects bear a spirit in terms of challenges
and achievements that is similar to the ones Umpleby highlights in §§50, 61, and 76f.2
15. García suggests that if the approaches used to address complex issues are to be
improved, then actions must be taken to integrate knowledge and to co-construct the study
object among the multidisciplinary team members. A mere call to interdisciplinarity is not
enough. What is needed is a new methodology, explicit lines of work, and new tools and
techniques easing such integration. García proposes this methodology by reflecting on his
research experience on climate change, drought and famine through a constructivist lens
(García 2006). As far as I know, cybernetics and radical constructivism have not made
much progress in designing this kind of proposal (although Hugo Alrøe and Egon Noe
2014 provide a good discussion that, in many aspects, is in line with García’s consider-
ations). Perhaps the lack of greater integration with empirical social research presents an
obstacle. I think Umpleby’s remarks in §§65–69 suggest a similar diagnosis. I can only hy-
pothesize as to what extent such lack of integration is due to an unclear stance on society’s
“reality status,” and subsequently, its effective conditioning on knowledge (Glasersfeld
2008; Müller 2008). In any case, García’s work could be a fine case for observing how a
constructivist perspective that acknowledges social forces and social structures can indeed
make a contribution on this matter.

Open Peer Commentary:

Shed the Name to Find Second-Order Success: Renaming
Second-Order Cybernetics to Rescue its Essence
Michael R. Lissack

1. Stuart Umpleby’s target article highlights the intellectual progress of second-order

cybernetics and its related branch of constructivism while at the same time making note
of (and slightly bemoaning) its lack of implementation in both contemporary academic

2.  It is worthwhile mentioning that Umpleby provides a deepened elaboration on the organizational
dimension of science, which has been poorly elaborated in García’s work. A special note must be
given to the ethical considerations found in von Foerster and Piaget, which García seems to have
replaced with political and strategic considerations.

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thought and practitioner practice. His hopeful expressions of the paths second-order cy-
bernetics might take contrast with the field’s lack of progress for the past two decades or
more. In this commentary, I will rephrase Umpleby’s proposed pathways by making ex-
plicit the main obstacle to their implementation: the very words, labels, history, and jargon
that cyberneticians use to define their field and to encourage the uptake of its perspective
by others.
2. The reader should take careful note of an important irony here. In my role as the
President of the American Society for Cybernetics I am tasked with preserving, evangeliz-
ing, and promulgating the essences of the field. To do this successfully, I believe that we
need to recognize the context in which the very label “cybernetics” functions. The word
has shifted in its meaning. The two-syllable conjunction “cyber” is now associated with
computers and computation. While the old meaning of “steering” remains in the dictionary,
it is lost on those whom practitioners in the field need to reach. If we are to further cyber-
netics, and especially second-order cybernetics, as a field of intellectual inquiry, I believe
we as a community need to accept that we have lost the battle of “the word.” What matters
in successful communication is how the listener receives the signals being transmitted and
then converts those signals into personal meaning. Our insistence on making use of the
1950s and 1960s meaning of words such as “cybernetics” is getting in our way. Our desired
listeners struggle to grasp our intended meaning. To “save” cybernetics so that it may live
and prosper, I believe that its very name needs to be relegated to “historic label” and that
we, as a community, need to find new ways to express our essential thoughts.
3. It is on one of those essences that I will focus herein – the role of always asking
about how context matters. Context here must be viewed in its broadest sense. Not just
the material, social, and physiological opportunities, boundaries, and constraints that may
serve to describe a given situation, but also the intellectual, semiotic, and lexical triggers
that affect how any given participant or observer mentally processes that situation. As
Umpleby quotes Thomas Kuhn: different participants/observers
see different things when they look from the same point in the same direction. […] Both
are looking at the world, and what they look at has not changed. But in some areas they see
different things, and they see them in different relations one to the other. (§4)

4. In response to the Kuhn quote, second-order cybernetics and constructivism would

also add that indeed what they look at has changed. Each participant and observer has their
own set of mental constructs, and they can only “see” what they possess the constructs for.
In §7, Umpleby notes:
Since people have different experiences – language, home life, culture, religion, academic
training, and job experiences – each person’s ‘reality’ is in some respects unique, though
our knowledge of the physical and social world has many common features.

As Kuhn (1970: 48) put it: “You don’t see something until you have the right metaphor
[model] to let you perceive it.” And as Daniel Kahneman (2011: 87) elaborates: “We often
fail to allow for the possibility that evidence that should be critical to our judgment is miss-
ing. What we see is all there is.”
5. Each participant and observer is thus perceiving, dealing with, processing, reacting
to, and enacting their own “private” world. As Karl Weick claims, when people “enact”
the environment,

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they construct, rearrange, single out, and demolish many ‘objective’ features of their sur-
roundings. They unrandomize variables, insert vestiges of orderliness, and literally create
their own constraints. (Weick 1995: 30f).

In other words, they attempt to reduce the “world” to their “model” and labels. In so doing,
they are making personal choices.
6. Cyberneticians and constructivists have insight into the boundaries and constraints
imposed by each individual’s frame of thought. But, all too often, both cyberneticians and
constructivists fail to recognize the imprisonment of their own personal frames of thought.
The centrality of those personal frames was, of course, underscored by Ernst von Glasers-
feld’s “substitution of ‘viability’ or ‘functional fit’ for the notions of Truth and objective
representation of an experiencer-independent reality” (Glasersfeld 2001: 31). Somehow,
members of our community all too often fail to reflect on the idea that it is they who are
drawing the frames and thus determining viability. “Fit” is recognized as a function of
context. But, “fit” is also a function of personal choices. All of the factors that contribute
to personal choice must be included in any definition of context. What we easily attribute
to others is quite often hard to see in oneself – including, in this case, the role of personal
choices.
7. Both cyberneticians and constructivists forget the lessons of Hans Vaihinger’s
(1924) Philosophy of “As If.” They seldom discuss the power of “enabling constraints”
(Juarrero 1999). They overlook the criticality of Robert Rosen’s (1985) models. They con-
fuse how to apply the dictum “make everything as simple as possible, but not simpler”
(which is almost always incorrectly attributed to Einstein) with von Foerster’s imperative
“act always so as to increase the number of choices” (Foerster 2003d: 227). And when
discussing differences in mindsets with realists, they all too often forget Richard Rorty’s
dictum: “Knowledge is not a matter of getting reality right … but rather a matter of acquir-
ing habits of action for coping with reality” (Rorty 1991: 1). Coping means finding mean-
ing where one can by making choices.
8. One of the tenets constructivism shares with several other approaches such as semi-
otics is that meaning is not embedded in language as if that language was merely a look-up
table. Collectively, in everyday life, words and phrases often emerge from concrete situ-
ations in which participants jointly work out ways of describing what is going on. New
terms, symbols, or images are situated; they acquire meaning through collective use in
real situations. They are the product of a never-ending web and network of intersecting
personal choices. Those choices get simplified so that the situation can be indeed reacted
to and moved on from. All too often the choices made will fail to reflect their own nuanced
environment and instead demand coherence with a simpler exogenous model. “We need
models to explain what we see and to predict what will occur. We use models for envision-
ing the future and influencing it” (Derman 2011: 43). Sometimes this approach works.
Oft times it fails. But note – both success and failure are rather clear cut when they occur.
9. Following the observations of such success and failure come the attempts made to
explain the results. It is here where second-order cybernetics and constructivism can have
their greatest impact. Umpleby notes: “Under the old regime of the traditional scientific
method, a societal problem was solved once this problem was successfully modelled or ex-
plained” (§51). But in today’s society, a solution is not accepted without practical applica-
tion. The “authority” of science conducted per the “scientific method” has eroded. Practical

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applications demand context. They can only be explained in light of the full context as I
defined it above.
10. Public acceptance of solutions is now dependent upon the public’s willingness to
accept restricted definitions of context such that the problem appears to be solved in that
restricted context. Mere modelling or theoretical explanation is insufficient. In the absence
of a defined context where a practical solution is demonstrable, problems are not “solved”
– regardless of the elegance of a model or an “explanation.” The public has, in effect, cho-
sen to disregard “science” as the source of authoritative solutions.
11. This choice stems naturally from our public tendency to accept a narrowing of
the information we consider. “We take up only those actions and solutions that have an
immediate effect on the situation, and always as they have been framed for us” (Piattelli-
Palmarini 1996: 58). The frames used to view the problem are usually provided by others
(be they politicians, the media, or “opinion”) and they are usually missing information.
“We, therefore, fail to note important items in plain sight, while we misread other facts by
forcing them into preset mental channels, even when we retain a buried memory of actual
events” (Gould 2010: 223). More critically, we all too often fail to realize that only “true
models” in the Rosen (1985) sense allow for interventions to be “rehearsed.” We instead al-
low others to frame mere descriptions for us as if they were models – and then are surprised
when the anticipated affects of interventions go awry.
12. What we choose to see will affect what we then pay attention to, which then af-
fects the processes we call upon to make sense out of those attended to items. As Deborah
Lupton points out, we then need to “clean up” the attended to data and its resulting story
– removing the anomalies and ambiguities, and leaving behind a “simple story.”
All cultures have ways of dealing with these anomalies and ambiguities. One way to deal
with ambiguity is to classify a phenomenon into one category only and maintain it within
the category, thus reducing the potential for uncertainty. Another method of dealing with
anomaly is to physically control it, removing it. A third way is to avoid anomalous things
by strengthening and affirming the classification system that renders them anomalous. Al-
ternatively, anomalous events or things may be labeled dangerous. (Lupton 2013: 62)

Simple stories are usually not “true models” (a la Rosen) but are mere descriptions. But
we use them as if they were models – models devoid of nuance, ambiguity, and context.
13. When this succeeds, it is as Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow describe it,
“as-if” our simple story was the very reality we need to deal with.
The only meaningful thing is the usefulness of the model […] When such a model is suc-
cessful at explaining events, we tend to attribute to it, and to the elements and concepts
that constitute it, the quality of reality or absolute truth. (Hawking & Mlodinow 2010: 7)

Empowered by such success, we overlook its context-dependence. But our very definition
of success has been intimately tied to the boundaries and constraints (cf. Juarrero 1999)
that we imposed so as to frame the situation. In other words, our choices about context help
to determine the success or failures of our models.
14. We must remember the lessons from Vaihinger: “The object of the world of ideas
as a whole is not the portrayal of reality – this would be an utterly impossible task – but
rather to provide us with an instrument for finding our way about more easily in this world”
(Vaihinger 1924: 15). and of Rorty. Our simple story is the result of choices we each make
and have made. We make those choices to “make sense” out of a situation, to help us in

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 57

our way-finding and in our coping. We always have the option of making different choices.
But, the reality with which we deal will be the one we choose to deal with.
15. This is the realm of “pragmatic constructivism” (Lissack & Graber 2014). The
“pragmatic” here refers to the process of how we go about explaining a situation to some-
one else and the process of how we reach an understanding of that situation ourselves.
When simple perceptions are inadequate, the need for tools that enable better access to the
“what, who, and how much” that one needs to know in order to act becomes painfully obvi-
ous. The pragmatic constructivist is happy to accept the scientific realists’ models as a base
that must then be modified to account for boundaries, constraints, and the manifold possi-
bilities inherent in the interactions of large numbers of autonomous and semi-autonomous
agents. Such modifications are rooted in the observer/actor’s understanding of the situation
at hand – an understanding that itself can be molded by the interactions it observes and
participates in. Explaining is the ability to relate a narrative to the questioner, which, at a
minimum, allows a “fit” between the question asked and the “attended to” context and, in
depth in the form of acquired understanding, allows the explainee to apply such narrative
to new contexts and new questions.
16. When we are explicit that we are choosing the realities we deal with, the problems
we recognize as problems, and the boundaries and constraints that enable solutions, we are
not only accepting some form of constructivism, but we are also accepting that we each
have a sense of responsibility regarding such choices. Cybernetics has served to produce
great insight into how we might manage these responsibilities, including:
ƒƒ the role of the observer (von Foerster 2003d),
ƒƒ the law of requisite variety (Ashby 1958),
ƒƒ the importance of the observer in cognition (Maturana & Varela 1980),
ƒƒ the use of Black Boxes (Glanville 1982),
ƒƒ the idea that all action is in some ways a conversation (Pask 1975a),
ƒƒ the importance of recognizing that “true models” (in the Robert Rosen sense, cf.
Lissack 2016) differ from descriptive representations,
ƒƒ the importance of narratives (Clarke 2014).
These insights can be reduced to a fundamental essence: it is critical to ask and explore
how context in its fullest meaning matters. Second-order cybernetics is at essence the sci-
ence of exploring how context matters.
17. Exploring how context matters is a second-order concept. It is the essence of ev-
erything written above. Indeed, it may be the essence of everything in this volume. What is
important is that “exploring how context matters” is not jargon, is not domain or intellec-
tual foundation restricted language, is not hard to grasp. Exploring how context matters is
a question that can be applied to every scientific exploration, every strategic business deci-
sion, every social issue, and nearly every personal choice. If we can focus our second-order
cybernetics efforts on getting others to “explore how context matters,” we can reintroduce
a ubiquity to the cybernetic/constructivist endeavour.
18. Umpleby (§82 and §84) poses a challenge to the second-order cybernetics com-
munity: find relevance or risk death. His list of issues where a second-order cybernetics
approach may yield valued results is both lengthy and practicable. But Umpleby (like the
other authors in this volume) has minimized our actual dilemma: if we continue to use
jargon to which others cannot relate, we fail.

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 58

Dimension First-order Second-order

Commonly cited distinctions

Approach Reductionism Holism
Method Analysis Synthesis
Primitives Entities Relations
Processes Deterministic Probabilistic
Relation to designer Controlled Autonomous
Relation to designer Designed Self-organized
Embeddedness Context free Context dependent
Role of observer Observer-free Observer-dependent
Position of observer Outside observed system Embedded in observed system
Theory dependence Theory-free phenomena Theory-determined phenomena
Metaphysics Ontology Epistemology
Working framework Naïve or critical realism Pragmatism, radical constructivism
Aim 8QGHUVWDQGLQJSUHGLFWLRQ Action (intervention)
'H¿QLWLRQ &ODULW\RSHUDWLRQDOGH¿QLWLRQV Ambiguity as opportunity
Subjects Inanimate objects (nonhuman) Thinking participants (human)
5HÀH[LYLW\ 8QUHÀH[LYH 5HÀH[LYH
Medium of interaction Physical Language
Mode of interaction Communication Conversation
Common conceptual rubrics
Historical period (DUO\F\EHUQHWLFV± /DWHF\EHUQHWLFV±SUHVHQW
Target systems $UWL¿FLDOGHYLFHV Human systems
Disciplines Engineering & natural sciences, Social, psychological, therapeutic
medicine (bionics) arts & sciences, management, arts,
organizational & social change
My perspective
Purposive systems Study, design, construction and use Study, design, construction and use
(systems with of purposive systems (natural and/ of interactions between purposive
embedded goals) RUDUWL¿FLDO V\VWHPVQDWXUDODQGRUDUWL¿FLDO

Table 1. 6RPHGLPHQVLRQVRIWKHSURSRVHG¿UVWRUGHUVHFRQGRUGHUF\EHUQHWLFVWUDQVLWLRQ

19. Many other intellectual communities are doing work that falls within the domains
of second-order cybernetics and what I prefer to call “pragmatic constructivism.” We can
bring members of these communities “into the fold” if we begin to use language that gives
them meaning. Together we can co-construct a new science of context. Exploring how
context matters is just a beginning.

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Open Peer Commentary: Beware False Dichotomies

Peter Cariani

1. I am in general agreement with Stuart Umpleby’s thoughtful historical and concep-

tual review of second-order cybernetics, and do agree with him that widespread adoption
of the epistemological stances of second-order cybernetics would constitute a fundamental
revolution in how most scientists think about and do science. The proposed revolution
involves a shift from realist ontology to constructivist epistemology, from realism to prag-
matism, and from observer-free to observer-aware descriptions. That is all fine and good.
2. Missing, however, from Umpleby’s account (e.g., the Popper-von Foerster-Kuhn
trichotomy in Table 1) is an acknowledgment of parallel paradigmatic realist-pragmatist
debates that have played out in science and in the philosophy of science. The cyberneticists
have not been the only ones to formulate alternatives to realism. And not all scientists are
either naïve-realists or Popperian falsificationists. There have always been pragmatists and
operationalists (e.g., Heinrich Hertz, Ernst Mach, Percy Bridgman, and Nils Bohr) who
have regarded scientific models as provisional, observable-dependent, predictive models
rather than as correspondences with some underlying absolute, knowable reality. In the
debates over quantum mechanics and the foundations of physics debate, Bohr and oth-
ers sought to explicitly include the observer in the predictive modeling process (Murdoch
1987). Similarly, in the philosophy of science, there are well-developed, full-blown prag-
matist and radical constructivist alternatives to realism (Van Fraassen 1980; Munévar 1981;
Glasersfeld 1995). A tactical question is whether second-order cybernetics is the best banner
under which to advance this alternative understanding of science, or whether a broader front
united with like-minded scientists and philosophers of science would be more effective.
3. A second, related point is that normal practice in empirical science does to some de-
gree take into account the methods and purposes of the observer. Although most individual
scientists are not very reflective about their ontological and epistemological assumptions
(in many fields, especially in biomedicine, discussion of “larger philosophical questions”
is palpably maladaptive for securing funding), in practice empirical science does not au-
tomatically make the naïve realist assumption that what is being measured is completely
well-characterized (i.e., the assumption “it is what we think it is”). With the exception of
theoretical discussions and commentaries, every scientific paper has an introduction sec-
tion where the observer’s reasons for considering a phenomenon are presented and a meth-
ods section where the experimental procedures of the observer are spelled out to the extent
that the observations made can be reliably replicated by others (i.e., intersubjectively veri-
fiable). The removal of subjective biases and the striving for “objective” measurements
and evaluations (as in Kandel quote, §22) is not to assert realist objectivity but to assure
conditions for pragmatist intersubjective verifiability. By “objective,” Kandel means not
that the measurement is objectively true, but that, to the greatest extent possible, it is not
being intentionally biased by the observer.
4. The observer determines which measurements will be made and how they will be
made, but the specific outcome of each measurement cannot be under the control of the
observer if measurements are to be replicated by others (who have potentially different
intentions). A realist says “say how it is,” and Heinz von Foerster replies “it is how you say

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it” (§27 and Table 3), but a pragmatist-operationalist would say “you will see it this way, if
you construct these lenses for observing it.”
5. The observer alone does not determine what he/she/it observes. Exactly what is ob-
served is co-determined by the experimental preparations and measuring devices chosen by
the observer (the observational frame) and how the measuring devices interact with their
surrounds. We construct our own epistemic realities to the extent that we choose how to
view the world (the nature of the measurements made), but beyond this, we do not control
specifically how the world will appear to us (the outcomes of those measurements) once the
choice is made. If we did control specific outcomes, there would be no reduction of uncer-
tainty for the observer (in Ashby’s sense). It would also mean that observers with different
intentions would not be able to use each other’s data in building models and theories.
6. Even the most reductionistic molecular biologists, who tend to eschew philosophi-
cal considerations entirely, are keenly aware that interpretation of a given body of data
depends critically on exactly how the system was prepared and the measurements made.
They understand that they do not know exactly what is being measured in their assays. A
great deal of time and mental effort is spent not taking data at face value, and acknowledg-
ing that different observational frames, even if they are supposedly measuring similar or
related things, are not necessarily commensurable. Rather than caricaturing most normal
scientists as unsophisticated naïve realists, it may be more persuasive to emphasize those
parts of scientific practice that do explicitly take the observer into account, thereby show-
ing that many aspects of the new perspective are already valuable parts of current practice.
7. “Second-order cybernetics” is often contrasted with “first-order cybernetics” along
various dimensions of difference. Many can be seen in my Table 1, which includes distinc-
tions from Umpleby’s Tables 1–4 and additional ones from recent related discussions with
Umpleby and other cyberneticists. These are not repeated verbatim, so they reflect my
understanding of the distinctions. They also include some ideas from Eric Dent, Umpleby’s
former graduate student and collaborator.
8. The commonly cited distinctions in the table relate to the dominant subject matter,
philosophical stances, aims, and methods of the two proposed forms or modes of cybernet-
ics.
9. Although this dichotomy of distinctions may fairly characterize second-order cy-
bernetics, I think it seriously misrepresents the concepts and practices that most people
would tend to label as first-order cybernetics. For example, three major artefacts of the
early period of cybernetics – Ross Ashby’s adaptive homeostat, Grey Walter’s autonomous
robotic tortoise, and Gordon Pask’s self-organizing electrochemical device – do not fit well
into the caricature of first-order cybernetic devices as deterministic, controlled, predict-
able, or even well-defined (Cariani 1993, 2009; de Latil 1956; Pickering 2010). The major
proponents in the early phase (e.g., Norbert Wiener, McCulloch, Ashby, Walter, Pask, Staf-
ford Beer, von Foerster) held pragmatist, not realist, epistemologies heavily informed by
neuroscientific and psychological perspectives.
10. The dichotomy of first- vs. second-order cybernetics too easily lapses into a his-
torical break (early vs. late cybernetics), a difference between nonhuman (natural sciences
and engineering of artefacts) and human systems (socio-psychological interventions), and
a disciplinary divide (hard scientists and engineers vs. soft social and psychological sci-
entists and human systems people). Do we want to divide cybernetics along these lines?
Perhaps the distinction can be coherently construed as a historical transition from one kind
of research to another. But, if so, we should avoid the error of thinking that the first wave

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of cybernetics was epistemologically less sophisticated, either because they came earlier
or because many of them studied and designed feedback control systems or because many
of them were biologists and neuroscientists. If a revolutionary flag is to be raised, the
distinction should instead be made between an observer-aware second-order cybernetics
and traditional, realist conceptions of science and engineering. There is no need to use the
distinction to divide cybernetics itself.
11. I do agree that a historical and sociological transition can be identified in the
cybernetics movement, but this is not so much a revolution of ideas but a shift in who
continued to work explicitly under the banner of cybernetics and what kinds of systems
they studied (“first-order” and “second-order” are misleading labels for this kind of transi-
tion because they imply an essential, conceptual distinction rather than a sociological one).
During the 1950s and 1960s, there had been a series of scientific conferences and technical
publications related to cybernetics, self-organizing systems, and bionics, but by the late
1960s, these had ceased entirely. It appears that government funding for the cybernetics of
natural and artificial systems dried up, causing scientists and engineers to leave the field.
The center of gravity of the field then shifted to the cybernetics of human systems.
12. In part, the loss of funding can be attributed to the Mansfield Amendment (Umple-
by 2003). But perhaps more importantly, by the late 1960s, proponents of computational
approaches to artificial intelligence had also achieved control over the major sources of
American defense funding (ARPA, ONR) and did not hesitate to defund competing re-
search programs. Funding for research in cybernetics, neural networks, trainable machines,
bionics, and self-organizing systems all abruptly came to a halt. Many people attribute
the cutoff of funding for research on neural networks directly to the influence of Marvin
Minsky on funding decisions (Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1988; Boden 2006). In conversations
with his colleagues and students, I have learned that von Foerster expressed similar beliefs
about why funding for his Biological Computation Laboratory had dried up. More light
needs to be shed on this history.
13. There is also the question of whether the dichotomy divides cybernetics in such
a way that undermines the maintenance of diversity (perspectival variety) within the cy-
bernetics movement. Projection of realist and reductionist (purportedly first-order) beliefs
onto engineers working on artificial systems or scientists studying natural systems has the
effect of discouraging their participation in the cybernetics movement. It is probably un-
healthy for the movement to nourish an identity politics of who is second-order or whether
a given person’s perspective is sufficiently second-order (i.e., “politically correct”). As
a neuroscientist and theoretician, I constantly wonder about myself and exactly where I
stand vis-à-vis the tenets of second-order cybernetics.
14. We need an inclusive big tent rather than a divisive faction fight. I think the cy-
bernetics movement will be enriched if it brings in participants from all fields that deal in
some significant way with purposive systems (Table 1, bottom row), i.e., those systems
that have internal goals that they pursue (Ackoff & Emery 1972). These include fields of
endeavor that deal with the broad range of purposive artificial, natural, and social systems:
engineering, natural sciences, neural & psychological sciences, social sciences, therapy,
management & policy sciences, the arts, and movements for social change.
15. There will be those who deal with how such systems are organized so as to ef-
fectively pursue their goals (first-order), and others who deal with how such self-directed
systems interact with other such systems (second-order) to cooperate, compete, and con-
verse. Somehow we will all get along and learn from each other.

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Open Peer Commentary:

Second-Order Cybernetics Needs a Unifying Methodology
Thomas R. Flanagan

Introduction
1. In his target article, Stuart Umpleby’s current review of the evolution of the epis-
temology of second-order cybernetics draws our attention first to a neurophysiological
(neuropsychological; cognitive neuroscience) consideration of the sensory system. Sen-
sory-input, the first step in sense-making, is both organically selective and autonomously
filtered. Meaning, which is the substrate of cognition, is individually derived from direct
and vicarious experiences via the senses. Our shared understandings are meanings that
have become socialized through communication. And communication again involves se-
lective and filtered sensory channels. Sensing and sense-making is, Umpleby asserts, the
foundation of second order science … and for all other sciences too. The specific relevance
of sense-making to the practice of second-order cybernetics is asserted to be based upon a
(r)evolution in the construction of social meaning and a concurrent enhancement of action
taken within living systems.
2. The revolution is stated as an altered perspective. The cybernetic scientist is im-
mersed within the system with the inference that being positioned within a system will alter
the experience of the experimental observations that the scientist gathers. Implicit in this
expectation is the belief that the scientist’s way of seeing and interpreting observations into
meaning changes as a function of the altered observational perspective. This theme war-
rants considerable exploration given that sense-making (and higher meaning-making) have
autonomous features forged by formative experiences beyond voluntary control as well as
reflective features that are more obviously and directly under voluntary control. The point
that I am exploring here relates to autonomous features of a researcher’s sense-making
capacity that may be resistant to un-learning and re-learning without specific methodologi-
cal support.

Expanding the research arena

3. A fundamental feature of an observer’s immersion within a sapient living system
relates to the exchange of emerging understandings with and among actors in that sys-
tem. When sense-making is a collective, subjective process (rather than solitary, objective
work), the product of the sense-making is co-constructed. The second-order cybernetic
researcher cannot be viewed simply as a cultural anthropologist artfully hidden behind a
one-way mirror positioned in the center of an interactive sapient system; the cybernetic
researcher is interacting directly and is being directly influenced by interactions. The re-
searcher also cannot afford simply to be an arbitrator for collisions among differing theories
of how things work in the system under study. Interdisciplinary perspective is not a matter
of theoretical reconciliations, but rather it is a co-construction of new theory through the
reconfiguration of meaning drawn from joint consideration of primary observations. This
recombination can be considered as homologous to the synthesis of new chemical enti-

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ties through reactions that facilitate recombination of elements into new coherent wholes.
This letting go and rebuilding cycle can be particularly painful for researchers who cling
strongly to favored theories.
4. Input that is intentionally drawn from interactive recombination of ideas from a
community of actors changes expectations of what constitutes a scientific finding. The
finding is a complex function of:
a. the observational and communication dynamics within the system under study,
b. the conjoint sense-making methodology selected for use by the researcher and fel-
low actors,
c. the focus and boundary conditions of the inquiry specified by the researcher,
d. the adequacy of the reporting narrative (see next section).
5. Umpleby reports that second-order cybernetics research was used in the 1950s to
engage tactical response from within a community (i.e., the Institute of Cultural Affairs,
ICA; §34). The wisdom behind this use was based in the belief that those closest to prob-
lems would have the best insights into how problems could be addressed.
6. Indeed, input from the public could be gathered to contribute to the co-construction
of a model of how things could work. A fine distinction should be drawn about the role of
the researchers who are practicing second-order cybernetics in the community: are they
contributing to the blended emergence of new scientific meanings related to how to un-
derstand and then solve tactical problems (in the sense of second-order cybernetics), or
are they more modestly manipulating and observing the natural evolution of thinking that
occurs in a sapient system once that system has engaged in collective action (in the sense of
expert analysis). Without reference to specific methodological interventions, it is difficult
to extract the extent to which researcher exchanges have been critically catalytic for new
ways of thinking or to which researcher exchanges have been sampling ongoing innovative
action. Methods as modest as hosting discussions represent an intervention within which
exchanges among citizens (to the exclusion of exchanges with researchers) might catalyse
inclusive citizen sense-making and design of new response tactics without impacting the
science. Had citizens been involved in co-designing an intervention program that included
when, where, and how to host specific types of exchanges, researchers and citizens might
more convincingly demonstrate their inclusion in second-order cybernetic work. This level
of inclusion would represent co-design of “collective choice rules” (after Ostrom 1990).
If the citizens were to be involved in specifying how the inquiry into the system had been
designed (e.g., the questions that were being asked and the venues that were to be used in
citizen-researcher co-engagement), they would have been participating at the “constitu-
tional level” (again after Ostrom 1990).
7. It can be argued that only when citizens do participate at the constitutional level
will they provide input into the “theories” upon which the second-order cybernetic inter-
ventions would operate. This level of participation is not an easy starting point – which will
be obvious to any practitioners with experience in the arena. Work at this level is critical
because activity at this level is the most direct way that experiences from the arena feed
back into the corpus of theory (see the domain of science model, below). It is my belief that
citizens will only contribute to the corpus of the theory of practice when they are supported
with methodologies that provide compelling demonstrations of the coherence of their col-
lective sense-making activity.

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Developing a sense-making methodology for second-order cybernetics

8. Research method matters. To amass a coherent body of findings for comparisons
among and across sapient systems, the scientific community supporting the research (as
well as supporting the evolution of the science behind the research) will need to minimize
the ambiguity of the findings. The dynamics within the systems themselves will be un-
controlled variables, while the word-use and the reporting style of the resulting narratives
must be matched to the needs of specific audiences. Improvement then depends upon re-
finements to the precision and boundary conditions of the inquiry and to the sense-making
methodology. A focus on codification of the topic and boundary of inquiry along with a
concurrent focus on a codified sense-making methodology are needed to reduce ambiguity
that will impede the evolution of the field.
9. Much as Umpleby in his article focused on fundamental limitations of neurophysi-
ological processes to identify the foundation of second-order cybernetics, establishing the
foundation for a dialogic sense-making methodology benefits from first considering funda-
mental limitations of the sense-making process.
10. Collective sense-making is a cognitive communicative task with expected and
unexpected costs and expected and unexpected benefits. As such, the sense-making pro-
cess can be modeled as an unspecified economic system (Charter & Loewenstein 2016).
In Nicholas Charter and George Loewenstein’s model, natural language is the fundamental
means of negotiated exchanges. Natural language as a medium of exchange is problematic
due to its idiosyncratic evolution in all individuals (as discussed above). The embodied
cognition theory posits that each lexicon of natural language results from an accumulation
of combinations of early experiences captured into locally used words (Lakoff 2012). In
this view, words are compounded metaphors for experienced meaning, and each coding of
a complex, multidimensional cognition into a linear flow of words constitutes an idiosyn-
cratic abstraction that unavoidably leaves some meaning behind. Languaging addresses the
matching of meaning with word use. Iterative explanation allows initially succinct verbal
expressions to be augmented with some of the meaning that was stranded during a prior
expression. Iterative explanation is only possible, however, when the sense-making meth-
odology preserves both the authenticity of an original author’s statement and the real-time
linkage of that specific author to that specific statement. This linkage assures that the aug-
mented meaning will remain coherent with the original cognitive thought. Second-order
cybernetic methods will need to evolve to support and to improve the efficiency (reduce the
cost) of group-level sense-making.
11. A collective sense-making methodology for second-order cybernetics must in-
clude provisions for languaging because people use language that is uniquely coded for
expressing only certain parts of their immediate needs (see Christakis & Bausch 2006).
The meanings behind statements need to be decoded and clarified within a consensual
linguistic domain so that parties engaged in collective sense-making can accurately share
understandings. The language used within the sense-making process evolves when it is
discovered to carry additional meaning. The meaning behind linguistic labels for complex
thoughts need to be captured in the language of the group and presented as an evolving
reference for real-time support of the parties engaged in collective sense-making. Languag-
ing among groups is difficult, and is most difficult when applied within highly diversified
groups, as prescribed through Ashby’s law of requisite diversity. A methodology for lan-
guaging will be critical in enabling the expansion of second-order cybernetics.

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12. The essence of sense-making is the process of pulling disparate ideas into a co-
herent assembly. Ideas are connected by virtue of the paths through which they exchange
materials in classic system dynamics modeling and by linkages through which they exert
influence in one of the multiple forms of interpretive structural modeling (see Christakis &
Bausch 2006; Warfield & Cardenas 1994). These two methodologies are complementary
examples of codified means of making connections between ideas. Connections could be
made using any link between any pair of nodes within a systems map. The coherence of the
overall structure will depend upon the ease with which the structure is read.
13. Different audiences can be expected to have different skills or preferences for in-
terpreting system models. Participants in the community under study need to share mental
models to make sense of their situation so that they can design interventions with a cyber-
netic perspective. Interpreting and internalizing a systems model must be balanced with
benefits from reduced executive and management costs in
a. mobilizing action, and
b. monitoring and coordinating goal-directed activity.
A model building or problem structuring methodology for second-order cybernetics should
include an agile method for building and updating models at levels of detail appropriate
for community use.
14. Whether we are based in a scientific community or the civic community at large,
we socialize ourselves through the narratives that we share. When working with complex
sapient systems, narratives will spontaneously emerge, and carefully crafted narratives are
subject to the intended or unintended influences of those who retell the narrative. When a
narrative is based upon a systems model, the narrative can be anchored to a learning artifact
that was constructed through a conjoint sense-making process from within the community
(Flanagan 2008). The artifact has legitimacy to the extent that its designers are recognized
as authentic voices in the community, and it has durability to the extent that it is current
(i.e., can be readily updated as new information is discovered or as prior ideas become
irrelevant). The methodology for crafting narrative with explicit reference to learning ar-
tifacts from sense-making work will enhance and sustain social impact mediated through
second-order cybernetic interventions.

Advancing the science of second-order cybernetics

15. Learning within a complex arena is frequently reported as a case study narrative.
This mode for contributing data into a reservoir of comparable scientific information could
be improved if case study methodology was codified. Codified case studies would contain
a consistent set of elements, which would facilitate inter-case comparisons. Codified cases
could evolve to include self-assessments by authors on the extent to which specific ele-
ments of the case were observable, and suggestions for improving observability in future
cases. Without agreement on case study design within the scientific community, each case
study is a narrative (i.e., an incomplete collection of all potential observations of a system
coherently expressed as a story). Compelling narratives are artfully crafted with features
that appear immutable because they are embedded in networks of dependent findings. An
easily read and easily compared graphic alternative to (or addition to) a thick narrative
would render relations among salient findings more explicit. This will benefit both the
scientific community and the sponsors of civic works. Second-order cybernetics reports

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Selection
criteria Method
olo
gy
The Science

The
ry

Rules &
Theo

environment

arena
The domain
of science model
corpus

Applic
Postulates
The

atio
ns
ion
dat
Foun
Strengths &
weaknesses

Figure 1. The Warfield domain of science model.

should use network analysis approaches to model the systems that are analyzed. If the
inclusion of a systems model were part of a codified reporting scheme, then, over time, that
model-construction process could powerfully contribute to learning by facilitating meta-
analysis across accumulated cases.
16. John Warfield (1986, 1987) advanced a model wherein philosophy, principles,
axioms, tenants, or laws constituted a foundation from which theories of action were de-
vised (see Figure 1). To test the theory, specific methods were adopted or developed with
attention to specific conditions of the arena within which the methods would be used.
Foundational principles, causal theory, and applied methodology were framed as compo-
nents of science. In this model, the methodology is the means through which the science
connects to the arena of application (Bausch & Flanagan 2013). Within the arena, methods
specify agents, venue, and schedule, resulting in applications. Lessons from the impact of
specific applications in the arena are envisioned to connect back to parties who maintain
an active surveillance of the relevance of the principles that are the foundation of the sci-
ence. Learning that occurs in the arena thus informs the science. The specific challenge is
the imperfect understanding of lessons from the isolated perspective of the arena, and the
imperfect link (through the scientist) from the arena back into the corpus of the science.
17. Second-order cybernetics is an approach that seeks to fuse the knowledge of the
science with the wisdom of the arena. The second-order cybernetic scientist plays a critical
role as a sapient agent of the science in a sapient system of the arena. At this juncture, sense
must be made of a situation or opportunity that couples the arena to the science so that les-

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sons from the use of the application of prescribed methods in the arena will efficiently and
authentically be communicated back into the corpus of the science.

Conclusion
18. Second-order cybernetics is part of a slow cultural (r)evolution toward greater
civic inclusion. The transition will require expansion of civic capacity for participating in
pluralistic investigations of complex situations on one hand and governance confidence
in civic participation on the other hand. Without delegating the authority to design parts
of the future to local authorities, the political will that is needed to engage in such a pro-
cess inclusively will not peacefully emerge (Ostrom 1990; Flanagan 2014). Second-order
cybernetics makes a critical contribution to learning experiments that advance this trans-
formation. I strongly share Umpleby’s view that “second-order cybernetics as a mode of
research from within still has a significant future” (§46); however, realizing this potential
requires a robust sense-making methodology (see also Umpleby 2002). The methodology
is not only needed to enhance impact within the arena but also to bridge the arena back to
the corpus of the science (Figure 1). Structured dialogic design (Christakis & Bausch 2006)
is one sense-making methodology that could be used as such a bridge.

Open Peer Commentary:

Viva the Fundamental Revolution!
Confessions of a Case Writer
T. Grandon Gill

Introduction
1. As a teacher and researcher in information systems, I have always been perplexed
by a paradox. The authentic discussion case study, a meticulously prepared in-depth de-
scription of an actual decision situation faced by a protagonist (key decision-maker), has
long been recognized as the premier means of incorporating constructivist learning into
the business classroom. The process of writing these cases often involves lengthy visits to
an organization, extensive interviews of the protagonist and other stakeholders in the deci-
sion, the gathering of archival data from diverse sources – both paper and electronic – and,
finally, synthesizing these into a document that is accessible to a broad range of students,
who can be expected to come at the decision from diverse perspectives and very different
levels of expertise. The paradox is as follows: despite the nature of the activities involved
in developing a quality case, few academic researchers in business today are willing to
characterize the case writing process as “research.” They would be absolutely horrified by
the notion of anyone proposing case writing to be a form of “science.”
2. Stuart Umpleby, in his target article “Second-Order Cybernetics as a Fundamental
Revolution in Science,” nicely captures the notion that there need to be alternative ap-
proaches to science. For different domains, different approaches will necessarily dominate.

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In my commentary, my objective is to make two key points. The first is that the process of
developing authentic discussion cases maps nearly perfectly to the underlying philosophy
of second-order cybernetics. The second is that most of the environments that are studied in
business and management environments could benefit greatly from more – not less – of this
type of science. I begin, however, by providing some background on case studies.

Background
3. To understand the current state of business research and the role played by case
studies, particularly in the US, it is useful to go back to the 1950s. Up to that point in
time, graduate schools of business were generally treated as quasi-disreputable institu-
tions whose main purpose was to provide an academic pathway for wealthy individuals
whose intellectual stature or morals were insufficient for serious intellectual endeavors. At
Harvard, for example, legend long has it that bloody pitched battles between the business
school faculty and their more serious colleagues at the Graduate School of Arts and Sci-
ences were avoided only through the moderating presence of the Charles River between.
While the actual situation doubtless differed from this caricature, it is nevertheless fair to
assert that the typical products of business research in those days differed considerably
from what is considered respectable research today. Specifically, business researchers were
much more likely to produce practice focused artifacts – such as case studies and industry
reports – than the theory-driven research of today.
4. In the late 1950s, this situation culminated in a couple of foundation reports on
business education and research that were highly critical of business schools. Two recom-
mendations of these reports were particularly noteworthy. On the education side, institu-
tions were encouraged to make greater use of the case method, as practiced at Harvard
Business School (HBS). That produced an extensive program of funded case method train-
ing in the 1960s. On the research side, the reports advocated adopting approaches of social
science modeling, particularly applauding the practices of Carnegie Mellon University.
5. One (possibly) unintended consequence of this bifurcation of paths was that case
studies became associated with “education,” whereas what was considered “research”
moved towards the philosophical positions of Popper and, to a lesser extent, Kuhn (as suc-
cinctly set forth in Umpleby’s Table 1). Moreover, since the 1960s, the research activity has
increased in relative importance at many business schools, particularly those that are part
of research universities. For this reason, the perceived value of case writing as a vehicle for
career advancement continues to decline.

Second-order cybernetics and the case writing process

6. In order to understand the relationship between the case writing process and
Umpleby’s article, it is useful to describe the case artifact and case writing process briefly.
As noted previously, a discussion case study is an in-depth description of a decision situa-
tion facing a protagonist. The ideal case study combines a number of characteristics:
ƒƒ It is authentic, meaning the process through which it has been developed involves
a systematic assessment of the situation, triangulated through multiple sources.
While some disguising, such as changing individual or organization names, is often
employed, the best cases do not materially change the setting or decision context.

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ƒƒ It is open-ended. Discussion cases present decisions that need to be made. It is

also very unusual for a discussion case to have a single “right” answer. In fact,
many facilitators – including myself – are indifferent to what decision was actu-
ally made by the organization. Just as in the “real world,” we believe that there
will always be environmental factors or elements of the context that could make
a well-considered decision turn out badly or an impulsive decision turn out well.
The focus, therefore, is on the rigor of the process used to reach a recommendation.
It is this aspect of discussion cases that makes them such beneficial artifacts for
constructivist learning.
ƒƒ It is driven by the protagonist’s perspective. Because we ask participants in a case
discussion to view a situation through the eyes of the decision-maker, the case
must present the world as the protagonist sees it. This can have significant implica-
tions for the case writing process.
7. In order to develop a case study, the case writer must proceed through a series of
steps, described in detail in my book Informing with the Case Method (Gill 2011). The
skeletal version of a typical discussion case development project might proceed as follows:
ƒƒ Site identification. The case writer perceives a need for a case study on a particular
topic or involving a particular setting (e.g., industry, function) and reaches out to
organizations that might be an appropriate fit. This might involve either using the
author’s own contact network or “cold calling.”
ƒƒ Protagonist and decision identification. A potential protagonist is identified within
the organization and the case writer interviews that individual to determine what
decisions are currently being made. The goal here is to identify a decision that
relates to the perceived need. Eventually, both the protagonist and the case writer
need to agree on the decision that will become the focus of the case.
ƒƒ Data gathering. Through a series of interviews with the protagonist and other in-
dividuals influencing or impacted by the decision, the case writer develops a rich
view of the context of the decision. In parallel, the case writer acquires a collection
of archival information (e.g., memos, white papers, brochures, images, emails) and
may also request reports generated from the organization’s information systems.
In addition, the case writer often gathers information from publically available
sources relating to the industry, region, product or decision. These often become
supporting exhibits for the case.
ƒƒ Writing. The information that has been gathered is synthesized into a 5–15 page
document that is supplemented with exhibits. The case then goes through a series
of drafts that must be approved by the protagonist and other individuals within the
organization.
ƒƒ Publication. At the end of the case writing process, the pre-release version is often
tested in a classroom setting prior to publication. Once all parties are satisfied, the
case is released for publication.
8. Arguably, many elements of the process – particularly the use of triangulation in
data gathering – follow the same practices that would be employed in developing a re-
search case, as presented in Yin (2009). There are, however, a number of key differences.
First, most research cases are built around a body of theory, and seek to test hypotheses.
Most discussion cases are driven by decisions that need to be made. Second, research cases

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seek to adopt an objective perspective. Discussion cases must necessarily adopt the per-
spective of the decision maker. Although adopting an objective view of a decision setting
in order to contrast that with the protagonist’s view can be a useful element of the discus-
sion of the case, if the protagonist does not believe a fact to be true or relevant, that fact is
unlikely to influence the decision.
9. The third and most important way in which the development of discussion cases
diverges from more traditional case research is in the researcher’s engagement with the
decision. Best practice for traditional case research involves as little observer interaction
as possible. In discussion case development, the opposite more often applies. Motivation
for such engagement comes from both sides. One of the principal benefits that a protagonist
perceives from participating in the development of a case is access to “free” observations
from the case writer. Typically, the case writer is more than happy to provide these. In the
process of doing so, the decision can be impacted. From the case writer’s side, the goal is
to prepare a logically consistent document. In most instances, this will involve questioning
the protagonist with respect to the rationale of the possible decision options being consid-
ered. In the course of this process, the case writer may introduce new options or may even
make the protagonist rethink and reject previously considered options.
10. These differences between research and discussion case development are major
contributors to the academic unwillingness to view discussion case development as re-
search. But consider them in terms of Umpleby’s Table 1 distinctions between research
philosophies. Discussion cases are built around the protagonist’s construction of a deci-
sion, as opposed to any objective reality. The observer – in this context, the case writer
– plays an active role in the process being observed. Any notion that there is a “right”
or “true” solution to a problem is discounted; instead, the discussion case writer accepts
that many forms of uncertainly will not be reducible and that many facts provided by the
protagonist and others are likely to include a considerable (but unknowable) amount of
opinion. Indeed, the whole concept of objective knowledge is of questionable relevance in
the decision-making process; what drives the protagonist’s decision is what she thinks is
known. Which, of course, is often influenced by the case writer during the process.
11. The analysis just presented proposes that if second-order cybernetics became
broadly accepted as a research philosophy, discussion case writing would be considered re-
search. Unfortunately, that does not address the more value-laden question: should second-
order cybernetics be considered a valid philosophy for business research? To that question
we now turn.

The role of second-order cybernetics in business research

12. In considering the role that second-order cybernetics could or should play in the
broader world of business research, it is important not to look at the world as a vacuum. A
well-established set of research philosophies already exists to guide business researchers.
To the extent that these are providing sufficient value, we could easily conclude that intro-
ducing a new philosophy – one that violates many of the premises of the existing accepted
philosophies – might be a battle not worth fighting.
13. Not surprisingly, the value of business research is a matter of perspective. From
the academic researcher’s perspective, it has demonstrated extraordinary value. In the US,
we typically get paid nearly twice as much as our reference discipline faculty counter-
parts. A much higher percentage of our doctorates find academic jobs than doctorates from

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other fields. Unlike our engineering colleagues, the pressure on us to acquire grants is
manageable. Unlike our liberal arts colleagues, we can generally find outside consulting
opportunities if we look hard enough. Yes, business research has been good to us; thus, our
motivation to adopt new paradigms is decidedly limited.
14. The value of business research looks quite different from the business practitio-
ner’s perspective. Without going into details that are presented in Gill (2010) and permit-
ting myself to over-generalize only slightly:
ƒƒ There are very few examples of our research having had a significant impact on
practice;
ƒƒ Managers frequently do not believe our findings when informed about them;
ƒƒ In those limited areas where our research has been adopted by practice, the as-
sumptions upon which the research is based often fail;
ƒƒ We rarely replicate our findings and when we try to, the failure rate is extraordi-
narily high;
ƒƒ Most of the research that managers do rely upon comes from sources other than
academic researchers, such as consultants.
15. My assessment is that the principal source of these deficiencies is the mismatch
between the way we conduct most of our research and the underlying complexity of the
domains that we study. In complex domains, effects tend to be the result of complex in-
teractions between large numbers of variables – similar to the interactions between ingre-
dients in a recipe – rather than through the sum of individual main effects, which is what
our statistical tools are good at parsing out. Complex domains are also subject to frequent
cybernetic cycles, as agents on the landscape react to the environment and the presence of
other agents and, in doing so, change the underlying landscape itself. To compound the
problem, as agents form self-similar groups as a consequence of the process of adaptation,
illusions that suggest significant main effects are present are an expected consequence (Gill
2012: 72).
16. To be effective in highly complex environments, research designs need to be high-
ly localized and need to shed some of the formalisms of the traditional scientific method,
such as the hypothesis test (intended to support or refute stable, general propositions). In
place of these approaches, the researcher needs to become highly aware of the interactions
affecting the local context and must also become expert in the art of observation and the
construction of models that reflect the local reality. These are the skills of the discussion
case writer. They also parallel the lists Umpleby provides in Tables 2 and 3.
17. To take the matter a step further, as far as highly complex environments are con-
cerned, the entire notion of the independent researcher can be questioned. Where phenom-
ena are highly contextualized, the individual researcher’s ability to step in and achieve
immediate understanding of what is being observed is limited. Under such conditions,
the knowledge accumulated from standing inside is likely to contribute to understand-
ing far more than knowledge of general research principles. In §31, Umpleby introduces
Karl Müller’s (2016) distinction between exo-mode and endo-mode research. The former
describes research conducted by the objective, distant observer, with the latter describing
research with high levels of participant involvement. Complex environments are likely to
be better served by endo-mode research, driven by the participant-researcher. Moreover,
where an external researcher does become involved, the best course would seem to be
partnering with a participant from within the system.

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18. Umpleby’s ICA case study example would seem to present a laudable destination
for research conducted in complex environments. Within ICA, the researcher and partici-
pant roles became inseparable. Learning was accomplished through local experimentation
and sharing of results. Success was not measured through publications, but through ob-
served social change. It should also serve as a cautionary tale for today’s researchers, how-
ever. It illustrates how effective practitioners can be at solving complex problems… once
they have acquired a modest amount of knowledge relating to the design and conduct of
research. It is not clear that we have trained our fellow academic researchers to be equally
adept at observing, adapting to, and participating in new contexts.

Conclusion
19. Undoubtedly, Umpleby’s article has clarified my thinking. I also feel a certain
optimism as I look towards the future. Recently, AACSB International – the best known
accrediting agency for business schools – has placed a new emphasis on measuring the im-
pact of our research on practice. We have long been aware that the academic journal article
that is built around the narrowly defined scientific method is a very inefficient channel for
communicating with practice. Moreover, whatever impact is achieved is nearly impos-
sible to detect owing to the distance between the academic and practitioner communities.
Achieving and detecting research impact, on the other hand, is among the greatest strengths
of the endo-mode research that constitutes second-order cybernetics. Umpleby’s ICA ex-
ample illustrates this in a compelling way; I have seen similar impact, on a smaller scale,
in my own case writing experiences. As this new top-down emphasis on impact takes hold,
we will perhaps see another major rethinking of our attitudes on what makes for “good”
research, paralleling the last dramatic shift, observed in the 1960s.

Author’s Response:
Struggling to Define an Identity for
Second-Order Cybernetics
Stuart A. Umpleby

1. I shall discuss the commentaries on my target article using three themes. Two of the
commentators emphasized the academic and social context of second-order cybernetics.
Two commentators were concerned with how to describe the field both to people outside
the field and to those inside. And two commentators were interested in the relationship of
second-order cybernetics to management research and practice.

The context of second-order cybernetics

2. Allenna Leonard suggests that the lack of acceptance of both first-order and sec-
ond-order cybernetics is probably related to a “general lack of comprehensive social sci-
ence research” (§1). By this she means a lack of interest in formulating general theories.
She describes a wave of interest in general theories in the 1960s and 1970s (§2). Leonard

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also points to a “lower sense of common values that … now characterizes our communities
and nations” (§1).
3. It is certainly the case that the social sciences lack a common foundation, which the
engineering disciplines find in physics and chemistry. And the number of scholars seeking
to create a transdisciplinary foundational discipline for the social sciences is limited, as far
as I know, to the practitioners of systems science and cybernetics – disciplines that have no
established home on US campuses today. Her broader point, that there is a lack of common
values in societies, may also be a contributing factor, if people do not assume that estab-
lishing a common frame of reference is possible. She is correct that corporations regularly
lobby the government to forestall or diminish research that they think will reduce their
profits, even if the research would benefit the public (§5). Smoking and climate change are
just two examples. And participatory methods are sometimes seen by managers as threat-
ening their prerogatives, even though their use would likely improve the performance of
the organization (§4).
4. I also agree with Leonard that the incentive systems in universities have in recent
years moved strongly toward rewarding research in narrow disciplines rather than transdis-
ciplinary research (§7). Government agencies frequently say that they seek interdisciplin-
ary research proposals, but young faculty members are reluctant to work on research that
will not be counted toward promotion. She suggests that the need for more use of systems
and cybernetics approaches will become clearer (§9) as the unsustainability of current
practices becomes more evident. In the meantime, there is plenty of work to do to develop
the new points of view. Leonard’s observations help to explain why research that once
attracted great interest has diminished in recent decades.
5. Gastón Becerra (§10) compares my article to the work of Roland García and Jean
Piaget, who claimed that social, cultural, and historical contexts condition the direction
that the emergence of knowledge takes. Becerra notes these authors describe two types of
analysis. Psychogenesis refers to the development of knowledge from childhood to adult-
hood (§13). Sociogenesis describes the history of science. “Here the epistemic framework
refers to a worldview resulting from philosophical, religious and ideological factors that
influence the contents of theorizing by enabling or inhibiting our questions” (§10). He
quotes García, according to whom…
a particular cultural pattern enters in a very concrete way into the shaping of science in
a particular society at a particular time. It acts as an epistemological obstacle […]. Here
the social component is not merely providing directionality to scientific research; it enters
deeply into the conceptualization of science. (§10)

These quotations are an excellent description of the different reactions to second-order cy-
bernetics that I have witnessed in Europe and the US. In Europe, second-order cybernetics
is welcomed and appreciated. In the US, in the past, it was sometimes attacked, dismissed,
and disparaged as if one were denying the most fundamental tenant of a religion.
6. Becerra writes that new tools and techniques are needed to integrate multidisci-
plinary team members (§15). Cybernetics has done this by combining a variety of meth-
ods: group facilitation methods such as those of the Institute of Cultural Affairs; causal
influence diagrams; process improvement methods; and, when attempting to understand
or bring about social change, the use of theories and methods from several disciplines:
economics; psychology and anthropology; sociology and political science; and history and

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law, organized into a meta-method (Umpleby 2014: 21; Medvedeva & Umpleby 2015).
I agree with Becerra that additional examples and improvement of methods are needed.

Some debates within the field

7. I understand and share the frustration that Michael Lissack and others feel with the
word “cybernetics.” As a theory of the interaction between ideas and society, the field is
unusually large in its range of interests. It essentially encompasses all human knowledge,
at least in so far as knowledge is used to achieve human purposes. Currently, not many
people have heard of cybernetics, even though most professionals spend several hours
each day in “cyberspace.” Only parts of the field are known to some academics. And cur-
rent cybernetics research – in philosophy, social science, and design – is not the part that is
most known. Many people in the US interpret the term as a synonym for computer science,
which is more confusing than not knowing the field at all. So should we rename cybernet-
ics? Lissack suggests a “science of context” (§19). A “science of reflexivity” would come
closer to my interests. Unfortunately, no term encompasses all aspects of the field, except
the name “cybernetics.” The original name has the advantage of providing an address for
the literature in the field.
8. Although authors such as Andrew Pickering (2010) and Ronald Kline (2015) said
that cybernetics ended in the mid 1970s, the American Society for Cybernetics has held
an annual meeting almost every year since it was founded in 1964. Numerous journals
have “cybernetics” in their titles, and a gradually increasing number of conferences on the
subject are being held each year. Where the field has had difficulty has been in establishing
courses and degree programs on university campuses. The institutionalization of cybernet-
ics has been difficult primarily due to its multidisciplinary character. The field touches all
the schools on a university campus, but none feel a special responsibility for it.
9. It seems odd that people in business and government frequently call for more com-
munication across disciplines, yet a field that brings together people from many disciplines
and has made contributions to many disciplines is not enthusiastically established on cam-
puses. Many books have been written applying ideas from cybernetics to numerous fields
– engineering, medicine, management, arts and sciences, design, and philosophy to name
a few. There is no shortage of applications. However, in each field of application, other
theories and methods already exist. Specialists hesitate to learn new theories and methods
when they already have a body of knowledge that is familiar and respected by others within
their fields. Not everyone seeks cross-disciplinary understanding.
10. Perhaps the term “cybernetics” should be used simply as an address. Rather than
writing about cybernetics or second-order science, we could write about improving the
efficiency and effectiveness of science and advocate more attention to how purposeful
systems can better achieve their goals.
11. Peter Cariani raises the question of whether cybernetics should continue to be
a small revolutionary band seeking to make a scientific revolution or a broader field that
welcomes interested people from many disciplines. This is a debate that has existed within
the American Society for Cybernetics (ASC) since it was founded (Herr et al. 2016). I have
always preferred the large-tent strategy. ASC, however, has so far decided to be a small
committed band of advocates for a new development in science. What the new direction
is changes somewhat with each president, but, since the 1970s, the emphasis has been on
some version of second-order cybernetics.

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12. Cariani points out that my list of constructivist philosophers is incomplete. I ap-
preciate the additional references. He suggests that second-order cybernetics may not be
the best banner under which to advance this alternative understanding of science. Perhaps
broadening the group involved in the discussion would lead to a new name for the field.
13. Cariani provides a succinct but thorough explanation of how practicing scientists,
particularly in biology, operate, knowing that the role of the observer is essential. The de-
bate within cybernetics has usually been between engineers and scientists/ philosophers. I
agree with Cariani that many second-order ideas were present in the earliest writings on
cybernetics. But as the field developed, the engineering applications – computers, artificial
intelligence, and robotics – received the most attention. The term “second-order cybernet-
ics” was chosen in an attempt to refocus attention on the early interest of Warren Mc-
Culloch, Heinz von Foerster, and others in cognition. I agree that there is no need to divide
cybernetics, but most people outside the field assume that cybernetics means computers, so
some modifier of “cybernetics” has been helpful.
14. Regarding Cariani’s comments (§12) on the loss of funding for cybernetics in the
1970s, in conversations that I heard, the subjective approach of cybernetics was consid-
ered to be naïve, out-dated, and not worthy of support. This was the view of people both
at the University of Illinois and in the Research Applied to National Needs program in the
National Science Foundation. The two epistemologies – realism and constructivism – con-
tinue to be discussed in the US in two societies, one devoted to systems science and one
to cybernetics. There have been efforts over the years to combine the two societies, in part
to minimize administrative work. These efforts have failed because of the sharp difference
of opinion regarding acceptable epistemologies. In Europe and elsewhere, systems and
cybernetics topics can be discussed in one conference, but not yet in the US.

Implications for applications

15. Thomas Flanagan emphasizes the need for second-order cybernetics to be con-
nected to practice through methods. He mentions in particular structured dialogic design
(SDD), system dynamics modeling, and interpretive structural modeling. I agree that re-
peated testing is the way to improve and extend a scientific theory. However, I think of
second-order cybernetics as being different from the usual theory. Whereas we usually cri-
tique scientific practice from the perspective of philosophy of science, cybernetics, because
it is based on neurobiology, provides a way to critique present conceptions of knowledge
and science. As our conception of knowledge changes, new ways of doing science are
considered appropriate.
16. Cybernetics originated in a desire to create a science of the informational do-
main (i.e., communication and control) in addition to the physical domain (i.e., matter and
energy). Since the philosophy of science usually illustrates its examples of how science
should be done by citing examples from physics, social researchers, in an effort to create
social science, have sought to imitate physics and overlooked cybernetics. The result is a
preoccupation in contemporary social science with finding linear causal relations with a
high level of statistical significance, often independent of a theory. Meanwhile, schools of
management have constructed knowledge in narrow fields – finance, marketing, account-
ing, and labor relations – without regard to a general theory. And research in universities
is evaluated by number of publications in peer reviewed journals, rather than its utility in
improving the performance of individuals and organizations. The result is that the literature

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on management and social science often lacks clear connections to philosophy, theory, and
practice.
17. Second-order cybernetics began with an effort by von Foerster to include the ob-
server in the descriptions created by scientists. This suggestion was resisted, often quite
strongly, by those who felt that including the observer would imply self-reference and
lead to paradox and inconsistency. Maintaining that the observer could be excluded from
research descriptions enabled scientists to claim objectivity and lack of bias. Von Foerster
(1971) cited the work of John von Neumann, Gotthard Günther und Lars Löfgren that
concluded that self-referential statements do not necessarily lead to inconsistencies, but the
desire to avoid political controversy led scientists to adopt the claim that they were doing
objective research. My concern is that our current conception of science, that descriptions
can somehow be created without observers, is limiting our ability to describe important
problems and therefore to devise needed solutions. When people hold different views,
creating multiple descriptions is necessary.
18. I believe that cybernetics, as a general theory of communication and control, a
general theory of management, and a general theory of an information society, will prog-
ress most successfully if it clearly states its connection to philosophy, theory, and practice.
So far, second-order cybernetics has tended to emphasize the biology of cognition, i.e.,
it focused on the individual knower. By connecting second-order cybernetics to the large
literature on management methods, particularly group methods, second-order cybernetics
can make clear its practical utility and its status as a general theory of management, namely
that human groups work more effectively when they use explicit methods for engaging in
problem-solving tasks.
19. Some of the best work in management is done by consultants who work most
closely with clients and who are not constrained by narrowing what they observe to the
issues of interest in an academic field.
20. The Institute of Cultural Affairs (ICA) did not know about second-order cybernet-
ics in the 1950s or even until recent years (§5). The term “second-order cybernetics” was
invented in the 1970s. However, the ICA did know about – and disagreed with – Saul Alin-
sky’s approach to community organizing in Chicago (Alinsky 1971), and they had read the
work of systems theorists such as Kenneth Boulding and Margaret Mead. My point in the
target article was that the work of ICA, both at the local level and in designing and carry-
ing out a global strategy, was compatible with and could be thought of as an illustration of
principles from second-order cybernetics.
21. My purpose in describing the work of ICA was to illustrate both a different way of
doing research on organizations and a different goal for doing research (§6). Second-order
cybernetics originally focused on the role of the observer in doing scientific research and,
by extension, the importance of the points of view of different participants in an experi-
ment. Much social science research today focuses on surveying respondents and analyzing
data. Facilitating conversations among a group of people who share an interest in an orga-
nization is done not to establish a causal relationship among variables but rather to improve
the operation of a social system. Facilitated group discussions are a kind of research in that
the participants learn what the members of the group are thinking. Decisions are made,
acted upon, and after a few months the planning process is repeated. It is an iterative ap-
proach – small steps eventually leading to large changes.
22. People at the local level are learning what the group feels is needed and what ac-
tions they think will be fruitful. The facilitators are learning what methods seem to work

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best and what kinds of problems arise in more than one community. Hence, they can be
better prepared when those issues arise in the future. Discussions at the local level also
serve as training programs for the participants. After participating in several meetings, a
person can move up to leading a small group discussion and later a plenary session. Train-
ing sessions for group leaders are also conducted in addition to the planning and organizing
meetings. With additional experience, participants are able to lead training programs and
later suggest different methods and training programs.
23. Many people in management do not think of management methods as the result
of research. The methods are just “how we do things.” It is a mistake to think that only
academics do research. Process improvement methods constitute a kind of research as well
(Umpleby 2002). They are also a way of designing and redesigning an organization.
24. I think of second-order cybernetics not so much as a way of interacting with cli-
ents or of developing methods for facilitating group discussions but rather as an argument
for why working with people in groups on problems of interest to them is a legitimate form
of scientific research (§16). The purpose of science must not only be to publish research
results in journals but also to help people achieve their goals by working in harmony with
their colleagues and neighbors.
25. Developing management methods (i.e., procedures used in organizations) is often
considered to be different from management research, which is thought to involve analyz-
ing data (§17). But individuals and organizations are purposeful systems. Cybernetics is
a science of purposeful systems. Developing methods that improve the performance of
individuals or organizations is definitely a form of scientific research that should be guided
by second order cybernetics. As Flanagan’s Figure 1, citing Warfield, illustrates, it is em-
pirical and guided by theory.
26. Grandon Gill places my article in the context of two approaches to business re-
search: the case method and classical social science research. He notes that my arguments
would support the legitimacy and appropriateness of the case approach relative to social
science research (§§2f).
27. I like this framing of the issues. However, I believe there is a third approach.
Service-learning has been increasing steadily as a teaching method in recent decades
(Umpleby 2011). In service-learning, students work with clients on current problems,
rather than examples from a textbook. I have my students do service-learning projects with
organizations – a business, a government agency, or a non-governmental organization. I
describe the projects as the laboratory part of the course, see http://www.gwu.edu/~rpsol/
service-learning. In their project reports, students are expected to describe their activities
using as many concepts from the course as possible. In this way, the concepts in the course
are connected to their personal experiences and observations.
28. The theory that underlies a cybernetics approach to research is that both individu-
als and organizations are purposeful systems. The goals of such systems, and how the goals
change, is an essential part of understanding and modifying them. Note that the classical
approach to science places the observer outside the system being studied. Although this as-
sumption has worked well in the natural sciences, carrying it over to management research
conflicts with the phenomenon being studied. Managers are members of the organizations
they manage and how the two interact is the subject being investigated. Gill notes that not
only managers but also the writer of a discussion case study interact frequently with the
manager and organization and generally adopt the point of view of the decision-maker
(§9).

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29. Gill wisely and accurately notes that greater involvement by researchers in the
organizations they study will require new skills in working within very different cultures
(§18). And he expresses his hope that the new emphasis on measuring the impact of re-
search will lead to rethinking our attitudes on what makes for good research (§19).

Conclusion
30. The field of cybernetics, by creating a general theory of communication and con-
trol, is a major contribution to contemporary science. It provides a common foundation
for the biological and social sciences by pointing out the similarity of circular causal and
feedback processes. Reflexive processes, where elements of a social system both observe
and participate, have been an important recent addition (Lefebvre 1982, 2006; Soros 1987,
2014). Second-order cybernetics, since the term was introduced in the mid 1970s, has
enabled cybernetics to continue to make noteworthy contributions. Work on second-order
cybernetics in the past 40 years has led those in the field to believe that it enables a recon-
ceptualization of the scientific enterprise, one that will accelerate the contributions that
scientists can make to improving our ability to cope with current and future events.
31. There are many challenges to guide future research. But the primary challenge
seems to be explaining cybernetics and second-order cybernetics to the scientific com-
munity and to university faculty and administrators. The difficulty of this task provides
evidence that cybernetics is a different kind of academic field.

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 Cybernetics, Reflexivity
and Second-Order Science
Louis H. Kauffman

Introduction
1. In this article, I study the questions “What is cybernetics?” and “What is science?”
I examine these questions in the form of reflexivity. I shall explain what is meant by a
reflexive domain and in the process expand the concept of cybernetics. Cybernetics is con-
cerned with circularity, a circularity that includes the observer (or operator) in the system.
The observer is actively in the system. Nevertheless, domains with such circularity remain
amenable to rational study. In cybernetics, one attempts to be fully aware of the context of
any situation. This means that a reflection on the context, and an inclusion of that aware-
ness of context into the context is always present. What is being evoked is a different
sense of the rational than that offered by traditional science. In the face of the circularity
of context and observer it is still possible to explore and come to agreements that have
every appearance of being scientific facts. I shall describe how it comes about that an arena
generated by dynamic interactions and shifting relationships can become a world just like
ours, subject to exploration, invention and discovery. One may say that from this point of
view, objectivity is an emergent phenomenon! The body of the article is formed in a series
of short, numbered paragraphs that I hope will let the reader explore and compare the ideas
as they are articulated. The main ideas have already been expressed in this paragraph, but
extensions and ways to speak and express these notions occur in the expanded form of the
article itself.
2. As cybernetics grew, this notion of circular domains, in which cybernetics occurs,
also grew. There are areas of logic and mathematics that have a good correspondence with
the sort of circularity that cybernetics needs. I shall speak of reflexive domains.
3. A reflexive domain is an abstract description of a conversational domain in which
cybernetics can occur. Each participant in the reflexive domain is also an actor who trans-
forms that domain. In full reflexivity, each participant is entirely determined by how he or
she acts in the domain, and the domain is entirely determined by its participants. I write
D = [D, D] to denote this reflexivity of a domain D (Kauffman 1987, 2001, 2004, 2005,
2009, 2012a, 2012b, 2015; Scott 1971; Varela 1979).1 The symbol [D, D] denotes all the

1. These references deal with both lambda calculus and the notion of reflexive domains. In this
listing I have indicated only those references that explicitly or implicitly deal with reflexive do-

85

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available transformations of the domain D to itself. The equation says that D is identical
to the processes that transform it. The point to note is that if a transformation T is defined
by the equation T(D) =  [D, D], then the transformation T applied to a domain D reveals all
the processes that can transform D into itself. A reflexive domain is itself an eigenform
(see below): D =  T(D) =  [D, D]. Note that a reflexive domain is a context for action, and
when we say that the domain D is itself an eigenform, we stand back momentarily from
the domain into a larger context that can include it. This means that no domain, even a
reflexive domain, is the end of our deliberations. Each domain can be transcended to a new
and larger domain. The process is endless and is the source of all our constructions and
considerations.
4. An eigenform is a fixed point for a transformation. In the context of this article, an
arbitrary transformation is allowed in any mathematical domain with a fixed point either
in that domain or in some extension of that domain. This usage is an extension of some
technical uses of the term that are special cases of this notion. In the next paragraph, I give
a specific example of how an eigenform can arise as the fixed point of a transformation that
is simple and syntactical. For our purposes an eigenform is the analog of an eigenvector
in analysis or linear algebra, but it is much more general and includes the fixed points that
occur in reflexive domains, as will be explained below.
5. I define T(x) =  [x]. Then I can apply T again and again to an arbitrary x as shown
below:
x
[x]
[[x]]
[[[x]]]
[[[[x]]]]
[[[[[x]]]]]
…
6. If you do this for a long time it begins to look like
E = [[[[[[[[[[…]]]]]]]]]]
and this expression has the form of something that does not change if you put one more
set of brackets around it. Thus E (above) is an eigenform for the transformation T where
T(x) =  [x].
7. The entity E appears in our perception due to the recursive action of the transforma-
tion, and it is a consequence of how one deals with E, seeing it as invariant under T, that
makes it into an object for our perception. That E appears as an object is part and parcel of
being an eigenform. Thus Heinz von Foerster spoke of eigenforms in the phrase “objects
as tokens for eigenbehaviors” (Foerster 2003a). Heinz, in a wonderful turn of perception,
turned the mathematical idea on its head. He pointed out that ordinary objects are tokens
for eigenbehaviors. Ordinary objects are invariances of processes performed in the space of
our experience. The “space of our experience” is the context in which we have our experi-
ence and it is the experience itself. I make objects by finding fixed points in the recursion of

mains. A reflexive domain is a particular situation where lambda calculus applies.

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my interactions. Eigenforms are a touchstone for the relationship of circular and recursive
processes and the ground of our apparent worlds of perception. This point of view should be
compared with that of Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1987), where they see the
construction of conversational domains through the coordination of coordinations of actions
of organisms in the course of their evolution.
8. With this in mind, look again at the defining property of the reflexive domain
D, D = [D, D], and understand that the domain itself is an eigenform.
9. This structural observation has consequences for the applications of cybernetics
and applications to the epistemology of second-order science (Kauffman 2015; Müller &
Riegler 2014; Umpleby 2014). For if science is to be performed in a reflexive domain, then
one must recognize the actions of the persons in the domain. Persons and their actions are
not separate. If an action is a scientific theory about the domain, then this theory becomes
a (new) transformation of the domain. Theory inevitably affects the ground that it studies.
Furthermore, the fact that an entire domain can be seen as an eigenform suggests that one
can be an observer of that domain in a wider view of the landscape. Thus physics can be
seen as a reflexive domain and one can take a meta-scientific view, allowing physics itself
to be one of the objects of a larger domain of in which it (physical science) is one of the
eigenforms.
10. How then, do physical and natural science manage to obtain their apparently ob-
jective results? The answer lies in circularity and eigenform. Traditional science searches
only for those actions that are independent of the observers (persons) involved. This means
that traditional science asks to work within a particular subset of available eigenforms.
Once this is realized, one can begin to see how to widen scientific operations.
11. Exploration of this theme will proceed in other papers, but the point I want to
make here is that the initial place to begin cybernetics and second-order science is in the
recognition of circularity and reflexivity.
12. In this article, I shall show that there is no definition of cybernetics that is not a
circular definition. This result should be a cause for celebration, for cybernetics is a study
of circularity and the fact that it requires a circular definition shows that cybernetics is
fundamentally not separate from circularity.
13. The next section discusses definitions and the structure of circular definitions fol-
lowed by a section showing that basic notions of mathematics would require circular defi-
nitions but that mathematics, allowing as it does undefined terms, can give the appearance
of avoiding circularity. I continue with a section providing the proof that cybernetics, if it
has definitions, must have circular definitions.
14. The subsequent section is a discussion that leads outward to the structure of sci-
ence and the meaning of eigenform and reflexive domains. I show that our concept of
reflexive domain is itself an eigenform and that the central, circular concept of eigenform
underlies and overlies all notions of reflexivity. In the Conclusion, I discuss science and
second-order science directly. It is my thesis that all science, all attempts to find knowl-
edge, are faithfully modeled by the search for eigenforms in a reflexive domain. A conven-
tionally successful science will find such forms and point to them as the objective results
of that science. But a wider look at the situation will reveal that the larger landscape of
the reflexive domain has been significantly influenced by these theories. The world has
changed as a result of the scientific activity. There is no inviolate ground. The path is being
constructed in the act of making it. And yet there are beautiful and important eigenforms to

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be found. The quest of science becomes larger and more romantic and more intentional in
the embracing of the second-order. I imagine worlds and bring them into being.

Distinction and circularity

15. How do definitions come about?
16. A definition of a term, as it is usually taken, defines that term in terms of other
terms. For example, I may say that “a hammer is a device for pounding nails into wood”
or “a straight line segment is the shortest distance been two points in a plane space.” Defi-
nitions in this form are to be found in the dictionary. Some words are genuinely difficult
to define. Consider what happens when I look up the world “distinction” in a dictionary.
I find that the word distinction is defined as a marking off, an indication of a difference, a
discrimination or a distinguishing quality or characteristic.
17. If you already know the meaning of distinction, the dictionary entry can be useful
in pinning down some subtleties of usage of the word. But if you did not know the mean-
ing of the word, then you would only find synonyms for distinction in the definition of
distinction.
18. The dictionary has engaged in circularity in defining distinction.
19. According to the dictionary:
1. A distinction is a marking off of a difference.
2. A difference is the making of a distinction.

20. This is a circular definition. Each term is defined in terms of the other term. I have
been taught that circular definitions are wrong and should be avoided. And yet our diction-
aries routinely use circular definitions for the most fundamental terms and concepts such as
distinction. I say that the circularity of definitions of distinction is a cause for celebration.
For it cannot be otherwise.
21. What is a definition? In order for a definition to be effective it must make a dis-
tinction. It must carve a niche in the world of our words. In order for a definition to tell
us without circularity what is a distinction, that definition must distinguish distinguishing.
This cannot be accomplished without circularity.
Theorem 1. There is no definition of distinction that is not circular.
Proof. If there were a definition of distinction, this would be a distinction that characterizes
distinction. Thus the definition would be circular, using the concept of distinction to define
distinction. Hence there is no definition of distinction that is not circular. QED
22. This theorem does not tell me that I cannot understand distinction. It tells me that
such understanding is necessarily a matter of experience. Make a distinction. Draw a circle
in a tide-flattened stretch of sand. Bake a cake. Prove a theorem. Sing a song. Attempt to
understand understanding. Live a life. Distinction transcends closed worlds of words, and
moves into the worlds of feeling and action.

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Mathematics
23. Mathematics is based on the idea of a distinction and mathematics is usually re-
garded as a gold standard for precision. No one said that distinctions could not have pre-
cision. I said that they must have circularity, but circularity does not preclude precision.
24. Take numbers, positive integer numbers such as 1, 2, 3. We all seem to agree how
to treat them and work with them and they are precise. If I say that I have one apple, you
know what I mean. But I may ask what is the number 2? This is a question at a different
level.
25. The number 2 is represented by the set TWO = { { }, { { } } } whose members are
the two sets { } and { { } }. The first set is empty and the second set has as its member the
empty set. Thus these two sets are distinct, and so TWO is a set with two distinct members.
TWO represents the number 2.
26. I produced the set TWO and checked that it had two distinct members. So I al-
ready knew what two was and used it in the definition of TWO. But TWO is not two! TWO
is a set and it is like a ruler. TWO is the mathematician’s standard for the number two. If
you ask a mathematician “Are there two sheep in that field?”, he pulls out the set TWO
from his waistcoat and compares it with the sheep in the field. He then says to you “I have
attempted to make a one-to-one correspondence between the sheep in the field and my set
TWO. I discover that there are more sheep in the field than there are members of TWO.
Therefore I tell you that there are more than two sheep in that field.”
27. I do not need a definition for 2. If someone wants to know if there are 2 things
about, I just take out my ruler and check. But could I give a definition of 2?
28. Bertrand Russell gave a definition of number. He writes “[…] a number of a class
[is] the class of all classes similar to the given class” (Russell 1938: 115).
29. Thus Russell would say that 2 is the collection of all (possible) pairs. Russell’s
definition is a deep insight, but it is very wide. How am I to know about all pairs? Let us
keep thinking about Russell’s idea but leave it aside for now.
30. What if I said that 2 is the set { { }, { { } } }? That will not do. I could call this set
TWO, but I cannot call it 2 because 2 is the concept of a pairing and the set is just a set. So
I use the set as a definite example of a pairing, and then I say that something has 2 elements
if they can be matched with this set.
31. Now there is an even deeper problem. In defining 2 via this set and the idea of
matching, I use the idea of two for the matching. Two things are matched if you put them
in correspondence with one another, and so I use the concept of 2 in defining the concept
of 2. Matching and pairing mean the same. As I see these features of twoness, I get a
precise idea about the concept 2.
32. Precision of concept is something that one can explore, even though there is no
way to avoid circularity of definition.
33. There are other issues about number. I have the symbols 1, 2, 3, … and rules
for working with them such as 3 + 1 = 4 and that 9 + 1 = 10. I can specify the rules without
circularity and so learn to use the numbers. It takes discussion, teaching and learning to do
arithmetic. Later, once one has learned to do arithmetic, it is possible to make definitions
and theories and worry about circularity. The worry about circularity has led mathemati-
cians to the remarkable notion of undefined terms. In every mathematical theory there are
terms that are simply not defined. In this way these terms avoid circular definition.

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34. Let us go back to the standard for 2. This is built from sets, and sets are, in their
own theory, undefined, but have special operations for building them. The simplest set is
the empty set, usually written as { }. This set is distinguished by the fact that it has no
members, and is represented as an empty container. As a container, it is a distinction with
no contents and no markings other than its boundary. I cannot define a distinction, but I
use distinctions all the time and mathematics is built from them. When I go into the realm
of distinctions I go into the realm of my own creations and into the realm where I can
make the imaginary act that distinguishes myself from what I do. I am a reflexive domain.

The definition of cybernetics and the cybernetics of definition

35. I assert that cybernetics cannot be defined without circularity. Recall the theorem
of the previous section:
Theorem 1. There is no definition of the concept of distinction that is not circular.
36. I shall use this theorem to prove the next theorem. The point is that cybernetics
is so deeply involved in the concept of distinction that it can no more be defined than can
distinction be defined without circularity.
Theorem 2. There is no definition of cybernetics that is not circular.
Proof. Cybernetics includes within its purvey the concept of distinction since it studies
circular processes and all distinctions are circular processes involving the production of
an observer in relation to an observing system and the production of an observing system
in relation to an observer. Therefore a definition of cybernetics would entail a definition
of distinction. But by Theorem 1 (see above) there can be no definition of distinction that
is not circular and therefore there can be no definition of cybernetics that is not circular.
QED
37. In proving this theorem, I have assumed that cybernetics deals with the funda-
mentals of circular processes. This is in accord with its history and with its use. Contrast
this situation with mathematics. Mathematics studies distinctions, but I do not insist that
distinctions themselves are the subject matter of mathematics. Nevertheless, if pressed, I
would argue that mathematics is also indefinable!
38. I conclude that a definition of cybernetics could be given in the following form:
Cybernetics is the study of systems and processes that interact with themselves and pro-
duce themselves from themselves. This includes cybernetics itself as a system or process
that interacts with itself and produces itself from itself.
39. While the reader may object to this definition on grounds that it is not broad
enough for a definition of cybernetics, at least the definition is circular.

Cybernetics and reflexive domains

40. I should note that once cybernetics is defined in terms of itself, it becomes what
is commonly called “second-order cybernetics.” Perhaps there never was a first-order cy-
bernetics but this is a useful distinction. When I distance myself from an object of study,

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but nevertheless examine its circularities, it may be natural to call such a study cybernet-
ics of the first-order. Here I am concerned with the second-order, but I will just call that
cybernetics.
41. There is a way to do mathematics that is explicitly circular, called lambda calcu-
lus (Barendregt 1985; Kauffman & Buliga 2014; Kauffman 2015; Scott 1971). It is called
“Laws of Form” (Spencer-Brown 1969) in its full simplicity.
42. First I want to discuss Laws of Form and then pass over to more complex ver-
sions.
43. In George Spencer-Brown’s book Laws of Form (Spencer-Brown 1969), a very
simple mathematical system is constructed on the basis of a single sign, the mark, desig-
nated by a circle or a box or a right angle bracket. I shall not develop the formalism here.
But that sign, in our eyes, makes a distinction in plane in which it is drawn. And the inter-
pretation of Spencer-Brown’s calculus has us understand that the sign refers to the distinc-
tion that the sign makes (we make that distinction when we are identified with the sign).
Thus the sign of distinction in the calculus of Spencer-Brown is self-referential. That is,
expressions in the calculus refer to themselves and to other expressions in the calculus.
44. While this calculus is circular and self-referential, it is consistent.
45. By a series of departures and constructions, the calculus of indications of Spen-
cer-Brown can be seen to be a foundation for the construction of all of mathematics, and
it gives direct insight into the structure of language and communication. The external
observer is intimately involved in this calculus, for it is through that observer that the
distinctions take place. Thus the circularity of the calculus engulfs the observer. One is in
a cybernetic domain.
46. A more complex form of circularity in mathematics occurs when an expression
explicitly refers to itself. For example, I could write the self-referring equation x =  1 + 1 / x
and have an expression x that is defined in terms of itself. More general fixed points indi-
cate other circularities. For example
“This sentence has thirty-three letters.”
is a sentence that refers to itself and tells a truth about itself. I can formalize circularity in
terms of fixed points. Heinz von Foerster (2003b) was fond of this relationship of circular-
ity and fixed points. He saw that a fixed point, taken in the cognitive world, can connote
an object in the perception of an observer. In his terms, the object is a token for an eigen-
behavior, the iteration of a transformation whose fixed point is the object. The observer
embodies a transformation T that leaves the object fixed in the sense that one has the fixed
point equation T(Object) = Object. This means that no extra distinction is introduced by
the application of the transformation T to the Object. Von Foerster called the object so
fixed an eigenform, and the transformation an eigenbehavior.
47. It should be understood that the object, the eigenform, may come into existence
through the action of the transformation. This can happen by an interlock of meanings
without any iteration. By an interlock I mean a direct reference of the sentence to itself, or
a mutual reference of two structures. For example, the US dollar bill has a statement writ-
ten upon it that says “This bill is legal tender.” That statement interlocks with the dollar
bill upon which it is printed. When we shake hands, each hand grasps the other hand. The
hands interlock. In the next example, we have the sentence “I am the one who says I.” The
sentence prior to the one you are now reading shakes hands with its reader and makes an
opportunity for the reader to identify himself or herself.

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48. I have the following operator:

T(x) = the one who says x
The eigenform for this operator is “I”.
“I am the one who says I”
“I = the one who says I”
I = T(I)
49. This explication of “I” as an eigenform places its fundamental circularity starkly
before us. I is an eigenform of the transformation, but the identity of the I can vary. I can
be the one who says I and so can you. The eigenform I is fixed by a linguistic transforma-
tion but is handed back and forth in the conversation among a community of I’s. This is
exactly the condition that Spencer-Brown (1969: 76) describes for his mark when he says
“We see now that the first distinction, the mark and the observer are not only interchange-
able, but in the form, identical.”
50. A community of observer/participators forms a reflexive domain D. By this term
I mean that each person in the domain is also an actor in that domain. Each one acts upon
the others and each can be acted upon by the others and by himself. This is the funda-
mental condition for the cybernetics of social and economic behavior, and it is also the
condition for all scientific behavior.
51. There is a key relationship between reflexive domains and eigenforms. I state this
relationship as a theorem.
Church-Curry fixed point theorem. Let D be a reflexive domain and let T be any ele-
ment of the domain D. Then there is an element X in D such that X is a fixed point for T.
That is, TX = X.
Proof. Define the following operation on elements of D:
Gx = T(xx).
That is, G operates on x by letting T operate on the result of x operating on itself.
Since D is a reflexive domain, I can assume that the operation G is itself an element of the
domain. Now examine the result of G operating on itself. G operating on itself is the result
of T operating on G operating on itself. That is, GG = T(GG). Thus GG is a fixed point for
T. QED
52. It is quite possible that the reader will find this construction, simple as it is, quite
baffling! It is best to discuss it from a number of angles. The key point for a reflexive do-
main is that participants in the domain can act on themselves. One must take this property
to heart. Regard yourself as such a participant and understand that you interact not only
with others (for example in a market) but also with yourself. There is a singularity about
interacting with oneself that is different from interacting with others. You have to separate
yourself from yourself to interact with yourself and this separation is at a conceptual level
or an imaginary level, since you are not actually separate from yourself. Think of the G
in the theorem as a person. This person acts on another person P by letting the transfor-
mation T act on the self-interaction of P. What does it mean to act on the self-interaction
of another? It means to go into conversation with that other. Thus G induces T to go into

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conversation with P. One can think of G as a coach who gets people to interact with one
another. But how does G act on himself?
53. Well G acting on G induces T to be in conversation with G. This means that G’s
self-interaction is acted on by T. Thus G’s self-interaction is indeed the action of T on G’s
self-interaction. The singularity of self-interaction leads to the fixed point.
54. This singularity of self-interaction is well-known in many puzzles and paradoxes.
For example, there is the tale of the village with a barber B who shaves only those who
do not shave themselves. This is straightforward just so long as I do not ask “Who shaves
the barber?” For if the barber shaves himself then by definition, he cannot shave himself.
55. A deeper relationship with the fixed point theorem is Russell’s paradox. For this
purpose, let AB denote the relationship “B is a member of A.” Thus A acting on B is the
act of B becoming a member of A. Then I can define Rx =  ~(xx) where ~ denotes “not.” R
is a set with the property that x is a member of R exactly when x is not a member of x. R is
the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. This set R is the famous Russell set.
The paradox of the Russell set is that
56. RR is an eigenform for negation. For I have
Rx =  ~(xx) and so RR =  ~(RR).
57. This Russellian eigenform is a problem for those who insist that negation must
not have fixed points. Certainly RR is a rogue set from the usual point of view since it
apparently can both belong to itself and not belong to itself.
58. This depends upon what is the “usual point of view.” Looking from the reflexive
domain of persons and selves, I see that RR is very like a person. RR is part of itself, but
RR is also the whole of herself and so not a part at all. RR is a member of RR and RR is
not a member of RR. In the reflexive domain of persons and selves it is natural enough for
RR to be a eigenform of negation.
59. It is an axiom of physical science that one requires results and procedures that
can be repeated by others to a sufficient degree of accuracy so that the community of
physicists agrees that the results and procedures do not depend on the specific observers
(other than that they carry out the actions of the experiment according to the specifi-
cations). It should be clear from this well-known description of experimental physical
science that an experiment is a transformation E that involves persons P and a result X
and I desire an eigenform X so that E(P, X) =  X independent of the choice of P (within a
community of “competent scientists” P). Why does X appear on the left-hand side of this
equation? By this I mean that the experiment is repeatable. You can record X as a result of
the experiment and then find that when you perform it again, you get the same result. It is
the repeatability that makes a successful experiment into an eigenform.
60. That knowledge should be independent of the observers is related to the repeat-
ability and I will discuss it further below.
61. Physics is defined circularly and it demands certain eigenforms for its successful
experiments. These eigenforms are in accord with the description of a world that is objec-
tive, a world that is independent of the particular choice of observers. The objective world
of physics is not given a priori. The objective world of physics is a construction of the
physicists based on the type of results that they deem acceptable as valid physics. Of course
it could have happened that physics would fail and there would never be any experiments E
of this kind or any results X of this kind. Fortunately for physics, there is a whole world of
physical results, and it would appear that there is no end in sight to the progress of physics.

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04 Kauffman.indd 94 06-07-17 10:55:26 AM

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form. This shows how eigenforms can be dynamic. The entire world of science is itself
an eigenform. The world of the stock market is an eigenform. The cybernetics world is an
eigenform. These eigenforms are the forms of closure that occur in large interacting sys-
tems where the dynamics of individuals leads their identities outward and the individuals
become identified with their actions. Just so do words become identified with their actions
in Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958: §43): “The meaning of a word is its use […].” In the same
way, Charles Sanders Pierce (Kauffman 2001) had the concept of the individual as a sign
for himself. This means that in the dynamics of sign-behavior there arises reference and
eventually self-reference and through this self-reference the individual becomes a sign for
himself. Word and individuals are both seen as elements of a reflexive domain in the work
of Wittgenstein and Pierce. Pierce’s concept is directly related to the reflexive domain in
which the individual comes to have an identity through the eigenform “I”.
70. With this I return to the identification of the mark and the observer in Spencer-
Brown (1969), now at the scale of the detailed interactions of individuals with many others.
71. I have the fundamental theorem that every element T of a reflexive domain D has a
fixed point X with T(X) =  X. Eigenforms prevail at the individual as well as the global levels
in reflexive domains. The world of reflexive domains and their eigenforms is the world in
which cybernetics occurs.
72. How does a reflexive domain come about? In some cases, such as our person-
hood, one simply lives there and cannot easily give an account of how it happened. I live
in the eigenform of my reflexive domain of self-other interaction. It is a mystery how it
happens. I do not have a sequential construction for it. On the other hand, consider some
given domain D that is not reflexive. By not reflexive I mean that the transformations of D
to itself are not in perfect correspondence to elements of D. There are transformations A
taking D to D that are not members of D. What should I do? I may include them and form
a new domain D1. But D1, while larger than D, may still not be reflexive, so I may need
to adjoin more elements. The general pattern is T(Dn) =  [Dn, Dn] = D(n + 1). Then I iterate the
construction of enlarging the domain to infinity or to a very large N where DN and D(N + 1) are
indistinguishable. At this point I have achieved DN as an eigenform for T. I have created a
reflexive domain. Once I have a reflexive domain, I can avail myself of the Church-Curry
fixed point theorem within that domain and all the other amenities of closure that such
domains afford. The insight that reflexive domains are themselves eigenforms is directly
related to how they can come into existence. The technical details of this limiting process
can be seen in the work of Dana Scott (1971).
73. With this point of view, I can think of a reflexive domain as arising in the free-
dom to assign names to processes, and to allow those processes to become new elements
of the original domain of objects (under scrutiny). This sort of freedom is well-known to
computer programmers of languages, where an algorithm or procedure is given a name and
that name is then at the same level as other original terms in the language. The language
expands in time as the programmer makes new “macros” of this sort. In this practical situ-
ation one does not have to go to the limit of an infinite tower construction (as described
in the previous paragraph) to obtain reflexivity. One only has to recognize that defined
processes are subject to being elements of an always-extending language.
74. The construction I made in the Church-Curry fixed point theorem can be ac-
complished under relatively ordinary circumstances. For example, suppose that I define
Gx = <xx> as a symbolic process. It is a process that a computer can perform on symbol
strings such as x. Then applying G to x means that I duplicate x and place brackets around

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the two copies of x. This is an operation that can be performed by a computer. I regard G
itself as a string of symbols (with one character). The strange and curious thing is what
happens when I apply G to G.
75. With Gx = <xx>, I obtain GG = <GG>. I obtain a statement of self-reference and, if
I take this equality seriously as an action, I obtain the unending recursion (GG is replaced
by <GG>)
GG = <GG> = <<GG>> = <<<GG>>>
= <<<<GG>>>> = ….
76. All this is compatible with the previous notion that
E = <<<<<<<…>>>>>>>
is invariant under bracketing: E = <E>.
77. In one case, I obtain the eigenform by singular substitution. In the other case, I
obtain the eigenform by a limiting process. It should be noted that these examples of strict
substitution and transition to infinity are idealized and do not begin the wonderful partial
aspects of self-reference that occur in our worlds of language. For example, I may refer to
myself without yet knowing what boundaries of the self are intended and indeed with the
hope of extending them. I may say “I am a mathematician” or “I am a clarinetist,” in each
case using the declaration as a performative act that may promote the one who says it into
that category. The act of saying can be an essential ingredient in the movement to a state of
being. Thus does one say “With this ring I thee wed.”
78. It is at this point that the reader will discern that I am in favor of both nouns and
verbs. In fact, from our point of view it is indispensible to have both nouns and verbs, and
the possibility of changing nouns to verbs and verbs to nouns as the need arises. Due to the
long discussions in systems theory about the nature of nouns and verbs, this aspect of our
epistemology will be continued in other papers.
79. I shall now see how self-reference can arise in systems that are powerful enough
to have reference, and powerful enough to take the names of processes and the names of
things and use them in the language on an equal basis (just as one does in human natural
languages). Nouns and verbs become interchangeable. Suppose that I have a system S that
can make distinctions in its world and give names to the sides of these distinctions.
80. S has a language, and in that language S will write A  →  B to mean “A refers to B”
or that “A is the name of B.” S is endowed with a special process denoted by “#” so that
when A  →  B, S creates a new reference #A  →  BA called the indicative shift of the original
reference A →  B. Thus #A is the name of “B with a name-tag A attached.”
81. I say that #A is the meta-name of BA. This shifting of names to meta-names is
fundamental to the observing system S. The shift enables an object and its name to be su-
perimposed just as I find that persons I know have their name as one of their direct proper-
ties for me. It is the shift of naming that allows the system S to achieve self-reference. The
system S will create a name for the operation of the shift itself.
82. Let M  →  # denote the name of the shift operation. Note that this is an instance of
a process (#) acquiring a name (M) and thereby being associated with a noun. But then
this naming of the shift process can itself be shifted, and I find that #M  →  #M is the result
of that shift. In this way, the system S acquires self-reference. If I let I = #M then I find
that I refers to I. If the system could talk, she would say “I am the meta-name of my own
meta-naming process!” The structure of this acquisition of self-reference has the same

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pattern as the Church-Curry fixed point theorem. Our point in describing it is to show that
the self-reference of “I am the one who says I.” occurs naturally in a model of a system
S that is capable of reference, naming and distinction. Such systems deserve the name of
“observing systems.”

Conclusion
83. I am now in a position to discuss second-order science in the light of an under-
standing of reflexive domains. I have discussed how a society of persons can be schemati-
cally modeled by a reflexive domain D. The domain contains more than just the human
persons. It contains processes that are initiated by them, with each process regarded both as
an object in the domain and as a transformation of the domain. The transformative proper-
ties of an element can be referred to any other element or person in the domain. I can now
look at the practice of science in terms of the landscape of the domain D. I emphasize that
the domain D should be seen as “the world” in the sense of Wittgenstein. Here I refer to
a world that begins in the context of the early Wittgenstein of the Tractatus (Wittgenstein
1922) but continues into the world of the later Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investiga-
tions (Wittgenstein 1958). From the point of view of reflexive domains these worlds are
not incompatible. What is the case is the present state of action and eigenform. But there is
no longer an impenetrable barrier between the descriptions (pictures) of the world and the
world itself. Each acts upon the other. Each creates the other. Words acquire their mean-
ings via actions, and distinctions occur in the sharp invariances of certain eigenforms. The
world is everything that is the case, and the world evolves according to the theories and ac-
tions of the participants in that world. Thus when a scientist in the world proposes a theory,
this theory becomes a new element of that world. The theory acts and is acted upon by the
world of persons and elements of the world. There is no protection for the world from the
effects of such a theory. It is remarkable that physicists have been able to isolate phenom-
ena that do not appear to be affected by the theories of those phenomena.
84. For example, the Maxwell theory of electromagnetism does not appear to affect
the behavior of electromagnetic fields. What has been discovered is that the electromag-
netic field (as measured by the procedures associated with this physics) is an eigenform of
the theory. The physics is defined to be physics when the object of the theory is found to
be an eigenform of the theory. But I can take a wider view and examine the effect of the
electromagnetic theory in the world at large, not just its effect on the “fields themselves.”
85. Since James Clerk Maxwell and the allied discoveries of electrical generators
and electromagnetic wave transmission, the entire face of our world has been transformed
by the entry of the theory of electromagnetism into that world. This is so striking that it
seems hard to believe that it is a common belief that scientific theories are just objective
descriptions of the way the world “is.” The way the world “is” is an evolving context for
interaction and exploration.
86. The key to the apparent objectivity of a science is in its carefully crafted eigen-
forms that are checked to remain fixed throughout significant periods of time. If one at-
tempts to maintain this sort of objectivity in other forms of social science, the processes can
take a much different shape. For example, one can design trading algorithms for the stock
market on the basis of seemingly reliable information about the behavior of the market. But
these very algorithms, when entered into daily practice in the market itself affect the action

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of the market and can even lead to instabilities and behaviors that were nowhere in the
original theories. Certainly the same remarks apply to the theories and even the opinions
of investors, which when made public can affect the action of the market itself. One may
say that this indicates that the market is not a subject for objective science, but this is not
necessarily the case. Our definition of objective science is that the actions in the reflexive
domain produce relatively stable eigenforms. Thus a new version of stock market econom-
ics could arise that searches for such regularities even in the face of the publication of the
theories themselves.
87. Other aspects of knowledge certainly have this reflexive pattern. There is a sci-
ence to learning to play a musical instrument, and it involves principles that do not appear
to be changed by the acts of practice. But other aspects such as learning to improvise are
clearly a matter of finding a moving eigenform in the course of the action of the play. A
simpler example is learning to ride a bicycle. The riding of a bicycle is an eigenform in
action and there is no way to find this eigenform except to perform the action. Theories of
games that do not submit to exact analysis such as chess or Go evolve in relation to the play
of the game. The known theories of chess have seriously affected tournament play, and in
turn this tournament play has changed the evolution of the theories.
88. Here is a remarkable story told by the physicist John Archibald Wheeler about a
game of twenty questions:
Then my turn came […] I was locked out an unbelievably long time. On finally being read-
mitted, I found a smile on everyone’s face, a sign of a joke or a plot. I nevertheless started
my attempt to find the word. ‘Is it an animal?’ ‘No.’ Is it a mineral?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Is it green?’ ‘No.’
‘Is it white?’ ‘Yes.’ These answers came quickly. Then the questions took longer in the an-
swering. All I wanted from my friends was a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ Yet the one queried would
think and think before responding. Finally I felt I was getting hot on the trail, that the word
might be cloud. I knew I was allowed only one chance at the final word. I ventured it: ‘Is it
cloud?’ ‘Yes,’ came the reply, and everyone in the room burst out laughing. They explained
to me that there had been no word in the room. They had agreed not to agree on a word.
Each one questioned could answer as he pleased – with one requirement that he should have
a word in mind compatible with his own response and all that had gone before. Otherwise,
if I challenged, he lost. This surprise version of Twenty Questions was therefore as difficult
for my colleagues as it was for me […] What is the symbolism of the story? The world, we
once believed, exists out there independent of any act of observation. […] I, entering the
room, thought the room contained a definite word. In actuality, the word was developed
step by step through the questions I raised […] Had I asked different questions or the same
questions in a different order I would have ended up with a different word […] However,
the power I had in bringing the particular word cloud into being was partial only. A major
part of the selection lay in the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ replies of the colleagues around the room […] In
the game, no word is a word until that word is promoted to reality by the choice of questions
asked and answers given. (Davies & Brown 1986: 23f)

Wheeler’s allegorical fable was intended to illuminate the conditions of the quantum physi-
cist. In quantum physics, no phenomenon is an actual phenomenon until it is observed and
agreed upon by all the physics colleagues. The story just as well illustrates the world of
social interaction.
89. My thesis is that all attempts to find stable knowledge of the world are attempts to
find theories accompanied by eigenforms in the actual reflexivity of the world into which
one is thrown. The world itself is affected by the actions of its participants at all levels. One
finds out about the nature of the world by acting upon it. The distinctions one makes change

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and create the world. The world makes those possibilities for distinctions available in terms
of our actions. Given this point of view, one can ask, as one should of a theory, whether
there is empirical evidence for this idea that stable knowledge is equivalent to the produc-
tion of eigenforms. In this case we have only to look at what we do and see that whenever
“something is the case” then there is an orchestration of actions that leaves the something
invariant, making that something into an eigenform for those actions. The eigenform thesis
is not itself a matter of empirical science. It is a matter of definition, albeit circular defini-
tion. Another point of view is that the empirical evidence is all around you. Examine any
thing. How does it come to be for you? Investigate the question and you will find that thing
is maintained by actions. The action could be as simple as opening your eyes and looking at
the cloudy sky. With that action, the cloudy sky comes to be for you. I do not assert that this
is the usual scientific explanation of cloudy sky. But if you want to work with such things
then it is usually even more transparent. The sharp spectral lines of helium are the result of
setting up a very particular experiment that produces them. The experiment, its equipment,
the scientists and all that is needed to perform it is the transformation whose eigenform is
the spectrum of helium.
90. It is a fruitful beginning to look at present scientific endeavors and to see how they
are interrelated and find connections among them, to engage in meta-scientific activity.
This can reveal how theories, seemingly objective, actually affect the world through their
very being, and how these actions on the world come to affect the theories themselves. In
exploring the world, we find regularities. It is possible that these regularities are our own
footprint. In the end we shall begin to understand the mystery of the eigenforms that we
have created, constructed and found.

Open Peer Commentary:

Remarks from a Continental Philosophy Point of View
Tatjana Schönwälder-Kuntze

1. For me, the great merit of Louis Kauffman’s target article is that it brings together
– intentionally or not – abstract mathematical and logical formalism with philosophical
reflections ranging from everyday-life experience to scientific experience through second-
order cybernetics. The article tries to support two interlocked theses within a mathematical
framework. The first states that scientific observers always observe themselves, at least in
some way. The second says that the observed objects depend on their observers, insofar as
they are shaped by the observation (§4). From my point of view, there is nothing to reject.
Maybe one could add that the observers are also shaped by the forms and categories with
which they observe their objects and subsequently by the knowledge about them – but
this is another discussion I do not want to enter into here. Instead, I want to draw attention
to some striking similarities between “classical” philosophical approaches, Wittgenstein
aside, and the statements in Kauffman’s article.
2. Being trained in philosophy of science and formal logic, and being especially fa-
miliar with George Spencer Brown’s Laws of Form (1969), but thinking and doing re-
search in the field of continental philosophy, I want to make two remarks:

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a. Kauffman’s proposition seems to be an attempt to bring Immanuel Kant’s “Co-

pernican turn” into the (self-)reflections and descriptions of science (in its narrow
sense);
b. Kaufmann’s interpretation of “eigenform” can be seen as Kant’s figure of tran-
scendental conditions of the possibility of the knowledge of the things we can have
experience of.1
If (b) obtains, it might help to bridge the – pretended – gap between analytic philosophy,
which understands itself as being based on scientific methods, including the conviction
that an independent “real reality” exists that is as such knowable by analysing language,
and the “continental” philosophy, which is judged – from the analytic side – as nonscien-
tific because of its “relativism.” This judgement derives from its reflexive attitude, called
“critical” by Max Horkheimer (1975), Michel Foucault (2007) and others, of taking its
own historical dependence and therefore always constructed standpoint into consideration.
3. Unfortunately, this commentary is not the place to reconstruct Kant’s transcenden-
tal philosophy or even his transcendental reflection, which is shown and described in his
Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787). Rather, it must be sufficient to explain the Kantian
meaning of “transcendental,” which is different from its use as “transcendental argument”
or “transcendental reason” as, e.g., Ross Harrison (1998: 452) defines it. As pointed out
in §2 above, Kant calls the structures (“elements”) of our thinking transcendental, which
make our experience, i.e., primarily the perceptions of things as different things in a world,
possible. These elements are the two “forms of intuition,” space and time, and twelve cat-
egories called “pure concepts of understanding.” After Kant, these categories order spon-
taneously the manifold impressions that is given by our senses through space and time as
phenomena. So how we present the “world” to ourselves while making experience depends
on our instruments of observation. Everything we discover, e.g., connections or relations,
we discover as such because our minds provide a priori a categorical ordering set arrang-
ing the phenomena this way. This is in nuce what Kant refers to, talking about Copernicus:
“Hitherto it has been supposed that all our knowledge must [go by] its objects.” Instead,
Kant proposes to assume “that the objects [have to go by our concepts]” (KrV: B XVI, my
translation2). Discussing our concept of “causality,” Kant is even more explicit when say-
ing that “we are able to extract […] pure concepts from experience only because we have
put them into experience, and so have first brought experience about through them” (KrV:
A 196/B 241,3 Kant 2007: 217). This could be linked to Kauffman’s “theory inevitably af-
fects the ground it studies” (§9), but we need to make this more obvious.

1. “Ich nenne alle Erkenntnis transzendental, die sich nicht sowohl auf Gegenstände, sondern mit
unserer Erkenntnisart von Gegenständen, insofern diese a priori möglich sein soll, überhaupt
beschäftigt.” (Kant KrV B 25, emphasis in the original) – “I call all knowledge transcendental
which deals not so much with objects as with our manner of knowing objects insofar as this man-
ner is to be possible a priori.” (Kant 2007: 52, emphasis in the original).
2. “Bisher nahm man an, alle unsere Erkenntnis müsse sich nach den Gegenständen richten […]
Man versuche es daher einmal, […] daß wir annehmen, die Gegenstände müssen sich nach unse-
rem Erkenntnis richten.”
3. “Es geht aber hiermit [den reinen Verstandesbegriffen] so, wie mit anderen reinen Vorstellungen a
priori (z. B. Raum und Zeit) die wir darum allein aus der Erfahrung als klare Begriffe herauszie-
hen können, weil wir sie in die Erfahrung gelegt hatten, und diese daher durch jene erst zustande
brachten.”

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4. Transcendental concepts or forms are ordering structures of our minds that provide
the possibility to make experience of different things, events and connections between
them. If they were not given (in one way or other) or if we did not bring them with us,
we could not make experiences in the way we do. This is what makes transcendental con-
cepts necessary in the sense of being undoubtable. But these forms not only shape our
experience, they also correspond with Kauffman’s “eigenform” insofar as they make the
“transcendental reflection” possible, i.e., the critical, purifying and scientific reflection and
observation Kant himself undertook or realized while writing his book. Kant’s self-obser-
vation iterates the observing relation between the understanding and its objects by using
the same observation and ordering instruments and by dividing itself into an observed
part, “the understanding,” and an observing part, which is called “reason.” Thus the set of
ordering instruments found by the reflecting reason to be necessary for experience is also
necessary for its own reflective practice, for its own being. Self-observation and object-ob-
servation depend on the same structures or forms. With Kauffman (§14), one could say that
philosophy, too, has been searching for its “eigenform” in a reflexive field. Even more, one
could add that Kant’s transcendental reflection as the “objective result” has significantly
changed the world of social science since then – at least if we follow Foucault’s (1994)
interpretation of the philosophical event at the end of the 18th century that might be called
the “transcendental turn.” Or, as Judith Butler puts it more generally: “But we must also
have an idea of how theory relates to the process of transformation, whether theory is itself
transformative work that has transformation as one of its effects” (Butler 2005: 2004).
5. What does this kind of observation imply? From my point of view, one can see, in
accordance with Kauffman, that philosophical research is also self-referential and reflex-
ive, and that it has not only provided the necessary conditions for making experiences but
has also shaped our experiences as well as its own research contexts. From this (Fou-
caultian) perspective,4 humanities as an effect of the philosophical transcendental turn that
reflects on our own as human beings as the condition of knowledge at all evolved in the
self-creating and self-discovering “transcendental era.” This self-reflection can be seen to
have been re-discovered by mathematics and formal logic more than a hundred years ago.
Yet it is well known that in those times, self-referential structures were avoided due to the
paradoxes negative self-references produce (e.g., Tarski’s “theory of types” as a strategy of
avoidance). The grounding of mathematics in Spencer Brown’s Laws of Form (1969) and
Kauffmann’s reference to it in §§41–44 could be seen as the second step of re-discovering
the self-referential structure of science (and thinking in general). Spencer Brown not only
deals with negative self-referential figures by interpreting the moving within the paradox
as creating time (Spencer Brown 1969: 58–68), he also found a very concise way of mak-
ing self-referential processes and thus self-referential creations obvious on the basis of a
single self-referential sign, , marking at the same time itself, its other, therefore identity
and difference, and the process of its own coming into being.
6. But, I am not convinced that the search for “eigenforms” is necessarily the driving
force of science, though. Of course, it is needed as long as we think we have to search for
structures, rules, concepts, laws, etc. that verify themselves. But as soon as we accept that
it is us who (want to) find regularities, rules, patterns, etc. in our ordering mind because we
draw distinctions by observing our objects and ourselves, we will see that we do not need
to focus on what we have already ordered and how we have ordered it, but can also focus

4. The subtitle of Foucault’s The Order of Things is An Archeology of the Human Sciences.

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on our fantasy and the power of inventing new ways of thinking. Maybe the truth created
by self-referential congruence is not the one and only criterion for valid knowledge.
7. Coming back to my expectation that Kauffman’s observations might help to bridge the
“gap” between analytical and continental philosophy, I was wondering: if mathematics and
formal logics could show that science is always self-referential then this would be valid for
every philosophical standpoint – even for the “analytical” one. If we interpret self-reference
in philosophy as the fact that philosophical theories are always socio-cultural-historically
based, i.e., shaped in form and content by their times, too, as Hegel (1986: 15–20), Jean-Paul
Sartre (2016), Horkheimer (1975), Foucault (2005) and other contemporary continental phi-
losophers claim, then one of the defining differences between those two philosophical move-
ments will disappear. Even the second difference concerning the status of language, which
is seen to represent an independent world, will disappear if we follow Spencer Brown’s idea
that signs always (also) describe the distinction made by them. To show this in detail requires
more space than a commentary, but Kauffman’s article is a good starting point.

Open Peer Commentary: Finally Understanding Eigenforms

Michael R. Lissack

1. Louis Kauffman’s target article is but one of many where the concept “eigenform”
(Foerster 1981) gets used. I must confess that despite my serving as the President of the
American Society for Cybernetics, and despite nearly two decades’ work in cybernetics,
I have found this concept to be among cybernetics’ most difficult. At its heart, an eigen-
form is a “stability” – and, like many other examples of circular logic, the meaning of
that stability supposedly becomes apparent with use. Until this article by Kauffman, I can
woefully confess, such usage failed to ascribe much meaning, at least to me.
2. In an earlier article (2005), Kauffman suggested that the notion of an eigenform
was related to the idea that “an object is a symbolic entity, participating in a network of
interactions, taking on its apparent solidity and stability from these interactions” (Kauff-
man 2005: 130). The eigenform is an expression of that stability:
Heinz von Foerster has suggested the enticing notion that ‘objects are tokens for eigenbe-
haviors.’ There is a behavior between the perceiver and the object perceived and a stability
or repetition that ‘arises between them.’ It is this stability that constitutes the object (and
the perceiver). (Kauffman 2005: 132)

3. Philosophically, this notion of stability is troublesome. “Stable with respect to

what?” becomes an obvious question. The von Foerster answer of “between object and
perceiver” sheds little light on this matter. In my view, it leaves out the context in which
the network of interactions is situated. To me, there can be no stability except in consid-
eration of the context, but that transforms the notion of an eigenform into at minimum a
three-way interaction amongst object, perceiver, and context and, given the possibility of
multiple perceivers each with their own context, at maximum an infinite interaction. If,
indeed, an eigenform is possibly the product of an infinite network, then how is it possible
for that product to be “stable?”

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4. Kauffman continues:
Coalesence connotes the one space holding, in perception, the observer and the observed,
inseparable in an unbroken wholeness. Coalesence is the constant condition of our aware-
ness. Coalesence is the world taken in simplicity […] In the world of eigenform, the
observer and the observed are one in a process that recursively gives rise to each. (Kauff-
man 2005: 133f)

5. At this point, the circular logic tends to defeat me. Stability, as a product of recur-
sion, in the absence of consideration of context, is beyond my reckoning. Kauffman’s
present article rescues me by restoring the notion of context to the understanding of ei-
genforms generally. As he states: “a reflection on the context, and an inclusion of that
awareness of context into the context is always present” (§1).
6. The key to understanding is located in §3: “A reflexive domain is a context for
action” and §4: “An eigenform is a fixed point for a transformation.”
7. By this definition, an eigenform is the assertion of a stable coherence (perhaps only
momentary) that is required before a distinction can be drawn, a choice made, a boundary
or constraint asserted, or a bifurcation cut. The eigenform is the stability against which
there is now to be asserted something new or different. When we ask “Different from what?
or “Newer than what?” the “what” is the stable eigenform against which we are defining,
measuring, drawing the distinction.
8. This meaning of “eigenform” suggests that eigenforms are not generated as the
result of a search for stability but rather as a necessary component if change or boundaries
(constraints etc.) are to be recognized. Eigenforms become the logically necessary priors
for a distinction to be made. Eigenforms afford distinctions, and distinctions are impossible
absent their being immediately preceded by an eigenform.
9. The eigenform formulation becomes as follows: if a distinction is to be drawn it
can only be drawn if one treats the prior condition as if it had a coherence, coalescence,
unity etc. such that the distinction can be recognized as distinct. The prior condition can-
not be somehow vague enough that the distinction made is not distinct. The context for all
eigenforms thus must include the need/desire/opportunity for a distinction to be afforded
as a possibility. Eigenforms are not merely the product of the interaction networks settling
down but instead are the momentary requirement of a process that demands stability so that
a new distinction can be made.
10. Some might object that such a conception of eigenforms creates a space for teleol-
ogy. My rebuttal would be that by definition the eigenform is not an attribute of a situation
or an object but rather is an assertion of a “state” describing that situation or object by
an observer. The observer is drawn to make such an assertion in order to create the pre-
conditions necessary for a distinction to be drawn. In the absence of the perceived possible
need/desire for a distinction to be drawn the observer has no “need” to assert the existence
of an eigenform. Vagueness and ambiguity are fine when there is no contemplation of
distinction.
11. Eigenforms are summoned into existence by the observer contemplating the pos-
sibility of choice. Absent that possibility, the eigenform may lie dormant, unneeded, and
likely not only unperceived but unperceivable. The perception of the eigenform is afforded
by the contemplation of choice and vice versa. Kauffman’s recursive form has moved from
the contemplation of object by observer (thing to thing) to the logical preconditions if
choice is to be afforded to a participant in a given situation.

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12. Hans Vaihinger claimed:

The object of the world of ideas as a whole is not the portrayal of reality – this would be
an utterly impossible task – but rather to provide us with an instrument for finding our way
about more easily in this world. (Vaihinger 1924: 15)

Werner Heisenberg’s observations serve to complement the point:

The world is not divided into different groups of objects but rather into different groups
of relationships. […] The world thus appears as a complicated tissue of events, in which
connections of different kinds alternate or overlap or combine and thereby determine the
texture of the whole. (Heisenberg 1963: 107)

Eigenforms are a means by which an observer can for a brief moment stabilize some set of
connections so as to enable Vaihinger’s wayfinding.
13. Kauffman notes:
There is no longer an impenetrable barrier between the descriptions (pictures) of the world
and the world itself […] when a scientist in the world proposes a theory, this theory be-
comes a new element of that world. The theory acts and is acted upon by the world of
persons and elements of the world. There is no protection for the world from the effects of
such a theory. (§83)

14. In Vaihinger’s terms, the invention of a new means of wayfinding changes the
very territory through which one wishes to find one’s way. Eigenforms are a means to an
end, where the end is the ability to make distinctions and to make choices. Eigenforms
serve as a constructed picture of what might be reality, much like the picture of a watch
drawn by Einstein and Infeld:
In our endeavor to understand reality we are somewhat like a man trying to understand the
mechanism of a closed watch. He will never be able to compare his picture with the real
mechanism and he cannot even imagine the possibility of the meaning of such a compari-
son. (Einstein & Infeld 1966: 31)

15. Eigenforms are not a perception of the “real mechanism.” They are instead the pic-
ture which that the man drew so as to understand, as Richard Rorty pointed out: “Knowl-
edge is not a matter of getting reality right […] but rather a matter of acquiring habits of
action for coping with reality” (Rorty 1991: 1). To the extent that science is a quest for such
knowledge, then science is making use of tools which that allow us to cope.
16. Kauffman opens his article by telling us that “the scientific endeavor [is] a search
for eigenforms in reflexive domains.” When one views eigenforms as the assertions of
stabilities that are the prerequisites for making distinctions and choices, then the scientific
endeavour is the search for the bases that afford those same distinctions and choices. In
such a search, realism and constructivism can find common ground in the transitory “as-if”
nature of eigenforms – for the end goal is the product of the choices made, not the process
by which they get made.
17. Kauffman has successfully recast eigenforms as intellectual/cognitive elements
in the process of distinction making. As such, eigenforms lack an existence separate and
apart from the domain/situation they describe and the observer relying upon the existence
of that description. Eigenforms are essences – much as von Foerster described. But now,
in language I can understand.

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Open Peer Commentary:

Eigenforms, Coherence, and the Imaginal
Arthur M. Collings

1. Beginning with the concepts of eigenform and “reflexive domain,” Louis Kauff-
man’s target article explores at a deeply abstract level the question of what constitutes
second-order science. Kauffman has written a series of papers over the last 10 to 15 years
that take as their point of departure the concept of eigenform, returning again and again
to revisit and explicate the ideas of eigenform, reflexivity, and second-order cybernetics.
2. In this commentary, I express fundamental agreement with Kauffman’s formulation
of second-order science. I also gather a succinct list of principles, to clarify and define the
nature of second-order science in relation to reflexive domains.
3. The idea of reflexivity, as Kauffman expresses it, is a formalization of the idea of
circularity, defined and described in a process that is necessarily circular. A reflexive do-
main is the name of the space that can encompass this circularity. Kauffman uses a math-
ematical language, called the lambda calculus, which is simultaneously very simple and
highly abstract. Readers who find this formalism difficult may find it useful to think of the
reflexive domain of everyday living or even more simply the space in which a conversation
occurs. The keys to note about reflexive domains are:
ƒƒ the ability to make distinctions exists, and therefore every “element” in the domain
has a name;
ƒƒ every element is also subject to actions, or transformations; and
ƒƒ transformations in turn may be referenced and thereby given names.
These simple rules describe the domain, and give rise to what Kauffman and Heinz von
Foerster call “fixed points.” Fixed points are recursions in which, for example, an observer
observes itself observing (observing itself observing…). Finally, the reflexive domain it-
self is subject to reference, naming, and transformation, permitting sentences such as “this
discussion would be easier without the mathematics!” or “cybernetics is self-referential.”
4. Von Foerster coined the terms eigenform and eigenbehavior (Foerster 2003a). He
conceived that the perception and production of objects by an observer is circular, where
the observer’s percepts and conceptions iterate upon themselves as coordinations of coor-
dinations, in potentially infinite recursion. When the process of eigenbehaviour is stable,
when there is a fixed point, von Foerster says that the object is then a token for the coordi-
nations that produced it.
Heinz performs the magic trick of convincing us that the familiar objects of our existence
can be seen to be nothing more than tokens for the behaviours of the organism that create
stable forms. (Kauffman 2003: 73)

5. What distinguishes this article from his earlier writings on the theme is Kauffman’s
focus on the question of the production of “objective” knowledge in the practice of science
and second-order science. Describing second-order systems, in which the observer too is
observed, Kauffman states that…

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domains with such circularity remain amenable to rational study […] In the face of the
circularity of context and observer it is still possible to explore and come to agreements that
have every appearance of being scientific facts. (§1)

Context: Science and anti-science

6. In the summer of 2015 and winter of 2016, members of the American Society for
Cybernetics (ASC) in cooperation with the Institute for the Study of Coherence and Emer-
gence (ISCE) sponsored small conferences in Boston and Salem, MA to discuss the con-
cept of second-order science. One concern addressed by these gatherings was the American
public’s lack of knowledge of science, its high level of skepticism about science’s reliability
and truthfulness, and the premise that second-order science be applicable to some of the
problems.
7. Every two years, the National Science Foundation and its controlling body, the Na-
tional Science Board, publishes a comprehensive statement assessing the state of science
in American society, the latest published being Science & Engineering Indicators 2016.
Depending on their context, these findings are either quite disturbing, as (National Science
Board 2016: 49f):
ƒƒ 24 percent believe the sun goes round the earth
ƒƒ 50 percent believe that electrons are bigger than atoms
ƒƒ 41 percent do not know the father’s gene determines the sex of the child
ƒƒ 51 percent state they do not believe that humans evolved from other species
ƒƒ 25 percent believe to some degree in astrology;
or, upon reflection, somewhat comforting: overall scores reported have remained incredibly
constant over the last 22 years of publication (National Science Board 2016: 42), and the
belief in astrology is hovering close to the recorded low.
8. Writing in a student-published blog hosted by Nature, Ryan Hopkins cites a nearly
identical set of facts from Indicators 2012, and then offers a plausible explanation:
So why do political and religious ideologies win when they come into conflict with science?
A 2012 study on conspiracy theories offers an explanation. Psychologists found that con-
spiracy theorists can hold their beliefs in the face of contradictory facts because of a process
called global coherence, by which subjects selectively chose to believe only those facts
which supported their worldview.1

The study Hopkins cites, “Dead and Alive,” examines the arising and co-existing of deeply
contradictory beliefs held by conspiracy theorists: “Believing that Osama bin Laden is
still alive is apparently no obstacle to believing that he has been dead for years,” conclude
its authors (Wood, Douglas & Sutton 2012: 6). There is no need to delve further into the
study, but the key point is of the second order: the writers, who are keen observers, distance
themselves from their subjects, maintaining their own coherence.

1. “Unbelievable: Why Americans mistrust science,” http://www.nature.com/scitable/blog/scibytes/

unbelievable

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Eigenforms and the imaginal

9. The concept of eigenform applies both to ordinary objects, as well as to non-phys-
ical objects (let us call them extraordinary objects, or ideas). The criteria that is advanced
by both von Foerster and Kauffman, stability, applies equally to ordinary or extraordinary
eigenforms. The idea, simply, is that eigenbehavior presents sufficient stability that it can
be distinguished, named, and referenced. Ordinary objects include most of the artefacts
and many of the natural phenomena that we encounter, that we pick-up, hold, touch, drive,
and control, while extraordinary objects include concepts, abstractions, archetypes, and
myths. Science, too, is an extraordinary idea. Bigfoot, unicorns, the characters in certain
films and novels, the pantheon of Greek gods, each have persistence in being named and
woven into stories that are repeated again and again. Hallucinations, rumours, lies, false-
hoods, and similar non-existent forms are also objects, provided they are persistent.
10. Von Foerster, describing how “objectivity” emerges in the world of objects as
we know it, contends that objects arise in the form of agreements that are like circular
conversations.
Under which conditions, then, do objects assume ‘objectivity?’ Apparently, only when a
subject, S1, stipulates the existence of another subject, S2, not unlike himself, who, in turn,
stipulates the existence of still another subject, not unlike himself, who may well be S1.
(Foerster 2003a: 266f)

11. Kauffman is very clear: although they must be circular, eigenforms can be precise
(§§23–32). In my conversations with Kauffman about such extraordinary eigenforms as
Bigfoot,2 unicorns, and generally recurring fictional characters such as Sherlock Holmes,
Kauffman pointed out that mathematical objects are evaluated based both on their preci-
sion and their internal logical consistency. We also evaluate their more literary cousins,
Sherlock Holmes for example, based on a sense of their coherence and consistency; when
we encounter the instantiation of such a character, in the performance of a play, we readily
determine if the actor is in-character, and whether the performance coheres.

Second-order objectivity, precision, and coherence

12. The view of second-order science that Kauffman describes is deeply grounded in
constructivism and second-order cybernetics. I would like to entertain the idea, inherent in
the concepts of eigenform and reflexivity as Kauffman states them, that the distinction be-
tween scientific inquiry and other forms of constructing knowledge (if we choose to make
one) should not be considered fundamental. Rather, it is better to believe that science is
one aspect of the imaginal, lived and performed in conversational community, in reflexive
domains, neither separate from nor different than other aspects of living – where scientific
facts and truths, like all extraordinary objects, are tokens for the stable eigenbehaviors that
produce them.

2. I live in the Town of Red Hook NY, home of Bard College, 100 miles north of New York City. Red
Hook is also home to “Bigfoot Researchers of the Hudson Valley,” which claims as its purpose
collecting evidence and conducting research to support the contention that Bigfoot individuals are
living inhabitants of the Hudson Valley. The organization has received 1 426 likes on its Facebook
page to date.

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13. This perspective raises a number of issues, not least of which being that the ability
to discern truth, reliability, accuracy, and credibility in the claims of others is highly use-
ful. Constructivism and second-order cybernetics reject the idea of the objective observer
and the correspondence theory of truth. The emergence, as implied by von Foerster’s
definition of objectivity (quoted in §10 above), of numerous, splintered conversational
communities, each with a common set of perspectives and beliefs that diverges from all
other groups, can readily be observed in matters of contemporary public discourse, and is
bound to create a clamor for objective knowing that cannot be easily satisfied. Kauffman
does not explicitly address such a fracturing or multiplicity of worlds of discourse, but the
idea is presaged in his use of the plural term domains.
14. Given the consideration I have given to the idea of the imaginal, I offer the fol-
lowing three principles (or feed-back loops if one prefers), which I imagine to apply to the
practice of second-order science and cybernetics:
ƒƒ Second-order science is lived and performed within reflexive domains and in con-
versational community. The coherence, or the logical, emotional, and behavior
consistency, of such a conversational community, be it scientific or otherwise (e.g.,
Thagard 1989), should be determined based on internal rather than external ob-
servers. Such coherence, or lack thereof, will be identical to the stability of eigen-
behaviors that have produced the agreement of perspective within the conversing
community.
ƒƒ Precision is an indicator (but not necessarily a determining factor) of the degree to
which a community discourse is scientific or, more generally, rational. Precision in
this sense includes the numeric and statistical, compliance with sound logical in-
ference, and acceptable conformance with well-formulated standards and methods.
ƒƒ Finally, second-order cybernetics and second-order science are, or should be, com-
mitted to perturbing their own coherences and to increasing the varieties of their
own perspectives – for example by engaging in transdisciplinary research and dis-
cussion, by engaging energetically in dialogue and dissent, and by observing itself
reflexively. Such an approach contrasts with extra-rational fringe groups (such as
Bigfoot researchers), which maintain coherence by releasing themselves from any
particular obligation to comply with method or logic, and also contrasts with estab-
lishing and maintaining coherence through a strict enforcement of methodological
and linguistic constraints.

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Open Peer Commentary:

Conserving the Disposition for Wonder
Kathleen Forsythe

1. The act of questioning the notion of how a scientific theory relates to the world
and affects the world requires that the author and the commentator engage in a reflexive
domain of conversation through the writing. The act of reading in itself demonstrates the
distinction between objectivity and (objectivity), so often used in a second-order cyber-
netic explanatory approaches to science. The argument for objectivity as if there were no
persons involved can only be made in language by a person that makes a distinction. The
making of a distinction requires that a context be cleaved through this act of perception
that transforms as a conception that can unfold as a construction of meaning. As the author
states in §1, the observer is actively in the system. He further claims that arguments and
theories that contain this premise are no less rational if they include the one who is com-
posing and constructing the theory based on observing a world.
2. Distinction by its very nature requires an observation of that which is to be distin-
guished and, as Kauffman argued in §21: “This cannot be accomplished without circular-
ity […] Theorem 1: There is no definition of distinction that is not circular” and in §22:
“Distinction transcends closed worlds of words and moves into the worlds of feeling and
action.”
3. I would say these are the words of second-order science that most distinguish this
thinking from classical science, in which the observations of an objective world made
with reason deny the act of imagination that enabled the perception and the conception of
a reality in the first place. There is no acknowledgement of the process in which making
a distinction is a property of rationalization that actually requires the imagination of the
context in which the distinction becomes possible – that of a person that perceives.
4. As I began to read this article it was with some trepidation. I am a poet and not
a mathematician. However, throughout the first paragraph, I was smiling and, as I pro-
gressed, I was delighted. For indeed, what Kauffman has done in this article is to deepen
Humberto Maturana’s extraordinary explanation about the world of objectivity and the
world of (objectivity) in parenthesis (Maturana 1988: 28). Kauffman has managed through
his article to collapse the distinction into the idea that objectivity itself is an emergent
phenomenon (§1).
5. In the heady days of the early 1980s when I was first introduced to second-order
cybernetics through conversations with Gordon Pask, Maturana, Ranulph Glanville, Heinz
von Foerster, Lou Kauffman and many others, I went through the dissolution of my tradi-
tional education to find myself in a space of understanding that the world I was experienc-
ing actually arose through the dynamics of being in it. I also came to understand that I was
so structurally coupled that I actually thought there was an objective reality, even though
my intuition suggested to me that there were as many worlds to unfold as there were imagi-
nations to conceive them!
6. I knew then, 30 years ago, that the challenge of science as being a description of an
objective world, independent of the observers in that world, no longer made sense to me. I,
however, did not have the capacity to demonstrate the elegance of the eigenform, nor how

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profound the awareness that it can be shown, even in domains such as physics, that the
object of a theory can be found to be an eigenform of the theory (§83).
7. Through my poetic vision, I grappled with what I was perceiving and conceiving
and, in a moment of revelation, understood the notion that it was in the movement and
the moment that perception and conception arose in one flow between domains that both
arose and collapsed in the moment and movement of observing them. Maturana named this
realization of mine an isophor (personal communication in response to Forsythe 1986). It
was from this notion that I began to see that circularity and reflexivity held other ways of
seeing. It all depended upon the point of view – whether what we understand as a fixed
point or an invariance in nature was actually a distinction made by an observer because
“everything said is said by an observer” (Maturana 1987: 65).
8. As I grappled with the seeming illogic that second-order cybernetics suggested,
that there was no way to prove that there was a reality separate from myself, I came to ap-
preciate the freedom entailed in seeing myself emerging moment by moment, aware that I
am emerging structurally coupled with a rippling wavefront of existence […] I may think
I am an object walking around in an invariant landscape yet I know that all is dynamically
and recursively in a dance of which we are only infinitesimally aware.
9. Metaphorically, I began to speak of the imaginary space of conception (Forsythe
1987) in which we live unaware of the shared universe until one day we awake and realize
the experiences we are having and give them names. As languaging arises in infants and
children, it is these coherences of experience that inform the sounds and context of words
that help us to share meaning and bring forth a world in consensual coordinations of con-
sensual coordinations (§7). For the baby, cup-ness emerges when she reaches her hand for
the object from which to drink. It is in the experiences of that hollowed vessel containing a
liquid and the relational landscape of sound and bodily emotional experience around it with
the m/other that an invariance of the process arises in the space of the baby’s experience
and the baby begins to live in the domain of languaging. I have often wondered at babies
who live with people who use different sounds for such an experience and how the baby in-
evitably sorts out accurately the different spoken languages. My own work with non-verbal
children on the autistic spectrum has forced me to look very deeply at the coherences in
their observed experience to see where the invariances of process may arise so that we can
see that objects do arise in their world even without speech to confirm this.
10. Kauffman refers in §7 to von Foerster’s reference to objects and extends this to the
“space of our experience” – the context in which we have our experience, and it is from the
experience itself I make objects by finding fixed points in the recursion of my interactions.
“Eigenforms are a touchstone for the relationship of circular and recursive processes and
the ground of our apparent worlds of perception” (§7). Until she wanted to cut, knives as
objects did not appear in the perception of my non-verbal 7-year-old learner with autism;
when they did, then they also began to appear in her receptive language.
11. My introduction to second-order cybernetics in its early days deeply affected me
and I have lived my professional career from this perspective. Being neither a scientist nor
a mathematician, I never felt confident enough to make the argument that Kauffman has
made, even though I recognized in the emergence of second-order cybernetics that there
was indeed a new way to consider science.

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12. In particular, in §9 Kauffman says:

For if science is to be performed in a reflexive domain, then one must recognize the actions
of the persons in the domain. Persons and their actions are not separate.

Kauffman is asking us to see that it is in the reflexive domain that conversation occurs. As
he says in §3:
A reflexive domain is an abstract description of a conversational domain in which cyber-
netics can occur. Each participant in the reflexive domain is also an actor who transforms
that domain.

13. Because we humans live in language (as a fish lives in water), we cannot in our
observation of an objective world remove ourselves from our relationship to that world
(objectively). In the recognition of the reflexivity that exists in the conversational domains
through which we bring forth worlds together in language, the role of imagination enters in
– even to the most rationally argued scientific theory. For how else could the scientist have
conceived an objective world without the capacity to perceive it directly and transform
reflexively the perception into the conceptual architecture of languaging?
In the moment of conception
We perceive
the conversation…3

And the role of the perception/conception dynamic is precisely the same role as that of the
participant in the conversation – to be an actor who transforms that domain.
14. Persons and their actions are not separate. Nor are persons and their perceptions
separate. And it is through the act of perceiving that distinctions are made. Scientific theory
does not exist without the imagination to conceive it from what one perceives – and per-
ception is the space of our experience from which the invariances of processes give rise to
ordinary objects as eigenforms of themselves. The very notion of living systems as auto-
poietic systems has built in to the definition the dynamic nature that the molecular space
is itself generated through the poiesis of experience through structural coupling with its
environment. When we extend this to how we know a world, we cannot unglue ourselves
from our embodied molecular structure, which requires our perceptual apparatus in order
to develop our conceptual capacities that we recognize in and through languaging.
15. My excitement as I worked through Kauffman’s mathematics was palpable. If a
reflexive domain is itself an eigenform and a reflexive domain is a context for action, then
“there is no end of our deliberations,” as Kauffman says in §3. For me, this confirmed my
aphorism, “Thought without emotion is a womb with no way out.” The notion that there
can be objective thought without the ground of the state of being of the one who is doing
the thinking does not allow for the generative mechanism of creativity. There would be no
new distinctions. If we accept that emotions are dispositions for action, then, our actions
tell us about what we are experiencing, and we require this perception in order to concep-
tualize our experience and recognize our actions! This requires the circularity of a reflexive
domain and a fixed point of transformation that we hold in our imaginations as we make
the transformations. We sometimes call this “thinking” and because thinking requires our
bodily engagement, it is what von Foerster referred to as “objects as tokens for eigenbe-
haviors” (§7, Foerster 2003a). I claim that thinking and rationality require this imaginative

3. From my unpublished Warrior of the Gentle Passion, 1991.

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act of transformation through which the reflexive domains of conversation in one’s own
“space of our experience” (§7) give rise to our awareness of our self.
16. I think an epistemology of imagination is fundamental to a second-order science.
For the second-order science that is supported in Kauffman’s article is one that is grounded
in learning as the perception of newness, where newness is a distinction that the one who
is learning can make about herself. As Kauffman says in §52, “There is a singularity about
interacting with oneself that is different from interacting with others.” And it is the new-
ness of distinctions that the scientist makes within his or her own imagination that is used
to formulate theory.
17. I have been most appreciative in this article in following Kauffman’s arguments
that explore those aspects of science that often characterize its inviolability, e.g., the repeat-
ability that is often claimed as proof of an invariant physical universe. Kauffman shows
that it is repeatability that makes a successful experiment into an eigenform. In §67 he
describes a scientist as being in search of eigenforms that are independent of the action of
the observer… indeed, he further expands this to declare that the entire world of science
is an eigenform that, by elaboration, continues such a search. The fact that scientists can
use their imaginations to map the invariance of transformations in the manner in which the
world appears to solidify through its structural coupling does not prove that the physical
universe is invariant. If you have followed his argument and have an awareness of yourself
as being glued to the world, it arises with you, you will no doubt agree.
18. I think that what is most significant about the arguments put forth is that persons
are not separate from their actions and neither is their science. In §82, Kauffman says,
Words acquire their meanings via actions, and distinctions occur in the sharp invariances
of certain eigenforms […] when a scientist in the world proposes a theory, this theory
becomes a new element of that world. The theory acts and is acted upon by the world of
persons and elements of the world. There is no protection from the world from the effects
of such a theory.

Clearly, there are ethical repercussions from seeking to understand a second-order science
that includes the observer and, by extension, the environments to which the observer is
structurally coupled.
19. Yet it is the homage to creativity and the imagination as the hallmarks of good
science that most benefits from this article. As a knowledge architect myself, I understand
that knowledge does not exist objectively independent of being brought to life by the per-
son who makes distinctions and demonstrates the conduct adequate for others and him or
herself to say that they know. As Kauffman points out in §88, the world is itself affected by
the attempts to find stable knowledge of the world because, as he says, “one finds out about
the nature of the world by acting upon it.”
20. It is this conservation of the disposition for wonder that grounds scientists’ pursuit
of understanding, discovery and knowledge of the ever-unfolding matrix of existence. Rec-
ognizing that we are participants in the processes of the worlds that we unfold and share
together though the imaginative distinctions in the reflexive domains of the conversation,
as explicated so eloquently in this article, leaves me as awed as any aspect that the universe
might be either invariant or completely other than we thought!

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Author’s Response: Distinction, Eigenform and

the Epistemology of the Imagination
Louis H. Kauffman

1. In George Spencer-Brown’s Laws of Form (1969), we have a perfect example of

self-reference that occurs apparently without the formal appearance of a fixed point or ei-
genform. This example is the Spencer-Brown mark, , which is seen to make a distinction
in the plane in which it is drawn and is intended to refer to some given distinction. Since
the mark may refer to a given distinction, it can be seen to refer to itself in its own making.
Thus we may write an arrow of reference  →   for this fundamental self-reference of a
distinction to itself. We are not yet at the bottom of the rabbit hole. The arrow of reference
is also a distinction, and the mark itself can be regarded as a mark of reference from itself
to itself. In this sense we can write
=  
  →  
.
And eigenform appears! Now we have the mark as the solution to the equation
X  → 
=   X.
The mark is that which is referred to by the mark. The mark is the fixed point of the trans-
formation T(X) =   → X. Fundamental self-referential distinction becomes eigenform in
the acts of observation, imagination, description, reflection and construction of context.
Here I have formalized this transition. These themes appear repeatedly in the comments on
the original article and have led me to think all over again about the roles of distinction, ei-
genform, reflexivity, the imagination of context and the context of imagination. Eigenform
is a precondition for distinction and distinction is a precondition for eigenform.
2. In her commentary, Tatjana Schönwälder-Kuntze wonders “if mathematics and
formal logics could show that science is always self-referential then this would be valid
for every philosophical standpoint – even for the ‘analytical’ one” (§7). And even the dif-
ference between analytical and continental philosophy “concerning the status of language,
which is seen to represent an independent world, will disappear if we follow Spencer
Brown’s idea that signs always (also) describe the distinction made by them” (ibid). Her
hope that a reflexive viewpoint could unify a schism in philosophy made me return to the
relationship between distinction and eigenform as indicated in the first paragraph above.
In the making of a distinction, significant issues arise that are considered in all philoso-
phies. They arise, often in different orders, and appear to give rise to different systems of
thought, and yet there is a basic circularity that must be traversed. Distinctions themselves
are circular and seemingly have a simultaneous arising of awareness and awareness of a
difference that is the distinction. Awareness exfoliates into description and description can
become eigenform. It must be understood that eigenform made explicit, made into a fixed
point, even for a moment, is descriptive yet can be as timeless as “I am the one who says
I.” And yet eigenform in the sense of recognition and the eternal or timeless return is no
less fundamental than distinction/awareness itself. It is only in the ordering that we put on
our experience that one seems prior to the other. Eigenform is a precondition for distinction
and distinction is a precondition for eigenform.

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3. The apparent ordering of world and perceived world and the structuring of pre-
conditions for perception of form as envisaged by Kant is extended to a circularity in the
reflexive view. Just as eigenform is a precondition for distinction and distinction is a pre-
condition for eigenform, so are Kant’s a priori categories both the predecessors and the suc-
cessors of the act of perception. In this way, I agree with Schönwälder-Kuntze when she
emphasizes that eigenforms are the ordering structures that make experience possible in
the first place because they enable “transcendental reflection” (§4). She adds that “Kant’s
self-observation iterates the observing relation […] by dividing itself into an observed part,
‘the understanding,’ and an observing part, which is called ‘reason’” (ibid). Referring to §4
in my target article, she claims that “philosophy, too, has been searching for its ‘eigenform’
in a reflexive field” (ibid). In the reflexive view presented here there is no fixed a priori. Pre
and post conditions occur in a circularity wherein one may indeed describe a world that
divides itself into a part that is seen and a part that sees in an endless round.
4. This brings us directly to the question of context. In the circularity, the “that which
brings forth” the distinction is its context, and it is the distinction that allows us to make a
further distinction and discriminate the first distinction from the context in which it has oc-
curred. Often, some context is given beforehand. For example, in a tide-flattened stretch of
sand, I wield a stick and draw a circle in that sand, making a distinction between an inside
and an outside. The prior context of the sand and stick is a precursor to the appearance of
the distinction, and yet the context of the drawn circle in the sand is a different context
from the original one. The new context contains the imagination of the marking in the sand
as a distinction from an inside to an outside, and it displays the potentiality of the stick as
an instrument to bring forth such a pattern in the hands of a maker/observer. In his com-
mentary, Michael Lissack speaks of the prior condition or prior context to the emergence
of a distinction:
The prior condition cannot be somehow vague enough that the distinction made is not
distinct. The context for all eigenforms thus must include the need/desire/opportunity for
a distinction to be afforded as a possibility. Eigenforms are not merely the product of the
interaction networks settling down but instead are the momentary requirement of a process
that demands stability so that a new distinction can be made. (§9)

5. I agree with his understanding that the eigenform is not precisely a stability of some
system settling down in its interactions, but rather the coming to be of a certain kind of
choice of distinction in the interaction of the observer with his observed (not to be taken
as separate). The demand for stability “so that a new distinction can be made” is a brilliant
phrase on Lissack’s part and can be seen so in examples of eigenform. There is no stable
self, there is no I except that we create the I, and who are we that we should be able to
create ourselves. And yet it comes about in a demand for stability that a new distinction
be made. I am the one who says I. Before that saying there is no I. After that saying, the I
is imagined and its reality becomes our task in living. There is no I in the prior condition
and no Thou either. These are the creations and eigenforms of a context that is capable of
transcending itself, including the I that is so declared. The same applies to the eigenforms
of science. They are not only the result of empirical inquiry and at the same time they do
not partake of a Kantian a priori. In §7, Lissack defines an eigenform as “the assertion of
a stable coherence (perhaps only momentary) that is required before a distinction can be
drawn […] [It] is the stability against which there is now to be asserted something new or
different.” I found here a new view of eigenform compared to the one I had held and was

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returned to go down the rabbit hole of §1 above to see that context, eigenform and distinc-
tion form a circular round, a trinity, with each the progenitor of the others.
6. Let us turn to science. Our scientific and mathematical knowledge is nothing if it
is not the record and action of the distinctions we are able to make in the world that forms
our momentary context. These distinctions can be seen to be eigenforms, and the hard-won
eigenforms of science can be seen to be significant distinctions. In working with the physi-
cal world, we must confront that certain of our ideational distinctions such as number come
directly into play in ways that seem not to involve the observer directly. Computers factor
numbers with the programmer’s help, but they do it in a technique that transcends him,
and find information for us that we can verify but would never have computed ourselves
without the aid of the automatic recursive discriminations of the electronic calculator or
even the abacus. Thus we have discovered arithmetic anew in the calculating machine.
One should be surprised that these entities do what they do with reliability. The reliability
of the machine is itself an eigenform and it is engineered and it is constructed and we have
discovered that it works. This is the non-trivial and universally accepted discovery of com-
puter science. It is not an obvious discovery. It might have been quite different and it may
become different in the future as we push for ever more competent machines.
7. I have chosen this excursion into computer science in order to bring up a key issue
raised by Art Collings. He points out that eigenbehavior provides the stability needed to
distinguish and reference objects irrespective of whether they are “ordinary” or non-physical
“extra-ordinary” ones, such as ideas and science but also “Bigfoot, unicorns, the characters
in certain films and novels, the pantheon of Greek gods […] [h]allucinations, rumours, lies,
falsehoods, and similar non-existent forms are also objects, provided they are persistent”
(§9). This extraordinary range of possible eigenforms calls into question the distinction be-
tween scientific endeavor and other forms of imaginative and literary endeavor that produce
distinctions and eigenforms. In §13, Collings provides a solution for this predicament that
focuses on how coherences are dealt with. Science (and with it second-order cybernetics
and second-order science) should always be open to perturbing its own coherences and to
increasing the varieties of its own perspectives. Other “extra-rational fringe groups,” by
contrast, want to maintain coherence “by releasing themselves from any particular obliga-
tion to comply with method or logic and also contrasts with establishing and maintaining
coherence through a strict enforcement of methodological and linguistic constraints.” Along
with this intent to examine coherences and take the widest possible views, looking for the
widest possible agreements, I suggest that we identify scientific discoveries by their combi-
nation of imagination and surprise. In each example of what we take to be a good scientific
discovery, there is something that is entirely not contrived, something that seems to be the
way it is for no reason other than it is that way. This is the case even when the result is math-
ematical. We can prove the Pythagorean theorem on the basis of the axioms of geometry.
The theorem is a fully agreed upon eigenform of Euclidean geometry. But beyond that, there
is no further explanation for its truth. Indeed, we did not “make up” this result. It is part of
the discovery of geometry. And still Collings’s issue can disturb us, for does not Sherlock
Holmes in his character have a similar quality of inevitability? We must remember that in
the scientific mode there is always the matter of repeatability of experiments and forms of
reasoning. This means that the eigenforms produced, the distinctions created are subject
to severe forms of testing and criticism of an active kind by the participants in the work.
The work is not a production of one individual to be appreciated and assimilated by others.
Scientific work is collective work by a community, with the standards of testing that have

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evolved. It is these differences that make the textures of scientific work worth examining
and distinguish it from other forms of human creation.
8. Finally, we turn to the second-order cybernetic view of the imagination of reality.
In §7 Kathleen Forsythe writes:
I grappled with what I was perceiving and conceiving and, in a moment of revelation,
understood the notion that it was in the movement and the moment that perception and
conception arose in one flow between domains that both arose and collapsed in the moment
and movement of observing them.

In §15 she further writes

The notion that there can be objective thought without the ground of the state of being of
the one who is doing the thinking does not allow for the generative mechanism of creativ-
ity. There would be no new distinctions.

9. For Forsythe, the prior condition is the ground of the state of being, giving rise
to and running back to feeling and imagination. All this is present through and through a
reflexive way of holding and being. None of this can be excluded in reflexivity or in second
order science, which is why an “epistemology of imagination is fundamental to a second-
order science” (§16).
10. We can summarize the commentaries by their emphasis on the role of context and
the role of eigenform as a form of distinction, possibly momentary and evanescent in the
flow of time and process, and yet important as a turning point for the emergence of distinc-
tion. This way of holding the theme of eigenform and reflexivity is enlarged by the under-
standing that each of eigenform and distinction can be seen as the precondition for the oth-
er. This is how we have begun this response with a formalization showing how the simple
distinction, the mark, can be seen as an eigenform of its own self-reference. The mark is
the observed reference of the mark to itself. With this the worlds of eigenforms imagined
in the original essay and in the commentaries become worlds of distinctions imagined by
communities in the course of becoming the contexts that they themselves observe.
11. Let us return to the self-reference of the mark, the “first distinction.” We said in §1
herein  →   , indicating the self-reference of the mark. But we did not reach the bottom
of the rabbit hole. For the arrow itself is a mark and it is the mark itself that refers to itself
and so this expression must be replaced simply by a single mark that is understood to be
in the act of self-reference, coalesced with the observer who reads and understands this
epistemology of the imagination.

What is created is the imagination of a distinction. Beyond that there is nothing to say.

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 Cybernetic Foundations for Psychology
Bernard Scott

The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained

by calling it a “young science”; its state is not comparable with
that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that
of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychol-
ogy there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion.
(As in the other case, conceptual confusion and methods of proof.)
The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have
the means of solving the problems that trouble us; though prob-
lem and method pass one another by. (Wittgenstein 1953: 232)

Introduction
1. From 1950s onwards, concepts from cybernetics spread throughout psychol-
ogy. In particular, they helped give birth to the domain of modern cognitive psychology.
Models of “information processing” became ubiquitous and the research interests of cogni-
tive psychologists increasingly overlapped with those of workers in artificial intelligence
research, helping spawn the multidisciplinary domain of “cognitive science.” Cybernetic
concepts also permeated other domains within the broad field of psychology. However,
with rare exceptions, the historical origins of the concepts were lost. Also lost was the
intent of the early cyberneticians to look for interdisciplinary enrichment and transdisci-
plinary unity. In this article, I overview the field of psychology as it currently stands, with
its many areas of research and application, which, to a large extent, exist as separate spe-
cialist domains of activity (for example, the several subdomains that make up biologically
and behaviourally based psychology, cognitive psychology, social psychology, develop-
mental psychology, abnormal psychology and the study of individual differences). I then
demonstrate how cybernetics, when its contributions are made explicit, can provide both
foundations and an overarching unifying conceptual framework for psychology. In order
to do so, I make the distinction between first- and second-order cybernetics and briefly
define some key cybernetic concepts, including “system,” “self-organisation” and “con-
trol” (Scott 2011a, 1996). I also make a broad-brushstroke distinction between “process”
and “person” approaches within psychology. I go on to show how cybernetic concepts can
unify these approaches. I also show how cybernetic concepts can unify individual psychol-
ogy and social psychology, a unification that also builds useful conceptual bridges with
psychology’s sister discipline, sociology. I include reference to my personal experiences as

119

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a practitioner psychologist who encountered cybernetics at an early stage in his studies and
who has found that cybernetics can indeed provide conceptually satisfying and practically
useful foundations for psychology. It can reveal underlying similarities between problem
situations and provide tools for modelling those situations. It can facilitate more effective
communication between practitioners.
2. The treatment is necessarily terse given constraints on the length of the article. The
author may provide a book-length treatment in the future. In the meantime, it is hoped that
the article will generate wider discussion of the issues raised. It should also be noted that
cybernetics is an abstract discipline. I have not attempted to provide a comprehensive ac-
count of its many applications in psychology. There is a wealth of examples in standard
texts, though not explicitly named as such. (See for example, Eysenck & Keane 2015).

The story of psychology

3. Standard histories (for example, Miller 1962; Hunt 1993) tell us that psychology
emerged from philosophy as a science in the late 19th century, a key moment being the
founding, by Wilhelm Wundt, of the first laboratory dedicated to empirical studies of psy-
chological phenomena. An emphasis on the scientific value of empirical data, rather than
armchair theorising, combined with the controversies over the validity of data derived from
introspection, led to the rise of behaviourism as the dominant paradigm (or “school”), a
dominance that lasted until well into the 1950s and early 1960s. Behaviourists aspired to
make psychology an objective science. They abjured reference to consciousness and refer-
ence to “inner” experience and studied behaviour as objectively observable phenomena,
using controlled experimental conditions that afforded replication of findings. For conve-
nience, many studies were carried out using animals, such as rats and pigeons. The main
research programme of behaviourists was focused on studying learning. At an extreme,
explanations of how and why learning occurred were eschewed in favour of empirically
derived “laws” that afforded predictions about when and where learning would occur – for
example, under what circumstances a rat could be most effectively induced to learn how to
navigate a maze or a pigeon’s behaviour shaped so that it responded in predictable ways in
response to particular stimuli.
4. Competing paradigms included structuralism, functionalism, Gestalt psychology,
depth psychologies (such as psychoanalysis) and humanistic psychology. In the 1960s,
inspired by concepts from cybernetics, a new dominant paradigm arose: cognitive psychol-
ogy. Cognitive psychology addressed issues to do with attention, perception, memory and
problem solving, topics that had been addressed in earlier decades and that had amassed a
wealth of empirical findings. What the “new” cognitive psychology contributed was new
ways of talking about, and modelling, cognitive processes. The central analogy ran like
this, “As programs are to computers, so thoughts are to brains.” Models of cognitive pro-
cesses were built that showed the flow of “information” around a cognitive system. Many
such models consisted of static images of boxes and arrows. Others adopted a “compu-
tational” approach and were written as computer programs. Parallel work in computer
science aimed to create “artificial intelligence” programs to solve problems, to serve as
“expert systems,” process images, interpret natural languages and acquire “knowledge.” A
new field became demarcated, “cognitive science,” centred on the concept that both brains

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and computers are “physical symbol systems.” This work following this paradigm contin-
ues today. I say more about these developments below.
5. For psychology, a seminal text was the book Plans and the Structure of Behaviour,
authored by George Miller, Eugene Galanter and Karl Pribram (1960). Not only does the
book introduce key concepts relevant for the new approaches in cognitive psychology,
it also gives an account of the origins of these concepts in the then emerging field of
cybernetics. Other texts that highlighted the relevance of concepts from cybernetics for
psychology were George (1960) and Pask (1961). As in other fields, as the years passed,
researchers took from cybernetics those concepts they found useful for their special areas
of interest, ignored or rejected others and very soon forgot their origins.
6. In more recent decades, “cognitive neuroscience” and “physiological psychology”
(or, taken together, “biological psychology”) have come to the fore, largely due to the abil-
ity to map and manipulate activity in the nervous system and the major advances made in
understanding these processes, anatomically and physiologically, down to the molecular
level, where the interactions of the endocrine system, the nervous system and the immune
system can be seen to form a systemic whole. Because of the systemic nature of this whole,
in what follows I frequently refer to the “brain/body system” rather than refer to the brain
as if the nervous system was all that is of interest.
7. If one considers psychology as a whole field, one can see that over the years there
has been a to-ing and fro-ing as paradigms have become more or less dominant or fash-
ionable, with the major shifts having been brought about by the impact of concepts from
cybernetics. Mainstream psychology continues to place great emphasis on empirical re-
search. Associated theorising and model building tends to be specific to a domain or sub-
domain. Overall, there is still conceptual confusion and controversy over what psychology
is about: what it should be aiming to achieve and how it should pursue those aims. At a
metatheoretic level, there is now an explicit domain of “critical psychology” that questions
the assumptions that underlie mainstream practice (see, for example, Sloan 2000). There is
also a periodic (and less critical) attempt to examine the epistemological foundations of the
several paradigms (see, for example, Chapman & Jones 1980; Leary 1990).
8. To illustrate the unchanging face of psychology as a field consisting of a variety of
topic areas and approaches, in the Appendix, I list the contents of standard undergraduate
text books: one from the 1960s (Sanford 1966) and two bestselling texts from the 2000s
(Hayes 2000; Gross 2010). I, myself, was an undergraduate in the years 1964–1968 and
taught undergraduate courses in psychology, on and off, between 1968 and 2000. I was
thus a witness to the changes that occurred in those years. One topic not featured in the
Appendix that was (and still is) commonly taught as part of undergraduate courses is or-
ganisational psychology.
9. In anticipation of the next section, I wish to say a little more about the conceptual
confusion that Wittgenstein above refers to. The crux of his critique is that we should look
carefully at how we use words to talk about psychological events and processes, as a way
of avoiding the ontologising of “mind” and “matter” (for “matter,” one could also write
“brain”) as different kinds of fundamental “substances.” This ontologising comes with
the adoption of one of the particular metaphysical positions that underly the competing
paradigms in psychology. In brief, both functionalism and structuralism employ dualis-
tic parallelism (mental events are correlated with physiological processes); some dualists
also advocate a Cartesian mind/brain interaction; mainstream behaviourism is monistically
materialist and reductionist (talk of mental events is not permitted); “cognitivists” are on-

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tologically monist, materialist reductionists in that they reduce the “mental” to the status of
programs executed by a computer.
10. In the unpublished essay “The relevance of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychol-
ogy to the psychological sciences”1 Peter Hacker provides an extended discussion of Witt-
genstein’s position and its relevance for psychology. As discussed further below, cybernet-
ics in its role of a metadiscipline and a transdiscipline engages in the kind of “philosophical
ground clearing” that Wittgenstein (and Hacker) calls for.

Understanding cybernetics and its contributions to psychology:

The story of cybernetics
11. I am not aware of any single text that gives a clear and inclusive account of the
origins, early years and key later events concerning cybernetics. Here, I will give a very
brief summary.2
12. The story has several possible beginnings. One common starting point is the pub-
lication, in 1943, of the paper “Behavior, purpose and teleology” by Arturo Rosenblueth,
Norbert Wiener and Juliann Bigelow and associated discussions that lead up to the Macy
conferences on “feedback and circular causality in biological and social systems” held
between 1946 and 1953. The paper proposed that the goal-seeking behaviour that could be
built into mechanical systems and the goal-seeking observed in biological and psychologi-
cal systems have a similar form: they are structured so that signals about achieved out-
comes are “fed back” to modify inputs so that, in due course, a prescribed goal is achieved
(a cup is picked up) or a desired state of affairs (the temperature of a room or of a living
body) is maintained. This process is referred to as “circular causality.” It was recognised at
an early stage that many fields of study contain examples of these processes and that there
was value in coming together in multidisciplinary fora to shed light on them, to learn from
each other and to develop shared ways of talking about these phenomena. In 1948, Norbert
Wiener, one of the participants, wrote a book that set out these ideas in a formal way that
not only collected together many of the emerging shared conceptions but did so in a coher-
ent way that not only facilitated interdisciplinary exchanges but also stood as a discipline
in its own right: an abstract transdiscipline – the study of “control and communication in
the animal and the machine.” Wiener called this new discipline “cybernetics.” Following
the book’s publication, the Macy conference participants referred to their conferences as
conferences on cybernetics, keeping “feedback and circular causality in biological and
social systems” as the subtitle.
13. As the subtitle emphasises, there was an interest in biological and social systems.
The participants were interested not only in particular mechanisms, they also looked for
the general forms to be found in the dynamics and organisation of complex systems (liv-
ing systems, small groups and communities, cultures and societies): how they emerge and

1. http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/DownloadPapers.html
2. As further reading, I suggest Heims (1991), Glanville (2002), Pickering (2010), Scott (2002,
2004) and Müller & Müller (2007). I also recommend the 2006 biography of Norbert Wiener,
written by Flo Conway and Jim Siegelman. One should also consult key texts of cybernetics’
founders and early contributors: Wiener (1948), Ashby (1956), Pask (1961), Foerster, Mead &
Teuber (1953), Bateson (1972).

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develop, how they maintain themselves as stable wholes, how they evolve and adapt in
changing circumstances. The term “self-organising system” was adopted by many as a
central topic for discussion in later conferences (for example, Yovits & Cameron 1960).
Formal models of adaptation and evolutionary processes were proposed.
14. In the years following the Macy conferences, cybernetics flourished and its ideas
were taken up by many in many disciplines. Cyberneticians also found common ground
with the followers of Ludwig von Bertalanffy, who were developing a general theory of
systems (Bertalanffy 1950, 1972).
15. By the 1970s, cybernetics, as a distinct discipline, had become marginalised. A
number of reasons have been suggested for this. I believe two are particularly pertinent.
The first is that, at heart, most scientists are specialists. Having taken from cybernetics
what they found valuable, they concentrated on their own interests. Second, in the USA,
funding for research in cybernetics became channelled towards research with more obvi-
ous relevance for military applications, notably research in artificial intelligence.3 Attempts
to develop coherent university-based research programmes in cybernetics, with attendant
graduate level courses, were short-lived. However, some developments in the field that
occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s are particularly pertinent for the theme of this
article.
16. First, it is useful to note that the early cyberneticians were sophisticated in their
understanding of the role of the observer. In the later terminology of Heinz von Foerster
(see below), their concerns were both first-order (with observed systems) and second-order
(with observing systems). It is the observer who distinguishes a system, who selects the
variables of interest and decides how to measure them. For complex, self-organising sys-
tems this poses some particular challenges. Gordon Pask, in a classic paper, “The natural
history of networks” (Pask 1960), spells this out particularly clearly. Even though such a
system is, by definition,4 state-determined, its behaviour is unpredictable: it cannot be cap-
tured as trajectory in a phase space. The observer is required to update his reference frame
continually and does so by becoming a participant observer. Pask cites the role of a natural
historian as an exemplar of what it means to be a participant observer. A natural historian
interacts with the system he observes, looking for regularities in those interactions. Pask
goes as far as likening the observer’s interaction with the system with that of having a
conversation with the system. Below, we will see how this insight of Pask was the seed for
his development of “conversation theory.”
17. Second, the early cyberneticians had the reflexive awareness that in studying self-
organising systems, they were studying themselves, as individuals and as a community.
Von Foerster, in a classic paper from 1960 “On self-organising systems and their environ-
ments,” makes this point almost as an aside. He notes:
[W]hen we […] consider ourselves to be self-organizing systems [we] may insist that in-
trospection does not permit us to decide whether the world as we see it is ‘real,’ or just a
phantasmagory, a dream, an illusion of our fancy. (Foerster 2003: 3f)

3. For more on this, see Umpleby (2003).

4. The fundamental tenet of systems theory, cybernetics and computer science is that a system’s next
internal state and its output are a function of its current internal state and its input. These states and
inputs and outputs are as distinguished and modelled by the observer.

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Foerster escapes from solipsism by asserting that an observer who distinguishes other
selves must concede that, as selves, they are capable of distinguishing her. “Reality” in-
deed exists as the shared reference frame of two or more observers. With elegant, succinct
formalisms, Foerster, shows how, through its circular causal interactions with its envi-
ronmental niche and the regularities (invariances) that it encounters, an organism comes
to construct its reality as a set of “objects” and “events,” with itself as its own “ultimate
object.” He goes on to show how two such organisms may construe each other as fellow
“ultimate objects” and engage in communication as members of a community of observers.
18. This interest in the role of the observer and the observer herself as a system to be
observed and understood led Foerster to propose a distinction between a first- and a sec-
ond-order cybernetics, where first-order cybernetics is “the study of observed systems” and
“second-order cybernetics is the study of observing systems” (Foerster 1974: 1). Foerster
also referred to this second-order domain as the “cybernetics of cybernetics.”5 Of relevance
for us here is that cybernetics is not only, as noted above, a discipline in its own right that
can serve as a transdiscipline, cybernetics can also serve as a metadiscipline that studies
not only itself but other disciplines, too.6 I have discussed these aspects of cybernetics in
some detail in Scott (2002).
19. Again, for the purposes of this article, it should be mentioned that others had
been thinking along somewhat similar lines to those of Pask and von Foerster. Humberto
Maturana in his seminal paper, “Neurophysiology of cognition” (Maturana 1970a), frames
his thesis about the operational closure of the nervous system7 with an epistemological
metacommentary about what this implies for the observer, who, as a biological system in-
habiting a social milieu, has just such a nervous system. The closure of the nervous system
makes clear that “reality” for the observer is a construction consequent upon her interac-
tions with her environmental niche (Maturana uses the term “structural coupling” for these
interactions). In other words, there is no direct access to an “external reality.” Each ob-
server lives in her own universe. It is by consensus and coordinated behaviour that a shared
world is brought forth. As Maturana succinctly points out, “Everything that is said is said
by an observer.” In later writings (some written in collaboration with Francisco Varela),
Maturana uses the term “autopoiesis” (Greek for self-creation) to refer to what he sees as

5. For more detailed accounts of the events that led up to Foerster’s making this distinction, see
Glanville (2002) and Scott (2004).
6. It is of particular interest that, beginning with Wundt, many psychologists have considered psy-
chology to be the “propaedeutic science” (Greek propaideutikos, i.e., what is taught beforehand)
because what it says about human behavior and cognitive capabilities can shed light on how
science works and how it can be carried out effectively by practitioners in other disciplines (and,
of course, in psychology itself). See, for example, Stevens (1936). In more recent years “the psy-
chology of science” has emerged as an active area of research. See, for example, Gholson et al.
(1989) and Feist (2008). Worthy though the aims of this research are, it remains the thesis of this
article that they will be best achieved if psychology itself is properly founded using concepts from
cybernetics.
7. The nervous system is an example of a circular causal system: it is a sensorimotor system in
which what is done (motor “outputs”) affects what is sensed (sensory “inputs”) and what is sensed
affects what is done (Dewey 1896). It is also worth noting (as stressed by von Foerster) that all
sensing is a form of acting (sensory cells are primed to send signals to other cells when something
happens that may be relevant for the whole system of which they are a part) and all acting includes
sensing (by proprioception and kinaesthesia) what is being done.

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the defining feature of living systems: the moment by moment reproduction of themselves
as systems that, whatever else they do (adapt, learn, evolve), must reproduce themselves
as systems that reproduce themselves. In explicating his theory of autopoiesis, Maturana
makes an important distinction: the distinction between the “structure” of a system and the
“organisation” of a system. A system’s structure is the configuration of its parts at a given
moment in time, a snapshot picture of the system’s state. The organisation of a system is
the set of processes that are reproduced by circular causality such that the system continues
to exist as an autopoietic unity. In general, a system with this “circular causal” property is
said to be “organisationally closed” (Maturana & Varela 1980).
20. The ideas of Pask are particularly relevant for this article. Not only was Pask an
early enthusiast of, and contributor to, cybernetics, he also had psychology as his core
discipline. As noted above, Pask had an early interest in seeing interactions between an
observer and a self-organising system as having the form of a conversation. Central in his
research activity was the design of “teaching machines” and “learning environments” that
interact with a learner, in a conversational manner, and adapt to the learner’s progress so
as to facilitate her learning. Pask was familiar with the work of Foerster and Maturana as
a friend and colleague and drew on their ideas in creating his theory of conversations. As
described below, Pask’s theory is a much more fleshed out and elaborated account of hu-
man cognition, learning and communication than is to be found in the writings of either
Foerster or Maturana.
21. I shall begin my account of Pask’s theory by disambiguating the terms “observer”
and “observing system” as used in cybernetic writings. Usually, it is clear from the context
that “observer” refers to a human observer capable of being a member of a community of
observers. The term “observing system” is used more generally to refer to autopoietic sys-
tems. A single-celled organism, such as an amoeba, can serve as an example. An amoeba,
to maintain itself as a unity, distinguishes itself from its environment. In its interactions
with its environment, it adapts. The form of its organisation changes as a consequence of its
interactions (its moment by moment structural coupling). As long as these changes do not
affect the organisational closure of the system, the system persists.8 The amoeba becomes
“in-formed” about its environment. It has its own perspective on what is its environment,
its “environmental niche.” There is thus a sense in which to be alive is to cognise. Multicel-
lular organisms with nervous systems that afford rapid transmission and receipt of signals
and rapid self-referential operations no doubt have greater cognitive powers. One may
speculate that the cognition of a porpoise (say) is qualitatively different from that of a tree.
22. Although much of what Foerster and Maturana have to say is pertinent to humans,
arguably it is Pask, the psychologist, who has given us the most comprehensive observer-
based cybernetic theory of human cognition and communication. From the earliest stages
of his thinking, he was aware that the human self develops and evolves in a social context
and that “consciousness” (Latin con-scio, with + know) is about both knowing with oneself

8. It is worth noting that alongside the abstract cybernetic considerations of the systemic property
of organisational closure, there is ongoing research in biophysics that seeks to understand the
specific mechanisms by which living systems maintain themselves as coherent entities. See, for
example, Mae Wan-Ho’s review, in which she notes that none of the biophysical theories of the
coherence of biological systems, as developed so far, is “as yet complete or fully coherent” (Ho
1995: 733). I suspect the search to understand the “glue” that holds living systems together will
continue to be incomplete, just as other theories in quantum mechanics and cosmology remain
incomplete.

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and knowing with others. Throughout his writings, from the 1960s onwards there is an
acknowledgement by Pask of his indebtedness to the Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky,
who argued that, as a child develops, what begins as external speech eventually becomes
internalised as an inner dialogue.9
23. Pask, at an early stage in his theorizing made a distinction between a cognitive
system and the “fabric” or “medium” that embodies it. This distinction is analogous to
the distinction between programs and the computer in which they run. However, unlike
the cognitivist science community, where the analogy is the basis of the thesis that both
brains and computers are “physical symbol systems,” Pask is aware that this interpretation
of what is a symbol is conceptually naive.10 He stresses how important it is to take account
of the differences between brain/body systems and computing machinery. Brain/body sys-
tems are dynamical, autopoietic systems, whose structure is constantly changing, whereas
computers are designed to be stable. In Pask’s terms, there is an interaction between a
cognitive system and its embodiment. A change in the structure of the brain/body system
affects cognition. Changes in thinking affect the structure of the brain/body system. It is
important to note that Pask’s distinction is an analytic distinction, not an ontological one.
It affords a way of talking about cognitive processes distinct from physiological processes.
24. In the late 1960s, Pask adopted a new terminology. Brain/body systems and exten-
sions are referred to as “mechanical individuals” (M-individuals). Cognitive systems are
referred to as “psychological individuals” (P-individuals). M-individuals (with extensions,
such as vehicles, pens and telescopes) are the “processors” that “execute” the P-individuals
as cognitive “procedures.” Both kinds of system are organisationally closed, self-reproduc-
ing systems. As we shall see in later sections, Pask’s distinction between the two kinds of
individual (or unities) is very useful for the aim of providing psychology with a coherent
conceptual framework.
25. In order to avoid some of the confusions a partial or shallow reading of Pask can
lead to, I refer to P-individuals as “psychosocial unities” and M-individuals as “biological
unities” or “biomechanical unities.” Pask himself on occasion referred to conversation
theory and his later development of “interaction of actors theory” as theories of the psy-
chosocial (Pask 1996).

Cybernetics in psychology
26. A key feature of cybernetic explanations is their use of models. The cybernetician
Frank George proposes that a theory is a model together with its interpretation (George
1961: 52–56), where a model can be anything: marks on paper, a computer program, a
mathematical equation, a concrete artefact. The key idea is that a model is a non-linguistic
part of the theory. It is a form, a structure, a mechanism that can be manipulated by an
observer and that maps onto the “real” system that the theory is concerned with. This is to
be contrasted with many so-called “theories” that are to be found in the humanities, where
metaphors and analogies are liberally deployed, without formal (non-linguistic) justifica-

9. Vygotsky’s work, carried out in the 1920s and 1930s, did not become available in English until
1960 (Vygotsky 1962).
10. See Scott & Shurville (2011) for an extended discussion of this conceptual confusion within the
AI/cognitive science community.

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tion. Models are to be found throughout the sciences. What makes a model “cybernetic”
is the inclusion of circular causality, for example, in a model of a control system, such as
a thermostat. Non-cybernetic models feature “linear causality” only, for example, models
that show how the magnitude of a variable is a function of the magnitude of another.11
27. The mapping between a model and the system modelled has the form of an anal-
ogy relation, such as, “A is to B as C is to D,” where A and B are parts or states of the model
and C and D are parts or states of the system modelled. There may of course be a number of
such relations. It is also relevant to note that metaphors are abbreviated analogy relations.
For example, the term “The ship of state” is asserting that steering a ship is analogous to
governing a nation state. Pask tersely defines cybernetics as “The art and science of ma-
nipulating defensible metaphors” (Pask 1975a: 13). Not only does this definition capture
the idea of constructing and validating models, “manipulating” carries with it the idea that
the observer is in a circular causal relation with the model and the system modelled and
the use of the word “defensible” carries with it the idea that the observer is a member of a
community of observers.12
28. Prior to the advent of cybernetics, psychology’s bias was towards reporting empir-
ical findings. As theory, the best that behaviourism could offer was a model of the brain as a
kind of telephone exchange where “stimuli” give rise to “responses.” Gestalt psychologists
used the concept of brain activity being “field”-like in an attempt to explain how perceptual
inputs were reconfigured to conform to the “laws of pragnanz” (good form) in perception
and problem solving.13 Now models featuring circular causality can be found throughout
psychology, for example, models of perceiving, problem solving, learning, remembering
and skilled performance. However, their general form tends not to be highlighted. There
is a focus on specific subdomains, rather than an appreciation that the models are part of
larger general class.

Unifying “process” and “person” approaches

29. By “process” approaches, I am referring to those that set out to model and under-
stand some particular aspect of human cognition. As mentioned above, models for these
processes abound in contemporary psychology, as an examination of standard texts will
show (for example, Eysenck & Keane 2015). By “person” approaches, I am referring to
those that concern themselves with a human being as a whole, albeit, possibly focusing
on some particular set of attributes, such as “personality” or “intelligence.” Whole person
approaches are sometimes referred to as “humanistic psychology.” My proposal here is
that cybernetics, because it deals with both the processes that constitute the behaviour of
parts of a system and the joint effects that constitute the behaviour of whole systems, can
supply a conceptual framework that unifies the two approaches. I have written about this

11. For more on cybernetic explanations and cybernetic modelling, see Klir & Valach (1967) and
Scott (2000).
12. For more on the use of analogies in science, see Hesse (1966). For more on the use of analogies
in cybernetics, see Pask (1963).
13. In “hands-on” studies of the brain (neuropsychology), more sophisticated models were construct-
ed, as in the classic work of Donald Hebb (1949), whose models are clearly “cybernetic” in the
sense used here.

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possibility elsewhere (Scott 2001d, 2011b, 2011c) and have drawn on two main sources,
Pask and von Foerster.
30. In the field of “cognitive science,” which subsumes artificial intelligence research
and certain approaches to cognitive psychology and the philosophy of mind, there have
been several attempts to build a “unified cognitive architecture.” See, as examples, New-
ell’s SOAR (Newell 1990),14 and Anderson’s ACT-R (Anderson 1983).15 Both systems are
built from components. Both systems take inspiration from (and can be seen as embody-
ing) theories of human cognition. Both systems are “artificial intelligences” in their own
right. In SOAR, every decision is based on current sensory data, the contents of work-
ing memory and knowledge retrieved from long-term memory, where long-term memory
contains procedural knowledge, semantic memory and episodic memory. ACT-R’s main
components are: perceptual-motor modules, two kinds of memory module (declarative and
procedural), buffers that access modules and a pattern matcher that matches buffer contents
to the possible actions (“productions”) stored in procedural memory. Further details are not
relevant for the argument being made.
31. In contrast, von Foerster makes clear that the components of a unified cognitive
architecture are inseparable:
In the stream of cognitive processes, one can conceptually isolate certain components, for
instance (i) the faculty to see (ii) the faculty to remember (iii) the faculty to infer. But if one
wishes to isolate these faculties functionally or locally, one is doomed to fail. Consequent-
ly, if the mechanisms that are responsible for any of these faculties are to be discovered,
then the totality of cognitive processes must be considered. (Foerster 2003: 105)

32. More generally, von Foerster criticises “the delusion, which takes for granted the
functional isomorphism between various and distinct processes that happen to be called by
the same name.” In this context, he mentions the misapplication to computing machines
of the terms “memory,” “problem solving,” “learning,” “perception” and “information”
(Foerster 2003: 172).
33. Theorising in any discipline needs foundations: somewhere to begin the telling of
explanatory stories. In psychology, it has been common practice to begin with elementary
building blocks, such as “habits,” “expectations,” “stimulus-response bonds,” “memory
states,” “drives,” “thoughts,” “instincts,” “cognitive processes,” “feelings.” I believe that
von Foerster provides a cybernetic foundation for psychology with his concept of a “self-
organising system,” as set out in his 1960 paper “On self-organising systems and their
environments.” A self-organising system “eats energy and variety from its environment”
(Foerster 2003: 6). The rate of change of redundancy in the system is always positive. The
system is always becoming more ordered. The observer is continually obliged to update
her reference frame.16 He points out that, reflexively, the observer is just such a system. A
classic example from the human domain is a human infant exploring its environment. Of

14. See also http://soar.eecs.umich.edu

15. See also http://act-r.psy.cmu.edu
16. Foerster (2003: 281) refers to Varela, Maturana and Uribe as the inventors of the idea and to
their joint paper (Varela, Maturana & Uribe 1974) as the first statement of the idea in English.
Elsewhere (Foerster 2003: 251), he notes that the general form of the closed system of recursively
applied operations that constitutes autopoiesis was described by Maturana before it was named
(Maturana 1970a, 1970b).

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course, metabolic requirements mean it has to rest once in a while as energy and variety
are assimilated and accommodated.
34. In later years, von Foerster refined the concept of a self-organising system, citing
the concept of autopoiesis as a useful way to speak about an organism as an autonomous
entity: “Autopoiesis is that organization which computes its own organization”; “Auto-
poietic systems are thermodynamically open but organizationally closed” (Foerster 2003:
281). I believe von Foerster’s definitions are a very useful way of uniting the earlier and
later literatures.
35. In his studies of human learning and cognition, which lead to the development of
his conversation theory (CT), Pask took von Foerster’s concept of a self-organising system
and made it a cornerstone of his theorising about the dynamics of learning, arguing that
humans have a “need to learn.” He refers to his interest in the whole system aspects of hu-
man cognition as “macrotheory.”17 In contrast, he refers to his (and colleagues’) accounts
of how human subjects construct particular cognitive structures as “microtheory.” Pask
(1975b) refers to the processes that are the parts of a cognitive system by the general term
“concept.” Pask’s usage of the term is quite unusual as his concepts are dynamic processes.
In mainstream cognitive science, concepts are typically thought of as relatively static rep-
resentations.18 Pask defines a concept as a procedure that recalls, recognises, constructs or
maintains a relation. A concept may be likened to a program or operator that solves particu-
lar problems. “Relation” is used here as an empty slot or label for that which is being acted
upon by the process as input or product.
36. Recursively, there are concepts whose domain of application, whose input and
products, are other concepts. This affords the construction of hierarchies of concepts. Thus,
there can be problem-solver concepts, the task of which is to construct and select from
amongst lower-level putative problem solvers, guided by feedback from the problem do-
main about the success or not of their application. Thus learning is an evolutionary pro-
cess. One of Pask’s very elegant definitions of learning is that it is the construction of a
hierarchy of problem solvers (Pask 1975b). Micro and macro aspects of his theorising are
married in the idea that “conceptualisation,” the process of creating and recreating con-
cepts, is an ongoing dynamic activity. A Paskian P-individual is a system of concepts that
is self-reproducing. Particular hierarchies of concepts are seen to be temporary construc-
tions and re-constructions within an overall heterarchical, organisationally closed system
of processes.19,20
37. In CT, in an effective learning conversation, the role of the teacher (human or
machine) is to facilitate the learner’s construction of new concepts. This is done by provid-
ing the learner with descriptions and demonstrations of what is to be learned, as part of an

17. Macrotheory is crucially concerned with giving some account of “awareness” and “conscious-
ness” as being concerned with seeking variety and the consequent reduction of uncertainty. It is
not possible here to address these topics satisfactorily, see Pask (1981) and Scott & Bansal (2014).
18. Walter Freeman (2000) gives an elegant description of the differences between representationalist
accounts of cognition and dynamic and “enactive” accounts from the perspective of contemporary
findings in neuroscience. His arguments in favour of dynamic approaches are cognate with Pask’s
theorising.
19. Within mainstream representationalist cognitive science, there have been attempts to develop the-
ories of concept system dynamics. See, for example, Barsalou (2012). Arguably, these accounts
are unsatisfactory because they lack the concept of an organisationally closed unitary system.
20. For further discussion of these core ideas of CT, see Scott (2009).

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ongoing conversation. In return for these affordances to help in her learning, the learner is
invited to say what she is aiming to learn and how she intends to go about it (what strategy
for learning she has, if any). Periodically, the learner’s understanding of new concepts is
assessed by requiring her to “teach back” what she has learned.21 With respect to this ongo-
ing cycle of learner and teacher interactions, Pask not only views the two participants as
self-organising systems in interaction, he also views the learning conversation itself as an
emergent self-organising system, a P-individual (psychosocial unity) in its own right. As
a generalisation, Pask then argues that all conversations are, at heart, learning conversa-
tions. In conversations, whatever else the participants are doing, they are learning about
each other.

Unifying individual and social psychologies

38. What is also innovative and unifying in Pask’s conversation theory (CT) is the
voiding of the distinction between the human individual and the social processes that are
constitutive of him/her and that he/she constitutes. Pask agrees with George Herbert Mead,
Leo Vygotsky, Martin Buber and von Foerster that the psychological individual is dialogi-
cal in form, is a social process, is constituted by an inner dialogue, is an inner conversa-
tion. As a good cybernetician, Pask abstracts from specific cases and voids the distinctions
and thus argues that all conversations, all dialogues, all social processes are psychological
individuals. They are all organisationally closed, self-producing, collectives of concepts
(psychosocial unities). Thus, in ontogeny, individuals and collectives are co-evolving psy-
chosocial unities. For an extended discussion of this view, see Scott (2007). We can now
see the usefulness of making a distinction between M-individuals (biomechanical unities)
and P-individuals (psychosocial unities) in that the two types of unity need not necessarily
be in one-to-one correspondence. A single M-individual (a brain/body system, for exam-
ple) may embody several P-individuals (the inner conversation). A single P-individual (the
outer conversation that unifies a collective) may be embodied in several M-individuals.
39. CT is useful for providing a conceptual framework that helps in understanding
the dynamics of interpersonal perception and the pragmatics of human communication
(see Scott 1987, 1997). As a reflexive theory of theory building (learning), CT accounts
for its own genesis. Top down, it accepts that theories are the consensual constructions of
communities of observers engaged in conversation, including conversations about conver-
sation. As such, it is cognate with the “discursive” approach in the humanities and social
sciences (also known as social constructionism).22 Bottom up, its foundations lie in the
cybernetics of self-organising systems and their interactions as described above.
40. It is also worth noting that the CT concept of a psychosocial unity provides an
alternative, cybernetics-based, concept of a social system to that developed by the sociolo-

21. For more details about CT’s application in the design of a conversational learning environment,
see Pask, Scott & Kallikourdis (1973).
22. As examples, see Gergen (1999) and Gergen, Schrader & Gergen (2009). The latter is a collection
of readings; authors of contributions include Rom Harré, John Shotter, Steve Duck, Erving Goff-
man, Harold Garfinkel and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

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gist Niklas Luhmann (1995). Luhmann distinguishes three kinds of “autopoietic” system:23
biological, “psychic” and social. Pask’s unification of the individual and the social distin-
guishes just two kinds of organisationally closed system: the biological and the psychoso-
cial (M-individuals and P-individuals).24

Future directions
41. There are two areas in which I believe an observer-focused cybernetics can con-
tinue to contribute to psychology and the cognitive and social sciences at large. One is
conceptual clarification; the other as a foundation for and a reframing of the education of
psychologists.
42. As so ably pointed out by Hacker (op. cit.), conceptual confusion abounds in psy-
chology, cognitive science and the neurosciences, not least in talk about “consciousness”
as an ontological essence or of brains and computers having the same ontological status
as “physical symbol systems.” Hopefully, second-order cybernetics will continue to do its
job of conceptual ground-clearing, and the ongoing empirical and theoretical research into
“minds,” “brains,” “individuals” and “societies” will be better conceived and more fruitful.
43. Arguably, the education of psychologists should begin with an understanding of
complex adaptive systems and the specific concept that humans are self-organising, au-
topoietic wholes that in their ontogeny and social interaction develop organisationally-
closed cognitive and affective systems and become psychosocial unities (psychological
individuals).25 It should then set out, in broad-brushstroke form, the unifying conceptual
framework I have sketched out above.

Conclusion
44. I have proposed observer-based cybernetic foundations (with complementary first
and second-order aspects) and a unifying conceptual framework for psychology and have
argued for the value of my proposals based on the experience of how cybernetics served
me. As an undergraduate, encountering cybernetics transformed my approach to studying
and understanding psychology. It gave psychology a conceptual coherence that, previ-
ously, I had found lacking. In later years, as my understanding of cybernetics deepened, I
continued to use second-order cybernetics as a foundation and framework for my work as
an experimental psychologist (summarised in Scott 1993) and my later work as a practitio-
ner in educational psychology (Scott 1987) and educational technology (Scott 2001a). The
transdisciplinary and metadisciplinary nature of second-order cybernetics empowered me
to read widely (and, on occasion, deeply) in other disciplines (logic, mathematics, comput-

23. Luhmann takes this term from Maturana and Varela to refer to systems that are self-reproducing
and organisationally closed. His use of the term is controversial. See, e.g., Buchinger (2012) and
the associated open peer commentaries.
24. Pask and Luhmann are compared more systematically in Scott (2001b) and Buchinger & Scott
(2010).
25. Elsewhere I have outlined a curriculum for “cybernetic enlightenment,” which sets out some of
my proposals in more detail (Scott 2014).

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er science, philosophy, linguistics, the natural sciences, the social sciences).26 Second-order
cybernetics helped me learn how to learn. It helped me to appreciate readily the concepts
and methods that inform other disciplines and their applications. I hope my account here
will encourage others to explore, or to continue to explore, what second-order cybernetics
has to offer.

Appendix: Contents of standard undergraduate textbooks

Contents listing for Sanford (1966)

Part One: Introduction 1. Knowing the human being. 2. Theories of people.
Part Two: Biological Foundations of Behaviour 3. The developing organism. 4. Biological
basis for integrated behaviour.
Part Three: Methods in Psychology 5. Tests and measurements in psychology. 6. Experi-
mental design and psychological statistics. 7. Intelligence.
Part Four: Segments of the Psychological Process 8. Motives. 9. Emotions. 10. Sensa-
tion. 11. Perception. 12. Basic processes of learning. 13. The management of learning.
14. Higher mental processes.
Part Five: Behaviour of the Whole Organism 15. Personality. 16. Adjusting. 17. Neurosis,
psychosis and psychotherapy. 18. Social psychology.

Contents listing for Hayes (2000)

1. Perspectives in Psychology.
Section 1: Cognitive Psychology 2. Perception and Attention 3. Memory 4. Language and
Literacy 5. Thinking and Representation.
Section 2: Individuality and Abnormality 6. Intelligence 7. Theories of Personality 8. The
Medical Model of Abnormal Behaviour 9. Alternatives to the Medical Model.
Section 3: Physiological Psychology 10. Brain Development and Clinical Neuropsycholo-
gy 11. Consciousness 12. Sensation and Parapsychology 13. Emotion and Motivation.
Section 4: Social Psychology 14. Self and Others 15. Understanding Others 16. Social
Influence and Social Action 17. Attitudes, Prejudice, and Crowd Behaviour.
Section 5: Developmental Psychology 18. Learning and Skill Development 19. Cognitive
Development and Social Awareness 20. Social Development 21. Lifespan Develop-
mental Psychology.
Section 6: Comparative Psychology 22. Introducing Comparative Psychology 23. Animal
Behaviour 24. Animal Communication 25. Methods and Ethics in Psychology.

Contents listing for Gross (2010)

The Nature and Scope of Psychology: What is this thing called psychology? Theoretical
approaches to psychology. Psychology as a science.

26. A propos of this, the developmental psychologist, Jean Piaget (1977: 136) writes, “Thus cyber-
netics is now the most polyvalent meeting place for physicomathematical sciences, biological
sciences, and human sciences.”

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The Biological Basis of Behaviour and Experience: The nervous system. Sensory pro-
cesses. Parapsychology. States of consciousness and bodily rhythms. Substance de-
pendence and abuse. Motivation. Emotion. Learning and conditioning. Application:
health psychology.
Cognitive Psychology: Attention and performance. Pattern recognition. Percep-
tion: processes and theories. The development of perceptual abilities. Mem-
ory and forgetting. Language, thought and culture. Language acquisition.
Problem solving, decision-making and artificial intelligence. Application: cognition
and the law.
Social Psychology: Social perception. Attribution. Attitudes and attitude change. Preju-
dice and discrimination. Conformity and group influence. Obedience. Interpersonal
relationships. Aggression and antisocial behaviour. Altruism and prosocial behaviour.
Application: the social psychology of sport.
Developmental Psychology: Early experience and social development. Development
of the self-concept. Cognitive development. Moral development. Gender develop-
ment. Adolescence. Adulthood. Old age. Application: exceptional development.
Individual Differences: Intelligence. Personality. Psychological abnormality: definitions
and classification. Psychopathology. Treatments and therapies. Application: crimino-
logical psychology.
Issues and Debates: Bias in psychological theory and research. Ethical issues in psychol-
ogy. Free will and determinism, and reductionism. Nature and nurture.

Open Peer Commentary: Wielding the Cybernetic Scythe

in the Blunting Undergrowth of Psychological Confusion
Vincent Kenny

Introduction
1. It is an admirable and generous project to attempt to reconstitute what is known as
“psychology” by using the keen insights from the framework of second-order cybernetics.
However, before Bernard Scott embarks on a book-length version of his target article, and
before he sets off to use the glue of cybernetics to stick together psychological components
that might not have much, if anything, to do with one another, I would like to add some
fundamental issues to his list of “conceptual ground-clearing.” These issues mostly relate
to the fragmental chaos of that which is called “psychology.”

“Psychology” does not exist

2. “Psychology” uses very different operations of distinctions with very different cul-
tural and language preferences and with very different socio-cultural and political intents.
For example, the dominant values of psychology for the past century were to “predict and
control,” which, every so often, emerge publicly as critical moral issues in situations such

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as the long-running scandal of the American Psychological Association members secretly

colluding with the CIA in the torture of prisoners (American Psychological Association
2015a). Historically, we have seen in Russia the use of psychiatric diagnosis for the in-
carceration of political prisoners (Lader 1977), and many other socio-political abuses of
the “prediction and control” mentality (Breggin 2008; Johnstone 2000; Mills 2013; Tyler
2013).
3. There is no universal – or even dominant – consensual agreement as to which
operations of distinction are to be used to bring forth any given version of a “psychology”
nor for which purposes. This raises serious questions about “values” in psychology, and
reflects Scott’s statement that “there is still conceptual confusion and controversy over
what psychology is about” (§7).
4. It is no less than extraordinary that the report on the APA’s long-term involvement
in torture should raise questions as to what “psychology” is. To quote the chairman of the
report, former federal prosecutor David Hoffman, who says that their investigation “will
help define the meaning of psychology,” he feels it necessary to warn that when the psy-
chology profession allows for the possibility that psychologists will intentionally inflict
pain on defenceless people “…faith in the profession can diminish quickly” (American
Psychological Association 2015b: 72).
5. The absence of any consensual agreements has had the effects of generating count-
less versions of what “psychology” is understood to be. Donald Bannister and Fay Fran-
sella observe:
In the past, the carving up of the field into mini-psychologies has allowed a ‘live and let
live’ policy. Each psychologist has been free to stake his own claim and produce work
which had no implications, nice or nasty, for the endeavours of those in other territories.
(Bannister & Fransella 1971: 56.)

6. With such unilateral attitudes, it is clear that “psychology” is not a coherent entity,
and is not a “unity.” “Psychology” does not exist in the way that we understand physics,
chemistry, etc. to be existing – as an accumulated body of knowledge that is reliable and
experimentally replicable. Instead, there is a proliferation of “mini-theories” about highly
selective areas of human experiencing (“memory,” “motivation,” etc.) which has been de-
scribed as “the sickness of chapter-heading psychology which has made a textbook conve-
nience the limits of our imagination” (Bannister & Fransella 1971: 15).
7. Scott himself illustrates this in his observations of the “unchanging face of psychol-
ogy as a field” (§8) – that is, that the textbooks still continue today with the same “chapter-
heading” limitations.
8. “Psychology” is not a unity to be recomposed as an “entity” because it has never
existed as such and has never been organised into a coherent system of knowledge.
9. This, then, is to do with the traps “psychology” makes for itself by its use of idio-
syncratic operations of distinctions that are then obscured by the object they have brought
forth.

Irrelevance of psychological research

10. What has been produced over a century of research amounts to little more than a
mass of trivialities having little or nothing to do with people’s actual experience of living

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their lives. That is, the dominant form of “chapter-heading psychology” – which reduces
the person to convenient segments – has entirely failed to deal with its proper subject.
11. Apart from the stark irrelevance of academic research psychology to the actual
living experiences of people, there has not been very much connection between the world
of research on the one hand, and clinical psychology and psychotherapy practice on the
other hand (Tavris 2004). That is, clinicians have not found much help from their research
colleagues in their daily task to be of some helpful relevance to people in dealing with their
ongoing states of suffering. Robert Joynson (1974: 34) observes that: “… the psycholo-
gist’s findings seem either to be a mere repetition of what ordinary good sense already
knew, or, regrettably, a distinctly inferior brand of information.”

Cooking the books

12. Going back to the last century in British psychology, we find the infamous case
of Sir Cyril Burt, whose research work on the heritability of intelligence was shown to
have been fabricated. Leslie Hearnshaw, a fellow psychologist and his official biographer,
concluded that most of Burt’s data from after World War II were unreliable or fraudulent
(Hearnshaw 1979).
13. Most recently, we have seen the case of Diedrik Stapel, who was shown to have
fabricated his research to the extent of rendering at least 30 of his publications fraudulent,
and throwing much doubt on many other publications (Stapel 2014).
14. There have been continuing alarms sounded about the status of research in psy-
chology and the level of unreliable research findings (Ioannidis 2005; Simmons, Nelson &
Simonsohn 2011). An anonymous survey of 2 000 psychologists by Leslie John, George
Loewenstein and Drazen Prelec (2012) finds that “questionable practices may constitute
the prevailing research norm.” And Tom Farsides and Paul Sparks wonder:
Consider the roll call of those who have in recent years had high-status peer-reviewed
papers retracted because of confirmed or suspected fraud: Marc Hauser, Jens Förster, Dirk
Smeesters, Karen Ruggiero, Lawrence Sanna, Michael LaCour and, a long way in front
with 58 retractions, Diederik Stapel. […] Could most of what we hold to be true in psychol-
ogy be wrong (Ioannidis 2005)? (Farsides & Sparks 2016: 368).

The replication crisis

15. Apart from the sheer volume of faked results, we also have the enormous problem
of replicability – or rather of the non-replicability of experimental results in “psychology.”
This problem was already flagged by Hans Eysenck 60 years ago when he warned that…
the root of many of the difficulties and disappointments found in psychological research,
as well as the cause of the well-known difficulties in duplicating results […] lies in this
neglect of individual differences[…]
Hundreds of extremely able psychologists spent time, energy, and a considerable amount
of money […] apparently quite pointlessly; must this sort of thing be repeated endlessly
before we learn the lesson that individual differences […] may not be pushed aside and
forgotten when experiments are designed which purport to reveal universal truths?” (Ey-
senck 1966: 26)

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16. It is just as well that Eysenck is not around anymore to learn that indeed it seems
that psychologists are condemned to repeat the same errors endlessly, getting nowhere with
the replication issue 60 years later! Psychologists are supposed to know something about
“learning,” but if they do they certainly do not know how to reflexively apply their learning
schedules to themselves.
17. Farsides and Sparks also comment on the very serious problem of replicability in
psychological research.
Few successful attempts have been made to rigorously replicate findings in psychology.
Recent attempts to do so have suggested that even studies almost identical to original ones
rarely produce reassuring confirmation of their reported results. (Farsides & Sparks 2016:
370)

18. Commenting on the fact that the Reproducibility Project has revealed that only 36
per cent of findings in psychology appear to stand up to a replication attempt:
[F]or any recently published significant result in a leading psychology journal, there is only
a one in three chance that the research, if repeated, would produce a statistically significant
replication. […] Furthermore, the effect size of the repeated study is likely to be less than
half of that originally reported. (Morris 2015: 858)

Instead of “giving psychology away” as George Miller (1969) once tried to do – and who
would want it even for free? – must we now think of just “throwing it away”?

“Guild-ing the wily”

19. So arising from the fact that “psychology” is not what it pretends to be, and that it
has produced very little of relevance to people’s daily experiencing, one of the major tasks
in hand is to deal with the guild-like functioning of “psychological societies” or “associa-
tions,” usually organised at a national level, who perpetuate the illusion of “psychology”
as a “science.”
20. In describing what he calls “disabling professions,” Ivan Illich notes that they go
beyond the type of powers operated by guilds and unions in that:
They claim special, incommunicable authority to determine not just the way things are to
be made, but also the reason why their services are mandatory. Many professions are now
so highly developed that they not only exercise tutelage over the citizen-become-client, but
also determine the shape of his world-become-ward.
A profession, like a priesthood, holds power by concession from an élite whose interests it
props up. (Illich 1977: 16f)

He continues:
Professionals assert secret knowledge about human nature, knowledge which only they
have the right to dispense. They claim a monopoly over the definition of deviance and the
remedies needed […] Public affairs pass from the layperson’s elected peers into the hands
of a self-accrediting élite. (ibid: 19f.)

21. So here we have the serious problem of a professional psychological élite that
exerts the powers conceded to it to demarcate territory, controls who can work within this
territory, establishes and imposes price-lists, and operates to expropriate the competencies

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and self-governing understandings and skills that have always existed in the common-
sense domain of human living.
22. The extensive fragmentariness of “psychology” is hidden and obscured by the
operations of psychology organisations, which create the social illusion that there does
in fact exist a coherent scientific body of work that legitimises their claims to “expertise”
(when the opposite is the case). These are self-declared “experts” with little scientific or
other basis for their claims to the right to expropriate that which belongs to the common
citizen (McCann, Shindler & Hammond 2004).
23. Criticising the tendency among “psychology professionals” to prefer the sensation
of certainty arising from the exercise of control over others rather than face the uncertain
task of creating personal significance in one’s living, Kelly observes:
We would rather know some things for sure, even though they don’t shed much light on
what is going on. Knowing a little something for sure, something gleaned out of one’s ex-
perience is often a way of knowing one’s self for sure, and thus of holding on to an identity,
even an unhappy identity. And this in turn, is a way of saying that our identities often stand
on trivial grounds. If I can’t be a man I can, at least, be an expert. (Kelly 1977: 7)

Conclusion: A genuinely psychological psychology

24. So what is necessary in any new psychology is a return to the common under-
standings of the “layperson” as opposed to perpetrating the pretence that “psychological
science” has ever, or will ever, “discover” something that will replace the common under-
standings. “Psychological science,” after more than a century of research, has significantly
underwhelmed the layperson because whatever they have “discovered” is either something
already well known (the layperson’s understandings were correct) or they discovered some-
thing so banal that it had little or no relevance to the way people live their lives. Instead of
perpetuating “segmented man” in the guise of “physiological psychology,” “neurological
psychology,” etc., we need a psychology that is capable of being “psychological”!
25. We need new ideas of what a psychology could be and what kind of psychology
is needed for the forms of mentality/experiencing of this century. We need to throw away
the stale, outmoded notions of over 100 years ago. People today have very little in com-
mon with people of the Victorian era. What it means to be “human” has radically changed,
along with the kind of world within which we must find novel adaptations. This applies
especially to those born after the commencement of this millennium. Anyone who works
in psychotherapy and who deals with young people will know exactly the profound irrel-
evance of trying to apply psychological models from the last century to their experience
of living today.
26. Cybernetics would be better used not as a “glue” for sticking together things that
cannot belong together – into a “PsychoFrankenstein” – but rather to create a completely
different understanding of what a genuinely useful psychology could be for this new era.

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Open Peer Commentary: To What Extent Can Second-

Order Cybernetics Be a Foundation for Psychology?
Marcelo Arnold-Cathalifaud & Daniela Thumala-Dockendorff

1. Bernard Scott’s target article is among the few works of psychologists who discuss
a possible unification of psychology in a reflexive way. Scott does not refer to an “imagined
identity,” nor does he argue from a historical background or from considerations following
in the footsteps of pioneers of contemporary specialties or “schools.” In other words, he
is not trying to create nostalgia or feelings of loss. Instead, his work is strongly proactive.
The focus is therefore on proposing adherence to a theoretical construction – second-order
cybernetics – warning that it could set strong demands and cause changes in the current
mode of the discipline of psychology.
2. Scott’s arguments, while brief and focused, incorporate many aspects that evidence
long work and reflection on these issues. In this commentary, we assume the position of
the Devil’s advocate in order to encourage further discussion on the subject. To do this, we
have selected some indications and critical aspects of the text, especially those that can lead
to a productive exchange of opinions in a diverse, yet constructively oriented, academic
community.
3. We highlight that Scott’s diagnosis, although disciplinarily focused on psychology,
represents a general condition in human and social sciences. Scott argues that up to now,
these disciplines have seemed to be content with developing increasingly sophisticated
methods, whose applications accumulate specialized but disconnected knowledge. Cer-
tainly, and agreeing with Scott, all these disciplines could be seen to be in a pre-paradig-
matic phase, as well as lacking internal unity, not only among its specialties but also within
them. Although this generalization may be correct, we can still envision some cases that
depart from this pattern. For example, linguistics and economics seem to have more inter-
nal consistencies than other social disciplines. How could they come to this? Perhaps Scott
could shed light on this question and venture some comparisons.
4. Moreover, a possible “blind spot” in Scott’s diagnosis can be found when he im-
plicitly and arbitrarily assumes a positive value for the conceptual and theoretical unifica-
tion of disciplines such as psychology. Although this may sound acceptable (and could
even be partly shared by us) it is not enough to justify the need for something that has not
prevented psychology from becoming an autonomous discipline. Even more so, how is it
possible to explain that the coexistence of organizational and disciplinary spaces of many
“psychologies,” some of them almost isolated from each other, has not fractured psychol-
ogy? In other words, is that unity useful? Or is it just a matter of values and preferences
of those who attempt to give coherence to their choices? Finally, we wonder, do the most
“mature” sciences such as physics or biology enjoy unity? In short, the “obviousness” of
the need for a coherent conceptual discipline, as well as the benefits that would result from
having general theoretical models, are arguable. Scott seems to have a perspective, but this
perspective would need to be cleared up.
5. The main argument of the article is that second-order cybernetics has the charac-
teristics to unify the scattered field of interests and applications of modern psychology.
The author notes some progress when he documents that certain cybernetic concepts have
prematurely permeated different fields of psychology, starting from those with a cognitive

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orientation. He argues that these assimilations have been used in research and applied areas
regardless of their foundations or their subsequent developments. Undoubtedly, this is cor-
rect but it could be argued that cybernetics, as well as systems theory, does not have a uni-
fied conceptual body. In fact, cybernetics and systems theory are full of contradictions and
open disputes (Cadenas & Arnold 2015). Finally, is Gordon Pask’s cybernetics (to which
Scott refers) not just a version of cybernetics? How could a single version satisfy the need
for a unified psychology?
6. The guidelines for distinguishing between systemic and constructivist perspectives
such as “second-order observation,” “self-organized systems” and general indications
about “observer systems” are very powerful and yet problematic. Can psychology integrate
them? Or would it need to ignore the differences between the notions of “self-organized
systems” and “autopoietic systems”? Specifically, would it need to ignore the differences
between the classical distinctions of “circular causality” of second-order cybernetics and
the notions of “operative closure,” “structural determination” or “structural coupling”
developed by Humberto Maturana and his colleagues (for example, Varela, Maturana &
Uribe 1974; Maturana 2002), especially when these notions are transferred from machines
and organisms to human and social systems? What is Scott’s perception of the emergence
of these new levels of complexity? Or does he only propose a metaphorical use of such
advanced second-order cybernetic notions?
7. When we take Scott’s perspective to a particular field of psychology, for instance
clinical psychology and, in particular, to psychotherapy, more specific questions arise.
Many diverse psychotherapeutic models and schools are widely recognized, some of
which have shown more clinical effectiveness than others. However, the persistence of
this diversity of approaches (and its increase) shows the complexity implied in the distinc-
tion between psychological problems and their treatments. From most orthodox versions
of behaviorism to the most orthodox versions of psychoanalysis, the approaches cover
multiple visions of
a. mental health and mental illness,
b. the therapeutic objectives that must be reached,
c. notions of change and its possibilities in therapy, and
d. the role of the therapist and methods of intervention, among others.
Can second-order cybernetics provide a sufficiently broad and integrative framework and
at the same time be specific enough to guide the generation of knowledge and psychothera-
peutic practices?
8. Considering Niklas Luhmann’s perspective (1984, 1986), it is interesting that by
recognizing the unity of “psychic systems” as “autopoietic systems,” this sociologist has
also somehow demarcated a disciplinary field for psychology and related disciplines into
something that we call “psycho (auto) poiesis” (Thumala-Dockendorff 2010; Arnold 2010)
as an emerging and distinguishable unit. Luhmann’s demarcation involved a conceptual
re-specification of the notion of autopoiesis that up to now has been very controversial
(Arnold, Urquiza & Thumala 2011). In this sense, the question arises of whether Scott,
when comparing the works of Luhmann and Pask, puts both at the same level. And in what
way does he appreciate their similarities and differences?
9. Finally, in our opinion, even considering our own proximity to Luhmann’s theory,
we believe that the complexity of the matters we intend to deal with is too great to be con-
fined to a single theoretical observation program irrespective of its sophistication. However,

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we agree with Scott that systemic, cybernetic and constructivist notions are priceless con-
tributions that deserve our full attention and dedication to develop them and apply them to
disciplines such as psychology, especially due to the normative character of many of its ap-
plications. It remains to be seen how the author will continue his approach by applying it to
the development of knowledge in different fields of psychology. As Scott’s proposal is well-
founded and opens interesting questions and possibilities, the conversation remains open.

Open Peer Commentary: The Importance –

and the Difficulty – of Moving Beyond Linear Causality
Robert J. Martin

1. We owe a debt of gratitude to Bernard Scott for opening a conversation on the

failure of the foundations of psychology to move beyond linear causality toward circular
causality and other concepts central to cybernetics.

Linear causality: The underlying paradigm of science

2. The concern with linear causality in this commentary is not with the idea in itself,
but with the exclusion of circular causality and other cybernetic concepts from science.
Science, including psychology, is rooted in the eighteenth and nineteenth century reduc-
tionist idea that the universe is a giant clock. The assumption was that if you understood the
constituent parts of the clock, you understood the clock and you could predict the operation
of the clock. Keep in mind that “clock” at this time does not have to mean only a clock:
watch and clock makers built a variety of automata using clockwork mechanisms. One
example is the orrery, a model of the solar system that both modeled the relationships of
the planets and, like a clock, predicted their positions in real time.
3. Physics was seen to reveal cause and effect in a game of billiards, chemistry was
seen to reveal the secrets of molecules and how to make them, biology was seen to reveal
the relationship between stimulus and response (for example, as demonstrated by making
the legs of a recently dead frog twitch when an electrical charge is applied). While these
examples are now viewed as early steps leading to the complex disciplines of physics,
chemistry, biology, psychology, and so on, one thing remains: the assumption that every-
thing can be understood as a physical mechanism and that the role of science is to uncover
or reveal the underlying causality that underlies all phenomena. It is this assumption that
second-order cybernetics questions.
4. Surrounded by physical mechanisms that modeled the universe, it seems under-
standable that the metaphor of physical mechanisms would have come to influence or even
dominate the thinkers who lived in these centuries. Of course, mechanistic models could
not explain human thinking, so, perhaps in an effort to make room for human thinking,
Descartes proposed a dualism of mind and body. Rejecting the notion of a non-material
mind, modern science has identified the mind with the brain and proceeds on the assump-
tion that the mind/brain can be understood in reductionist fashion as a physical mechanism.
5. Differences are not physical entities. Anthropologist Gregory Bateson, one of the
founders of cybernetics, was deeply troubled by this reductionism. Bateson (1972) argued

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that science excludes human beings (as living systems). By this I believe he meant to
point out that the assumption that everything can be understood as a physical mechanism
prevents the study of those processes that characterize human beings and that are usually
identified as “mind” in the dualism of mind/body. On the one hand, Bateson was against
any supernatural explanation of mind; on the other hand, he was against any assumption
that mental processes – or any processes that require computation of a difference – could
be reduced to physics or chemistry. Bateson argued that relations are not material; they
arise through the computation of a difference, and those differences (which are not things)
are what make possible the formation of a hand from a genetic instruction, the ability of
a tree to reach toward the light, or the ability of human beings to think. Bateson was not
denying that these things are based on physical processes; the point is that they cannot be
explained by physics or chemistry, but only by higher-order complexity.
6. Predictions are not explanations. In the example of the orrery, prediction could
also be considered an explanation: this is how and when the planets move. In the case of
behaviorism, as Scott points out in §3, “[…] explanations of how and why learning oc-
curred were eschewed in favour of empirically derived ‘laws’ that afforded predictions
about when and where learning would occur […]” Explanations were eliminated in favor
of predictability.

Why a paradigm shift is worthwhile but difficult to achieve

7. Granted that circular causality and other concepts need to be folded into the foun-
dations of psychology, the foundations of cognitive science, and even into science in gen-
eral, we need to ask the question: What interferes with this happening? The following
interlocking answers suggest possibilities.
8. Use conditions understanding. When we use technology, we probably think of that
technology in terms of use through controlling a switch, button, lever, knob, or key rather
than in terms of understanding the underlying mechanism. Even a technician may not need
an adequate understanding and description. In other words, the adequacy of a description
depends upon the user’s goal and the user’s view of what serves as an adequate description.
9. Technological cultures use the tools and metaphors appropriate for the task at hand.
People use the understanding they need to accomplish the goal they have in mind. In cy-
bernetics we regularly refer to the thermostat as an example of feedback, but we need to
keep in mind that just as we think of the thermostat – and feedback – as an example of cir-
cularity, most people continue to think of the thermostat as a cause and effect mechanism.
The point is that we live in a technological culture where we are surrounded by circular
systems that are thought of as linear causal mechanisms that we, the users, control, and this
dominant metaphor of technological cultures influences our thinking at a deep level (see
Martin 2015).
10. Implicit and unexamined paradigms are powerful. Much of what an individual
knows is implicit; much of what an individual knows is performative and implicit; that
is, it reveals itself in how she behaves. Even as a scientist, much of what ones does is
performative and implicit. For example, in designing research, writing a grant, writing a
paper, and so on, what one knows is embodied in the skills one uses to produce the artifacts
(such as this commentary) that come from the performance of one’s skill set. As I pursue
my work, I follow the strategies I have learned through study and apprenticeship within
my profession.

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11. One can understand and agree with a concept without incorporating the impli-
cations of that concept into the performative aspects of how one does research. We are
immersed in a worldwide culture that recognizes circularity in specific processes but typi-
cally treats them as something that can be controlled through an understanding of linear
causality. Recognizing circularity in learning, cognition, problem solving, etc., does not by
itself change a rootedness in linear causality. Scott (§28) points out that psychology has
moved in the direction of accepting circularity in processes such as perception, memory,
problem-solving. However, the issue is that psychology has not embraced the concept of
human beings as self-organizing systems whose circularity is intrinsic and foundational,
not peripheral.
12. The rise of information processing took place when the possibility of writing digi-
tal computer programs capable of solving problems (e.g., playing checkers or chess) arose:
Can we write a software program to do X? The need for circular processes in writing
software is understood: that is what a software program is – a series of loops that produce
a result through iteration. Still, the underlying thinking is not necessarily (or even usually)
based on the understanding of cognition as a process that is circular, and the metaphor that
“the brain is a computer” is a return to the idea that learning, thinking, and remembering
are identical to computer processes such as storage, input, output, and retrieval.
13. The gold standard – and the prestige that follows from meeting the gold standard –
belongs to the laboratory and the field experiment, with their emphasis on linear cause and
effect. Even in those many studies designed to provide correlations, the underlying idea is
still to answer questions such as: Which method works best? For example, which method
of teaching reading works best? Does more homework produce better scores? Is this anti-
depressant better than a placebo?
14. It is important to understand that in §1 Scott is not talking only about revising the
historical foundations in order to create a coherent discipline (though he is certainly wants
that to happen). In §44 Scott is also concerned with how research is carried out in the pres-
ent. The study of cognition cannot advance until we see living systems and cognition as
more than the result of cause-and-effect processes that incidentally include circular loops
(e.g., practice in learning). If researchers are embedded in a system of proposal, fund-
ing, research, and publication that rewards proposals and papers that follow only certain
established paradigms, those paradigms will tend to preserve themselves through many
generations of researchers.
15. Findings that point toward constructivist concepts are thought of as anomalies.
Decades of research on perception have revealed that color vision does not have an iso-
morphic correspondence with electromagnetic frequencies (Gregory 1970). Decades of
research also show many other examples of how we see what we expect to see, not what is
supposedly there (Eagleman 2015). If these research findings were not considered anoma-
lies – features of human perception rather intrinsic properties of cognition – could scien-
tists still think of themselves as representing an external reality?
16. Our preference as human beings, whether individually or in groups, has been to
try to control others, and our environment, both social and physical. Incorporating circular
causality and self-organization would threaten the belief that humans can control others
and nature through appropriate understanding of linear cause and effect. This belief is
embedded at all levels of thinking in our cultures: parenting, the law and justice, business
management, science, and the technology of modern life – children, employees, criminals,
one’s toaster, one’s automobile, and the earth itself – can be understood and controlled.

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17. Given all of the barriers to the acceptance of non-linear causality within psychol-
ogy, it is all the more surprising that there has been a small but increasingly important
thread of psychology that is built on the concepts of constructivism and circular causality
based on the work of Jean Piaget. What I would like to add to Scott’s history is that dur-
ing the same period that behaviorism became the dominant model of learning and, later,
information processing became the dominant model of cognition, Piaget was evolving a
theory of cognition based on ideas of self-organization (the mind organizes itself through a
series of assimilations of and accommodations to the environment). Piaget’s fieldwork and
the theory that flows from his fieldwork is a constructivist theory of learning and cognition
that incorporates the ideas of circularity and self-organization, though without using those
terms. Piaget was very clear that the mind organizes itself – and this organization creates
our understanding of the world. Piaget (1974) titled one of his books: To Understand Is To
Invent. Ernst von Glasersfeld – who coined the term and the notion of radical constructiv-
ism, and was also a Piaget scholar and a director of doctoral theses using Piaget’s con-
structivist assumptions, incorporates the notion of the mind organizing itself according to
its goals (we might use other terminology today) into radical constructivism (Glasersfeld
1984). In the last four decades, the importance of Piaget and neo-Piagetians has increased,
though Piaget continues to be thought of as a stage theorist in the area of cognitive devel-
opment rather than a researcher and theorist of cognition and learning.
18. An important idea in Scott’s target article is his consideration of concepts of pro-
cedures. Scott mentions Gordon Pask, but not Piaget, in his consideration of concepts as
procedures. Piaget also thought of concepts as procedures – procedures in a constant pro-
cess of change and development. This is not to take away anything from Pask, but to point
out that in Piaget, there is no conceptual difference between motor schemes and conceptual
schemes: both change through interaction, both can be thought of as operators. In fact, this
is Piaget’s central idea: we know the world not through representation but through opera-
tion on it using motor and concept schemes – and conceptual schemes develop through
using motor/conceptual schemes to process the environment. I think we can make a bet-
ter argument for including cybernetic and constructivist concepts into the foundations of
psychology by pointing out that these ideas have also been implicit in the work of Piaget
and Lev Vygotsky.

Conclusion
19. The history of humanity is a history of changing technologies, including book-
keeping, mathematics, and writing, which allow for greater control of time, people, and
resources. In all of these efforts, assumptions of control through cause and effect are almost
universal. A causes B. Push the button and your car starts, the bomb drops, the vending
machine delivers a candy bar, and so on. Never mind that A does not cause B, it merely
initiates a sequence of events; this is how we human beings prefer to understand “reality.”
In the nineteenth century, the idea of science as a rational way to discover how nature
worked established the idea that the discovery of cause and effect relationships could be
made into objective process from which neither humans or nature could escape. Thus were
cemented together two key components of modern human life: grafting the objective find-
ings of science and the objective results of technologies onto the subjective experience of
cause and effect: I do something and I see a result. The assumption of cause and effect is a
phenomenon that permeates almost all theory and all practice in modern life.

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20. By the end of the twentieth century, psychology’s concern with learning and cog-
nition had three main very different approaches to learning and cognition: the reductionist
approaches of behaviorism and information-processing, and the non-reductionist, con-
structivist approaches of Piaget and Vygotsky and those influenced by them. Behaviorism
has expanded to include mental behaviors, especially in the field of mental health, and
virtually all behaviorism includes cognitive behavioral strategies. Information process-
ing/artificial intelligence has developed enormously more powerful software, but has not
changed its stance vis-a-vis cognition as a self-organizing system. Piaget’s and Vygotsky’s
work has been embraced by some in the education community, especially those concerned
with teaching science, because a constructivist approach works better than the traditional
“transmission of information” approach that continues to dominate the rest of education.
Behaviorism and information processing could profit from including the concepts of self-
organization and circular causality in their core understanding. Piaget’s work already in-
corporates the concepts of self-organization and circular causality and the construction of
knowledge, but researchers influenced by Piaget could benefit from using specific terms
such as self-organization and circular causality to inform their teaching and research. Piag-
et, Heinz von Foerster, Pask, Humberto Maturana, Glasersfeld, and other constructivists
and second-order cyberneticists have important insights, but their insights tend not to affect
the research done by cognitive scientists.
21. In closing, I agree with Scott that psychology needs to incorporate circular causal-
ity and other concepts from cybernetics – both first- and second-order (§§43f) – but this
may not create a paradigm shift. Many areas of psychology are aware of circular processes,
as Scott (§28) points out. The problem is that psychology (i.e., the structure of psychology
as represented by various groups with power and influence, not just individual psycholo-
gists) needs to see clearly that the reductionist model that underpins much of the research
interferes with incorporating circularity, self-organization, and other cybernetic concepts
into the underlying psychological understanding of human beings as self-organizing, cir-
cular systems.
22. A more flexible way of thinking about human beings can continue to use designs
and methodologies that allow researchers to move forward. For example, while using the
traditional tools of psychological research, positive psychology also uses concepts related to
constructivist and cybernetic concepts. These researchers do empirical research that accepts
and investigates the circular nature of remembering. Our anticipation of satisfaction and our
memory of satisfaction in participating in an event have been found to be more closely re-
lated to one another than they are to our satisfaction at the time of the event; in other words,
our memories are more closely related to our internal expectations than to external events
– we do not remember what we experienced, we remember what we expected to experience.
23. Finally, conversation is essential in developing these ideas. I came to understand
the ideas in Scott’s article and in my commentary by writing about them – a conversation
with myself – and by listening to others having conversations with them. The important
task is that professional communities undertake to reflect on the assumptions that underlie
their practice.

Acknowledgement
Extensive editorial suggestions by biologist Dr. Suzanne Martin are gratefully ac-
knowledged.

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Open Peer Commentary:

Obstacles to Cybernetics Becoming a Conceptual
Framework and Metanarrative in the Psychologies
Philip Baron

The sidelining of cybernetics

1. Bernard Scott (§§5,15) posits two reasons for cybernetics becoming side-lined dur-
ing the 1970s.
a. Scientists used only what they deemed fit for the paradigms within which they
were working and thereafter concentrated on their own interests, ignoring the roots
of their specialisation and use of cybernetics.
b. Funding models in the USA have favoured research geared to military exploits
over research in psychology – although cybernetics was also a proponent in the
military research domain. Scott (2012: 75) believes that in the 1970s the “new
cybernetics” literally went unnoticed in circles outside of the systems movement.
Scott’s (§15) two reasons are fair; however, with more than 40 years elapsing since the
heralding of the “second order,” there still remains limited explicit intermingling of cy-
bernetics in mainstream psychology, which is exactly what Scott (§§7, 10) is concerned
about. There is no denying that many cybernetic principles can be found dappled across
the psychologies, but as Scott (§1) notes, there is almost no awareness that such principles
and other evolved derivatives have originated from cybernetics. Cybernetic approaches
are thus rarely found as a complete curriculum in psychology studies in either American or
European universities. I propose four additional reasons for this status quo of the margin-
alising of explicit cybernetics in psychology disciplines. I believe these obstacles are still
at play and act as boundaries to Scott’s ideal of cybernetics providing both a conceptual
tying together of competing psychology approaches as well as becoming a meta-view for
psychology. Also presented are some findings from the South African context in order to
balance the Americentric and Eurocentric context.

Obstacle 1: Teacher and learner challenges

2. Second-order cybernetics is challenging for students to grasp and for educators to
teach (Baron 2015). This may be due to the epistemological shifts that are usually required
upon embracing cybernetics, not as a model that can be objectified, described, and then ap-
plied as something separate from the observer but as both a theory and a lived experience,
addressing both the sophia and phronesis of knowledge (Baron 2014; Glanville 2015). Stu-
dents (and others) grapple with the idea that cybernetics may be something that can be used
to frame everything else, while still being personally connected to this very frame.1 Scott
(§43) rightly argues that education in psychology should begin with topics on autopoietic

1. This statement is based on the feedback from visitors (mainly students) who have visited www.
ecosystemic-psychology.org.za This website is a resource for people who are interested in eco-

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wholes and complex adaptive systems; however, would it be reasonable to expect learners
to grasp these principles when they have not yet learned cognitive and social psychology?
How does one present these cybernetic topics when the learners do not yet have knowledge
of human mental processes, memory, and perception? Language, too, is a major feature in
cybernetics, both in the manner in which much cybernetics text is written – the specificity
of words, phrases, and their intended meanings – and in the topics of cybernetics research
on communication systems (conversation theory, for example). This is especially challeng-
ing when the learners have a different mother tongue than the teacher’s, which is often
the case in large multicultural universities, in particular in the South African context. The
educators and practitioners themselves would need to re-think their teaching and learning,
as many of them may have already become entrenched in a particular paradigm of knowl-
edge, the same paradigms that Scott (§4) believes have not acknowledged cybernetics.
3. Educators and scientists who are interested in cybernetics may find the observer-
dependent realities, non-purposeful drift, structural determinism and coupling, entropy/
negentropy, equifinality and equipotentiality all troubling aspects to incorporate into their
research and hence their teachings. This forms part of the first obstacle. Thus, it may be
beneficial to create a guide for educators on how to present these cybernetic topics, as well
as an introductory book for learners in a format that is at a low level and not intimidat-
ing (“conceptual ground-clearing,” §42), such as the popular mainstream book brand For
Dummies. The introductory titled book on cybernetics is Ashby’s (1956) An Introduction
to Cybernetics, which is an important text, but may be too mathematical for a new student
in the psychologies.2 Scott (§2) does mention that he may provide a book on the topic he
proposes regarding cybernetics as a unifying framework for psychology, but being an avid
researcher in education himself, he may also consider something of the order of: Cyber-
netics for Dummies: A Guide for Teachers and Learners. This can assist in overcoming
the adoption of explicit cybernetics into mainstream psychology curriculums, and may
solve the problem of favouritism of some cybernetic topics while other equally valuable
topics go ignored, possibly owing to their perceived complexity. Humberto Maturana and
Francisco Varela (1992) did well in simplifying their work and opening it up to a wider
audience with their book titled: The Tree of Knowledge.

Obstacle 2: Traditional universities

4. The second barrier, dependent on the first, rests on the structure of traditional uni-
versity curriculums. Scott (§§26, 28) notes that psychology studies are populated with
various theories and their models, which is part of the reason for Scott’s quest to delineate
the commonalities across the different psychology approaches in the first place. However,
in keeping with the traditional university style of compartmentalising knowledge areas by
separating disciplines, presenting topics independently from other topics without address-
ing their connections,3 and often disregarding individual learning styles, many students

systemic psychology and cybernetics in therapeutic psychology. The site traffic averages 49 page
views/day.
2. There is another, lesser-known book with same title as Ashby’s. This translated book was written
by Viktor Glushkov and published in 1966 as document No. FTD-TT-65–942, Air Force Systems
Command, Foreign Technology Division, Wright-Patterson, Airforce Base, Ohio.
3. Pask (1976: 101) noted this point with regards to mechanics and electricity in university curricu-
lums.

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thus also address their coursework in the same serial manner – learning to compartmental-
ise their studies. This is further exacerbated when the educators specifically create assess-
ments that ask questions in an outcomes-based approach that further isolates the parts of a
single curriculum, often required for the auditing bodies who want to measure the learners’
performance against a pre-determined scale for each course outcome or knowledge area.
Students get accustomed to the disconnect between themselves and their study areas, miss-
ing the point that knowledge and knowing are not synonymous, for knowing requires a
knower and is tied to context and epistemology (Glasersfeld 1990). Thus, in the uncommon
event of explicit cybernetics being a topic within a certain module of a university degree/
diploma, it simply forms the next topic placed adjacent to the others in the list of knowl-
edge areas in which the learner must achieve competence.4 Further, the same method of
“applying” each paradigm/theory to a psychology case study, for example, now takes place
with cybernetics as the tool, resulting in abundant confusion. If educators were versed in
conversation theory as Scott (§37) describes, tools such as Teachback, analogy learning,
etc. could be used in a widespread fashion, assisting in steering the learners and thus en-
gaging with the different styles of learning that each learner demonstrates. However, this
is particularly difficult in distance-learning universities, where verbal conversations are a
luxury.
5. In undergraduate years, there may be an introductory module providing an over-
view of the main approaches in psychology theorists of the last century. For example, in
South African public universities, a personology course would consist of the depth psy-
chology approaches (Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung, Alfred Adler, Erich Fromm, and Erik
Erikson), the behavioural and learning theory approaches (BF Skinner, Julian Rotter, Al-
bert Bandura, and Walter Mischel), the person-orientated approaches (Abraham Maslow,
Carl Rogers, George Kelly, and Viktor Frankl), and then lastly the alternative approaches
(Eastern, African, and ecosystemic) (see Meyer, Moore & Viljoen 2008). What is notable
is that the ecosystemic approach reflects the explicit cybernetic approaches, which is un-
fortunately presented as a separate section in this particular personology module. Thus, in
addressing Scott’s (§§43f) goals, the textbook would need to be re-written from Scott’s
(§§1,7,10,43) view of tying the cybernetic tenets that are implicitly used within some of
the neighbouring approaches and concluding with cybernetics as a meta-view, instead of
simply being a separate independent approach. The mega university in question is called
the University of South Africa (UNISA),5 which has student numbers of over 300 000, with
89 000 of these enrolments in the humanities (DoHET 2013: 4f). Two out of the three top
universities in Africa (the University of Cape Town, the University of the Witwatersrand,
and the University of Pretoria) have systems theory explicitly as part of their curriculums,
however with a limited scope. In these two instances, the explicit use of cybernetics (first-
order) is within family therapy or group therapy praxis. Thus, Scott’s (§§29, 44) attempt at
grounding the competing psychology paradigms within cybernetics, whether process- or

4. Pask (1976: 96) was concerned about how modules are structured for students to learn serially/
operationally. This topic is still relevant even 40 years later.
5. While this is an African university, it reflects international Western trends in curriculum structure.
This particular university is also one of the only universities on the African continent to offer their
clinical psychology master’s degree from an ecosystemic approach (cybernetic); yet from brow-
sing the undergraduate curriculums, one would not assume this fact. This in turn means that only
learners who achieve the master’s degree would have had an opportunity to engage in a cybernetic
approach to clinical psychology.

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person-orientated, is not without merit, also allowing for an appreciation that many models
are part of a larger class with the goal of addressing whole systems. A review of traditional
university psychology curriculums and the prescribed texts may need to go hand in hand
in overcoming this barrier of introducing cybernetics as a conceptual framework in the
psychologies.

Obstacle 3: Linear causality, research methodology, and technological efficacy

6. My third proposed barrier rests on the well-established linear research method-
ology. Sigmund Koch (1976: 485) stated, “at the time of its inception, psychology was
unique in the extent to which its institutionalisation preceded its content and its methods
preceded its problems.” Empirical research is a major activity within psychology as Scott
(§§3, 4, 7, 28) notes, however Scott (§42) would like it to be informed by second-order
cybernetics. With abundant psychology research and what Scott (§4) refers to as “a wealth
of empirical findings,” one wonders how rich these enquiries are when mostly undertaken
according to an epistemology that has not accounted for observer-dependent realities and
contexts. Dorothy Becvar and Raphael Becvar (2006) call for re-research, alluding to the
idea that when research findings are understood from a frame of reference that does not ac-
count for its own worldview, this research should be viewed tentatively­– not being as rich
as initially thought. Scott (§7) mentions critical psychology and the attempt to review the
assumptions of mainstream psychology, which is important; however, there is still a barrier
in that Western thought idolises the individual and one’s ability to control and manipulate
one’s environment. Linear causality is central to the Western mind and the dominance of
positivism, prizing mechanisation and the objectification of measurements, which are often
the goals of funding models. In terms of psychotherapy, efficacy that relies on standardisa-
tion has found its way into psychotherapy with the “manualisation” of process to provide a
cheaper intervention (Soldz 1990; Werbert 1989). In terms of therapy practices, there is an
increasing need for psychology as a profession to demonstrate that its interventions yield
tangible and measureable results to clients and their families, as well as to human rights
groups in light of inhumane practices of some psychiatric institutions or abusive traditional
healing practices in some low- to middle-income countries (Kagee & Lund 2012: 103).6
Cybernetic approaches in research methodology have the scope for an ethical approach;
however, comparing measureable success against other approaches almost requires a dif-
ferent set of measurement criteria, or at least an understanding of systems thinking.
7. The move to technological efficacy (see Ellul 1964) brings forth an epistemol-
ogy of highly controllable, linear, predictable, and structured systems that do not readily
adapt for humanness. Artificial intelligence supported by cognitive science does have a
history of cybernetics as an important proponent in this endeavour, as highlighted by Scott
(§30). However, in his unpublished manuscript “Metadesign,”7 Maturana stresses the term
“consensual” in explaining existence: consensual living, consensual emotions, consensual
co-ordinations, consensual behaviours, and consensual conversations. It seems that hu-
manity, in the presence of machines, still has a lot to achieve for consensual existence to
occur. The structure of the majority of technology is not readily consensual (Baron 2013).
With humans at the receiving end of technology, humanity may become conditioned to

6. See also the “chain-free initiative,” http://www.emro.who.int/mental-health/chain-free-initiative,

accessed 30 December 2013.
7. http: //www.inteco.cl/articulos/metadesign.htm

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what Jacques Ellul (1964: 324) termed “the law of technique.” The deep integration of
technology into the day-to-day living of people has resulted in major shifts in how people
communicate and achieve their daily goals. This technological efficiency may adjust our
worldview, and should not be thought of as something neutral (Heidegger 1977: 4). It
is not surprising that one of the most influential humanist psychologists noted, “In our
technological society, people’s behaviour can be shaped, even without their knowledge or
approval” (Rogers 1980: 140). Thus, the linearity of technology programming, too, may be
a barrier to embracing circular causality in research.
Second-order cybernetics is, however, an important approach to research. Some an-
thropologists have recently realised the importance of acknowledging research method-
ologies from their sister disciplines in addressing past mistakes, especially in terms of
ethnographic works that arrive at conclusions that upon revisiting do not hold their ground
(Lembek 2014). This “new insight” into new observer-dependent research methodologies
further depicts the lack of adoption of cybernetics in other disciplines too, now expanding
Scott’s scope. One of the earliest advocates of the second order was an anthropologist her-
self – Margaret Mead – who advocated the importance of alignment in both the theorising
and the praxis of research for the fruits of cybernetics to be realised (Mead 1968). Thus,
while Scott focuses on the psychologies, one wonders if his argument also applies to other
disciplines.

Obstacle 4: Personal preference, ethics, and responsibilities

8. The last obstacle rests on personal preference. Scott may do well to provide a co-
herent conceptual framework for the psychologies, but there may be an audience – as
always – who choose not to acknowledge cybernetics, or who dismiss it simply as a type
of post-modernism. Scott (§18) would like to see cybernetics as a metadiscipline, which is
ideal, but how does one achieve a meta-narrative with groups of people who have not yet
understood even the early cybernetic principles? This is indeed a dilemma. Second, there
is a high degree of unpredictability in state-determined systems that require continuous
updates for participant observers, as Scott (§16) describes, citing Maturana, Gordon Pask,
and Heinz von Foerster. This may not be a well-liked position for researchers to subscribe
to. As Scott states (§17) “cyberneticians had the reflexive awareness that in studying self-
organising systems, they were studying themselves.” The associated ethics and responsi-
bilities that arise out of second-order cybernetics may be overwhelming. This is an unset-
tling no-man’s land for many scholars and students, who in turn opt out of this challenging
reflexive epistemological domain.

Conclusion
9. Scott (§7) notes that if the field of psychology is looked at as a historical whole,
there has not yet been any single paradigm that stands as a dominant victor, rather compet-
ing paradigms are at play in different areas. This means there is still scope for cybernetics
to “re-enter” and take a seat at the table of dominant approaches in psychology, gaining its
position as the metadiscipline while also not excluding other knowledge systems. How-
ever, there are boundaries that need to be addressed in order for the step to embracing
cybernetics to take place.

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Open Peer Commentary: The Social and the Psychological:

Conceptual Cybernetic Unification vs Disciplinary Analysis?
Eva Buchinger

1. It was Aristotle who said that “it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any
sense of good and evil, of just and unjust” and that “the individual, when isolated, is not
self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole” (Aristotle 1920: 29).
One could argue that this is a perfect and still up-to-date expression of the inseparability of
the social and the psychological dimension of human beings.
2. Psychology and sociology nevertheless have been developed as distinct academic
disciplines with an established link in the form of social-psychology (Goethals 2007; Ross,
Lepper & Ward 2010). What are, therefore, the benefits of another approach to interrelat-
ing these two disciplines? In the section “Unifying individual and social psychologies” of
his target article, Bernard Scott argues that the benefits can be found in better supporting
the understanding of the dynamics of interpersonal perception and human communication
(§39). He argues further that a concept of social systems based on the conversation theory
of the cybernetician and psychologist Gordon Pask could provide an alternative to the
theory of social systems developed by the sociologist Niklas Luhmann (§40).
3. Scott’s excellent analysis of the role of cybernetics in psychology and his inspir-
ing thoughts concerning the unification of process and person approaches indeed support
the better understanding of the interlinking of the social and the psychological. He further
gives a clear illustration of how Pask’s P-individuals are conceptualized as psycho-social
unities (§§25, 38) that are hosted by either one M-individual (human being, biomechanical
unity) or by several M-individuals. Of special interest is the latter idea, which indicates that
– complementary to an inner dialog – an outer dialog exists (outer conversation that unifies
a collective) that is also a P-individual, but of another nature. The same holds for Pask’s
definition of conversation as “concept sharing” along a certain togetherness and thereby
distinguished from communication as “signal transfer which may, or may not, be conver-
sational” (Pask 1980: 999). The expression “certain togetherness” makes sense because
a. there must be enough togetherness supported by institutions (e.g., a dining table,
café, market, organization), but
b. too much togetherness gives rise to individual or social malaise.
The second point is the result of digitalization – the growth of data storage and computa-
tion, in Pask’s wording (Pask 1980: 1000) – which rapidly creates an information environ-
ment. Pask concluded that communication that only resembles conversation will be ampli-
fied in this signal-overloaded information environment and will therefore “appear as major
hazards in the future” (Pask 1980: 1001). All these considerations are based on a second-
order cybernetic understanding1 that refers to the work of Ross Ashby, Norbert Wiener

1. First-order cybernetics is understood as the exclusion of the observer within an observation and
second-order cybernetics as the inclusion of the observer in what is observed. Second-order there-
fore means that the observer is “inside the box” (Brand, Bateson & Mead 1976: 38), respectively
“a person who considers oneself to be a participant actor” (Foerster 2003: 289), and is contrary to
“the first order of classical black boxes and negative feedback” (Pask 1996: 355).

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and Heinz von Foerster,2 among others, which are astonishingly up-to-date concerning the
recent debates about the digital revolution. Scott’s proposition of a unifying conceptual
framework on the basis of conversation theory is therefore quite promising.
4. But one should be aware of the complexity of the world society, which is the focus
of Luhmann’s social theory and which is not covered by conversation theory. From a socio-
logical point of view, this can be seen as an expression of strengths of progressing within
the disciplinary path. While elaborating the societal micro-macro link as part of his social
systems theory, Luhmann emphasized the difference between interaction and society by
focussing on the latter (Luhmann 1977, 1982a, 1982b):
a. Interaction forms the basic type of social system, which emerges whenever pres-
ent individuals perceive one another (face-to-face interaction). They communicate
verbally and/or non-verbally with those that are present (with the option to speak
about those that are absent).
b. Society represents the comprehensive system of all communicative interactions.
Very simplified, it can be said that after a first evolutionary transformation from segmenta-
tion to stratification, another evolutionary transformation from stratification to functional
differentiation led to the world society in which we live now. Functional systems (which
are societal subsystems) co-evolved with symbolically generalized communication media.
Here are some examples:
ƒƒ Money is the communication media of the societal system economy, which oper-
ates on the basis of the binary code pay/not pay.
ƒƒ Truth is the media of the scientific system, with the code true/false.
ƒƒ Power belongs to the political system and the code is government/opposition.
Thus, an economy is a self-referential system based on all the communication elements
that fall into the scheme of pay/not pay; all communication belonging to the code (scien-
tifically) true/false constitutes the functional system of science; and all communication-
elements belonging to power and government/opposition generate the political system. As
a consequence, operational closure results in particular system rationalities: scientific ra-
tionality, economic rationality, political rationality, etc. Modern societies neither have one
center (one top) nor one rationality integrating the particular rationalities of the different
societal systems. “It is a society without an apex or center” (Luhmann 1990a: 31) There-
fore, modern society is characterized by an enormous degree of complexity and it is the
explanation of this (complex, functionally differentiated) world society that is Luhmann’s
objective (Luhmann 1982b, 2012: xiii).
5. An integration of Pask’s conversation and Luhmann’s interaction approach could
benefit from Pask’s rich account of learning as the evolution of concepts within a con-
versation as well as from Luhmann’s advanced elaborations on the complex dynamics
of modern society (Buchinger & Scott 2010: 118). Such integration could be based on
already-established conceptual links, since Luhmann himself was very much influenced
by cybernetic considerations. For example, his notion of resonance was inspired by von
Foerster (as discussed in Buchinger 2012: 23), his notion of self-reproduction by Ashby,

2. See Pask (1970; 1996). For sources see, for example, Rosenblueth, Wiener & Bigelow (1943),
Wiener (1948); Shannon & Weaver (1949) and Ashby (1952).

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Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (Luhmann 1990b, 1995: 34, 369), and his notion
of mutualistic-dialogical unities by Pask (Luhmann 1995: 38).
6. The progress in each discipline thereby provides the ground for the integration.
For overall scientific advancement, both are needed, disciplinary specialization on the one
hand and conceptual integration (or spill-over between disciplines, or inter-/transdisci-
plinary fields) on the other.

Open Peer Commentary:

Second Thoughts on Cybernetic Unifications
Tilia Stingl de Vasconcelos Guedes

1. The problem of conceptual unification is usually considered critical for a mature

academic discipline. The main point in Bernard Scott’s target article is to demonstrate the
possibility of using concepts of second-order cybernetics to provide a foundation and a
unifying conceptual framework for psychology. In fact, he argues that cybernetic concepts
have influenced psychology since the 1950s. He also claims that the origins of psychologi-
cal concepts based on cybernetic ideas were lost and the interest of cyberneticians in work-
ing on transdisciplinary unity did not last (§1). Scott’s article is an attempt to offer means
and ideas for this unity. According to Scott, one can build conceptual bridges between psy-
chology and sociology – by merging individual and social psychology. Scott’s motivation
comes from his personal experiences as a practicing psychologist, in which he understands
cybernetics as a provider of useful tools for modeling specific situations.
2. In this commentary, I want to demonstrate that the journey to unification in an
actor-based discipline such as psychology has not ended with Scott’s article but has only
just started. In my view, three important yet missing aspects must be addressed in order
to reach the stage of unification, i.e., the problem of levels, the problem of multiple-level
dynamics, and the problem of being sufficiently different.

The problem of levels

3. Fields such as psychology, sociology or ethnography deal with individuals and so-
cieties, both in static and in dynamic aspects. Scott recommends that these individuals
should be described in a dual manner, namely by a differentiation of mechanical individu-
als, or M-individuals, and psychological individuals, or P-individuals. Both are considered
as self-organized and organizationally closed systems. This distinction between M-individ-
uals or M-unities (§25) as processors for the procedures of P-individuals or P-unities may
have its unifying merits, but they are, in my view, insufficient and under-critical as unifiers.
4. In recent decades, we can observe that there has been an enormous literature in the
cognitive neurosciences, which have made spectacular advances in promoting the level of
neurons and neural network interactions as the basis for studying psychological phenom-
ena such as perception, emotions, memory, etc. Can we still use Scott’s M and P differen-
tiations at the neural level as well? Can we use M- and P-unities at the level of neurons and
their interactions? In other words, can we use the split between M- and P-unities across
different levels, starting with the neural level and single neurons as acting unities to higher

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neural levels up to the micro-level of individuals? If the answer turns out to be negative,
then the proposed cybernetic framework would be inadequate to reach its unification goal.
5. The same argument can be applied upwards towards higher levels of aggregation
such as groups, organizations or even regions or states. Using a similar distinction from
sociology or economics, micro-psychology can be understood as an actor-based configu-
ration whereas macro-psychology deals with unities as composites of individuals. Can
we also use Scott’s M and P-separation for these macro-unities or are we bound to the
individual or micro-level alone? Again, a negative answer would demonstrate the basic
restrictions of Scott’s approach.
6. Finally, the question arises of whether Scott’s approach is able to deal with prob-
lems of the subconscious as well, which, at first sight, the framework of M and P unities
does not seem to address.
7. But even a positive answer that the distinction between M- and P-unities can be
used across all levels from the basic neural level up to the level of macro-psychology,
including the level of the subconscious, would result in a very serious new challenge,
which can be classified as the problem of the dynamics in multiple-level configurations, as
discussed in the next section.

The problem of multiple-level dynamics

8. As my second critical comment to Scott, I would like to address the issue of the
analysis of multiple-level configurations, which also is a general problem in many disci-
plines outside the social sciences.
9. After 1945, we can observe the appearance of a large number of new actors op-
erating beyond the traditional local, regional or national level. Transnational enterprises,
transnational public and private organizations and very large-scale transnational systems
such as the financial markets emerged. This lead to a highly complex multiple-level con-
figuration where relevant actions occur at all different levels simultaneously. Rogers Hol-
lingsworth and Karl Müller (2008) remind us that the dynamics across a multiplicity of
levels is still an unsolved analytical challenge.
10. The governance of the contemporary world and the interconnections among gov-
ernance, democracy and knowledge are far more complex than most observers recognize.
No single level is decisive in shaping the world in which we live. Moreover, the levels are
nested and linked with each other. So one of the great remaining challenges is to compre-
hend the nature of this nestedness, to understand how governance, democracy and knowl-
edge are linked together not only at each of these levels but also how these processes are
linked together across different levels. As societal institutions are increasingly nested in a
multi-level world, we are all faced with the perplexing problem of how to govern ourselves
(Hollingsworth & Müller 2008: 417). Unfortunately, in his article, Scott has provided no
clue as to how to deal with the issue of multiple-level dynamics, which, as stated above,
forms a problem for his approach if he offers a positive answer to the differentiation of M-
and P-unities across different levels.

The problem of being sufficiently different

11. Finally, a third aspect of Scott’s program for the cybernetic unification of psychol-
ogy needs to be urgently addressed: the status of previous and current unification attempts

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in psychology. For example, sociology has seen many unifying approaches, starting from
the days of Max Weber at the beginning of the 20th century, culminating with Talcott
Parsons for a short period in the 1950s, and ending in its current configuration with a
multiplicity of different unification approaches by, to name a few, Pierre Bourdieu, Michel
Foucault, Anthony Giddens, Jürgen Habermas, Niklas Luhmann and Richard Münch. Two
important phenomena can be observed. First, due to their inherent differences, these unifi-
cation approaches further fragment sociology rather than unify it. Second, the multiplicity
of different foundations has not affected the methodology of empirical social research,
which continues in its normal operations of quantitative and qualitative analyses. Thus, in
sociology, any new unification attempt increases the number of available alternatives and
leaves the empirical work of sociologists largely unaffected. From this, one can conclude
that each new attempt moves the unification of sociology a step further away.
12. Will the same happen to psychology? Given the failed attempts in sociology, what
can Scott’s new cybernetic approach offer that makes it different from previous unification
attempts, and how can his second-order cybernetics framework also affect the empirical
work of psychologists in order to make a difference with regard to the normal practices of
psychologists?
13. The work on a unifying foundation for a discipline such as psychology based on
second-order cybernetics literally begs for a high degree of self-reflection and consider-
ations of the impact that this kind of unification could generate for the community of psy-
chologists. Perhaps in academic disciplines such as sociology, economics and psychology,
one can only start a discussion about the relative advantages or disadvantages of various
unification approaches without being able to reduce them to a dominant paradigm in the
sense of Thomas Kuhn.
14. In any case, even without Scott’s contribution, psychology has already begun to
use cybernetic concepts to provide solution-focused, fast, effective ways to deal with daily
issues – many of these methods are based also on cybernetic ideas, with ongoing research
considering concepts of second-order cybernetics, especially in the field of systemic thera-
py (see, for example, Schlötter 2005; Varga & Sparrer 2016; Vorhemus 2015). Even though
the systemic work represents a specific sector of psychology, its explanations are based on
cybernetic thoughts being accepted as the foundation of systemic methods. How do these
highly practical methods fit Scott’s call for unification?
15. In this respect, Scott’s article may be considered only one of several starting points
for a long journey towards unification, rather than its finishing line.

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Open Peer Commentary:

Cybernetics and Synergetics as Foundations
for Complex Approach Towards Complexities of Life
Lea Šugman Bohinc

Introduction
1. With a background in psychology and psychotherapy, working as a university
teacher in three (inter)disciplinary fields, i.e., social work, psychotherapy, and education,
and teaching a variety of courses in bachelor’s, master’s, and doctoral programmes, I have
been rewarded with experience of learning about a field through learning about the history
of its ideas more than once. That is why I have been excited to read Bernard Scott’s target
article and to learn about “his” story of cybernetics, which fulfils two promises:
ƒƒ it shows how second-order cybernetics can provide a much-needed foundation for
constructing a new meaning or order in the conceptually messed-up discipline of
psychology;
ƒƒ it brings together the so-far more-or-less divided branches of individual and social
psychology by unifying person and process aspects.
2. I have always been interested in constructing patterns that connect (rather than dis-
connect or divide) the social and natural sciences and the theories developed within their
disciplines. During more than twenty years of teaching, my students of social work, psy-
chotherapy, and education (e.g., teaching, social education, and special and rehabilitation
pedagogy) have repeatedly expressed confusion with the variety of (often contradictory)
research findings, theories, concepts, work models, methods, or skills in their use, best
practice examples, etc. Students have usually found it relieving, informing, and empower-
ing to make sense of the distinctions and similarities between different approaches when
interpreting them through the lens of first- and second-order cybernetics. Defining those
premises always demands negotiating the meaning of the concepts used by the students.
This eventually leads them to arrive at new understandings, such as new individual in-
terpretations and new agreements, including the agreement to disagree (Pask 1987: 18f).
These understandings arise among two or more “locally synchronised” participants (Pask
1980: 999) while maintaining or increasing their (interpersonal or polyvocal interpretative)
distinctions (Pask 1987: 23).
3. In what follows, I will introduce two of the connecting patterns that have proved
useful for me and that I believe to be useful for Scott’s intention to unify psychology.

“Third-order” cybernetics
4. For me, the epistemology of second-order cybernetics is more than just a construc-
tivist theory of knowledge, a philosophical world view, a viewpoint, or even a science.
I interpret it as a set of assumptions at the basis of individual and collective patterns of
cognitive acts (Maturana & Varela 1992: 173f), in which “every act of knowing brings
forth a world” (Maturana & Varela 1992: 26). As such, cognitive acts are processes leading

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to certain products (e.g., thinking processes lead to certain thoughts and acts or decision
making processes result in a decision or act) that then serve as a starting point for a new
process (of thinking, decision making). These processes are recursive and the relation be-
tween processes and products is complementary. Bringing high sensitivity to the influences
of structural societal factors, such as power imbalance relations, into the reflection on how
people construct their worlds, I have joined authors such as Rudi Dallos, Ros Draper, and
Amy Urry (Dallos & Draper 2010; Dallos & Urry 1999). These authors complemented
the notion of second-order cybernetics with a “third-order” one – not as a different epis-
temology but as an additional recursion or a variation of the constructivist paradigm, with
important implications for the life quality of human population and social justice. It is what
Scott, in §39, refers to as “social constructionism.” In my opinion, the role of dominant
public discourses performed by social elites and unconsciously internalised (i.e., ingrained
in their inner dialogues, which progressively become saturated with those dominant narra-
tives) and lived out by the public, as reflected in the work of Michel Foucault (1980) and
other critical theory authors, has to be explicitly articulated and emphasised when we talk
about the epistemology of second-order cybernetics. Foucault, in a personal communica-
tion with Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (1983: 187), asked: “We know what we think;
we think we know what we do; but do we know what what we do does?” Tracking down
the effects of our cognitive acts for other people’s lives, Michael White (2011: xxviii) could
identify one of their origins: the expert knowledge twisted together with the new forms
of power thus creating the “politics” (in the general sense of relating to other people and
directing their behaviour by using our power) of widely accepted and unquestioned “expert
power” in any field of expertise. The reflection on the consequences of the structural fac-
tors for how we, as humans, socially construct our realities needs to be complemented with
a reflexiveness on how our expert knowledge, along with our gender-, class-, culture-based
identities, enters and effects our conversation with others in whatever interactional context.
5. So, rather than a worldview, I prefer to understand the epistemology of second- and
third-order cybernetics as an attitude towards oneself, the others, and life or world as one
constructs them, reflected in one’s continuous endeavour to make his or her thoughts, deci-
sions, feelings, values, etc. congruent with actions and vice versa. That is how, according
to Gordon Pask (in Scott 2001c), we construct conceptual (“knowing why”) and procedural
(“knowing how”) knowledge (Scott 2001c) in different contexts of dialogical practice.
That is how we make it our experiential knowledge about the world, constructed and lived
through as our “lived experience” (White & Epston 1990: 9). Again, it is our conversation
partners (students or clients or service users, to use the traditional linear terminology, as
well as our colleagues, family, and community co-members etc.) who feed their under-
standing of our related congruence or incongruence back to us. It is they who teach us
about the consequences of our acts in interaction with them. The precondition for that to
happen is an established relationship context, mutually perceived as safe and trustworthy.
To acknowledge the meaning of lived experience is to acknowledge the complexity of any
conversation participant (i.e., one or more of his or her constructed selves or voices or
“psycho-social individuals,” as Scott refers to Pask in §§24f, 36–38, and 40) in both their
individual (autonomous) and social (relational) self (Flaskas 2002: 91).

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Synergetics
6. Generally speaking, conversation participants can be interpreted as self-organizing
systems in which nonlinear interactions (at the microscopic level) might result in emergent
new patterns (at the macroscopic level), such that an observer can interpret them as a
(new) self-organizing system in itself (§§13, 37). In the history of ideas, cybernetics as a
transdisciplinary science of patterns and complex systems is referred to as one of the main
origins for another transdisciplinary science of self-organizing processes, i.e., synergetics
(see, e.g., Haken 1983, 2006, 2009).
7. Since 2005, I have been using synergetics as an experimentally supported theory
for describing and dealing with complex living and non-living systems through a perspec-
tive of interpretive (macroscopic) common principles. The “generic principles of syner-
getics” (see Schiepek et al. 2005a, 2005b) make it possible to overcome the traditional
split between natural and social science by integrating them into one unified conceptual
and methodological framework (Šugman Bohinc, 2016). The main focus of synergetics
is the exploration of the conditions in which a complex system spontaneously, i.e., in a
self-organizing and qualitative manner, changes the pattern of its operation as a result of
non-linear interactions among the system’s elements, which can themselves be complex
systems. Understanding the circumstances that can potentially stimulate a complex system
to adapt to those very circumstances by reorganizing its operational patterns can increase
the chances of creating an encouraging environment for processes of (desired, needed,
agreed upon) change. In other words, it is useful to understand the changes in the environ-
ment that, when interpreted in a certain way, serve as stimulation for the complex system
to reorganize its operational patterns and thus adapt to the new circumstances. Synergetics
has been used and proved meaningful and successful in many disciplines, such as psycho-
therapy (e.g., Schiepek et al. 2005a, 2005b; Schiepek, Tominschek & Heinzel 2014) and
social work (Sommerfeld et al. 2005), as well as in psychology, education, organizational
sciences, economy, linguistics, etc. and, of course, in different fields of biology (e.g., in
ecology), physics etc.
8. Personally, I have used synergetics in the last two research projects on which I have
collaborated. One deals with the change processes in teaching and learning as well as giv-
ing support and help to children in a school setting, the other deals with multi-challenged
families in their communities. Furthermore, I teach synergetic theory of complexity to my
students of social work, systemic psychotherapy, and education. The more experienced
they are in their profession, the more they find this conceptual and procedural framework
meaningful and useful. The bachelor’s students usually interpret it as very abstract and dif-
ficult to grasp; the master’s students, who already have work experience, report that their
intellectual and practical knowledge finally becomes integrated, and holistically as well as
critically reflected. The doctoral students make use of synergetics in their research design
and interpretive synthesis of analysed data whenever they are dealing with processes of
change in the functioning of complex systems.

Conclusion
9. Understanding the interconnectedness and embeddedness of biopsychosocial com-
plex systems in other complex systems, e.g., cells within organs within a brain/body within
a family within a community within state administrative systems as well as socially con-

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structed norms, roles, identities, etc., enables us to bridge the dichotomies that have been
developed in the last century, such as micro and macro context, individual and social,
theory and practice, evidence-based and practice-based research, etc. emerging in psychol-
ogy, as Scott claims in many sections throughout his article. Our understanding that inter-
actions (e.g., conversations) of complex, self-organizing biopsychosocial systems, such
as human beings, produce emergent complex, self-organizing systems of a different order
can serve as a bridge over the conceptual distinctions and divisions brought forth in the
development of psychology and other social and natural sciences along with the very split
between those two categories of scientific research. The notion of constructivist (social
constructionist) epistemology and the common principles offered by the transdisciplinary
sciences of complexity, such as cybernetics and synergetics, have laid the foundations for a
more unified and integrated approach to the complexities of life. It can be a self-reflective
and self-reflexive, socially critical and responsible approach to participating in conversa-
tions that would lead to creating complex answers to the complex challenges of our time.

Author’s Response:
On Becoming and Being a Cybernetician
Bernard Scott

1. I am happy that my commentators are generally supportive of my proposal that cy-

bernetics can provide a unifying framework and foundations for psychology. (As a point of
clarification, when I refer to “cybernetics,” I mean the complementary union of both first-
and second-order cybernetics.) However, I quite understand that, as pointed out by several
commentators, this proposal will not be acceptable to everyone. Many domain specialists
in any discipline lack an interest in the more holistic issues of foundations and conceptual
unification. They have other priorities. Many have cognitive styles (by habit or heritage)
that are not conducive to this sort of contemplation (for more about individual differences
in cognition and learning, see Scott 1993).1 But I do believe that many can benefit if my
proposal is adopted. As noted in my article, my early exposure to cybernetics certainly
helped me. As an undergraduate student of psychology, I was an indifferent and poorly-
motivated student in the midst of what I saw as a mess of a discipline, in which my teach-
ers, espousing different paradigms, were incapable of constructive conversation with one
another.2 Cybernetics enabled me to make sense of this mess and inspired me to become
an enthusiastic scholar. It is thus no surprise that Vincent Kenny’s impassioned account of
the sorry state of psychology resonates with me. I see a properly-founded and articulated

1. We also continue to have wide gaps between the two cultures of the sciences and the humanities.
Many in the latter camp are quite “illiterate” when it comes to science, mathematics, logic and
technology. Arguably, popular writings on these topics are helping to bridge the gaps.
2. Marcelo Arnold-Cathalifaud and Daniela Thumala-Dockendorff (§3) assert that linguistics
and economics are more internally consistent than psychology. Of course, this depends on how
one defines these fields. I certainly see competing paradigms, especially if one adds the psycho-
logical and sociological dimensions, without which the disciplines are very limited to the point of
irrelevance and sterility.

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cybernetic psychology as the “psychological psychology” he seeks. I am certainly not

advocating any kind of “glue” (§1). I see my proposed foundations and conceptual frame-
work not only as unifying but also as filters that sift out and reject dross.
2. I was inspired, eventually, to regard myself as being a cybernetician. Heinz von
Foerster stated that
we need a theory of the observer. Since it is only living organisms which would qualify
as being observers, it appears that this task falls to the biologist. But he himself is a living
being, which means that in his theory he has not only to account for himself, but also for
his writing this theory. (Foerster 2003: 247)

Thus the aim of second-order cybernetics is to explain the observer to herself. He also
stated that “Life cannot be studied in vitro, one has to explore it in vivo” (ibid: 248). I took
these ideas to heart. As a transdiscipline, cybernetics empowered me to cross disciplinary
boundaries. This was exhilarating. I also understood other transdisciplines (systems theory,
general semantics, synergetics) to be quite cognate with cybernetics and, at a high enough
level of abstraction, despite differences in terminology, to have conceptual structures ho-
momorphic or isomorphic with those of cybernetics.3
3. In response to Arnold-Cathalifaud & Thumala-Dockendorff (§5), I should like
to point out that I see all “versions” of cybernetics as having a core commonality. It is
obvious that every scholar or practitioner will have her own narrative and ways of doing
things and that these may be undergoing changes with experience and further study and
reflection. What I detect with cybernetics is a commonality that evolved amongst a com-
munity of scholars, where differences in emphasis, terminology and areas of interest and
practice mask underlying agreements and similarities of form. To emphasise what I say in
my article, I count amongst this community certain central figures: Norbert Wiener, War-
ren McCulloch, Ross Ashby, Gregory Bateson, Stafford Beer, Gordon Pask and Humberto
Maturana. There are, of course, precursors, not least Jean Piaget, who embraced cyber-
netics when he encountered it. I thank Robert Martin for highlighting the significance
of Piaget’s contributions (§§17f), which I did not stress in my target article but which I
perhaps should have. Certainly, his work has been a central influence in the development
of conversation theory (see also below). I also thank Martin for his more general endorse-
ment of my proposals and for his additional elaborations of the significance of the concept
of circular causality.
4. I agree with Philip Baron (§§2–8) that there are challenges to trying to take my
proposal forward. I have already noted that not all students take to holistic thinking and, of
course, there are many institutional barriers. Discussions about how best to place cybernet-
ics within educational curricula have been going on since shortly after its inception. The
(now defunct) Department of Cybernetics at Brunel University, where I studied for my
PhD, had postgraduate students only, arguing that one needed to have a strong disciplin-
ary base before embarking on transdisciplinary studies. I myself am a supporter of Jerome
Bruner’s concept of the “spiral curriculum”:
A curriculum as it develops should revisit the basic ideas repeatedly, building upon them
until the student has grasped the full formal apparatus that goes with them. (Bruner 1960:
13)

3. On the application of homomorphism and isomorphism to conceptual structures, see Pask, Kal-
likourdis & Scott (1975).

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We begin with the hypothesis that any subject can be taught effectively in some intellectu-
ally honest form to any child at any stage of development. (ibid: 33)

As a teacher at primary school level, I introduced my pupils to the concept of circular pro-
cesses as part of encouraging them to gain some understanding of the ecosystem.
5. I also agree with Baron (§3) that a “dummy’s guide to cybernetics” could be use-
ful.4 In 2010, with excellent technical support, I produced a multimedia “Dummy’s Guide
to Learning Design” for the British Armed Forces (sadly, not available to the wider pub-
lic), in which I embedded cybernetic concepts. Courses on learning to teach and learning
to learn can readily include explicit reference to cybernetics. Diana Laurillard’s influen-
tial book, Rethinking University Teaching: A Conversational Framework for the Effective
Use of Learning Technologies (Laurillard 2002), although it does not explicitly mention
cybernetics, uses Pask’s conversation theory as the source if its core model for teaching
and learning. Nigel Ford’s Web-Based Learning Through Educational Informatics (Ford
2008) makes even more extensive use of the theories and research findings of Pask and
his research team. Ford states that his disciplinary background is in “information science,”
which of course can be considered as a part of the broader field of cybernetics.
6. Not everyone who studies cybernetics becomes a cybernetician who studies “the
cybernetics of cybernetics.” There are many scholars of cybernetics who look on only from
their main area of practice and position themselves in the first instance as being historians,
philosophers, architects, biologists, sociologists, psychologists and so on. In doing so, I
believe they miss the point, the sense of what it is to be a cybernetician and a member of
the cybernetics community.
7. Some of the commentators invite me to comment on issues and disciplines, such
as sociology, that are beyond my immediate concern with psychology. I agree that these
topics are of interest and that cybernetics has a role to play in conceptual clarification
and unification. It is relevant to note that there is a very active community of interna-
tional scholars concerned with “sociocybernetics,” see https://sociocybernetics.wordpress.
com. I thank Eva Buchinger for her discussion of Luhmann’s cybernetic macrotheory of
functional social systems. It is beyond the scope of my article to comment much further
here, except to note that the P-individual concept can be readily extended to include the
recursive nesting and the dynamics of interaction of social actors at different levels.5 I also
note that, as Buchinger emphasises, sociology, as a discipline, departs from psychology
and social psychology when sociologists choose (as do Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luh-
mann) to study social systems that, by definition, have an autonomous existence beyond
the level of individual human beings. One can, of course, draw on cybernetics in making
these studies (as do both Parsons and Luhmann). In contrast to the social systems of soci-
ologists, P-individuals at the social system level have their existence in the conversations
(both internal and external) of particular human beings, not least those who hold ultimate
responsibility and are accountable for the form those social systems take (kings, presidents,
ministers of state, heads of institutions, leaders of professions and so on).

4. In the 1970s, Frank George, Professor of Cybernetics at Brunel University, wrote Cybernetics
(George 1976) as part of a “Teach Yourself” book series that was similar in intent to the “Dum-
my’s Guide” books. Of its time, it does not include reference to second-order cybernetics.
5. I refer the reader to the collection of my papers Explorations in Second-Order Cybernetics (Scott
2011a), in which I discuss aspects of the cybernetics of social systems in several chapters (5, 10,
15, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 30, 32, 34, 35 and 36). See also Scott (in press).

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8. It is also worth noting that Luhmann follows Parsons in basing his concept of a
psychic system on the controversial theories of Sigmund Freud and his followers.6 I find
Freud’s concept of “the unconscious”7 as a repository of repressed desires, hopes and fears
particularly troublesome. Studies of brain dynamics and the processes of learning and skill
acquisition show that many cognitive processes occur without conscious awareness. This
is discussed in detail in Scott & Bansal (2014), which presents a cybernetic theory of
consciousness and “the unconscious,” understood as an ongoing evolutionary process of
conceptualisation and internal and external conversation.
9. In answer to a question from Tilia Stingl (§4), the P-individual concept cannot be
applied at the neuronal level.8 P-individuals are psychosocial unities that emerge within
human communities. I discuss the ontogeny and ontological status of P-individuals in some
detail in Scott (2007) and Scott & Shurville (2011). The works of Piaget, Lev Vygotsky and
George Herbert Mead play central roles in these accounts, alongside references to the ideas
of Pask, von Foerster and Maturana.
10. In her question concerning levels and interactions of different systems, Stingl (§9)
refers approvingly to an article by Rogers Hollingsworth and Karl Müller (2008). Interest-
ing though this article is, by their own declaration, the “new paradigm” they promote (“Sci-
ence II”) is monistic. They contrast this with the ontological Cartesian dualism found in
“Science I” (ibid: Tables 1 and 6). The complex systems and networks they refer to, what-
ever their origins in particular disciplines, are just that: complex systems and networks. For
them, it is a virtue that the “natural” and the “social” can be studied with similar models
and methods and that, because of this, the distinctions between disciplines can be voided.
This is in contrast to the P-/M-individual distinction, which is a theoretical, analytic way
of distinguishing the “social” and “symbolic” from the “natural” and the “mechanical.”9
11. In cybernetic terms, the different disciplinary studies Hollingsworth & Müller
refer to are all first-order: they are studies of observed systems. Interestingly, cybernetics
(first- or second-order) is not mentioned by name in their account of the history of work on
complex systems, nor do they reflexively acknowledge that their own academic endeavours
are a part of an evolving, complex, self-organising system of academic activity and that, as
participant observers, they are engaged in bringing about changes in scientific discourse of
the same kind as they claim are happening. I am reasonably sure that this circularity is vir-
tuous. This can be usefully contrasted with the Cibercultura y Desarrollo de Comunidades
de Conocimiento research programme of El Centro de Investigaciones Interdisciplinarias
en Ciencias y Humanidades (CEIICH) at La Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
(UNAM), http://www.ceiich.unam.mx/0/20Ciberc.php, in which the self and other obser-
vation of the observers of observers of observed systems plays a central role.

6. Psychoanalysis was not included in the undergraduate psychology syllabus that I studied, as it
was considered not to be open to refutation and thus not scientific. See Popper (1963) for a very
influential critique of psychoanalysis. In general, psychoanalysis plays only a small part in mains-
tream psychology. In contrast, it frequently plays a major role in literary criticism.
7. The term has entered popular culture, along with other Freudian concepts (“ego,” “id,” “supe-
rego” and so on). Stingl (§6) seems to use the similar term “the subconscious” uncritically.
8. Incidentally, whilst Stingl repeatedly attributes the P-/M-individual to me, it is, of course, as I
hope is clear in my article, originally due to Pask.
9. Pask (1979) is a forceful critique of the limitations and dangers of what he refers to as “systemic
monism.”

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12. Stingl also asks for comment on recent work in psychotherapy that is informed
by cybernetic concepts (§14). As described in Scott (1987) and as evident in the commen-
tary by Lea Šugman Bohinc, there is a long tradition of the use of cybernetic concepts
in psychotherapy. I see this as an excellent justification for taking my proposals seriously.
13. In her very informative commentary, Šugman Bohinc refers to a third-order cy-
bernetics. In the literature, there are several attempts to invoke higher levels of cybernetics.
One can certainly do this. However, it is important to recognise that, as Šugman Bohinc
does, higher levels, whilst having explanatory usefulness, do not add anything new epis-
temologically. This point was made by von Foerster (2003: 301). The key step is the tran-
scendence to a new domain, the second-order domain, in which reflexivity is introduced.
Šugman Bohinc refers to her interest in power relations as revealed in discourse and social
interaction. I see this concern as one that is central in second-order cybernetics and I thank
her for raising this topic, which features as a major theme at conferences on sociocybernet-
ics. Some of my own thoughts about this can be found in Scott (2006).
14. Having read the commentaries, I am even more persuaded that my proposals con-
cerning cybernetic foundations and a unifying conceptual framework for psychology have
merit. I acknowledge that the proposals face institutional barriers and may have limited up-
take amongst students and practitioners of psychology. However, for those who do take the
proposals on board I see great benefits, not least the insights and understandings provided
by second-order cybernetics concerning the human condition, which I believe should be
promulgated widely. I am further persuaded that I should broaden the scope of my propos-
als to include the social sciences more widely. Accordingly, I am now considering writing
an introductory text with the provisional title An Introduction to Cybernetics for the Social
Sciences, in which I will bear in mind that…
social cybernetics must be a second-order cybernetics – a cybernetics of cybernetics – in
order that the observer who enters the system shall be allowed to stipulate his own purpose
[…] [I]f we fail to do so, we shall provide the excuses for those who want to transfer the
responsibility for their own actions to somebody else. (Foerster 2003: 286)

Acknowledgements
I thank the editors for their hard work in putting this volume together and I thank the
authors of the open peer commentaries for taking on the task of reading and commenting
on my article.

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 Consciousness as Self-Description in Differences
Diana Gasparyan

Introduction
1. In different areas of knowledge, consciousness or, more specifically, its explana-
tion, is currently one of the most central and frequently discussed topics. This subject is in-
variably addressed by the cognitive sciences: philosophy of consciousness, neurosciences,
cognitive psychology, etc. As for philosophy, since the mid-twentieth century conscious-
ness has become one of its favored themes (Papineau 2002). The main purpose of these
studies is to find the answer to the question “Can we explain consciousness?” (Chalmers
1997). Despite lengthy discussions, the question remains unanswered.
2. The problem of consciousness forces us to delve into the capabilities of the obser-
vation apparatus we have available, to think over what we are able to observe and what
we can describe, acting as beings involved in observation of the objects we are going to
describe.
3. Second-order cybernetics (SOC) can help to shed light on this topic. The fact is that
no other area of knowledge is characterized by this situation, whereby a total disregard of
the epistemological principles underlying SOC results in so many inconsistencies. This can
be observed in consciousness-related studies, including one of the most popular and fast-
growing areas of knowledge – modern analytical philosophy of consciousness. Philosophy
of consciousness is a perfect choice for SOC application, and the lingering hesitation to
apply it is unreasonable and perhaps simply an omission. One objective of this research is
to rectify this situation.
4. The research is formed of two parts. In the critique section (Part 1) I will show
that consciousness should be studied by giving the level of the observer priority atten-
tion, for its neglect will lead any theory of consciousness into paradoxes and finally to
absurdity. Then, I will address criticism of the subject–object dualism from the SOC per-
spective. I will also detail the unproductive epistemological assumptions that may result
from application of the subject–object model in studying consciousness. I will show that
theories tending to explain consciousness from the subject–object dualism perspective in-
variably come to an epistemological deadlock. When dealing with theories attempting to
explain consciousness, cognitive sciences indirectly introduce the idea of consciousness
as a subject–object (dualistic) model where reflection can exist only in the form of meta-
knowledge. I will also demonstrate that in speaking about the self-description (reflection)
of consciousness it would be inefficient to speak about a metalinguistic structure: in trying

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to explain reflection in the subject–object paradigm (with object consciousness and stand-
alone subject consciousness), we lay down a paradox. In the positive section (Part 2), rely-
ing on SOC principles, I will explain that consciousness should not be seen as an essence,
and I will show how consciousness could be approached using the apparatus of differences.

Part 1: How consciousness does not work

Discussing consciousness using the language of consciousness: From the

consciousness that is being observed to the observing consciousness
5. Although consciousness is an extremely popular topic that has attracted the at-
tention of a great number of researchers, studies are frequently aimed at the “elimination
of consciousness” or, in other words, at explaining it away (Chalmers 2003). Since the
second half of the 20th century, most manipulations of consciousness have been performed
to narrow it down either to physiological properties (Demircioglu 2013) or to some other
objective forms (for example, social or linguistic relationships; Pinker 2007). Such “stud-
ies of consciousness” all have a similar purpose – to diffuse consciousness in objective
processes. If we take a closer look at the general vector of consciousness-focused studies,
which began in the second half of the 20th century, we clearly see a prevailing “preferred
vocabulary,” namely the vocabulary of natural sciences, which sets the criteria for passable
solutions of consciousness problems (Van Gulick 1985).
6. The important point is that most modern theories of consciousness are based on
principles typical of natural-science methods compliant with classical modern European
(Newtonian) ideals. In accordance with Newtonian physics, the observer is essentially ex-
cluded from the view (Foerster 1995). This means that consciousness is seen as a certain
essence or a phenomenon that can be studied objectively – disregarding the researcher-
observer, who is perceived as a transparent medium. Consequently, it can be stated that
most modern theories of consciousness as well as the entire analytical philosophy of con-
sciousness are still based on first-order cybernetics (FOC). In the case of SOC, first-order
cybernetics may be seen as a limited case where the link back from observed to observer
is sufficiently weakened. Under such circumstances, we assume the observer simply and
neutrally observes what is going on (Glanville 2002).
7. This approach is clearly manifested in different programs of reductionism, where
the task is to reduce consciousness to various types of objective essences. This task is
mainly implemented in the search for a causal relationship between the body and the
mind, i.e., in understanding how the physical produces the non-physical – the so-called
mind–body problem, which has been called the hard problem of consciousness by David
Chalmers (1997). This also manifests itself in the search for other external reasons for
consciousness, such as language, culture, and society. However, the application of FOC
or, in other words, the conversion of consciousness into an object – while the observer is
disregarded – generally results in the elimination of consciousness. Any attempts to speak
“about” consciousness using FOC terminology are senseless, for we have to use this very
consciousness to do so, having no other cognitive tools. The object of consciousness is
consciousness as such.

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8. For example, the most common type of reductionism – physicalism – argues that
consciousness is completely reducible to neurophysiological processes and brain functions
(Hellman & Thompson 1975; Dennett 1992). For example, the identity theory states that
consciousness is identical to neuronal activity in the brain (Place 1956). According to this
theory, any mental condition is identical to a certain condition of the brain, i.e., the mental
condition and the respective neural condition mean the same. Therefore, advocates of the
identity theory believe that while mental conditions can theoretically exist separately from
the material systems that generate them and, as such, could exist on their own, in actual
fact they coincide with them (Bennett et al. 2007; Tononi 2012; Churchland 2013; Bickle
2012).
9. In addition to physiological reductionism, there are other methods of eliminating
consciousness. For example, some theories identify the functional capabilities of con-
sciousness with consciousness. Such theories construe mental conditions as remaining in a
certain functional condition. The core thesis of functionalism promotes the idea of carrying
over consciousness from one medium (the human brain) to other possible media. In other
words, some functional conditions can be “launched” in fundamentally heterogeneous
physical systems; first of all, in computers (Funkhouser 2007). In fact, such theories also
reduce consciousness – specifically to functional operations of consciousness (McCullagh
2000; Piccinini 2004; Shagrir 2005).
10. By now, reductionism – and its attempts to reduce consciousness and, in fact, to
abandon it – has been severely and repeatedly criticized (Van Gulick 1985; Kriegel 2009). I
will not dwell on the points of criticism; suffice it to say that most critics agree on the inad-
missibility of reducing consciousness (mental facts) to material things and states (physical
facts) (Levine 1983, 2001; Jackson 1986, 1982; Nagel 1986).
11. In the meantime, very few scholars have paid attention to the initial epistemologi-
cal problems associated with studying consciousness or, more specifically, to the fact that
understanding consciousness in the way expected by most modern theories assumes doing
what cannot be done: moving beyond the limits of consciousness (this problem has been
addressed by scholars such as Colin McGinn 1989, 1991 and Roger Penrose 1989, 1994).
It is obvious that in being observers asking the questions “What is consciousness?” and
“How is it connected with the body?” we ask these questions using the same consciousness
that we are trying to convert into an object. But here SOC can offer the most appropriate
and adequate explanation, namely that the observer is essentially included in the view
through her frame of reference and her motion relative to the objects and events under
consideration.
12. In fact, philosophy of consciousness, which claims consciousness of conscious-
ness, should, similarly to cybernetics of cybernetics, take the observer into consideration,
as in this case she is not only important as an interpreter of reality, but also related to the
object of study (Ashby 1956). In this case, the object of study coincides with the method,
since we study consciousness with the help of this very consciousness, without which we,
as researchers, are bereft.
13. In SOC, we take into account the relationship between the observer (observing)
and the observed, particularly when this relationship is understood to be circular. Second-
order cybernetics presents a (new) paradigm, in which the observer is circularly (and inti-
mately) involved with and connected to the observed. The observer is no longer neutral and
detached, and what is considered is not the observed (as in the classical paradigm), but the
observing system. Either the aim of attaining traditional objectivity is abandoned or what

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objectivity is and how we might obtain (and value) it is reconsidered (Glanville 2002). The
main strategy for using second-order cybernetics lies in the development of the philosophi-
cal idea that the concept of perception as reflecting the world in an objective manner is no
more than illusion. Much of the work of embedding this idea into modern epistemology
and science was undertaken by Heinz von Foerster (1981), Ernst von Glasersfeld (1987),
Humberto Maturana, and Francisco Varela (1987). With a view to understanding human
knowledge, cyberneticists studied the nervous system and came to the conclusion that
observations independent from the observer are virtually impracticable. Underlying this
conclusion is the philosophical reasoning according to which it is impossible to separate
the cognizable from the instruments of cognition even logically, while it is impossible to
prove the reality of the world beyond a certain system of perception (the reality of such a
world might be introduced on the basis of a belief, a conviction, or a postulate, but not on
proof of the procedure that was carried out). For example, as I am writing this article, I am
using my own system of perception and cognition formed as a result of different interac-
tions specific to my personality: cultural background, language, academic qualifications,
personal interests, etc. If, according to the classical concept of science, scientific theories
intrinsic as the observer’s traits are not taken into account whilst observing, then by study-
ing the nervous system, cyberneticists reveal a contradiction compared to the mainstream
presentation of the philosophy of science.
14. Due to the fact that observations not dependent on the observer are impractical,
the conclusion that all knowledge is judgmental suggests itself. This idea requires cor-
rect understanding: what it involves is that “objectivity” becomes dispersed subjectivity.
This assertion in SOC means that people do not seek confirmation of their views in the
“objective world.” We do not have access to the world; however, we have access to other
interpretations of the world, which one might aspire to bring into accord. Various interpre-
tations become different prospects for the perception of one another even in cases where
understanding of the world is not taken into account. This assertion in SOC will be used to
support my own views in the last part of this article.
15. Therefore, if science relies on the objective nature of its objects, consciousness
does not have this external criterion in its self-descriptions. When cognizing itself, con-
sciousness discovers the meaning of its judgments only in itself. This means that con-
sciousness is always studied by the consciousness, and any theories of consciousness con-
stitute parts of self-describing consciousness and serve as tools for self-description. For
this reason, consciousness can be seen as an example of the autopoietic system, knowledge
of which is generated by the same system. Such a system is a unity, “defined as a network
of production of components, which recursively, via their interactions, generate and imple-
ment the network which produces them” (Maturana & Varela 1980: 137). In turn, SOC
is the most adequate model for description of this system, which is of “a circular nature:
the person is learning to see himself as the part of the world he observes” (Foerster 1981:
239). Thus, we can assume that the “epistemology of the observer” should be seen as an
adequate philosophy of consciousness (Foerster 1992), which focuses on internal descrip-
tion (Rockmore 2005).
16. In the development of both philosophy and science, SOC will be useful in the
following ways:
a. SOC can help revise such types of reductive studies, in which we assume that
consciousness is a certain object of study and we have a certain mysterious meta-

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language that has nothing to do with consciousness that we can use to discuss
“object-consciousness.” In particular, it might help to clarify the boundaries of
physical reductionism itself: for example, when we suppose that we have con-
sciousness and that there is a language of neural correlates, which generates it,
or that there is consciousness and there are C-fibers that produce the “effect” of
consciousness. Both these methods illustrate reductive techniques, and by using
them we may speak about consciousness with the help of the language of physical
processes and events.
b. By applying SOC, it is possible to bypass the strategy of a causative search for
the factors generating consciousness – be it physical processes or groups of fac-
tors such as language, culture, or society (as the most frequently mentioned). In
this case, SOC allows consciousness to be treated as something that is originally a
causally closed system, with all reasons within itself.
c. SOC offers such a descriptive strategy, which would relieve us from the search
for descriptive languages exterior to consciousness, which in turn merely lead to
metalinguistic paradoxes since the descriptive languages are part of conscious-
ness itself. By using SOC we can bypass the strategy of reductionism and replace
it with a strategy whereby consciousness will be talked about in the language of
consciousness. This means that consciousness should not be seen as an object
observed from outside; understanding (description) of consciousness from inside
makes better sense.
d. SOC helps eliminate subject–object dualism, the application of which regarding
some significant manifestations of consciousness, in particular reflection, leads to
paradoxes and unproductive theories.
e. SOC allows us to take a fresh look at the concepts of truth and objectivity within
the framework of sciences studying consciousness. Under the conditions of to-
tality of consciousness, the truth is understood not as remote objectivity but as
“distributed subjectivity” – the confirmation of ideas and theories is not sought in
the “objective world” but in the provisions of other theories or, more broadly, one
system of knowledge within others.
17. When we speak about the difficulties we encounter when we try to reproduce
someone else’s individual consciousness with the help of our own consciousness, most
people agree that the task is next to impossible. However, when we design different theo-
ries of consciousness, we frequently tend to ignore such difficulties. In the meantime, these
difficulties arise every time we turn to traditional scientific theories of consciousness to ex-
plain consciousness with the help of non-consciousness. For example, physicalist theories
of consciousness, which reduce consciousness to operations of the brain, seem to take a
view overriding any mental experience and to offer a physical explanation of conscious-
ness. This involves that the language of physics should be used to explain consciousness.
However, this is impossible: the physicist acting as an observer still has consciousness,
and her physical picture or theory has meaning only inside the conscious observation that
understands this meaning. Therefore, if the task is to speak about consciousness not using
the language of the consciousness, we encounter a paradox (Gennaro 2012). In turn, SOC
entails a constructivist epistemology (theory of knowledge) that starts from the assumption
that, “the thinking subject has no alternative but to construct what he or she knows on the
basis of his or her own experience” (Glasersfeld 1995: 1).

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18. Let us take a closer look at psychophysiological conditioning when brain ac-
tivity defines the experience of consciousness. The weakness of this concept is obvious:
we must say that even if the brain induces consciousness, the entire system exists in this
consciousness (of the researchers, philosophers, and other observers who describe this sys-
tem). In this system, the observer is essentially included in the view through his frame of
reference and his motion relative to the objects and events under consideration (Foerster
1979). There is also a further type of conditioning: let us assume that social mechanisms
or any other cultural patterns cause the generation of consciousness. The same logic as
above can be applied here: conscious experience is required for putting social and cultural
mechanisms into operation. Finally, we can say that consciousness is a consequence or
product of language – however, we again encounter problems, as using language implies
understanding the meanings inherent within it, and meaningfulness implies consciousness.
19. The three key grounds mentioned above – language, culture, society (social re-
lations) – allow us to identify the paradox encountered in revealing generating reasons,
which is even more obvious than in cases of reduction to the brain. Both language and
culture, as well as society, per se, are just names given to different manifestations of con-
sciousness. This means that, at first, we should assume the existence of consciousness in
simply making what “causes” it possible. In SOC terms, this means that when describing
consciousness, we skip one level of observation no matter what level of observation we
assume as the initial level (Mead 1968). The conclusion is that consciousness always pre-
cedes what is suggested as its cause.
20. This then means that we can analyze consciousness only through the experience
of consciousness, rather than through the experience of brain, linguistic, or social activity.
The dependency of consciousness on the body can be displayed in the form of a conscious
statement implying conscious understanding. But the meaning of the statement arguing
that consciousness is induced by causes (for example, the physical activity of the brain) is
not physical. By definition, the meaning is part of conscious experience.
21. Thus, programs that aim at studying consciousness by trying to narrow it down to
physical processes or anything else (in fact, by abandoning consciousness) initially seem
controversial. The explanation for this is that they try to convert consciousness into an ob-
ject. Almost all theories in which consciousness is caused by something (that is, is seen as
the product of non-consciousness) make the same epistemological mistake. As a rule, the
reductionist puts consciousness into a black box and observes the processes accompanying
the mysterious object’s remaining in the box. However, such research methods do not offer
anything that would help us understand consciousness. After sophisticated and extensive
reductive manipulations, consciousness remains as mystical as it was before the research;
however, the reductionist believes that he has been able to explain consciousness, though
he was only able to describe something associated with consciousness (for example, neural
processes in the brain).

The subject–object uncertainty

22. The main reason for this cognitive volatility of consciousness is the subject–object
uncertainty with which it is associated. Should sciences (cognitive psychology, neurosci-
ences, or philosophy of consciousness) enter their own object of study when seeing it as
a phenomenon and, consequently, seeing themselves as its component? Strictly speaking,
any theory of consciousness is self-description (of consciousness) or “consciousness of

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consciousness,” rather than description of the object (consciousness). Although this theory
is distinct in having an observer (the subject) whose qualities, according to all scientific
rules, cannot affect the target object, let alone penetrate this object, it (this theory) will
invariably be part of the “object” when dealing with consciousness.
23. The above paradox implies that the concepts of the subject and the object turn out
to be semantically inadequate for their application in the theory of consciousness. When
dealing with consciousness, we have to reject the “old European tradition” that non-re-
flexively operated this type of “self-description” and wrongly assumed that it had some
substantial content.
24. For theories focused on the subject–object model of cognition and associated
FOC, consciousness is cognitively inaccessible. There is no external supra-conscious en-
tity, such as the division into consciousness and non-consciousness or into what has and
does not have consciousness, that works within consciousness. Consciousness is total in
the same way as society is total in the sociology of Niklas Luhmann (1990, 2000). There-
fore, the fact that consciousness cannot be an object for us implies that any attempt at
describing it entails all the means and conditions, the origin of which must be identified.
25. As such, the theory of consciousness is the theory of the description of conscious-
ness rather than the theory of its explanation. “The theory” of the description of conscious-
ness confronts any other normal theory. To a certain extent, this theory of consciousness is
a non-normal theory. With it we do not try to speak about consciousness by using languag-
es other than the language of consciousness (for example, languages of neural correlates
or computer programs), rather we analyze consciousness within the limits of conscious-
ness. Here, we deal with a certain autopoietic system, in which there is nothing except
consciousness. We can refer to it as an autopoietic system, following several interrelated
features of consciousness, which we will continue to use in the present article. This is, first
of all, the thesis of self-containment of consciousness – in its existence it is determined
primarily by inward conditions. Second, it is self-construction, self-reproduction, and in
the case of consciousness, an appeal to ourselves, as consciousness is impossible without
self-consciousness. Third, it is organized without division into the producer and product –
and in the case of consciousness into the conscious and something that is conceived. This
system is seen as self-determining from within (Maturana 1980). It constitutes a fragment
of reality, which is relatively isolated from the environment by its causal structure. The
external environment is not able to determine the autonomous system from outside and to
break its causal impermeability. The existence of the external environment can be taken
out of context. If this environment has no effect on consciousness (it does not determine,
create, or change it), it can be largely disregarded.
26. This “non-normal” theory can help us to explain the special characteristics of
consciousness, which cannot be captured by a conventional theory. Special characteristics
should be understood in context as when the object under consideration is identical to
its interpretation. The “method of observation” and the “observed” turn out to be intrin-
sically indistinguishable from each other. Such effects generally escape the attention of
conventional theories, which clearly differentiate between the “object” and the “method
of observation”; therefore, they should be studied from the perspective of a special theory.
This theory must provide for an approach that allows disregarding the difference between
the interpretation and its object.
27. When applying this approach, we will have a description that is identical to what is
described; in other words, “what” also means “how.” This property (the identity of “what”

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and “how”) is the most significant characteristic of consciousness. When we encounter the
identity between the object and the method of its observation, we come across the experi-
ence of consciousness. In other words, the experience of consciousness is performative in
principle.
28. This fits quite well with Gregory Bateson’s approach to the mind:
[I]n no system which shows mental characteristics can any part have unilateral control over
the whole. In other words, the mental characteristics of the system are immanent, not in
some part, but in the system as a whole. (Bateson 1972: 338)

29. Let us go over the specifics of performative utterances – we say “I swear” or “I

promise” and we perform an action through these utterances: we assert our oath or prom-
ise (Searle 1979). The form of such utterances is identical with their content – there is no
need to expand these utterances so that they will perform their function (Austin 1962).
Furthermore, if we make an attempt to perform such an expansion, we will see them turn
into meaningless tautologies – we will have to say “I promise that I promise” or “I swear
that I swear.” If we keep expanding performative utterances, we will run into an infinite
regress – utterances such as “I swear that I swear that I swear, etc.” and “I promise that I
promise that I promise, etc.” (Searle 1979).
30. These specific characteristics of performatives give an excellent illustration of
what is typical of the experience of consciousness. The acts of consciousness have a perfor-
mative nature – the “what” of my thought is given to me having this thought as the “how.”
Strictly speaking, “what” I think and “how” I think are identical, as in the thought that my
“how” is also my “what” (Gergen 1997; Harre 1989). Certainly, I can specify and clarify
my thought or see some latent meaning from it; however, then it will be a different thought,
in which “what” and “how” will be again identical (Gennaro 2004). When we encounter
the above characteristic (the characteristic of the performative), we encounter what can be
conventionally described as consciousness. The SOC principles should be applied to the
phenomena of this type.
31. Thus, we know in the very least what should constitute the initial stage of our stud-
ies of consciousness: observation of the observation and description from inside. Adequate
studies of consciousness imply that consciousness should be discussed in the language of
consciousness without using the most commonly used reductionisms – applicable to the
body (brain), language, and cultural experience. If we cannot study consciousness directly,
we should try to study it through description. The theory of description, which allows for
the principles of second-order cybernetics, is a specific “quasi-theory,” the application of
which makes us aware that consciousness is something we always and permanently have
and that cannot be objectified or eliminated.
32. Then, self-description can be seen as the proper theory of consciousness. Follow-
ing Luhmann’s The Society of Society (Luhmann 1997), which tries to tell society about
society on behalf of society, every observation is autobiographical. Therefore, SOC must
primarily be considered in the first person and with active verbs: the observer’s inevitable
presence should be acknowledged, and written about in the first person, not the third, giv-
ing us an insight into who these observers are (Foerster 2003).

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Reflection is always self-reflection

33. The subject and object concepts as well as the subject­–object methodology are not
only unsuitable for developing theories of consciousness, but also are quite inefficient for
understanding more specific states of consciousness, for example, its most important char-
acteristic – reflection. The subject–object dualism has inherent insoluble contradictions,
which make it impossible to come up with an adequate idea about reflection. Any attempts
made to resolve these contradictions tend to be counterproductive – it makes much more
sense when we stop talking about consciousness in terms of a subject–object dualism,
which implies insurmountable difficulties regarding the description of consciousness. I
will try to prove that this is the case.
34. In most areas of modern analytical philosophy of consciousness (based on the
classical epistemology of Descartes’s type), consciousness is seen as a certain object or as
what inheres in a person (a subject) (Gennaro 1995). In other words, the person is asked to
comprehend his own consciousness in FOC terms – as something that is observable. The
possession of consciousness is seen as the most reliable reference point (according to Des-
cartes’s well-known principle of the cogito, anything can be called into doubt except one’s
own consciousness) (Descartes 1966; Lähteenmäki 2007; Van Gulick 2000).
35. Besides, according to classical epistemology, consciousness can be defined
through reflection or, in other words, through knowledge about knowledge (Merleau-Ponty
1962). Consciousness takes place when there is duplication of knowledge – it is not enough
just to know; it is important to know that you know. Furthermore, reflection is seen in clas-
sical epistemology as a unique quality of indifferent mirroring (Wrathall & Kelly 1996).
Both words are significant. “Mirroring” means the ability of consciousness to witness its
own operation, while remaining the same consciousness. “Indifference” means that con-
sciousness is given to itself as it is, “as true,” without any distortions – the privileged ac-
cess of consciousness to itself implies that knowledge about the knowledge is always true.
36. On the face of it, everything looks quite convincing; however, if we accept this
theory, very soon we come across a number of paradoxes. The general principle “con-
sciousness is knowledge about knowledge” brings up problems. The main objection is that
subject–object dualism is applied to consciousness when it is seen as “knowledge about
knowledge,” which, in its turn, brings about a number of logical difficulties.
37. These difficulties can be demonstrated in the following way. If we intend to see
consciousness as an object, then there must be something that perceives the consciousness
that is objectified during the research. If we accept the “perceiving–perceived” tandem, we
will need a third term to refer to the perceiving as perceived. From there, we have the fol-
lowing alternatives. We can opt for some element, and the entire series will move into the
unperceived because of the optional stoppage. Or, if we accept infinite regress, it will bring
us nowhere. The conclusion is as follows: the subject–object model cannot be applied to
consciousness and, second, the consciousness that perceives is identical to the conscious-
ness that is perceived. In other words, the consciousness that perceives constitutes a whole
with the consciousness that is perceived. The latter circumstance makes us assume that
the best approach is when consciousness is perceived only in a certain phenomenological
circle (in the terms of phenomenology) (Merleau-Ponty 1962) or circularly, where there is
no division into the producer and product (in the terms of SOC), i.e., autopoietically.
38. Therefore, we should avoid incorporating analysis that delimits consciousness (as
the subject) and the perceived (as the object) into the philosophical model of reflection,

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since the consciously perceived pair requires a third component so that the perceiving, in
its turn, can become the perceived. Consciousness is not able to turn itself into an object,
to act as the observer with regard to itself. In short, this means that the principle of the pair
should not be applied to consciousness, since perceiving oneself is not a pair. If we want
to avoid regress into infinity, we should make sure that consciousness is a direct relation of
itself to itself. This relation of “itself to itself” is the pure immanence of the experience of
consciousness, knowledge about oneself, or its autopoiesis.
39. After we have revised the dualistic models of description of reflection in favor of
the autopoietic, we can offer a concept that meets the SOC principles, namely, the “system
of consciousness,” which is offered as a solution to the paradoxes of the classical theory
of consciousness. As there is inevitably a fusion of the observation with the observed on
which the observation is focused, we have to speak about the primacy of the “system.”
This “system” offers a more universal level of description of consciousness compared to
the subject–object level. The “system of consciousness” is not a subject that is seen as the
universal foundation of observation within a framework of the reflexive procedure. Rather
it includes qualities of both the object and the subject.
40. The aforesaid brings forth another implication, namely, revision of the classical
idea about reflection as mirroring. This refers to doubts regarding the ability of conscious-
ness to preserve indifference toward itself. Classical epistemology sees this wonderful at-
tribute as the ability of consciousness to observe its own operation, which, in fact, means
the ability to operate in a self-reporting mode (Husserl 1931). The key point in such self-
observation is the passivity of the reflective function – it adds nothing and it lessens noth-
ing; it only records the operation of consciousness as it is. This statement is consistent with
what served as a significant assumption of classical (dating back to Descartes) philosophy
of consciousness, according to which the most accurate reference point of any phenom-
enon of consciousness is the givenness of consciousness to itself (Humphreys 1992). This
thesis assumes that consciousness has immediate experience of itself, which means that
consciousness has such states, to which it can refer when claiming that it knows its ratio-
nale. This classical thesis, which can be found in many contexts of modern philosophy of
consciousness, can be questioned when seen from the SOC perspective.
41. We can assume that any conscious act should involve such acts, which took place
outside and beyond any reflection, being inaccessible to the latter. This means that there is
a certain “non-objectified remainder” (“blind spot”) in thinking, which, in fact, is thinking
per se.
42. The difficulties encountered by methods of description of consciousness that rely
on classical epistemology are caused by the fact that consciousness always comes across
a certain “blind spot” that is inaccessible to reflection. These difficulties can be resolved
if we give up our intention to achieve total understanding, which is typical of classical
epistemology. Despite the postulates of this form of epistemology, there is no reflection
primacy and consciousness has no miraculous ability to reflect upon itself. On the contrary:
it is pre-reflexive consciousness that makes reflection possible (Husserl 1960). In other
words, acts that have already taken place without any reflection and remain unreflected in
consciousness constitute a condition of any conscious act. If von Foerster wrote about the
non-transparency of areas of non-knowledge (“we do not see that we do not see” – Foerster
1979), in this case we speak about non-transparency of some functional areas of the in-
nermost activity of consciousness.

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43. These operations of consciousness result in its productivity, though they cannot be
perceived (Nelkin 1989). If we understand something, the laws that govern our understand-
ing cannot be understood and they cannot be included in the experience of understanding.
Understanding cannot be grasped by understanding: it allows seeing itself as the result
rather than the ongoing process; understanding always arrives with a slight delay – when
the operation of the consciousness is completed – and it is given to us as an effect (or a
result), having which we cannot deduce how it was obtained.
44. Thus, if a certain “non-objectified remainder” (pre-reflexive thinking) is the main
active element of consciousness, the operation of consciousness takes effect due to the
existence of a certain indefinite cognitive non-understanding, a cognitive blindness with
respect to its own operations. However, we can also assume that this systemic drawback of
consciousness is required for the successful functioning of the entire system of conscious-
ness and its reproduction as an autopoietic system (Luhmann 1995).

Part 2: How consciousness works

Consciousness is “a difference that makes difference”

45. Therefore, if consciousness is an autopoietic system, we should try to understand
how self-description works within it. This self-description can be analyzed at two levels:
ƒƒ a the local level of consciousness of a carrier; and
ƒƒ at the global level of consciousness, where the latter is seen as an aggregate of
meanings as such and tries to form knowledge about itself.
46. In both cases, self-description of consciousness can be seen as a bundle of internal
differences, where some parts, being differentiated, allow the existence of others (whereby
I am assuming from the assertion that the description in terms of differences might be ap-
plied to any autopoietic system). Self-descriptions make it possible to refer to themselves
through differentiation of some states from others (Luhmann 1990, 1995). In the first case,
we speak about the functioning of local consciousness, which is represented by differentia-
tion of its states such as memory, imagination, figure, background, etc. In the second case,
self-description is represented by global consciousness – the science of consciousness (say,
a certain theory of consciousness, whether dualism or physicalism, as its opposite), which
only serves as a means of organization of areas of meaning, which are immanent to con-
sciousness. However, in both cases, self-descriptions will constitute semantic effects, with
the help of which consciousness describes itself. Self-descriptions are organized only with
the help of internal relationships; they are not supported by any substance that could be
objectified as an object. Below I will look into both levels – local and global. In general,
we speak about the principle, based on which the objective thing does not exist as a sub-
stance (essence) but is perceived as the result of correlative processes in the internal system
of relationships. The main problem here is how to understand consciousness if it is not
represented by something substantial and objective. How can we understand what is not
an object or a property of an object and what, as can be seen from the aforesaid, is difficult
to define as something?

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47. However, even if it is difficult to identify consciousness, we can still attempt a

closer look at it, and we will see that it contains a certain criterion that makes it possible to
differentiate consciousness from non-consciousness. At the same time, this criterion can-
not be defined as something essential. It does not mean a positive attribute, for example,
memory or imagination. We cannot set the criterion of differentiation between conscious-
ness and non-consciousness through a positive attribute, for to understand what memory
or imagination is we must already have consciousness. Summarizing the aforesaid, we can
conclude that to understand what makes consciousness different from non-consciousness
we must have consciousness.
48. This means that the experience of consciousness, which is basically the experi-
ence of differentiation, is a criterion of differentiation between the experience of conscious-
ness and non-consciousness or non-experience. Here we encounter the same logic that
allows us to agree with Bateson when we say that the differentiation of information from
non-information is, in its turn, information. Keeping in mind its totality, when we actually
have to say that everything is information, we must also add that information is nothing
other than a universe of differences (Bateson 1972). Therefore, consciousness is the experi-
ence of differentiation.
49. In a more general sense, I understand the difference to be the minimum unit of
meaning. One can say that the difference is everywhere that it makes sense, in other words:
the meaning appears when there is a difference. This can be shown with the help of a
logical apparatus. Judgments have a minimum meaning (concepts, from which judgments
are made, still have no meaning, whereas conclusions are complex structures made of
judgments). Judgments have the simplest subject-predicate form – “x equals y,” which
is formed with the help of a difference. In this respect, the judgment itself is in fact the
difference. Thus, I understand the difference to be the basic element of logic (cogitation).
Therefore, in the sense that consciousness takes into account such logic, it might be said
that it is formed by differences. As far as the world of objects is concerned, in this respect
they are products of our cognition (and according to the basics of epistemological construc-
tivism are inseparable from it), therefore difference would also be fundamental for them. If
we bear in mind the phenomenological rule “the order of ideas corresponds to the order of
things,” the difference will become the fundamental principle of organization, both for the
arena of things and the arena of consciousness.
50. To some extent, the definition “experience of differences” can be applied to any
system that focuses only on internal relationships and is total, autonomous, and self-suf-
ficient (orientated at self-reproduction) – in fact, autopoietic. The array of difference will
constitute the “essence” of this system (taking into consideration that it has no essence).
To this extent, this system does not have any substances-essences and is not a substance by
itself. This system has nothing but differences.
51. We should say that consciousness, though it is not a thing and does not constitute
a unique set of properties and qualities, can still differentiate things, their properties, and
qualities. We can say that the experience of differences is the simplest and “closest” experi-
ence available to anyone. If we take a closer look at the process of awareness, we will see
that it contains nothing except differences. For example, we differentiate light from dark,
warm from cold, hard from soft, one item from another item, contours of the item from its
core, the cause from the effect, the assumption from the conclusion, etc. We fundamentally
outline differences to form objects and, to this extent, we deal with the entirety of reality
(Miller 1966). This is why we can assume that the world as such has no differences; they

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exist only for the conscious observer. In this case, the basic difference will be the differenti-
ation between the figure and the background or between the essential and the non-essential.
52. Thus, the experience of differences will be essential for consciousness as com-
pared to any other autopoietic system. It is not just the way consciousness operates; it is
consciousness itself. Indeed, if everything is given as one undifferentiated flow, we can
understand nothing. Once we decide to apply conscious experience, we must perform a
minimum differentiation or separation of one from another (Gasparyan 2015). Something
must be hidden and something must be revealed. When I understand something (perceive
something), I understand that there is this and not-this. This is a minimum basic level of
perception: it is an ability to single out, to differentiate one from another. As a rule, all of
us have this intuition for perception-differentiation. I am going to give an example from
developmental psychology. When we show toys to a child and he just looks at them, we
do not feel that he has any conscious response. He can even touch them; however, until a
choice is made (all the toys are given approximately equal attention), his behavior does not
look conscious to us. Once the child has chosen one toy out of many toys (for example, he
stretches his arm and takes the toy or looks at it for a longer time compared with the other
toys), we start interpreting his behavior as conscious at minimum (Piaget 1954). An illus-
tration of this idea can be also found in more recent research interpreting consciousness as
an implemented action (Noë 2004; O’Regan 2010). According to the sensorimotor theory
of consciousness, sensorimotor contingencies constitute the core of phenomenal states of
consciousness, and originate on the grounds of actively performed differentiations, allow-
ing the action to be implemented. In turn, perception and action should be interpreted as
equality, i.e., in a phenomenological sense (including a neuro-phenomenological sense,
according to the meaning of Varela’s theory), as one thing cannot precede another – one
should realize before acting but act so as to realize. The difference in such an interpretation
will be operative in two meanings:
a. in a methodological sense, allowing us, in spite of the equality, to talk about iden-
tity of two states: action and perception; and
b. content-wise: in order to act one should distinguish, and likewise in order to be
conscious one should differentiate things (O’Regan, Myin & Noë 2005).
53. To explain the above-mentioned ideas, an example from the field of phenomenol-
ogy can be given. Phenomenology or cognitive psychology tells us that in any state of
consciousness we come across a step-by-step process of experience: differentiation–syn-
thesis–recognition (Tye & Wright 2011). I want to point out that differentiation comes first
as primary experience, due to which comparison and perception also become experience.
Comparison cannot take place without previously differentiated correlative conditions (in-
formation about the color, shape, sound, smell, etc.).
54. We can raise an objection, saying that we do differentiate something (identical to
itself), that we do differentiate one from another. As this “something” must exist, can it be
that at first we recognize something (the object identical to itself) and only then differenti-
ate it from another recognized something (the identical object)? If this is correct, can the
experience of identity be more primary than the experience of differentiation?
55. The answer is as follows: synthesis and recognition are certainly required ele-
ments of the completed experience of consciousness, of the experience in which the “out-
lines” of the object are identified and synthesized, after which the object is configured and
recognized. By so doing, we differentiate one object from another. If we take a closer look,

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we will see that this full cycle of experience is also an experience of differentiation, for
recognition results in differentiation. The complete structure of the perception experience
will be as follows: differentiation–synthesis–recognition–differentiation. This means that
synthesis and recognition are built into differentiation, and not vice versa. Differentiation
turns out to be broader and it is differentiation that organizes both synthesis and recogni-
tion, which take place as temporary states since they quite quickly transit or are ready to
transit into new differences (Ricoeur 1965).
56. Thus, the ability to differentiate characterizes psychic life in general, whereby
human consciousness has a unique ability to spot differences and differentiate between
types and hierarchies of meanings (self-reference, self-reflection). In turn, the difference
between differentiation and identification in the traditional epistemology of the classical
(Cartesian) theory of reflection is thought of as the difference between subject and object,
or I and not-I, whereby it is not taken into account that these modes are parts of one con-
sciousness in its different stages and manifestations. Reflection is no more than something
external related to consciousness; however, a certain level of differentiation of differences
is needed.
57. Thus, any “something” appears as an object of perception primarily due to differ-
entiation. Distinguishing is performed not from the substantial material, but actually from
other differences or, in this case, from other perceptions. Something is perceived because it
is separated from another something, which, in turn, is also perceived at the same moment.
If we speak about the simplest level of consciousness – perception, differentiation will
constitute its essence, starting with the basic forms. Seeing, listening, feeling, smelling,
touching, and experiencing taste sensations mean, first of all, differentiation. It is impos-
sible to perceive something without differentiating (Bateson 1979). To put perception into
effect, we must single out some information and take aside other information; we should
see one and should not see another (Gasparyan 2015).
58. Thus, any difference envisages the difference between foreground and back-
ground; their principal “asymmetry” characterizes such an experience of consciousness
as preference. In turn, the steady preference of a certain foreground and “ignoring” of the
background implements the objectified function of consciousness. It manifests itself in
postponing further contextual differentiations, which in this way allows the setting of the
boundaries of the subject. Thus, the meaning of the objectivity of the subject is achieved by
pausing in differentiating. The objectified function is the ground for recognizing the sub-
ject that might be interpreted as “shaped” and identified from the set of meanings, in which
connection is included. The ability to differentiate defines the ability to direct attention, i.e.,
to separate and give a steady preference to this or that differentiated object, as well as to
anticipate, forecast, and predict.
59. For instance, whilst differentiating between two colors, we immediately spot (dif-
ferentiate) the context in which we conduct this differentiation: red and green might be the
signals of traffic lights, symbols of social movements, degree of ripeness of certain fruits
and vegetables, etc. Each of these contexts is at a certain level in the contextual hierarchy
(embedded into another contextual differentiation): driver/pedestrian, elected person/voter,
seller/buyer, etc. Differentiation is not an image, not a symbol, not an object, but a source
of an image, symbol, or object. In turn, meaning is not a mental atom capable of amalgam-
ating with other atoms, but the relation of contextual levels. In the case of traffic lights, the
meaning of the light for us is the necessity of differentiating the movement of traffic flows
or movement of transport and pedestrians. The meaning as differentiation defines a pos-

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sible set of signs – the carriers of this meaning (a signal with the help of a color, a gesture,
a traffic-controller).
60. In fact, this is the way in which perception turns into information. The scheme I
offer matches the concept of information offered by Bateson. His range of differences is to-
tal – the differences that are not perceived are referred to by him as “potential differences,”
whereas “perceived differences” fall into the category of “effective differences.” Our usual
perception might be considered as consisting of a million potential differences, but very
few of them become effective differences (i.e., units of information) in the mental process
of a larger system of observation. Therefore, information consists of non-indifferent differ-
ences (Bateson 1972).
61. Taking into account the above-mentioned facts, I am assuming that we cannot see
the differentiation – it is objectless. However, we can see the results of differentiation: we
can see different colors, we can hear different sounds, etc. So the given is always a result
or a consequence of some differences that themselves do not belong to this reality, and can-
not be found within it. That through which reality is created is not a part of it. At the same
time, it is important to note that these differences are for the most part strictly functional
and operational; they can be operated, but cannot be recognized subjectively (objectified),
which (if it were possible) would allow us to speak about them from the third-person point
of view or make them universally observable.
62. In this sense, consciousness is the variety of differentiations (primary experience),
as well as preferences (eliciting elements differentiated as the foreground) and identifica-
tions of the differentiated object. Therefore, differentiation is always primary in relation to
the experience of synthesis and the experience of identification. If we try to prove the op-
posite and attempt to argue that, in enumerating differences, we identify them, we should
keep in mind that the identification of a difference is nothing other than an experience of
differentiation and its actualization. Such identification of differences, their enumeration
and classification, is based on the base system of differences. In other words, any experi-
ence of givenness is based on the initial system of differences, which constitutes a special
autopoietic system of consciousness.
63. Examples of basic differences constituting the primary experience of conscious-
ness can be as follows. Differences in time: past, present and future; differences in spatial
positions: top, bottom, right, left; differences in perception of color, sound, smell, taste,
and touch; differences in “raw sensations” (qualia): light and dark, hot and cold, heavy
and light, dry and wet; differences in basic modes of consciousness: perception, memory,
imagination, doubt, assumption, etc.; differences in emotional states; transition from one
state of consciousness to another, “mood changes”; difference between your own experi-
ence and someone else’s experience; difference between waking consciousness and dream-
ing; difference between your own experience of consciousness and other types and kinds
of experience, etc.
64. The aforesaid is in line with Bateson’s interpretation of the mind, where differenc-
es are seen as an objective characteristic of the surrounding world (Bateson 1972). Bate-
son argues that perception is based only on differentiation. Any information is obtained
through information about differences. The operation of the mechanism is explained by
Bateson in the following way: the difference becomes non-indifferent for a certain perceiv-
ing system in terms of the initiation of further mental events within it, provided that this
difference surmounts the differentiation threshold of this system, taking into consideration
that any perception of difference is limited by the threshold value. When differences are

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too weak or slow, they cannot be perceived, and they do not turn into food for perception.
Bateson (1979: 134–136) outlines the following marginal characteristics of the system,
which can be seen as characteristics of the mind:
ƒƒ the system must operate with differences and be based on differences; and
ƒƒ the system must consist of closed loops or networks of pathways, along which dif-
ferences and transformed differences shall be transmitted (what is transmitted by a
neuron is not an impulse, it is news of difference).
65. By seeing consciousness as experience of differences, we can, first of all, “retain”
consciousness without reducing it to something physical; second, we can avoid substan-
tivization of consciousness. Difference is a uniquely non-objective experience, which, in
principle, cannot be substantivized. It cannot be found in the world as a thing; however,
thanks to it we can find all other things – different and fragmented. These differences are
primarily actualized non-reflexively (as the pre-reflexive thinking I have discussed earlier),
but it is in them that the possibility of reflection as self-description is rooted. Therefore,
the experience of differences is more primary than intentionality (the focus of conscious-
ness on the object). The experience of differences allows for singling out such structures
of consciousness as grasping and identification of the object. Consequently, reflection on
this experience is a self-description of various states of the differentiated, which organize
the operation of consciousness.
66. The principal proof of the fact that the experience of differences underlies all other
types of experience stems from understanding the primacy of the experience of differences
by everyone who attempts to reproduce it. Argumentation here, first of all, appeals to the
immediate experience of consciousness. Differentiation might be directly “perceived” in
the experiences of presentation and judgment, but also in a phantasy, reminiscence, evalua-
tion, doubts, etc. (within the framework of the logical model “this is that” or “truth-false”);
ethics and will (within the framework of the model “good-evil”); space and time (“up-
down,” “right-left,” “past-present-future”); aesthetic sensibility (“beautiful-ugly”). Last,
we have access to reflexive perception of stated differences only “on the basis” of differ-
ences themselves. In this sense, differentiation is the self-referential experience that does
not need any justification.

Differentiation – local and global level

67. If we look at the local level of consciousness, self-description will be represent-
ed by reflection, which does not dominate the object similar to the subject, and does not
double consciousness, as is typical of the dual pattern; in fact, it is the experience of dif-
ferentiation, which is aware of itself.
68. As for the global level of consciousness, macro-mental formations such as culture,
society, religion, economy, science, means of communication, and many others owe their
existence to certain areas of consciousness. The organization of these macro-dimensions
is also actualized through the experience of differences. Consciousness forms a number of
movable semantic and value hierarchies that define the content of individual and intersub-
jective experience. The sequence of such hierarchies allows for talking about the history of
human consciousness, avoiding nominalisation. This way one can eliminate periods – so-
called primitive thinking – with prevailing specific differences and intuitive identifications,

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and follow-up periods, which make up conceptual- and value-frames of certain epochs and
cultures, where abstract differences and descriptive identifications prevail.
69. In this case, self-description is represented by the ability of these macro-mental
formations to refer to themselves through the differentiation of some of their areas from
other areas. An example of such a scheme can be found in Luhmann (1997). Luhmann talks
about such an organization of society, which is kept together, for example, by differences
between “external,” “primitive,” “barbarian” systems and “internal,” “cultured,” “civi-
lized” systems. According to Luhmann, social systems, in contrast to physical-chemical
and biological systems, operate on the basis of meaning, which he sees as the mechanism
for processing differences. For Luhmann, “society” actually serves as a definition for the
self-description of communications, and if during such self-description, any of these com-
munications develop into a societal theory, they only assert that “society consists of com-
munications.” This means that description of society has a circular basis or, in other words,
is self-description (Luhmann 1995, 1997).
70. Appealing to the example of Luhman’s society theory, we see that this model,
which applies to the form of consciousness that is known as society, is typical of the en-
tire domain of consciousness. For example, in science, or rather in sciences addressing
consciousness, consciousness reflects itself. Different related theories of consciousness
(physicalism, dualism, functionalism, panpsychism, etc.) can be also seen as different
communications – ways through which consciousness can speak about itself. These com-
munications can exist only differentially – as theories different from one another. They are
opposed to one another and acquire their “positive” meaning through this opposition. For
example, physicalism is opposed to dualism and vice versa. The approach that eventually
discusses the existence of these differentiated theories can be seen as the self-description
of consciousness.
71. It should be noted that none of these communications (theories) relies on any
“objectively” fixed object (consciousness), which means the impossibility of a criterion of
truth in relation to the problem of consciousness under discussion, as well as the impos-
sibility of the only reliable conditions of its observation. On the contrary, descriptive dif-
ferentiation implies that consciousness sees itself through the “eyes” of its theories, which
means that it has to describe itself by using different and sometimes mutually exclusive
theories. In this respect, consciousness as the object of study of different theories in phi-
losophy of consciousness is thus some sort of figment.
72. In turn, the subject (the isolated observer) is also a figment of self-description.
It also constitutes the state of the system, which emerges during continuous correlating
operations: communications in the system of consciousness. These operations exist only
as alternating and are induced by one another. Then the subject will be represented by the
system providing continuation of communications and experiences, and this operation by
itself is a contribution to communication.
73. “Objectivity” in this case can be interpreted as distributed subjectivity. This as-
sertion means that cognition is a map divided up into semantic regions from inside, where
verification of one group of truths will be undertaken in contact with the other groups. Such
a procedure is different from the correspondence theory of truth – in it, the theories and
research seek confirmation of their views not in the “objective world” but in the provisions
and results of other theories and research. We do not have access to the world; however,
we have access to other interpretations of the world, which one might aspire to bring into
accord with one’s own. Different interpretations are described in relation to (1) different

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prospects of perception regarding one another, and (2) those forms where consciousness
exists, and these interpretations do not necessarily result in any contradiction.
74. By applying such a scheme, we might eliminate many errors and contradictions of
reductionism, which simplifies the essence of things, as well as eliminating subject–object
dualism. For this purpose, in the case of consciousness we have to think more metaphysi-
cally (due to its comprehensive nature and totality), to which we are accustomed within the
framework of the modern scientist paradigm. But such an interpretation is justified by the
very nature of consciousness, which is perceived by us through the perception of the facts
that we and “it” are one and the same thing.

Conclusion
75. The focus on subject–object dualism based on the classical epistemology govern-
ing FOC, which is popular in modern analytical philosophy of consciousness, promotes the
generation of numerous theories initially characterized by epistemic contradictions. As a
result, analytical philosophy of consciousness has not moved far in its answers, while of-
fering a great deal of varied theories and approaches. All reductive (and FOC) approaches
to cognition share the same fate: the external observer fallacy (Bishop & Nasuto 2005).
On the other hand, if we change the approach and replace FOC with SOC, at the very least
we will have an adequate epistemology and avoid wasting our effort in trying to create
contradictory or non-working theories.
76. We may ask what SOC can offer as a more successful theory. This will be the the-
ory of the self-description of consciousness, which is different from traditional (subject–
object) theories, which has no division into the subject and object, and which addresses
self-understanding consciousness organized as a total and immanent domain of meanings-
differences (Scott 1996). For example, this research is not a meta-linguistic explanation of
consciousness, where consciousness is the object and the author is the privileged observer.
The author of this research is part of the observation or, in fact, the self-observation of one
large autopoietic system of consciousness. In turn, local consciousnesses similar to the ex-
isting theories of consciousness will, in fact, be individual self-descriptions of the system,
where values will differ from one another by their larger or smaller scale and clarity.
77. Therefore, the strategy addressing consciousness in terms of differences, relation-
ships, and correlative processes will be more efficient. The fact that consciousness is a
bundle of significant differences can be demonstrated by the example of local conscious-
ness, i.e., our own consciousness, which can be offered as the most illustrative means of
justification. We only need to observe how the consciousness of each one of us operates.
The same principle can be extrapolated to the total domain of consciousness. Thus, to a
certain extent, consciousness is structured holographically – the general principle typical
of the entire system can be found in each of its smaller local parts. Thus the system of
consciousness is a system of differences composed of differences. Self-observation in this
system is conducted with the help of observations of observations.
78. Turning back to the question regarding what SOC can offer to modern philosophy
of consciousness, we should say that the task of the explanation of consciousness can, in
a way, be redirected from the external question “How can consciousness be explained?”
to the internal question “How does consciousness describe itself?” Even if we assume that
the answer to the question “What is consciousness?” will remain a blind spot (the systemic

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gap that is required for the operation of the entire system) for consciousness, internal self-
description through different forms can be sufficiently transparent. Even if consciousness
never finds out what it is, it is able to be aware of itself. Apparently, there are questions the
system cannot answer. The most that can be done regarding these questions is to be aware
of them. A certain number of such unanswerable questions can be singled out and per-
ceived as system-inherent points of non-transparency, which are required for the operation
of the system. Despite such areas of non-transparency, consciousness can become aware of
itself through the differentiation of its own forms. Such awareness can be obtained without
a contradictory “external observer.” SOC will act as epistemology, adequately describing
the principles underlying this system. Probably the best conceptual framework for avoid-
ing the external observer fallacy and encompassing the fundamental characteristics of cog-
nitive systems is the general framework of SOC.

Acknowledgments
The article was prepared within the framework of the Academic Fund Program at the
National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in 2016–2017 (grant no.
16-01-0032) and supported within the framework of a subsidy granted to the HSE by the
Government of the Russian Federation for the implementation of the Global Competitive-
ness Program.

Open Peer Commentary: On the Too Often Overlooked

Complexity of the Tension between Subject and Object
Yochai Ataria

1. Diana Gasparyan’s target article aims to offer a new model for consciousness.
However, it also raises some philosophical and methodological concerns, which will be
the subject of my commentary.

Naturalistic dualism
2. David Chalmers offers different kinds of possible solutions to the hard problem in
the study of consciousness. One of them is to create a nonreductive theory of experience by
creating “new principles to the furniture of the basic laws of nature” (Chalmers 1995: 210).
In turn, he says, “these basic principles will ultimately carry the explanatory burden in a
theory of consciousness” (ibid). To make a long story short, Chalmers (1995) defines this
kind of theory as naturalistic dualism. In a way, Gasparyan’s solution goes in that direction
because by saying that “differentiation is always primary in relation to the experience of
synthesis and the experience of identification” (§62), she adds a new kind of law, and hence
creates a nonreductive theory. However, by so doing, she embraces a dualistic approach.
Indeed, from the following citation it becomes very clear that this new principle is in fact
a new fundamental law:

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by seeing consciousness as experience of differences, we can, first of all, retain conscious-

ness without reducing it to something physical; second, we can avoid substantivization
of consciousness. Difference is a uniquely non-objective experience, which, in principle,
cannot be substantivized […] the experience of differences is more primary than intention-
ality (the focus of consciousness on the object). The experience of differences allows for
singling out such structures of consciousness as grasping and identification of the object.
(§65, my emphasis)

3. Thus to argue that the experience of differences is more primary than intentionality
is to say that there is some basic experience that we do not have access to – as Gasparyan
put it:
I am assuming that we cannot see the differentiation – it is objectless. However, we can see
the results of differentiation: we can see different colours, we can hear different sounds, etc.
So the given is always a result or a consequence of some differences (§61, my emphasis)

In turn, these unobservable and inaccessible aspects are responsible for the structure of
consciousness. This suggestion, so it seems, presents a new law.
4. By going in that direction, Gasparyan is giving up any attempt to explain con-
sciousness rigorously and thus instead embraces the notion according to which “[c]ertain
features of the world need to be taken as fundamental by any scientific theory” (Chalmers
1995: 210).

The language of consciousness

5. Gasparyan argues that “by using SOC we can bypass the strategy of reductionism
and replace it with a strategy whereby consciousness will be talked about in the language
of consciousness” (§16). However, it remains unclear what Gasparyan means by “language
of consciousness.” This is not a technical issue. It seems that in a way if we were able to
define the language of consciousness we would, in fact, have already solved the hard prob-
lem in the study of consciousness. Thus, by arguing that one has the ability to speak in the
language of consciousness, we assume that one knows all there is to know about phenom-
enal consciousness – to use Ned Block’s (1990) terminology – for, unless one has this kind
of knowledge, how can one have the ability to talk in the language of consciousness and to
know that this so-called “language” is indeed the language of consciousness.
6. Furthermore, Gasparyan argues that “if the task is to speak about consciousness
not using the language of the consciousness, we encounter a paradox” (§17). With this in
mind, Gasparyan needs to confront the following problem: if consciousness has a language
of its own that is unique merely for consciousness (and if I understand what Gasparyan is
trying to say, this so-called language of consciousness describes the process of differentia-
tions, which is, as we just saw, a new kind of a fundamental law), it is arguable that what
Gasparyan is actually offering here is a new science of consciousness that has nothing to
do with the current scientific project. If this is indeed the case, we do not have the means
to examine Gasparyan’s new model of consciousness from the very start with the tools we
have today, given to us by traditional science.
7. The situation in the science of consciousness is not easy and as a result it might be
tempting to call for a new paradigm for studying consciousness. Having said that, we must
remember that any new paradigm needs to be established upon some new empirical find-
ings or at least to be able to explain better some older findings – it goes without saying that

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Gasparyan’s model does not rely upon some new evidence and does not help us to solve
old paradoxes or contradictions in the study of consciousness. Furthermore, Gasparyan’s
model does not predict anything in terms of scientific experiments; moreover, it does not
even allow us to imagine new experiments that would support her model. So at this point,
from the perspective of philosophy of science, the target article seems to offer nothing for
the study of consciousness as a scientific project. Gasparyan writes,
[consciousness] constitutes a fragment of reality, which is relatively isolated from the en-
vironment by its causal structure. The external environment is not able to determine the
autonomous system from outside and to break its causal impermeability. The existence of
the external environment can be taken out of context. If this environment has no effect on
consciousness (it does not determine, create, or change it), it can be largely disregarded.
(§25, my emphasis)

8. It seems that according to Gasparyan, the concept of how consciousness needs to be

explained is fundamentally different compared to how the rest of the physical world needs
to be explained. If my analysis is accurate, then Gasparyan’s model is simply a version of
dualism.

Science or a mystery
9. Gasparyan argues that
Taking into account the above mentioned facts, I am assuming that we cannot see the dif-
ferentiation – it is objectless. However, we can see the results of differentiation: we can
see different colors, we can hear different sounds, etc. So the given is always a result or a
consequence of some differences. (§61)

10. This appears to be a rather problematic suggestion. In his reply to Michael Kirch-
hoff and Daniel Hutto’s “Never Mind the Gap” (2016), Michel Bitbol & Elena Antonova
argue that Kirchhoff and Hutto “systematically misconstrues the original approach to the
‘hard problem’ of consciousness advocated by Francisco Varela under the name neurophe-
nomenology” (Bitbol & Antonova 2016: §1). According to Varela, “the lived experience is
where we start from and where all must link back to, like a guiding thread” (Varela 1996:
334). Yet with this in mind, the aim of Varela’s neurophenomenology research program
(NRP) was to “present a model that can account for both the phenomenology and neurobi-
ology of consciousness in an integrated and coherent way” (Thompson, Lutz & Cosmelli
2005: 87). Varela argued that (and this stands at the core of the NRP working hypothesis)
the “opposition of first-person vs. third-person accounts is misleading” (Varela 1996: 340).
Notice that the NRP does not dismiss third-person accounts nor objective tools. Instead,
the NRP tries to construct a robust and irreducible dialogue between first-person and third-
person data, namely between neurobiological aspects of consciousness (third-person) and
phenomenological features of consciousness (first-person). In contrast to NRP, Gaspary-
an’s theory simply ignores the objective world, suggesting that “objectivity in this case can
be interpreted as distributed subjectivity” (§73).
11. This limitation makes Gasparyan’s theory appear to be a doctrine embedded
within mystery rather than a scientific theory. For instance, it is difficult to understand
how Gasparyan could have reached the following conclusion and how it can be examined:
“Therefore, differentiation is always primary in relation to the experience of synthesis and
the experience of identification” (§62, my emphasis). Furthermore, even if this notion is

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correct, and differentiation is indeed a primary element, scientifically speaking, what are
the implications of this statement? Does this notion allow us to reinterpret results in the
field in the study of consciousness?

Chiasm
12. In his book The Visible and the Invisible, Maurice Merleau-Ponty presents the
notion of chiasm. This concept is rooted within the “paradoxical fact that though we are of
the world, we are nevertheless not the world” (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 127). He argues that
we are both objects among objects like any other object in the world, yet at the same time
we are subjects: “my body is at once phenomenal body and objective body” (ibid: 136).
This structure of subject/object and touching/being-touched reveal the twofold dimensions
of “reversible flesh.” Merleau-Ponty uses the notion of flesh to describe our being-in-the-
world in a less polarized manner (subject versus object), that is, as an integral part of the
world. We are interwoven with the world, thus, the boundary between the body and world,
according to Merleau-Ponty, is vague and hazy.
13. Gasparyan tries to develop a theory of consciousness that breaks the subject ver-
sus object structure – “SOC helps eliminate subject-object dualism” (§16d) – but fails
to acknowledge the complexity of this structure, i.e., that it is impossible to describe the
world merely subjectively or objectively. Although the Cartesian dualistic subject-object
approach is indeed problematic, methodologically speaking, eliminating the subject-object
structure is almost impossible (Ataria, Dor-Ziderman & Berkovich-Ohana 2015). Further-
more, phenomenologically speaking, it would be a fundamental mistake, for we are both
a subject and an object, so by giving up one of these dimensions you will lose the very
essence of being human. The tension is necessary: “A human body is present when, be-
tween the see-er and the visible, between touching and touched, between one eye and the
other, between hand and hand a kind of crossover occurs” (Merleau-Ponty 1964: 163).
Fundamentally then, if this sensing-(being)sensed structure collapses, the very essence of
being a human being will lose its meaning and thus there “would not be a human body”
(ibid: 164). Moreover, when this subject-object structure collapses, when one can no longer
touch and being touched, it is not merely the end of the human body but, in fact, it is the
end of humanity: “such a body would not reflect itself; it would be an almost adamantine
body, not really flesh, not really the body of a human being. There would be no humanity”
(ibid, my emphasis). Unfortunately, Gasparyan’s subjective model ignores this complexity
of the human being as both a subject and an object at the same time.
14. We need to understand this complexity; not to eliminate it. Thus, by eliminating
the subject-object structure (tension), Gasparyan makes the same mistake as those who
eliminate consciousness or the subjective experience. It is impossible to construct a science
of consciousness while ignoring the subjective dimension, yet it would be meaningless
and even pointless to ignore the fact that as humans we are part of the world, we are both
a subject and an object.

Beyond the limits of consciousness

15. Gasparyan rightly notes that “understanding consciousness in the way expected
by most modern theories assumes doing what cannot be done: moving beyond the limits
of consciousness” (§11). One must wonder, however, does this observation not apply to

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her article as well? The only way to answer this question is to assume something about
consciousness. Indeed this might the target article’s most serious problem: it begins from
the very end – as if Gasparyan already knew something about consciousness and about
the phenomenal subjective experience. It might be an intuitively appealing presentation;
however, this intuition needs to be put to scientific examination. Yet instead of doing so,
she offers a theory that, in essence, cannot be verified.

Open Peer Commentary: Where Is Consciousness?

Urban Kordeš

1. One of the highlights of Diana Gasparyan’s target article – the idea to put dis-
tinction in the centre of the study of consciousness – is most intriguing, but, at the same
time, it is also not quite new. The idea was put forward in the 1960s by polymath George
Spencer Brown (1969), whose book The Laws of Form has inspired, among others, the
authors of the autopoietic theory.1 Spencer Brown grounds his work on epistemic logic on
the imperative: “Draw a distinction!” He sees drawing a distinction as a condition and the
fundamental act of cognition. In the absence of distinctions, one would be floating in an
endless, shapeless void.2 In general, it seems that Gasparyan agrees with Spencer Brown
in concluding that without distinctions, the world would not be possible because “if every-
thing is given as one undifferentiated flow, we can understand nothing” (§52).
2. The target article uses the term “difference” but I do not see a good reason for
departing from Spencer Brown’s term “distinction.” Gasparyan uses the expressions “ex-
perience of differences” (§50) and “experience of differentiation” (§48), where the for-
mer sounds somewhat problematic; it suggests that the (experienced) differences are “out
there.” Spencer Brown with his “draw a distinction,” on the other hand, meaningfully
implies that the distinction lies in the hands of the beholder and is not a simple cognitive
response to the contours of the “real” world. This view is closer to Gasparyan’s “experi-
ence of differentiation.”
3. Perhaps it would be suitable to follow Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and
Eleanor Rosch (1991: 172; see also Kordeš 2016: 383) in choosing the middle way by
introducing the term “experience of enactment of distinction”? This, admittedly clumsy,
denomination better emphasises the blurred line between perception and action; between
representing and inventing – a quality that the authors of the term “enaction” wanted to
affirm and that is also noticed by Gasparyan in §52.

Hiding in plain sight

4. The constructive role of the observer in the formation of distinction is perhaps best
elucidated by the mind-body dichotomy, or better – the distinction between the experiential
and the physical. It is interesting to notice how hard it is to pinpoint the former part of this

1. Varela (1979) saw Spencer Brown’s kind of formal logic as a perfect analytical instrument to be
applied in the then developing autopoietic theory.
2. Mystics might interject that letting go of distinctions is the very first step towards enlightenment,
but let us leave this discussion for another time.

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dichotomy (i.e., the experiential), despite it being our most intimate feature. Perhaps the
best definition of the experiential is that about which we can ask ourselves with Thomas
Nagel “What is it like to be?” The question “What is it like to be the reader of this text?”
is answerable. The answers can vary substantially; nevertheless, each one of them will
describe at least some kind of experience. If we, however, ask ourselves “What is it like
to be this computer screen?”, it becomes very hard to imagine the answer. The question
therefore makes sense (is answerable) only when we are dealing with consciousness. One
might therefore be tempted to describe experience as the answer to the question: “What is
it like to be conscious?”
5. It seems that we have a blind spot for the fact that experience is the most basic
and unavoidable medium of our being. Not only do we normally not notice how all our
beliefs about ourselves and the world constitute experience; we do not notice that we do
not notice. When we say “here is the screen,” it is entirely natural to omit the part: “I
experience/see/think that here is the screen.” It is very hard to make ourselves notice that
“here is the screen” necessarily presupposes experience, consciousness. This blind spot
is related to what Edmund Husserl (1982) very aptly describes as the natural attitude: we
organise, interpret and make sense of our experience with the constant help of a notion that
all experience is the experience of something. This process of organising, interpreting and
sense-making is so efficient and swift that it is not hard to overlook the medium into which
it is inevitably submerged – consciousness.
6. The blind spot of the natural attitude prevents us from noticing that the dichotomy
experiential/physical is not a genuine dichotomy. A genuine dichotomy has to split the
content space into two, if at all possible, non-overlapping parts. The pair experiential/
physical, however, muddles two content levels: the level of experience, which is the pri-
mary medium of being, and the level of the physical world, which is a way of organising
the experiential content.
7. Let me point out that this is not a debate on the ontological existence of the physical
world. Accepting the simple fact that we cannot perceive anything outside of our experi-
ence does not mean we have chosen a type of idealism, asserting that experience is primary
and the physical world is but a frivolous play of mind. All we did (following Rene Des-
cartes, William James, Husserl and other epistemologists) is notice the fact that experience
is a medium into which we are immersed and from which we cannot escape.
8. Enactment of distinction as the fundamental modality of experience can be com-
pared to the development of a scientific theory. If the enactment of distinction is to lead
to a viable image of the world, it has to acknowledge constraints. From the constructivist
viewpoint, we are, in both cases, constructing a functional theory – a theory adhering to the
available data in a tightest possible way. Our beliefs about the world are, much like a sci-
entific theory, a map, not the territory – they help us navigate. They are a way of organising
experience in a meaningful and continuous way. Philosopher Paul Natorp (1912; see also
Bitbol & Petitmengin 2013) has shown how the aforementioned blind spot leads to sub-
sequent dichotomies, such as subject/object and “outer”/“inner.” According to Natorp, we
select the “parts” of our experiential field that are invariable in relation to (inter)personal,
chronological and spatial situations. He calls this process, which leads to the feeling of a
stable objective (“outer”) world, “objectification.” What is left is subjective, “inner” expe-
rience. Interestingly, Natorp notices that the boundary between the two changes throughout
life (usually the subjective gives way to the objectification). Natorp sees the physical world

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as a subset of the experiential,3 which seems exactly opposite to our everyday attitude,
which makes us see experience as a subset of the physical world. It is important to notice
that these two seemingly opposite views are not symmetrical. In the first case (the notion
of a physical world arises as a way of organising the experiential landscape), we are not
talking about the actual physical world. Rather, we need to talk about our belief about the
existence of such a world. Belief is, of course, a type of experience.
9. In our everyday “natural” intuitions, we overlook the experiential medium, which
is the source of every possible perception, and accept the physical world as the foundation.
If we overlook experience, what remains is a world filled with things. Some of these things
exhibit behaviour that might hint at experience hiding behind it, but nowhere can we mea-
sure or clearly see this elusive entity. From this viewpoint, it is clear why, for a long time,
experience did not belong to the scientific discourse. The rise of cognitive science forced
researchers uneasily to accept the existence of this suspicious substance and to start look-
ing for where and how it is hiding in the physical world. Experience chose a cleverer hiding
spot than most cognitive scientists suspected: in plain sight. Everything is immersed in
experience. Gasparyan, together with phenomenologists and the founders of second-order
cybernetics, notices this immersion.

Can there be a theory of consciousness?

10. Up to this point, I have used the terms “consciousness” and “experience” almost
interchangeably. From the view of the naturalistic cognitive science, we could define con-
sciousness as that feature of organisms that enables experience. More precisely, that en-
ables phenomenal reports or some other kind of behaviour that might hint at the presence
of a phenomenal world. At this level, we can only talk about behaviour – as there is no
experience to be found in the physical world.
11. There are at least three perspectives from which contemporary theories of con-
sciousness try to approach their subject:4
Functional: What are its adaptive advantages and how has it (evolutionarily) come to be?
Explanatory: How does consciousness work or how does it emerge from the physical foun-
dation?
Descriptive: What are the first-person features of consciousness?
12. Explanatory theories attempting to naturalise consciousness have to deal with the
major problem, namely the fact that the universe they are operating in does not contain the
entity they attempt to explain. So, as Gasparyan notices, all that remains are attempts to
explain consciousness away (§5; Chalmers 2003). While searching for adaptational (and
other) functional explanations of the emergence of consciousness might be interesting, it
will probably not help much in understanding its essence.5 What is left, then, is the descrip-
tive approach, which can only be done from the first-person perspective. The target article
promotes this option and I wholeheartedly agree.

3. In contemporary cognitive science, a similar view is held by Max Velmans (1990).

4. Here I partially follow Robert Van Gulick (2014). Güven Güzeldere (1995) enumerates even more
levels of investigation that should be included in a theory of consciousness.
5. The scope of this commentary does not allow for a more thorough overview of the very interes-
ting and broad field of physicalistic theories of consciousness. For a very broad overview of views
and theories, see David Chalmers’s list at http://consc.net/online/8

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13. Gasparyan does not clearly articulate the relationship between consciousness and
experience. If “consciousness is the experience of differentiation” (§48), I wonder, would
it not be more appropriate to skip the “differentiation” part and start with “consciousness is
experience”? Would such a position not mark the most fundamental level? As mentioned
earlier, I am suggesting the relationship as: experience is what it is like to be conscious.
14. In any case, it is the experiential realm that the target article sees as primary for the
discussions on consciousness, and I fully agree. Accepting such a(n) (immersed) perspec-
tive of description, “theory of consciousness” (§25) does not seem to be the proper term.
A theory usually tries to describe a phenomenon with categories that are broader than the
described phenomenon. If we agree that consciousness is a medium into which we are
unavoidably immersed, then designing a theory of consciousness would be as if physicists
tried to design a theory of the universe. One attempts to describe the features of the uni-
verse (as seen from within), but that is not the same as a theory of the universe. For such
a theory, one should be able to step outside the defined phenomenon and describe how it
came into being (from something else) and how it relates to other entities (outside it). If
we are discussing the all-encompassing medium, then such an endeavour is meaningless.
I believe that Gasparyan is stretching the term “theory” a bit too far when she writes: “As
such, the theory of consciousness is the theory of the description of consciousness rather
than the theory of its explanation” (§25). Would it not be better to simply state that we are
aiming for the description of the phenomenal realm? Such a description could, of course,
contain categories, description of various first-person modalities, and perhaps theories of
those entities.

Attending the unattendable

15. The study of consciousness should be the study of consciousness as it presents
itself, i.e., the study of experience. I especially agree with Gasparyan that second-order
cybernetics would be the most appropriate epistemological foundation for such research.
In the article “Going Beyond Theory: Constructivism and Empirical Phenomenology”
(Kordeš 2016), I tried to point out the benefits of cooperation between second-order cyber-
netics (as an epistemological model) and the empirical study of experience.
16. The self-referential nature of studying experience is, in my opinion, one of the fea-
tures where second-order cybernetics could offer an adequate epistemological framework.
Nevertheless, the introduction of such a framework can by no means solve all the chal-
lenges posed by such research. Gasparyan’s article addresses an exceptionally important
one: how do we deal with experiential modalities, which are not (fully) explicable? I find
this to be one of the most important novel insights delivered by her article.
17. Researchers in the field of so-called empirical phenomenology (Kordeš 2016)
seem to have arrived at a (mostly unarticulated) consensus that it is possible – using
appropriate techniques – to bring any kind of experience from the unattended fringe of
consciousness to the focus of attention (Vermersch 2009). Considerations that some ex-
periential phenomena cannot be fully explicated, however, are rare. The experience of
enactment of distinction, discussed in the target article (under the term “experience of
difference”) might very well be one of those elusive experiential modalities. Following the
target article’s insight, I suggest serious consideration and further of the experiences that
are intrinsically on the fringe of awareness. I refer to the phenomena that are, without a
doubt, part of the experiential realm, but are not observable in the focus of attention. If the

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purpose of many empirical phenomenological techniques is explication,6 we are left with

the question: How to study those parts of the experiential landscape, the principal qual-
ity of which is precisely that they reside on the periphery of attention? A deliberation on
possible approaches to studying such phenomena would be a very important step towards
understanding consciousness “from the inside,” and Gasparyan’s article seems to be one
bold attempt in this direction.

Open Peer Commentary: Theorizing Agents: Their Games,

Hermeneutical Tools and Epistemic Resources
Konstantin Pavlov-Pinus

1. In her target article, Diana Gasparyan continues her search for a general theoretical
framework relevant to modern consciousness studies (Gasparyan 2015). This time, she
concentrates not only on the ontological status of the theorizing agent, but also on method-
ological aspects that should be attributed to theorizing agents involved in consciousness re-
search. In my opinion, Gasparyan’s investigations have led her to the area where analytical
philosophy meets phenomenology and hermeneutics for she ends up with self-description
as a central epistemic concept; besides that, she finds the differentiation processes lying at
the heart of the conscious life. These are all phenomenological themes. It seems to be right
that the language of “second-order cybernetics” may play a bridging role between phenom-
enological and analytical styles of research. This gives us a chance to speak of a genuinely
fundamental theory of consciousness (FTC), a brief outline of which is presented below.
I will combine my critical notes with my personal constructive comments on this matter.
2. Generally speaking, any theory Th depends on five basic (meta)theoretical constitu-
tive elements Th = Th(language, problem/goal, criteria, method, theorizing agent). Here
language stands for a certain discourse that we choose to deal with; the next three consti-
tutive elements reflect the final goal to which we are oriented, the (set of) criteria for the
theory’s success and the relevant methods that we are allowed to follow. The last constitu-
tive element requires explicit articulation of the ontological status of the theorizing agent
and his epistemic resources. It recently became clear for all areas of theoretical research,
from mathematics to cosmology and economics (Pavlov-Pinus 2015), that the theoretical
status of the agent (i.e., our a priori assumptions about his computing, observing, compre-
hension and other abilities) influences significantly the ultimate architecture of the theory
itself. Therefore Gasparyan is right to state that the theoretical status of the agent has to be
taken into account seriously (Gasparyan 2015). It matters whether a theory is written as
if on behalf of a godlike creature or from a viewpoint of a human with limited epistemic
resources as this would significantly affect the corresponding theoretical approaches.
3. It is also widely known that, say, the predictive powers of a theory could be in con-
flict with the descriptive powers, the objectivity of the results could be incompatible with
human comprehension abilities, and so forth. The architecture of a theory depends on our
final goals and the target problems because whether we seek, say, deeper understanding

6. Most prominent is Pierre Vermersch’s elicitation interview technique, formerly known as the
explicitation interview (Vermersch 2016).

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or more and more detailed “objective” descriptions is extremely important. From this, it
could be predicted that any fundamental theory (within any fundamental area of research)
will have the form of a network of specific theories in the same way as category theory in
mathematics could be considered both as a general grounding theory for mathematics and
as a network of specific mathematical theories at the same time. Of course, FTC will also
have a network form. However, this is not the end of the story, for consciousness is a very
specific subject of theoretical research.
4. Two more features will largely affect the architecture and the dynamics of FTC.
First of all, this theory will depend heavily on hermeneutical definitions, rather than clas-
sical explicit definitions. Hermeneutic definitions, and hermeneutic procedures in general,
are tightly related to the concept of self-description advocated by Gasparyan. Secondly, the
performative nature of the subject we are aiming at, and its “nowhere” way of appearance,
make it credible that FTC will have the form of multi-agent theoretical game, obeying its
own game-theoretical laws and its own underlying logic. Let us take a closer look at both
features.
5. The difference between explicit (classical) definitions and implicit (hermeneutical)
definitions derives from the difference between explicit and implicit functions in math-
ematics. An explicit function has a form f(z) = F(x, y, …), with no zs appearing on the right-
hand side. Implicit functions have a circular structure: g(a, b, …) = G(a, b, c, h(a), …), with
a appearing on both the right- and the left-hand sides. In the same way, we can say that
classical definitions tend to have an explicit form Def(z) = F(x1, x2, …), i.e., the form of
definition of z strictly in terms of x1, x2, … For example, a point is an entity with no parts.
This definition has the form Def(point) = F(entity, parts, negation), with F standing for a
certain grammatical construction. However, far from all definitions in mathematics have
such an explicit form. For example, “a vector is an element of a space of vectors” has a
recursive structure. There is no vicious circle here at all. It is a primitive one-step recursion
with an initial level, which has the form of an explicit definition. Most recursive definitions
in mathematics have either a certain finite or even infinite number of steps. In general,
however, we may talk of highly-complex ramified, implicit, recursive definitions without
any starting point of recursion (in the same way as we can study implicit functions without
any specific limitations). For example, in Defn(A) =  R =  Fn(A, D1(n), D2(n), D3(n) …), where
n is a branch index, D1(n), D2(n), D3(n) … are entities defining A in terms of relations of A
with D1(n), D2(n), D3(n), while = R = stands for the switching rule between branches. These
“ramified recursive definitions without an explicitly defined starting point” could be con-
sidered as a formalization of hermeneutic definitions. For the sake of simplicity could be
called hermeneutic definitions themselves. In fact, implicit functions could be considered
as historically the first example of an implicit definition of a certain variable in terms of its
own functional relations with other variables.
6. A few illustrations. Note first that from an epistemic point of view, we must take
care to ensure not only the formal correctness of our definitions but also their comprehen-
sibility: “definitions” are epistemic procedures whose central theoretical role is to increase
(or deepen) our understanding. If, for example, we take a closer look at the internal epis-
temic structure of such concepts as “order,” “sequence,” “word,” and “sentence,” we will
see something that would be left out by any explicit definition. Namely, one can see that
these phenomena require unavoidable preliminary epistemic acquaintance with them. Any
definition of “order” will implicitly use ordering as a part of the definition, and without
comprehending “ordering” as (the actual process of) ordering, one will never be able to

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comprehend the definition of “order.” A definition of “word” will necessarily consist of

words that must be recognized as meaningful words, otherwise this definition will not be
informative at all. Definitions of gods, or hobbits, or points do not require any prelimi-
nary acquaintance with these entities. The presence of these circular structures points to
something much more general: certain aspects of human experience cannot be generated
from scratch; they can only be modifications of (pre)existing forms of experience. Another
illustration: any definition of “a human being” will be incomplete if we rule out the fact
that “mankind” is the only generating source of any new human individual. It looks like
a paradox: the whole society of humans should precede the existence of any particular
human being. And yet these are the initial conditions of anthropological research: recur-
sive structures of the type ((mankind → new humans) … → new humans) are the most
informative source of knowledge about humans. Note that the recursion here has temporal
ramifications: it moves step by step into the re-constructing past as well as into the ex-
pected model of the future. All other theoretical systems are less informative than, say,
those that tend to explain human matters out of non-human matters, for example (dinosaurs
→ Shakespeare’s Hamlet). While I do not have sound proofs so far, I think that the most
informative theories of human matters are those that are able to trace the trajectory of hu-
man experience modifications both into the indefinite human past and into the indefinite
human future. So my point is that (epistemically) complete definitions of such “circularly
closed” entities should be able to grasp these interesting epistemic features. And not only
that. Any definition is subject to revision. The reason for revision may come from many
different contexts, and this is exactly why a multi-contextual ramification may take place.
7. Why is this relevant to consciousness studies? Since the ultimate goal of the phi-
losophy of consciousness is to answer the question “What happens in the world whenever
an act of understanding occurs in there?”, there is no doubt that the most complete defini-
tion of consciousness has precisely this hermeneutical form. Gasparyan’s intuitions could
be formalized in terms of such recursive definitions, for consciousness could be defined
only in terms of networks and systems that already include “consciousness” as a constitu-
tive entity. For example, one branch of consciousness definition should reflect the circu-
lar structure of its social roots: Def1(consciousness) = F1(social networks, consciousness).
Another branch of this ramified definition should explicate the neurophysiological way
of coding and decoding acts of understanding: Def2(consciousness) = F2(neural networks,
consciousness). There are also linguistic ways of coding and decoding the self-understand-
ing of consciousness, and a few more; and each of them mutually affects the rest of them.
It must be stressed that the possibility to encode and to decode certain properties of the
self-understanding of consciousness in neurophysiological, or social, or linguistic terms
does not imply the possibility of its ontological reduction to the corresponding phenomena.
This is because to encode the description A in terms of D1, D2, … is not the same thing as
to reduce A to the ontology described by D1, D2, …
8. There is one more thing on which I fully agree with Gasparyan: the central epis-
temic concept of modern analytical philosophy of consciousness so far has been “explana-
tion” (§4); however, it is a priori not clear that all possible theoretical questions with which
we may address consciousness could be exhausted in this way of asking. I think she is right
in stating metatheoretical guidelines such as (1) Cartesian dualism, and (2) explanation as
a method of construction of answers that are highly correlated with each other. It seems
also that a guideline such as (3) usage of explicit forms of definitions must be added to this
list. These theoretical orientations, in fact, show that the metaphysics that stands behind

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modern analytical philosophy of consciousness significantly narrows down the horizon

of possible questions with which we may address consciousness. This horizon should be
enriched by phenomenological ways of inquiry which appears to be “translatable” to the
language of second-order cybernetics.
9. Now let us take a look at dynamic features of the future of FTC. I see some sort
of “abnormality” of this theory (as opposed to Gasparyan’s point of view, see §25, where
she calls her theory “non-normal”). This is not in that it deals with recursive structures and
self-describing procedures but in that it should be able to interpret its own counterexam-
ples, just because “consciousness” is a source of all possible counterexamples that human
imagination may produce. In order to have internal resources for being able to deal with its
own counterexamples, FTC has to have a dynamical form by itself. In other words, it must
be not just a theory or a network of theories but should rather be a multi-agent theoretical
game. Consciousness is not only a socially, biologically (etc.) conditioned family of spe-
cific phenomena but also is a performative source of theoretical novelty, FTC-architecture
changes, and social reconfigurations. In particular, this means that the history of FTC must
be an active part of FTC itself, at any moment. The only adequate way of theoretical re-
production of such a phenomenon is to reserve some space for theoretical dynamics in a
game-theoretical form. Again, it could be compared, to a certain extent, with an application
of category theory to the cosmological dynamics as described by Bob Coecke (2008) and
Louis Crane (2007).
10. By the way, one more philosophical application of Gasparyan’s ideas could be
mentioned here, i.e., in discussing free will, which is quite popular in analytical philoso-
phy. Most of these discussions appear to be meaningless in the context of modern physics
because the assumed theorizing agents are purposely designed to be either “outside-of-
the-world observers,” or some sort of supernatural fictional creatures. As cosmologist Lee
Smolin pointed out:
The concept of an observer outside of the world is based on an elementary contradiction,
for then there is a second world, larger than the first, that encompasses both what we called
the universe and its fictional observer. In a truly fundamental theory that aspired to describe
the whole universe, it should not be possible to make such logical error […] To avoid this,
I believe that we should ask more of a cosmological quantum theory than that it simply
allow the possibility of an interpretation in terms of observers inside the world. We should
require that the theory logically forbid the possibility of an interpretation of cosmological
theory in terms of an observer outside of the world. (Smolin 1997: 269)

This means that free will discussions in a framework of such theories are in fact disputes
about the free will of the assumed theorizing agent(s). Therefore, if an assumed theorizing
agent is a god or a godlike creature (like Laplace’s demon), then within a given theoretical
framework we are talking about the free will of the corresponding theorizing agent but not
the free will of humans. It would be a categorical mistake to think otherwise. This argu-
ment could be extended to biological and other theories.
11. Finally, I have three more critical considerations.
a. I see no good reason to exclude traditional “objectivist” studies of consciousness
(as Gasparyan suggests, say, in §23), for these results affect not only the sum of our
“objective” knowledge about things, but also have a certain influence on our self-
understanding. FTC as a network may easily include objectivistic theories inside
of its evolving net of theoretical inter-relations.

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b. The borderline between self-descriptions and other descriptions appears to be very

vague and not constructive. For example, our mutual descriptions via social inter-
actions seem to be very productive for understanding the nature of consciousness,
but one cannot immediately conclude that these types of descriptions have a form
of a self-description. Rather, we have here something like “descriptions-of-selves”
within the semantic space of social interactions. Gasparyan comes closer to her
own theoretical intentions when she speaks of “distributed subjectivity” (§16e),
but unfortunately she does not pay much attention to this concept.
c. I cannot agree with Gasparyan’s interpretation of phenomenological “intentions”
(§65). The latter could be no more “objectivized” than Gasparyan’s “differentia-
tions,” and it is misleading to treat them as “intentions to the object.” Intentions
are the structural part of Dasein’s way of being-in-the-world, the recursive step-
by-step realization of which explicates its in-the-world orientation, governed by
Dasein’s expectations about the future and other existential factors.

Open Peer Commentary: How Can Meaning be Grounded

within a Closed Self-Referential System?
Bryony Pierce

1. The target article defends a methodological claim about research into conscious-
ness, arguing that the epistemology of second-order cybernetics can offer a more effective
means of investigation than methodologies relying on a subject-object view of conscious-
ness. Diana Gasparyan proposes that consciousness be viewed as an autopoietic system:
self-organising and self-contained. The observer, she claims, is an integral part of this
(closed) system.
2. Ezequiel Di Paolo comments on the fact that there are unanswered questions in the
primary literature on autopoiesis. He says that “several essential issues that could serve
as a bridge between life and mind (like a proper grounding of teleology and agency) are
given scant or null treatment” (Di Paolo 2010: 46). It is the problem of the grounding of
meaning that I wish to address here. My claim is that the notion of consciousness as an
autopoietic system that is relatively isolated from the environment and causally imperme-
able, as Gasparyan claims (§25), introduces a potential problem when we seek to ground
meaning and norms. I will also consider whether Gasparyan’s approach might be used to
develop an integrated view of grounding in its various senses. I take the relevant senses of
grounding to be:
a. symbol grounding (semantic content);
b. biological grounding (purposiveness); and
c. the grounding of reasons for action to oneself (meaningfulness/affective content).
3. The symbol grounding problem is that of how symbols within a symbol system,
such as a language, can acquire meaning, while avoiding an infinite regress of explanations
in terms of other intrinsically meaningless symbols (Harnad 1990). This is illustrated in
John Searle’s (1980) well-known Chinese Room thought experiment, in which a monoglot

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English-speaking person follows detailed instructions in English to manipulate Chinese

symbols to produce correct responses to questions in Chinese. Searle concludes that this
fails to show that the English-speaking person thereby understands the meanings of the
Chinese characters, or, by analogy, that a computer understands the strings of symbols it
manipulates, even if it can simulate understanding.
4. Wolfgang Tschacher and Christian Scheier note that the symbol grounding prob-
lem is particularly problematic in a constructivist theory, when “adaptive action in a real
world is to be understood within the context of an agent’s internally constructed (instead
of represented) ‘reality,’ alone” (Tschacher & Scheier 2001: 561). One possible solution
to the symbol grounding problem, proposed by Stevan Harnad, is to ground symbols in
sensorimotor activity, “in the capacity to discriminate and identify the objects, events and
states of affairs that they stand for, from their sensory projections” (Harnad 1993: §7.2).
This account sits well, prima facie, with Gasparyan’s account of the language of conscious-
ness as involving perception, differentiation and identification, though only if the autopoi-
etic system is embodied and able to interact with objects in its environment. Gasparyan
says that, “the observer is essentially included in the view through her frame of reference
and her motion relative to the objects and events under consideration” (§11). I would like
clarification of where the boundaries of the system lie. The existence of an external world
could arguably be inferred, even if we can have no knowledge about it, from the notion
of motion relative to objects, but a methodological approach that explicitly denies that we
should incorporate the external world into our explanation of consciousness – advocating
self-description and self-reference only – seemingly cannot ground meaning in anything
external to itself or involving interaction with the external world.
5. As the grounding relation is a dependence relation in which one entity is explained
in terms of another more fundamental entity, a methodology that seeks to explain the lan-
guage of consciousness from within, with no reference to anything that might be deemed
more fundamental, is potentially problematic. It may be that Gasparyan considers ground-
ing an unnecessary notion in the context of the proposed methodological approach; it is not
universally accepted as a useful notion. If so, I feel that some alternative way of explaining
how meaning can arise within the system is needed, although I realise this was probably
beyond the scope of the target article.
6. Gasparyan says that, “it is impossible to prove the reality of the world beyond a
certain system of perception” (§13). My worry is whether, without certain knowledge of
the external world, the observer can construct anything more than a coherent set of sym-
bols that are internal to the autopoietic system and thus ungrounded in world-involving
sensorimotor activity. Gasparyan says, “When cognizing itself, consciousness discovers
the meaning of its judgments only in itself” (§15), but without [at least a presumption
of] access to or interaction with that which is external to the autopoietic system, which is
described as a ‘unity’ (ibid.), it seems that there can be no grounding of semantic content.
It is not obvious how meaning can be discovered from judgements. Gasparyan says that
meaning arises “when there is a difference” and that difference is “the basic element of
logic” (§49). The system has “nothing but differences” (§50) and is described as a “domain
of meanings-differences” (§76), but difference alone is not sufficient for meaning.
7. An element common to many accounts of grounding, including Harnad’s (1993)
account, is that there should be a causally efficacious realiser – information processed must
have some means of acting upon the external world. If the autopoietic system is isolated
from the environment and causally closed, it would inevitably lack a causally efficacious

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realiser. It seems that Gasparyan’s account would have to dispense with this feature, unless
it could somehow be internal to the system. I am sympathetic towards a sceptical view of
our epistemological limitations. My concern is that a theory of consciousness and action
in which meaning – and reasons for action – are grounded, in the relevant sense, must at
least posit the existence of an external world. For meaning to be grounded, there needs to
be a coupling with the environment, as described in Andreas Weber and Francisco Varela’s
account:
There cannot be an individuality which is isolated and folded into itself. There can only
be an individuality that copes, relates and couples with the surroundings, and inescapably
provides its own world of sense. (Weber & Varela 2002: 117)

There must also be a sense in which one entity is more fundamental than another, in order
for a grounding relation to obtain.
8. Biological grounding of reasons for actions, conferring purposiveness, also presup-
poses an external world. An external world, in which organisms evolve and with which
they interact, is necessary to ground reasons in biological utility. Biological grounding
relies on the premises that replication is a kind of success and that survival is good, in-
dependently of the evolution of consciousness and rational thought. But these premises
presuppose values that we can question in our reasoning. Biological utility cannot account
adequately for normative reasons to pursue courses of action; it is not sufficient to give us
reason to act from a subjective perspective or even to explain how reasons for action can be
compelling, from a third-person point of view, because it “fails to stop the infinite regress
of whys with respect to rational justification” (Pierce 2012: 84). Biological grounding tells
an evolutionary story about how we have come to behave the way we do, but can provide
no justification for attributing value to outcomes. Reasons grounded in biological utility
lack meaningfulness unless also grounded in some other way.
9. Grounding reasons for action to oneself requires justification of one’s reasons, such
that they can be understood, subjectively and unquestionably, to be compelling. Sensorim-
otor activity is not an end in itself: we need affective content, as well as semantic content,
for what I will call “subjective meaningfulness.” I propose that it is the qualitative char-
acter of affective responses that stops the infinite regress of whys that can otherwise arise
when we examine our reasons for action. It is always possible to question, intellectually,
why we should value outcomes, including our own survival, but we need eventually to be
able to stop asking why we ought (prudentially or morally) to do something, because it is
self-evident that a reason justifies something, non-inferentially, without further explana-
tion. I claim that it is the affective valence of anticipated outcomes of actions that provides
non-inferential justification for reasons for action, halting the regress of whys. We cannot
fail to believe that certain affective states are preferable to others. Affective valence is also
necessary for the construction of conceptual frameworks used in evaluation: concepts such
as “good” and “bad,” “welcoming” and “hostile,” or “broken” and “intact” require experi-
ence of affective valence in order to be meaningful in the range of contexts in which they
are applied.
10. Emotion, which has affective valence as part of its content, appears only as an
item on a list of types of differences in §63, and is accorded no special status in relation
to value or meaningfulness. In §66, Gasparyan touches upon evaluation, good and evil,
and aesthetic sensibility. These are concepts I argue can only be meaningful if one has
the capacity to experience affective responses. As with reasons for action, their meaning

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is grounded in affective experience, but in the target article they appear to arise out of the
purely cognitive capacity for differentiation and categorisation. No explanation is given of
how the meaning of these terms comes to be grounded or understood; it is stipulated that
the experiences of presentation and judgement need no justification. The kind of grounding
I am discussing now is distinct from symbol grounding, which merely allows symbols to
refer to something external to the symbol system. Subjective meaningfulness has affective
as well as semantic content. We just know what we value and desire and can use that knowl-
edge as a premise in reasoning, without needing any further justification. Affective valence
performs a regress-stopping role in grounding reasons for action subjectively, a role that is
lacking when we rely on the other types of grounding discussed above.
11. On a positive note, perhaps Gasparyan’s methodological approach could be used
to give an account of the grounding of meaning independently of knowledge of the external
world, by appealing to the role of affective valence within a self-referential autopoietic sys-
tem. I can know how I expect to respond to anticipated experiences regardless of whether
I can know that there is an external world. Reasons for action (from a position of external-
world agnosticism, if necessary) can then be judged subjectively to be compelling or not.
To allow a grounding relation, there could be subsystems within the autopoietic system.
The qualitative character of affective responses to experiences might be deemed more fun-
damental than subsystems producing perceptual and other experiences to which meaning
might be attributed. Which subsystems were fundamental could even be interchangeable
and context-relative.
12. In conclusion, the methodological approach espoused by Gasparyan faces a num-
ber of challenges if the existence of an external world cannot be incorporated into an ex-
planation of how meaning is grounded within the autopoietic system described. Despite
my initial worries with regard to symbol grounding and biological grounding, one avenue
to explore is that sensory perception might act as a subsystem within the system that is
consciousness-as-presented-in-the-target-article, providing information about how the un-
knowable environment seems in such a way that values can be attributed to anticipated
experiential outcomes. An integrated account of the grounding of semantic content (con-
structed from experienced perceptions and sensations, together with affective responses)
and reasons for action, from which purposiveness might follow, might then be possible.
Grounding would be in the qualitative character of affective responses to actual and antici-
pated outcomes, as experienced in consciousness.

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Open Peer Commentary:

Self-Description Alone Will not Account for Qualia
John Pickering

1. Consciousness is an aspect of life. Although the last few centuries have seen great
advances made in understanding how living systems arise, persist and function, this is
to study the vehicle for consciousness, not consciousness itself. It is notable that in his
landmark essay What is Life? Erwin Schrödinger (1944) makes virtually no reference to
consciousness. Even in his later work Mind and Matter, which deals explicitly with mental
life, he implicitly assumes that physical objectification is the only proper epistemological
stance for scientists to take (Schrödinger 1958). This stance, which treats consciousness as
just another aspect of a world that, with time, could be as fully and quantitatively known
as, say, electromagnetic radiation, inherits from the nineteenth century the ethos of what
Thomas Nagel (2012) has termed the “materialist neo-Darwinian conception of nature.”
It is notable that part of Nagel’s argument against this conception has centrally to do with
qualia. Qualia, being the characteristics of all and any conscious experience, are what we
know with most certainty. Despite this being so, many philosophers claim that we do not
know what consciousness is (e.g., Strawson 2016). Perhaps the epistemological dead ends
pointed out by Gasparyan contribute to this somewhat odd situation.
2. Nagel and other critics aside, the conception of nature that has no place for qualia is
still the one most commonly adopted, implicitly or explicitly, in the physical and biologi-
cal sciences. The existence of qualia is not in fact disputed; how could it be? However, the
assumption is that in time and with greater knowledge, especially of the nervous system,
they will be shown to be “nothing but” the workings of nerve cells (e.g., Crick 1994). In the
social sciences, this conception of nature is under constant challenge, since it is transpar-
ently unproductive and misleading. In psychology especially, it has been a controversial
issue right from the inception of the discipline, which William James named “the science
of mental life” (James 1890: 1). James noted that the central phenomenon with which this
science had to deal was consciousness. This, he felt, was something that, while patent, was
essentially beyond the grasp of reductive methodologies. As he put it:
[N]o mechanical cause can explain this process, nor can any analysis reduce it to lower
terms or make its nature seem other than an ultimate datum, which, whether we rebel or
not at its mysteriousness, must simply be taken for granted if we are to psychologize at all.
(James 1890: 2).

The phrase “…this process…” in this particular passage referred to an act of recall, but
towards the end of the same work, James expands and clarifies what he means:
[T]he only thing which psychology has the right to postulate at the outset is the fact of
thinking itself. I use the word ‘thinking’ […] for every form of consciousness indiscrimi-
nately. (ibid: 224).

3. Despite explicit early warnings against reduction by James and others, in the in-
tervening years the majority of those studying consciousness have adopted a reductionist
stance of one sort or another, where the aim is to objectivise subjectivity. As Gasparyan
makes clear in the first section of her target article, this epistemological gambit is bound

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to fail. Treating consciousness as if it were an object to be studied is only productive when

what is being studied is the vehicle for consciousness, namely the life processes associ-
ated with it. But if this approach is extended to consciousness itself, the gambit fails; the
observer and the observed become one and objectification becomes impossible, defeating
the aim of the exercise and leaving the central problem untouched.
4. In her second section, Gasparyan recommends a second-order approach to con-
sciousness based on the idea that to differentiate one subjective state from another is to no-
tice what differentiates them. This makes a plausible start on defining what Gasparyan calls
the “minimum unit of meaning” (§49). However, it begs the question of how the capacity
to notice arises in the first place. Nor does it touch on the status of conscious beings, such
as the higher vertebrates, who are certainly conscious, but not aware of being so.
5. Nonetheless, the differentiation of one state of consciousness from another is
clearly a productive way forward. Gasparyan elsewhere observes “[…] that to understand
what makes consciousness different from non-consciousness we must have consciousness”
(§47). As this comes dangerously close to circularity, more needs to be said about what
“different” means in this context. This is to be found, in part, in a somewhat Kantian sec-
tion where Gasparyan concludes “[…] that the world as such has no differences; they exist
only for the conscious observer” (§51).
6. This opens the way to connecting Gasparyan’s proposal of a change to a second-
order point of view with other discussions of differences and their origins. A fundamental
difference, so fundamental in fact that it can stand as an epistemological axiom, is that
between self and other. In psychoanalytic traditions, this has been a central issue, from Sig-
mund Freud’s (2002) discussion of the origins of religious experience being a regression
to the “oceanic feeling” of the infant mind to more recent pronouncements such as that of
James Hillman (1995: xvi), who claimed: “There is only one core issue for all Psychology.
Where is the me? Where does the ‘me’ begin? Where does the ‘me’ stop? Where does the
‘other’ begin?” The differentiation of self from non-self is patently second-order, since it
assumes there is a self that is differentiating. This is made more explicit in the work of
James Gibson. His notion of affordance is an illustration of how the perception of differ-
ences on which an observer relies to act effectively, crucially depends on the nature of the
observer; more specifically on what the observer is able to do (Gibson 1977).
7. The difference between self and other is not merely a theoretical construct. In neu-
rological studies of how the sensations reflecting actions in the world are distinguished
from those reflecting actions of the observer, the differentiation of self and other is given
quite explicit definition (e.g., Blakemore, Wolpert & Frith 2002). Likewise, studies of the
immune system often propose that it is in fact a system that “knows” the difference be-
tween self and not-self (e.g., Varela 1994).
8. Further examples could easily be found but are not needed since the claim being
made here should be clear. Merely to propose a change from first- to second-order cyber-
netics as the basis for observing and hence understanding consciousness, while useful up to
a point, is not enough in itself. The type of observer needs to be taken into account.
9. But this in turn raises a further, productive, question. Are there as many types of
consciousness as there are types of observers? At one level, the answer is clearly “yes.”
In his influential paper “What is it like to be a bat?”, Nagel (1974) points out that while it
would be unreasonable to deny that animals like bats are conscious, that does not imply
that we can know what that means in terms of qualia, what it “feels like” to have the qual-

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ity of consciousness of a bat. As he puts it, “Consciousness is what makes the mind-body
problem really intractable” (Nagel 1974: 435).
10. This pinpoints the difficulty with Gasparyan’s proposal. While it is useful in
avoiding some of the dead ends that are all too common in the literature on consciousness,
it leaves the central issue of subjectivity and qualia untouched. This, often called the “hard
problem” (Chalmers 1995), like many other important problems, does not have a solution.
It serves to create an arena of discussion within which ideas, such as Gasparyan’s can be
dialectically developed.
11. To develop Gasparyan’s proposal, what is being advanced here is the idea that in
order to be effective, a change of viewpoint also requires a metaphysical shift. This shift is
towards the radical panpsychism of Charles Sanders Peirce and Alfred North Whitehead.
12. Peirce’s triadic semiotics is an ontological system with three levels. The first is
bare existence, the second is relation and the third is, crucially, semiotic interpretation.
The first two levels are necessary for signs to exist, the third, and most significant level
for what is being suggested here, is concerned with distinguishing signs and acting upon
them. Peirce calls this level the “interpretant.” Somewhat problematically, Peirce’s triadic
system puts the interpretant in third position. However, it is being suggested here that it
corresponds to Gasparyan’s second-order proposition: Peirce gives the interpretant a fun-
damental ontological role as the primordial unifier of the mental and physical worlds (see
the numerous references to this volume in collections of Peirce’s work, e.g., Houser &
Kloesel 1992). Moreover, the interpretant is the means by which physical systems are able
to respond to themselves. It is, hence, a treatment of consciousness with significant resem-
blance to Gasparyan’s second-order approach. Biosemiotics, which combines Peirce’s rad-
ical panpsychism with the rational biology of Jakob von Uexküll, provides the conceptual
and methodological resources to clarify the types of differences of which any conscious
being can become aware (e.g., Hoffmeyer 2008).
13. Perhaps more radically still, Whitehead’s thoroughgoing organicism claims that
the ultimate ontological primitives are moments of subjective experience. In each mo-
ment a process Whitehead calls “concrescence,” prehends prior conditions of the world
to produce new and unique conditions. In this manner, the universe enacts what he calls a
“creative advance into novelty” (Whitehead 1929: 349). Whitehead holds that the process
of concrescence has no parts – it is an indivisible aspect of the universe where no distinc-
tion can be made between mental and physical realms. There is a non-trivial resemblance
here to Gasparyan’s notion of a “minimum unit of meaning” (§49). It is also worth noting
that the term “meaning” locates subjectivity. A subject “means” to act, and acts on the basis
of what the world “means” to the subject.
14. Finally, it might also be observed that most of the literature cited by Gasparyan
comes, reasonably enough, from the discussion of consciousness by Western academics
working in a Western context, with the implicit ontological and methodological assump-
tions that this entails. In many Eastern traditions, the study of consciousness has proceeded
for millennia with profoundly different assumptions. Western philosophers who have en-
gaged with Eastern traditions, especially those who are experienced meditators, approach
consciousness in a characteristically different way that often avoids some of the difficulties
Gasparyan points out (e.g., Metzinger 2003). A postmodern synthesis of Eastern traditions
and Western panpsychism may help to avoid some of the dead ends to which Gasparyan
draws our attention.

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Open Peer Commentary: Consciousness as Self-

Description and the Inescapability of Reduction
Sergei Levin

1. Diana Gasparyan proposes applying the principles of second-order cybernetics

(SOC) to the philosophy of consciousness as an alternative to the traditional approach,
which is supposedly based on first-order cybernetics (FOC). The new approach is very am-
bitious and, if successful, may radically shift the paradigm in the study of consciousness.
2. Interestingly, the application of SOC principles results in a theory of conscious-
ness that resembles the classical phenomenology. Both theories aim to provide a holistic
understanding of cognition without separating an observer from his experiences and en-
vironment. The proposed theory distinguishes itself from the classical phenomenology,
declaring “the experience of differences is more primary than intentionality” (§65).
3. There are various other aspects of the application of SOC principles in the philoso-
phy of consciousness. I concentrate only on one. My major concern is the promise to get rid
of the reductionist agenda in the study of consciousness. Gasparyan’s new theory promises
to escape reductionism and to provide a coherent self-description of consciousness. I argue
that it actually includes the problem of reduction.
4. The author says that the task of reductionism in the philosophy of consciousness “is
to reduce consciousness to various types of objective essences” and it “manifests itself in
the search for other external reasons for consciousness, such as language, culture, and soci-
ety” (§7). If it is possible to fulfill the reductionist’s task, then consciousness fully depends
upon something else that is not consciousness. If we assume that consciousness depends
upon a number of factors X, then, in a metaphysical sense, X are prior to consciousness and
X are more basic than consciousness.
5. It is hard to overestimate the appeal of the idea of the reduction of consciousness.
Reduction of consciousness could help us to explain consciousness in scientific terms, it
unifies the ontology and there are many philosophical arguments for reductionism. On the
other hand, reductionism raises the concern that reduction does not explain consciousness
but eliminates it. In effect, it just substitutes the phenomenon of consciousness with a list
of external factors. The concern is clearly expressed in the target article and it serves as
justification for replacing reductionism “with a strategy whereby consciousness will be
talked about in the language of consciousness” (§16).
6. There are objections to attempts to study consciousness within the domain of the
individual mind. For the sake of the argument, I would like to avoid going into these de-
bates and would like to embrace the proposed methodology. My aim is to show that even if
we agree with the initial premises and methodology of SOC in the study of consciousness,
the question of reduction would arise yet again. In other words, Gasparyan claims that
the “non-normal” theory of consciousness (§§25f) would replace the reductionist program
with a self-description. However, after that, the reduction just does not seem to go away.
7. The “non-normal” theory of consciousness proceeds from the premise that “con-
sciousness can be seen as an example of the autopoietic system, knowledge of which is
generated by the same system” (§15). Consciousness is the source, and at the same time the
instrument, of acquiring knowledge of itself. The application of SOC principles means that
we should not try to describe our consciousness from the “external observer” point of view.

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8. The main instrument of the study of consciousness for the “non-normal” theory is
self-description without postulating a subject–object dualism and the objective world. The
self-description should be as rich as our own consciousness; otherwise, it is not adequate.
The self-description has different modes, levels and content. The latter does not become
salient; it exists as “bundle of internal differences, where some parts, being differentiated,
allow the existence of others” (§46). According to the “non-normal” theory, a core feature
of self-description of consciousness is various differentiations.
9. Gasparyan has presented an elaborate theoretical model of self-description in terms
of differences, but there are not many actual examples of such descriptions in the article. In
this regard let us see how self-description in terms of differences give rise to the problem
of reduction in three easy and, I suppose, universal steps:
a. There are parts of consciousness (experiences) that differentiate themselves by
claims that they have consciousness. I call these experiences persons or people.
b. All people I have ever encountered have a relationships with other experiences.
These experiences are their individual characteristics and factors around them.
Some of those characteristics are related to claims about consciousness and some
are not. For example, hair color has nothing to do with consciousness, but the at-
tachment of the head to the body does seem to be very relevant factor.
c. In the self-description of my consciousness, I can search for the list of character-
istics and factors that are necessary and sufficient for claims about consciousness.
10. In the third step, the question of reduction arises anew. During these steps of
self-description of consciousness, I have followed the methodology presented in the target
article (§32). I described my consciousness in the first person with active verbs and I ac-
knowledged my presence as observer. Nevertheless, in the third step, I faced the question
of reduction. Even if I had constructed the problem of reduction and had never perceived
it directly, it is still the same problem, arising this time from the self-description of con-
sciousness.
11. The search for the list of characteristics and factors that are necessary and suffi-
cient for claims about consciousness is the question of reduction. The search for the list is
the “search for other external reasons for consciousness” (§7) and this is the task of the re-
duction. The characteristics and factors are internal parts of my consciousness, so I still do
not postulate any objective world. However, the list is external to people, since the experi-
ence of people and the experience of the factors and characteristics in the list are different.
12. The list does not even have to be the complete list of necessary and sufficient
conditions. It may well be the case that consciousness is such a vague state that it is impos-
sible to provide its comprehensive self-description or set rigid boundaries. The list may be
more like Wittgenstein’s family resemblance concept. Yet the search for this list would be
a question of reduction of consciousness because the phenomenon in question could have
various reasons (causes).
13. In the target article, Gasparyan has compared the experience of consciousness
to performative utterances (§§27–30). Prima facie, it may look like this move is anti-
reductionist because performative utterances are self-affirming. In fact, it is also compat-
ible with the question of reduction. To be successful, the performative utterance depends
on certain external factors. For instance, to name a ship, one must have the appropriate
authority and one can only do it at the right time and at the right place. The same applies

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to consciousness: claims about consciousness – even autobiographical claims – depend on

certain factors.
14. One possible criticism of the proposed steps to reduction is to say that claims
about the existence of the consciousness of others are not autobiographical and hence are
not the part of an autopoietic system, which consciousness essentially is. These claims
about consciousness bring back into discussion the third-person perspective and the objec-
tive world, which must be avoided in the new approach. That is how he problem of reduc-
tion appeared in the first place.
15. On closer examination of the proposed steps, it is evident that I do not postulate
the existence of people or anything else. The word “people,” etc., just refers to various
parts of my consciousness. I do not see how anyone could conceivably deny the existence
of the experience of others in the self-description of consciousness.
16. Furthermore, Gasparyan distinguishes access to the world and access to the other
interpretations of the world. We do not have the former but we have the latter (§73). The
interpretations of the world are not equal, some of them are better, some of them worse.
Claims by other people that they have consciousness are their interpretations of the world.
These interpretations are very convincing. A curious mind should start to wonder why such
interpretations happen at all and what are the reasons for them – and with that very inquiry
the question of reduction arises anew.
17. If the arguments I have presented are sound, then the self-description of con-
sciousness in terms of differences does not remove the question of reduction. Even if epis-
temological and ontological reductions are impossible, there is no contradiction between
self-description and the search for other external reasons for consciousness. The theory
of consciousness as self-description in terms of differences may be a useful tool for the
study of mind. It may even grasp the essence of consciousness. Still, the question of why
consciousness happens this way would remain, and this is the search for external reasons
for consciousness – hence the question of reduction.

Acknowledgments
The commentary was prepared with the financial support of the Russian Foundation
for Basic Research, within the framework of the project “Unity of Consciousness: the Phe-
nomenal Field and the Binding Problem” no. 16-03-00834.

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Open Peer Commentary:

The Non-Relationality of Consciousness
Adriana Schetz

1. In one of the most intriguing books of the last decade of the 20th century in cog-
nitive science, Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch developed a new
approach to the phenomenon of consciousness. They insisted on abandoning a purely sci-
entific, third-person methodology while discussing the realm of consciousness. The title
of this book, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience, explicitly
indicates which direction one should take to reach an adequate theory of consciousness:
the idea of the embodiment of mind. Diana Gasparyan’s target article fits squarely into this
trend, and is yet another effort to overcome a conspicuous crisis in attempts to resolve the
hard problem of consciousness, as described by David Chalmers (1995).
2. As I see it, the key problem Gasparyan presents is that contemporary cognitive sci-
ence treats consciousness as a relational phenomenon – something that supposedly takes
place between subject and object (§4). In this relationship, reflection is possible merely
as meta-knowledge (§4). This approach is entirely coherent and in line with the spirit of
cognitive science. However, it does not allow us to explain the main feature of conscious-
ness – the fact that it is reflective in its very nature, and that this reflectivity is transitive not
only outwardly, but somehow inwardly as well. Let me explain what this exactly means.
3. The author remarks that an “experience of consciousness is performative in prin-
ciple” (§27). That seems, as she cogently claims, to fit well with John Searle’s observations
about expressions such as: “I promise” (§29). In the case of such a declaration, when say-
ing “I promise,” there is no need for further activity to be successful in promising some-
thing (Searle 1979). Similarly, every time our own thoughts, feelings, or desires become
the object of our consciousness, the performative nature of such acts becomes noticeable:
“what” one is thinking about is identical with “how” this appears in one’s consciousness
(§30). For example, when one thinks about the beauty of a flower (say, this flower is very
beautiful), one is, at the same time, mentally somehow in a mode of performing the follow-
ing thought: this flower is very beautiful. Finally, we get something that I want to call the
non-relationality of consciousness, and that Gasparyan portrays as understandable from the
perspective of second-order cybernetics (§§6f).
4. By second-order cybernetics, she understands a rejection of first-order cybernet-
ics, i.e., rejection of the idea according to which consciousness forms a kind of relation
between the subject (who is conscious) and the object (“aboutness” of consciousness). For
second-order cybernetics, consciousness seems to be no longer relational. To be conscious
means to be in an internal state of mental differentiation – “the experience of differentia-
tion” (§48) – which eventually leads to undermining the subject-object distinction.
5. Admittedly, Gasparyan makes use of the concept of relation while speaking about
the reflectivity of consciousness, but one may hold that this is only derivative relational-
ity. It is derivative because it obtains between inner states of the mental system (mind) as
a whole; in addition it is conceived as an autopoietic operation of that system (§50). The
autopoietic nature of consciousness allows one to arrive at the conclusion that:

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The array of difference will constitute the ‘essence’ of this system […]. To this extent,
this system does not have any substances-essences and it is not a substance by itself. This
system has nothing but differences. (§50).

6. The idea of the autopoietic nature of consciousness seems very plausible to me,
and is fully consistent with Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s view on experience and auto-
reflection. What bothers me is Gasparyan’s attachment to the idea of a relational nature of
consciousness. Here are some details of my concern.
7. The embodied mind approach suggests that consciousness is basically non-rela-
tional:
The phrase ‘unity of consciousness’ refers to the idea that one understands all of one’s
experiences as happening to a single self. As Jackendoff rightly notes, however, there is an
equally obvious disunity in consciousness, for the forms in which we can be consciously
aware depend considerably on the modalities of experience. (Varela, Thompson, Rosch
1991: 55)

Moreover, Thompson, while speaking about John Searle’s model of the conscious mind,
notes that:
According to this model, the neural substrates of individual conscious states should not be
considered sufficient for the occurrence of those states, for those states themselves presup-
pose the background consciousness of the subject. Any given conscious state is a modula-
tion of a preexisting conscious field. An individual experience or conscious state (such as
visual recognition of a face) is not a constituent of some aggregate conscious state, but
rather a modification within the field of a basal or background consciousness. (Thompson
2007: 351)

8. Perceptual consciousness provides a good example of what I mean by non-relation-

ality, but without leaving out transitivity and differentiation of conscious states. The dif-
ference between, say, seeing and feeling some object by touch results from the difference
in phenomenal character of those two experiences. The conscious content of visual experi-
ence is somehow identical with the way it presents itself to the subject of experience. When
one is conscious of one’s visual experience, one has conscious experience of one’s visual
experience. However, being conscious of one’s visual experience should not be seen as a
different or a separate state from having conscious experience of one’s visual experience.
For if this were so, we would certainly talk about a higher-order theory of consciousness.
9. Such a higher-order experience theory of consciousness, also referred to as a
higher-order perception theory by Peter Carruthers (2011), was developed by John Locke
(1975), and more recently by David Armstrong (1993). Unfortunately, this approach faces
a number of difficulties. One of the most important is that in an attempt to explain this kind
of consciousness, one risks getting trapped in an infinite regress: the experience of percep-
tual experience is explained by invoking the experience of that experience, and this experi-
ence of experience is in turn explained by the presence of the experience of experience of
perceptual experience, and so forth. In order to avoid the regress, the content of the latter
(i.e., visual) experience becomes a mode of presentation of the former (i.e., conscious)
experience: visual experience modifies consciousness. The relation between conscious ex-
perience and perceptual experience (in this case, visual experience) is merely apparent or
illusory. In this point, I strongly agree with Gilbert Harman (1990), especially with what
he says about the transparency of perceptual experience. According to Harman, there is no
“mental paint” – i.e., the concept of sense data – when we perceive an object, which should

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be seen as being perceived by a higher-order conscious state. All that we are aware of in the
act of perceiving is an object being perceived. Therefore, perception modifies conscious-
ness without forming any kind of sub-state in relation to consciousness.
10. Harman’s conception of the transparency of perceptual experience fits his repre-
sentationalism. But, as I see it, since the content and the mode of perceptual consciousness
presumably form one unified act, there is still a place for direct realism concerning percep-
tual experience. A dually constituted act of perception may still have its external object,
i.e., reality. And then, when one is talking about the relational nature of consciousness, one
is talking – I take it – about the interaction between the sensory system and an external ob-
ject. Thus, in order to describe consciousness, one should reject the idea of “relationism,”
and replace it with the idea of knowledge, or better, of experience by differentiation. The
reason I want to avoid relationism is that it brings in the subject/object distinction, which
– as I agree with Gasparyan – should be abandoned if the phenomenon of consciousness
it is to be explained. As I tried to show above, the idea of relationism leads directly to an
infinite regress.
11. Therefore it is not relationality but modality that sets differentiation in the realm
of mind, and hence determines the differentiation of consciousness. Moreover, this kind of
differentiation is something perceptual modalities share, in my opinion, with a whole range
of mental states, including beliefs, desires, emotions, etc. Thus, the idea of consciousness
conceived as self-description in difference, as Gasparyan elaborates it, makes sense not
only for perceptual consciousness. Second-order cybernetics is now possible, since self-
description is no longer seen as a relation between subject (self) and object (content of
consciousness). This inner or inward transitivity of consciousness goes hand in hand with
its autopoietic nature, which preserves the unity of the conscious mind as a whole.
12. To conclude, the aim of my commentary was not to argue with Gasparyan’s at-
titude towards the problem of consciousness. In fact, I agree with most of her claims. In-
stead, I merely wanted to strengthen the idea of consciousness conceived as a unified, non-
dualistic phenomenon – in the sense of the inner distinction between subject and object. As
I have tried to show, the insistence on the non-relational character of conscious states is a
promising possibility in this respect.

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Author’s Response:
Phenomenology of the System: Intentionality, Differences,
Understanding, and the Unity of Consciousness
Diana Gasparyan

Consciousness as a phenomenological system: Intentionality and differences

1. In his rather critical commentary, Yochai Ataria points out that I over-emphasized
the subject by ignoring the tension between subject-object relations and by putting the ob-
ject aside. I agree that this would turn my thinking into a version of rather naïve solipsism.
However, this is not what I was trying to show. Rather I distanced myself from the subject-
object paradigm because it all too often results in an unproductive act of balance between
the two extremes – naïve realism and epistemic dead-end solipsism. In the first case, there
is a substantial emphasis on the priority of things and objects of the external world, and in
the second, on the priority of the consciousness that holds objects and the external world
strictly within the boundaries of experience. Philosophically, realism is mistaken, for we
never start with the outer world separately but only with the world as phenomenon, as it is
being given to consciousness. However, by starting with the fact of consciousness, we risk
never leaving it to reach the outer world – we meet only our own states of consciousness
everywhere. While such solipsism may be a philosophically correct argument, it misjudges
our everyday epistemic possibilities and renders cognition helpless. In order to eliminate
such a stalemate, phenomenology offers a new set of instruments in order to overcome
these equally bad options. In phenomenology, neither the subject nor the object is the
grounding relatum, but they are rather mutually dependent. This is the primary virtue of
putting the intentionality of consciousness as the starting point of every phenomenologi-
cal analysis. Intentionality equals the subject and the object, insofar as it relates them to
each other forever: Any object (phenomenon) exists only by being perceived by a subject
(consciousness); conversely, any subject (consciousness) exists only by being directed to
any kind of object. Simply put, there is no act of thinking prior to the objective thought and
there is no objective thought without any act of thinking.
2. I agree with Urban Kordeš (§4) that the term “experience” is even more relevant
than consciousness, as it certainly points to the indissolubility and priority of intentional-
ity. In other words, the boundary between subject and object is not only blurred – which
Ataria himself points out in §§12f it actually ceases to be a boundary and becomes a
bridge or a connection point, which is described by the notion of intentionality. Most phe-
nomenologists agree with this thought – Franz Brentano, Edmund Husserl, and Мaurice
Merleau-Ponty (to whom Ataria not only refers in §12 but with whom he also seemingly
agrees). So the subject does not precede the object, and nor does the object precede the
subject, but their relation is primary. Such a phenomenological view opens a wide range
of possibilities. In fact, it envisages that there comes into existence neither a subject nor
an object by itself, but that when they appear, they appear altogether as a system of mutual
relation and differentiation. However, this model does not exclude that we can resort to
the subject-object pair in cases when necessary. For example, science in general seems to
require the use of this pair. As Ataria (§13) rightly notes, it is very difficult for us to give

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up its use. However, here we can apply a “switch” that refers to the context – naturalist
or transcendental. If we focus, within the scope of what is intentionally given to us, on
the nature of objects, we follow a kind of naturalist approach. But if it is about how these
objects are given in relation to consciousness – we use the transcendental approach. Thus,
in spite of the subject-object unity, the intentional system allows for different accentuation
or switches, comparable to gestalt switches between figure and background. However, it
is important to understand that the notions “subject” and “object” themselves appear after
we “turned on the switch,” and in this sense they are to be considered artificial constructs,
which are applied for certain (practical) purposes.
3. This is why it would be incorrect to interpret my approach as a variety of dualism,
as Ataria supposes (§2). Of course, if one were to interpret my approach without leaving
the narrow frame of the dualistic paradigm (§13), then my abandoning of the objective
dimension would be regarded as an enclosure in the subjective dimension (the choice of
solipsism whilst refusing realism). However, I abandon realism not in order to choose
solipsism, but to find a middle ground – the path of phenomenological analysis of inten-
tionality, hereby suggesting a way out of the realistic-solipsism dilemma.
4. What I suggested can hardly be called a naturalistic dualism, in particular because
phenomenology does not restrict itself to the limits of any strong naturalist setting (which
assumes that everything is a pure object, i.e., can be objectivated without the need for any
reference to its state of being given to some consciousness). Ataria points out that the ad-
dition of the principle of differentiation as a new fundamental law serves as a reason for
referring to my approach as naturalistic dualism. Such an assumption seems controversial
to me – not every discovery of a new law within the framework of a given theory allows
for treating this theory as naturalistic dualism (§3). The reason will be the nature of the law
itself. David Chalmers (1996) underlines that those fundamental psychophysical laws that
he suggests have a principally naturalistic nature are part of nature and might be discovered
empirically (by means of a procedure of explanation). On the contrary, I insist that the prin-
ciple of differentiation is a metaphysical (i.e., fundamentally non-empirical) law and em-
pirical (explanatory) methods of cognition in this respect will turn out to be inapplicable.

Science or mystery: The role of understanding

5. The non-naturalistic direction of my approach is important for clarifying the issue
of its “scientific status.” In particular, another suggestion from Ataria (§7) underlines the
fact that, according my approach, one cannot “predict” new scientific facts – but this seems
to be rather irrelevant to my approach. The theory of consciousness I am talking about does
not, in principle, claim to be empirically fruitful. This means that it is not the task of scien-
tific explanation (i.e., external causative modelling) or prediction that falls to us, but rather
the task of phenomenological description, which means the understanding of fundamental
differences within the overall intentional system of relations.
6. In my opinion, second-order cybernetics (SOC), as well as the project of phenome-
nology, view epistemology more broadly than science. This, in its turn, means that science,
at least in its reductionist dimension, is not the only form of cognition. The method I am
trying to apply (which has different names: phenomenological rather than naturalistic, sec-
ond- rather than first-order cybernetics, understanding/description rather than explanation)
retains its rational nature from the point of view of adequate directionality. My thought
is that the primary subject matter of study must be consciousness, i.e., the intentional di-

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mension of the subject, such that the rational (adequate) stance will be a non-reductionist
approach. However, one should not understand “the natural scientific approach” as “scien-
tific nature.” In this respect I agree with Kordeš (§14) that it is quite possible that it is not
worth talking about descriptive theories of consciousness, but rather about description of
the phenomenal realm as a method in its own right.
7. While this point would deserve a deeper discussion, I cannot elaborate it here.
I can only refer to the founders of the neo-Kantian approach, who are in many respects
the ancestors of phenomenology – Wilhelm Dilthey (1977), Wilhelm Windelband (1915),
Heinrich Rickert (1962) – who suggested that we differentiate all knowledge into two types
of sciences – science of spirit (consciousness) and science of nature: we explain the life
of nature and understand the life of consciousness. Konstantin Pavlov-Pinus (§3) talks
about the same division when referring to the method of hermeneutics. The necessity of
dividing methodology becomes evident because mental life (understood in the very broad
sense, not only as the mentality of individuals – a point that is important for my discussion
of Sergei Levin below – but as the consciousness of whole societies or the aggregate of
senses developed by humankind) cannot be explained in terms of causative connections
building on some general law but must be reconstructed on the basis of some fundamental
laws of the comprehensive intentional system.
8. For example, the explanation of an event such as the falling of a body is totally ex-
hausted by pointing to gravitation as the general law, the particular case of which would be
the falling of a particular body. Such an event is regular and repetitive. Also, physical pro-
cesses do not have a qualitatively heterogeneous inner nature. By contrast, it is difficult to
point to a general law underlying, for example, some historical event such as the execution
of Robespierre during the French revolution. This dramatic event, first of all, is singular
and not repetitive, and second, to understand it, it is not enough to state the closest natural
reason (physical cutting-off of the head as a reason for death). If we only apply external
scientific explanations, we will only be able to construct the knowledge of the physical and
physiological dimension of this process but will not understand anything about such the
notional dimension of a political leader being eliminated, or of treason in terms of revo-
lutionary ideas, of the downfall of the pathos of humanism, etc. If we want to understand
factual events of such a type, we are interested in meanings, which are always founded by
values and envisage understanding. For example, the discovery of an artefact will become
meaningful for us, not when we perform a comprehensive chemical and physical analysis
of this object (because it is useless to weigh or dissect a statuette in order to understand
what it is like), but when we try to find out whether it is an object of a religious cult or
simply a decoration. And for this, in its turn, it is necessary to understand what religious,
aesthetic, and other values various peoples have cultivated, that is, it is necessary to go
deeper into the sphere of meanings.
9. In this respect, I found the thoughts of Bryony Pierce in §2 on the notion of norms
(the issue of values) particularly interesting. It seems that the sphere of values is, in fact,
the dimension of qualia, which in principle retains its prospects in the first-person. Being
a phenomenal aspect, the sphere of values cannot be explained in an external causal way.
This impossibility poses a serious problem for philosophy, i.e., the separation between
“what is” and “what ought to be,” which was presented in the most articulate way by David
Hume:

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In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that
the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the
being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am
surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet
with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. (Hume 2010: 213)

And further, “the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of
objects, nor is perceived by reason” (ibid: 214).
10. This also accords with the position of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1965), who denied
that values (morals) were facts or revealed in the world of particular fact-events, which
therefore cannot be formulated in terms of sentences. That is why with their help it is im-
possible to respond to the question “why?”, regarding the cashier (“Why did you return the
money to the cashier who was in the error?” – “I considered it correct,” – “Why did you
consider it correct?” – “I do not know”), as they do not continue the causal chain but rather
interrupt it in a wilful way that remains unclear for the procedure of explanation.
11. I am inclined to interpret this topic in accordance with the idea stated in §7 and
§11 above regarding the impossibility of an external explanation of the inner measure-
ments of a subject. So the point here is not about explaining but about understanding some
events – in this case acts of moral action. I agree that emotions mean the end of ground-
ing. I do not deny that the emotional sphere is an area inside the sphere of consciousness,
as it might seem, according to Pierce (§10). The point is that emotions still need to be
conceived. Thus joy cannot be phenomenologically separated from the realization of joy.
Therefore, phenomenology speaks about intentionality – emotion must also refer to a sub-
ject of consciousness in order to become effective. This does not contradict, it seems to me,
Pierce’s statement in §10 that emotional arguments do not behave like rational arguments
– the latter lead to regress, whereas the former stop it.
12. Correspondingly, when I am talking about self-consciousness, I mean exactly this
global sphere of meanings, the distinction of which would be in the fact that it always un-
derstands itself from within itself. It goes without saying that such a global sphere of mean-
ings understands itself and envisages a serious metaphysical shift, which John Pickering
(§11) points out, who uses “meaning” in Hegel’s terms. In order to specify this abstraction,
suppose that under this global sphere of meanings, the whole universe of the symbolic can
be understood – any sign formations (semiosis) – languages, cultures, values, images, and
ideas. This model well accords with what Pickering maintains, bearing in mind a certain
model of radical panpsychism (§11). Obviously, inside this sphere, the procedures of re-
ducing certain things to others are implemented (as Levin §9 points out), for example,
from simple to complex. Bearing in mind that any understanding requires reducing one
thing to another, I have to specify that when I speak about the inapplicability of reduction-
ism to consciousness, I mean the heterogeneous (not homogeneous) reductionism such
as the reduction of the mental to the physical, or subjective to objective. However, I do
not deny any homogeneous procedures of reduction, but rather point to the irrelevance of
heterogeneous reductionism. Therefore, I agree with Levin that inside self-consciousness
there are parts that can be reduced (or as I would say, referred) to others (§9), but under
no circumstances would I say that we are dealing with reduction (affine), which I oppose.
13. In contemporary analytic philosophy of consciousness, the above-mentioned di-
vision between “understanding” and “explanation” corresponds to the division of first-
person access and third-person access, respectively. According to the first approach, we
understand, and according to the second, we explain. The search for external reasons for

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consciousness, which Levin speaks about in §17, is part of the second strategy. In general,
this search remains irrelevant for the work on consciousness, for the simple reason that
consciousness does not allow talking about itself in terms of the external. It is not possible
to come closer to consciousness via non-consciousness. It is in this, and probably only in
this sense that reductionism and its infeasibility is referred to in my target article (§§7–10).
14. Exactly this motive retains its importance in case the possible objectivity or ob-
servability from the third-person perspective (third person access) is considered the only
criterion in the study of consciousness, as Ataria (§11) envisages. By contrast, I am orien-
tated towards an understanding in philosophy (which also exists in the philosophy of con-
sciousness, within the boundaries of anti-reduction programs) maintaining that there are
things that would be impossible to define in terms of objectivity. Above all, consciousness
refers to this. But also differentiation supposedly refers to it in the sense of the intentional
system of relations described above. In itself, differentiation is not objective (for example,
it is not a sign, if we talk about language– see below §§19–22 of this response), but it
makes all other elements (i.e., signs of language) objects.
15. In the following respect, Ataria (§7) is certainly right: the prognostic functions
of sciences studying consciousness and the totality of mental phenomena are by far not all
the possibilities that the sciences possess in order to study natural facts. But it is important
to understand that this would be connected not with the “defects” of the method of un-
derstanding but with the specific nature of the “object” itself – in this case consciousness
(presumably of a non-determinant nature). Equally, this does not cancel out the fully-fea-
tured heuristicity of knowledge about consciousness, but points to the necessity of apply-
ing another more relevant methodology. Treating it as the only explanatory (reductionism)
strategy in science, this explanation of understanding (explanation) in terms of a strategy of
pairing science and mysticism crucially impoverishes the picture of human consciousness
and definitely does not leave us with any chance of solving the puzzle of consciousness.

How closed is the system? Differences and the unity of consciousness

16. The model of a closed system, which, as Pickering (§11) rightly notes, has actu-
ally some features of panpsychism, suffers from a series of problems. The most obvious of
these, as Pierce (§10) notes, are the two problems of
a. establishing meanings:, and
b. justifying meanings
(It seems to me that by talking about the problem of justifying decisions Pierce also means
the problem of establishing meanings in general). Pierce writes that it is not quite clear
how meanings are established inside the system itself (§6).
17. To solve the first problem (establishing meanings in general), I would like to look
at the way in which language is organized (to the extent that language is an example of
an autopoietic system, the principle of internal differences can also be applied to it.) This
problem is described in structural linguistics as follows: “language is a form rather than
substance,” “the difference of the sign from others is everything that constitutes it,” “lan-
guage has nothing except for differences,” etc. (de Saussure 1983: 116). In general terms,
the linguistic model offers a view of the essence of the thing (its meaning) when it is de-
termined not by its positive content, but differentially – through the relation to essences of
other things (their meanings). In this respect, there is no substance if we understand it as

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some fixed and autonomous content as such, but there are meanings – values differentiated
relatively to each other.
18. According to Ferdinand de Saussure, this model is justified thanks to the fact that
the linguistic sign is not the connection of the physical object and its name but the unity
of concept (signified) and the acoustic image (signifying). The concept is the image of the
object in our consciousness, and the acoustic image is the image of the sound. These two
sides of the sign have a psychic origin, i.e., are ideal and exist only in our consciousness.
This phenomenon is also interpreted in phenomenology – this is not the object outside the
boundaries of consciousness but the image of the object (always processed and constructed
to a certain completeness). It is very difficult to falsify such a definition, as it is clear that
the physical object cannot be part of the sign or phenomenon.
19. This definition will also help to shed light on the second problem mentioned by
Pierce (§10) – i.e., how meanings can be justified inside the system itself. As Pierce rightly
notes, common sense tells us that beyond signs there are objects (§4). However, if we take
into account that the sign does not possess any substantial characteristics, i.e., does not
have any sovereign meaning outside the boundaries of the system in general, it does not
follow that signs correlate, first of all, with each other. Thus the meaning of any chess piece
is formed not as a result of its objective characteristics (material of manufacture, shape,
etc.), but by what place (position) it takes on the chess-board. Within the framework of
language, “everything relates in correlation,” i.e., no sign can have meaning on its own, but
only in relation to other signs. Meanings in language are not defined positively in terms of
their content, but negatively – in contraposition to other items of the language of the same
system. Accordingly, any separate item of the language is characterised by what the other is
not. Thus, in relation to the signs of writing, Saussure says that the “significance of letters
is quite negative and differential – all we need to do is to distinguish one letter from the
another” (Saussure 1983: 118). And further on, about the system of language as a whole:
“The whole mechanism of the language […] is based on oppositions of such a kind and on
phonetic and conceptual differences accompanying them” (ibid: 119).
20. As the signifying and the signified also refer to each other, first of all the signified
cannot be isolated (taken out of the structure of the language) and put outside, and second,
it is impossible to define what precedes what – the signified, the signifying, or vice versa.
If we accept the structure of the sign, we must agree to the fact that between them there
are no relations of precedence – they exist at the same time, concerning and in relation to
each other; that is always, when there is one (signifying), there is another (signified) (in
terms of phenomenology: noema always refers to noesa, and vice versa). This assumption,
naturally coming out of the definition of the sign, however, also seems counter-intuitive,
as common sense tries to insist on the fact that the signified has priority in terms of pri-
mordiality, and exists before the signifying. However, here we need to ignore the data of
everyday representation, as the signifying and the signified are retained by each other such
that they cannot have any semantic or objective advance. Consequently, we cannot appeal
to the primordiality of things outside the system of signs – we can suppose them (things),
but cannot work with them. But then it is not worth waiting for meanings to be transformed
by means of referring to “real” things.
21. In turn, the question of the close or open nature of the system should be interpreted
so as to suggest that, in all probability, the system has its own external. But the key word is
“own.” Any system has an external that it can have. In spite of the presence of this external
and active interaction with it (leading to transformation and change of the system), the sys-

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tem never meets it but includes, processes, and totally changes (the whole of it). Therefore,
the system will not let us come to the “real external.” But this does not mean that it is closed
to the external or that there is no external whatsoever, as Ataria suggests in relation to my
approach (§10). It possibly exists; however, it always comes up as represented by differ-
ent interpreters. As Kordeš says, we are immersed into our experience and cannot leave
it (§7). Such an interpretation plays a fundamental role in Peirce’s theory of significance,
which Pickering speaks about (§12).
22. In this respect, I am grateful to Pavlov-Pinus for a number of significant remarks.
I agree that the definitions of the systems supposing recursion are always opened towards
the future (§5). Such a system is in principle an indefinite and actively transforming organ-
ism that absorbs its own description, which in itself is a new move in the game, and in this
respect its description is already part of what is to be described – the rules of the game are
also acted out. I agree with Pavlov-Pinus in that such a system cannot be considered com-
plete in any of its states (§5) – its own attempts at thematisation lead to a state of imbalance
time after time. In all probability, it is exactly in this state that all the most productive en-
tireties exist that are known to us – consciousness, society, culture, and others. That is why
even if the system is open towards its external, and the external is present for this system,
the system operates proactively again – by being external it meets itself as renewed in con-
nection with the processing of the external.
23. Following the curious remarks of Adriana Schetz (§9) about a higher-order expe-
rience theory of consciousness, I agree that the differences inside the system are certainly
not arranged hierarchically. Even if we talk about relativity, the point is that all relations are
horizontal, and what is more important, inter-referenced (relational). Such a model allows
paradoxes of endless regress to be avoided. When talking about the system of differentia-
tions, I mean a non-hierarchical and not a vertical system. As I write in the section on
reflection in my target articlе (§§33–44), reflection is not correctly defined as knowledge
on knowledge. This is connected with the fact that in this case, as Schetz rightly notes,
there is a risk of endless regress (§9). On the contrary, in a situation where all references
are mutually crossed and belong to one level, such a danger is avoided.
24. I agree with Schetz that the system must be understood as a unity (§11). The inner
system of differences must not wash out this unity. On the contrary, the very possibility
of implementing a system of inner differences is only possible because these differences
beyond the system do not have any significance. As pointed out above, a good example
is the system of chess – each element of the system is allotted meaning only due to the
presence of other elements and the unity of the system on the whole. In all probability,
speaking about the work of consciousness, it is necessary to admit this connectivity of
inner elements.
25. At the end I would like to emphasize that the ideas of intentionality, differences,
understanding, and the unity of consciousness make sense not only for phenomenology.
Since self-description is no longer seen as a relation between subject (self) and object
(content of consciousness), genuine second-order cybernetics is now possible. Intentional-
ity removes the subject-object dualism by fixing that there is no subject before object or
object before subject. If so, this system no longer requires an external or independent ob-
server who could explain it to the outside. Therefore, not external explaining but only inner
understanding is possible. This understanding takes place between mutually differentiated
elements that require each other in order to have any significance. Such an inner or inward

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self-maintenance of the system goes hand in hand with its autopoietic nature, which pre-
serves the unity of the consciousness as a whole.

Acknowledgement
I am extremely grateful to my respected colleagues for reading my target article so at-
tentively and suggesting very precise, profound, and original thoughts. Some of these com-
ments were very critical, while others supported and developed my ideas. But without any
doubt, all of them were very productively directed to the clarification of the target ideas.
I would also like to thank Peter Gaitsch for his critical and helpful feedback on this
text.

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 Design Research as a Variety
of Second-Order Cybernetic Practice
Ben Sweeting

Introduction
1. In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in cybernetics amongst de-
signers. This has been prompted in part by the increased availability and affordability of
technologies with which to augment the environments we design, and those we design in,
which has fuelled interest in ideas regarding interactivity. While this technological focus is
an important aspect of what cybernetics offers design, the relations between the two fields
run much deeper. These connections have been explored explicitly in the work of Ranulph
Glanville (1999, 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2009a, 2011a, 2014b, 2014c), whose
work I use as a point of departure in this article.1
2. Drawing on Gordon Pask’s (1976) conversation theory and the common charac-
terisation of design in terms of conversation (such as by Schön 1991), Glanville (2007c,
2009c) has suggested a close analogy between cybernetics and design, understanding both
as “essentially constructivist” activities (Glanville 2006a: 63; 2013). The parallels Glan-
ville draws are significant enough for him to claim that “cybernetics is the theory of design
and design is the action of cybernetics” (Glanville 2007c: 1178).
3. While part of Glanville’s motivation in developing the connection between cyber-
netics and design has been the insight that the former might bring to the latter, it is an
important aspect of his position that the converse is also the case: that design can set an
example to cybernetics in terms of practice and so inform it, not just vice versa. Thus the
relationship between cybernetics and design is to be understood as one of mutual overlap
and support and, as such, one that avoids the difficulties that can follow from the applica-
tion to design of theories external to it (a problem that seems to recur in architecture in

1. Together with Neil Spiller, Glanville supervised my PhD research, and although this article has
been developed after his passing, it is significantly influenced by my conversations with him. In
addition to his work, on the relationship between cybernetics and design see also: Dubberly &
Pangaro (2007, 2015); Fischer (2015); Fischer & Richards (2015); Furtado Cardoso Lopes (2008,
2009, 2010); Gage (2006, 2007a, 2007b); Goodbun (2011); Herr (2015b); Jonas (2007a, 2007b,
2012, 2014, 2015a, 2015b); Jones (2014); Krippendorff (2007); Krueger (2007); Lautenschlaeger
& Pratschke (2011); Lobsinger (2000); Mathews (2005, 2006, 2007); Pratschke (2007); Rams-
gard Thomsen (2007); Rawes (2007); Spiller (2002); Sweeting (2014, 2015c).

227

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particular) and the more general shortcomings that can follow from our tendency to see the
relation of theory and practice as predominantly the application of the former to the latter
(Glanville 2004a, 2014a, 2015; see also Sweeting 2015c).
4. More specifically, Glanville’s understanding of design as being the action of cy-
bernetics is part of his characterisation of second-order cybernetics (SOC) as being con-
cerned with how cybernetics is to be practiced rather than, as can tend to be the case, a
theoretical reflection on this (Glanville 2011b; Sweeting 2015b). This concern was par-
ticularly evident during his time as President of the American Society for Cybernetics
(ASC), during which he often referred to Margaret Mead’s (1968) challenge, delivered
in her address to the inaugural ASC conference, to practice cybernetics in line with its
own ideas. While the principal legacy of Mead’s remarks has been the epistemological
concerns of SOC, as developed by Heinz von Foerster (1995, 2003a) and others, their
original context is that of the practice of the society itself. It is this aspect to which the
ASC returned during Glanville’s presidency, in terms of both the form and content of its
conferences, which explored cybernetics’ relation to practice using conversational, cy-
bernetic, formats (Baron et al. 2015; Glanville 2011b, 2012; Glanville, Griffiths & Baron
2014; Glanville & Sweeting 2011; van Ditmar & Glanville 2013).2
5. In contrast to this understanding of its relation to practice, Andrew Pickering
(2010: 25f) has characterised SOC as a turn away from the more tangible modes of ex-
perimentation in earlier phases of cybernetics, and towards the linguistic. This view can
be countered: SOC is a reflection on the performative involvement of observers within
their observations, in contrast to the separation of observer and observed in conventional
science. This is very much in line with Pickering’s own emphasis, for example in his
comments on R. D. Laing’s psychiatry as taking seriously “the idea that we are all adap-
tive systems, psychiatrists and schizophrenics alike” (ibid: 8) or his reference to Pask’s
account of the “participant observer,” who tries to maximise interaction with what he or
she observes in order to explore it (ibid: 343f).
6. However, even its advocates must admit that SOC can run the risk of becoming
overly introverted, especially given its central concern with self-reference. Recent think-
ing regarding von Foerster’s development of SOC has addressed this concern by under-
standing it as the beginnings of a research programme rather than as primarily a form of
worldview, and as prompting the “new course of action” suggested in this journal under
the heading of “second-order science” (SOS) (Müller & Müller 2007; Müller 2008, 2011;
Riegler & Müller 2014).3 In this light I suggest that Glanville’s understanding of design,
and particularly his (1999, 2014c) account of the relation between design and science that I
discuss below, allows us to view the currently expanding field of design research as a con-
temporary variety of SOC practice, whether SOC is explicitly invoked or not.4 My purpose

2. See also the recent special issue of Constructivist Foundations on alternative conference formats,
which was inspired in part by these ASC conferences (Hohl & Sweeting 2015; regarding the ASC
conferences, see especially: Richards 2015; Sweeting & Hohl 2015).
3. See also http://www.secondorderscience.org
4. Given that cybernetics stresses the interdependency between acting and understanding, and so
between theory and practice (see e.g., Glanville 2014a; Sweeting 2015c), I could equally refer to
design research as a contemporary variety of second-order cybernetics as to one of second-order
cybernetic practice. Nevertheless, I feel it is important to stress the practical here, given that
SOC, and constructivism generally, currently risk being seen more as a worldview than an active
research tradition.

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in doing so here is not primarily to add to what SOC can bring to design research, which
has been explored in depth elsewhere by many others. Rather, my focus is on what design
can bring to cybernetics, in line with what I have understood as being part of Glanville’s
own motivations for developing this analogy, as noted above. Design research offers an
example of how SOC can develop as a practice-based and outward looking enquiry, while
also suggesting a way of integrating the legacy of tangible experimentation from earlier
cybernetics with its contemporary concerns.

Method and practice in design and research

7. During the period of scientific and technological optimism that followed the Sec-
ond World War, there was a tendency, as evident in what is usually referred to as the design
methods movement, to see design as something that should be put on rational scientific
foundations.5 Since around 1980 this view has been countered by arguments that have
seen design as a discipline in its own right and so as being of the same status as science
rather than something to be corrected by it. Amongst these, the account that Glanville
(2014c) presented at the 1980 Design: Science: Method conference, later expanded as the
journal article Researching Design and Designing Research (1999), is particularly strongly
framed, reversing what had been the more usual hierarchy. Rather than seeing design re-
search as one specific form of scientific research, Glanville argues that, instead, we can
see science as a specific form of design enquiry. This follows from the way that scientific
research inevitably involves design activity, for instance in devising and setting up experi-
ments, but not vice versa.6 Design is, it follows, the more general case and, therefore, “it
is inappropriate to require design to be “scientific”: for scientific research is a subset (a
restricted form) of design, and we do not generally require the set of a subset to act as the
sub subset to that subset any more than we require [that] the basement of [a] building is its
attic” (Glanville 1999: 87f).
8. This argument and others like it around that time, such as those put forward by
Bruce Archer (1979), Nigel Cross (1982) and Donald Schön (1991), consolidate a shift
during the 1970s from trying to base design on the scientific method to the idea that it
has its own epistemological foundations, independent of science (for an overview of this
shift, see Cross 2007b). The attempt to order design according to a linear version of the
scientific method, understood as moving from analysing the problem at hand to testing
and optimising solutions to it, failed for reasons that seem obvious in retrospect: because
design involves the creation of new situations, design questions cannot be fully formulated
in advance but shift and change as they are explored and as proposals are enacted. One of
the most important accounts of these limitations is that developed by design theorist Horst
Rittel, who, writing with the urban designer Melvin Webber, characterised the situations
that designers encounter as “wicked problems,” the complex interdependencies of which
make them unsolvable using conventional linear problem solving (Rittel 1972; Rittel &
Webber 1973, 1984).

5. See for instance: Alexander (1964); Broadbent & Ward (1969); Simon (1996). For a critical dis-
cussion of the design methods movement, see Gedenryd (1998).
6. This is not to say that designers do not make use of scientific research but that doing so is not
essential to what design is, whereas design is a core aspect of research and so science.

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9. On the face of it, Rittel and Webber’s observations mark an incompatibility be-
tween design and science in terms of method. Indeed the exhaustion of the design meth-
ods movement by the 1970s – with leading figures such as Christopher Alexander (1984),
John Christopher Jones (1984) and, indeed, Rittel distancing themselves from it – along
with the unravelling of modernism more generally during that decade, marks something
of a parting of the ways between design and science (architecture, for instance, would
increasingly turn towards history and philosophy, rather than science, for theoretical sup-
port). However, given Glanville’s SOC-inspired argument noted above, this separation
between design and science is not what we might expect. If science is a limited form of
design, then is it not the case that scientific approaches should be commensurable with
design, even if not a basis for it? This apparent disjunction is only the case if we follow
the changes in how design was thought about during this period without also following
the comparable changes regarding science.
10. Design research and the philosophy of science broadly parallel each other over
this period. Both move from a concern with method in the 1960s through a critique of
this in the 1970s to new foundations from the 1980s onwards, focusing on what designers
and scientists actually do in practice rather than on what seems ideal in theory. As noted
above, this led to design being seen as a discipline in its own right (Archer 1979), with its
own “designerly ways of knowing” (Cross 1982) and a refocusing from methodology to
broader and more practice-based concerns, under the heading of design research (for an
overview, see for instance: Grand & Jonas 2012; Michel 2007; Rogers & Yee 2015). In
the context of science, there was a comparable turn during the 1970s and 1980s towards
understanding it in terms of the social and material agency of research as practiced, with
the growth of the fields of the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) and science and
technology studies (STS), such as in the work of Karin Knorr Cetina, David Gooding,
Bruno Latour and Pickering amongst others (for an overview see Pickering 1992). These
accounts are suggestive of a more designerly paradigm in science, in line with Glanville’s
argument. Indeed, accounts of experimentation in SSK/STS can be read almost as if de-
scribing the activities of a design studio; see for instance: Gooding (1992), Pickering
(1993, 1995) and Knorr Cetina (1992), who even uses a direct analogy with architecture.
11. In this light, what appears to be a rupture between design and science during the
1970s is instead a close parallel. Indeed, key critiques advanced in each area – that of
Rittel in design, and that of Paul Feyerabend (1970, 1982, 1993) in science – have similar
content. Rittel and Feyerabend were colleagues at UC Berkeley while they were develop-
ing their ideas. Both were influenced by thinking in cybernetics and systems at that time.
Rittel worked with Ross Ashby at the Ulm School of Design (Fischer & Richards 2015),
while Feyerabend (1982: 64) refers to “new developments in systems theory,” which was
flourishing at Berkeley (which was also home to C. West Churchman) and elsewhere
in California at the time (where Gregory Bateson, amongst others, was based), and his
(1982: 18) comments regarding participant observers reflect contemporaneous preoccu-
pations of SOC.
12. Science, like design, involves creating new ideas and understanding; therefore, as
in design, the criteria and methods that are appropriate will change as part of the process
and cannot be defined in advance if science is to progress:
…to ask how one will judge and choose in as yet unknown surroundings makes as much
sense as to ask what measuring instruments one will use on an as yet unknown planet.
Standards which are intellectual instruments often have to be invented, to make sense of

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new historical situations just as measuring instruments have constantly to be invented to

make sense of new physical situations. (Feyerabend 1982: 29)

13. Feyerabend’s (1970, 1993) reductio ad absurdum argument against the predefined
methods that were characteristic of the philosophy of science at the time concludes by
showing that the only criteria that can be given in advance, that will not inhibit scientific
progress, is that “anything goes.” This also appears in Rittel and Webber (1973: 164), while
Rittel (1972: 393) has “everything goes”: because designers inevitably encounter new and
ambiguously defined situations (it being the purpose of design to create the new), they
have no well-defined problems to solve or enumerable lists of options to pick from and
“any new idea for a planning measure may become a serious candidate” (Rittel & Webber
1973: 164). This phrase is also anticipated by theatre director Joan Littlewood (1964: 432)
in describing the Fun Palace project, on which cybernetician Pask was a key collaborator
along with architect Cedric Price (see e.g., Lobsinger 2000; Mathews 2005, 2006, 2007;
Spiller 2006: 48–50), and that is equally concerned with the in-principle unpredictable.
Furthermore, Feyerabend’s (1982: 202) comment that the proponents of scientific theory
are out of touch with scientific practice echoes the situation in design, where design meth-
ods had become an academic game divorced from practice, as both Alexander (1984: 309)
and Jones (1984: 26) point out.7
14. While Archer (1979) differentiated design as a third disciplinary pole with the
same status as the traditional “two cultures” of the arts and sciences (Snow 1961), Glanville
(2014c) argues against this separation and, instead, characterises all research as being a
design-like activity. This designerly continuity across different fields is, however, obscured
by popular misrepresentations of science as a logical and predictable activity, such as are
perpetuated in the structure of traditional scientific papers, which Peter Medawar (1996)
has critiqued as a fraudulent account of what scientists actually do in practice. Glanville
(2014c: 111) calls for honesty about how research is practiced in all disciplines, and sug-
gests that this will make similarities clear between apparently quite different fields. In this,
Glanville reflects a willingness to transcend disciplinary boundaries that is characteristic
of cybernetics’ origins, which had cut across distinctions between research fields as well
as those between objectivity and subjectivity, human and machine, and mind and body.
15. In stressing the continuities between design and other disciplines, Glanville
(2014c) contrasts his account with that of Archer (1979), whose positioning of design in
terms of its own disciplinary pole, separate to the arts and the sciences, risks isolating it
from other research traditions. Glanville’s understanding, however, still gives design re-
search the special status of Archer’s account: given the parallels he draws between design
and research, Glanville recognises design research as a self-reflexive activity of research-
ing research (Glanville 2014c: 116–119). That is, as design is a core part of research activ-

7. As one of the anonymous reviewers of this article suggests, the shift away from science in design
can be thought about in terms of a search for forms of rigor that make sense in a design context,
such as for example those described by Schön (1988). Feyerabend’s (1982, 1993) argument,
however, indicates that the scientific method as it had been promoted was unsatisfactory not just
in making sense of design but also in accounting for scientific practice itself (Feyerabend demons-
trates that examples commonly regarded as paradigmatic by the advocates of method violate the
methodological principles they propose). That is, in this period, the need for an understanding of
rigor that makes sense in the context of practice is a feature not just of design but also science.
Thanks to the anonymous reviewer for prompting my thoughts on this point.

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ity, to research design is to inquire into an aspect of research activity itself. In so doing,
Glanville anticipates recent discussions in Constructivist Foundations regarding second-
order science (SOS) as research activity focused on research itself (Müller & Riegler
2014a, 2014b; Riegler & Müller 2014). I return to this below.

Design research and second-order cybernetics

16. SOC was developed in the context of the shifts in understanding science and de-
sign that I have summarised above, and parallels these concerns. As such, SOC sits in a
pivotal position within cybernetics’ wider history. In consolidating its epistemology and,
with it, an ability to address rigorously the issues of self-reference towards which a field
concerned with circularity is inevitably drawn, it is with SOC that cybernetics reaches
maturity as a discipline. That this happens simultaneously with the fragmentation of the
field during the 1970s – under pressure from changes in the external funding climate and
professional accreditation (Umpleby 2003; Umpleby & Dent 1999) – has consequences
not just for the ideas of SOC but also for how we understand earlier, and other, aspects of
cybernetics.
17. Firstly, as the earlier work occurred before the maturity of the field, it is inevi-
table that it contains inconsistencies in epistemology, approach and terminology. This is
further complicated by the way that the fragmentation of the field is often associated with
the emergence of critiques of science and technology during the 1970s, of which SOC
is one instance. SOC has often, for this reason, been presented in contrast to first-order
cybernetics (FOC), which tends to be associated with the earlier work. The “first” and
“second” should not, however, be understood as implying a sequence or the surpassing of
one by the other.8 Rather, SOC is specifically the application of cybernetics to itself – “the
cybernetics of cybernetics,” as von Foerster (2003b: 302) titled Mead’s (1968) paper.9
18. The terminology of “first” and “second” can obscure the continuity between SOC
and earlier cybernetics. While Glanville has spent considerable effort in distinguishing the
two (e.g., Glanville 1997, 2004c), he has also recognised that cybernetics always involves
second-order considerations and did so even at its origins (Glanville 2013: 28) and that “it
would be better, nowadays, to talk only of Cybernetics, without orders: thus bringing the
different approaches into proximity” (Glanville 2002). This is certainly the case for Mead
and Bateson, whose backgrounds in anthropology involved a consideration of the partici-
pation of observers in what they observe (see e.g., their discussion in Brand, Bateson &
Mead 1976), and for Ashby in his (1991) understanding of the black box system as involv-
ing the observer as part of it. Even Norbert Wiener, according to Pask (as reported by Glan-
ville 2002; 2013: 33), recognised that there were further steps to take in developing the

8. While Fischer and Richards (2015), rightly point out considerable overlaps between the deve-
lopment of SOC and Rittel’s characterisation of first- and second-generation design methods, it
should be remembered that “first” and “second” are used in different ways in each context.
9. This development was both necessary for the field to consolidate its own disciplinary foundations,
and has also made possible innovatively reflexive research programmes that are of particular
interest in exploring those questions regarding cognition, society, epistemology and ethics that
inevitably involve self-reference. For a fuller discussion of SOC see e.g.: Glanville (1997, 2002,
2004c, 2011b, 2013); Müller & Müller (2007); Müller (2008, 2011); Scott (2003, 2004, 2011);
Foerster (1995, 2003b); Foerster & Poerksen (2002).

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subject. Indeed, Alvin Toffler’s (1970) Future Shock, a book that is emblematic of the criti-
cisms of science and technology that are often assumed to apply also to cybernetics (e.g.,
Lobsinger 2000: 134), is anticipated two decades earlier in the similar, cautionary account
of technological change in Wiener’s (1950) Human Use of Human Beings. In addition,
while Pickering (2010) sees SOC as being in contrast to the tangible modes of exploration
of the earlier cybernetics in which he is interested, the performative quality of the devices
through which Pask, Ashby, Grey Walter and others explored their ideas is an example of
the participation of observers in observation on which SOC reflects and places value.
19. Secondly, it is difficult to judge the consequences of SOC for practice, as the field
within which these implications would have been explored had broken up by the time the
possibility of doing so had emerged. The tendency of SOC to be largely theoretical in ori-
entation – which leads Pickering (2010: 25f) to view it as a form of linguistic turn – needs
to be understood in this context of a lack of opportunity for experimental work.
20. With the break up of cybernetics, many of its ideas were absorbed back into its
constituent fields. Some research in other disciplines, such as for instance robotics or com-
plexity, can be recognised as a continuation of its ideas and research programme, including
its performative approach to experimentation (see, for instance, the discussion of Rodney
Brooks, Stephen Wolfram and Stuart Kauffman in Pickering 2010: 60–64, 156–170). Giv-
en its continuities with cybernetics, as introduced in part above and discussed further be-
low, the field of design research can be thought of, similarly, as one such successor field.10
21. There is a longstanding history of connection and influence between cybernet-
ics and design, as has been summarised by Hugh Dubberly and Paul Pangaro (2015). In
particular, Ashby and Pask both engaged directly with design.11 Ashby lectured at the Ulm
School of Design with Rittel (see Fischer & Richards 2015) and was also a significant
influence on Alexander.12 Pask, meanwhile, became increasingly involved in architecture
from the 1960s onwards. He was a significant contributor to the prominent Fun Palace
project with Price and Littlewood, and collaborated with Nicholas Negroponte at MIT,
for whose Soft Architecture Machines (Negroponte 1975) he contributed a chapter. In
addition he held a consultant position at the Architectural Association in London, wrote
explicitly on architecture and design (Pask 1963, 1969) and influenced the development
of interactive architecture through Negroponte and others such as John and Julia Frazer
(Frazer 1993, 1995; Furtado Cardoso Lopes 2008, 2009; Spiller 2006: 204–210). More re-
cently, figures such as Pangaro, Glanville and Klaus Krippendorff, influenced particularly
by Ashby (Krippendorff) or Pask (Glanville, Pangaro), have made prominent contribu-
tions in both design research and cybernetics, while many others have worked in one field
in a way informed by thought in the other.

10. By “successor field” I do not mean to imply any sense of superiority, but rather the inheritance of
ideas.
11. Other figures could also be mentioned. Dubberly and Pangaro (2015) and Müller and Müller
(2011) also stress the interest of Heinz von Foerster in design. He addressed design audiences
(e.g., Foerster 1962) and was connected to figures such as architect Lebbeus Woods and Stuart
Brand, who can be mentioned in his own terms as a cross-over figure. Fischer (2015) has sugges-
ted connections between Wiener and recent work in design, while the work of Bateson, who intro-
duced Brand and von Foerster to each other, is a point of reference for contemporary discussions
of architecture and ecology (see e.g., Goodbun 2011; Rawes 2013).
12. Although, as Upitis (2013: 504f) notes, Alexander’s (1964) use of Ashby’s ideas can be questio-
ned.

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22. As well as this continuity of people, there is a significant continuity of ideas and
approach such that cybernetics can be thought of as design’s “secret partner in research”
(Glanville 1999: 90f). While this is not the place for a full discussion of these parallels
– I defer here to the accounts of Glanville and the others who I have cited – key points
include the following:
ƒƒ There is a conversational, and so cybernetic, structure that is central to what is
distinctive about the way designers work (see for instance Schön’s (1991: 76) char-
acterisation of design in terms of a “reflective conversation with the situation”).
Glanville has developed this parallel to the extent that, as I have noted, he claims
that “cybernetics is the theory of design and design is the action of cybernetics”
(2007c: 1178) while it is also what lies behind his (1999, 2014c) characterisation
of research in terms of design, as discussed above.
ƒƒ Both design and cybernetics are concerned with the new, as supported by the ten-
dency of conversation to involve invention at every turn. Both are “essentially
constructivist” activities (Glanville 2006a: 63; see also: Glanville 2006b; 2013;
Herr 2015b) that enable a form of “forward-looking search,” as Pickering (2010:
18) has described cybernetics, developing new ideas and possibilities rather than
looking to correspond to, or replicate, the real or the optimal.
ƒƒ The way that designers use drawings and models for exploring ideas rather than as
representations of them (Glanville 2009b) resonates closely with the performative
nature of the work of Pask and others, who played out their ideas using physical,
experimental devices in much the same way (as emphasised in Pickering’s (2010)
account). In contemporary practice-based design research, some work has strong
continuity with the sorts of devices made in earlier cybernetics (e.g., that of Mette
Ramsgard Thomsen (2007), Jennifer Kanary Nikolov(a)13 or Ruairi Glynn14), but
even the use of more analogue media (such as the sorts of pen drawings with
which I work; see Sweeting 2014) has a similar attitude to modelling as part of
thinking rather than as a representation of thought.
ƒƒ Design research is often concerned with epistemological questions regarding the
interrelations of designers, other stakeholders, working methods and the knowl-
edge embedded in what is designed. This has often been articulated in terms of dif-
ferences between research about/into, through/by and for design, following Fray-
ling (1993) and others, and as reviewed and synthesised by Jonas (2012, 2015a,
2015b). These distinctions distinguish between that research which looks at design
from the outside or which is applied to it, from that which is conducted as an inte-
gral part of it. This resonates strongly with SOC concerns regarding the participa-
tion of observers in their observations, and the active difference made by how this
participation is configured. Jonas (2007b, 2012, 2015b) in particular has explicitly
used the framework of cybernetics, drawing on Glanville (1997), to clarify these
points. I return to this below.
ƒƒ Design is a self-reflexive activity in much the same way as cybernetics, both in-
volving circular reflective processes and being examples of disciplines that can be
applied to themselves, in the design of design or the cybernetics of cybernetics.

13. http://www.labyrinthpsychotica.org/Labyrinth_Psychotica
14. http://www.ruairiglynn.co.uk

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23. While design research and cybernetics mostly differ in their subject matter, the
above parallels are significant. They share both ways of working – a conversational for-
ward-looking search and an interactive, non-representational use of modelling – and also
core concerns with observer positions and self-reflexivity in the constitution of their re-
search processes. These parallels hold to the extent that, while design research continues
to make reference to cybernetic ideas (for instance in exploring the possibilities of new
technologies (e.g., Ramsgard Thomsen 2007; Spiller 2002), or in understanding the rela-
tionship between research and design (e.g., Jonas 2007b, 2012, 2014, 2015a, 2015b), I sug-
gest we can also understand it as a contemporary variety of cybernetic research, whether
the connections with cybernetics are made explicitly or not. Seeing design research as an
example of SOC in this way suggests a continuity between the epistemological focus of
SOC and the tangible experimentation of earlier cybernetics, a connection that can easily
become obscured, as is evident in Pickering’s (2010) account.

Second-order science
24. As well as helping integrate the more practice-oriented legacy of early cybernetics
with SOC, design research can also provide an important point of reference for contem-
porary discussions of SOS, which have been a recent focus of Constructivist Foundations
(and which have led to the present volume). Karl Müller and Alexander Riegler (2014a)
proposed SOS as “a new course of action” in order to reinvigorate SOC – and constructiv-
ist approaches generally – as an active research field. They characterise SOS as a reflexive
form of research, either in methodological terms through the inclusion of observers as par-
ticipants (a direct continuation of von Foerster’s (1995, 2003a) SOC as the “cybernetics
of observing systems”), or through self-reflexive domains of research, in the sense of the
science of science or, similarly, the cybernetics of cybernetics or the sociology of sociology,
such as through meta-analyses of the products or practices of other scientific enquiry.
25. Müller and Riegler position SOS as a specific research agenda within the signifi-
cant transformations currently underway in the landscape of science (Müller 2008, 2011;
Müller & Riegler 2014b). These have partly been, as noted above, in terms of how sci-
ence has come to be understood in terms of its practice by fields such as SSK and STS,
but also through significant changes in this practice itself. This has included: a change
of focus away from a mechanistic and reductionist paradigm (associated with Newton
and Descartes) towards one based in complexity, adaptation and evolution, which Rogers
Hollingsworth and Müller (2008) have labelled in terms of a transition from Science I to
Science II; significant changes in the organisational structure of knowledge production,
with an increased emphasis on its social robustness and the context of application, which
has been labelled as a shift from Mode 1 to Mode 2 (see Nowotny, Scott & Gibbons 2006);
and growing interest in transformative and transdisciplinary aspects of research (e.g., Ni-
colescu 2012; Schneidewind & Augenstein 2012).
26. These various changes in science have all had the effect of science moving to-
wards a more designerly paradigm, in line with Glanville’s (2014c) argument discussed
above (as noted by Jonas 2014, 2015a). Given this convergence and the historical and con-
ceptual connections that I reviewed above, there is reason to consider SOS as a potential
point of interchange between design and science. This is especially so given that there is a
considerable overlap between core interests of design research and the two “motivations”

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for SOS that Müller and Riegler (2014a: 2f) have put forward: self-reflexivity, and the
inclusion of observers.
27. Firstly, self-reflexivity is important in design research in various ways. In a general
sense, designers often do this implicitly as they work, reflectively redesigning their design
processes to suit the specifics of the situations they encounter. More explicitly, design is a
field that, like cybernetics, can be applied to itself in the sense of the design of design. This
includes such instances as: the design of particular design methods (e.g., Alexander 1964) or
of technologies with which to design (e.g., Frazer 1995; Negroponte 1975; or contemporary
developments such as building information modelling); the way that a design research con-
ference is something that itself needs to be designed (Durrant et al. 2015; Sweeting & Hohl
2015); and the way that the products of design can allow for a continuation of the design
process in them, such as in the architecture of Price (as Price 2003: 136 himself remarks).
28. Specific design projects can also explore aspects of design itself, as for instance in
Peter Downton’s (2004) practice-based reflections on epistemology, or the work of Peter
Eisenman (Bédard 1994). Indeed, Eisenman’s Cannereggio project, for instance, can be
considered a meta-analysis in Müller and Riegler’s (2014b) sense for the way it takes Le
Corbusier’s unbuilt Venice Hospital scheme for the same site as its starting point.
29. Most significantly for SOS, understanding design as a core part of research, as
per Glanville’s (2014c) account discussed above, positions design research as a field of
researching research. This observation holds possibilities yet to be fully explored, offering
design research a field of application in science rather than vice versa, as is more often the
case.
30. Secondly, as noted above, the position of the observer has been a theme of particu-
lar importance in design research as part of the field’s shift from its mostly professional ori-
gins to being seen in more academic terms. This has included careful delineations between
ways in which designers and others observe and participate in design, and of the ways in
which material artefacts operate variously as part of the research process, as the object of
enquiry, as output or dissemination and sometimes as more than one of these depending on
their context. As noted above, one important and widespread way in which these distinc-
tions have been made is by distinguishing in terms of research about/into, for and through/
by design. As Jonas (2012: 34) discusses, the value of this sort of categorisation is that it
differentiates on the basis of the attitudes and intentions of designers, rather than in terms
of subject matter (which would not make sense in design because of its tendency towards
diverse and ambiguously delineated content). This has helped clarify where design is used
actively as a research process to explore a topic (through/by), where separate research is
applied in design, such as in research and development or market research (for) and where
design is the object of separate study by another discipline, such as history or sociology
(about/into). In elaborating on and clarifying these distinctions, which were initially rather
ambiguous, Jonas has drawn on Glanville’s (1997) description of different observer posi-
tions and orientations as a foundation, associating research through with the engaged SOC
observer, and for and about with the detached observer of FOC. Jonas distinguishes a new
category of research as design to correspond to where, in Glanville’s scheme, the observer
is inside the inquiring system and looking inwards, and interprets this in terms of “design

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as the inaccessible medium of knowledge production” and the role of abductive reasoning
(Jonas 2015b: 35).15
31. Categorisations of this sort are very much in the spirit of SOC and are highly
relevant for SOS; and we can think of research for, about/into, through/by and as in this
context in much the same way as in design. It is the observer-included modes of research
through/by and as that are of most relevance (these being associated with SOC). Ex-
amples include Glanville’s approach to conference design in terms of using cybernetic
processes (so the content of the conference can be acted out in its form; Glanville 2011b;
Sweeting & Hohl 2015) and the performative aspects of the devices of Pask and others,
as stressed by Pickering (2010). The more detached modes of research about/into or for
also have their counterparts, and would include historical and theoretical work, including
this present article and also accounts such as that of Pickering and others to which I have
referred.16
32. While Jonas has used the terminology of FOC and SOC to give a foundation to
these designerly categories, in turn they offer complementary possibilities back to cy-
bernetics. Whereas the phrasing of FOC and SOC invites a sharp distinction in terms of
whether the observer is included or not, and can be confusingly interpreted in terms of
a chronological sequence as discussed above, the categories of for, about/into, through/
by and as distinguish something of the nature of an observer’s involvement, not just the
acknowledgement of it, enabling these different observer positions to be seen in produc-
tive combination. This latter point is important for SOS, especially where it is conceived
in terms of reflexive operations such as meta-analyses, as it requires a close relationship
to the more conventional first-order science on which it is to operate (Müller & Riegler
2014b).
33. Given these significant overlaps, design research is a productive point of com-
parison for SOS. In particular, it suggests a possible example for how SOS can be consti-
tuted as a research field that is practice based and outward looking, both aspects that are
important in this “new course of action” (Müller & Riegler 2014a). This is partly through
the connections between SOC and earlier, more tangible, forms of cybernetics that are
suggested by design research, and also through examples of research through design,
which is notable for the way that even some of its most abstracted and introverted mo-
ments retain rich potential for concrete connections with the world.

15. Given Glanville’s (1997) enigmatic silence regarding this category, it makes sense to associate it
with the role of tacit knowledge in design, especially when seen in the context of Jonas’s (2015a,
2015b) presentation of these categories in terms of their relations with each other. Locating the ta-
cit here can help clarify the relation between the research involved in any design act and research
through design, which is in need of more explicit articulation, even if this could still be through
various media or embedded in artefacts.
16. Note that to write about SOC is a first-order activity. This is why neither von Foerster (2003b:
301) nor Glanville (2002) see the need for any third or fourth orders of cybernetics; these would
simply be instances of its first or second orders.

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Conclusion
34. I have drawn on the continuities, both of concepts and participants, between SOC
and the field of design research in order to position SOC in terms of practice rather than
as a mainly theoretical perspective. I have drawn, in particular, on Glanville’s (2014c) ac-
count of scientific research as a form of design activity, understanding this in the context
of the shifting relationship between design and science during the formative period of
both SOC and design research, and since.
35. I have suggested that design research is not just a field that is influenced by SOC
but a contemporary variety of it, whether this connection is made explicitly or not, in
a similar way that other fields can be regarded as continuing or reinventing cybernetic
concerns. Understanding design research in this way suggests a continuity between the
epistemological concerns of SOC and the material experimentations of earlier cybernet-
ics, in contrast to the way that SOC is sometimes regarded as a turn away from these more
tangible qualities.
36. These connections with cybernetics’ past are also relevant to contemporary dis-
cussions of SOS. Given that design research shares the central concerns of SOS with both
self-reflexivity and the inclusion of observers as active participants, it is suggestive of
ways in which SOS may develop as a field of research.

Acknowledgements
This article was developed from a presentation given at the 2015 conference of the
International Society for Systems Science in Berlin (Sweeting 2015a) in a session chaired
by Peter Jones, whom I thank for his comments and encouragement. Thanks also to the
American Society for Cybernetics, who funded my attendance at that conference as part
of the 2014 Heinz von Foerster Award. The ideas presented here have been influenced by
discussions with Nick Beech, Murray Fraser, Tim Ivison and Simon Sadler at the Canadian
Centre for Architecture in Montreal as part of an ongoing collaborative research project
funded by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. Thanks also to Tanya Southcott, Tilo Am-
hoff, Stuart Umpleby, the editors and the anonymous reviewers for their comments and
assistance.

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Open Peer Commentary:

Design Cycles: Conversing with Lawrence Halprin
Tom Scholte

1. Ben Sweeting’s target article provides an informative outline of the conceptual

confluences of design research and second-order cybernetics, explicit and otherwise, as
they have unfolded over the last several decades. A practitioner absent from Sweeting’s
summary (and from any other cybernetic overview of design practice of which I am aware)
whose work might be fruitfully included in this analysis is environmental architect Law-
rence Halprin. This OPC will endeavor to provide a brief sketch of the second-order cyber-
netic features of Halprin’s RSVP cycles in the hopes that they may find their way into the
ongoing discourse on the cybernetics of design that Sweeting has framed.
2. In the 1960s, while second-order cybernetics was incubating in Heinz von Foer-
ster’s Biological Computer Laboratory, architect and environmental designer, Halprin, in
collaboration with his wife Ann, choreographer and artistic director of the San Francisco
Dance Workshop, were engaged in their own inward examination of group creative pro-
cesses in search of a theory outlining their main features. Similar to Ranluph Glanville,
Halprin explicitly rejected “the attempt to make a science out of community design” claim-
ing that…
[h]uman community planning cannot ever be a science anymore than politics can rightly be
called political science. Science implies codification of knowledge and a drive toward per-
fectibility none of which are possible or even desirable in human affairs. (Halprin 1969: 4)

What Halprin did desire was a “means to describe and evoke (creative) processes on other
than simply a random basis” in the hopes that it “would have meaning not only for (the) field
of environmental arts and dance-theatre, but also for all the other arts where the elements
of time and activity (particularly of numbers of people) would have meaning and useful-
ness” (ibid: 1). It may be argued that, in his own way, Halprin may also have been looking
for something one might call “rigour,” but not as a means of justifying design’s place in the
academy on intellectual grounds. He simply wanted to help people work more efficiently on
a purely pragmatic level and, at the same time, avoid the undesirable outcomes of a narrowly
linear, dare call it “scientific,” approach to the transcomputable complexities inherent in any
and all design processes. He formalized his findings in the 1969 book The RSVP Cycles:
Creative Processes in the Human Environment, describing a recursive schema of iteration
and evaluation bearing striking resemblances to the conversational conception of second-
order cybernetics.
3. Below are the four components of the RSVP cycles as defined in Halprin’s book
(ibid: 2):
R – Resources which are what you have to work with. These include human and physical
resources and their motivation and aims.
S – Scores which describe the process leading to the performance.

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V – Valuaction which analyzes the results of action and possible selectivity and decisions.
The term ‘valuaction’ is one coined to suggest the action-oriented as well as the decision-
oriented aspects of V in the cycle.

P – Performance which is the resultant of scores and is the ‘style’ of the process.

4. While the arrangement of the acronym RSVP (the request for a response) was chosen
for its elegance in naming an essentially conversational process (ibid: 2), a typical iteration
of the cycle would more accurately be expressed as RSPV: the articulation of an inventory of
the resources available, and desirable, for inclusion in the project, the articulation of a score
indicating what is to be done with/to the resources, the performance (implementation) of the
score, and a period of valuaction during which the results of the performance are evaluated
and re-enter the next iteration of the cycle as new resources, for which a new score will be
articulated.
5. From a second-order cybernetic perspective, it is significant that the “motivations
and aims” of all of the individuals involved in the project must also be articulated and taken
into account in addition to the purely physical or financial resources at play. This is, in fact,
the ethical foundation of the entire schema, as “its purpose is to make procedures and pro-
cesses visible, to allow for constant communication and ultimately to insure the diversity
and pluralism necessary for change and growth” (ibid: 5). This ethical foundation seems
entirely commensurate with the “desirable ethics” of Glanville (2004b).
6. Halprin opens his book with a definition of scores:
Scores are symbolizations of processes which extend over time. The most familiar kind of
‘score’ is a musical one, but I have extended this meaning to include ‘scores’ in all fields
of human endeavor. Even a grocery list or a calendar, for example, are scores. (Halprin
1969: 1)

The essential quality of a score is that it is a system of symbols which can convey, or guide,
or control (as you wish), the interactions between elements such as space, time, rhythm,
and sequences, people and their activities and the combinations which result from them.
(ibid: 7)

7. Halprin goes on to expand his list of sample scores to include plans for buildings,
mathematics, stage directions and dialogue for a play, Navajo sand paintings, the intrica-
cies of urban street systems as well as plans for transportation systems and the configura-
tions of regions, and much more. The most significant feature of any score is its position on
a spectrum from “open” to “closed” in terms of the amount of control it exerts.
The real nub of the issue […] is what you control through the score and what you leave to
chance; what the score determines and what it leaves indeterminate; how much is conveyed
of the artist-planner’s own intention of what is to happen and to what degree what actually
happens and the quality of what actually happens is left to chance; the influences of the
passage of time; the variables of unforeseen and unforeseeable events, and to the feedback
process which initiates a new score. (ibid: 7)

8. As to the performance phase of the RSVP cycles, an analogy between scientific ex-
perimentation and the performing arts employed by philosopher Robert Crease might help
further position Halprin’s schema at the intersection of design research and second-order
cybernetics described by Sweeting. Crease tells us that “the structure of performance is es-
sentially the same in the theatre arts and experimental science” when we consider that “[p]

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erformance involves the conceiving, producing, and witnessing of actions in order to try to
get something that we cannot get by consulting what we already have.” In both domains,
“the representation (theory, language, script) used to program the performance does not com-
pletely determine the outcome (product, work), but only assists in the encounter with the
new” (Crease & Lutterbie 2010: 165). Of course, the phenomena generated by both experi-
mentation and performance might well differ significantly from the expected outcome. Larry
Richards reminds us that is is the dynamics of performance that account for these potential
suprises and, in the spirit of second-order cybernetics, open up new horizons of possibility to
be explored in a subsequent iteration.
Formal languages remove the dynamics absolutely; in fact, the value of formalism is that
it removes the dynamics to leave a skeleton of constraints to guide action and performance
(like a script or score) […] A poem, a piece of music, a play, and their performance are
ways to use a language to play with dynamics. They don’t cause things to happen; they
trigger a dynamics of interaction that can lead to new distinctions. Contradictions and
paradoxes become desirable as avenues to new ideas, new alternatives, new choices. (Rich-
ards 2010: 16)

9. For Glanville, the second-order cybernetic conception of design is in direct opposi-

tion to the “slogan” in modern architecture, attributed to Louis Sullivan, that “form follows
function” (Glanville 2007b: 88). The level of complexity in most design challenges calls for
another approach entirely.
Rather than try to specify every requirement and every relationship between these require-
ments, and then find an optimal solution, design starts more or less ‘aimlessly’ and gradu-
ally constructs an ‘evolving’ form that not only changes but, in doing so accommodates
the required functions also, often in a novel and surprising manner, where normal relations
between functions are enriched or even replaced by new ones that are unexpected, differ-
ent, and often very good! (Glanville 2007c: 1196)

10. Glanville tells us that “the drawing, sketch or doodle” is “central to the process of
design” and that “[t]hese are often made without much purpose” (ibid: 1179). Throughout
his corpus, Glanville sings the praises of purposelessness and the “gifts” that it can bring;
a position that might seem, to some, to be at odds with the goal-directed preoccupations
of cybernetics. It is, however, yet another theoretical commitment shared by Halprin, who
claimed that “becoming goal oriented is “one of the gravest dangers that we experience”
through our tendency to pursue social goods, based on “incontrovertibly ‘good ideas,’”
by “the most direct means possible” resulting, through an “oversimplified approach […]
in the chaos of our cities and the confusion of our politics (or other politics – fascism and
communism are clear statements of this approach)” (Halprin 1969: 4).
When ekistitcians, for example, say that the ‘search for the ideal is our greatest obligation’
they are making the same basic error that all goal-oriented thinking does – a confusion
between motivation and process. We can be scientific and precise about gathering data and
inventorying resources, but in the multivariable and open scoring process necessary for
human lifestyles and attitudes, creativity, inquantifiable attitudes and openness will always
be required. (ibid.)

11. If, as Halprin suggests, the “confusion of our politics” is equally a result of a
flawed design process that is too dependent on narrowly defined goals and insufficiently
sensitive to feedback, then, perhaps, it is not going too far to expand Glanville’s audacious
claim that science is but a subset of design and make a similar claim regarding governance;

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a term that is, after all, also commonly understood to be virtually synonymous with the
term “cybernetics.” A conception of governance informed by the kind of second-order cy-
bernetic approach to design espoused by Glanville and encapsulated in Sweeting’s article
would have no option but to acknowledge openly the inevitability of error and eliminate
the peddling of supposedly iron-clad, fool-proof “solutions” in which the politicians of
every liberal democracy currently traffic. And where might that lead us? But that is a con-
versation for another time.
12. Sweeting’s article does valuable work in consolidating Glanville’s legacy of de-
sign cybernetic theorization as it evolved alongside a growing awareness within the design
research community that first-order, non-reflexive “scientific” models are insufficient to
deal with the emergent functional, aesthetic and ethical complexities of actual design prac-
tice. This provides a robust foundation from which a whole generation of cybernetic de-
signers influenced by Glanville (Thomas Fischer, Candy Herr, Michael Hohl, Tim Jachna
and others) can further develop and disseminate this rich body of theory and practice to
the generations to come. As a theorist/practitioner who independently evolved a recursive,
conversational approach to design so thoroughly embodying the ethical commitments of
second-order cybernetics, an additional reflection upon the work of Halprin has much to
offer this on-going endeavour.

Open Peer Commentary:

Understanding Design from a Second-Order Cybernetics
Perspective: Is There a Place for Material Agency?
David Griffiths

1. The main focus of Ben Sweeting’s target article is to examine the terms “design” and
“second-order cybernetics,” together with the practice designated by them, and to discuss
their relationship. This task is simply described, but leads inexorably into deep waters, in part
because of the entangled relationship between the terms, and in part because both terms are
contested. In the main, Sweeting navigates this complexity with skill, but inevitably there are
loose ends in the argument, which are worth pulling on to see if they lead to further insight.
2. The argument is founded on Sweeting’s analysis of Ranulph Glanville’s ideas on
design and second-order cybernetics (SOC), a task that he is particularly well-positioned to
undertake, given his long relationship with Glanville as both a student and a collaborator.
Sweeting cites Glanville as stating that “cybernetics is the theory of design and design is the
action of cybernetics” (§2), and reports that “Glanville […] characterises all research as being
a design-like activity” (§14) and that he “recognises design research as a self-reflexive activ-
ity of researching research” (§15). On the basis of Glanville’s work, exemplified by the above
quotations, Sweeting makes the core proposal of the article, suggesting that
Glanville’s understanding of design, and particularly his […] account of the relations be-
tween design and science […], allows us to view the currently expanding field of design
research as a contemporary variety of SOC practice. (§6)

This proposal is both well-founded and useful.

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3. I also find Glanville’s argument regarding the relationship between science and
design, and Sweeting’s discussion of it, to be convincing: “Design is, it follows, the more
general case and, therefore, ‘it is inappropriate to require design to be ‘scientific’: for sci-
entific research is a subset (a restricted form) of design…” (§7). The argument is in line
with the critique made by authors such as Stuart Umpleby (2014) and Karl Müller (2014),
who have contributed greatly to second-order science (SOS), to which Sweeting dedicates
a substantial section. This critique focuses on the important role of the scientist as an ob-
server and active constructor of the scientific process, a role that is systematically erased
from positivist accounts of scientific activity.
4. Sweeting thus establishes two alignments: between design research and SOC, and
between design and SOS. The question that arises in the reading of the article is the degree
to which it is possible to extrapolate from the alignment between these discourses in order
to draw conclusions that are applicable to science as it is carried out beyond the cybernetic
tradition and to design that is carried out without a reflexive turn.
5. When Glanville spoke about design, he did so not as an external observer sur-
veying the field, but as a participant explaining his experience of the process of design
(including his design of musical environments and performances). Indeed, given the
view of cybernetics that he sustained and lived by, we should not expect anything less.
Sweeting does not discuss Glanville’s practice but implies that it was in line with Horst
Rittel’s argument that “‘everything goes’: because designers inevitably encounter new
and ambiguously defined situations (it being the purpose of design to create the new),
they have no well-defined problems to solve or enumerable lists of options to pick from”
(§13), and that the problems encountered by designers are “wicked” (§8) because of their
complex inter-dependencies. Much design practice is illuminated by an analysis con-
ducted from this position, but many design problems are perceived by designers in much
simpler terms, and are not seen as being wicked. The Chambers Dictionary definition of
the verb “design” is “to develop or prepare a plan, drawing or model of something before
it is built or made,” and readers will be able to confirm that other dictionaries have simi-
lar definitions. This definition includes many contexts where designers are convinced
that they are working with well-defined problems, and that enumerable lists are avail-
able, including much of the field of engineering. A reading of Sweeting’s article with a
focus on this volume is complicated by the fact that the logic of the argument leads to
thematic sections that discuss both design research (which necessarily has a reflexive as-
pect) and design (which, in the view of many practitioners, does not necessarily involve
a self-reflexive aspect).
6. The designers of scientific instruments such as the CERN particle collider have
a well-defined goal, in this case to provide an apparatus capable of detecting the Higgs
Boson. But even in design that does not involve engineering, well-defined problems can
be identified. The builders of musical instruments provide a good example of designers
who have well-defined problems with lists of options. Iris Bremaud describes the choice of
woods for construction in the case of the designers of xylophones and slit-drums in Africa:
Many species could be encountered in either xylophones designed for temporary use, or
slit drums with strong aesthetical meaning, involving the ability of wood to be intricately
carved […]. On the contrary, the more prominent the purely ‘acoustic’ function of instru-
ments was, the higher the proportion of use of Pterocarpus […]. This choice is nearly
exclusive in most elaborate xylophones and in slit-drums that were used for message trans-
mission – up to more than 10 km distances. (Bremaud 2012: 812)

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These designers are clearly making choices from a list of predefined options, and deploy-
ing their design expertise in making the trade-off between the contrasting benefits of dif-
ferent materials and the range of pre-defined purposes to which the instrument will be put.
7. In a rather different musical context, Brian Eno, often described as a sound de-
signer, also explains the act of creating a musical composition in terms of selection:
What the composer had was a kind of menu, a packet of seeds, you might say. And those
musical seeds, once planted, turned into the piece. And they turned into a different version
of that piece every time. (Eno 2011)

Eno relates this approach to the influence of Stafford Beer, and perhaps this cybernetic con-
nection should not be surprising given the importance of selection in cybernetics since the
early work of Claude Shannon (1948).
8. The purpose of this digression into music, a field that was one of Glanville’s main
areas of activity, is to argue that there exist design practices that are well-defined, involve
selection from a list of pre-determined options, or both. I suggest, therefore, that Sweeting’s
characterization of design is best seen as an accurate description of a particular type of de-
sign. It may also be an argument and exhortation to other designers who do not share these
ideas or practice to consider more deeply the recursion involved in their design activity, and I
believe that this was the intention of much of Glanville’s work. The question arises, however,
how far (if at all) it is possible to make a convincing argument about design in general on
the basis of this SOC analysis to those who do not share the epistemological position of the
field, a challenge that is common to SOC as a whole. I see Sweeting’s discussion of Andrew
Pickering as being central to this question.
9. Sweeting cites Pickering extensively, and mostly with approval. However, he dis-
agrees with Pickering’s characterization of SOC as “a turn away from the more tangible
modes of experimentation that characterized earlier phases of cybernetics, and towards the
linguistic.” Sweeting counters this argument by pointing out that “SOC is a reflection on the
performative involvement of observers within their observations” (§5), but that the opportu-
nity to carry out this function was limited because the field of cybernetics had “broken up”
(§19) by the time that SOC emerged. I have some sympathy with this view, but nevertheless
I believe that it is incumbent on those who feel there is value in the heritage of cybernetics to
investigate Pickering’s point more deeply. Specifically, we need to assess the degree to which
the risk that Sweeting identifies that SOC can become “overly introverted” (§6) may have
played an active part in the break up of the field. Sweeting’s concern is not to conduct such
an inquiry into the decline of cybernetics, but rather to explore how its legacy can be applied
and revived in design research. Nevertheless, I believe that there is a key point at issue here,
as I now discuss.
10. The examples that are given of Pickering’s performative approach can indeed be
situated within SOC (R. D. Laing’s work on therapists, Pask and the participant observer).
But there are many aspects of Pickering’s thinking about the performative that are not easily
situated in this way. Pickering describes his conception of the performative as an “…image
of science, in which science is regarded as a field of powers, capacities and performances,
situated in the machinic captures of material agency” (Pickering 1995: 7). In his book The
Mangle of Practice, Pickering examines the history of the bubble chamber in physics re-
search. He argues that we should see this as a “dance of human and material agency” (ibid:
51). Pickering goes on to describe how…

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[r]esistance (and accommodation) is at the heart of the struggle between the human and mate-
rial realms in which each is interactively restructured with respect to the other – in which, as
in our example, material agency, scientific knowledge, and human agency in its intentional
structure and its social contours, are all reconfigured at once. (ibid: 67)

Here, I think, is the heart of the problem of the generalizability of insights from SOC. The
idea that the object of investigation (or design) has material agency that pushes back at the
scientist (or designer) is one that sits uncomfortably with an SOC view of constructivism,
and certainly of the radical constructivist tradition within SOC as exemplified by Ernst van
Glasersfeld (1995). To put it another way, the conception of the performative within design
research as described by Sweeting, and perhaps within SOC as a whole, may be different
from that which Pickering proposes.
11. In my view, SOC does not necessarily preclude the ascription of agency to the mate-
rial world. For example, the reformulation of the scientific method undertaken by Humberto
Maturana (1990: 18) implies constraints on our ability to engage with the agency of the
material, but it does not preclude its existence, and is compatible with Pickering’s “mangle of
practice.” The analysis proposed by Sweeting, however, does not encompass the agency of
the material. He does mention “the ways in which material artefacts operate variously as part
of the research process, as the object of enquiry, as output or dissemination and sometimes as
more than one of these depending on their context” (§30), but there is nothing to suggest that
the physical world “pushes back” at the designer, or even that such a thing might be possible.
I do not see this as a problem for the analysis proposed by Sweeting per se, as the design prac-
tice described may indeed consist of a recursive interaction between the designer, the design
and the people for whom it is intended. Moreover, from a radical constructivist perspective,
it may be argued that the perception of material agency is no more than a perception, and
that a methodology based on this is intellectually misleading and practically unreliable. It
does, however, raise a problem for the claim that design is a category that subsumes science.
Sweeting’s argument that scientific activity is a kind of design holds for a broad definition of
design, but the specifically SOC view of design put forward in this article does not map well
onto mainstream conceptions of science. The same applies even to first-order cybernetics in
the performative mode, for example for Grey Walter, whose robotic “tortoises” addressed a
well-defined problem: “to model goal seeking and, later, learning. But he did so as economi-
cally as he could” (Boden 2006: 244). The problem of mapping from design to science can
be resolved in one of two ways. One option is to broaden our understanding of design so that
it includes material agency, in line with Pickering’s mangle of practice. This would enable
the insight from SOC into the role of the designer in a recursive process of construction to
be generalized across the whole range of scientific and design activities. Alternatively, we
can make it clear that we are adopting a critical view of science, engineering and craft. This
would embrace the differences between different types of design and scientific practice, and
challenge practitioners to question the externality of the material agency that they ascribe
to the surrounding environment and independent of themselves. There is indeed a role for
such a practical critique. Sweeting refers to “pre-defined methods that were characteristic of
philosophy of science” in the 1970s, but a glance around the bodies funding research today
would show that this preference for pre-defined methods is alive and kicking.
12. Divergent opinions on the performative may in turn account for Sweeting’s dis-
agreement with Pickering on the linguistic turn in SOC. Sweeting comments that “SOC is
a reflection on the performative involvement of observers within their observations” (§5).
However, material agency is at the core of Pickering’s view of the performative but is not

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represented in design seen from a SOC perspective, as represented in this article. Conse-
quently, from Pickering’s perspective SOC is lacking an account of material agency and its
effects, whereas Sweeting does not discuss any such lack. It is the discrepancy on this lack,
I suggest, that leads Pickering to identify a linguistic turn in SOC, and also leads Sweeting
to disagree with him.
13. In conclusion, the important contribution of this article is to bring together and ex-
tend the thinking of Glanville, and to show how this can both inform design research and
serve as “continuing or reinventing cybernetic concerns” (§35). In doing this, Sweeting of-
fers a much-needed response to the lack of practical research being carried out within SOC, a
concern that Glanville also shared. In doing this, the article also raises important issues, going
beyond its main focus, about the nature of the relationship between second- and first-order
cybernetics and the possible role of material agency as a point at issue in the understanding
of the performative in these two aspects of cybernetics.

Open Peer Commentary:

What Can Cybernetics Learn from Design?
Christiane M. Herr

Differentiating externally motivated application and internally motivated practice

1. Ben Sweeting’s focus on the relationship of cybernetics and design presents a
valuable counterpoint to recent attempts at renewing interest in cybernetics by framing it
primarily in reference to science (§24). Based on Ranulph Glanville’s (2007c: 1178) char-
acterization of design as the action of cybernetics, and cybernetics as the theory of design,
Sweeting positions design research as a variety of second-order cybernetic (SOC) practice
(§4). This central point of Sweeting’s article deserves further strengthening, as practice is
not to be understood in this context as the application of theory (§§6–10). As argued by
Sweeting based on Glanville (2014a, 2015) (§3), SOC should not be conceived of as a
theory preceding and determining subsequent action. When seen from the perspective (and
experience) of design, theory is more appropriately understood as a framework for making
explicit thoughts developed in and through action. While generated from action, such a
theory can then also be used for abstract argument and analysis, but this should not be seen
as its primary purpose. Design reasoning is typically implicit: a form of thinking immanent
in, expressed, and developed through acting. This is illustrated in Donald Schön’s (1991)
well-known characterization of design processes as reflection in action. It is this recogni-
tion of the fundamental involvement of the observer in the process that sets design (and
cybernetics, specifically SOC), apart from the sciences, as Sweeting shows (§14).
2. Cybernetic descriptions of processes frequently revolve around goals, in particular
the pursuing of goals within circular processes (Ashby 1957). While such processes may
be described from the perspective of an outside observer identifying purposeful actions, it
makes much more sense to shift perspective to that of the involved inside observer. From
the perspective of the involved observer, goals appear more flexible, as they are deliber-

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ately selected, often temporary, and typically subject to change in response to various con-
straints encountered in the process of acting (Fischer & Richards 2015; Glanville 2007c).
Consideration of this constructed and process-oriented nature of goals is essential when
aiming to understand the actions of designers. With goals as well as ways to pursue them
being the subject of choices, the resultant cybernetic process relies strongly on personal
values and ethics. In the context of cybernetics, this observation has led Heinz von Foer-
ster (1992) to distinguish what he termed in principle undecidable questions – questions
that cannot be decided objectively or from an external perspective. This is well known by
designers, who must rely on personal values for much of their decision making (Triming-
ham 2008), as any kind of design practice involves questions of an ethical nature. While
designers rarely make this explicit, cultivating personal values forms part of what can be
described as design rigour, in reference to conventional scientific research. This observa-
tion may lead to further examination of the role of personal ethics in cybernetic practice.

The pleasure of constructing the world

3. While design may be understood as describing a particular kind of process (§§12,
22), it may be argued that design is also, and perhaps most importantly, a way of thinking
and perceiving the other (Glanville 2007c: 1197). This way of thinking and perceiving
cultivates not only keen awareness of the what is but also of the what could be. To de-
signers, the world is always a constructed world (Herr 2015b), where self and other are
dynamically merged: this worldview may be described as much as an analytical one as an
aesthetic-appreciative and constructive one. From this perspective, it becomes obvious
why designers are typically flexible in their employing of a wide spectrum of tools and
methods, ranging from science to art. Engaging with the other in this manner initiates
conversational processes of exploration that may be started by premeditated goals, but are
in essence driven by perceptions of potential and possibility. I would argue that cybernetic
processes may be understood in a similar manner.
4. While designers construct their realities, they tend to pay little attention to the na-
ture of the world in which they construct their realities (Glanville 2006a; Herr 2015b).
When engaged in explorative processes of designing, designers typically cast away theo-
retical preconceptions in favour of what is found to be practically viable in a given par-
ticular situation. What matters most is the immediate response of the other generated from
action, and the changes in thinking and perception this response in turn generates in the
designer. Designers construct realities through processes of informed participation, which
resonates with radical constructivist theory (Glanville 2006a) as well as Margaret Mead’s
call for cybernetically informed ways of acting (§4).
5. Although designers are usually comfortable acting, they are not necessarily com-
fortable or able to make explicit the nature and mechanics of the processes in which they
engage. This generates challenges when communicating beyond specific instances of de-
sign processes and especially beyond disciplinary boundaries. In addition, the implicit na-
ture of designing makes it difficult to discuss design processes in educational settings. It
is here where I see great potential for integrating the formal rigour of the cybernetic body
of thought with action-oriented design. As Sweeting has argued (§14), cybernetic vocabu-
lary was specifically developed to transcend disciplinary boundaries and is well suited to
supporting designers in describing, perhaps also in fine-tuning, their acting. In addition
to transcending cross-disciplinary boundaries in this manner, I would argue that design-

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cybernetic perspectives can also help in transcending cross-cultural boundaries, as I have

previously discussed (Herr 2011).

Cybernetic machines for thinking and showing

6. Sweeting (§22) points out that material experimentation, as it happened in earlier
cybernetics, could inform similar experimentation in contemporary SOC to allow it to
be more outward looking (§33). In this respect, cybernetics could adopt techniques well
honed in design, where models are employed not only for purposes of representation or
prediction, but mainly to support the exploration of ideas (§22). For a design-based variety
of cybernetic practice, the continuation of making automated models of an explorative
and performative nature seems a particularly fruitful direction. Such machines can be un-
derstood to be similar to conceptual models in design and may be developed based on
cybernetic themes. Besides the precedents in design research discussed by Sweeting (§22),
there are further examples of devices constructed in this spirit and relating explicitly to
cybernetics.
7. Over the past 15 years, Thomas Fischer and myself have built and documented vari-
ous – often automated – devices for conceptual idea exploration in architecture based on
cybernetic ideas. We have characterized these devices as machines for showing (Herr &
Fischer 2013, 2004), intentionally sidestepping expectations for prediction or immediate
applied utility. I have recently continued this line of thought with an analysis and discussion
of cellular automata models as they are used in design, where I have emphasized the ex-
plorative and flexible nature of such models (Herr 2015a). Once designers work with tools,
they tend to adapt them to their own purposes, which results in rules being interpreted in a
flexible manner and tools being used against their intended purposes (Fischer & Herr 2007).
In a similar manner, designers tend to adopt vocabulary and theory from various fields other
than design (§3). What is often not reflected well is that such processes of adopting external
theory and vocabulary should be understood as part of creative conversations, in which
terms are interpreted flexibly and vocabulary as well as theory is typically transformed to fit
a particular design situation.
8. One recent occasion where cybernetic devices were presented was an informal exhi-
bition held as part of the 2014 annual conference of the American Society for Cybernetics,
http://asc-cybernetics.org/2014. Most of the devices displayed were, however, of a repre-
sentational nature, with only a few of the presented items intended to create questions or
initiate new thoughts. With cybernetics’ growing maturity and increasingly complex body of
ideas, it seems contemporary cyberneticians are primarily concerned with explaining exist-
ing principles clearly rather than inventing new ones or playing with these ideas in an open-
ended – and perhaps messy or incongruent – manner. It is this manner of acting and thinking
through acting in a playful and explorative spirit that cybernetics can learn from design.

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Open Peer Commentary:

Rigor in Research, Honesty and Values
Michael Hohl

1. In §14 of his target article, Ben Sweeting examines Ranulph Glanville’s concept of
honesty. I think the concept of honesty, while not being central to the main argument of the
target article, deserves some more reflection, especially in relation to the concept of rigor.
2. While “rigor” in research is often mentioned, I think its constituents are rarely thor-
oughly discussed. I would like to use this opportunity to discuss these further, as Sweet-
ing’s article allowed me to get a much deeper understanding of Glanville’s concept of
honesty, especially linking it to post-rationalisation, which I found very enlightening.
3. When I was conducting my PhD research at Sheffield Hallam University, between
2003 and 2007, we had regular debates about academic rigor and what constituted rigor
in the research process of artists and designers. Adopted from research in the sciences,
the significant terms associated with rigor, and associated with PhD research, were that
the research had to be “thorough, exhaustive, accurate, and systematic.” In art and design
critical and reflective were often added as well. In our seminars, it emerged that “thorough”
and “exhaustive” were related and could described as together forming a “T”-shape: the
horizontal line of the “T” consisting of an exhaustive, broad and comprehensive overview
of what is considered the context of research and related practice, while the focus area, the
vertical element of the “T,” consisting of going deep into it and being thorough in one’s
own contribution. I assume “objective” might have been included in earlier definitions of
rigor in research in art, design and architecture, however in the research of artists, design-
ers and architects, the requirement of the term might have been abandoned at some time. In
artistic research, the individual creative process involves necessarily subjective, intuitive
and explorative phases in which adhering to “objectivity” might be more of a hindrance
and lead to post-rationalisation. More about this below.
4. When we examine the next term, “accurate,” meaning “correct in all details” or
“faithful representation,” it is perhaps to this that Glanville’s demand for honesty is most
related. How may “accuracy” be possible from a constructivist perspective? Does the de-
mand for accuracy refer to observations, measurements, models and analysis only? Then
how might it include a playful exploration, intuitive insights, creative leaps of mind, ran-
dom iterations or doodling conversations (Glanville 1999) that may lead to new under-
standing, insights, methods, techniques or discoveries? Glanville views such creative mo-
ments as “[…] pointless, undirected, seemingly purposeless, playful and dreamy activity
that is at the heart of design” (Glanville 2006a: 105). When such designing is at the heart
of research, then research has dreamy and purposeless aspects to it. How might these be
documented and interpreted accurately?
5. In the spirit of honesty, I would like to reflect upon my own PhD research pro-
cess. In retrospect, it had aspects of double-bookkeeping: presenting my methodology,
plans and intentions to my supervisors (and myself) accurately, yet the results being post-
rationalisations. From my own perspective, I relied on hunches, connections between facts
“suddenly” becoming clear, a rather unstructured and unclear, sometimes “terrifying” pro-
cess riddled with insecurities of “poking around in the fog” in order to understand what
I was learning, make sense of it and proceed to a next step. The applied methodology

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emerging quietly almost on its own in the background. Later, after completion, I would
end presentations of my PhD Research with the statement: “Told as a story, my research
appears pretty straightforward and top-down. In fact it was bottom-up and came together
step-by-step over three years. The research process was a constant learning process.” From
that perspective, the written thesis did not describe in thorough, “honest” detail how new
insights emerged, but made sense of it in post-rationalisation (Glanville 1999: 5). For ex-
ample, even a meticulously kept journal would not reveal how exactly the grounded theory
emerged in the analysis of interview data.
6. The following term, “systematic,” is in my view the most problematic in the re-
search of artists and designers. Systematic, meaning “acting according to a fixed plan or
system, methodical.” Following a fixed plan in practice-based design research contradicts,
in my view, exactly the possibility of acting on new insights and diverging from a perhaps
planned trajectory. It is this creative freedom that allows for new connections, experiences
and discoveries. I believe it lies at the heart of research in the creative disciplines. Without
it, we would be “drawing by numbers,” while serendipitous and radically new discoveries
would be less frequent. As a result, I think “systematic” may be relevant to the general
overall structure or model1 of the research process of PhD research but should be avoided
in the active creative phases in which new ideas emerge and solutions are developed.
7. In this context, I ask where the “values” in scientific research might enter. In artistic
research, they often are referred to, or better emerge, in a reflective chapter. Karl Popper
asks why few scientists care to write about ethics and values:
[…] values emerge together with problems; that values could not exist without problems;
and that neither values nor problems can be derived or otherwise obtained from facts,
though they often pertain to facts or are connected with facts. (Popper 1976: 226)

8. I would say that it is here where a second-order cybernetics perspective might

provide a valuable contribution to avoid the “view from nowhere” (Turnbull 2000: 221).
When design research aims to answer a research question, a process that also involves
looking at problems, then this should be linked to particular values held by the researcher,
fundamentally informing the thinking and acting. However, these are rarely made explicit.
If this happens this usually takes place in a reflective chapter towards the end of the writ-
ten thesis.
9. I believe that Sweeting’s emphasis on Karl Müller and Alexander Riegler’s pro-
posal (§§25f) linking second-order cybernetics and design creates a most promising direc-
tion for both disciplines. This might be especially so in view of current developments in
design such as transition design (Irwin 2015), design for social change and user experience
design. All three examples include theoretical models that inform acting, which may lead
to designing intangibles, such as processes, involving (§25) complexity, adaptation and
evolution, and (§26) self-reflexivity and the inclusion of observers (§30).

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Open Peer Commentary:

Digital Design Research and Second-Order Cybernetics
Mateus de Sousa van Stralen

1. Gordon Pask pointed out “it is easy to argue that cybernetics is relevant to architec-
ture in the same way that it is relevant to a host of other professions; medicine, engineering
or law” (Pask 1969: 494). Indeed, there are several publications about the application of
cybernetics in design. In the target article, Ben Sweeting looks at this the other way around
and proposes that design research can contribute to cybernetic thinking by suggesting that
design research is not just a field influenced by cybernetics but is a form of second-order
cybernetic practice. Sweeting relies on Glanville’s work to underpin the strong relation of
second-order cybernetics (SOC) to practice and design. Through his work, Glanville has
shown that not only can cybernetics contribute to design, but that design can also inform
cybernetics, understanding cybernetics and design not as separate entities but as a circu-
lar interwoven process of acting and reflecting, theory and practice. The discussion I put
forward in the commentary is that Sweeting’s arguments can be made even more explicit
if we focus on a more specific form of design research that is based on digital processes
– digital design – and look how it is practiced. The connections between digital design,
design research and SOC can serve as bridge for a new generation of designers to access
and incorporate radical constructivism in their reflections and actions.
2. In the last decade, there has been a growing interest in cybernetics amongst design-
ers, especially young ones, driven by the increasing use of digital technologies in design.
Computer programming and its promise of machine intelligence in the process of design,1
manufacturing2 or embedding it in the environment3 are part of today’s design practice.
The development of the different digital processes and techniques was mainly motivated
by transformations in praxis led by architects and designers trying to explore the potential
of digital technologies in their work. As Neil Leach (2012) points out, much of the research
in digital design was done outside the traditional academic environments. Designers had to
develop their own software and building process to ensure the feasibility of their designs,4
and many reached out to theories external to design to support their works.5 But as Rivka
Oxman (2006: 232) has noted, the impact of digital design on practices has resulted in a
need for a revision of current design theories. Many research groups and designers have
looked to cybernetics to create conceptual frameworks to guide research and development.

1. Among others, the following AI-based techniques are popular: neural networks, genetic algo-
rithms, multi-agent systems, evolutionary architecture (Frazer 1995).
2. Topology optimization, digital fabrication, and self-assembling are examples of techniques in
which computation is applied to the manufacturing process.
3. In interactive environments and relational architecture, computation is embedded in the environ-
ment to enable reactive, interactive and dialogical behavior. See, e.g., the works of Usman Haque,
http://www.haque.co.uk, and Ruairi Glynn, http://www.ruairiglynn.co.uk.
4. See, e.g., the design companies Gehry & Partners and Zaha Hadid Architects.
5. The special issue of the London journal AD on “Folding in Architecture” (Lynn 1993) has several
articles that exemplify how designers reached out to theories external to design to support their
works.

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3. Digital design research can be seen as a subcategory of design research, but given
the impact of computation in designing and in production practices, it is evolving to be-
come a unique field in design (Oxman 2006). In digital design, computation can be inte-
grated in the total process of design, from the initial concept through to materialization,
production and use. In this “digital continuum,” as it is called by Branko Kolarevic (2003),
design is directly connected to materialization, from the initial conceptual stages with rapid
prototyping techniques, to the final object with digital fabrication processes and interactive
systems. The connection between design and materialization, research and action indicates
how the relations between design research and cybernetics can be even more evident in
digital design. It is not a surprise that most examples of connections between cybernetics
and design listed in §21 of the target article can be seen as examples of early digital design.
Nicolas Negroponte’s Soft Architecture Machines (Negroponte 1975) discusses computer-
aided architecture related to machine intelligence in design. John Frazer’s An Evolutionary
Architecture (Frazer 1995) investigates form-generating processes by considering architec-
ture as a form of artificial life. Glanville also had several articles related to digital design,
such as “CAD Abusing Computing” (Glanville 1992) and “Variety in design” (Glanville
1994). Further evidence can be found by bringing the discussion of the concepts of self-
reflexivity and the inclusion of the observer into the light of digital designing.
4. Sweeting discusses how self-reflexivity and the inclusion of the observer can be
seen as important points of interconnection between design research, SOC and second-
order science (SOS). Self-reflexivity is one of the central issues in digital design processes
today. This becomes more evident in those practices where computation is inextricably part
of the process, such as algorithmic and parametric design, in which the designer designs
computational process to generate form. The design of the design process that generates
form gives the idea that form is not “given,” but “found.” In the first case, data forces shape
onto passive matter, and in the second case, matter and data interact and give shape. The
idea of giving shape makes the connections between observer and process more explicit, as
most designers are eager to claim their involvement in the process. That is why the inclu-
sion of the observer does not seem to represent a problem in design. But in form finding this
becomes more blurry, as questions can arise as to who is responsible for the design. This
process, which is also called “emergence,” leads to a false idea that computers themselves
are generating autonomous objects. However, from an SOC perspective, the designer is
also responsible for the final design because form is actually coded in the computer by the
designer. The observer is included in a self-reflexive act of designing design.
5. Another point worth being discussed is the impact of the digital continuum in
design. Digital fabrication enables designers to create short feedback cycles of design-
ing, making and reflecting. In that context, practice-based research methods have become
more widely used and accepted, as designers are now able to make high-end models and
products in a fast and accessible manner through different iterative cycles. Either explicit
or not, these feedback cycles can be seen as examples of cybernetic practice, which rein-
forces Sweeting’s arguments.
6. In conclusion, Sweeting’s target article positions design research as a contemporary
variety of SOC and by doing so, establishes the connections between design and SOS,
creating a circular relation where one can inform the other. The parallels between design
research, SOC and SOS can be even more explicit in digital design. SOC and SOS can
point towards the creation of an epistemological foundation to digital design, where self-
reflexivity and the inclusion of the observer are central questions.

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Open Peer Commentary: Cybernetics Is the Answer,

but What Was the Conversation About?
Jose dos Santos Cabral Filho

1. Ben Sweeting’s target article shows a genuine and welcome effort to amplify our
understanding of the relationship between design and cybernetics. Sweeting explores in
detail the intricacies of such a relationship, presenting a well-argued investigation into the
possible links between the two fields of investigation and looking for a kind of mutualism,
exploring the improvement that both parts can bring to one another. He does so by continu-
ing Ranulph Glanville’s lifelong enterprise of clarifying the intertwining of the two areas,
an effort that was often made in unusual ways, escaping the conventional idea of applying
cybernetics to design.
2. My collaboration in this open commentary is to suggest that if a radical consider-
ation of the systemic nature of design were taken into account, the main arguments of the
article could be constructed in an easier and simpler way. The question of simplicity here
is less to attend the principle of Occam’s razor and more to make the arguments even more
compelling and, therefore, have a greater chance of extending their practical implications.

Design as an invitation to dialogue

3. There seems to be widespread consensus that to consider design under the prin-
ciples of second-order cybernetics is mostly to acknowledge the inclusion of the observer
and the conversation that originates from this acknowledgment. However, the bibliography
on the subject shows that most researchers consider the inclusion of the observer to be
restricted to the design process (the work of designers), and sometimes extended to the
research into the design process (the work of researchers, academic or not). This applies
to different researchers, such as Glanville and Donald Schön, and, in fact, it underlies the
target article. Most of the time, the issue of the use of the designed object does not get much
attention, as if the design role had ended with the creation of the object. Nevertheless, the
consideration of the object and its use is not enough: if we understand the systemic nature
of design in a radical way, we have to come to terms with the fact that the final product of
the design chain is not an object but a system, in which the object is included. Acknowledg-
ing this will change, concomitantly, the design process and design process research.
4. Thus, if we want to push the idea of design research as a variety of SOC to its most
interesting limits, we have to consider that what we design when designing is not merely
an object but a larger system that includes the object (and in some cases, may even prescind
from physical objects). That may seem common sense, obvious and self-evident, and, in
fact, it is one way or another acknowledged by most designers, especially by architects
(and it is surely indisputable amongst cyberneticians).
5. This matter was already highlighted by Gordon Pask in his seminal paper “The ar-
chitectural relevance of cybernetics” (Pask 1969). It posits, amongst other things, that “ar-
chitects are first and foremost system designers,” a reasoning that can be easily extended
to design in general. Pask’s paper is certainly one of the most quoted papers in relation
to cybernetics and architecture/design, especially due to its unexpected proposition that
architecture is more relevant to cybernetics than the other way round.

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6. However, Pask’s assertion on the systemic nature of architecture is not fully tak-
en into account by practitioners, if not even downplayed. Certainly, several researchers,
particularly those with some sort of direct link to Pask himself, such as Hugh Duberly,
Paul Pangaro, Usman Haque, and John and Julia Frazer, have all drawn attention to the
groundbreaking aspect of Pask’s contention, and have consistently tried to develop it fur-
ther (§21). Dubberly & Pangaro (2015) even argue that this paper “anticipates Donald
Schön’s notion of design as conversation […] and goes further than Rittel and others who
described design as a cybernetic process” (Dubberly & Pangaro 2015: 10). For certain,
Pask goes beyond Schön’s notion of design as conversation, considering that Schön, even
though he pushes the idea of design beyond mere problem solving, still regards the design
process as somehow ending with the object. In this way, conversation, in Schön’s view,
ends up been a kind of soliloquy between the designer and his or her drawings, regardless
of whether he or she is using drawings to articulate ideas and not just as a representation.
However, it is undeniable that Schön’s book The Reflective Practitioner (1991) turned out
to be very influential and played a significant role in the general acceptance of design as
conversational outside the circle of cybernetics.
7. Thus, on the one hand, we have a theoretical recognition of the importance of the
systemic principle of design, and on the other hand, what we can term as a politically
correct embracing of democratic intentions by designers. The problem is that despite this
general and diffuse acceptance of a systemic approach, we are witnessing a continued and
excessive focus on the design of non-systemic objects that is more and more tailored to
meet the spectacularization of our lives and cities. In other words, we see not the use of a
dialogical framework in the actual practice of design, but a dialogical discourse superficial-
ly applied to design. As a matter of fact, a dialogical discourse is a contradiction in itself, as
discourse is opposed to dialogue, as the philosopher Vilém Flusser (2011: 83) reminds us.
8. The problem with a superficial adoption of design as conversation is that it can lead
to sterile self-reflexive attempts such as Peter Eisenman’s Cannereggio project, referred to
in the target article (§28). On the one hand, it is for sure a meta-reflection on the design
process and apparently it articulates an ingenious convergence of the three categories of
design research – into, through and for (§§22, 30). On the other hand, its design scenario
excludes so many layers of the concerns and stakeholders implied on that specific archi-
tectural design that it becomes a restricted conversation, a soliloquy so to speak, that ends
up as a selfish and exhibitionist exercise, no matter how intellectually flamboyant and mar-
ketable it may be. In other words, it is not enough to be self-reflexive and simply engaged
to explore the full potential of being an SOC observer. The question is not only about the
engagement or detachment of the observer; it is not only about where we position ourselves
as observers (§30) but also about how far we are willing to take the systemic approach, that
is to say, it is about the extent and nature of the included observers invited to the dialogue.
9. Pask and Price, once more, have shown some possible paths to including the ob-
server radically with their Fun Palace project – a collaboration with Joan Littlewood (§13).
However, it is worth noting that the same contradiction regarding Pask’s paper – praised
but not fully taken into account – goes for the Fun Palace. It is widely reverenced in ar-
chitectural magazines and at exhibitions but it seems to have had little practical impact on
the production of contemporary architecture. The digital design trend of recent decades,
for example, which is based on the design research of the 1970s, has promoted a change
in practice from designing the object to designing the process of designing the object (de-
signing design, form-finding, etc.). A radical move would change the focus on the object in

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itself towards a systemic and relational scenario where the object exists in its full dialogical
potential; that move, however, seems unattainable (or possibly, undesirable).
10. Even if we consider the development of so-called interactive architecture, the Fun
Palace proposition is still far ahead of what we have achieved, in spite of the advances
in digital technology at our disposal. It seems that, contradicting Price’s famous dictum
“technology is the answer, but what was the question?”, technology is not the answer
in our present situation. At least not technology outside an SOC framework. Perhaps we
should bring Price’s dictum up to date by saying: cybernetics is the answer, but what was
the conversation about?

Conclusion
11. A significant advance in design towards a second-order level will come when
designers embrace an all-encompassing systemic approach that will necessarily have the
inclusion of the observer, at all possible levels, as its pivotal point. If the desire is to keep
design and design research as a practical enquiry into openness, as Sweeting seems to
aspire, designers must extend the conversational and recursive strategy used in the design
process towards the creation of dialogical objects and the system in which they are in-
serted. To consider design within the complexities and seriousness of Pask’s conversation
theory would allow a radical rethinking of design in a way that it would necessarily be-
come SOC in practice. Then, Glanville’s assertion that “cybernetics is the theory of design
and design is the action of cybernetics” (2007c: 1178; §22) would become unequivocal,
and design, as well as design research, would be undoubtedly more similar to the tangible
experimentation of first-order cybernetics, as the target article proposes.

Open Peer Commentary: (Architectural) Design

Research in the Age of Neuroscience: The Value of the
Second-Order Cybernetic Practice Perspective
Andrea Jelić

1. In the context of the increasing interest of neuroscience for architecture and,

more broadly, evidence-based design, Ben Sweeting’s target article offers a critical per-
spective for plausible positioning of design in such an interdisciplinary dialogue. Spe-
cifically, by understanding (architectural) design research as a contemporary variety of
second-order cybernetics, an opportunity arises for tackling potentially crucial obstacles
to future progress and the usefulness of neuroscientific investigations in an architectural
context. Accordingly, the aim of this commentary is to highlight the value of the target
article’s view by examining its possible contribution to several crucial issues, including:
a. addressing concerns of prescriptive design solutions;
b. using the inherent second-order cybernetic structure of design research to ques-
tion the roles of the architect-designer and the scientist in the context of experi-
mental studies; and

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c. indicating the need for and possibility of a new second-order science of interdisci-
plinary design research framed on the basis of cognitive science and phenomenol-
ogy of architectural experience and design.
2. Before proceeding, it is important to contextualize the commentary’s argument and
motivations by sketching briefly the background and current efforts in the field dedicated
to investigating the relationship between the mind, body, and built environment through a
neuroscientific lens (for a comprehensive introduction, see Mallgrave 2011, 2013). On the
one hand, a renewed interest in the experiential dimension of architecture and a turn toward
human-centred design, and on the other, decades-long history of architectural psychology
and environment-behaviour research have created conditions for a seamless opening of
neuroscience-architecture dialogue. However, despite promising initial efforts, there is a
lack of a systematic framework purposely aimed at defining and structuring the relation-
ship between architectural design and scientific insights/evidence. It is in this light that the
target article’s cybernetic parallels between science and design are proposed as a direction
for approaching this important issue.
3. Concretely, the continuity of ideas between cybernetics and design research as pre-
sented by the author (§22) establish potential interpretations for neuroscientific knowl-
edge-architectural design connection at two levels:
ƒƒ at the level of design research being exercised as a second-order cybernetic prac-
tice, and
ƒƒ at the level of interdisciplinary design research as a second-order science.
4. Firstly, the essentially conversational and constructivist nature of the design pro-
cess challenges directly any concern for developing evidence-based prescriptions for ar-
chitectural solutions. In this sense, any (recurring) attempt to “scientise” design through
neuroscientific methods and inputs – a genuine possibility in the age of neuroscience
– can be countered effectively by bringing awareness of the cybernetic conditions gov-
erning design research into this interdisciplinary endeavour. Therefore, similarly to the
capacity of the work of architecture only to trigger and not control the subject’s experi-
ence (according to the enactive-embodied view, Jelić et al. 2016; see also Sweeting’s hy-
pothesis of architectural experience as facilitating second-order inquiry, Sweeting 2015a),
neuroscientific inquiries into the experience of architecture primarily serve to shed light
on design knowledge, to relate the intuitive decisions to spatial scenarios, and not to
modify the design activity as such.
5. Secondly, in line with the theory of embodied cognition, architectural design is in
itself an embodied process: it is hypothesized as being a neurological activity that always
involves embodied metaphorical thinking and multi modal image-making (Arbib 2013;
Mallgrave 2011). Indeed, reflecting phenomenologically upon one’s own experience as
a designer and based on (auto)biographical descriptions of the process by extraordinary
practitioners (e.g., Zumthor 1999), it can be suggested that architects commonly have
rather suggestive, lifelike, intensive (bodily) feelings when imagining the spaces they
are designing, in resonance with imagined atmospheric qualities. Accordingly, a neuro-
scientific, or better yet, neurophenomenological investigation of the design process may
bring forward the awareness about the bodily and emotional processes involved in (pre-)
reflective experiences of “living” the designs. Hence, design research with reference to
second-order cybernetics principles (§22) could help to distinguish the participant’s di-

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mension – how an exchange of different observational positions occurs (i.e., imagining

experience from the position of the user and one’s own as a designer), how such switching
is incorporated into the conversation with the medium in which the designer works, and
ultimately, in what manner such an observer’s awareness could be introduced to teaching
design and facilitating the learning process.
6. Following the target article’s convincing argument for the necessary shift in un-
derstanding science as a design-like activity (§§13f), a concrete illustration can be offered
in the context of the neuroscience-architecture inquiry. If design research is understood
as a variety of second-order cybernetic practice, then this kind of interdisciplinary experi-
mental work encounters a particular observer issue: who is a designer here – an architect
or a scientist? Currently, the majority of neuroscientific investigations are one-sided, i.e.,
led and conceived primarily by cognitive scientists, with little or no support from the ar-
chitectural side. In such a situation, designing experimental setups, involving the creation
of architectural environments, is guided more by the requirements of scientific methods
than by architectural purposes. Thus, the validity of resulting evidence can be questioned
on the basis of its appropriateness and usability in design. For this reason, there is a need
to strategize such an interdisciplinary endeavour by establishing a framework for the new
second-order science (see, for instance, the proposal by Hugo Alrøe and Egon Noe 2014),
which should include careful rethinking of the participants’ roles in relation to their dis-
ciplinary perspectives, expertise, and corresponding impact on study outcomes. In other
words, there is a need for self-reflexivity and differentiation according to the observer
(architect or scientist), in the spirit of second-order cybernetics and science, as indicated
in §15 and §30.
7. To illustrate further the parallels between design research and (second-order) cy-
bernetics (§23), this last point considers the overlap between the notion of cognitive-
science-cum-phenomenology providing a genuine second-order science (for a detailed ac-
count, see Vörös 2014) and the proposal by Sweeting (§26) of second-order science being
a potential point of interchange between design and science. In the context of neurosci-
ence-architecture dialogue, Sebastjan Vörös’s argument can be transformed into a cogni-
tive science-cum-phenomenology of architectural experience and design, where the latter
refers to a longstanding tradition of architectural phenomenology and the above-men-
tioned phenomenological descriptions of architects’ works and design thinking (classical
examples including Holl, Pallasmaa & Pérez-Gómez 2006; Pallasmaa 2005). In paral-
lel, current efforts to provide a systematic conceptual framework for the complex bio-
cultural nature of architectural experience prevalently belong to the enactive-embodied
understanding of cognition (see, for instance, Jelić 2015; Jelić et al. 2016; Rietveld 2016;
Rietveld & Kiverstein 2014). Taken all together, a new second-order science of interdis-
ciplinary design research can be conceived of as a conversational framework between
the enactive-embodied approach and the phenomenology of architectural experience and
design, which focuses on the interdisciplinary research itself. Thus, its aim is to identify
and establish a plausible pathway of exchange between neuroscience and architecture –
that is, to create a communicative space, a “trans-domain” where scientific and designerly
research may converge (Jonas 2015a: 34). Accordingly, the architect’s ways of knowing
might be able organically to incorporate alternative approaches to life-world perspectives,
in this case, one that is enactive-embodied and evidence-based, and thus strengthen in
turn the architectural mode of structuring and representing the world.

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8. Finally, the value of target article in the context of constructivist approaches more
broadly, can be particularly emphasized in terms of its pertinence to addressing problems
beyond cybernetics – more specifically, in the domain of enactivism as related to architec-
ture – by indicating a way of structuring interdisciplinary research and thus tackling one of
the key issues of design research in the age of neuroscience.

Author’s Response: Beyond Application

Ben Sweeting

1. I wish to thank all commentators for their stimulating contributions. The first thing
to note in response to these seven commentaries is the range of ground they cover, indicat-
ing the wide potential of the relation between cybernetics and design research to inform
both fields. It is significant that many of the aspects raised by commenters are focused on
core topics of cybernetic research: computing technology (Mateus van Stralen; Chris-
tiane Herr); cognition (Andrea Jelić); and, broadly, the relationship between research/
theory and action/practice, which is a focus of Herr and Michael Hohl, and underlies
the concerns of Jose Cabral, Dai Griffiths and Tom Scholte. As Karl Müller (2010) has
noted, there is a need to focus on core topics in order to reinforce the coherence of radi-
cal constructivism (RC) and second-order cybernetics (SOC) as a research field. Müller’s
remarks could be taken as a call for a turn away from topics such as design that have been
prominent in recent cybernetics. These commentaries, and the research to which they
point, suggest that design may instead offer a focus in which a number of such core issues
can be explored.
2. In this context, Scholte’s introduction to the work of Ann and Lawrence Halprin
may be valuable even beyond the project of connecting cybernetics-inspired discussions
in design and theatre studies (see also Scholte’s target article). Building connections such
as this would seem to be a way to help broaden the relationship of cybernetics with both
design and theatre beyond one of application, releasing their potential to explore central
cybernetic concerns through practice (cf. Müller 2010: 36f).
3. Of the commentaries, those of Griffiths and Cabral put forward the most explicit
questions, and I therefore concentrate on these below. In line with my approach in the tar-
get article, I have attempted to remain focused primarily on how issues raised in design can
contribute to questions in cybernetics.

Ill-defined problems
4. Griffiths (§8) suggests that the account of design that I have given applies to a
particular subset of design, whereas at least some other areas of design deal with well-
defined problems. Some design tasks or components of design tasks are, indeed, charac-
terised by more constrained problems than others. Yet even apparently clear and familiar
design tasks regularly involve incomplete criteria or contestable premises, and a clearly-
defined goal is no guarantee of a well-defined problem (cf. Griffiths §6). This is because
design is always concerned with the new (target article §8), which is the case even when
designers are not attempting to be especially innovative (that is, when we design a build-

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ing, we are concerned with creating something new even when we stick to an established
typology). This can be seen within the scope of the definition that Griffiths (§5) cites:
the process of preparing a plan for constructing something is not solely a matter of set-
ting out production information (the working drawings and specifications that will guide
manufacture) but of devising what is proposed in these. This process involves forms of
reflective, conversational activity whenever such a plan is considered in more than arbi-
trary terms (that is to say, when it is designed).
5. Take, for instance, some of the questions posed in the design of a new motorway
(an example within the compass of engineering, and one to which Horst Rittel and Mel-
vin Webber refer, Rittel & Webber 1973: 163). Different configurations of road junctions
will be both better and worse according to different terms of reference. Even considering
only the efficiency of traffic flow, there will be trade offs between congestion at different
points in the road system. There are also many other relevant criteria, such as, for instance:
safety, other road users, cost, construction sequencing, maintenance, noise pollution, air
quality and impact on natural habitats. While these criteria are mostly easily recognisable,
they are not all commensurable with each other, such that there is no one way to resolve
definitively between them, nor is it possible to optimise against an overall goal without this
being distorting. Further, the interactions between these different criteria and the limita-
tions they set on each other in the specific situation that is at hand only become clear as
particular solutions are developed, discussed and enacted. Taking a broader scope, one
might also challenge the premises under which the project is advanced: having explored
the likely consequences of the new motorway, we may take a different view on whether it
is a worthwhile project and consider alternative options instead.
6. While such situations resist exhaustive analysis and conventional linear problem
solving, designers deal with them as a matter of course and without regarding them as
being problematic. In so doing, they develop and refine not just their design proposals
but also the questions to which these proposals respond. Indeed, as Nigel Cross (2007a:
100) points out, designers treat even well-formed problems as if they are ill-defined, an
approach that has the benefits of testing the assumptions that are given at the outset and
searching for new opportunities.
7. Griffiths (§6) gives two counter examples – those of scientific and musical in-
struments – where questions are very tightly constrained. Indeed, these situations are so
constrained that they might well not be considered as instances of design activity in that
they respond to a plan rather than create one. The musical instrument example, which is
perhaps better understood in terms of craft, is closely related to the existing tradition of
musical performance in which each instrument must be usable. These constraints can,
however, be understood as a result of a wider design process, one where the configura-
tion of the musical instrument has co-evolved slowly over several generations together
with the traditions of musical performance to which it is related (this is comparable in
architecture to the development of a vernacular tradition). The development of scientific
instruments can be thought of, similarly, as blurring with that of scientific experimenta-
tion itself, as is reflected in accounts of scientific practice (target article §10). What is
learnt in experiments using the instruments generates new criteria for further experiments
and so new or refined instruments. Thus we can think of this as one overall process, which
we could characterise either in terms of science or design, encompassing scientific experi-
mentation and the construction of the instruments that support this.

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8. Griffiths (§8) asks the question of to what extent an SOC account of design can
be convincing to those that do not share its epistemological position. I do not see this as a
question of different design epistemologies but of different degrees of explicitness about
the epistemology that is acted out in design, and different ways of making this explicit.
What designers do in practice is not always what they describe themselves as doing, as
discussed by Herr and Hohl. It is in retrospect that the paths taken seem clear and, as it
is this clarity that is what designers need to communicate, the messy process by which
this clarity is developed usually remains unremarked on. Making these sorts of processes
explicit is a core concern of design research and something to which SOC can contribute.
The purpose of this is not, as I see it, to reconfigure design practice in some specific way.
Rather, articulating what would otherwise remain tacit helps maintain what is already
special about design (including attitudes towards values, as raised by both Herr §2 and
Hohl §§7f), something that can otherwise become lost.
9. This relation of SOC to design practice in terms of making the implicit explicit
may, as Griffiths (§8) suggests, inform how SOC might be advanced more generally.
Cybernetic processes are implicit in everyday life and, as with design, making these pro-
cesses explicit reinforces what is special about them, which can otherwise become lost
in the context of other concerns. Looked at in these terms, SOC’s relation to practice is
not limited to where its epistemological position is explicitly shared. It can enjoy a broad
relation to practice in terms of implicitly cybernetic processes, while still contesting the
ways in which particular practices are conventionally understood.

Material agency and viability

10. Griffiths points out tensions between RC and Andrew Pickering’s (1995) account
of material agency. As Griffiths (§11) notes, there is not necessarily a conflict here and it
seems to me that such tensions can be defused, or at least sharpened to more precisely the
points at issue.
11. This is supported by the case of design, which while constructivist in orientation is
compatible with ideas of material agency, even if this was not emphasised in my account.
This is both in terms of the media with which designers think and the technologies and
industries with and in which they work:
ƒƒ Media plays an active role in how designers work. It is important to how they deal
with complexity (Gedenryd 1998), model the material and spatial (Sweeting 2011),
and construct new possibilities (the process of sketching that Ranulph Glanville
2006a, 2007c emphasises is one that needs to be embodied in media of some kind).
This includes the digital technologies discussed by van Stralen, as well as the
more obvious materiality of the analogue. Accounts of the active role of instru-
ments in science, such as that given by Pickering (1995), can be read as if referring
to the design studio (target article §10).
ƒƒ What is materially and technologically feasible is a crucial constraint on what de-
signers propose. This is especially the case where designers try to use materials
in forms to which they are particularly suited, as can be summarised by architect
Louis Kahn’s oft-quoted conversation with a brick – “You say to a brick, ‘What
do you want, brick?’ And brick says to you, ‘I like an arch.’ And you say to brick,
‘Look, I want one, too, but arches are expensive and I can use a concrete lintel.’

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And then you say: ‘What do you think of that, brick?’ Brick says: ‘I like an arch’.”1
As well as this material-focused approach, material agency can be seen in the way
that technological changes have transformed the nature of material constraints
(discussed by van Stralen §§2, 4), and it remains an important factor even where
design approaches are focused elsewhere.
12. The principle move in RC is to change the orientation of epistemology from a
concern with how we know (or do not know) about any real world beyond our experience,
to a focus on this experience itself. This relocates epistemology to the realm of experience,
in which (our experience of) the material is important to include (as is evident in design).
While, therefore, RC can be contrasted with the material where this is meant in the sense
of the real, there is no conflict between RC and our material experience. Indeed, the latter
can be encompassed in the notion of viability, which is central to Ernst von Glasersfeld’s
account. RC is not a licence for unconstrained construction. Von Glasersfeld (1990) gives
the example of not being able to walk through a desk, and thus being unable to maintain a
viable idea of the world that would allow him to do this. This is an example of a material
condition in which we experience epistemological, not just practical, resistance.
13. Von Glasersfeld sometimes referred to viability in terms of “fit.” In RC, this is in
the sense of “fitting with” or evolutionary fit, and so perhaps better phrased in terms of the
elimination of the unfit. There is no sense of correspondence to the real and much room
for contradictory explanations to be viable in our experience at different times. This is not
to be confused with the athlete’s notion of fit, of an idea becoming fitter and fitter in the
sense of a closer match to the goal of the real. In this latter view, while it may still be ac-
knowledged that we do not have access to the real, our experience is claimed to be a good
guide to it in any case because of the constraints that are imposed on it, thus returning to a
correspondence view of epistemology. The main point at issue here is, as I see it, not about
material agency per se but whether this is understood in terms of the real or in the realm of
experience, and about how this is then put to work epistemologically.
14. Similarly to what I have said above regarding the relation between SOC and de-
sign, I think that RC is agile enough to engage with the material and the performative
across the “whole range of scientific and design activities” (Griffiths §11), while also con-
testing what is at stake epistemologically in these. Indeed, RC can help provide the honesty
that Glanville (2014c) suggests will efface the differences between different research tradi-
tions (target article §14; and as expanded on by Hohl).

Designing systems
15. Cabral’s call for an increased focus on the systemic nature of objects is some-
thing that I support. The issue as I see it, and as Cabral (§3) points to, comes back to
what, especially in architecture, is a surprising gulf between theories regarding how we
understand, on the one hand, what is designed and, on the other, the process through which
design occurs. Recent work has addressed this in part by seeing architecture in terms of
its place within the building industry (Lloyd Thomas, Amhoff & Beech 2016). From the
vantage point of SOC, there are further, more designerly opportunities for bridging be-
tween these areas. The work of Jelić is significant in this regard, establishing an account
of architectural experience in commensurable terms to constructivist accounts of design

1. https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2013/feb/26/louis-kahn-brick-whisperer-architect

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practice. I have previously suggested there is potential in connecting conversational ac-

counts of design with conversational accounts of architectural experience (Sweeting 2011),
while in the context of the target article one can also understand particular examples such
as the Fun Palace as being part of SOC enquiry not just resulting from it (Cabral §9; Jelić
§4; Sweeting 2015a).
16. The building of such bridges does not, however, guarantee in what manner they
will be crossed. In making the argument in the target article – that design is a form of
SOC even where SOC is not explicitly referenced – it was important for me to refer to
work in design beyond figures such as Cedric Price, Nicholas Negroponte and John Frazer,
who were explicitly influenced by cybernetic ideas. My reference to Peter Eisenman is
not therefore intended to validate his architecture but to point to the formal similarities
between his work and second-order science (SOS) that are of interest whatever we think of
his proposals. Indeed, the sort of critiques put forward by Cabral and others, such as that
of Robin Evans (1985), may inform how SOS and SOC can be developed: as Cabral (§8)
puts it, “it is not enough to be self-reflexive and simply engaged to explore the full potential
of being an SOC observer.” The question of how to design such systems is an open one, and
a topic on which design research and cybernetics might collaborate.

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 “Black Box” Theatre:
Second-Order Cybernetics and Naturalism
in Rehearsal and Performance
Tom Scholte

Introduction
1. Whether in print or in person, when highlighting the importance of James Clerk
Maxwell’s “black box” gedanken-experiment to his own work, Ranulph Glanville would
often playfully gesture to the black box theatre (a simple, flexible, unadorned performance
space with a flat floor and no proscenium arch) as decidedly not the kind of Black Box
to which he was referring. It is with a similar mix of playfulness and earnestness (and as
a small but heartfelt memorial to his enormous contributions) that I gesture back to the
theatrical black box as precisely the place where that other kind of Black Box might be
fruitfully investigated.
2. As a practitioner and teacher of acting and directing for the theatre, the theory
explicated herein was inspired by the growth of my engagement with cybernetics to in-
clude not only my initial “first-order” concerns with the ways in which, through rigorously
applied cybernetic heuristics, the Stanislavski system of acting can consistently generate
“believable” performances (Scholte 2015), but also “second-order” questions regarding
the mechanisms through which observers (audiences) assign this sense of “belief,” as well
as “meaning,” to these performances. The result is the theoretic formulation below, which
will be experimentally investigated and analysed over the next several years.
3. At all phases of the work as it has unfolded, the list of its second-order cybernetic
implications has continued to grow and, along with it, my nascent belief that not only could
second-order cybernetics bridge theoretical gaps between post-structuralists and cognitiv-
ists within theatre studies, but that naturalist theatre (along with related offshoots including
Theatre of the Oppressed and psychodrama) could provide a hitherto untapped laboratory
for the generation of quantitative and qualitative research pertaining to several dimensions
of second-order cybernetics,1 particularly cybersemiotics, which, as a result, might end up

1. One reviewer suggested that cybernetics, if it is indeed a science at all, is inductive rather than
empirical and is, therefore, under no obligation to run laboratory experiments. This and other
conceptions of the disciplinary status of the field, including Gordon Pask’s eventual disavowal of
the label “science” in favor of “applied epistemology” (Pask 1980b) and Lowell Christy’s recent

271

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better positioned to help dissolve onto-epistemological deadlocks between constructivists

and realists of all stripes across the academy and beyond.2 In my view, this represents
a significant new approach to second-order research, indicating that, fifty years after its
inception, the theoretical advances of second-order cybernetics are not only continuingly
relevant, but, in vast areas of the humanities, still to be explored. My hope is that the theo-
retical considerations discussed here might inspire others to bring their expertise to this
fledgling research program.
4. I will begin by outlining the current, hotly debated onto-epistemological deadlock
in theatre studies that has been the backdrop against which my work has been carried out.
I will then introduce the cybernetic fundamentals of the Stanislavski system of acting (the
methodology most commonly employed in the rehearsal and performance of naturalis-
tic plays). I will then further excavate the second-order cybernetic depths of naturalist
theatre’s methods of production and reception while proposing ways in which second-
order cybernetics might be operationalized, through the application of elements of Gordon
Pask’s conversation theory (CT), as a cybersemiotic intervention in the aforementioned
dispute within theatre studies as well as other similar outstanding questions across the
humanities and social sciences. Conversely, it is my hope that the employment of the natu-
ralist theatre as a “research site” might help the field of second-order cybernetics further
refine its theoretical foundations lending credence to Ross Ashby’s assertion that “the dis-
covery that two fields are related leads to each branch helping in the development of the
other” (Ashby 1956: 4).

The impasse in theatre studies

5. A “Cognitive Turn” has swept through theatre studies, along with many other disci-
plines within the humanities, during the opening decades of the 21st century. The previous
era of high postmodernism had been a dangerous time for any scholar willing to make a
statement even remotely resembling some kind of universal truth-claim, and this had been
the case particularly for university-based teachers of the Stanislavski system of acting,
grounded, as it is, in 19th century notions of the “self” and the “truth of the human spirit”
(Stanislavski 2008: 19).
6. In terms of theatrical practice as a whole, the genre of realism, the performance
mode most often conflated with the theoretical commitments of naturalism, and where
Stanislavski’s methods have traditionally been most at home, had been hit particularly
hard. Considered “cranky, weary, old-fashioned, prescriptive, middle-class, and formu-
laic,” realism is described by Amy Holzapfel as “one of the most berated dramatic forms
within contemporary theory,” and as commonly considered “a conservative force that re-
produces and reinforces dominant cultural relations” (Holzapfel 2014: 5).

comment to me that the field’s difficulties establishing an institutional home for itself are due, in
part, to the fact that it is actually an “anti-discipline,” certainly deserve consideration.
2. There is, of course, nothing like a total embrace of cybersemiotics amongst cyberneticians, but its
insistence on the role of observer-dependent onto-epistemology in the interpretation and descrip-
tion of both symbolic and non-symbolic phenomena makes it sufficiently compatible with other
strands of second-order research to be of wide experimental usefulness across the field.

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7. Regarding the Stanislavski system in particular, an early paper by Rhonda Blair

vividly diagnoses its American descendent, “the Method,” as a similar casualty of the criti-
cal theoretic onslaught; pilloried for its reification of “a non-existent “self” and accused
of “colluding in mechanisms of representation that serve the ends of decadent late capital-
ism,” its “ahistorical, noncritical, sentimentalized or sensationalized view of experience”
is said to participate in a dubious “humanist project of universalizing experience” that is
“inherently patriarchal and misogynist” (Blair 2000: 202).
8. But, as the new millennium dawned, a cluster of theatre scholar/practitioners, frus-
trated by the fact that “few scholars in [the] field have asked the advocates of Bordieu,
Lacan, and Derrida […] to justify the epistemology of their theories on scientific grounds”
(McConachie 2008: 9), grabbed hold of cognitive science as a means of “defying the scep-
tical paralysis that characterizes much of postmodern thought” (Rokotnitz 2011: 5) and
rebuilding our ability to “trust performance.” Undergirding this view is the belief that “[e]
mbodied modes of reception and perception are those that do not require logical analysis
for their verification; their presence and effects are made manifest in the body” and that
this bodily apprehension and confirmation provides us with “truths of which we may be
sufficiently satisfied in order to trust with confidence” (ibid: 2).
9. Regarding Stanislavski’s position in this reappraisal, the early days of the move-
ment saw Blair offer the thoroughly isomorphic relationship between the Method’s termi-
nology and that of the computational theory of mind as a potential arrow in the quiver of
the theatrical cognitivists.
Behavior that is adaptive is designed to accomplish or prevent something or to achieve a
goal, which is action in the Method’s sense. ‘Opportunities’ and ‘constraints’ defined by
‘other people’s behavior’ are analogous with [the Method’s] ‘objectives,’ ‘obstacles’ and
‘given circumstances.’ From this perspective, key parts of the Method are fundamentally
Darwinian and biological, not necessarily Romantic, modernist, humanist, psychological,
Western, and spiritual. If this theory is correct, it means that the appeal of the method is
due not necessarily (and only) to the hegemony of various kinds of realism and habits of
representation and mimesis but to the fact that this is how we function organically. From
this perspective, self and behavior are grounded in our being as physical organisms while
also being affected by culture and conscious choice. (Blair 2000: 206)

10. The obvious short step from the computational theory of mind to the goal-directed
and feedback-controlled conception of cybernetics, and its place within a unified theory of
human behavior (see Grinker 1958), could, potentially, position the field to play its own
role in the cognitive turn and its insistence that…
while doubt is necessary for rigorous analysis, and essential for the advancement of intel-
ligent inquiry, art and drama can also teach us of other forms of knowing that are no less
valid, rigorous, or true. (Rokotnitz 2011: 12)

11. But, while the notion that art and drama may provide access to “other […] no
less valid […] forms of knowing” is appealing, the notion that such forms of knowing
might be “true” speaks of a desire for the kind of ontological certainty that is the hallmark,
and blind-spot, of first-order science (and, for that matter, first-order cybernetics). And it
would, in my view, be most unfortunate if this blind-spot were to prove the very undoing
of the cognitive turn, as the movement offers an opportunity to confront certain persistent
phenomena that have not been satisfactorily explained away by a strictly social construc-
tivist semiotic approach.

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12. Many theatre practitioners continue to work with notions of “truth” in perfor-
mance, along with a sustained belief that representational drama in the realist/naturalist
tradition can contain genuine epistemic goods. Arguably, a large percentage of mainstream
theatre audiences would agree, at least tacitly, with this notion. Countless acting students
are routinely stunned by the sudden emergence of “truthful” behaviour under imaginary
circumstances when their colleagues first begin to effectively execute the cybernetic prin-
ciples of the Stanislavski system. Peer reflections inevitably include such comments as: “It
was great to hear you use your real voice instead of your acting voice,” “I’ve never seen
your movements and your gestures seem so natural,” “It was just like watching you be-
ing yourself in that situation except the words weren’t the words you would use.” But, of
course, these accounts have long been inadmissible as “evidence” in the postmodern court
of opinion since words such as “real,” “natural,” and “self” have been effectively stricken
from the record. They are, of course, similarly suspect in second-order cybernetic dis-
course. So what are we to make of the persistent phenomena attested to daily in classrooms
and professional rehearsal halls throughout the Anglo-American and European world for
more than a century? What can we say about this difference between acting that is com-
monly called “good” and that which is called “bad” and that seems to have something to do
with a kind of relationship to the behaviour we recognize from our everyday observations
and that is fairly dependably produced by the application of cybernetic principles to the
world of “make-believe”?
13. Semiotically-minded theatre scholars such as Ric Knowles have already pushed
back against the “proselytising […] excesses of [the cognitive turn’s] still early days” and
declared the phenomenological “lack of mediation” it vouches for to be “a theoretical ideal
rather than a practical possibility” (Knowles 2015: 83–87). Interestingly, Knowles’s de-
fence of semiotics’ alleged “unscientific errors” also gestures towards its integration with
“biological structuring” in the work of Jakob von Uexküll, a scientist whose biosemiot-
ics have also played such a pivotal role in Søren Brier’s cybersemiotic formulation. This
seems to set the stage nicely for a second-order intervention that might provide a produc-
tive “middle way” between these two contesting camps in theatre studies.

Stanislavski’s cybernetic system

14. Scholte (2015) examines, in some detail, the essentially cybernetic vision at the
core of the Stanislavski system of acting, first highlighted by Robert Cohen, who begins
his explanation with the most often cited example of cybernetics in action: the thermostat
on a regulated furnace that is, of course, “calibrated to go on when feedback reveals the
room temperature is too low, and to go off when feedback reveals the opposite” (Cohen
1978: 33).
15. Cohen then points out that, in order to provoke her own organic responses on a
moment-to-moment basis in performance, the actor must remain responsive to the feed-
back emanating from her fellow actors that will let her know whether she, like the regu-
lated furnace, is getting closer to, or further from, the “objective” that she, in orthodox
Stanislavskian practice, has chosen for her character to pursue throughout the scene (i.e.,
soliciting a declaration of love).

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This feedback includes not only conscious dialogue and conscious non-verbal signals like
winks and shrugs but also the unconscious and autonomic responses of our physiology; be-
haviours of which we (as humans) are skilled observers and interpreters. They are all part
of the feedback of information which makes us adjust our behaviour toward the satisfaction
of our intentions – and sometimes to adjust our intentions as well. (1978: 36)3

16. Guided by this feedback, characters create what engineers would describe as
“closed loop” control systems as they mutually seek to influence each other’s behaviour.
The mental discipline to remain genuinely engaged in such loops within imaginary circum-
stances lies in direct correlation to the seeming “naturalness” of performance that is the
hallmark of great Stanislavskian, or Method, acting.

Active Analysis: An ordinary language description

17. Nowhere did Stanislavski harness the power of his cybernetic approach to acting
more productively than in the rehearsal methods known as his “later legacies” including
Active Analysis (AA). Bella Merlin outlines the process of AA as follows:
First of all, the actors read the scene. Second, they assessed the facts of the scene… What
is the event? What are the inciting objectives and counter-objectives? […] The third stage
consisted of the actors improvising the scene using their own words, incorporating any of
the facts that they could remember. […] Following the improvisation, the actors reread the
scene and compared it with what they had just experienced. They noted which facts were
retained and which were forgotten, and whether the inciting incident took place. Rehears-
ing […] consisted of repeating this four-stage process. […] With each new improvisation,
the actors strove to add more details of events, language, and images… The fifth and final
stage involved memorizing the scene… In fact, if the improvisational work had been suc-
cessful, they found that the scene had virtually ‘learned itself.’ (Merlin 2003: 34f)

18. This initial process is meant to last for the first two thirds of the total allotted re-
hearsal time. In the final third, the director engages in the more traditional work of formal-
izing (“blocking”) the final staging of the show; setting the actors’ physical movements,
tempos, and rhythms so that “the words of the dialogue, contained in the text, are scattered
through and inscribed in the time and place of the stage” in such a way as to “make the
deep meaning of the dramatic text tangibly evident” (Pavis 1998: 364). The more or less
conventional gestural, proxemic, illocutionary, and temporal semiotic codes she employs
to do so comprise what has become known as the “performance text” as distinct from the
“dramatic text” comprised of the author’s written word (Elam 1988: 3). In shaping this
text, the director initiates an additional control loop that remains open when she is satis-
fied with what is unfolding on stage and that she closes periodically in order to modify the
performances to her satisfaction.
19. According to Merlin, the fact that the actors participating in AA “[were] starting
from themselves” allowed them to “kick-start the creative process into action” in a manner
that pays off in “profound effects both in rehearsal and in performance” as “the sense of
improvisation is carried all the way from first preview to last night” requiring “no ‘creative’

3. Of course, unlike the furnace, as an organism that learns and also exercises “theory of mind,”
the feedback to which the actor/character responds will be continuously contextualized by the
moment-to-moment predictions she is making regarding the other characters’ behavior.

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force’ or impossible demands” (Merlin 2003: 35). After observing Stanislavski’s Moscow
Art Theatre in rehearsal, Norris Houghton corroborates this claim indicating that the pow-
erful connection between actor and character forged in early rehearsals remains unbroken
by the director’s later interventions and that “once it is achieved, the director can in a fairly
short time add shape to the performance and not disturb the actor in so doing” (Houghton
1962: 80f).

Beginnings
20. In May of 2015 I undertook an experiment, in collaboration with Alan Kingstone
of the UBC Department of Psychology, to explore the potential impacts of the AA rehearsal
method (seldom, if ever, employed in professional North American theatre practice for
reasons discussed in Scholte 2010) upon audiences. Two actors rehearsed and performed
David French’s naturalist drama Salt-Water Moon under my direction, employing the AA
rehearsal process. The play portrays an encounter on a single evening in August of 1926 in
which a young man returns to his hometown in rural Newfoundland to try and win back the
girl he left behind when he suddenly fled to Toronto without a word a year previous. Fol-
lowing the completion of the first two thirds of the process, audiences were invited to view
four performances of the entire piece in which the actors adhered to the author’s written
text while the performance text was still allowed to unfold autopoietically each night based
solely on the actors’ emergent and self-organizing cybernetic response. The final third of
rehearsal, in which I, as director, fixed an allopoietic performance text, was then completed
followed by a further four performances for invited audiences. At all eight performances,
data on the audience’s qualitative appraisal of the “truthfulness” and “believability” of the
actor’s performances,4 as well as overall satisfaction with the performance, was gathered
through the use of Likert scale questionnaires. Additionally, data regarding audience inter-
pretation of the piece as a whole was gathered using a method Kingstone had previously
developed and employed in a study of film audience responses (see Coleman et al. 2013).
21. Participants are asked to press a button on a mobile clicker when the action is
found to be “meaningful.” Observers press and hold down the key and let go when the
moment ends. Any segment of action during which multiple participants held down their
buttons simultaneously is deemed a moment of “convergence.” We hypothesized that audi-
ences would indicate a greater sense of “believability,” with fewer moments and lower lev-
els of “convergence” around “meaning,” in the autopoietic performances. The difference
in degree of “audience satisfaction” with these two models remained an open question at
the very heart of this experiment, the answer to which would lead to further hypothesizing
as to the expectations and desires of theatrical audiences.
22. Detailed analysis of the copious data generated by this experiment is on-going
and will, ultimately, be presented in a separate article co-authored with my collaborator,
Dr Kingstone. But it was during the rehearsal of the production itself that the second-order
cybernetic underpinnings of the AA process came into sharper focus for me, suggesting a

4. While the dialogue in certain plays may be more “heightened,” or stylized, than everyday speech
(even within the realm of naturalism), the indicators of “believability” found in vocal tone, body
language, and dynamics remain constant. We are particularly impressed when a gifted actor achie-
ves such an effect in, for instance, a performance of Shakespeare.

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Conversation A:
Given circumstances and objectives

Re-entry
Improvise scene:
Read scene
Test hypothesized objectives

Conversation B:
Observer/participant descriptions

Figure 1. Active Analysis: A conversational theoretic diagram.

potential new direction for this type of inquiry that could, through the additional deploy-
ment of elements of CT, shift future experiments onto a firmly cybersemiotic footing. The
explication of this notion, which will make up the remainder of this article, must begin by
re-examining the process of AA itself through a distinctly second-order cybernetic lens.

Active Analysis: A conversation theoretic description

23. Figure 1 illustrates the circular nature of the first two thirds of the AA process and
indicates the recursive re-entry of observations as it cycles through its successive itera-
tions. We will examine each component of this process in some detail, highlighting the
second-order cybernetic considerations implicit in their procedures and suggesting ways
in which they may be made more explicit, and analytically useful, through the application
of CT.
24. When a production team of actors, designers, and director begins its work, its
members must confront a formal object that is both a result and embodiment of second-
order observation: the playwright and his/her text. Before examining the subsequent opera-
tions taking place within the rehearsal process, it is necessary to spend some time framing
the naturalistic play text itself in second-order cybernetic terms.

The naturalistic play as a Black Box

25. In Glanville’s view, Maxwell’s Black Box Gedankenexperiment provided “one of
the greatest inventions of human thinking, because it allows us to develop understandings
of the universe without having to claim we know what it’s made up of or that we have ac-
cess to actual mechanisms, emphasizing that our descriptions are descriptions, not to be
confused with actuality.” He defines this “fantas[tical]” (i.e., wholly imaginary) conceptual
tool as follows.
In its simplest form, the Black Box is taken to be a virtual input/output machine. A signal
is input, the output observed, and then another signal (usually the most recent output) is
input, producing another output – and so on. What is observed is the behaviour of this in-

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put/output machine. The collection of observations is itself observed, so we may construct

a pattern. When we have constructed such a pattern, we are inclined to say that we know
what the Black Box does, and that it is now ‘white’. (Glanville 2012: 421)

26. Swept up by the explanatory promise of late 19th century Darwinian science (par-
ticularly as developed in the writings of Hippolyte Taine (Pickering & Thompson 2013:
15)), the program of literary naturalism (still, arguably, the most prominent dramatic genre
of the present day) sought to bring a rigorous analysis of heredity and environment to
bear upon works of the imagination in the hopes that they might play a role in diagnosing
psychological and social pathologies. The movement’s most prominent early proponent,
novelist, essayist and playwright, Emile Zola, expressed the movement’s aims in the fol-
lowing terms:
[T]o possess a knowledge of the mechanism of the phenomena inherent in man, to show the
machinery of his intellectual and sensory manifestations, under the influences of heredity
and environment, such as physiology shall give them to us, and then finally to exhibit man
living in social conditions produced by himself, which he modifies daily, and in the heart of
which he himself experiences a continual transformation. (Zola 1893: 649)

27. Of particular note here, from a cybernetic perspective, is the invocation of the
term “mechanism” to denote some set of functions within man responsible for generating
the phenomena that are “give[n]” to the observer through behavioral effects in the “physi-
ology” of the individual(s) under observation, as well as the acknowledgement of a circular
rather than linear causal relationship between the modifications of both man and his “social
conditions.” The latter insight indicates a nascent systems perspective inherited directly by
Zola from his primary scientific role model, Claude Bernard. Pre-echoes of what might be
characterized as a proto-systems theoretic viewpoint can be found throughout Zola’s natu-
ralist manifesto and even foreshadows notions of both biological and social autopoiesis
(Zola 1893: 650).
28. As an example of the “experimental novelist” at work, Zola points to his country-
man Honoré de Balzac’s portrait of the character Baron Hulot in his 1846 work, Cousin
Bette.
The novelist starts out in search of a truth.[…] The general fact observed by Balzac is the
ravages that the amorous temperament of a man makes in his home, in his family, and in
society. As soon as he has chosen his subject he starts from known facts, then he makes his
experiment, and exposes Hulot to a series of trials, placing him amid certain surroundings
in order to exhibit how the complicated machinery of his passions works. (Zola 1893: 647)

29. Zola’s employment of the term “experiment” to describe the operations performed
by the author is obviously dubious. There is clearly no actual individual who is being
placed within “certain surroundings” in order that his subsequent behaviours may be ob-
served. What the author is providing, rather, is a hypothesised pattern of behaviour that an
individual possessed of certain proposed psychological mechanisms would, in the author’s
view, be likely to exhibit. Zola, essentially, acknowledges as much.
The idea of experiment carries with it the idea of modification. We start, indeed, from the
true facts, which are our indestructible basis; but to show the mechanism of these facts it is
necessary for us to produce and direct the phenomena; this is our share of invention, here
is the genius in the book. (Zola 1893: 647)

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30. Despite the overblown sense of ontological certainty explicit in Zola’s language,
the idea that the “indestructible basis” of this imaginative elaboration are the “true facts”
previously “observe[d]” by the author in the course of his societal interactions and that,
furthermore, the elaboration itself is intended to “show the mechanism of these facts”
renders the naturalist novel or play (as well as each of the characters with which it is
populated) a type of Black Box – again, as defined by Glanville – invoked by the author,
who, having observed an “unclear […] mess” that, nonetheless, appears to be “some action
which [one] might be able to call behaviour,” and applied as an “ordering concept” allow-
ing “the unclear chaotic mess” to be “(re)constructed as behaviours associated with an
input-output machine, where the machine is the Black Box (the home of the mechanism”
(Glanville 2009a: 153).
31. The Black Box that is the naturalistic play is now confronted by the production
team in a further process of second-order analysis implicit in Conversation A.

Conversation A

Play analysis as cybernetic explanation

32. While the traditional Western theatre artist would not be likely to conceive of
or articulate her work in these terms, I suggest that it is this very process of Black Box
“whitening” on both the level of individual characters and the social system that they par-
ticipate in constituting that motivates the entire enterprise of naturalistic theatre vis-a-vis
the “deeper meaning” that the director is charged with “inscribing in the time and space of
the performance.”
33. The dominant Western model of play production that evolved (along with the
emergence of the position of director itself) in the second half of the 19th century, and is
still taught in many Master of Fine Arts Directing programs, including the one in which
I teach, begins with an intensive “pre-production” period of textual analysis. Confronted
with the behavioural descriptions that constitute the playwright’s text, the director embarks
on what is clearly a process of “cybernetic explanation” as articulated by Gregory Bateson,
in that it is always “negative” and considers
what alternative possibilities could conceivably have occurred and then ask[s] why many
of the alternatives were not followed, so that the particular event was one of those few
which could, in fact, occur. (Bateson 1987: 405)

34. Various textbooks on the subject of play direction have laid out overlapping cat-
egorical templates for organizing the information contained in the play and that Stanislav-
ski grouped under the heading “given circumstances.” The composite picture that emerges
from this analysis can also be classified under another term. Returning to Bateson, “the
course of events is said to be subject to restraints, and it is assumed that, apart from such
restraints, the pathways of change would be governed only by equality of probability”
(Bateson 1987: 405f). Actors and directors are similarly charged with the task of close
textual analysis, leaving no potential restraint unaccounted. It is these restraints, including
the internal mechanisms of the characters, that will govern the process described by David
Ball, in which the beginning of a play presents a portrait of stasis (Claudius on the throne

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Character’s interpretation of given circumstances

S* (What is [appears to be] the case)
Objective
(Desired State)
Discrepancy or comparison between S and S*
C S
R
Body and voice
(Effector)
E X Cognition
(Comparator)
Playwright’s given circumstance
(State of affairs represented by S)

Figure 2. Character as basic feedback control system.

and Hamlet sulking silently), the stasis is disrupted by a moment of intrusion (the ghost of
Hamlet’s father commands his son to avenge his murder) and, by the play’s end, a new sta-
sis is established (Fortinbras on the throne and the stage littered with the corpses of Hamlet,
Laertes, and Gertrude as well as the previously slain Polonius, Ophelia, Rosenkrantz and
Guildenstern) (Ball 1983: 19–24). The example of Hamlet, while by no means naturalistic
in the strict sense, does illustrate well a play’s action as the self-reorganization of an auto-
poietic social system (a la Luhmann) following a substantial perturbation. The amount of
ink spilled speculating upon the particular ways in which the internal mechanisms of that
play’s central Black Box (i.e., character) constrain the paths of that reorganization outstrip
the amount spilled in the name of cybernetics by considerable orders of magnitude; and in
the realm of theatre production, the structure of such mechanisms is the essential purview
of the actor.

The naturalist actor as radical constructivist

35. Figure 2 adapts Jim Rebitzer’s diagram of a basic feedback control system to illus-
trate the cybernetic conception of the actor/character in performance (Rebitzer 1995: 47;
the categories from Rebitzer’s original legend are included in parentheses). The existence
of playwright’s given circumstances and character’s interpretation of given circumstances
as separate categories points to the assumption of a distinct, subjective onto-epistemology
for each character; the construction of which it is the actor’s task to trace carefully.
36. Of the many templates on offer to assist in this task, I regularly recommend to
my acting students one developed by Anita Jesse as particularly thorough. It guides the
actor to answer, from the character’s perspective, questions about their particular social
background, relationships, attitudes, desires, fears, etc. based upon textual evidence. The

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Place The environment the characters are in structural coupling

Character Biographies The events in the past that shape the characters ontogeny
The changes that affect the behaviour of the
Events perturbations
characters
The pictures of the future that drive the present
Intentions S*
action of the characters
The thoughts about others that calibrate the
Relationships S
behaviour of the characters

Table 1. Katie Mitchell’s given circumstances in second-order cybernetic perspective.

final, and most encompassing, category of given circumstances in Jesse’s template is titled:
“What is my point of view, or how does the world work?” It is characterized as follows:
The point of view is the character’s belief system, the frame of reference in which the char-
acter operates. Each of the convictions that make up the belief system should be anchored
in specific action. For every element of a person’s belief system there is an event that either
inspired the belief or at least corroborates the point of view. People don’t consciously
choose to invent convictions; they interpret their experiences as proof that ‘this is how the
world works.’ (Jesse 1996: 136. Italics in the original)

37. In Piagetian/Glasersfeldian constructivist terms, this “point of view” contains, or

is the summation of, the entire repertoire of conceptual and behavioural schemes that have
proven viable over the course of the character’s imagined ontogeny and have subsequently
been internalized according to the innately conservative phylogenetic tendency, articulated
by Maturana, of repeating what has worked in the past as the surest means of maintaining
equilibration and, ultimately, the continued realization of autopoiesis (Glasersfeld 1980:
77f). In fact, the very climax of a good percentage of naturalist plays is the moment when
the central character either succeeds or fails at making a necessary accommodation of the
sort von Glasersfeld defines5 (Ibsen 2015). It is, therefore, incumbent upon the actor to
scour the playwright’s description for reports of those formative ontogenetic episodes in
the character’s “back-story” (again, understood as having taken place in the hypothesised
“possible world’ of the play) as well as the assimilatory and accommodating schemes em-
ployed and on display in the present action. Jesse lays strong emphasis upon the need for
the actor to “internalize” rather than “show” this conceptual repertoire; to get “behind the
eyeballs of the character” as Cohen puts it, so that it will guide spontaneous behaviour
through the recursive iterations of improvisation leading to performance.

Director and actors in “strict conversation”

38. The director will, of course, also have completed a similar process of investigation
of the given circumstances. Table 1 adapts the template of renowned British director Ka-
tie Mitchell (2009:10), incorporating second-order cybernetic terminology drawing from

5. E.g., Hedda Gabler’s fatal inability to conceive of Eilert Lovborg as anything other than a kind of
Dionysian übermensch “with vine leaves in his hair” and to accommodate successfully his sordid
end: accidentally shot through the bowels in a tawdry whorehouse.

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Director Actor

Receives or Receives or
offers explanation Why questions offers explanation
Why?
in terms of given and responses in terms of given
circumstances circumstances

Offers and elicits Receives and offers

How questions
hypothesized tasks hypothesized tasks How?
and responses
and objectives and objectives

Modelling facility = The Stage

where hypothesized tasks and objectives
are tested via improvisations

Figure 3. Skeleton of conversation A (after Scott 2011).

Maturana and Varela and referring back to the previous figure of the character as feedback
control system.
39. Conversation A, in which the director and actors share the fruits of their analyses,
refine and expand their findings, and, ultimately, formulate scene objectives to test through
improvisation, qualifies as what Bernard Scott would call a “strict conversation.” Figure 3
adapts Scott’s “skeleton of a conversation” from its initial description of a teacher/student
interaction through the lens of CT (Scott 2011: 310) to the particularities of the director/
actor relationship. In the context of Pask’s CASTE educational application, the modelling
facility is the space (either literal or virtual) in which projects testing the student’s level of
mastery of the topic are completed. For our purposes, the modelling facility is the stage,
as this is where the collaborative formulation of given circumstances and objectives will
be tested for their efficacy in actor improvisation, observations of which will re-enter sub-
sequent iterations of Conversation A. But before making that move, I propose our first ap-
plication of CT in order to leave, in the words of its creator, a “residue” of the conversation
that can be employed for analytical purposes after the fact.
40. As a depiction of an uninterrupted encounter between two characters, Salt-Water
Moon provides an ideal play upon which to experiment with the graphical expression of
conversation as “concept sharing” envisioned through CT. The analytical process executed

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 283

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Figure 4. Entailment structure showing Jacob and Mary’s operationalized concepts regar-
ding the topic, Jim Snow. * = Jacob’s concepts, ' = Mary’s concepts.

by actors and director described above deals quite specifically with the identification of
stable concepts within the participants (characters). Figure 4 adapts some of Pask’s tech-
niques for the construction of entailment structures in order to diagram a conversation
between two participants, the result of which, if agreement is reached, some, or all, of the
conceptual procedures belonging to each may now be shared by both (Pask 1980a). This
adaptation reflects the concept-sharing executed in the following passage of text from the
play, regarding the character Mary’s late father who was killed at the battle of Beaumont-
Hamel in the First World War.
Jacob: Go on with you. Jim Snow was a brave man. The one the stretcher bearers found
closest to the German wire that night when they went out to collect the dead.
Mary: Yes, and a lot of good it done, his courage. He left behind two daughters and a wife
who can’t look after us. (French 1988: 40)

41. The entailment structure in Figure 4 establishes a schematic overview of the con-
testing ontologies at play in this interaction in which the concepts “brave” and “courage”
are assumed to be analogous (this could, of course, be contested) while the differing en-
tailed descriptions produce an ambiguous and jarring counterpoint. Interestingly, neither
character contests the other’s description allowing them fully to resonate in tension within
the conceptual repertoire of the audience who, like the characters themselves, are free to
take on or reject parts or all of both descriptions or combine them in novel ways. This
basic entailment structure can, of course, be elaborated to express the conceptual relations
between all of the topics of conversation between the two characters throughout the course
of the play. That one entailment represents the conceptual operations of a hypothesized
independent young man in the summer of 1926 and the other a hypothesized dependent
young female housekeeper of the same time period seems ripe for the kind of social con-
structivist analysis intended to trouble and problematize the naturalization of such concepts

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 284

and the unremarked erasure of the contingency of their production. This is what makes the
composition of such entailment meshes during Conversation A a critical component of the
cybersemiotic investigation I am proposing to take place after the passions of performance
have cooled.

The stage as modeling facility

42. Robert Cohen’s notion that “humans are skilled observers and interpreters” of
“autonomic responses” of the “physiology” of other humans commits theatre practitio-
ners working in the Stanislavskian tradition to a biosemiotic epistemology characterized in
Brier’s cybersemiotic framework as “the genuine semiotic level belonging to all living sys-
tems.” The “paralinguistic […] sign games” of this level function below that of “social lan-
guage systems” and serve as the scaffolding upon which they are built (Brier 2008: 390).
It is obvious that what we call language games arise in social contexts in which we use
our minds to coordinate our wilful actions and urges with fellow members of our society.
Some of these language games concern our conceptions of nature as filtered through our
common culture and language. But underneath that, we also have emotional and instinctual
psychological sign games. For humans these function as unconscious paralinguistic signs,
such as facial expressions, hand gestures, and body positions that originate in the evolution
of species-specific signification processes in living systems. (Brier 2008: 395)

43. I posit that it is the spontaneous, non-premeditated emergence of these sign games
amongst actors engaged with each other cybernetically, and their subsequent “emotional
and instinctual” recognition by observers, that constitute the very phenomena categorized
by acting students (and, arguably, the majority of mainstream theatre audiences) as “truth-
ful” or “natural” and gestured to by the theatrical cognitivists as phenomenologically un-
mediated embodied forms of knowing.
44. In his critique of the Stanislavski system of acting, postmodern performance theo-
rist Phillip Auslander rejects the notion that “the actor’s self precedes and grounds her per-
formance and that it is the presence of this self in performance that provides the audience
with access to human truths.” He asserts, instead, that “[t]he act of signification produces
its own significance” and that there is “no presence behind the sign lending it authority”
(Auslander 1998: 30). From the cybersemiotic perspective, however, the “presence behind
the sign” is the actor’s very embodiment itself. Its fluctuating autonomic and unconscious
behaviors, while unconcerned with consciously signifying anything, engaged cyberneti-
cally within imaginary circumstances, enter the realm of semiosis only when indicated
as distinctions by conspecific observers sharing a mutual structural coupling. Nowhere in
this process, for either actor or audience, do we find the “reification” of a “non-existent
autobiographical self” as alleged by Auslander and other theatre scholars of a similarly
postmodern bent. It is also noticeably absent from any of the instructions Stanislavski
bequeathed to his followers.6

6. Stanislavski’s error, according to Auslander, is that he “treats the subconscious as what Derrida
shows it is not; a repository of retrievable data, as in his famous metaphor of the house through
which the actor searches for the tiny bead of an emotion memory.” Citing Derrida’s reading of
Freud, Auslander reminds us that “the making conscious of unconscious materials is a process of
creation, not retrieval” and that “[t]he unconscious is not a source of originary truth – like lan-

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 285

45. Appealing to interdisciplinary arguments “for the importance of embodiment in

semiosis,” Brier goes on to invoke a second-order cybernetic concept that will play a cen-
tral role in the theory of theatrical “meaning making” presented below.
Ethology and embodied metaphor theory have both discovered that the conception of a
sign as standing for something for somebody in a particular way is controlled by releasing
mechanisms that connect motivation, perception, and behaviour/action in one systemic
process, as von Uexküll described in his Funktionskreis and which Heinz von Foerster
refers to as perceptual Eigenvalues. (Brier 2008: 393, italics in the original)

46. Hypothesized given circumstances, objectives, tasks, and obstacles from Con-
versation A “pass the test” in the modelling facility if their operationalization within the
improvisation generates behavioural eigenvalues across the group of observers present
(including the actors second-order observations of their experience after the fact) that are
isomorphic with eigenvalues observed in off-stage daily living, seem appropriate to the
behavioural descriptions in the text, and in which the director feels reasonably confident
that, in subsequent performative iterations, they will generate similar eigenvalues across
new groups of observers; namely audiences. At that stage, it is probably most appropriate
to describe them, after von Foerster’s article introducing the concept, as eigenbehaviours
(Foerster 2003a). These emerge, in the words of Bruce Clarke, when “a multiplicity of
mutually reinforcing observers maintains relationships and states of stable cross-systemic
resonance […] at both the biological and social level” (Clarke 2009: 46). While the direc-
tor’s (and, subsequently, audience’s) observations, interpretations, and assessments of the
plausibility of the character’s behaviour will be influenced by the “theory of mind” that
they have developed for each of the individuals under observation, such behaviour could
also be illustrated on a purely symbolic semiotic level by highly calculated performanc-
es of obvious “theatricality” bearing little or none of the “spark of genuine life” sought
by Stanislavski and his artistic heirs. The “emotional and instinctual psychological sign
games” enumerated by Brier, plus the haptic effects of organic, spontaneous vocal tonal-
ity and dynamics borne of felt, rather than feigned, emotion, all held to be pre-linguistic,
pre-conceptual, and pre-symbolic by the proponents of the cognitive turn, are the exclusive
domain of the biological eigenbehaviour.
47. At this stage in the rehearsal process, it is essential that the director’s relationship
to the emergent behaviour remain an “open” rather than “closed” loop in that she does not
seek to intervene and correct the behaviour if it is discordant with either her theory of mind

guage, it is subject to the vagaries of mediation” (Auslander 1998: 26). While Stanislavski does,
indeed, invoke the metaphor quoted above, Auslander completely distorts the spirit in which it
is offered. Stanislavski fully acknowledges that a memory is not an exact replica of the event to
which it refers and tells us that there is an unconscious and automatic selectivity involved over
time lending “poetry to memory” and rendering it “clearer, deeper, denser, richer in content and
sharper than reality itself” (ibid: 206). More importantly, he actively discourages his students
from relying upon the deliberate, repeated reconstruction of autobiographical memories as the
foundation for “truthful” performance (ibid: 207). He warns them not to “imagine for a moment”
that they “can retrieve a feeling that has gone forever” and admonishes them to “give up the
idea of hunting old beads – they are beyond recall” (ibid: 216). Instead, Stanislavski exhorts his
charges to allow ever new and evolving emotional overlaps with their characters to arise, as much
as possible, in spontaneous response to the actual sensory “stimuli” available to them in the mo-
ment of performance itself.

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 286

regarding the characters or on the level of eigenbehaviours isomorphic with observed daily
life. For Stanislavski, it is essential to remain a “director of the root” rather than a “direc-
tor of the result” (Cole & Chinoy 1976: 109). In other words, she must not interrupt the
unfolding improvisation nor even, following the performance, ask the actors for specific
behavioural alternatives in the next iteration (“faster/slower, louder/softer, more angry,
more seductive, with a pause here, etc.”). She must not even compare the actors’ emergent
behaviour with some desired ur-performance she has imagined but rather must obey the
imperative of director, Ann Bogart, to watch “without desire” (Bogart & Landau 2004:
31) and allow only the “plausibility” and “believability” of the scene, regardless of its
actual dynamics, to guide her response.7 Even then, she must not express those responses
in terms of “right” or wrong” but seek only to address those moments and passages that
seem unsatisfactory by reverse-engineering alternative behaviour through further mining
the onto-epistemic mechanisms of the characters and the constraints manifest in their rela-
tionships and environment to which they must constantly adjust. This will be the business
of Conversation B.

Conversation B and the return to the text

48. The only important point that needs to be raised here regarding the move through
Conversation B and the beginning of the next recursion with the return to the text is the
importance of maintaining the strict separation between the two steps. Conversation B is
entirely concerned with distinctions and descriptions of what took place during the previ-
ous improvisation. The subsequent return to the text provides the opportunity to refine or
indicate further distinctions within the playwright’s descriptions of the interaction system
with which the improvisation is intended to be, in ever increasing degrees through the pro-
cess of recursion, isomorphic. These distinctions will now meet the re-entry of the distinc-
tions drawn in Conversation B in the subsequent iteration of Conversation A. It is here that
non-isomorphic irregularities will be identified and adjustments in the onto-epistemologies
at work through the characters in the action of the play will be proposed as a means of
generating new eigenbehaviours. Beyond the first iteration of Conversation A, the onto-
epistemologies in question may not only be those of the characters but of the actors as well.

Conversation A: Subsequent iterations with re-entry

49. Confronted with those moments when “the given material fails to stimulate you
sufficiently and you must search for something which will trigger an emotional experi-

7. I learned this lesson the hard way a number of years ago directing a company of actors of wildly
varying levels of experience. When I finally got so frustrated trying to get them to do what I wan-
ted in a repeatable fashion that I completely gave up, I was suddenly free to see what they were
actually doing, free from an ongoing comparison with how I thought their rhythms and dynamics
should sound and where I believed all the pauses and transitions should be, which, to my deligh-
ted, and humbling surprise, more than adequately satisfied the two essential criteria specified
above. Critics particularly praised the production for its acting and I have never been the same
director since.

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 287

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Figure 5. Substitution as analogical entailment (after Scott 2011).

ence… and send you into the immediate action of the play,” Stanislavskian actor/director/
teacher Uta Hagen extends the range of inputs available to the actor through her develop-
ment of the substitution technique.
A young actress working on the part of Manuela in Children in Uniform was having dif-
ficulty with the moment when Fraulein von Bernburg, the teacher she loves and admires
confronts her with her torn chemise and says, ‘This will never do!’ Manuela must react
with deep shame and humiliation. The actress could not make this moment meaningful.
Neither the garment nor the actress playing the teacher seemed to matter enough to her.
Accidentally, I supplied her with a stimulating substitution for both teacher and chemise.
I said, ‘What if Lynne Fontanne had a pair of your soiled panties in her hand and showed
them to you?’ The actress turned beet red, snatched the chemise from her Fraulein von
Bernburg and hid it frantically behind her back. (Hagen & Frankell 1973: 35)

50. Substitution has become a widely known and practiced technique over the last
half century plus and the exchange described above is exactly the sort of thing that might
take place when the results of an improvisation are being compared with the playwright’s
descriptions in an iteration of Conversation A with re-entry. It is also a technique to which
CT can be applied through the expression of an entailed analogy as presented in Figure 5,
again adapted from Scott (2011: 319). The composition of such entailment structures at this
point in the AA process would provide us with yet another object of second-order cyber-
netic study with particularly rich possibilities for analysis.

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 288

Characters in play

On–1 In–1
g
Audience member

On In
g
Researcher

Figure 6. Cybersemiotic theatrical laboratory as nested black boxes.

O: output, I: Input, g: stable observations across recursions (eigenbehaviours).

51. At work in the example above is a complex constellation of social signification

through the dual lenses of both the character’s and actor’s conceptual operations regarding
such topics as hierarchical social status and the female body and its traces (to name only
two of a great possible number), which, when executed simultaneously, give rise to the bio-
logical eigenbehaviours of blushing, snatching, and hiding likely to be “read” cybersemi-
otically by audiences as signs of shame; biological eigenbehaviours triggered by elements
of the character/actor’s “semiosphere” that are quite likely to have been deeply influenced
by the impingement of societal concepts around normativity, deviance, reward, and sanc-
tion in their cognitive formation. Much detailed analysis of the complex interplay between
biologically and socially constructed semiosis employing the full arsenal of critical theory
could potentially be facilitated through a combination of audience questionnaire data, audi-
ence clicker data, and the conversational “residue” of entailment structures illustrating the
conceptual operations at work across the range of nested Black Boxes that are the observer/
participants in the production and reception of these eigenbehaviours in performance.

Performance

Inside every theatre there are n Black Boxes trying to get out
52. Figure 6 applies Glanville’s diagram of recursive Black Boxes to the naturalistic
theatrical cybersemiotic laboratory I am proposing. To the audience, the interaction system
depicted in performance is a Black Box that, as Glanville indicates, is made white within as

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 289

the Black Boxes nested inside it (the characters) make descriptions of each other (Glanville
1982). These descriptions guide the emergent dynamics of cybernetic interaction between
them. Continuing to follow Glanville’s recursive logic, audience members plus perfor-
mance now constitute new Black Boxes that are whitened within as individual members
draw their own distinctions regarding the behaviour under observation and describe its
mechanisms to themselves through the act of semantic and semiotic interpretation. These
acts of distinction and interpretation can be considered second-order operations performed
upon emergent eigenbehaviours (both biologically and socially/symbolically constructed)
and carry the requisite awareness of contingency (to greater and lesser degrees across the
various audience members) to qualify as observations of a genuinely second-order (Luh-
mann 2000: 54–101). The final Black Box (and subsequent whitening) we encounter in
this discussion is that of the researcher (myself) seeking to describe the mechanisms of
interpretation at work amongst the audience as individuals, in total, or on average by per-
forming second-order operations of distinction and interpretation on the data collected
through the questionnaires and clickers. If, over its recursive iterations, the nested systems
described above stabilize on particular descriptions that hold across their boundaries, they
assume the status of eigenbehaviours for which it is possible, as Glanville says,
to have an apparently fixed, shared, social value, or to be what are thought of as ‘facts’ The
black box model does not, thus, preclude e.g., science. (Glanville 1982: 6)

It is critical, however, that we do not fall into an error similar to that committed by the
hard core of the cognitive turn and mistake the word “science” for “objective ontological
truth” rather than continuing to view it as a powerful and useful description that continues
to work only until it does not and is always circumscribed by the closed operations and
bounded rationality of the observer/participants.

Performance texts: autopoietic vs. allopoietic

53. While celebrating the epistemological latitude provided by the Black Box, Glan-
ville reminds us how essential it is that we never relinquish our constructivist perspective
on its use.
It is important to note the essential contribution of the observer in all this: (s)he brings in
the Black Box, operates it, observes, and creates the pattern that is taken to be symptomatic
of the mechanism within. (Glanville 2012: 421)

54. Once a play enters the production process, the most empowered observer is, tra-
ditionally, the director. It is easy to see how, without keeping Glanville’s admonition alive,
she can be easily seduced by the belief in one’s own powers of “objective” analysis so
prevalent in first-order science (and first-order cybernetics for that matter). This is not
surprising given that virtually every canonical text employed in the teaching of play direct-
ing (explicitly naturalistic or otherwise) reinforces the notion that the director’s primary
function is to use all of the theatrical resources at her disposal to make tangibly visible her
interpretation of the play’s “deeper meaning” (see e.g., Dean & Carra 1989; Hodge 1994;
Sievers, Stiver & Kahan 1974) or, in our terms, her own particular whitened version of
the Black Box. This positions the director as a kind of “privileged observer” who will, as
Niklas Luhmann describes “observe his emerging work in anticipation of its observation
by others” and, despite the fact that

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 290

there is no way of knowing how others […] will receive the work through their conscious-
ness […] he will incorporate into the work ways of directing the expectation of others.
(Luhmann 2000: 40)

At work here, perhaps tacitly, is precisely the kind of “ontological thinking” described by
Krzystof Matuszek:
Ontological thinking presupposes the existence of a privileged observer endowed with
authority, who describes and explains reality in the only correct and binding (for everyone)
way […] The privileged observer instructs those who stray, corrects their mistakes and
guarantees the final convergence of all observations. (Matuszek 2015: 204)

55. While the likelihood of completely achieving such a feat might be slim, this
description vividly captures an ideal of the theatrical director that many postmodernists
within the field of theatre studies suspect, with good reason, to be the, more or less, un-
conscious modus operandi of traditional theatre practitioners and, particularly in the case
of realism/naturalism, view with the deep suspicion illustrated in the opening section of
this article.8 On the second-order cybernetic front, such a procedure can also been seen to
“violate” both Heinz von Foerster’s ethical imperative to “always act so as to increase the
number of choices” as well as Larry Richards anticommunication imperative stating that, if
we “desire the new” we should “compose asynchronicity” (Richards 2010: 13f). A desire to
confront these issues and assumptions played a crucial motivating factor in the experiment
described above and inspired me to specifically investigate the impacts of both autopoietic
and allopoietic performance texts in the first place; an investigation that I intend to contin-
ue with the even sharper second-order cybernetic focus provided by the application of CT.
56. When watching an autopoietic performance the audience observes an interaction
system for which, as Richards puts it, the initial description manifest in the formal lan-
guage of the script (dialogue and stage directions) provides a “skeleton of constraints to
guide action” that can then “trigger a dynamics of interaction that can lead to new dis-
tinctions” (Richards 2010: 15). The potential development of a cybernetically grounded
naturalistic theatre less hermeneutically coercive than is traditionally the case is one of the
research strands to be pursued as this work continues.

Future directions
57. In reference to an fMRI study performed on improvising jazz and rap musicians
at Johns Hopkins, Clayton Drinko comments that “[t]he outward focus that improvisa-
tion demands allows the intuitive and creative brain centers to flourish, while drastically
inhibiting self-censoring regions.” While it may be difficult to interpret such scans with
explanatory exactitude, at the very least “it appears that the brain is operating quite dif-
ferently while improvising than while performing memorized scores” (Drinko 2013: 96).
And, while the promise of the “mirror neuron” theory (an eagerly embraced and essen-
tial cornerstone of the cognitive turn) has increasingly come under fire (see, e.g., Hickok
2014), it may still indicate some degree of “contagion” of mental states capable of creating

8. Moreover, the more-or-less continuous “closed loop” control exerted by the director working in
this manner quickly begins to sap the genuine responsiveness and creativity of the actors; not to
mention their very enthusiasm for the project itself.

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a palpable sense of difference in an audience if, as Merlin promises “the sense of improvi-
sation is carried all the way from first preview to last night” (see §17) of a play rehearsed
through the cybernetic practice of AA.
58. Hans-Ulrich Gumbrecht suggests that we challenge the primacy of the herme-
neutic imperative at the heart of “Western” culture and, instead, “conceive of aesthetic
experience as an oscillation (and sometimes as an interference) between ‘presence effects’
and ‘meaning effects” (Gumbrecht 2004: 2). In an essay taking up Gumbrecht as well as
George Spencer-Brown and Niklas Luhmann, Edgar Landgraf outlines a psychic mecha-
nism within the observer of an improvised performance that might engender a sense of
“identification” powerful enough to account for such interference.
Identification here would mean that temporarily one would no longer observe the action
from a distance – that is, draw one’s own distinctions to observe the event – but instead
would ‘embody’ the process. That is, to experience a performance as such, one has to expe-
rience the logic of the distinctions drawn and the operations performed as one’s own. The
point is that such an identification with the performance is not symbolically mediated, as
Adorno would have it, but rather results from a (nevertheless cognitive) identification with
the self-programming of the form-creating process. (Landgraf 2009: 194)

59. Gumbrecht and Landgraf’s theories identify one thread of the complex interplay
between biologically and socially structured semiosis that I intend to follow as I continue
this work. At the same time, I intend to investigate Bertolt Brecht’s claims that the kind of
identification described above, and in which Stanislavski’s theatre most deliberately traf-
fics, militates directly against the awakening of social consciousness and subsequent activ-
ism and calls for a vehemently anti-naturalistic theatre capable of encouraging a genuine
second-order awareness of the contingency of dominant societal structures.

Conclusion
60. In this article I have posited that an analysis of naturalistic theatre’s processes of
meaning-making filtered through the constructivist ontological agnosticism of second-or-
der cybernetics offers a productive middle way forward for those on both sides of the social
constructivist/embodied cognitive realist divide, within and beyond theatre studies. Once
employed, we need not be paralyzed by Knowles admonition that “we risk policing the
‘appropriate,’ ‘normal,’ or valued characteristics of elements of the world and of humanity
each time we say of a representation, ‘yes, I recognize that’” (Knowles 2014: 4) or that
giving some credence to our embodied responses to naturalist performance dooms us to be-
ing “what the French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser calls ‘hailed,’ or ‘interpellated’
into an ideological system” (ibid: 33) that we are not still free to deconstruct employing
Marxist, feminist, queer, or critical race theory to name only a few of the discourses which
would remain fully at our disposal.
61. If we can re-conceptualize naturalist theatre (and perhaps all representational art)
as dealing in the generation of eigenbehaviors rather than laying claim to objective por-
traits of “reality” and examine those eigenbehaviors through a cybersemiotic lens em-
ploying both quantitative data around meaning and believability and conversation theory
reflecting the operationalized conceptual schemas of characters, actors, and, ultimately,
audiences (through either pre- or post-show group facilitation or software assisted compi-

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lation), and that, with regard to their emergence, denies neither the influence of culturally
constructed language games nor bioconstructive couplings between embodied cognitive
agents and certain invariant (but only indirectly accessible) aspects of their environment,
we can commence to tease out the complex interplay between “biological and social level”
eigenbehaviors in a manner free of the fundamentalist excesses of both totalizing cogni-
tive-scientific objectivism and paralyzing postmodern scepticism providing great potential
benefit to scholars and practitioners on both sides of such theoretical divides. The theoreti-
cal formulation and experimental procedure described in this article were undertaken as a
hopeful first step in this direction.

Open Peer Commentary: Audience and Autopoiesis

Bruce Clarke & Dorothy Chansky

1. Tom Scholte introduces his directorial experiment as part of a research agenda con-
cerned with “the ways in which […]the Stanislavski system of acting can consistently
generate ‘believable’ performances […] but also […] questions regarding the mechanisms
through which observers (audiences) assign this sense of ‘belief’ as well as ‘meaning’ to
these performances” (§2). To open, or “whiten,” the Black Box of such theatrical phe-
nomena, Scholte adapts Ranulph Glanville’s elaboration of Norbert Wiener’s evocation
of James Clerk Maxwell’s invention of the idea of the black box to denote any system for
which we can make external observations of its behavior – for instance, that inputs of one
sort produce outputs of another sort – while lacking knowledge regarding the internal pro-
cesses by which these behaviors are produced. In Glanville’s summary, Maxwell posited
the notion of the black box…
in order that he could justify the building of functioning descriptions (i.e., in his case, equa-
tions) that accounted for the observed behavior of some phenomenon when the workings of
that phenomenon were not clearly visible. (Glanville 1982: 1)

Glanville noted that Maxwell was previously the author of a fictive “demon,” and we
would add that along with the invention of the Demon as a kind of “supernatural” observer,
Maxwell’s thought experiment also placed his Demon within a box-like apparatus, a sort
of proto-black box for the Demon to inhabit and within which to work its white scientific
magic.
2. Maxwell conceived his famous Demon, you will recall, in order to “pick a hole” in
the second law of thermodynamics. The drift of closed physical systems toward increasing
entropy due to the leveling of energy differentials could be counteracted, Maxwell sur-
mised, if only one could insert into that system an agency capable of discriminating high-
from low-energy particles and sorting them into separate containers. Thus the Demon’s
box was partitioned into two chambers. The Demon would do its sorting among randomly
hot and cool molecules using an aperture in the partition to gather hot molecules into one
chamber and cool molecules into the other. The Demon would thus defy the second law by
lowering the entropy of the system, restoring a heat differential from which work could be
extracted, not by the application of additional energy, but simply by the ordering effect of

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its ability to operate upon an internal observation of the system contained in the box as a
whole (Clarke 2001: 103–110).
3. Maxwell’s Demon comes down to the history of cybernetics not only as the genius
presiding over the transformation of the quantity of entropy in Boltzmann’s statistical me-
chanics into the quantity of information in Claude Shannon’s information theory, but also
as a precursor to the second-order cybernetic prescription to position the observer within
the system to be observed. One may pick up this thread in Heinz von Foerster’s 1960 essay
“On Self-Organizing Systems and Their Environments,” where von Foerster puts not one
but two Maxwell’s Demons to work observing the ordering and disordering processes con-
stituted by adding environmental considerations to the observation of self-organizing sys-
tems (Clarke 2009). In this regard, Scholte describes a directorial experiment in which…
audiences were invited to view four performances of the entire piece in which the actors
adhered to the author’s written text while the performance text was still allowed to unfold
autopoietically each night based solely on the actors’ emergent and self-organizing cyber-
netic response. (§20)

4. Scholte’s second-order cybernetic analysis of theatrical matters through the lenses

of Gordon Pask’s conversation theory and Niklas Luhmann’s autopoietic theory draws
upon a conceptual account well-funded by its inheritance of this line of systems discourse.
With Scholte’s guidance, one also recovers the theatrical and performative elements latent
in systems theory’s long history of constructing models in order to explore systems too
complex to seize in their totality, but experimentally reducible to key parameters whose
dynamics can be fruitfully observed. Every theatrical representation “constructs a reality”
which is then rendered to reconstruction by multiple observers. Scholte’s essay is illumi-
nating, particularly in walking its reader through the recursive observational dynamics
constituted by both the construction of the play through the rehearsal process that trans-
forms a script into a theatrical work and the performance of that work ultimately presented
to the gaze and response of an audience. With regard to the constructive work of the re-
hearsal, Scholte borrows Pask’s concept of the “modeling facility,” which for his purposes
“is the stage,” the theatrical Black Box,
as this is where the collaborative formulation of given circumstances and objectives will
be tested for their efficacy in actor improvisation, observations of which will re-enter sub-
sequent iterations. (§39)

5. It is also the case that we hit some speed bumps along the way. Scholte’s ac-
count of how the director got out of the way of the players for a while as they – well
– played with and in the text gave way to an opportunity for experimenting with audi-
ence participation/feedback. Scholte’s first audience(s?) saw four performances that argu-
ably were still rehearsals, in that the director withheld formal interaction with the actors’
autopoiesis. Later audiences were invited to four performances of the director’s “fixed
[…] allopoietic performance text” (§20). If we understand correctly, four of the perfor-
mances featured actors treating the full text via what felt right and responsible to them,
while four other performances featured the same text then sculpted by the director’s block-
ing (creation of set movements, timing, and stage pictures). We would like to know more
about how these audiences were constituted. For the autopoietic performances, “audiences
were invited”; for the allopoietic ones, there were “invited audiences” (§20). It’s unclear

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to us whether “invite” is being used the same way in these two instances. Were random
people welcome to show up, or was the presence of particular people solicited?
6. George Pierce Baker’s early experiments with audiences as respondents for the
work of his fledgling playwrights at Harvard in the 1910s had membership requirements
and stipulated that people could be dropped from the roster if they missed too many per-
formances (Chansky 2004: 97–106). Did the two sets of four audiences comprise the same
people? The statement “Audiences were invited to view four performances” at first glance
said to us that they had to commit to four viewings – something that could reveal much
about the differing choices actors might make while still in that allopoietic phase. For in-
stance, “by the third time around, I wasn’t clicking as long or as hard,” or, arguably more
interestingly, “my heart raced when she turned upstage on that line – so unexpected after
what she’d done the first three times.” Minus such a control mechanism, are we to assume
that this experiment takes all audiences to be interchangeable? We are mindful here, too,
of Joseph Henrich, Steven J. Heine and Ara Norenzayan (2010) calling most research stud-
ies that use North American undergraduates as respondents flawed if they are meant to
talk about humans, either as cognitive or as sociosemiotic beings. These authors used the
acronym WEIRD as shorthand for the usual Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and
Democratic suspects.
7. Who then, exactly, was in Scholte’s audience? Does the experiment assume that
audiences are self-selecting members of the imagined community that more or less “gets”
realistic theatre? If they are not – if they come from other cultures, or know little about
theatre, or do not like theatre, will this experimental protocol fall apart? Does the require-
ment for them to be “conspecific observers sharing a mutual structural coupling” (§44)
load the deck to excess? One hoary platitude has it that ninety percent of effective directing
is casting. Should the director also get to cast the audience? Or, from another perspective,
should a director be required to take seriously a response – via clicker, questionnaire, or
what used to be called voting with one’s feet – from a cohort ill-equipped to grasp his or
her allopoiesis? (This may be irrelevant in the case of realism, but it is a definite theatrical
impasse in work in other aesthetic modes.)
8. Be that as it may, for the performance studies scholar also at home in the praxis that
Scholte investigates, the mainstream, text-driven theatre practice built around mimetically
constructed characters, he does nail the description of a conundrum, even as his answer
to the problem may suggest little to directors and actors unschooled in the language of
second-order cybernetics. To wit, he pinpoints an impasse within his field between the
abstract linguistic-cultural idealism of the post-structuralists and the newer neo-Darwinist
adaptationism of the “cognitivists.” In rough terms, actors and directors who would em-
brace Scholte’s suggestions might readily understand his “goal-directed and feedback-con-
trolled” AA rehearsals (§10) as a generative period based on the crude idea that “acting is
reacting” bundled with responsible textual analysis, a generous dose of improvisation, and
the director getting out of the way of the players for a while as they – well – play with and
in the text. Further, we cannot imagine a practitioner who would not welcome the idea of
“applied epistemology” (Footnote 1) – the idea that we know via embodied doing – nor any
who would refuse the idea of gently and generously taking care not to mistake “the word
‘science’ for ‘objective ontological truth’ rather than continuing to view it as a powerful
and useful description that continues to work only until it does not” (§52). The concept of
something “working” (unless it does not) is so common a shorthand in theatre that it might
deserve a separate analysis of its own.

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9. By drawing out von Foerster’s concept of eigenvalues (a topic explored at some

length in Glanville 1982) as expounded in Søren Brier’s discourse of cyber semiotics
and, above all, in numerous variations by Louis Kauffman (1987, 2005, 2015), however,
Scholte does demonstrate the potential of second-order cybernetics to deconstruct cogni-
tivistic truth-claims regarding “phenomenologically unmediated embodied forms of know-
ing” (§43). In short, whereas the postmodern critique on the one hand lacks an account of
systemic operationality and the cognitivist critique on the other hand lacks an account of
recursive sociality, a robustly eclectic deployment of second-order cybernetics loops indi-
vidual bodyminds and their semiotic mediations into recursive social circuits in a manner
that can account for their creative success if not predict the spontaneous content of their
operations. Thus we find Scholte’s approach to be an effective reminder of the breadth of
second-order cybernetic conceptuality as it has developed since the 1970s and an apt dem-
onstration that this vocabulary provides an analytical repertoire adequate in this instance to
the complexity and manifold stages of the theatrical phenomena being described, from the
construction in rehearsal to the delivery in performance of the play.

Open Peer Commentary: “Truthful” Acting Emerges

Through Forward Model Development
Bernd Porr

1. One of the aims of Tom Scholte’s target article is to re-introduce the stigmatised
word “truth” back into the discourse of theatrical practise and also constructivism. This
has been (from my point of view) successfully achieved by using the rehearsal process as
devised by Constantin Stanislavsky as a constructive example. Central to this approach is
improvisation, where the actors base their actions on the internal goals of their characters
and start to interact. If successful, the director, the audience and, thus, observers, as a result
report the behaviour of the actors to be “truthful.” The article bravely goes beyond the
postmodernist notion that “truth” needs to be avoided at all costs and successfully removes
its stigma.
2. While the article succeeds in making “truth” credible again, it could have also
benefited from being ambitious on the front of open vs. closed loop. This could have easily
been taken into account as well because from the cybernetic point of view, the target article
is not just about closed loops but also about open loops. However, as with the word “truth,”
“open loop” is also often frowned upon in constructivism, which traditionally demands
that descriptions are based on closed loops, recursions and the observation of loops by
other loops. In this commentary I remind the audience of the concept of the forward model,
which is a well-established construct in second-order cybernetics and control theory (Palm
2000). This concept is implicitly woven into the main text and my aim is to make it explicit
in this commentary.
3. First of all, we need to define “forward model.” An ideal forward model is an open
loop controller that no longer needs feedback to arrive at a desired outcome (Palm 2000). If
we refer back to the well-trodden territory of the thermostat, then a thermostat action using
a forward model will not require its feedback path because it knows the exact temperature

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change in advance when switching on/off the heating. It would notice a change from the
desired state and then would switch on/off the heating without making any comparison of
the achieved result with the desired result. Another example is a chef who knows exactly
how much salt needs to be added to a soup without tasting it afterwards. The chef is able
to achieve the perfect taste because he/she has operated in closed loop mode many times
before but no longer needs to do it because he/she has a forward model.
4. One might argue that we will not need forward models. It is of course possible
to live without developing any forward models in our lives but this is a risky strategy. A
purely reactive feedback system is always at the mercy of the environment, hoping that
its requisite variety will always be sufficient when reacting against disturbances. The rab-
bit hopes to be fast enough all its life to escape all attackers. However, animals – and in
particular humans – develop a multitude of forward models to pre-empt what is going to
happen. This can only be achieved through learning, which step-by-step develops forward
models through experience on top of feedback loops (Porr & Wörgötter 2002, 2005). Even
if these forward models fail from time to time and the feedback loops need to kick in over-
all, the agent has developed models of its environment. This does not mean that the agent
knows everything about its environment, but it has understood its own closed loops. With
that knowledge, the agent knows how to avoid unexpected surprises. In the worst case,
these might kill the agent. However, they could be just a situation where the agent enters a
cocktail party with a room full of strangers. This leads us to the special case of human–hu-
man interaction, where two or more people try to develop forward models of each other.
5. What happens if agents develop forward models of each other by interacting with
each other? This is what Niklas Luhmann calls “double contingency” (Luhmann 1984). It
is mastered by creating mutual forward models to achieve a high degree of certainty. For
example, bakers often talk about recipes or theatre practitioners about the rehearsal pro-
cess and not baking recipes. Here, learning develops forward models of the other person
because the other person (alter) disturbs the closed loop processes of the first person (ego)
and vice versa. It is important that both persons start off from their personal closed loops
and that if they do not learn they just see each other as mutual disturbances (think again of
the cocktail party with a room full of strangers). Only because they develop forward mod-
els do they actually create a closed loop system that spans through both of them (Porr & Di
Prodi 2014). This is an important step and is often overseen because the people themselves
become open loops (!) because they no longer need their own personal feedback loops.
For example, when talking about the weather, the response of the other person is highly
predictable. The person has developed a forward model of the other person in terms of the
topic of weather. This can be termed as a theory of the other person’s mind.
6. Now we can go one step further and observe a conversation of two people, for
example in a pub. It is important that the observer has developed her own forward models
of conversations in the past as described above. The observer can observe and perhaps
join into the conversation because of her forward models. This will work more or less
seamlessly, depending on the topic and shared experiences, but it will be just part of the
everyday operations in our environment.
7. Now, observing acting is a special case in contrast to observing people interacting
in everyday situations. The main text is spot on that the actors and the director need to find
out what goals (or in control theory, desired states) the different characters want to achieve
and that then, through the technique of improvisation, this will be tried, tested and evolved.
Again, this can be understood in terms of forward models: at the start of the improvisation,

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the actors have a very limited or perhaps no forward model of the other actors’ goals or
closed loop behaviour. However, the two actors then learn to predict what the other actor
is going to achieve so that their mutual uncertainty is reduced, in the sense of Luhmann’s
reduction of double contingency. If the improvisation has been successful (very similar to
the everyday conversations), the actors will mainly act in open loop using their forward
models by knowing what the other actor is trying to achieve. This is in stark contrast to
reading out lines, which require very little predictive power and, thus, no forward model.
An observer who watches the improvisation (or the director) should then be able to com-
pare their forward models to that of the two or more actors on stage. If there is a reasonable
match, then this is perceived as being “truthful” in the sense that there are similarities of
forward models developed by both the actors and the audience.
8. Scholte’s article also has wider implications because improvisation imitates every-
day double contingency reduction and acts as a convincing demonstrator/simulator of how
everyday communication emerges. The actors face a similar challenge to somebody enter-
ing the aforementioned cocktail party with a room full of strangers. Again, here, forward
models need to be developed to engage in meaningful conversations.
9. As a final remark, I would like to draw attention to film, where certain directors use
improvisation not just to shape the acting but as a tool for developing the story as such (as
done by Mike Leigh for example). Another example is the recent film “Victoria,” which
indeed feels very “real.” This has been achieved by just prescribing inner goals for the
protagonists in the form of a treatment that they then use to improvise the action. Even in
more traditional environments, film is usually developed as a two-stage process where first,
a treatment is written, which often describes the characters’ goals, and then a script based
on the treatment is evolved.
10. Be it film or theatre, improvisation should be at the heart not only of the rehearsal
process but ideally also of the story development itself.

Open Peer Commentary:

Naturalism in Improvisation and Embodiment
Edgar Landgraf

The introduction of the chorus was the decisive step

with which war was declared openly and honourably
against any naturalism in art. (Nietzsche 2008: 28)

1. The “essentially cybernetic vision” (§14) Tom Scholte locates at the core of the
Stanislavski system of acting (or Method acting) is most apparent in Constantin Stanislav-
ski’s use of improvisation. Improvisation demands a particular mindset, the attentiveness
to one’s surroundings and the willingness to stay “engaged in [feedback] loops within
imaginary circumstances” (§16). Improvisation serves as a tool to evoke spontaneity and
immediacy in acting, qualities that promote the semblance of naturalness and authenticity.
These qualities are retained even after a scene has been memorized and has undergone
“formalization” by the director.

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2. Stanislavski’s use of improvisation resonates with one of the central theses of my

book Improvisation as Art: Conceptual Challenges, Historical Perspectives, namely that
“improvisation is best understood as a particular mode of staging art that shares properties
common to various individual arts and fulfills many of the expectations we have for the arts
in general” (Landgraf 2011: 11). My argument is based on the recognition that it is impos-
sible to decouple improvisation fully from structure and repetition. Yet, despite following a
deconstructive logic, I wanted to be able to account for the effects that are at the base of the
continued association of improvisation with notions of spontaneity, immediacy, and inven-
tiveness, effects recognized by practitioners as much as by their audience. Like Scholte, I
drew on second-order cybernetics to circumvent the impasse between postmodern skepti-
cism (expressed, for example, by Jacques Derrida’s proclamation that improvisation is
impossible) and the essentializing tendencies adopted by many practitioners of improvisa-
tion (e.g., Derek Bailey), who find the practice of improvisation in its “immediacy” utterly
incompatible with theoretical reflection.
3. Stanislavski’s association of improvisation with naturalism most closely parallels
the many comparisons of improvisation with conversation. In these comparisons, con-
versation is idealized as a form of free and spontaneous social interaction where the par-
ticipants are thought to be able to act naturally and authentically. As in improvisation,
this freedom is the result of long practice, of experience and situational familiarity, and is
something that not everyone will learn to master equally well. A comparative analysis can
further underline the social constructedness of “naturalism,” even for conversation. Merely
consider, for example, how aristocratic etiquette in pre-modern times encouraged quite
different conversational practices than the bourgeois emphasis on sensibility that became
dominant in the course of the eighteenth century and put strong emphasis on non-verbal
signs (blushing, feinting, gestures, etc.) in and outside the theatre. As I explored more
extensively in my book, the expectation that interlocutors of a conversation engage in an
open exchange of ideas (“stay engaged in feedback loops”) is itself a modern development.
Again, in feudal societies, by comparison, conversation was highly regulated and impro-
visation, too, did not aim for naturalism or inventiveness. The latter is apparent in the use
of masks in the Commedia dell’arte, its repeatable plot structures, or the rhetorical corsets
that defined and made predictable the practice of improvisation in older theatre and poetry
traditions (see Angela Esterhammer 2008 and Beatrix Müller-Kampel 2003 for examples).
4. This brief historical comparison should serve as a reminder of the constructed-
ness of our contemporary views on the naturalness of conversation, improvisation, and
acting. More specifically, I want to argue that the comparison between conversation and
improvisation suggests that today the appearance of “naturalness” must itself be linked to
the recognition of open and dynamic processes of social interaction. In cybernetic terms,
nowadays actors and audiences alike have learned to read the emergent qualities of auto-
poietic performances as markers of authenticity and naturalism. This is why Scholte’s turn
to Gordon Pask’s conversation theory for his quantitative analysis promises to be highly
productive. Scholte might also want to include Keith Sawyer’s work. Sawyer draws on
Erving Goffman in his description of processes of “collaborative emergence” that he ob-
serves in improv theatre dialogues. The performances Sawyer analyses demonstrate how
from contingent beginnings, an unforeseen story can emerge within seconds, a story with a
defined plot, novel characters, specific times and places, and so on (Sawyer 2003: 41–43).
In this regard, improv theatre can serve as a model for how to stage the absence of planning
to create effects of spontaneity, immediacy, freedom, and authenticity.

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5. To look at conversations and dialogues as a model for autopoietic and self-steering

processes is also to acknowledge that such processes develop not only around linguistic
utterances, but consciously and subconsciously involve many other elements, such as ges-
tures, facial expressions, perception of place and time, timing, the surrounding atmosphere,
etc. These are all factors that help determine what will be perceived, but also what an actor
will experience and “embody” as natural and authentic behavior. Paskian cybernetics al-
lows us to understand such experiences as mediated through our body’s sensory apparatus.
This means admitting pre-conscious and pre-symbolic modes of cognition and communi-
cation, while nevertheless maintaining that such experiences are acquired, are the product
of cultural training (socialization and education), and reflect culturally determined expecta-
tions and interpretive patterns.
6. The cultural dimension is often shortchanged by the humanities’ recent turn to the
cognitive sciences. In my essay “Form aand Event,” I take to task the “naturalism” of
theories of embodiment that employ the term “embodiment” as a foundational concept, as
evidence for an evolutionary-physiological determination of our being-in-the-world. If we
look at current debates surrounding the schools of thought associated with posthumanism,
we notice on a much broader scale the renewed desire for ontological or physiological
foundations, for a return to a realism that is not plagued by the specters of postmodernism.
Cybernetics is not immune to this quest, even a cybersemiotically versed thinker such as
Søren Brier adopts embodiment as a central concept from where to develop a notion of
reality that is thought to exist – and exist with definable qualities – independent of its (se-
miotic re)construction by an observer.
7. Brier argues that “although we have rightly abandoned the notion of ‘objective re-
ality’ in second-order cybernetics, we should not give up the notion of a partly independent
‘outside reality’” (Brier 2008: 92). From the perspective of Niklas Luhmann’s operational
constructivism – which is more consequential, and asks us not to lose sight of the social
involvement (communication) in our construction of knowledge – this “outside,” too, has
to be understood as the “inside” product of its observation, whereby the primary observer
for Luhmann is not a subject, mind, or body, but the system of communication. The argu-
ment is simple. Anything we (individual minds) observe and any meaning we might attach
to any observer, be it the mind, the body, a subject, or communication, will have to draw on
the operations of the system of communication to do so. This applies also to our observa-
tions of reality. Accordingly, when Luhmann defines reality, for example, as resistance to
arbitrariness, he still insists that reality remains the construct of system operations:
When reality should still be understood as resistance against arbitrary thematization – and
what other concept of reality would we still have – then we must be dealing with resistance
of signs against signs, language against language, communication against communication.
That is: we are dealing with recursively formed complexity. In its continuing operations,
the system tests, so to speak, against self-produced uncertainty and self-produced resis-
tance what, from moment to moment, it can treat as eigenvalue. (Luhmann 1997: 1126f,
my translation).

8. I will not be able to do justice to Brier’s concept of cybersemiotics here, neverthe-

less, I want to suggest that Brier’s “realism” fails to give due credit to the system of com-
munication’s role in defining the mind’s ability to observe and attribute meaning to what it
observes, including what it observes as physiological capabilities and needs that developed
as the result of evolutionary processes. As Scholte notes, the point is not to ignore the reali-

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ties science offers in its first-order observations, but to remind oneself that they, too, are
observer-dependent and ultimately have to draw on and operate within the system of com-
munication. Only by retaining an eye on both, observer and observed, can we overcome
what Scholte describes as the “onto-epistemological deadlocks between constructivists and
realists” (Scholte §3) and avoid the “fundamentalist excesses of both totalizing cognitive-
scientific objectivism and paralyzing postmodern skepticism” (§61).
9. More specifically, then, rather than naturalizing embodiment, drawing on Luh-
mann’s systems theory, we can observe how the body is accessible by our nervous system
(the sensory apparatus) that interacts (is structurally coupled) with the mind (conscious-
ness understood as an emergent phenomenon) that in turn is conscious due to its structural
coupling with the system of communication, its ability to use language for the reproduction
of its elements (perceptions, thoughts, feelings). Structural coupling is responsible for a
high degree of stability in the interaction between these systems – what Scholte examines
as eigenbehaviors – a stability that on the level of interaction between nervous system and
psychic system is the result of long-term, evolutionary processes. We can think of con-
sciousness or cognition or feelings as embodied in this sense and do not have to question
the value of research that investigates the biological, physiological, chemical, semiotic,
and other parameters that enable such a system to function and maintain relations to other
systems and its environment. Such research will no doubt strengthen our understanding of
the biological foundations of our mind, and of our sense of being-in-the-world. But one
should not neglect what nothing demonstrates more clearly than acting itself: that the sig-
nification processes that are associated with embodied modes of cognition and experience,
as well as their meaning, exist separate from these experiences, and can always be faked,
simulated, feinted, and manipulated.
10. How can we conceive the role of theatre and, more broadly, of art in the context of
these observational practices? I quoted Nietzsche above, who sees naturalism as a principle
enemy of the theatre. Nietzsche cites theatre’s most famous character, Hamlet, in support
of his thesis that art responds to the fundamental need for illusion (the need to “turn those
thoughts of disgust at the horror or absurdity of existence into imaginary constructs which
permit living to continue” – Nietzsche 2008: 29). Scholte reads the current return to natu-
ralism as a reaction to a crisis of meaning, as representing a backlash against “paralyzing
postmodern skepticism” (§61). It is certainly not surprising that a time that sees itself
confronted with overwhelming natural and technological challenges and finds itself disil-
lusioned about its political maneuverability, might put an increased stake into science and
feel the need to emphasize the reality of the threat rather than concern itself with language
games, rhetoric, performativity, or ideological contradictions (which appeared more mean-
ingful in the aftermath of WWII).
11. It is legitimate to ask what the role of art and theatre is under these circumstances.
Does art want to insist on expressing the reality of the looming social and environmental
crises and their effects on contemporary society? Or does art remain committed to purely
aesthetic criteria and thus aim to preserve its autonomy, or at least a certain distance from
the immediate concerns of its time? From a systems theoretical point of view, there might
be a middle ground. If we adopt the theory of modern society’s functional differentiation,
we will have to acknowledge that a social subsystem such as art is part of, but also limited
in how it might affect society at large. Which raises the question of the specificity of art’s
mode of communication vis-à-vis that of other social subsystems. If we take “illusion” to
be central to art and theatre, we can distinguish art in terms of it not being bound by what

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other social systems construct as their external reality. This freedom allows art to cite and
recontextualize other societal discourses and thus make apparent the constructedness of
the reality to which they appear to respond. Put differently, art in modern society “natu-
rally” invites second-order observation on society’s observations, instilling a sense of con-
tingency and freedom, what Scholte, in a Brechtian spirit, calls a “genuine second-order
awareness of the contingency of dominant societal structures” (§59).
12. Whether naturalism in rehearsal and performance contributes or undermines this
particular function of art, however, will again depend on the observer, on the audience, and
on its ability to recognize naturalism in art as staged. Scholte’s research project holds the
promise to further our sensibilities in this regard, by examining more closely how natural-
istic effects are produced, what signs, behaviors, gestures, and so on accompany commu-
nicational exchanges and create the impression of naturalism in today’s culture – and thus
invite second-order observation also of naturalism itself.

Open Peer Commentary: Opening the Black Box of Minds:

Theatre as a Laboratory of System Unknowns
Lowell F. Christy Jr.

1. Heinz von Foerster loved magic, with its sleight of hand and how one’s perceptual
field is directed. Magic was of interest but his passion was how the sleight of mind in
perception undermines the realist’s claims to independent reality and objective tenets of
science. In 1971 when I first met him in Cuernavaca, Mexico, where he was collaborat-
ing with Gordon Pask, Humberto Maturana and Douglas Engelbart over the future of the
technologies arising from cybernetics, he was fascinated by the Eastern spiritual tradi-
tions of the koan. The koan is a question/riddle that cannot be solved by remaining in the
same paradigm that framed the question. For von Foerster, second-order cybernetics was a
koan requiring making the mind larger than the problem at hand and the facts given. Tom
Scholte’s answer to the koan of second-order cybernetics requires going to another level
by moving upstream from the paradigm of science into the pre-conceptual, pre-perceptual
world of art and theatre.
2. Scholte’s target article “Black Box Theatre” offers a refreshing alternative. With
the example of theatre as an investigative tool in second-order cybernetics delving into
the epistemological and ontological levels of systems, Scholte offers a research approach
and agenda leading out of constructivism’s “infinite linear circularity”1 Instead of waging

1. “Infinite linear circularity” arose out of a discussion in July 1971 between Engelbart and Pask
in Cuernavaca, Mexico, which I attended. Pask was lecturing on conversation theory and doing
one of his famous doodles of a double mirror picture of the human head, within a human head
within a human head. Engelbart said that Pask’s conversation theory reminded him of a fatal
software programming mistake of infinite do-loops that went nowhere. “Infinite circularity” was
a 1960s substitute term for continuous do-loops creating programming mistakes where there is no
resolution except continuous processing. Engelbart added the term “linear” to infinite circularity
because he wanted to emphasize the difference between vicious cycles, where learning occurred
only within the bounded rationality of Pask’s “teach-back,” versus virtuous interactions, which

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an assault on the paradigm of privileged observer knowledge and strong epistemological

reductionism of science, Scholte opens the possibility of a research methodology based on
the formation, conformation and deformation of the social life of information.
3. What is radical in its very hypothesis is that beyond the level of command, con-
trol and objectivity, new research methods can test regulatory principles in the forming of
information and the bounded contexts of communication. Meaning, identity, relationship,
ecological insights could emerge in a carefully designed “system of systems” research
effort. Von Foerster’s central theme “How we know what we know?” (Segal 2001: 1) re-
quires moving from worrying about truth to intelligence, from cognition to perception and
from shattering the fantasy of an objective reality to deciphering the logic of interacting
systems. The task is not to know what is in the black box but the structure of the box and
its linkages, feedback loops and transformative processes of signs and symbols. Only by
revealing systems of feedback loops, their consequences over time and the structural pat-
terning of vicious versus virtuous cycles could von Foerster’s deep concern for reigning in
the “monsters of reason” (ibid: 2) set constructivism on a new course.
4. Scholte boldly proposes that naturalist theatre “could provide a hitherto untapped
laboratory for generation of quantitative and qualitative research pertaining to several di-
mensions of second-order cybernetics” (§3). His “hope is that the theoretical consider-
ations discussed here might inspire others to bring their expertise to this fledgling research
program” (ibid). Scholte points to a different way forward for epistemological constructiv-
ists by investigation of the perceptual interactions leading to the formation of the image or
narrative through which the world emerges. Using the clash of meaning in the interactive
theatre of observers and the observed, the regulatory functions within and between systems
could be revealed and studied. Instead of focussing on constructivism itself, this direction
of research is asking about the meta-rules and regulators of systems and their consequence
in individuals, groups, cultures and beyond.
5. What is the unique configuration and constitution of these perceptual lens and
feedback loops? Organized systems of interactions of observers and observed are present
in theatre. The arts operate at the pre-linguistic, pre-conceptual and pre-symbolic levels,
where science appears excluded by its very act of operating on formed information and its
reliance on the analytic droppings of data. Scholte makes the case that regulatory principles
forming our fields of intelligence, perception could be probed. Probing the circuitry of con-
nectedness and dependence within and between bounded systems offers the opportunity to
move beyond the strait jackets of knowledge/no knowledge into learning to learn.

address complexity by creating evolutionary intelligence. This was an epistemological clash

between Engelbart, who championed the co-evolution of human mind and machine that seeks
collective intelligence processes versus Pask’s conversation theory, which emphasized learning
to make knowledge explicit. Scholte relies on Pask’s conversation insights but must emerge from
Pask’s inward spiral feeding upon existing “knowns” if a results-oriented research agenda is to be
achieved. Engelbart’s and, more recently, Francis Heylighen’s work on bootstrapping processes
of emergence of ever more complex adaptive systems (Heylighen 2013) is important in construc-
tivist research. The productive link between Pask, Engelbart and Heylighen’s work is their com-
mon pursuit of higher levels of relationships or meta-structures (scaffolding), which a reflexive
theatre of theatre could investigate. Gregory Bateson’s emphasis on co-evolutionary structures of
minds would assist researching higher levels of learning of systems of systems of second-order
cybernetics.

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6. In his target article, Scholte draws from von Forester’s eigenbehaviors, Pasks’ con-
versation theory and Bateson’s cybernetic epistemology to investigate the interrelations
and ecology wherein the world and the observer co-create each other. Scholte understands
that “[t]he logic of the world is the logic of the description of the world”; (Segal 2001: 1)
in doing so, he illuminated a path that bypasses the trap of accounting for the black box of
cognition and the totality of our mental faculties. Calling for research not on cognition but
on the field of intelligence emergent between the black boxes of perceptions and cognition,
Scholte states that theatre provides an ideal place for understanding the structuring of our
dreams of reality in an environment that starts with the “willing suspension of disbelief”
(Coleridge 1817: Ch. XIV).
7. Scholte relies on Søren Brier’s bio-cybersemiotic framework. Brier (2008) pro-
poses a semiotic level that belongs to all living systems, and that serves as the scaffolding
for “social language systems” (§42). Emergence of images and linking back to perception
requires weaving of information based on differences making a difference to the whole
system. Identification of the meta-patterns and how they constrain lower level functions
would be a research objective of perceptual weaving and its holistic economy of relations.
How information becomes entangled (develops) within the whole scaffolding as well as
the potential for disentangling or “reverse engineering” complexity is a distinct possibility.
8. For a theatre of theatre, Scholte ends his target article with this thought about the
nature of the organization (read regulator) of information, communication that co-creates
itself. Teasing out the complex interplay between eigenbehaviors requires the re-concep-
tualization of…
naturalist theatre (and perhaps all representational art) as dealing in the generation of ei-
genbehaviors rather than laying claim to objective portraits of ‘reality’ and examine those
eigenbehaviors through a cybersemiotic lens employing both quantitative data around
meaning and believability and conservation theory reflecting the operationalized concep-
tual schema of characters, actors and ultimately audiences. (§61)

9. The question remains of how to deal with black boxes of the unknown and whether
there is a researchable pathway to super-sensible knowing and learning? Scholte’s insight
is that by researching processes (eigenbehaviors) through cybersemiotic and conversation
theory in the terrain that is pre-scientific, we can complete the revolution of second-order
cybernetics. The task of second-order cybernetics was to turn epistemology on its head.
The question now is building on the constructivist revolution. What is tantalizing is that
he points not to the secrets (the things) inside the black box but to relationship structures,
understood both quantitatively and qualitatively, of the feedback loops of perception, de-
ception and conception in the interactions between actors, audience and script.
10. Scholte’s method simply states there is a field of inquiry that can not only in-
vestigate itself but can learn about patterns of organization and relational symmetry in
the very perceptual and conceptual processes that create stability of objects. Theatre of
theatre opens the possibility of investigating eigenbehaviors as tokens of processes. These
processes are the relationships, feedback loops and interactions between the black boxes
of minds. This research would answer questions not just about what is present between the
black box of minds but importantly the development potential for change and transforma-
tion in the circuitry of information and communication through which we organize the
world. A theatre of theatre research agenda would document the processes in the develop-
ment of structures of increasing complexity and improbability.

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11. The black box of unknown inner principles of change and stasis in living systems
operates as a token of processes giving rise to fully formed objects. When we consider a
pattern of patterns or cybernetics of cybernetics or the proposed theatre of theatre that fold
back on themselves, we find there is a foothold for analysis. Louis Kaufman in his paper
on von Foerster’s eigenbehavior writes,
Such concepts appear to close around upon themselves, and at the same time they lead
outward. They suggest the possibility of transcending the boundaries of a system from a
locus that might have been within the system until the circular concept is called into being,
and then the boundaries have turned inside out. (Kauffman 2003: 73)

12. Ranulph Granville makes a similar point in his 1979 paper delivered at the Lon-
don Cybernetics Society, “Inside Every White Box are Two Black Boxes Trying to Get
Out,” where he concludes:
There comes, then, a point at which formal (artificial) systems, as we understand them, are
limited by the distinction between level and meta-level. In terms of our (level distinctive)
logics – themselves artificial systems – this distinction is sacrosanct. […] Thus, the black
box model […] requires not only this change but also as one means for the establishment
of eigen-behavior and hence, objects, the observer’s ability to ‘step outside’ or transcend
levels. (Glanville 1982: 9)

13. The movement away from objects that are socially constructed and a world where
everything is relative does not mean the world of mind simply floats on the whim of the
dominant class or prevailing paradigm. Like the relative in a family, where faces bear a
striking wholeness of relationship (like Wittgenstein’s family resemblances), what consti-
tute the structures are it’s underlying differences. Identification of those patterns that con-
nect and disconnect would be the heart of the research effort.
14. Intelligence, perception, morphogenesis and in-formation are all eigenbehavior
delineating processes that move upstream from science’s world view to where objects are
not objects of study but indications of processes – “the concatenation of operations upon
themselves” (Kaufman 2003: 73) The unit of analysis is the two-way interactive co-cre-
ation of “organism plus environment” forming a structural coupling (Bateson 1999). The
theatre of theatre would investigate structural coupling where the phase (transformative)
space between meta-system scaffolding and operations, between organism and environ-
ment can not only be identified and studied but is regulatory functioning viewed.
15. Scholte’s value-added proposition in creating a theatre of theatre second-order
laboratory points towards a new, non-trivial paradigm. This paradigm requires heavy theo-
retical lifting and the design of new experimental questions and tools. Whereas the scien-
tific method is analytic probing of the discrete variables, second-order methods seek the
dual processes of the whole that
ƒƒ sustain and provide stability over time, and
ƒƒ have the capacity to change.
Change has many dimensions, including structural (morpho-genesis), change in ideas, hab-
its, responses in behavior or in symbolic representations (ideo-genesis), or change niche/
environment (eco-genesis). All three areas could constitute second-order research. The
change from seeking variables in the slice and dice analytic of science and the unification
of holistic systems design due to changes in its circuitry is a significant shift in the way
we think.

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16. A voice from theatre is a strange place to listen for how patterns of organization
and relational symmetry emerge, are sustained and evolve or dissolve. Black box theatre
points in an important direction. Second-order rigor probes the circuitry of the entangled
relationship of observers and the observer’s co-creation. A method and tool of investigation
emerges out of a hierarchy of levels of analysis incorporating the system of observer and
observed. Establishing a theatre of theatre laboratory is fully consistent with the reflexive
cybernetics of cybernetics, linguistics of linguistics, logic of logic, learning of learning or
meaning of meaning.
17. Scholte’s article stands on its own as a strong argument that black box theatre
research offers a new way of thinking about thinking with a potential to change how we ap-
proach knowledge, intelligence and evolutionary design of the world. In seeking construc-
tivist foundations, Scholte’s idea is that aesthetics and art may provide deeper insights into
the nature of epistemological circuits, their closure as a system and their consequences.
Improving the way we think requires entering into the pre-perceptual and pre-conceptual
domain of the arts. When asked in Mexico in 1971 about the future of cybernetics, von
Foerster gave me a book, The Dream that Was No More a Dream: Search for Aesthetic
Reality in Germany, 1890–1945 (Kinser & Kleinman 1969). Witnessing Nazi Germany’s
Berlin during WWII, von Foerster’s pioneering work in constructivism and cybernetics
was driven by the epistemological bankruptcy of reason, rationality and its handmaiden,
science. Countering the tyranny of certitude required tilting at science, truth and reality,
but for von Foerster, Bateson and Kenneth Boulding (cf. his 1956, The Image), the future
required probes into art countering construction of images, symbols and language that
produced the “monsters of reason” (Segal 2001: 2).
18. Theatre is uniquely positioned to provide methods and tools to understand conse-
quences of differing configurations forming perception and conception. The koans embed-
ded in what von Foerster accomplished in raising the specter of second-order cybernetics
requires new experimental design and the heavy lifting of theory. Repeating what the pio-
neers of cybernetics and constructionism said means we roll their koans up a hill only to
have them crash down. Beyond the mountains of truth/no truth and relativity lies a field of
images, narratives and relationships with consequences. I will meet you there.

Open Peer Commentary: Does Second-Order Cybernetics

Provide a Framework for Theatre Studies?
Albert Müller

1. I understand the intentions of the author, Tom Scholte, as an attempt to create a

systematic relationship between Stanislavski’s naturalistic theatre, his own theatre work
and cybernetics, especially second-order cybernetics, with a focus on a well-known key
concept of cybernetics, the black box.
2. It is always welcome to see transdisciplinary cybernetics used either as a theoretical
framework for the solution of a set of special scientific problems or entangled with other
scientific disciplines. In fact, this applies not only to the sciences but also to various applied
fields, including systemic therapy or consultancy schools, and, as it the case here, to vari-

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ous fields of the arts. Among many others who supported such an agenda were Heinz von
Foerster, Gordon Pask, Ernst von Glasersfeld and Ranulph Glanville.
3. Already in an earlier publication, Scholte (2015) tried to establish this relation-
ship between cybernetics and the undoubtedly ingenious theoretician and practitioner of
theatre, Stanislavski – who, besides Bertold Brecht, must be considered the most influen-
tial revolutionary in 20th century theatre. For an historian this opens up the problem of
anachronism or the problem of a possible anachronistic fallacy (Fischer 1970) because
Konstantin Stanislavski, who passed away in 1938, could definitely not have been aware
of the development of cybernetics. This took place in the 1940s and the 1950s, mainly
carried out by Norbert Wiener, Warren S. McCulloch and the Macy Group, and the British
cyberneticians, including Ross Ashby. Since Stanislavski’s major works were published
in the 1930s, we need to wonder what kind of relationship Scholte tries to establish, for it
cannot be a relationship of influence or mutual influence. Even though I am aware of the
fact that Heinz von Foerster, Ernst von Glasersfeld and Gordon Pask as well (and probably
others) read some of Stanislavski’s books, I cannot assume that he had any influence on
the development of early cybernetics for, as far as I know, there is no literature in early
cybernetics making any reference to Stanislavski.
4. Besides this (for a historian) obvious criticism, there are other issues one needs to
look into. One of them is the question of intellectual economy (or, if you will, Occam’s
razor sensu Hahn 1980): Of course, there are obvious parallels between Stanislavski and
cybernetics – and Scholte tells us very interesting details about that – but is it actually
necessary to adopt (second-order) cybernetics in order to understand, to explain, let alone
to develop his conception of theatre, i.e., Stanislavski’s system?
5. Another example in Scholte’s article, depicted in Figure 6, is the reformulation of
a quite conventional theatre situation (with “characters in play,” “audience member” and
“researcher”) as nested black boxes in the sense of Glanville (2012: 447) but with an ad-
ditional time variable. There is no doubt that the concept of the black box is a fundamental
theoretical instrument in the history of cybernetics. While it would be possible to demon-
strate that there were predecessors, it is clear that the first full description and discussion
of this concept goes back to chapter 6 of Ashby’s An Introduction to Cybernetics (Ashby
1956). In Ashby’s handwritten Journal, http://www.rossashby.info, we find a first entry
concerning this concept in the year 1951. Glanville (2012: 42) suggested it was possible to
trace the general idea of the black box back to James Clerk Maxwell. A similar suggestion
was made by Heinz von Foerster when he used Maxwell’s demon in his thought experi-
ments related to his work on “self-organizing systems and their environments” (Foerster
2003b). In any case, the black box has been one of the traditional concepts of (first-order)
cybernetics that has often been used innovatively in new contexts, Scholte’s article being
one of them.
6. Glanville (2009c, 2012), in some ways, broke with the traditions of cyberneticians’
black box thinking and went considerably beyond it. One of his central innovative ideas
was to ascribe to the black box the quality of being “whitened.” By being “whitened,” the
black box becomes a white box. This clearly transcended Ashby’s conception of a black
box, which would always remain a black box, never to be opened and only to be hypotheti-
cally ascribed a specific function by an observer (or the experimenter coupling himself to
the box, in Ashby’s 1956: 87 terminology). In Glanville’s terms, “whitening” the black box
refers to the building of a circular system as a new whole that includes the black box and
the observer, who provides a functional description of the black box. Glanville’s approach

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takes into account that different observers may come up with different functional descrip-
tions. The whitening of the black box also whitens the observer but the circular system they
are forming appears again as a black box for a second observer. With this reformulation
of Ashby’s “Problem of the Black Box” (Ashby 1956: 86), Glanville turned the originally
first-order cybernetics concept of the black box into a second-order cybernetics concept
and made it a universal epistemological tool. But was it meant to be applied beyond epis-
temological questions, questions of what we can or cannot know, questions that were also
formulated in von Glasersfeld’s radical constructivism (Glasersfeld 2007)? I do not think
so. Was it meant to be used for applied research, including social and psychological, and
for problems emerging and being studied in theatre studies of the type Tom Scholte is do-
ing? I have my doubts. The view that a concept, a theory is beautiful does not necessarily
mean that it matches certain problems better than other or older concepts and theories.
However, this does not mean that concepts and theories from second-order cybernetics
cannot be successfully used – it must be carefully decided in which context they can be
applied.
7. With his target article, Scholte announces a research program accompanying his
theatre work that could last for years. In particular, this ongoing work could influence both
theatre and research and might very well lead to lasting changes in concepts and theories
as well. We shall remain curious.

Open Peer Commentary:

A Theatre for Exploring the Cybernetic
Ben Sweeting

1. While Tom Scholte has concentrated on ways in which cybernetics can inform
theatre, the connections that he has developed between the two fields are significant for
being not ones of application but, rather, overlap, where cybernetic processes are seen to
be being enacted within an already established set of practices. Scholte’s bridge building
is, therefore, suggestive of further possibilities, opening up a new avenue for exploring
how cybernetics may be understood in terms of action rather than theory, and so as an ac-
tive research tradition rather than one form of worldview amongst others. This is highly
relevant to the context of this volume and previous concerns in Constructivist Foundations
with second-order science (Riegler & Müller 2014).
2. One point of comparison for Scholte’s target article is with the development of sim-
ilar connections between cybernetics and design, such as in the work of Ranulph Glanville
(e.g., 2007). This commentary is not the place to work through the various connections that
can be made between design and theatre via cybernetics (a study that would be in the spirit
of cybernetics’ original trans-disciplinary agenda). However, reflecting on the parallels be-
tween Scholte’s account and the invocation of design in cybernetic literature suggests ways
in which the connections that Scholte has explored may be further developed.
3. Scholte concentrates on the underpinning that cybernetics can offer to processes in
theatre, for instance in moving beyond the theoretical impasse that he describes (§§5ff),
and ways in which the use of ideas from cybernetics such as entailment meshes may en-

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rich those processes (§§40f). There are several areas of design where, similarly, cybernet-
ics can provide theoretical support, particularly as regards interactive technology (e.g.,
Spiller 2002) or the relation between design and research (e.g., Glanville 2015; Jonas 2007,
2015). Glanville’s analogy between cybernetics and design is, however, notably two-way:
“cybernetics is the theory of design and design is the action of cybernetics” (Glanville
2007: 1178). That is, design contributes back to cybernetics, such as where second-order
cybernetics is understood in terms of the cybernetic practice of cybernetic ideas (Sweeting
2015), and where the overlaps between cybernetics and core aspects of design practice
have allowed designers to contribute to cybernetics through their tacit understanding of
such processes, rather than via theory (on this see also my contribution elsewhere in this
volume; Sweeting 2016).
4. Similarly, given the parallels that Scholte has suggested, and his quotation from
Ashby (§4), we might expect ideas from theatre to inform or challenge ideas in cybernetics
as much as vice versa – to provide a theatre, as it were, in which to explore the cybernetic.
If the relations between cybernetics and theatre have not yet been explored in as much
depth as those between cybernetics and design, there are, as with design, a number of
clear parallels in existing work that can be drawn on. These include Heinz von Foerster’s
(2003c: 325ff) concerns with magic; the performance events that have long been part of
the conferences of the American Society for Cybernetics (Richards 2015); and Andrew
Pickering’s (2010) interpretation of British cybernetics as what he refers to as “ontologi-
cal theatre,” where ideas are explored through their staging in experimental devices or
other forms of practice. Central in Pickering’s account is the work of Gordon Pask, who
is also a key reference for Scholte. Scholte’s concern with Pask stays close to the formal
aspects of conversation theory, which he uses to make connections with the Stanislavski
method (§§23ff). This is similar to the way that Glanville draws on Pask in building bridges
between cybernetics and design (Glanville 2007, 2009b). Pask’s oeuvre, however, sug-
gests further possibilities for building the relationship between cybernetics and theatre.
Pickering (2010) emphasizes the performative qualities of Pask’s devices, through which
he embodied his ideas in order to explore them in a way not unlike Scholte’s (§§42ff)
account of the stage as a modeling facility. Most explicitly, Pask was directly engaged in
the theatrical, most notably with the development of the Musicolour device with Robin
McKinnon-Wood (Pask 1971) and his substantial collaboration with avant-garde theatre
director Joan Littlewood and architect Cedric Price on the Fun Palace project during the
1960s (Mathews 2007). By building on these connections, together with the analogies that
Scholte has developed, theatre and cybernetics can offer each other mutual support in much
the same way as cybernetics and design.
5. Theatre provides a rich territory in which to explore epistemological and cybernetic
ideas, and the laboratory that Scholte (§52) proposes is one such exploration. The varied
ways of configuring the relationship between performers and those they perform to, and
the possibility of interactive or self-reflexive arrangements, also offer a number of other
possibilities. Even in conventional formats, theatre is a significantly interactive medium,
compared to, say, film, because of the way that actors respond to the way that the audi-
ence responds to them (this is Pask’s starting point in his collaboration with Littlewood1).
Theatre therefore offers the potential for staging different epistemological relations that

1. See Pask’s unpublished report “Proposals for a Cybernetic Theatre” produced on behalf of Litt-
lewood’s Theatre Workshop & Pask’s own System Research as part of the Fun Palace project. A

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can be explored by participating in them from different observer positions: for instance,
whereas Figure 6 shows a straightforward hierarchy, the audience or researchers may also
find themselves within a play being observed by the characters, and so on.
6. In this light, it is interesting that it is not clear where second-order cybernetics, with
its concern with observer inclusion, would sit vis-à-vis the debate between naturalistic
and anti-naturalistic approaches to the theatre that Scholte briefly mentions (§59). Both
approaches are concerned with observer inclusion: on the one hand, an anti-naturalistic
approach explicitly articulates our presence as observers and agents in the social setting of
the theatre; on the other, it is in the naturalistic approach where we are caught up within
the flow of the constructed world of the performance, identifying with characters and their
situations. Whereas second-order cybernetics is often presented in simple opposition to
first-order cybernetics, theatre’s modeling of observer relations offers possibilities for ex-
ploring nuances of how our presence in our observing is configured.

Open Peer Commentary:

The Many Varieties of Experimentation in Second-
Order Cybernetics: Art, Science, Craft
Laurence D. Richards

1. Tom Scholte expresses concern that second-order cybernetics (SOC) is being mar-
ginalized within mainstream academia. The implication seems to be that if SOC was rec-
ognized as a legitimate and mainstream approach to science and design, it could contribute
significantly to many types of human endeavor. Scholte proposes that the theatre could
provide a laboratory for experimenting with ideas in SOC as a way to add some legitimacy
and demonstrate value. I find this to be a novel and intriguing proposal and encourage its
further development. Scholte has the unusual combination of expertise in theatre studies,
directing and cybernetics necessary to pull it off. I am unsure how many people with these
abilities and interests there might be; perhaps Scholte’s work will stimulate more interest.
In this commentary, I wish to question the prospects for, and even the desirability of, push-
ing SOC into “mainstream” academia.
2. SOC is distinguished by the new questions it asks, not by the answers it might
supply to current questions. Its legitimacy lies in the logic(s) embedded in these questions
and the desirability of the consequences of exploring the questions further. Its method is
deductive. Looking for empirical support for cybernetics concepts in current systems is not
of value in responding to questions about systems that do not yet exist, but that might be
desirable if they did exist. The activity of designing and exploring new systems invokes the
realm of the un-decidable question – questions only we can decide, questions of desirabil-
ity. Artistic performance, as in the theatre, provides a vehicle for creating new systems and
then experimenting with them. The form of experimentation, however, may not be in the
tradition of the scientific experiment, where empirical results are used to support or oppose

copy of the document is archived in the Cedric Price Archive at the Canadian Centre for Architec-
ture, Montreal, reference: DR1995:0188:525:001:009.

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pre-formulated hypotheses and theories; on the contrary, the more appropriate experimen-
tation might be in the form of “playing” with the dynamics of interactions and relations.
Opportunities for playing with dynamics reside in the composition of the script/score; in
the interactions among the actors, between actors and director, between performance and
audience and among audience members and others; and in the scheduling of a performance
as an event among other events.
3. Experimental composition and experimental theatre are common subjects in uni-
versity programs in the fine and performing arts. In fact, the movement arts, and all the
arts, are experimental. Ideas are tried, consequences explored and new ideas generated.
The controlled experiments of science, on the other hand, use the word “experiment” in a
different way: scientific experiments are intended to prove or disprove an explanation of
a current phenomenon. The controlled aspect of these experiments requires the specifica-
tion of a current system in which the explanation will be tested. The idea of a craft merges
art and science and adds action. For the craftsperson, the repetition of an activity – that is,
learning through doing – could be regarded as a continuous process of experimentation:
through practice, the craftsperson develops her craft.
4. There is, of course, an art, science and craft involved in all these activities, but
it is the focus on experimentation in the sciences that increasingly gives legitimacy to
an academic field of inquiry. Cybernetics has always been trans-disciplinary, even anti-
disciplinary, in approach, treating all systems (existing or imagined) as potential subject
matter. The approach of SOC involves art, science and craft together, simultaneously and
without bias. Mainstream science is disciplinary, empirical and oriented toward questions
that can be decided through observation and controlled experiment. SOC does not belong
in the mainstream and is not likely to carve out a place for itself there; rather, it provides an
epistemology for an entirely different system of inquiry, one that focuses on the observers/
listeners themselves, their ways of thinking, their desires and their interactions with each
other. The hope of SOC is in the prospect of a new way of thinking and talking about our
world, our society and ourselves.
5. Why focus on experimenting with the “dynamics” of human interactions and rela-
tions when speaking of SOC? Three features unique to cybernetics come to mind.

Dynamics and relations

6. Cybernetics attempts to address two domains of inquiry simultaneously: the do-
main of dynamics (experience) and the domain of relations (explanation) (Richards 2010,
2013). Bridging the domains requires the observer/listener to select a clock by which ob-
servations are to be made and explanations formulated. I use the word “clock” to speak
of a way of sampling a dynamics. In science, the commonly accepted tradition is to select
an external standard clock (years, weeks, days, hours, minutes, seconds, milliseconds and
so on – equal increments based on revolutions of the earth around the sun, rotations of the
earth on its axis or other fixed reference points, which self-referentially already require the
selection of a clock in order to call them “fixed”), with the only choice being how often to
record observations of states or structures in the phenomena being observed. For example,
observing the growth of a culture in a petri dish requires a decision about whether to record
observations every day, every hour, every ten minutes or some other interval (sampling
rate), so that causal relations among the variables under consideration can be inferred from
the changes in state or structure observed. Different sampling rates produce different rela-

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tions, with different consequences for science, for the scientist and for the world that ac-
cepts the results. In the arts, many possible clocks (or conceptions of time) are employed
or invoked, often without explanation or justification by the artist. For example, spray
painting carries a different conception of time than splattering with a brush. Music plays
with conceptions of time in the performer and the audience. Artists accept neither the regu-
larity of time nor the desirability of the standard clock, preferring to challenge accepted
notions of time. Invoking multiple conceptions of time can create an out-of-synch-ness
among composer, performer and audience – a situation of conflict to be resolved and an
opportunity for new ideas to emerge. This is the role of the arts in society (Richards 2010).
SOC deals explicitly with the choice of clocks, placing responsibility for the consequences
on the observer/listener.

Recursion
7. Cybernetics deals with recursive processes and closure in the dynamics of opera-
tions of systems, rather than with the whole systems and open systems approaches more
common in the sciences and humanities. SOC suggests that focusing on the dynamics of
operations of systems – patterns of changes – can throw light on the human predicament
in ways no current science does, but that it does so by including the observer/listener, and
their selection of (a) clock(s), in the system of interest.

Conversation
8. Cybernetics is enacted in conversation: a particular dynamics of interaction in a
language such that the dynamics moves from an asynchronicity (a friction, conflict, contra-
diction, disagreement, being on a different plane, being out of synch) towards synchronic-
ity (including agreement or agreement to disagree). This dynamics is the realm of SOC.
9. I have often talked of the cybernetician as a craftsperson in and with time (Richards
2016). All artists manipulate time; the cybernetician does so thoughtfully and deliberately.
For scientists to deviate from the standard clock in their research would be to insert, de-
liberately, the observer and the observer’s desires into the system being observed. This
would be a new science, one where the theatre and other arts could become a playground
for research. At present, this conception of science is so far removed from what is accepted
that it makes little sense to push the SOC agenda onto it. SOC will become appreciated by
the desirability of the consequences realized when people employ this way of thinking –
namely, a reduction or elimination of violence. I use the word “violence” to speak of any
action that reduces the participation of some by eliminating their choices and alternatives.
I regard the reduction or elimination of violence as a consequence most of humanity (even
if not all) could agree on as desirable and therefore what experiments with SOC need to
demonstrate. The theatre is a place to practice and hone this craft.
10. I would also like to make the case that SOC implies an approach to experimenta-
tion with language that is different from traditional approaches. Specifically, treating signs
and symbols as fundamental units of analysis in the study of language, as in semiotic re-
search, does not recognize them as objects generated by the very language being studied.
SOC recognizes languaging as a process (the coordination of the coordination of action),
with the language produced then serving as a medium through which the dynamics of a
conversation can happen. If there is to be a unit of analysis in SOC experimentation, it

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should be the entire conversation. In theatre, the conversations could be those that actors or
directors have with themselves – namely, those that generate thinking; those that occur on
stage as modulated by a script or score; those between actors and between the actors and
director in preparation of a performance; and those between actors/directors and audience,
or between audience members, or between audience members and others not in attendance.
In all cases, the opportunity is to play with the dynamics of interactions and relations.
Characteristics to observe include amplitude, speed, frequency, rhythm, emphasis, pivots,
events and, of course, synchronicities and asynchronicities, among others – anything that
would distinguish a pattern of dynamics.
11. In conclusion, Scholte lays out for us a challenge: let us advance SOC by doing it.
Our ability to generate significance through scientific experiments on minds, societies and
the world in general is limited by current conventions and resources and complicated by
constant change in conditions, factors and desires. The theatre (and all the arts) offers the
opportunity to create micro-worlds where these complications can be accounted for and
experimented with, without the same constraints of convention and resources that limit
the traditional sciences. Current best available knowledge can be applied and the artist’s
skills brought to bear on the creation of a performance, while also applying the craft of the
cybernetician. The results will speak for themselves. I look forward to hearing about the
experiments, if not participating in them.

Author’s Response:
“Playing With Dynamics”: Procedures and
Possibilities for a Theatre of Cybernetics
Tom Scholte

1. I must begin this response with an expression of deep and sincere gratitude to the
eight authors of the open peer commentaries and to the editors of this journal for facilitat-
ing their rich contributions to this project. The questions and comments they have provided
have not only helped clarify my reflections on the work as it has proceeded thus far but
have also played a pivotal role in inspiring and orienting its direction moving forward. My
response will be organized along these two thematic lines under the categories “proce-
dures” and “possibilities.” In the context of this response, the term “procedures” is meant
to denote both the particular research protocols queried by Bruce Clarke & Dorothy
Chansky and the embodied cognitive operations of actors and audiences interrogated by
Edgar Landgraf and Bernd Porr. Possibilities will reflect upon Larry Richards’s and
Ben Sweeting’s suggestions for future directions of the overall project as well as Lowell
Christy’s endorsement of, and Albert Müller’s objections to, its conceptual foundations.

Procedures
2. Clarke & Chansky’s request for clarification regarding the research protocols em-
ployed in the experiment described in §20 of the target article is well-grounded given the
significant potential ramifications of the details in question. To clarify, the description of

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the two sets of performances (autopoietic and allopoietic) in §5 of their commentary is,
indeed, accurate. The term “invite” in both instances refers to an invitation to “random
people to show up” (ibid.) to a single performance put out through the social media outlets
of the Theatre and Film and Psychology Departments at UBC as well as personal invites
from the investigators (Alan Kingstone and myself) and actors. Suspecting that the social
media invitations were most likely to solicit the participation of university students, the
personal invitations (targeted toward non-theatre specialists) were intended to introduce
some diversity into our subject pool. Admittedly, the majority who attended would still fall
within the categories of the WEIRD acronym (§6). They are also assumed to be relatively
interchangeable in their competency as spectators of naturalistic/realistic theatre given its
position of dominance within the field and the ubiquity of its modes of actor performance
across the adjacent fields of film and television. As the authors indicate, more experimental
aesthetic modes would likely introduce new potentially confounding influences (§7) but
this was not a concern in this instance.
3. As a description of the cognitive operations underpinning the kind of everyday
social behavior that naturalistic theatre seeks to simulate, Porr’s insistence on the ap-
propriateness of forward modeling and open control loops provides a welcome conceptual
refinement that is entirely compatible with the Stanislavskian notions outlined in the target
article. Indeed, many moments of heightened drama occur precisely when the forward
model that a character is depending on is perturbed and “these forward models fail […] and
the feedback loops need to kick in” (§4). Furthermore, as referenced previously in Scholte
(2015), Stanislavskian teacher/practitioner Uta Hagen tells us that, in life, while “[w]e
never know what the next moment will be […] we always have expectations about it.” “Ut-
ter spontaneity” onstage becomes possible when the actor can learn to “suspend knowledge
of what [is] to come by unearthing the character’s expectations” and let those expectations
collide with what actually takes place “in the moment” (Hagen & Frankel 1991: 128). The
forward model/open loop conception of the character’s operations also seems compatible
with an earlier cybernetic conception that proved useful in rehearsals for our experimental
production of Salt-Water Moon: Warren McCulloch’s postulated “redundancy of potential
command” summarized by Gordon Pask as describing a set of “goal-directed subsystems”
that “compete for dominance” with the command position “shift[ing] from time to time in a
way that favors the subsystem currently in possession of the most relevant information […]
from the environment (or from the aggregate of subsystems, or both)” (Pask 2011: 528).
4. Extending Porr’s cocktail party scenario, an individual in attendance in order to
seek a potential mate can fairly effortlessly engage in small talk relying on open loop
forward models while the “search for mate” subsystem is highly attentive to feedback as
he or she surreptitiously scans the room for potential candidates. In this sense, the subsys-
tem currently in command may be engaged in a closed loop while the other subsystems
necessary to continue to function successfully in the environment can “get by” on open
loop forward models. That is, until the individual distractedly commits a conversational
faux-pas and their partner responds in a perturbing fashion. At that moment, the “social
damage control” subsystem will seize control, temporarily overriding the forward model of
the conversational partner and closing the loop until the situation is satisfactorily stabilized
and “search for mate” can resume the command position. Again, such moments are often
the stuff of drama; or perhaps, more often, comedy.
5. Regarding the film-based improvisational processes referred to by Porr (§9), both
varieties have played a major role in my own artistic practice as I have been an actor/co-

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creator on three feature films developed in the mode of Mike Leigh (Dirty, 1998; Last Wed-
ding, 2001; Crime, 2007) and a trilogy of films that, like Victoria, were entirely improvised
based on objectives and given circumstances in a collaboratively developed treatment
(Mothers&Daughters, 2008; Fathers&Sons, 2010; Sisters&Brothers, 2011). However,
with a focus on circular causal interactions and increased observer agency for the audience,
the level of directorial/editorial control in terms of shot selection, pacing, rhythm, size, etc.
and the linearity of traditional editing strategies, I have not found the medium of film to be
as fruitful an arena for the type of investigation I am carrying out as live theatre. Of course,
it is possible to push against predominant, mainstream cinematic techniques and provide
more room for the elements in which I am interested within the filmic medium, and it
may yet find its way into this program of research. Certainly, improvisationally-generated
films manifest performance modalities that are markedly different from traditional author-
centred works and, like Porr, I would attribute this difference to the wider margins within
which cybernetic self-organization can take place facilitated by these processes.
6. Landgraf’s incisive problematization of our notion of naturalness resonates pro-
ductively with Porr’s observation that “improvisation imitates everyday double contin-
gency reduction and acts as a convincing demonstrator/simulator of how everyday com-
munication emerges” (§8). In this vein, Landgraf’s previous deployment of the manner in
which Judith Butler “draws on the concept of improvisation to describe a person’s practice
of enacting his or her identity in terms of a complex interaction between individual doing
and societal constraint” (Butler 2004: 16) in the monograph to which he refers (§2) pro-
vides a useful lens through which to view the “simulation” of the “everyday” that a second-
order cybernetic conception of the naturalistic theatre might illuminate. In interrogating
cultural norms around gender, Butler describes the manner in which women are expected
to make manifest behaviorally a socially constructed model of sanctioned femininity as an
“improvised performance in a scene of constraint” (Butler 2004: 1). While I do not wish to
diminish, in any way, the depth, power, and specificity of the manner in which such mecha-
nisms impact and oppress women in particular, I agree with what I take to be Landgraf’s
suggestion that the notion of “improvised performance in a scene of constraint” can be
usefully extended to describe the inherent performativity of all manner of social identity ly-
ing, mostly unconsciously, at the center of our daily living. Landgraf tells us that Butler’s
vision of the highly circumscribed agency emerging when “individual ‘doing’ intersects
with the particular social constraints it engages”:
[R]everses the causal link between doer and deed, giving primacy to the ‘doing’ rather than
the doer. She asks us to conceive of agency (or, more precisely, of the mere appearance of
agency) as the result, not the source, of a continued, improvised practice. In this regard,
improvisation’s object of invention – the ‘thing’ created – is the improviser herself; for
Butler, improvisation marks the simultaneous composition and performance of the ‘doer’.
(Landgraf 2011: 18)

7. The creation of “character” by an actor in the Stanislavskian mode is no different.

This is why actors training in this tradition are constantly urged to let go of any notion of
“character” as a consistent entity outside themselves that they must understand, describe,
and then seek to recreate, and rather, simply to be “themselves” inside the given circum-
stances (i.e., constraints) of the text on both the level of the societal milieu represented
by the fiction and the stylistic tendencies of the particular genre or author that shape the
text itself. There is no “character,” only a pattern of actions described by an observer as a

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“character.” (Hence my invocation of the “black box” a la Ranulph Glanville.) What has
made the Stanislavski system of acting the default “best practice” in the generation of nu-
anced and “life-like” performance is that it is these very mechanisms that lie at its heart.
That the “life” these performances are “like” reflects and conforms to social constraints
that are different, but just as constructed, as earlier historical periods is a point well taken.
This overlap between the actor’s work and the mechanics of “everyday double contingency
reduction” identified by Porr is precisely what makes the naturalistic theatre such a rich
field for second-order observation.
8. Landgraf critiques Søren Brier’s commitment to softening the constructivist
stance somewhat by embracing the “notion of reality that is thought to exist – and exist
with definable qualities – independent of its (semiotic re)construction by an observer” (§6).
Nevertheless, I remain sympathetic to Brier’s position and persuaded by his argument that,
without some degree of external invariance, the generation of an eigen-object would not
be possible (Brier 2008: 105). It is enough to acknowledge that our access to this external
environment is indirect and our descriptions of it the inferential constructions of closed
systems. Even Ernst von Glasersfeld himself comes close to admitting as much when he
speaks of the “obstacles” and “constraints” within our environment with which we “clash”
even if this does not tell us “what the obstacles are or how a reality consisting of them
might be structured” (Glasersfeld 1995: 73, italics in original). My embrace of Brier’s soft-
er position does not represent a capitulation to the tendency in the contemporary humani-
ties, rightly identified by Landgraf, to embrace embodiment as a “foundational” position
from which to fend off constructivist skepticism of various stripes. At the very heart of my
proposal is the intention to interrogate the manner in which the eigenbehaviors Landgraf
eloquently describes as “stability that on the level of interaction between nervous system
and psychic system is the result of long term, evolutionary processes” (§8) are hijacked
and repurposed to serve hegemonic power structures that rely, largely, on the symbolic
arsenal within the system of communication. Even though, as Landgraf points out by way
of Niklas Luhmann, “[a]nything we observe […] will have to draw on the operations of
the system of communication to do so” (§7) Luhmann is also open to the idea that systems
theoretic functional analysis
can clarify ‘latent’ structures and functions – that is, it can deal with relations that are not
visible to the object system and perhaps cannot be made visible because the latency itself
has a function. (Luhmann 1995: 56)

Luhmann goes on to point out that “[t]he more starkly a system is hierarchized, the more
clearly do forms whose latent function is to protect hierarchy’s need for latency stand out”
and that
[c]onsciousness can undermine social latencies when it forces communication, and com-
munication can sabotage psychic latencies, especially in the form of communication of a
person who is defined as seeking to protect and conceal personal latencies. (ibid: 336f)

(Perhaps this is the manner in which systems boundaries are “turned inside out” in the
passage from Louis Kauffman cited by Christy in §11). I count the undermining of such
latencies among the cybersemiotic theatre’s possibilities and certainly among the desires
I have for its use.

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Possibilities
9. While I have great respect for Müller as an esteemed historian and theorist of cy-
bernetics, I fear that, in this instance, he has completely misconstrued my main arguments.
At no point in the target article or in the previous one that he mentions (Scholte 2015) do
I make the claim that Stanislavski could have been influenced by cybernetics. When one
looks at the dates of the two bodies of theory in question, as Müller has done, it is obvi-
ously a question of basic mathematics. Neither do I suggest that the early cyberneticians
were influenced by Stanislavski. As Sweeting cogently observes,
the connections that [I have] developed between the two fields are significant for being not
ones of application but, rather, overlap, where cybernetic processes are seen to be being
enacted within an already established set of practices. (§1)

That Stanislavski’s independently and previously developed theory of human behavior,

completely absent the influence of what would become cybernetics, could so closely mir-
ror the latter is precisely the point. As to Müller’s question regarding the appropriateness
of my redeployment of Glanville’s black box as “epistemological tool” (§6), I am not sure
what kind of issue observer-dependent distinctions, beginning with the naturalist author,
through the naturalist actor and director and, finally those of “believability” and “mean-
ingfulness” indicated by audiences of naturalistic theatre, would be if not epistemological;
an issue with which the “other and older concepts” Müller suggests might “match bet-
ter” have been inadequate in coping as the target article seeks to detail. It is also not my
intention to “adopt (second-order) cybernetics in order to understand, to explain, let alone
to develop [my] conception of theatre, i.e., Stanislavski’s system” (§4) or to “replace”
Stanislavski’s original formulation with cybernetics. Rather, I am suggesting that, if the
implicit cybernetics of the naturalistic theatre (including Stanislavski’s approach to its per-
formance) is made explicit, it can facilitate new uses of the naturalistic theatre as an instru-
ment of cybernetic inquiry. But perhaps I have unwittingly created some of this confusion
regarding my intentions myself by mingling second-order cybernetics with empirical ex-
perimental psychology as it has been traditionally practiced. This is an error that might be
well avoided in light of the persuasive corrective offered by Richards and augmented by
further analysis from Sweeting.
10. Sweeting’s citation of “Pickering’s (2010) interpretation of British cybernetics as
what he refers to as ‘ontological theatre,’ where ideas are explored through their staging
in experimental devices or other forms of practice” (§4) is particularly apt vis-a-vis this
research project. The autopoietic generation of a performance score by actor/characters en-
gaging in what Stanislavski describes as goal-seeking behavior can be read as an analogue
of Ross Ashby’s multi-homeostat setup, which “stages for us a vision of the world in which
fluid and dynamic entities evolve together in a decentered fashion exploring each other’s
properties in a performative back and forth dance of agency” (Pickering 2010: 106). The
director of such a performance finds himself in a position similar to Ashby, whose
atomic knowledge of the individual components of his machines and their interconnections
[…] failed to translate into an ability to predict how aggregated assemblages of them would
perform. Ashby just had to put the units together and see what they did. (ibid: 108)

(Remembering, of course, the circumscribed nature of “agency” thematized by Butler, mir-

rored by the fact that, while unpredictable, the behaviour of the multi-homeostat setup is,

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at bottom, deterministic on a mechanical level.) Sweeting’s assertion that a cybernetic in-

vestigation of theatre might work together with related trends in cybernetic design research
in “opening up a new avenue for exploring how cybernetics may be understood in terms
of action rather than theory, and so as an active research tradition rather than one form of
worldview amongst others” (§1) takes on an increased poignancy when contextualized by
the experimental vision sketched by Richards and in conversation with Müller’s theoreti-
cal reservations.
11. Richards captures the spirit of my enterprise thus far as a proposal that “the the-
atre could provide a laboratory to experiment with ideas in SOC (second-order cybernet-
ics) as a way to add some legitimacy and demonstrate value” but questions “the prospects
for, and even the desirability of, pushing SOC into “mainstream” academia.” He suggests
instead that “SOC is distinguished by the new questions it asks, not by the answers it might
supply to current questions” and that a more “appropriate form of experimentation” for the
theatrical laboratory that I am proposing “may not be in the tradition of the scientific ex-
periment, where empirical results are used to support or oppose pre-formulated hypotheses
and theories;” but rather “in the form of ‘playing’ with the dynamics of interactions and
relations” (§2). This is an appealing and accurate description of the kind of activity I most
definitely have in mind; however, my current interest is less “in responding to questions
about systems that do not yet exist, but which might be desirable if they did exist” (ibid)
than it is in shedding light on pathologies in existing systems through cybernetic analysis
of the processes of their representative embodiment and observation in naturalist drama;
as well as potential pathologies in the processes themselves. (Of course, over the arc of an
extended research project, the latter may well end up facilitating the former.) This is why I
have confined my focus to more traditional theatrical forms and, thus far, not engaged with
the experimental theatre lineage of Pask referred to by Sweeting (§4), as rich and valuable
as it certainly is. Similarly, it has led me to side-step the excellent work on purely impro-
vised performance by Keith Sawyer alluded to by Landgraf although the themes emergent
across the commentaries have led me to reconsider him as an important potential source
of insight into Landgraf and Porr’s overlapping conceptions of improvised identity and
“everyday double contingency reduction” discussed above. The same could be said of the
“frame analysis” work of Erving Goffman and its foundational role in the rich literature of
symbolic interactionism. Richards’s admonishes that “SOC will become appreciated by
the desirability of the consequences realized when people employ this way of thinking”
(§9) and to just get on with “advance[ing] SOC by doing it” in “micro-worlds […] without
the same constraints of convention and resources that limit the traditional sciences” (§11).
This is a powerful and persuasive message that I am considering deeply as I ponder the
next phase of this work. Such a micro-world may indeed be a more effective venue in
which to “demonstrate the value of cybernetic thinking” while, perhaps, also avoiding
some of the philosophical features of the current project that Müller finds disconcerting.
But what might be sacrificed through disengaging with mainstream science in areas such
as psychology, with its extensive literature on areas of cognition that have long been a
part of cybernetic inquiry? Is the emergence of “a new science, one where the theatre and
other arts could become a playground for research” such a long shot (Richards §9) that
we should embrace and entrench our position on the margins with deliberate purpose? Per-
haps. But another strand of cybernetics-inspired theory, touched upon by Christy, offers
a language through which a long-ago called-for but as yet undeveloped science might be
explored: Kenneth Boulding’s eiconics or science of the image.

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12. Around the middle of the last century, two books emerged from Stanford’s Cen-
ter for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences; the second, George Miller, Eugene
Galanter and Karl Pribram’s Plans and the Structure of Behavior (1960), offered as a direct
and complementary response to the first, Boulding’s The Image (1956). Boulding’s book
laid out his conception of the Image as “what [one] believe[s] to be true; [one’s] subjective
knowledge. It is this Image that largely governs [one’s] behavior” (Boulding 1956: 7f). The
Image is subject to the impact of “messages” that “consist of information in the sense that
they are structured experiences. The meaning of a message is the change which it produces
in the image” (ibid: 7, italics in original). Each individuals image is composed along the
following dimensions:
ƒƒ Spatial (location in space)
ƒƒ Temporal (the stream of time and his place in it), relational (universe as a system
of regularities)
ƒƒ Personal (individual in the midst of persons, roles, and organizations)
ƒƒ Value (scales of better or worse)
ƒƒ Affectional/emotional (various items imbued with feeling or affect)
ƒƒ Division of conscious/unconscious/subconscious, certainty or uncertainty/clarity
or vagueness, reality or unreality (degree of correspondence between image and
“outside”)
ƒƒ Public/private scale (degree shared by others) (ibid: 47).
The role of “value” as well as “fact” in this subjective knowledge structure is critical.:
At the gate of the image stands the value system demanding payment. This is as true of sen-
sory messages as it is of symbolic messages. We now know that what used to be regarded
as primary sense data are in fact highly learned interpretations. We see the world the way
we see it because it pays us and has paid us to see it that way. (ibid: 50)

13. Miller, Galanter, and Pribram pick up this conceptual thread and offer their notion
of a “plan” as “any hierarchical process in the organism that can control the order in which
a sequence of operations is to be performed” and link them to Boulding’s Image in the fol-
lowing reciprocal manner.
Changes in the Images can be effected only by executing Plans for gathering, storing, or
transforming information. Changes in the Plans can be effected only by information drawn
from the Images. (Miller, Galanter & Pribram 1960: 18)

14. Before concluding his book, Boulding calls “half tongue in cheek” for the found-
ing of a new science he dubs “eiconics” to study “the formation of images, the impact of
messages, and the consequences of images for behaviour” (Boulding 1956: 172). Such a
science would be intrinsically designed to operate on a second-order level of analysis as
“[w]e can examine consistency, coherence, survival value, stability, and organizing power
in the image, because the image can investigate the image” (ibid: 174). If “a new science”
in which “the theatre and other arts could become a playground for research” is to coalesce,
the framework of eiconics developed over these two books might be a place from which
to begin. Why Boulding chose a stance of only half-seriousness to float this conception
can, of course, only be a matter of speculation. My guess is that it served as a pre-emptive
defensive maneuver by a man who knew only too well how both radical and unformed his
thinking was in this particular instance and who feared the derisive scorn of the mainstream

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academics with which he was more regularly in contact. Moving towards this endeavor
from a position of artistic practice rather than economics, I consider myself fortunately less
vulnerable to the kind of professional price Boulding might have been asked to pay and
am unashamed in suggesting that we take up his proposal in earnest. (In fact, the authors
of the second volume acknowledged that, traditionally, artists were the ones best equipped
to carry out such a project (Miller Galanter & Pribram 1960: 214). The expansive vision
in which this proposal is enveloped is articulately captured in Christy’s commentary and
I can add little to it other than my humility in the face of its vast aspirations. Whether this
new field would retain the identifier of “science” or, as Boulding suggested was likely, opt
for the descriptor “discipline” (Boulding 1956: 160–163) depends largely on the kinds of
considerations raised by Richards. His idea that a cybersemiotic theatre laboratory that
featured “the scheduling of a performance as an event among other events” (§2) might best
facilitate fruitful experimentation is a practical suggestion worth considering. An event de-
signed to “demonstrate the value of second-order cybernetic thinking” is likely to resemble
something quite different from a typical evening at the theatre and may well benefit from
built-in para-theatrical components to facilitate the type of second-order reflection desired.
The development of such new paradigms is likely to require a Stafford-Beer-sized imagi-
nation. It is this reflection that brings me to my concluding thoughts.
15. In closing, I would like to address Müller’s suggestion that my project demon-
strates a lack of “intellectual economy” and that, perhaps, I have been seduced by the
beauty of a theory that does not survive Occam’s Razor when applied in the manner that
I am suggesting (§§4, 6) My response takes the form of two questions that I have found
myself asking. What was the coalescence of cybernetics itself if not an exercise in stretch-
ing descriptions across domains and testing their elasticity, perhaps to the breaking point?
And how has the field continued to grow and renew itself if not for the further stretching
of “beautiful theories” beyond the margins of Occam’s Razor from Stafford Beer’s claim
that an organization the size of a national government could be modeled upon the human
nervous system to Luhmann’s endlessly controversial extension of the theory of autopoi-
esis into the realm of social systems to the audacity of Glanville’s claim that science itself
is in fact a restricted subset of design that is, in turn, the embodiment of cybernetics? It no
way is my intent to place myself, and my endeavor, on the same level as these giants of
our field. It is, rather, to point out that if my proposal entails some rather radical, perhaps
questionable, extensions of existing concepts, it is largely because I have been so pro-
foundly inspired by the daring cyberneticians of the past, who have cleared the intellectual
space for entirely new forms of thinking. Certainly, this flair for theoretical eccentricity
has fueled the recurrent accusation that cybernetics is not a genuine science but rather an
elaborate system of analogies (Medina 2011: 11); but, perhaps, we should simply follow
Richards’s lead and happily surrender the scientific claim altogether. Either way, I am
grateful that, in spite of his misgivings about its intellectual foundation, Müller feels that
my “ongoing work could influence both theatre and research and might very well lead to
lasting changes in concepts and theories as well” and that he “shall remain curious” (§7).
To some, Beer’s Cybersyn project might stand as a singularly spectacular quixotic failure.
And yet many continue to sift through the detritus of its collapse for lessons that might still
serve us well. In this spirit, I will endeavor to follow the admonition borrowed by Ranulph
Glanville from Samuel Beckett: Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better.

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 Remarks of a Philosopher
of Mathematics and Science
Michèle Friend

Structural style
1. In the target article, Louis Kauffman discusses the notion of an eigenform. In tech-
nical mathematical terms: this is a fixed point for a transformation. In very general and
woolly terms, it is a reflexive stability that is reached while something is still changing or
moving. The image of a spinning top, before it destabilizes and collapses, can be counted
as an image of an eigenform. There is movement (transformation) but also a fixed point
(the material top, the axis of rotation and place on the surface of that rotation). The top
turns upon itself. It is in this sense reflexive. The rate of spin changes as it dissipates
energy. In this sense the “spinning top” (not just the material top at rest) but the top in its
spinning state is affected by its own spin. It is, after all, like all material things, subject to
the second law of thermodynamics. The energy transmitted to it, by the initial rotation of
fingers that set it off, is dissipated in the movement.
2. Eigenforms are relative stabilities, or meta-stabilities, stabilities in motion, but
more than that they affect, and draw on, the world around them. We are affected when we
watch the spinning top, the physical world is affected since tops make a little noise and
they affect small air currents. They draw on the world around them through their design,
the aerodynamic, material and balancing properties, these are “put into” the top in its con-
struction. The spin of the fingers that set it off transmits energy to the top, which is then
dissipated in the motion.
3. The structural style of Kauffman’s article is itself an eigenform. In the course of the
article, Kauffman elegantly spins the ideas about themselves, widening the scope, or going
into greater detail, returning to the main theme without repeating himself. The ideas de-
velop in this reflexive circulating manner, and by the end of the article, we are affected by
the information, and begin to recognize eigenforms and fixed points around us. We see the
world differently. As people read the article, as commentators comment on it, the second-
order properties of the eigenform manifest themselves. The recognition of the structure of
eigenforms in objects and processes is part of cybernetics. When we reflect upon, or are
affected by, such recognition, we move to the meta-level or the second-order level. This
reflection iterates – we reflect upon the reflection itself, and it is we who do this, so the
reflection is reflexive but transforming at the same time; we become incorporated into the

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second-order eigenform of the style of the article. We in turn affect other people around
us, maybe speaking to them a little differently since our repertoire of concepts has been
widened, having been changed ever so slightly by the reading of the article, etc. This wider
scope of the eigenform is its third-order transformative effect.
4. I cannot do justice to Kauffman’s structural style by imitating it. I am afraid I shall
have to be quite banal in my structural style: more piecemeal, since I want to discuss two
other, quite different, themes: objectivity and sustainability.

Objectivity
5. In our daily lives, as we go about our routines, we have a simple account of ob-
jects and objectivity. From this perspective, there are physical objects in the world. They
are there, and most are there independent of us. We can move some of them, we can alter
them, but there are objective limitations to what we can do, since the objects have objective
properties that we only rarely alter. The simple conception of objectivity is fine, since it is
sufficient for us to navigate the world with some local success. We avoid bumping into hard
objects, move out of the way of hard objects that are on a collision course with us, we can
pick out groceries, we can estimate how much food to buy, we can put on our clothes fairly
well in the morning and take them off at night. Each of these activities involves objects
that we can move and alter. If we are interested in the survival of an individual person in
the “modern” world, we can safely say that we bump around in the world fairly well. We
do this because we can distinguish objects and their properties: hardness, nutritional value,
the fit of an item of clothing (we do not wrap a scarf around our foot or try to stuff a sock
into our ear). There are objective properties of objects in the world. If we get them wrong,
the results can be fatal. Objectivity in this mundane sense is not all that mysterious, and the
sense of objectivity is reinforced by our experience in the mundane world.
6. The mundane world, with its medium-sized dry goods and objective properties
and relations is left behind in the outer reaches of mathematics and science. There, as we
study increasingly complex systems, as we look at the very small, or at the very large, the
objects and objectivity of mathematics and science become less tangible and more ethereal.
In mathematics and science, the notion of “objectivity” is not as simple as many people
suspect.
7. In mathematics we study infinite sets, and various infinite numbers; we study infini-
tesimals, irrational numbers, lowest upper bounds, self-referring systems, paradoxes and
the formal relationship between formal mathematical theories that contradict one another.
As we learn about the outer reaches of mathematics, we learn that mathematics, as a dis-
cipline, cannot be unified by one mathematical theory. There is no unique and consistent
foundation for the whole of mathematics, at least at the present state of play in the disci-
pline.
8. From the perspective of the mundane world that we navigate, this is cause for
alarm. We expect to be able to transfer our experience of the everyday to the world of
mathematics. We expect objects in mathematics to have properties and assume that these
objects and properties are objective. There is an immovable, hard quality to them (“immov-
able” and “hard” are metaphors transferred from the world of medium-sized dry goods).
The object “8” might not be a physical object, but it is objective in the sense that we can-
not make up its properties. It does not change its properties, or so we think. The notion of

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objectivity in mathematics starts to lose its grip when we think of mathematical properties
that are true of an object in one theory but false of the “same” object in another theory.
Even the innocent number 8 fails to have objective properties, tout court. What it does have
are objective properties relative to, i.e., that change with, the theory one is working in. For
example, the number 8 has an immediate successor if our domain is the natural numbers,
but it does not have one if our domain is the real numbers. The context, or theory, changes
the properties of “the” object 8.
9. From the cybernetics perspective, especially the second-order perspective, this is
not cause for alarm. The “same” number 8 in the set of natural numbers closely resembles
the number 8 in the set of reals. This is because the two 8s share many properties. They are
both smaller numbers than 9, for example. Thus, objectivity is a metaphysical feature only
found at a higher level of discussion, when we can discuss the object and its context, that
is, within a theory. Moreover, we can shift from one theory to another, using a translation,
knowing that we lose information in translation. 8 is not an object of mathematics in the
sense of one stable well-defined entity such as “the moon.” It is an eigenform in math-
ematics. “It” changes with mathematical theory development. “It” is defined differently
in different mathematical theories, but there is still a recognizable “it” sitting relatively
stable through the shifts in theory and perspective. This second-order notion of objectiv-
ity is conceptually rich and fruitful. It bears further development and exploration, and I
encourage such development. The second-order notion of objectivity can also be found in
the “hard” sciences.
10. In the “hard” sciences, the reproducibility of experiments is an indicator of objec-
tivity. As Kauffman writes: “It is the repeatability that makes a successful experiment into
an eigenform” (§59). The repeatability tells us that the result is robust or stable within the
parameters of what is to count as “similar” experimental conditions. Water boils at 100 de-
grees centigrade, provided it is sufficiently pure, one is close to zero altitude, the pressure
of the air is similar to that which we have on earth, and so on. “Water boils at 100 degrees
centigrade” is relatively objective. It is a relatively stable fact. The stability and objectiv-
ity depend on, and vary with, the context, what is usually thought of as the experimental
conditions. But it is richer than that.
11. The context not only includes the physical experimental conditions, but it also
depends on our language and our theory. These in turn, depend on the underlying meta-
physics (water is a compound substance), the mathematics we choose for our theory and
the underlying logic of that mathematics and language. None of these is untouched, pure,
independent of the other or independent of us. They are not simply objective. They feed
off each other, inform each other, change each other with new discoveries and knowledge
and with new participants in the theory, language, logic, and so on. Together, as a package,
they have their second-order, or third-order, eigenforms. The eigenforms give us enough
stability that we can do science, but when things become complicated, and we are surprised
or puzzled, turning to the second- and third-order questions becomes important. The im-
portance is more immediate in the “softer” sciences, where we are dealing with complex
issues that are not as stable.
12. Kauffman’s notion of eigenform as a mark of objectivity in mathematics and sci-
ence is refreshing, and frees us from many sterile philosophical conundrums about identity
conditions on objects, about the role of an observer, about knowing the truth of a theorem.
I shall not give examples here. But in all of these areas of philosophical enquiry, the notion
of eigenform can give us new insights.

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Sustainability
13. “Sustainability” is a word that has come into vogue, but it is poorly defined if
defined at all. Here is my suggestion for extending Kauffman’s ideas, this time on the more
political and cultural stage. We should look for the eigenforms of “sustainability.” What
would these look like? Why do I use the plural?
14. The word “sustainability” contains “sustain.” “Sustain” suggests stability. But it
is a stability in motion. It includes internal change, but change within stable parameters, on
a first reading. It is also an “ability” that is, a potential, or a predisposition. With “sustain-
ability” we want to preserve the ability of something or the ability to do something.
15. Here are two different conceptions of sustainability. We shall develop a more
interesting third conception after exploiting the notion of eigenform. We might want to
sustain the current state of affairs, what is commonly referred to as “business as usual.”
In this case, our economic, political and infrastructural institutions are sustainable in the
very simple sense that we do not have to do anything. By leaving the institutions alone,
and letting them change in the ways they have been changing, we sustain business as usual,
and we might be tempted to think that this is almost by definition “sustainable.” Here is
why: what people usually mean when they favour “business as usual” is that they do not
want government interference. They do not want a particular type of institution (such as a
government or international agreement) to influence other institutions such as businesses
or trade. Thus, to sustain the business-as-usual practice, to ensure that it is sustained, we
need to do nothing new. Do nothing, and we sustain business as usual by definition. How-
ever, things are not so easy. There is a subtlety. Government institutions change, and this
is also “usual.” Thus, to properly sustain the business as usual model, we have to be clear
about what counts as usual and what counts as unusual. In fact, we need to ensure against
a government, or higher institution, interfering in business at a lower level. The problem
with this conception of sustainability will not only come from government and interna-
tional agreements.
16. Scientists tell us that this conception of sustainability is impossible in the long
run, or that it is unwise, imprudent or immoral. Why? There are physical, biological and
environmental limitations that we either have already passed or are about to reach. We live
on a finite planet, with a finite amount of fertile land, a finite amount of ocean and a finite
amount of biomass that cycles carbon into oxygen. Competing for these resources, aggra-
vated by population growth, becomes increasingly costly (which is why it is an unwise and
imprudent conception), and the competition will become ferocious, harming many people;
hence the imprudence is immoral.
17. Of course, the situation is more complex than what I have described, thus, it re-
quires more sophisticated conceptual tools to analyse. There are rates of replenishment of
resources. A farmer can add more fertilizer, but the crops will still only grow at a certain
rate. There are limits to the speed-up of plant growth through irrigation, genetic alteration,
adding fertilizer, and so on. Carbon is converted into oxygen at a rate. Aquafer levels are
replenished at a rate. Fossil fuels and coal are produced in the earth at a rate. When the rate
of consumption of these resources and services (creating oxygen) is greater than the rate of
replenishment, we are living unsustainably in a more scientific sense.
18. We have two eigenforms corresponding to the two conceptions of sustainability.
One takes as its reflexive domain society and the economy within the context of neo-clas-
sical economic thinking. Neo-classical thinking is the fixed point allowing the transforma-

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tion of business, society and politics. The second conception widens the reflexive domain
to include the natural world as we know about it through science. It is us, in the world,
shaping and changing the world that together have an eigenform. The relationship between
us and the environment, the sustaining of our life by, and within the natural environment
is the fixed point. The transformation is the cyclical nature of the seasons and replenish-
ment of resources at, or above, the rate of consumption. That is how we live, or fail to live,
sustainably under the second conception.
19. The first conception is first-order. We hardly perceive, or are not aware of, the con-
text. We take neo-classical economics for granted and refuse to think of alternatives. The
second conception is second-order. We have more obvious reflexivity, we are interested in
a relationship between us and something else, we recognize that we influence the natural
environment, and it influences us. Living in harmony with it is what affords stability to the
whole system. This is the second eigenform of sustainability. This second form is unac-
ceptable in the “more advanced” cultures.
20. Here is a third conception that is third-order. Today, only quite “primitive,” “in-
digenous,” “very poor” (living below the poverty line) or a few isolated commune cultures
live sustainably under the second conception. Mankind lived in such a state, arguably, up
to the industrial revolution. After that, we started to live unsustainably, according to the
second conception. Those of us who enjoy the riches of the industrial revolution are often
unwilling to give up those riches. The third conception, due to Kozo Mayumi, is that we
should decide on a culturally acceptable rate of entropy production per rate of consump-
tion.
21. That is, we accept that we are not living sustainably as per the second conception.
We also recognise the science that warns us that we cannot live sustainably as per the first
conception. We recognise, with the scientists, that we create entropy. That is, we use up
resources at a rate that is greater than the rate of replenishment. Different cultures have
different expectations about material and energy consumption. Each culture can make a
prima facie decision independently of other cultures at what rate (above the rate of replen-
ishment) they are willing to use up the resources.
22. Of course, we are talking of reflexive domains. The rates decided upon have their
own momentum and direction. But cultures are rarely isolated. We influence one another.
We exchange information. We try different lifestyles or read and hear about them. Thus,
what is an acceptable rate of entropy production per unit of consumption has its own (meta-)
rate of change. This is a third-order eigenform. The rate of entropy production per rate of
consumption is the fixed point. The culture is the transformation. We have a new concep-
tion of sustainability that is quite abstract, and has the structure of an eigenform, and thus
can be mathematically represented, and reasoned over rigorously, up to the standards of
our best mathematics. As a culture seeking sustainability, we are after this third-order ei-
genform. We seek to sustain a rate of depletion because it is worthwhile. It is deemed to be
worthwhile when we consciously allow ourselves to consume a certain amount of material
and energy that will not be replenished. I think that awareness of this third level eigenform
will help us understand what is at stake if we want to live “sustainably.”

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Conclusion
23. The conception of eigenform developed in an eigenform structural style by Kauff-
man has rich conceptual possibilities. It is another way of seeing things.
24. When dealing with complex questions, it is usually beneficial to spend time look-
ing at the question from several perspectives. We find several different-looking solutions,
and we are then faced with the also complicated task of making sense of the differences.
This is all in the nature of enquiry into complex issues.
25. The notion of objectivity in mathematics and science, and the problem of defining
and agreeing upon a notion of sustainability are examples of problems that benefit from
the perspective suggested by Kauffman. Reading the article already starts us on the path
of recognizing eigenforms around us. We then move on to develop our own, to bring the
concepts to bear on other areas of enquiry. We form a community of people who share this
perspective, and develop it further, creating our own eigenform of eigenforms.

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 The Past and the Future
of Second-Order Cybernetics
Ronald R. Kline

1. I would like to thank the editors for the opportunity to comment on the fivefold re-
search agenda for second-order cybernetics that is laid out in the special issue on “Second-
Order Cybernetics” of Constructivist Foundations for July 2016, see http://constructivist.
info/11/3.
2. As a historian of science and technology, I am struck by the role of the past in
this book. History is important to the editors, Karl Müller and Alexander Riegler, and to
the generation of scholars who studied under the founders of second-order cybernetics in
the mid-1970s (Stuart Umpleby and Robert Martin, who did their PhDs with Heinz von
Foerster at the University of Illinois; and Bernard Scott who did his with Gordon Pask at
Brunel University). This is not surprising because they have all written participant histories
of the field (Müller & Müller 2007; Umpleby 2003, 2005, 2007; Martin 2007; Scott 2004).
But several members of the next generation also pay attention to history. These include
Ben Sweeting, who did his PhD with Ranulph Glanville, a student of von Foerster and
Pask, as well as scholars who do not have this academic lineage. The past is a resource for
developing and critiquing the fivefold research agenda in the editorial, target articles, and
commentaries.
3. At the very start of this volume, the editors employ their interpretation of how
Robert Martin and I independently portray the history of second-order cybernetics (Martin
2015; Kline 2015) to construct the “Kline-Martin-Hypothesis,” which states
As a research program, second-order cybernetics was
a. insufficiently developed,
b. has had no sustainable consequences for other scientific disciplines in the past, and
c. will remain mostly irrelevant in the future as well.

4. In regard to my work, they say I claim “that the move from first-order to second-
order cybernetics was a dead end that did not produce long-lasting impacts for other dis-
ciplines. As such, it did not leave any significant traces” (Müller & Riegler 2016: §1). At
the end of the editorial, which analyzes research in second-order cybernetics, Müller and
Riegler confirm parts (a) and (b) of the hypothesis, reject part (c), and describe an innova-
tive research agenda to promote the future of the field.
5. I am honored that the editors have attached my name to an hypothesis about sec-
ond-order cybernetics. Nonetheless, I disagree with their interpretation of how I treated
their field in my book, The Cybernetics Moment. In regard to part (a) of the hypothesis, I

333

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did not comment on whether or not second-order cybernetics was sufficiently developed
as a research program. I did quote Francisco Varela as saying in 1981 that von Foerster’s
framework for understanding cognition was “not so much a fully completed edifice, but
rather a clearly shaped space, where the major building lines are established and its access
clearly indicated” (Varela 1981: xi; Kline 2015: 197). But I also said the “work that [Hum-
berto] Maturana and Varela had done to erect and fill-in that edifice became more widely
known when they published Autopoiesis and Cognition” in 1980 (Kline 2015: 197). In
regard to part (b), I said that second-order cybernetics was, at the time the book was pub-
lished, a marginal field in the US with an institutional home in the American Society for
Cybernetics and in the journal Cybernetics & Human Knowing, which partially supports
that part of the hypothesis. But I also said that second-order cybernetics was “fruitful” in
the US and Europe among several social scientists. I noted that it had more success in Eu-
rope through the work of sociologist Niklas Luhmann and in the area of socio-cybernetics
(Kline 2015: 4f, 199, 201, 242f). In regard to part (c), I did not speculate on the future of
second-order cybernetics.
6. Nevertheless, I can understand why the editors thought I had implied that second-
order cybernetics was a “dead end.” I argued that its emergence in the mid-1970s was one
of two reinventions of cybernetics that occurred at the end of what I call the “cybernetics
moment” in the US. I defined the end of that moment as the time when cybernetics was dis-
credited among scientists (mainly because of its association with Soviet communism and
so-called fringe groups such as dianetics), when it lost its status as a promising universal
science, and when it lost institutional support from MIT and the University of Illinois. I
argued that cybernetics emerged from that crisis by being reinvented as a science of social
systems in its first-order form, and as second-order cybernetics (Kline 2015: chap. 7). To
me, the marginality of both first-order and second-order cybernetics in the early 21st cen-
tury did not signal a “dead end” for either one of those fields.
7. The past does a lot of work for Müller and Riegler. They use their interpretation
of the past to construct parts (a) and (b) of the Kline-Martin-Hypothesis, from which they
infer part (c). Then they test the hypothesis against research in second-order cybernetics
to specify a new research agenda for the field. In that analysis, the past sanctions their
two-part definition of second-order cybernetics: SOCE or cybernetics in the endo-mode;
and SOCL or cybernetics at the second-order science level. They found that “SOCE was
based on the initial definition by von Foerster as the cybernetics of observing systems”
in 1974, and that “SOCL was linked to [Margaret] Mead and her self-referential desire to
study cybernetic domains such as the American Society for Cybernetics with tools and
methods from cybernetics”, which she presented in a speech to the society in 1968 (Müller
& Riegler 2016: §49; Foerster 1974: 1; Mead 1968).
8. This use of history has been common in science and engineering since the profes-
sionalization of these fields in Europe and the US in the late nineteenth century. When a
new science is emerging, its promoters often write histories of their field in order to do
what sociologists of science call “boundary work.” That includes drawing closed or open
boundaries around their field in order to exclude some legacies and include others, or to
separate an emerging field from a competing one (Gieryn 1983, 1999).
9. Boundary work is evident in Müller and Riegler’s editorial as well as in the articles
and open-peer commentaries that follow it. I will discuss two examples that I, as an outside
observer, find instructive.

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10. The first one is the case of Luhmann, who is often cited as a prominent social
scientist who has taken up second-order cybernetics (e.g., Wolfe 1995; Hayles 1999: chap.
6; Geyer 2001). While the older generation in this book have noted Luhmann’s ties to
second-order cybernetics (e.g., Müller 2007: 411; Umpleby 2005; Scott 2004), they do
not embrace his work in the book. In their editorial, Müller and Riegler do not mention
Luhmann. Umpleby (2016: §46) cites Luhmann as an example of someone doing cyber-
netics in the “exo-mode”, i.e., not as second-order cybernetics. Scott (2016: §40) calls
Luhmann’s application of Maturana and Varela’s concept of autopoiesis “controversial.”
He describes his proposal to unify psychology through Pask’s conversation theory as an
“alternative, cybernetics-based, concept of a social system to that developed by the soci-
ologist Luhmann.” Yet, the younger generation in the book is more receptive to the grow-
ing influence of Luhmann. Two of the articles draw on Luhmann for their analysis. In her
article, Diana Gasparyan invokes his notion of autopoietic social systems to sanction her
second-order-cybernetic theory of consciousness. Tom Scholte (§34) interprets the action
in Shakespeare’s play “Hamlet” as the “self-reorganization of an autopoietic social system
(à la Luhmann) following a substantial perturbation.” In addition, the open peer commen-
taries by Marcelo Arnold-Cathalifaud and Daniela Thumala-Dockendorff, Eva Buchinger,
and Bruce Clarke and Dorothy Chansky engage with Luhmann’s voluminous writings.
11. My second case involves the sharp boundary that is usually drawn between first-
order and second-order cybernetics. The boundary is crucial to the identity of second-order
cybernetics, a taken-for-granted reality rooted in the past and often expressed as a progress
narrative (e.g., Umpleby 2016: §15). In contrast, Ben Sweeting, in his article on design
research, draws on Glanville’s interpretation of the past to argue against a progress narra-
tive and for a porous boundary between the two orders of cybernetics. Sweeting proposes
that the adjectives “‘first’ and ‘second’ should not, however, be understood as implying a
sequence or the surpassing of one by the other. Rather, SOC is specifically the application
of cybernetics to itself – ‘the cybernetics of cybernetics’”, as von Foerster titled Margaret
Mead’s (1968) paper. For Sweeting, the “terminology of ‘first’ and ‘second’ can obscure
the continuity between SOC and earlier cybernetics” (Sweeting §18). Sweeting also re-
fers to the diagrams drawn by Gregory Bateson in the interview Stewart Brand conducted
with him and Mead in 1976 to show the continuity between the two orders of cybernetics
(Sweeting 2016: §18; Brand 1976).
12. I will conclude by placing my brief account of present-day second-order cybernet-
ics in the context of the boundary work performed in a related field, information theory.
Many authoritative figures wrote “official histories” of information theory as it was being
developed. In 1953, five years after Bell Labs mathematician Claude Shannon published
“A Mathematical Theory of Communication”, his classic paper that founded the field, Co-
lin Cherry, an electrical engineer at Imperial College, London, presented a paper at the first
London Symposium on Information Theory entitled “A History of the Theory of Informa-
tion.” While Shannon had limited the genealogy of information theory to a couple of re-
searchers at Bell Labs and to Norbert Wiener at MIT, Cherry included a host of researchers
in a much longer history of communications. That inclusive boundary work comported
with the broad British interpretation of the term “information theory” (Cherry 1953; Shan-
non 1948; Kline 2004; Geoghegan 2008). In 1948, Wiener created an even smaller geneal-
ogy in his path-breaking book Cybernetics, by limiting information theory to the idea of
equating information with entropy. He claimed that it was independently developed by
statistician R. A. Fisher, Shannon, and himself (Wiener 1948: 18). As information theory

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became established as a discipline in the US in the next two decades, its promoters did
more boundary work by separating “Shannon theory” (coding) from Wiener’s “statistical
theory of communication” (prediction and filtering). Although some of this boundary work
unfairly cut Wiener out of the genealogy of “Shannon theory”, it marked off two robust
research agendas that thrived in the Institute of Radio Engineers’ Professional Group on
Information Theory and in its successor society in the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (Kline 2015: chap. 4).
13. This example shows that exclusive boundary work can help an emerging scientific
field prosper by marking off separate research agendas rather than allowing them to com-
pete for the mantle of the discipline. Of course, exclusive boundary work can also hinder
the development of an emerging field by shutting out promising lines of research.
14. I think that two trends in the present book are encouraging signs for the future
of second-order cybernetics. First, the wealth of research cited in the articles and com-
mentaries showed me that the field is in better shape than I thought it was when I wrote
Cybernetics Moment. Second, the diversity of scholarship and viewpoint that the younger
generation of scholars brought to bear on the proposed fivefold research agenda indicates
to me that the editors’ inclusive boundary work in selecting contributors for the volume
will help second-order cybernetics thrive in the future.

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Wiley and Technology Press, New York and Cambridge MA.
Wolfe C. (1995) In search of post-humanist theory: The second-order cybernetics of Maturana and
Varela. Cultural Critique 30(1): 33-70.

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 Embracing Realists Without Embracing Realism:
The Future of Second-Order Cybernetics
Robert J. Martin

Introduction
1. In 2015 I wrote an ASC column for Cybernetics and Human Knowing (Martin
2015b), hoping to open a conversation about how to reenergize second-order cybernetics
(SOC). SOC is currently working to overcome its being relegated to the sidelines of sci-
ence (a point made by Kline 2015 and Martin 2015b). I am delighted that the present book
more than fulfills my hopes for such a conversation. For this I am grateful to Alexander
Riegler and Karl Müller. However, I would point out that the Kline-Martin hypothesis
identified in their editorial is a misreading of the column I wrote. The 2015 paper does
point out that SOC has failed “to achieve wide acceptance, particularly in science” (Martin
2015b: 169) not because of any lack of value in the ideas, but because of the realist tradi-
tion and structure of science. I appreciate the efforts of Müller and Riegler to challenge
authors and readers to consider the three questions labeled the Kline-Martin hypothesis
(Müller & Riegler §1) but I must point out that the Kline-Martin hypothesis is their inven-
tion and does not reflect my views, especially as regards the value of SOC. I appreciate
their invitation to respond. I briefly summarize my arguments regarding the resistance to
change of traditional science below. The remainder of the commentary clarifies and ex-
pands my position in light of this volume.

Resistance to change
2. The Martin (2015b) article makes the point that science has been resistant to con-
sidering the change in paradigm that came about with SOC, in part because scientists have
no reason to see themselves as having problems that SOC can address. This can be attrib-
uted to three main factors:
a. Scientific disciplines have become silos that operate independently of the larger
ideas that might otherwise influence their thinking;

339

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b. In each discipline the cycles of proposal, funding, research, and publication are
profoundly conservative, inhibiting changes in paradigms that are not rooted in the
ongoing research of the discipline;
c. The structure of funding, research and publication inhibits or prevents scientists
from adopting the paradigm and tools of SOC; essentially, scientists have no rea-
son to see themselves as having problems that SOC can address.

Including realism within a constructivist approach

3. What constitutes the realism of science is that, as Louis Kauffman explains in his
target article, “Cybernetics, Reflexivity and Second-Order Science” (see especially §10),
physical science is a special case of producing theories that do not affect the phenomena
they describe or explain – and they must be so by definition. If they do not conform to this
criterion, they are not regarded as physical science. Note that the social sciences strive, but
are not able, to emulate this feat because the phenomena they describe can be affected by
the knowledge of the theories that describe and explain them. In other words, within the
context of constructivism, the realism of science can be seen as a special case.

Including constructivism within realism

4. If realism can be included within constructivism and constructivism can be (and
is) included within realism, how can this be? It is a matter of context. For example, using
Jean Piaget’s concept of adaptation through assimilation and accommodation (formalized
by Heinz von Foerster in his 2003 paper on objects as tokens for eigen-behavior), real-
ists can say that when learning has been successful, learners have constructed/invented an
understanding of science concepts that reflects an accurate understanding of the universe.
A constructivist understanding of learning science is that students must invent science
concepts through interaction with the environment (including conversation) in order to
understand science concepts accurately (Bybee & Sund 1982). This is a common paradigm
in science education in the US, but science teachers do not necessarily reject science as
a realist project; what they have learned through experience is that they cannot success-
fully teach science through lectures alone. Manipulation of objects plus reasoning through
conversation is necessary for students to construct an understanding that coincides with
accepted scientific explanations of the phenomenon.1 Teachers who consider themselves
constructivists may or may not accept that science itself is a true, accurate, and objective
representation of the world.

1. See, for example, “A Private Universe,” a film made by a Harvard University project on a con-
structivist approach to teaching an understanding of the phases of the moon and the change of
seasons on earth. The film is available from the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics at
http://www.learner.org/resources/series28.html

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Context allows pragmatic bedfellows

5. If as argued above, realism can be contained within constructivism and constructiv-
ism can be contained within realism, there can also be a third context in which realists and
constructivists can function together without difficultly. This is the context that Michael
Lissack,2 referring to Hans Vaihinger (2015), calls, “as if.” A pragmatic approach allows
both realists and constructivists to treat explanations that prove useful “as if” they were
true statements without worrying about to what extent they are true. Vaihinger showed that
any number of useful constructs can be shown to be fictions, but because of their useful-
ness, we treat them as if they were true.
6. Paring down Vaihinger, we do not need to concern ourselves with whether assump-
tions are fictions, but only whether or not the assumptions work to produce useful ideas
– useful as measured by their ability to achieve a purpose. Here we cross paths with Ernst
von Glasersfeld (1984), a parent of radical constructivism, who makes the same point in
his metaphor of a lock and the keys that open it: ideas and actions are to be measured by
whether they allow us to achieve our purpose. Just as there may be many different keys
that can open a lock, reality is a lock that can be opened with many keys – without our ever
knowing how the lock is constructed (ibid: 21). Constructivism is itself one these keys; re-
alism is another – especially the realism of science that holds that our understanding is still,
after all, only tentative and temporary; both constructivism and realism can provide ways
of dealing effectively with one’s environment; neither provides a way of understanding
things “as they are.” If this point happens to be lost on particular realists or constructivists,
it makes no difference as long as we proceed “as if” a set of assumptions or findings were
true. We stipulate that such and such is the case and we proceed to find out how far this
stipulation will take us before it breaks down. We do not need to engage in a battle between
realism and constructivism; it is sufficient that we agree that within a particular context, we
investigate how and to what extent a particular idea works.
7. Constructivist concepts/tools do work and some realists will be willing to accept
that they do work – but only within specific, limited, temporary contexts. I propose that
this is an arrangement we can live with. We can live with this arrangement for four reasons:
a. because constructivism and realism are both keys that have allowed us to make
progress in reaching various goals;
b. both can be regarded as “as if” approaches;
c. the truth of both is undecidable (using von Foerster’s concept of undecidable ques-
tions) and therefore must be decided by each individual; and
d. there is no reason to require acceptance of either realism or constructivism as a
prerequisite for working together.

2. Personal email received 14 December 2016, used with permission.

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Embracing realists without embracing realism

8. A hint as to where to go next comes from von Foerster. Rather than speaking of
constructivists and realists, von Foerster referred to inventors (those who believe the
laws of science are invented) and discoverers (those who believe the laws of science are
discovered).3 As a way of expressing the possibility of bridging the gap between construc-
tivists and realists, von Foerster, no doubt with tongue in cheek, suggested that inventors
might invent discoverers and discoverers might discover inventors. That is, constructivists
and realists might choose to work with one another. My own experience has been that most
of my colleagues are realists. Their willingness to defend their positions has helped me to
clarify my own position while also becoming convinced of the futility of trying to convince
my academic colleagues of the viability of the constructivist approach as an alternative
way of thinking. Nevertheless, as soon as we begin to discuss specific empirical research
projects, we find ourselves on common ground. From this I learn that our difficulties lie in
differences in epistemology, not at the level of accepting empirical research on perception
and cognition or of working together on how to approach problems and how to analyze
research findings – including those research findings that point to ways in which individu-
als construct/modify/filter their present experience to fit previous experience and existing
biases. In other words, for the purpose of solving many problems, there is little to prevent
cooperation between realists who accept traditional science and constructivists who wish
to incorporate traditional science into a larger framework.
9. We need to engage realists because most professionals, including scientists, are
realists and that’s where the action is. In the words of Lissack, “If we cannot find a way to
deal with…. [pragmatic] realism and with those whose worldview it comprises, we are ir-
relevant” (personal email). By pragmatic realists, Lissack means those who “believe there
is a singular truth but that we can only approximate it in our representations” (ibid). We
have an opportunity to develop more robust tools to understand, describe, and cope with
the problems faced by humanity. The commonalities between realist and constructivist
approaches make this possible. Constructivists and realists who accept traditional science
(though not necessarily the truth claims of traditional science) also accept:
a. Empirical evidence. Empirical evidence is defined in terms of observation and
experience. While constructivists maintain that experience is constructed and real-
ists, to one extent or another, believe in the possibility of representing reality, both
agree that science relies on observation and experience.
b. Temporary truth. Both realists and constructivists accept scientific findings as tem-
porary.
c. Human bias in perception. Both realists and constructivists accept social science
findings that show perception and decision-making in human beings to be biased,
often in systematic ways that cannot be easily overcome even when the perceiver
is aware that they exist. Constructivists believe that this limitation, in principle,
cannot be overcome. Realists believe that science, in principle, can overcome this
limitation, but this difference does not preclude working together.

3. This and the following sentences are based on my personal recollection of hearing von Foerster
say this a number of times during the time I took classes with him and attended conferences at
which he spoke. Unfortunately, I have not been able to find this anywhere in print.

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Concepts/tools for participant-observers

10. Just as science has accepted that “what the frog’s eye tells the frog’s brain,” is not
an objective reality but a fit between the frog and its environment, science can accept that
what the human’s perception tells the human is not an objective reality but a fit between the
human being and her environment. Going forward, what we have learned and are learning
about human perception and cognition may be moving realists toward accepting that hu-
man perception (and thinking) has systematic biases that can be investigated and reflected
upon so that decisions and actions can be based on more comprehensive understanding. In
other words, realists are moving toward constructivist evidence and conclusions, just not
toward constructivist epistemology.
11. Professionals in a variety of disciplines – law, heath care, psychotherapy, govern-
ment, and business – are participant-observers in ways that traditional scientists are not.
They have constituencies to whom they bring expertise (often based, at least in part, on a
scientific knowledge base) and to whom they are responsible for the consequences of their
advice, decisions, and actions. They are faced with a need to expand the concepts and tools
of their practice. Such a list of tools would include the following four sets of tools:
a. Tools to describe and think about complex processes that are not adequately de-
scribed by linear causality are needed to more fully describe processes such as
learning and other processes investigated by the social sciences as well as the bio-
logical processes studied by medical research. Circularity provides a set of con-
cepts/tools that can be used to address this need.
b. Tools to examine professional practice and its effects are needed. Reflexivity is a
set of concepts/tools that can be used to address this need. An example of reflexiv-
ity in practice – an example that is familiar to many – is Donald Schön’s reflective
practitioner (1983).
c. Tools to place an emphasis on behavior as a way of understanding, teaching, and
making decisions in professional contexts. The concept/tool of objects-as-tokens-
of-eigen-behavior can be useful in this endeavor.
d. Tools to address ethical questions that come to light as a result of addressing the
first three needs. The concept of ethics as developed by SOC can be useful in this
undertaking.
12. The four concepts/tools I have mentioned form the core of SOC: circularity, re-
flexivity, the understanding of objects as arising from (Eigen-)behavior (Foerster 2003),
and an expanded ethics. Other concepts/tools of SOC could certainly be included in the list.
While others outside the SOC community may be developing these concepts/tools within
their disciplines, the practitioners of SOC are already deeply engaged in developing these
four concepts/tools as the core of SOC – and opportunities for working with those outside
the SOC can increase as practitioners of SOC turn to work with interested individuals and
disciplines on problems they wish to cope with.

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Contributions past and present

13. SOC has already contributed to disciplines outside SOC; contributing to other
disciplines is part of what SOC does. This book contains many examples. Kauffman’s
target article addresses the question “How then, do physical and natural science manage
to obtain their apparently objective results? The answer lies in circularity and eigenform”
(§10) – which he then develops. Ben Sweeting’s target article “Design Research as a Va-
riety of Second-Order Cybernetic Practice” develops Ranulph Glanville’s take on design
as a cybernetics activity that encompasses science (rather than the other way around). Tom
Scholte’s article “Black Box Theatre: Second-Order Cybernetics and Naturalism in Re-
hearsal and Performance” develops a theory and a way of describing performance and re-
hearsal of theater that is leading to new ways of rehearsing. Frank Galuszka (2009) shows
how cybernetic ideas can be used to describe and understand visual art, especially painting.
Klaus Krippendorff (2000) shows that the stance of objectivity taken by sociology privileg-
es scientists in that area vis-à-vis those they describe – and that this is an ethical problem.
There are examples of cybernetics applied to teaching and learning that show the value
of strategies that are part of, or that developed from, SOC (e.g., see Baron 2016; Martin
2016). There are many more examples, many of them going back years or even decades;
the point is that engaging others who are not part of the SOC community has potential
for engaging what Umpleby, in his article “Second-Order Cybernetics as a Fundamental
Revolution in Science”, calls “actor based disciplines” (§§70-73) and what I have referred
to here as professionals, that is, practitioners of specific disciplines.
14. Engaging professionals, including social scientists, can be seen as an extension of
ASC past projects, such as those described by Umpleby (§§33-62), especially in his discus-
sion of “doing science from within” and his example of the work of the Institute of Cul-
tural Affairs, an example that goes back to the 1950s. We know that individuals in health
care, medicine, law, education, government, business, and the arts, as well as individuals
within the traditional sciences, have shown interest in the website, publications, discussion
groups, and conferences of the American Society for Cybernetics. In particular, the current
leadership of the ASC has moved in the direction of creating conversation-centered confer-
ences that focus on topics of interest to those outside the ASC community (see Richards
2015; Martin 2015a; Herr 2015; Hohl 2015; Lombardi 2015; Baron & Griffiths 2015).
15. I want to be clear that in no way am I implying that second-order cybernetics
should focus on becoming compatible with realist epistemologies. Rather I am pointing
out that in the investigation of practical problems, the concepts/strategies of second-order
cybernetics have much to offer professionals including those in science, especially social
science – whether they are realists or constructivists.

Recommendations
16. Because this commentary is concerned with how to increase the role of SOC with-
in the sciences and other professions, I offer the following as recommendations:
17. Identify topics central to SOC that are of interest to non-SOC communities and
create opportunities to bring members of these communities together. The ASC is work-
ing to do this through conversational conferences (see Herr 2015; Lombardi 2015; Martin
2015a; Richards 2015; Scholte 2015; Schroeder 2015). We are learning how to do these

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conferences through experimenting with topics, speakers, opportunities for publication,

and conference design and books such as this volume, which are designed to provide both
a broader context and multiple viewpoints from a variety of fields.
18. Use the language of the individuals we wish to reach. Note that while in learning
a discipline, a student learns the language of that discipline, in consulting and in doing
therapy, the consultant uses the language of the client. SOC can retain its own language
but also use the language of individuals, groups, or disciplines interested in its concepts.
19. When seeking funding or collaboration with other organizations such as the
AAAS and NSF, adopt the language of those organizations.
20. Encourage others to use the concepts/strategies associated with SOC within their
own disciplines and using their own language. For example, many individuals within sci-
ence education find the constructivism of Piaget and Lev Vygotsky both convincing and
helpful. Whether they hold realist or constructivist epistemologies is irrelevant; within the
context of understanding and teaching science, they understand and operate as constructiv-
ists.
21. Adopt a deliberate stance that welcomes all who are interested in ways of dealing
with complexity in their own disciplines and practice – without regard to their epistemolo-
gies. Even ardent realists can appreciate tools and research that come from SOC that help
them understand and cope with problems and contexts in their areas.
22. Present ideas through conversation rather than teaching or instruction. Providing
arguments and evidence for adopting a constructivist epistemology does not work. Change
comes through behavior, and although listening is a behavior, it is not as effective as con-
versation and collaboration.
23. Avoid privileging constructivism; it drives non-constructivists away. This may
irritate some constructivists, but as a radical constructivist I have learned in dealing with
colleagues, students, and clients, that I can share all my insights without pushing a con-
structivist agenda – no matter how much I would like to.
24. Work toward strategic change. Focus on projects that establish cybernetics and
SOC as relevant contributors to the sciences and those professions that use science as a
knowledge base.
25. These recommendations are not answers; they suggest a direction – a direction
that will need to be pursued through practical work such as giving conferences, making
webpages, publishing, encouraging learning communities, and having conversations.

Conclusion
26. Originally cybernetics was seen as being within the paradigm of the objective
observer of the real world. Acceptance of cybernetics was easy when the descriptions of
systems were descriptions of physical machines (Kline 2015). The research that followed,
especially that of Maturana, Varela, von Foerster, and others, led to the logical dissolution
of the paradigm of realism and the objective observer – a change that solidified into what
became SOC (Martin 2004). The sciences and those professions that use the sciences as a
knowledge base have not changed to a more constructivist epistemology. I now see that the
expectation that this would happen was unreasonable, given what cognitive science tells us
about the tendency of human beings – including scientists – to persist in ways of perceiv-
ing and thinking that serve them well in their environments. The most important change

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that took place in the transition from cybernetics to second-order cybernetics was a change
from the accepted science paradigm of the objective observer describing an objective real-
ity to the paradigm of a participant-observer who is a closed circular system constructing a
world as a result of behavior. As already noted, fifty years of effort have shown that we are
not going to shift traditional science to the latter paradigm in the foreseeable future. The
point is to not be defeated by this situation.
27. Every profession, including every science, is a practice. Through practice, every-
thing that has a name becomes an object. This includes the concepts and models that form
the basis of every discipline, including every science. The concepts and models become
objects that their users see as real objects – objects that cannot be questioned because they
appear as real as a car on the street. Only behaving differently enables us to see differently.
It is only through behavior that realists and constructivists can come to see the world dif-
ferently. And it is in practice that we learn both to act and see differently (Martin 2015c,
2011). It is through engaging others in projects and in conversation, both verbal and writ-
ten, that, regardless of our epistemologies, we change.

Acknowledgements
Thanks to Dr. Suzanne Wildhagen Martin for comments and editorial suggestions.

References
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Bybee R. W. & Sund R. B. (1982) Piaget for educators. Second edition. Waveland Press, Prospect
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Foerster H. von (2003) Objects: Tokens for (eigen-)behaviors. In: Understanding understanding:
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Martin R. J. (2004) The once and future: thoughts and notes. Cybernetics and Human Knowing
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 Some Implications of Second-Order Cybernetics
Anthony Hodgson

From emergence to methodology

1. The overview that Karl Müller and Alexander Riegler draw of the actual and fu-
ture possible field of SOC makes it easier to see the distinctions between first-order and
second-order. Without those distinctions it is unlikely that second-order cybernetics (or
science) will be able break out of the challenge of irrelevance asserted in the Kline-Martin
Hypothesis. It seems to me that the time is ripe for a major thrust to take SOC into further
domains not only for its deeper theoretical understanding but also because of its potential
relevance to social transformation.
2. The history, momentum and successes of first-order science, coupled with enor-
mous global investment in its institutions, communities and funding makes it no easy task
to get the voice of second-order thinking heard. When this is coupled with the conclusions,
which the review here confirms, that SOC has been little developed over the last fifty years
and that there is very little evidence in the form of sustainable consequences for other do-
mains of science, then the difficulty is exacerbated.
3. The emphasis Müller and Riegler place on research and development agendas for
the future of SOC is a timely affirmation that the potential of SOC has hardly been tapped
and developed. For example, the potential of the great insights of Heinz von Foerster,
Gregory Bateson and Ernst von Glasersfeld coupled with the championing by Ranulph
Glanville and Bernard Scott stands out as a rich field for exploration. I will introduce an
additional way of framing the essential features of SOC, which I propose should also be
extended to second-order science to broaden out the relevance. This framework emerged
from the interdisciplinary workshop “Second-order Science and Policy” (SOSP, http://
www.decisionintegrity.co.uk/page44.html) held early in 2016 to explore the potential rel-
evance of second-order science to policy formation. I will then use this framework as a
way of noting salient points from the various contributory target articles in an attempt to
indicate the inclusive relevance of the rich diversity of perspectives represented.
4. Michael Lissack makes the case (§1) that the label “cybernetics” has, in use, lost
contact with its essential meaning and needs new forms of expression. I see the switch to
the term “second-order science” as one way of contributing to this task, but only if the
concept is enlarged and made more comprehensive.

349

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5. It seems fairly typical of paradigm clash that the incumbent marginalises the new
that questions its assumptions. This leads to a kind of subterranean collusion to not even
acknowledge there is a challenge. This leads further to the issue being hidden in plain sight:
It seems that we have a blind spot for the fact that experience is the most basic and unavoid-
able medium of our being. Not only do we normally not notice how all our beliefs about
ourselves and the world constitute experience; we do not notice that we do not notice.
(Kordeš §5)

6. The development of a flourishing community of second-order researchers is likely

to be the most powerful way to open this up in discourse on the nature of science. Thomas
Flanagan (§3) points out that the very nature of the interactions in a community of re-
searchers changes expectations of what is considered to be a scientific finding. He sum-
marised that a finding is a complex function of:
(a) the observational and communication dynamics within the system under study
(b) the conjoint sense-making methodology selected for use by the researcher and fellow
actors
(c) the focus on boundary conditions of the inquiry specified by the researcher
(d) the adequacy of the reporting narrative.

7. The construction of second-order methodology could fall into an inconsistency trap

unless it is recognised that a community of scientists have made choices as to what second-
order methodology is. Approaching second-order methodology with first-order assump-
tions is unlikely to go very far. First-order methodology is limited by being based on linear
causality (Martin §11), which is inconsistent with the importance of circularity.
8. This trap is avoided if the approach to methodology is itself second-order. The
positive angle on this perspective is the scope for the conscious design of methodology.
Lissack (§16) summarises seven insights that cybernetics has given rise to that need to be
taken into account:
ƒƒ the role of the observer
ƒƒ the law of requisite variety
ƒƒ the importance of the observer in cognition
ƒƒ the use of black boxes
ƒƒ the idea that all action is in some ways a conversation
ƒƒ the importance of recognising that true models differ from descriptive representa-
tions
ƒƒ the importance of narratives
9. Another useful view of methodology is provided by John Warfield’s domain of
science model (Flanagan §16) in which there is a continuing cycle between foundation,
theory, methodology and application, which is portrayed basically as a learning cycle.
10. Müller (2016) outlines a seven-stage methodology that incorporates the principles
of second-order investigation searching for systemic universality. In parallel to this I devel-
oped a similar approach in my doctoral research (Hodgson 2016).

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Second-order science as designed practice

We need an inclusive big tent rather than a divisive faction fight. (Cariani §14)

11. An excursion was made by SOSP (see §3), an interdisciplinary workshop to en-
large the concept of second-order science building on the core work of second-order cyber-
netics by “sweeping in,” to use Charles West Churchman’s (1979) expression, a broader
range of approaches to science than is usually discussed in second-order cybernetics. All of
these shared the initial starting point of the presence of the observer as critical in some way
or another. The perspective that emerged from interdisciplinary dialogue across diverse
fields of science, policy and practice provided a richer picture as to what the hallmarks of
a second-order science practice might be. The enquiry was also facilitated to identify pos-
sible links between this emergent pattern and the challenges facing contemporary policy
development – what the possible relevance and use of a second-order discipline might
be. I will use this distillation of principles as a platform to explore second-order science
methodology.
12. A key “so what?” question is “so how do we go about science differently if we
intentionally adopt a second-order approach?” This can be treated as a design task affecting
how we might carry out both theoretical and empirical investigation. Grandon Gill (§16)
affirms:
To be effective in highly complex environments, research designs need to be highly lo-
calised and need to shed some of the formalisms of the traditional scientific method, such
as the hypothesis test (intended to support or refute stable, general propositions). In place
of these approaches, the researcher needs to become highly aware of the interactions af-
fecting the local context and must also become expert in the art of observation and the
construction of models that reflected the local reality.

13. The concept used from here on in this review can be regarded as a meta-model to
prompt the attention and awareness of the second-order practitioner. It is basically cast in
what Müller and Riegler define as the endo mode, science from within.
14. The concept comprises seven distinct areas. However, they are also systemically
connected and overlapping so, rather than a check-list they are better represented as a non-
linear visual pattern as in Figure 1.

1. The triadic network: Observer, language, society

Triadic networks in science can be built between (1) actors or researchers, (2) an environ-
ment or domain of investigation and (3) a common language, grammar, rule system or,
more generally, a knowledge base. (Müller & Riegler §21 )

15. The co-presence of observer, language and society (of scientists) is placed as
central and strengthens the principle that the observer role is critical. The triadic relation
is essential to von Foerster’s (2003) viewpoint. He characteristically summarised this as
analogous to the relationship between the chicken, the egg and the rooster. “You cannot
say who was first and who was last. You need all three to have all three.” The presence
of the observer in the observation is proposed as a fundamental condition in second-order
science. In this sense, all scientific knowledge is some form of intersubjective consensus

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7
Intervention
& Ethics
6 2
Multi- Reflexivity &
perspective Language Reciprocity
dialogic
1

ver
Soc

er
5 3

iety

Obs
Trans- Circularity
disciplinarity & Re-entry
4
Reflection &
Perception

Figure 1. Seven domains constituting second-order science.

amongst a community of scientists. Where those scientists are ignorant of their assump-
tions about knowing, they are restricted by second-order blindness to the implications of
their position. However, the observer is also a decider and actor and, in that sense, imposes
forms of policy by the very nature of the way she frames observation. This goes further
than a sociology of science as developed by Kuhn (Becerra §6).
16. Terms, symbols or images are situated; they acquire meaning through collective
use in actual situations. This triadic relationship is also dialogic and has emergent proper-
ties of a living language. Flanagan points out:
A collective sense-making methodology for second-order cybernetics must include provi-
sions for languaging because people use language that is uniquely coded for expressing
only certain parts of their immediate needs […] The meanings behind statements need to
be decoded and clarified within a consensual linguistic divide so the parties engage in col-
lective sense making can accurately share understandings. (Flanagan §11)

17. Bryony Pierce (§2) sees second-order science as grounded in enaction within a
community. This view also resonates with Konstantin Pavlov-Pinus’s (§1) positioning of
second-order science as bridging between phenomenological and analytical styles of re-
search.

2. Reflexivity and reciprocity

For the science system in general, the reflexive turn to a mode from within, or an endo-
mode, can yield at least four groups of new opportunities, … (Umpleby §48)

18. For Stuart Umpleby (§7) the essence of second-order science (in so far is it might
be captured in one phrase) is “the science of reflexivity.” Second-order science is able bet-
ter to take into account the way that scientific ideas and findings entering the awareness of
society change the nature of society and in turn the nature of the science that created the
ideas. However, in the absence of recognition of second-order understanding this largely
goes unnoticed. This leads to the idea of the study of observing systems. In observing the
observed is changed but there is also the feedback of that change to changing the observer.

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19. In reflexive systems, observation and intervention are not one-way streets. There
is reciprocity between the observer and the world observed. The observer is participat-
ing in the system and there are consequences. Making the observation may not leave the
observed in a constant condition. Intervention often creates new conditions (sometimes
referred to as unintended consequences), for example in social systems, by provoking new
ways of gaming the system. A second-order viewpoint would pay much more attention to
this effect and as a result would have to go beyond the conventional categories of first-
order thinking. Louis Kauffman (§3) sums up the situation thus:
A reflexive domain is an abstract description of a conversational domain in which cybernet-
ics can occur. Each participant in the reflexive domain is also an actor who transforms that
domain. In full reflexivity, each participant is entirely determined by how he or she acts in
the domain, and the domain is entirely determined by its participants.

3. Circularity and re-entry

In the face of the circularity of context and observer it is still possible to explore and come
to agreements that have every appearance of being scientific facts. (Kauffman §1)

20. In second-order thinking any stable properties of “the world” are not fixed things
but eigenforms. Art Collings (§9) emphasises that circular processes have the property
of generating eigenforms that are defined as fixed points in a transformation. From the
process perspective, things or objects are eigenforms generated by the circularity of that
process. In observing, the observer makes a distinction. The distinction in turn reflects
back on the observer. Second-order circularity implies that the condition of the observer
is changed by the feedback of the observation. Tatjana Schönwalder-Kunz (§5) also sees
science as a self-referential structure that is not simply between observer and observation
but in relation to the disciplinary context. The principle of re-entry proposes that any field
can be applied to itself as, for example, theory of theory, method of methods, and cybernet-
ics of cybernetics. From a second-order perspective the observer is continuously bringing
forth a world and responding to and learning from that world. This stance supports the view
that comprehensiveness is impossible. Knowledge is not some static object “out there” but
is constantly reforming through the engagement of the knower; and the knower is changed
by the encounter with knowledge.
21. Kauffman sees all cybernetics, not just second-order, as inherently circular: “Cy-
bernetics is the study of systems and processes that interact with themselves and produce
themselves from themselves” (Kauffman §38). In this sense, all cybernetics is second or-
der. He takes the view that there is no definition of cybernetics that is not circular. Indeed,
he takes this further and asserts:
… all attempts to find stable knowledge of the world are attempts to find theories accom-
panied by eigenforms in the actual reflexivity of the world into which one is thrown. The
world itself is affected by the actions of its participants at all levels. (Kauffman §89)

Such forms are discovered and then codified to become the objective results of that domain
of science. A wider perspective on the situation reveals that the larger landscape of the
reflexive domain has been significantly influenced by the theories it has given rise to. He
concludes that circularity is both legitimate and unavoidable.

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4. Reflection and perception

The subject–object dualism has inherent insoluble contradictions, which make it impos-
sible to come up with an adequate idea about reflection. (Gasparayan §33)

22. It is interesting to me that the development of a science of qualities has not yet
entered into the main discourse of second-order cybernetics. This may well relate to the
tendency of even this study to be locked into its own roots and language and inadvertently
miss out on other parallel explorations that use seemingly different starting points and
language. However, there seem to be at least two common elements. One is the attempt to
privilege qualities to be as important as quantities and thus challenge the limitations of how
measurement is conceived. The other is the presence of the observer in the observation and
intervention. Although this is not touched on directly in the work under review there are
notable linkage points in the section introduced by Diana Gasparayan on consciousness.
She makes the point that consciousness should be present in the study of consciousness and
therefore a first-order approach is self-defeating.
23. Perhaps a linking area around this question is that of qualia as the characteristics
of all and any conscious experience (Pickering §1) including the practice of second-order
cybernetics. A science of qualities treats the self-experiencing mind as the primary con-
scious instrument of the science, prior to the tools of investigation and measurement – mi-
croscopes, telescopes, computer modelling and so on. This is essentially the inclusion of
the question “how does the scientist/decision maker construct his or her reality?” (Becerra
§4).

5. Transdisciplinarity

A mere call to interdisciplinarity is not enough. What is needed is a new methodology,

explicit lines of work, and new tools and techniques easing such integration. (Becerra §15)

24. In the founding of the systems sciences the aspiration was for a universal language
of similarities that recurred in many fields. Mathematics is clearly one form of language
that has become supplemented by other forms of systems modelling. This has never sat
comfortably with the ingrained paradigms of academic institutions. A major necessity for
contemporary complexity and uncertainty is the tackling of challenges that cut across tra-
ditional disciplines. The fields open for investigation are much broader than most conven-
tional research. Indeed, a key question is: what constitutes a field for investigation?
25. Answers to this question are blown wide open by second-order science, which is
more congruent with so-called wicked problems that surface wide fields of connectedness
requiring understanding beyond knowledge and data. The perspectives of understanding
become critical.
26. First-order science has built its structure of knowledge through specialised disci-
plines. Transdisciplinarity is an attempt to go under and beyond these distinctions and seek
other forms of insight. From the perspective of Jean Piaget’s genetic epistemology, Ro-
lando Garcia (Becerra §14) suggests that improvement of approaches to complex problems
requires integration of different aspects of knowledge and to construct the study object
among multi-disciplinary team members.

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6. Multi-perspectival dialogic

Interdisciplinary perspective is not a matter of theoretical reconciliations, but rather it is

a co-construction of new theory through the reconfiguration of meaning drawn from joint
consideration of primary observations. (Flanagan §3)

27. A key component of second-order method is its accommodation of emergent pro-

cesses and emergent findings, some of which may be created in the process of application.
An interesting illustration of this is provided in Tom Scholte’s incorporation of Gordon
Pask’s conversation theory as a key component in the process in theatre research of Active
Analysis. Conversations regarding circumstances and objectives of the selected drama are
followed by active improvisation to be followed by a second conversation from the observ-
er/participant perspective. This in turn re-enters and reframes the original conversation. It
could well be that this approach generated in the context of the theatre is also applicable in
the theatres of action of other sciences. In some ways it reflects more congruently the live
experience of research. Eva Buchinger (§5) also proposes that Pask integrated with Nik-
las Luhmann as a way of conceptual integration between disciplines. A comparison with
dialogical design science would also shed further light on this (Bausch & Flanagan 2013).
28. In dealing with complex situations that do not yield to a single discipline it is valu-
able to take several perspectives. The process of dialogue around a question from a number
of disciplinary or stakeholder perspectives enables a creative emergence.
29. Allenna Leonard (§4) emphasises that these approaches provided a field for the
emergence of second-order cybernetics allowing for multiple constructs of stakeholder
positions in different cultural and social contexts. Such background must lead to the chal-
lenging of existing power relationships in both the scientific communities and their mana-
gerial communities.

7. Intervention and ethics

The associated ethics and responsibilities that arise out of second-order cybernetics may be
overwhelming. This is an unsettling no-man’s land for many scholars and students, who in
turn opt out of this challenging reflexive epistemological domain. (Baron §8)

30. The observer is not merely an observer. We can substitute terms like actor, de-
cider, and intervenor. From an enactive second-order perspective, in a world that is highly
structurally coupled, there can be no such thing as a totally detached observer. Any position
(even that of a decision not to observe) is an intervention. Assumptions are being made
based on values and judgements as to what is “in” and what is “out” of consideration.
Yet these judgements are often invisible and remain unquestioned, leaving research as
a methodological game played on a field where the game itself is taken as objective and
unquestioned. An implication for policy is that the use of “objective evidence” is at risk
of being interpreted and used as an argument for political ends without making clear the
value assumptions behind its supposed objectivity. A complementary second-order disci-
pline would seek to make clear the position assumed by the objectivity of the research. It
is interesting that the primary reference for the place of ethics is still von Foerster’s (1997)
often-cited work. This has not been very well developed and is of paramount relevance
to the relationship between social responsibility and science, a relationship the first-order

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culture of science has great difficulty in making sense of. Some explorations of ethics and
second-order cybernetics in decision making were explored by Hodgson (2010).
31. Making a distinction is making an intervention. This act defines content but, as
Lissack (§3) points out, context always matters. Although not a contributor to this book
there is much that could be brought to bear here from Gerald Midgley’s (Midgley &
Ochoa-Arias 2001) work on systemic intervention and boundary critique. The very nature
of second-order science implies that consideration of ethical dimensions is essential to a
full methodology.
Clearly, there are ethical repercussions from seeking to understand a second-order science
that includes the observer and, by extension, the environments to which the observer is
structurally coupled. (Forsythe §18)

Towards a conscious methodology

32. Can an operation of re-entry here contribute useful perspectives to research in
practice? I am thinking of two fields of practical relevance. The first area is early career
researchers, PhD students who are attracted to explore the second-order paradigm and wish
to conduct a piece of research that is intentionally and deliberately second-order, and signifi-
cantly, explicitly so in general terms beyond any specialist discipline that might be its field
of research. Many will recognise the typical actual experience reported by Michael Hohl:
Told as a story, my research appears pretty straightforward and top-down. In fact it was
bottom-up and came together step-by-step over three years. The research process was a
constant learning process. (Hohl §5)

33. The second area is that of policy making where there is increasing questioning of
the limits of evidence-based policy, where the evidence is based on first-order science and
yet the application is in the world of complexity and uncertainty of the society and its poli-
tics. Consider applying to policy development as well as design the following statement by
Jose dos Santos Cabral Filho:
A significant advance in design towards a second-order level will come when designers
embrace an all-encompassing systemic approach that will necessarily have the inclusion of
the observer, at all possible levels, as its pivotal point. (Cabral §11)

34. The elements of both design practice (Scholte-Halprin §12) and naturalist theatre
(Scholte §3) can provide suggestions as to how innovative second-order ways of going
about policy in a complex world with emergent properties might be tackled.
35. The facilitation of shared exploratory thinking in groups, especially using visual
thinking, has direct parallels with digital design (van Stralen §4) and the summary points
that Ben Sweeting (§22) highlights, namely:
ƒƒ Reflective conversation
ƒƒ Forward looking research
ƒƒ Use of drawings and models as a part of thinking
ƒƒ Importance of participation
ƒƒ Circular reflective process
ƒƒ Reciprocal relationship

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The implications for human affairs

The governance of the contemporary world and the interconnections among governance,
democracy and knowledge are far more complex than most observers recognize. No single
level is decisive in shaping the world in which we live. (Stingl §10)

36. The predominant view of scientists in society is that first-order research is para-
mount and that if implementation was not going well it was not a scientific problem and so
a problem for scientists. Umpleby strongly points out that this is no longer tenable:
The present time is characterized by an abundance of societal and environmental problems
locally, nationally, and globally, where a high accumulation of theoretical scientific knowl-
edge is accompanied by a deep deficiency in extension, implementation, or transforma-
tional knowledge. (Umpleby §56)

37. He sees the emergence of second-order science as one contribution to redressing

this problem in creating better channels between science and practical human affairs espe-
cially in the social and environmental domains.1
38. Substitute the word “policy” for “design” in Sweeting’s statement (§8) “…design
involves the creation of new situations, design questions cannot be fully formulated in ad-
vance but shift and change as they are explored and as proposals are enacted” this descrip-
tion would most likely be agreed by policy researchers.
39. Some further areas for research that the progressive policy community might con-
sider are:
ƒƒ Recursion of many levels; character and eigenvalue (Clark & Chansky §9)
ƒƒ Outside and inside (Landgraf §7)
ƒƒ Theatre is uniquely positioned to provide methods and tools to understand conse-
quences of differing configurations forming perception and conception. (Christy
§18)
ƒƒ Caution in transferring from one context to another (Müller §4)
ƒƒ Cybernetic theatre for exploring policy (moving on from Sweeting [A Theatre for
Exploring the Cybernetic] §5; Richards [The Many Varieties of Experimentation
in Second-Order Cybernetics] §4)
40. Of course, there are what may amount to intractable problems in all this for the
status quo culture. For example, recognising circularity in learning, cognition, problem
solving, etc., does not by itself change a rootedness in linear causality (Martin §11). In my
view, mainstream deterministic science is a special case of second order in which the com-
munity of scientists (and their political sponsors) have implicitly agreed to remain ignorant
(or to suppress) that the experiencer is “hidden in plain sight.” Two tricky areas are:
ƒƒ SOC challenges the dominant paradigm of power and control (Martin §21) where
evidence-based policy is limited to that of first-order science

1. A second-order approach to research in socio-ecological transformation is being pursued by Ioan

Fazey, Professor of the Social Dimensions of Environmental Change at the University of Dundee.
This includes a series of conferences on “Transformation in Practice” http://www.transforma-
tions2017.org/30/12/16

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ƒƒ Aspects of the theories that are held become engaged with and engaged by power
and shape the subterranean assumptions that drive policy behaviour (Bohinc §4).
41. Nevertheless, in conclusion, I suggest that there is potential value in research into
the relationship between second-order science and policy development, which could con-
tribute to a number of areas including:
ƒƒ Providing a common language of engagement for collaboration between “hard”
and “soft” sciences and policy development that includes explicit ethics
ƒƒ Providing a meta-framing for exchange across the disciplines of sciences, humani-
ties and the arts, and design more congruent with wicked problems
ƒƒ Providing some possible underpinnings for the limitations and possibilities of any
discipline’s contribution to societal transformation more clearly with transparency
of assumptions
ƒƒ Doing all this in a manner that renders the ethics of human activity transparent

References
Bausch K. C. & Flanagan T. R. (2013) A confluence of third-phase science and dialogic design
science. Systems Research and Behavioural Science 30: 414–429.
Churchman C. W. (1979) The systems approach and its enemies. Basic Books, New York.
Foerster H. von (1995) Ethics and second-order cybernetics. Stanford Humanities Review 4(2):
308–319.
Foerster H. von (2003) Understanding understanding: Essays on cybernetics and cognition. New
York, Springer.
Hodgson A. (2010) Decision integrity and second order cybernetics. In: Wallis S. (ed.) Cybernetics
and systems theory in management: Tools, views and advancements. IGI Global, Hershey:
52–74.
Hodgson A. (2016) Time, pattern, perception: Integrating systems and futures thinking. PhD Thesis,
University of Hull.
Midgley G. & Ochoa-Arias A. E. (2001) Unfolding a theory of systemic intervention. Systemic
Practice and Action Research 14(5): 615–649.
Müller K. H. (2016) Methodologies for second-order science. Chapter 8 in: Second-order science:
The revolution of scientific structures. Edition Echoraum, Vienna.

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 New Directions in Second-Order Cybernetics
Larry Richards

What is new?
1. Chapter 1 of Ross Ashby’s classic, An Introduction to Cybernetics (1956), is ti-
tled “What is New”, without the question mark. With the fiftieth anniversary of Margaret
Mead’s 1968 paper “Cybernetics of Cybernetics” approaching, it might be instructive to
ask that question of SOC – not from the perspective of a cybernetician or of first-order
cybernetics, but from the perspective of an interested bystander who happens on the term
and asks about its relevance today, not in the early 1970s. Different people who associate
themselves with cybernetics will respond to this question in different ways, and there does
not appear to be even general agreement on a response, as the various contributions to this
volume attest. However, there are some common threads that can be pulled through most
of the responses, and it is precisely in the variety of possible responses that some new
directions can be discerned. I have my own perspective on what is new and will try to
reconcile it with at least some of the ideas of the other contributors.
2. Another consideration in responding to this question is that any claim of newness
can be challenged by those familiar with similar ideas in fields of inquiry other than cy-
bernetics. So, it is important to be careful about what we claim in order to avoid being
dismissed as uninformed or as charlatans. For example, for SOC to claim that it is the
only or the first field of inquiry to advocate for including the observer of phenomena in the
phenomena being observed ignores the participant-observer approach to research, and its
ethnographical methods, widely used in anthropological and management studies, among
others. Separate from cybernetics, Paul Feyerabend (1975) developed a strong case for sci-
entists to build their own values and motivations into their research approach and findings,
and then to take responsibility for the consequences. Reflexivity,1 a topic of special interest
in SOC, has been of interest in communication theory, psychotherapy and other pursuits
as well. This is not new.

1. I use the word “reflexive” here to speak of a “turning back on to.” I will use the word “recursive”
to speak of a “returning to.” The word “recursive” can be used to describe many forms of circular-
ity. Reflexivity is specifically about actions taken (or utterances made) that turn back on the actor
(or speaker).

359

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3. I claim that cybernetics (that is, SOC) offers a vocabulary that is still relatively
new (and continues to evolve) and useful for talking and thinking2 about the dynamics of
relations and behavior in a way that accounts for the dynamics of relations and behavior of
the observer/listener (participant) who is doing the talking and thinking. That is, it offers a
way of thinking about ways of thinking, making the way of thinking (pattern of thought)
we might employ in a particular situation a choice rather than a default, without awareness,
to the prevailing way of thinking. What is new from SOC is that this way of thinking is a
way of thinking about itself, turning cybernetics into a process of conceptualization rather
than a set of relatively stable concepts like those that characterize other fields of inquiry.
There is certainly still a role for temporarily stable concepts in cybernetics, as a conceptu-
alization process generates concepts, and those that are useful will be retained while they
remain useful. However, there is no claim to truth, only to the desirability of the process,
which itself can change. So, SOC has the potential to change the approaches we take to
human inquiry itself.
4. After a discussion of the concept of success and what success would be for SOC,
I present a case for cybernetics as a way of thinking about ways of thinking in the form of
six conceptual problems that it could address. I claim that these six conceptual problems,
among others, represent current constraints on the possibilities for human sustainability
and associated societal transformation. These constraints are constraints on thinking, and
SOC can help to overcome them. I recognize that any presentation of a new way of think-
ing must rely on current language and the way of thinking that is embedded in its logic.
My choice of using the formulation of six problems as a presentation device is an attempt
to throw light on both the challenge that SOC represents and the hope that it offers. I am
under no illusion that it is sufficient as argument or that any mode of presentation at this
time could be. My desire is that it generate and sustain some conversations.

What would success look like?

5. I will not go into a lengthy definition or history of cybernetics or SOC. I assume
the reader is familiar with the terms or can locate reasonable expositions elsewhere. I will
only say that I regard SOC and cybernetics to be the same. While there may still be occa-
sions when it is useful to make the distinction between first and second order, the original
motivation for doing so has changed. Any scientist, engineer, technologist, designer, artist
or craftsperson who does not account for themselves and their desires and intentions in
the actions they take or the statements they make is not doing cybernetics, even if they
expropriate the vocabulary to justify what they do. As the person credited with naming

2. I use the word “thinking” here to speak of an awareness, in a language, of a set of concepts/
ideas and the connections among them. Metaphors for the experience of thinking might include: a
sequential unfolding or a sustained churning up of the set of concepts and their connections. I use
the term “way of thinking” to speak of a particular pattern of connecting, unfolding or churning,
with or without awareness. Logic is a common way of connecting, although not the only way, and
there are many possible logics.

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modern cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, advocated (1954), doing cybernetics includes taking
responsibility3 for the consequences of our actions.
6. Of course, there are those who will point to technologies like automatic control,
artificial intelligence, robotics, virtual reality and bionics as examples of the success of
cybernetics. Some would qualify these as successes of first-order cybernetics. Unless these
technologies were and are employed with awareness of their consequences for humankind,
and not mindlessly for their commercial or military value, I would not call them success-
ful or cybernetic. So, what might have once been considered a success of cybernetics no
longer qualifies under the transformation to SOC. In other words, I want the use of the
cybernetic label to imply an accounting for my desires and a taking of responsibility for the
consequences of my actions, as required of the cybernetics I now have. To the extent that
technology, any technology, is used with awareness of the desirability of the consequences
for humanity, I can accept it as potentially cybernetic. However, there is no guarantee of
desirable outcomes, and hence of success in the usual sense. We need new ways of thinking
about desire, intention, humanness and consequences, and success itself.
7. If I know what I want and I know it is possible to achieve it, I do not need cyber-
netics – I just go and do what I need to do to achieve the outcome. However, when I only
have a vague idea about what I want or do not want and I do not know how to pursue or
avoid it in the current society, the vocabulary of cybernetics can be useful.4 Cybernetics
is not about success and the achievement of goals; it is about the reconfiguration of con-
straints (resources) in order to make possible what was not previously possible, including
the avoidance of what was previously inevitable. When desires are treated as constraints,
they become subject to reconfiguration as well. So, to talk about the success of cybernet-
ics as though it is a tool that could help people who use it become wealthy and famous by
solving current problems dismisses what it has to offer. SOC is distinguished more by the
new questions it asks than by the answers it might provide to current questions, and its
value is more in the new systems it imagines than in the rehabilitation of current systems.
The dilemma of SOC is that recognizing the value of this way of thinking may require si-
multaneously assimilating it; its value is realized by doing it, but likely only by the people
doing it. This is consistent with its reflexive character.
8. I propose, then, that, rather than call on criteria from external and mainstream
sources, we set our own criteria for realizing the value of SOC: namely, as long as the
vocabulary of cybernetics is contributive in maintaining interest in ongoing conversations5

3. I use the word “responsibility” here to speak of an awareness of my desires with respect to the
consequences of my actions.
4. A claim could be made that the role of applied philosophy in society might be similar to that of
cybernetics as described here, and in fact philosophy might contribute in addressing the same
situation. However, I wish to distinguish cybernetics from philosophy, even though cybernetics
may inform philosophy and vice versa. Cybernetics depends on no specific philosophical tradi-
tion. Its formulation starts with the idea of difference or change, and the set of concepts and their
vocabulary are consistent with the simple act of drawing a distinction. It does not seek truth in the
philosophical sense; rather, its value lies in its usefulness as an alternative to the prevailing linear,
hierarchical, goal-oriented and especially theistic way of thinking about how the world does and
should work. Philosophers may disagree; but then, I am not a philosopher.
5. I use the word “conversation” here to speak of a particular dynamics of interaction among two or
more participants, in a language (verbal, graphical, audial, kinesthetic, gestural, etc.), such that
the dynamics begins with an asynchronicity (a conflict, disagreement, friction, contradiction, be-

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on nothing short of the transformation of society to a more just and equitable one, it has
value. These conversations can happen in any current arena: for example, science, design,
the arts, government, business, education, health care or everyday life, with the latter de-
serving special attention. I speak of a just and equitable society as:
a. one that supports every individual in their quest for significance through the unique
contributions each has to offer; and
b. one without violence, or at least where violence is an alternative of last resort.
This implies that the basic needs of all humans be met unconditionally (or there will be
violence), and that, once met, everyone can participate in the conversations on the trans-
formation and design of the society in which they are a member. Conversation (Pask 1976)
becomes a thread that can be pulled through all new directions proposed for SOC, and one
of consequence for virtually all human beings.

Second-order cybernetics and six conceptual problems

9. I have chosen six conceptual problems for which SOC can provide some assistance.
They all draw on SOC as a way of thinking for that assistance. The result in each case is a
slightly different way of thinking about each problem. These problems cannot be resolved
or dissolved as long as currently prevailing ways of thinking dominate, and these current
ways are not likely to change easily, as they are essential to maintaining the status quo.
The status quo both benefits those who are rewarded by it and operates without awareness
by most others. That is, we depend on these prevailing ways of thinking to make sense of
the current world and cannot imagine as desirable alternatives that would alter that sense-
making. Yet, the problems persist. The six articles in this volume identified as target articles
each correspond roughly to one of these problems, although with significant overlaps. My
discussion below does not draw directly from those articles or the critique of those articles.
Rather, I discuss each problem from the directions implied by SOC, as I see them.

Paradigms and the problem of the two cultures: Science and art
10. In his classic The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution (1961), C.P. Snow
identified a rift between the ways of thinking in the sciences and related technical fields and
those of the arts and humanities. He presents this rift in part as a warning and in part as an
opportunity. If these ways of thinking do not talk to one another (metaphorically speaking),
they may drift further apart, exacerbating the socioeconomic stratification and extreme
inequality that characterize the human predicament world-wide. If, on the other hand, they
could talk with one another, new ideas and approaches for addressing the disastrous con-
sequences that could result if the situation is not addressed might emerge. In a class I had

ing on different planes, being out of phase, i.e., out of sync, etc.) and moves toward synchronicity
(agreement, including the agreement to disagree, i.e., a mutual understanding). A conversation is
sustained by a mutual preference for recurrent interaction and can stop when other preferences
(including the avoidance of boredom) are given priority. A person can have a conversation with
herself, where the participants are different roles, perspectives, positions, etc., adopted by that
person. A conversation with oneself is the process that generates thinking.

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with Russell Ackoff, he would refer to the approach of science as searching for similarities
among phenomena that appear different and that of the arts as searching for differences
among phenomena that appear the same. While this is an obvious oversimplification, it
does point to the incommensurability of the two cultures and to the potential value of both
when embraced, without bias, simultaneously.
11. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970), Thomas Kuhn popularized the
word “paradigm” to speak of the prevailing way of thinking or pattern of thought embed-
ded in the language and behaviors of a culture, and that more often than not operates with-
out the awareness of the thinkers using it. The differences in paradigm become particularly
noticeable when one crosses from one culture to another and tries to live in it. As a way of
thinking about ways of thinking, SOC could be characterized as a paradigm of paradigms
of which it – cybernetics (SOC) – is one. This turns cybernetics into a process, a way of
thinking that is continually changing and must change whenever the set of ways of thinking
changes. It can also raise awareness of the way of thinking being employed in a situation,
rendering the way of thinking a choice.
12. In his target article, Stuart Umpleby promotes SOC as providing a framework
for a fundamental revolution in science, and in their editorial Karl Müller and Alexander
Riegler discuss such a framework and call it second-order science. Cybernetics has been
treated as a science since its modern origins as a science of control and communication
(Wiener 1961), and indeed its concepts have been of particular interest to mathematicians,
biologists, psychologists and social scientists, including management scientists, over the
years. As an important human enterprise, new directions in science as suggested by Umple-
by, Müller and Riegler deserve to be supported, and I would regard them as directions
compatible with SOC under four conditions:
a. that the new direction be treated not only as representing a new paradigm for scien-
tific inquiry but also as recognizing that multiple paradigms can provide simultane-
ously useful insights;
b. that the scientist be aware of the paradigm(s) being applied and make it(them) a
choice based on the desirability of its(their) consequences;
c. that SOC, as the overriding paradigm, be a process and itself subject to change as
a consequence of the doing of scientific inquiry; and,
d. that science not be given superior status relative to other modes of inquiry, par-
ticularly the arts.6
13. SOC has the potential to unstick us from the trap of a single paradigm and the
ethical dilemmas accompanying such a trap.

Disciplines and the problem of logical types

14. Bertrand Russell’s theory of logical types addresses the self-referential paradox
of sets that include themselves as a member. The problem of logical typing arises when

6. Some cyberneticians have recognized the mutual value of science and art in cybernetics. Ashby
referred to cybernetics as “the art of steersmanship.” Pask talked about cybernetics as “the art and
science of manipulating defensible metaphors.” Maturana defined cybernetics as “the science and
art of understanding.” For von Glasersfeld, cybernetics was “the art of creating equilibrium in a
world of possibilities and constraints” (Richards 2009: 101f).

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I have a situation involving categories (sets that do not include themselves as members)
that, if mixed, would produce a paradoxical formulation – the vicious circle or “damned
if you do, damned if you don’t” syndrome. This is the problem of observers who include
themselves in their formulations of the phenomena they are observing. The standard way
out of this dilemma, within the logic that produced it, is to create a hierarchy of logical
types that exclude all sets that include themselves as members – that is, paradox is not
allowed. Connections among logical types are then dealt with at the next higher level of
the hierarchy (as generalizations that maintain consistency) rather than at the lower level
where interactions among the logical types would result in inconsistency (hence the term
logical type). Logical typing is still the predominant way to simplify a complex situation
and may be a sufficient way to deal with a particular phenomenon, or it may not be. Paul
Watzlawick, John Weakland and Richard Fisch (1974) in their book, Change: Principles
of Problem Formation and Problem Resolution, demonstrate how an awareness of these
paradoxes in therapeutic situations can be dealt with by a therapist who operates at a higher
level. It does not account for the situation when the therapist is a part of the problem – this
would require a supra-therapist.
15. I claim (without argument here) that academic disciplines arise as a way to deal
not only with the complexity of what would otherwise be the interconnectedness of all
phenomena but more significantly with the inconsistencies that would rear their heads
when prevailing logic is applied to this interconnectedness. The prevailing logic does not
include time (and has been referred to as “time-less”) and therefore dismisses the role that
dynamics7 might play in the behaviors of certain phenomena. Disciplines are logical types
within which attempts are made to maintain consistency. Humberto Maturana and Fran-
cisco Varela (1992: 207-212) introduced the term “non-intersecting phenomenal domains”
to speak of domains of concepts that, if mixed, would create inconsistencies not allowed
in scientific explanations. Disciplines deal with different phenomenal domains, creating
problems of inconsistency when they attempt to interact with one another. Cybernetics has
been referred to as transdisciplinary, offering a vocabulary that could assist individuals
from different disciplines when they interact with each other – a language they can agree
on as they attempt to learn something new about their respective disciplines or the relations
between them (Müller 2012). Cybernetics has also been referred to as an anti-discipline,
providing the motivation to break down disciplinary walls by embracing paradox and de-
veloping alternative logics (e.g., Spencer Brown 1972; Varela 1975; Kauffman 1987) and
to organize instead around problems or projects where all currently best available knowl-
edge can be applied. What is learned is then no longer owned by a discipline.
16. For now, we live in knowledge structures that are, given our current language and
its logic, disciplinary. What we can do, and what I think SOC suggests, is to work within
our disciplines to:

7. I use the word “dynamics” to speak of a pattern of changes, where change, rather than object
or entity, is fundamental. Dynamics, in its pure sense, cannot be articulated and is therefore of
little use in explanations of phenomena. Attempts to include dynamics in explanations involve
extreme simplifications, typically linear and kinematic, as measured by an external and standard
clock. This actually removes the dynamics from what was experienced by the observer/listener/
participant prior to the explanation. Dynamics can be appreciated, just as our experiences can
be appreciated. Dynamics can be approached through art forms by manipulating language, as in
poetry (verbal), dance (kinesthetic), theatre (verbal and gestural), music (audial), drawing and
sculpture (visual), etc.

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a. raise awareness of the limits of our domains of inquiry and their logics;
b. use differences in language and logic to compose asynchronicities as triggers for
conversations across disciplines;
c. learn the languages and logics of other disciplines to generate new ideas in our
own;
d. explore alternative logics for reformulating our disciplines and the domains within
them, particularly those logics that offer alternatives to hierarchical structuring;
and
e. reformulate our disciplines to account for time and dynamics.
17. Maturana (1978, 1980), for example, has reformulated biology as a relational
science rather than a physical science. He explicitly recognizes the non-intersecting do-
mains of relations (explanations) and dynamics (experience), and creates the dialectical
pair: structure (a changing pattern of relations) and organization (an invariant pattern of
dynamics) in the formulation. By taking this dialectical approach, he both accounts for
dynamics and introduces a non-hierarchical way of thinking into science. A dialectical way
of thinking8 generates processes rather than hierarchies. In his target article, Bernard Scott
has proposed reformulating the discipline of psychology using an SOC framework. I look
forward to a reformulation of psychology that is as useful to me as the reformulation of
biology has been, and perhaps even to a breakdown of disciplines and the hierarchies that
support them, as incompatible or opposing phenomenal domains bump into one another in
non-disciplinary conversations.

Desires and the problem of conscious purpose

18. The idea that systems are purposeful has been around from well before the advent
of modern cybernetics. In a paper regarded as seminal in the lead-up to cybernetics, Arturo
Rosenbleuth, Norbert Wiener and Julian Bigelow (1943) demonstrate how the idea of pur-
pose arises from simple feedback loops that maintain the value of one or more variables
within limits, i.e., the system’s constraints. Any system with constraints appears to have a
purpose as there are outcomes precluded from the set of possibilities. The problem in SOC
arises when the observers/designers specify the purpose of their designs, giving conscious
intent to their actions. Gregory Bateson (1972a, 1972b) warned of the dysfunctions of
conscious purpose when the actions taken do not and cannot account for all the ecological
circularities of the situation and the unanticipated consequences inherent in taking such
actions. Yet, humans have needs, desires, preferences and values; we are self-aware of our
actions and alternatives; and, we can act with intent to satisfy our needs and desires. To act
without self-awareness of our desires and the possible consequences of our actions would
be irresponsible. SOC may point to a different way of thinking about desires, intentions
and consciousness that addresses Bateson’s concerns.
19. Conscious purpose has come to be associated with the specification of desires as
goals or objectives to be achieved. The word goal is used as a point concept, a target to

8. I use the term “dialectical thinking” to speak of a process of connecting concepts such that: for
every idea, create at least one incompatible and/or opposing idea, let these ideas interact to gener-
ate new ideas and their incompatible and opposing ideas, and so on. Some ideas will emerge as
sufficiently desirable to try out. Others will serve to further the conversations that support this
way of thinking.

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pursue; a goal is a future end state separate from the means used to achieve it. The word
objective is often used as a vector concept to distinguish it from goal, i.e., a direction to be
pursued (as in maximize or minimize); an objective, like goal, is also future-oriented and
separated from the means used to accomplish it. I have proposed that desires be treated
as a set of constraints (Richards 1991, 2007). Specifying a set of constraints treats desires
as a spatial concept, focusing attention on the states we wish to exclude from happening,
leaving open a space of possible outcomes deemed currently acceptable. This approach is
present-oriented, merging ends and means: the set of constraints that represent our desires
and the actions we take to avoid what we do not want are here and now, and our evaluation
of possible consequences is based on current best available knowledge. Our desires, ac-
tions and evaluations can change as we experiment, learn and change, making it important
to be careful about excluding outcomes that could become useful as circumstances change.
Treating desires as constraints and intention as an awareness of desires as constraints
opens the door for an alternative to the consciousness of purpose about which Bateson was
concerned. I have called this alternative a “consciousness of presence” (Richards 2013a,
2013b), similar to the treatment offered by Eugen Herrigel (1953).
20. Treating desires as a set of constraints and shifting consciousness from the
achievement of goals in the future to the presentation of self in the here and now have sig-
nificant implications for science, design and society. While I think it is useful to continue to
try to apply SOC ideas to an explanation of human consciousness (see Diana Gasparyan’s
article), I also think it is important to recognize that SOC suggests that the important ques-
tions of science are undecidable questions (Foerster 2003b: 293) – questions that only
we can decide, questions of desire. Under SOC, scientists would be explicit about their
desires and values, as advocated by Feyerabend (1975), and build them into their research
designs. There may be no better example of an undecidable question than the question of
consciousness. We have the opportunity to explain human consciousness as a desirable
attribute. Designing also involves desires; Thomas Fischer and I (2017) discuss the impli-
cations of constraint-oriented design for designers and society. I have no doubt that a shift
to a consciousness of presence implies a society quite different from what we have now.
Technologies, behaviors and attitudes toward one another would be different; conversation
would be an activity of choice and the society would be fully participative and dialogic.

Craft and the problem of time

21. The prevalence of a time-less logic in commonly accepted paradigms, the unchal-
lenged assumption of an external standard clock9 in science and other human endeavors,
and the prevailing reliance on linear, unidirectional time in the application of conscious
purpose all point to the problem of time – namely, time is a human invention created to re-
solve the paradoxes of self-reference and allow us to move and act with volition (Richards
2016). Norbert Wiener recognized an aspect of the problem when he titled the first chapter
of his book “Newtonian and Bergsonian Time” (1961). A recent book (Canales 2015) de-
tails a debate on the subject of time between Bergson and Einstein. The standard clock is,
of course, useful to scientists who wish to replicate the results of experiments performed by

9. I use the word “clock” to speak of a way of sampling a dynamics. The idea of a clock is often
used as a surrogate for the idea of time. The standard clock discussed here is one that samples in
seconds, minutes, hours, days, years, etc., as synchronized with the regular rotation of the earth
on its axis and the regular revolution of the earth around the sun.

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other scientists, an aspect of science regarded as essential. Clocks also serve a social func-
tion for humans; we synchronize our clocks in order to get to the same place at the same
time as others with whom we wish to have conversations and to exhibit the kind of caring
for each other specific to humans. Different cultures employ different clocks and concepts
of time. The arts play with time and dynamics, even if artists do not express what they do
that way. In his target article, Tom Scholte proposes using the theatre as a playground to
experiment with the dynamics of human interaction, and therefore with time.
22. When we accept unwittingly an external and standard clock, we also accept that
it can become a tool of oppression – for example, the time sheet/card at work, or the
continual reminder that “time is money.” Our lives become regulated by the clock, stable
reward-oriented hierarchies arise to implement this mode of regulation, and goal-achieve-
ment becomes that to which we devote our every moment. A society of oppression is not
a just and equitable one. However, if time is a human invention, it stands to reason that it
can be manipulated. SOC, as a way of thinking that recognizes many possible concepts of
time, can raise awareness of alternatives. In my response to Scholte’s target article, I speak
of the cybernetician as a potential craftsperson in and with time. If cybernetics is realized
in the doing of it, the cybernetician draws on both science and the arts, equally and without
bias, and then adds the craft of cybernetics. The idea of craft merges art and science and
adds action. Being a craftsperson in and with time is different from being an artisan, where
one works with physical media – although I claim that all art manipulates time. Time is not
a medium in the same way that sound and paint are. Knowing when to say or do something
as an intervention, how loudly or softly to speak, how fast or slowly to move, what rhythm
to use, how to turn a flow into an event, when to emphasize or not – all of these involve a
kind of craftsmanship in and with time.
23. The cybernetician’s craft gets enacted in conversation. The idea of a fully par-
ticipative and dialogic society implies that time take on a different significance than is
manifest in most current societies. Ernst von Glasersfeld (2007), Herbert Brün (2004) and
Maturana10 have written about time in a way that reflects SOC. Luigi Boscolo and Paolo
Bertrando’s The Times of Time (1993) also deserves consideration. The idea that we can
manipulate time while still remaining social and without going crazy is new and needs
SOC. For example, if all technology mediates human interaction in some way or another,
new technologies that support a participative-dialogic society are indicated. When a soci-
ety adopts an ever-changing present approach to time and life and when clocks are treated
as a human choice in the moment, a revival of analog computing may be required in order
to accommodate and facilitate the non-linear dynamics represented by a conversation –
that is, the intensity and complexity of conversation may exceed the capability of what can
be accommodated or facilitated by the digital simulation of that dynamics. In a conversa-
tion, multiple clocks can be operating simultaneously. Gordon Pask (1979) advocated for
the kinetic design of computing devices, as an alternative to the current kinematic design
approach. Designing and building alternative devices in support of conversation is another
role, a collaborative one, for the craftsperson in and with time.

10. Unpublished manuscript “The Nature of Time” at http: //www.slideshare.net/Longsthride/the-

nature-of-time-humberto-maturana-1995

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Design and the problem of participation

24. I regard participation in a society, and in the decisions that alter that society and
our participation in it, as a human need. I use the word “participation” to speak of my
awareness that what I say or do makes a difference. To feel my participation restricted and
my ability to make a difference in the world non-existent is a classic description of oppres-
sion and to accept it as inevitable is to give up at least some of my humanity. I claim that
this feeling of inevitability and alienation is supported by prevailing ways of thinking about
power and causality and by the social structures that emanate from these ways of think-
ing – namely, reward-oriented hierarchies (Marianne Brün 2004). SOC may offer a way
of thinking (about ways of thinking) that could provide an alternative to thinking that the
only way to make a difference in the world is to have the power to cause things to happen,
and therefore to be in a sufficiently high position in the relevant hierarchy to be granted
that power. The challenge for the practice of design is that we need not only a process that
creates technologies and social systems that encourage and facilitate participation but also
one that is itself participative. It is design that can satisfy the human need for participa-
tion. Ranulph Glanville’s (2007) insistence that the design process be embedded in SOC is
instructive for new directions in both design and SOC.
25. I have written elsewhere (Richards 2013b) that thinking in terms of how dynam-
ics works as opposed to how causality works may be useful as an alternative to thinking
in terms of power as the only way to make a difference in the world. The mechanism
through which this kind of dynamics can work is conversation. Conversation undoes power
(Krippendorff 1995). Speaking metaphorically, the smallest of perturbations can trigger a
transformation of the fabric of dynamics world-wide: think in terms of a ripple that radiates
immediately throughout that fabric. There is no causal link that can be traced back to the
perturbation, and no evidence that can be brought to bear on the direct effects of actions
taken. Change just happens. There may be constraints on what transformations can happen
that may be worth studying prior to taking action – this is the cybernetician’s craft. In a
conversation, it is the asynchronicities introduced that can trigger new ideas and/or new
conversations. Hence, the Anticommunication Imperative: if you seek the new, compose
asynchronicity (Richards 2010).
26. Hierarchy is a way of thinking about simplifying a phenomenon that would oth-
erwise be too complex to control or manage by breaking it into subsystems or categories
that are more manageable. When applied to social structures, an intent is to keep people
who make up a unit of the social system from interacting or having to interact with people
in another unit. Responsibility for coordinating the units resides with a manager at the next
level of the hierarchy. So, hierarchical social structures, by intent, suppress conversation
(Richards 2013b). To get people to want to move up to managerial positions, rewards are
offered – both monetary rewards and increased authority and power. These systems are
then driven by goal achievement. I have discussed elsewhere the design of alternatives to
hierarchically organized academic conferences (Richards 2015a) and the design for greater
participation in these conferences (Richards 2015b).
27. The challenge of introducing non-hierarchical social structures into current soci-
ety, like Stafford Beer’s icosahedral (1994) or other polyhedral structures, is that hierarchi-
cal thinking is ubiquitous. Government structures are set up to accommodate hierarchical
organizations; they have legal status; and, technologies support and reinforce this way of
thinking. In almost everything we do day-to-day, we deal with social hierarchies in some

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form or another. To realize a fully participative and dialogic society, we need a change of
system, a new order of things, not just a change in the current system. I look to a collabora-
tion between design and SOC, like that proposed by Ben Sweeting in his target article, to
imagine a new society and how to bring it about, without violence. I would suggest that a
precondition for such a society is that all basic needs (food, fresh water, shelter, sanitation,
health care, education, etc.) be met unconditionally and not used as rewards. Until all basic
needs are met, however they are defined, the uniquely human need for participation will
be secondary and dismissed as a luxury, thus reinforcing non-participative processes and
non-dialogic structures.

Ethics and the problem of human nature

28. Von Foerster (2003b: 291) argued that, in a desirable society, ethics should operate
under the surface, like an underground river that we never see but that affects our behavior
in every moment. He also offered the Ethical Imperative: act always to increase the number
of choices (ibid: 303). Brün (2003: 118) formulated the concept of ethics as: dilute power,
increase freedom. The problem is that leaving ethics unlegislated or even unspoken opens
the door for what is sometimes called the dark side of human nature. Human nature is then
used to justify systems of oppression and control. Hierarchical structures and the control of
resources by the few is regarded as necessary to suppress the instincts referred to as human
nature. Without a system of incentives and sanctions, human society runs amuck.
29. Greed, cruelty, abuse of power, in fact all of the so-called deadly sins, are often
considered aspects of this dark version of human nature, and as such constitute behaviors
to be addressed and controlled in the design of a society. I claim that these aspects of hu-
man nature are constructs of the current society and used to place blame on individual
humans rather than on the systems that reinforce, even require, those behaviors – competi-
tion, rewards, self-interest, family. In a participative-dialogic society, humans exhibit kind-
ness, generosity, compassion and creativity, with systems that are compatible with and sup-
port those qualities. What would constitute these alternative systems? Louis Kauffman’s
characterization of SOC as a reflexive domain (see his target article) might be helpful as
a way of thinking about such systems. In a domain where self-reflection and self-other
reference are inherent, perhaps von Foerster’s statement of desire, “A is better off when B
is better off” (Foerster 2003a: 209), could be extended reflexively to “A is better off when
B is better off, and B is better off when A is better off,” and we could then work together
towards its realization. Umpleby’s explicit incorporation of ethics as a requirement in an
SOC-based science (§§60-62) represents a hopeful direction.

New directions and questions

30. Conversation is a common theme running through all six of these conceptual
problems. Conversation is enacted in cybernetics, and its SOC version is of potential inter-
est to all humans world-wide. There may be many ways to talk and think about SOC and
conversation, of which the six problems is only one. Personally, I think a new approach
to science is needed, I think we need more from the arts, and I think the craft of the cy-
bernetician needs substantial development. The challenge is that the only way we have of
thinking and talking about new ways of thinking is with the language and logic we cur-

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rently have, which reinforce many of the behaviors we may wish to avoid with new logics
and languages. I express the six problems in current language and thinking, yet they point
toward ways of thinking that suggest alternative language. Cybernetics provides a help-
ful vocabulary, but we may also need new grammatical and syntactical structures. In the
meantime, we can move ahead on addressing the six problems and pursuing the directions
implied by the six target articles, taking into consideration the questions raised by the open
peer commentaries.
31. There are three trends in SOC that I detect in some cybernetic articles and occa-
sionally at cybernetic conferences that I think deserve questioning if not outright avoiding.
32. First, I regard any vision of using SOC to unify all human knowledge to be both
futile and an affront to what it has to offer. The idea of unification is hierarchical, pointing
ultimately to a supreme being. SOC is about change and processes of change, including
change of SOC itself. The value of SOC is as a process that supports dialogue and partici-
pation. Conversation is a dialectical process of generating the new, of continuing to retard
the decay of variety that is an inevitable consequence of cybernetic thinking. That variety
decays should not be taken as a negative aspect of cybernetics; on the contrary, if variety
did not decay, we humans would have nothing to do.
33. Second, and similarly, SOC is not a candidate for a new ideology. SOC is not
asking to be believed; it is asking to be accepted as useful in understanding the world and
ourselves, designing new systems, and living our day-to-day lives in a way that gives some
hope for overcoming seemingly insurmountable obstacles to realizing our desires, and be-
yond our desires the desirable. While our work in SOC may decay towards unification or
ideology, we must be vigilant in seeking ways to retard that decay and embracing new
ideas that challenge that direction.
34. Third, and most recently, cybernetics (and SOC) is being described as a “science
of context” (Lissack §§16-19). I am willing to exhibit a little more patience with this idea,
given its recent appearance, as it might still be useful as a trigger for some new questions
– that is, it qualifies as a potential asynchronicity. However, I don’t know where to go with
it in order to have the conversation. I understand what science is, and I understand the
word “context”, but I have yet to draw any significance from the combination: a science
of context. The question at this point is: How can we understand the word context so that
a science devoted to it is useful? If the word “context” is used in its traditional sense, as
whatever a receiver of a message needs to know to understand the intent of the sender or to
formulate their own intent, then we are talking about a science of communication, which
is not new. If the word “context” is used in its broad sense, as any and all circumstances
that might affect an observer’s looking, listening and acting in a particular situation – that
is, language, culture, education, family history, experiences, etc. – then we may be talk-
ing about a science of everything, and that is not particularly useful. If the word “context”
is used to talk specifically about the ways of thinking, including the desires and values,
brought to bear on a situation, then we have a science of context-making, or better: the art,
science and craft of context-making. This is a description of design and an argument for the
merger of cybernetics and design (Glanville 2007; Fischer & Richards 2017).

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 Possible Futures for Cybernetics
Karl H. Müller, Stuart A. Umpleby & Alexander Riegler

1.  In the field of science studies the term “boundary work” is used to describe writ-
ings by scientists that distinguish their field from other fields (see also Kline §8). This vol-
ume presents the boundary work for second-order cybernetics (SOC) and describes what
we believe will be its future scope and dimensions.  
2. During the Macy conferences in the late 1940s and early 1950s a group of aca-
demics from a wide range of fields came together to discuss the development of a general
theory of control and communication, of information and regulation, of learning, adapta-
tion and understanding, as a complement to the general theory of matter and energy in the
natural sciences.
3. In the 1950s and 1960s the field of cybernetics attracted widespread interest. Peo-
ple from many social science and engineering disciplines read and were influenced by the
publications from the Macy group. However, the commitments of most readers remained
to their home disciplines. They took ideas like feedback and the importance of communica-
tion and decision-making and used them in their home disciplines. Since most researchers
were employed teaching traditional courses, after a few years of reading about cybernetics,
they chose to work in the traditional disciplines.
4. Fortunately, a few people remained attracted to the new field, even if they contin-
ued to teach in their traditional disciplines. As a result, cybernetics continued to evolve,
and as it did, new ideas were invented:
ƒƒ self-organizing systems in the 1960s,
ƒƒ the biology of cognition, management cybernetics and autopoiesis in the 1970s,
ƒƒ reflexivity and its connection to ethics and macro-economics in the 1980s,
ƒƒ design in the 1990s, and
ƒƒ a fruitful critique of science in the 2000s.
5. In the 1950s and 1960s centers and institutes dedicated to systems and cybernetics
were established on several campuses in the US. But in the 1980s and 1990s these centers
and institutes began to close as their founders, often immigrants from Europe, retired. Uni-
versities had degree programs and tenure-track positions in the traditional disciplines but
not in systems and cybernetics.
6. Nevertheless, the ideas in cybernetics continued to attract enthusiastic multi-dis-
ciplinary groups on several campuses. While from the late 1970s to about 2010 journal
articles by North American authors declined steadily (see Figure 1), in the last 15 years an
increasing number of books about the achievements of cybernetics have been published
and earlier books have been reissued (Figure 2). There is widespread recognition that
break-through, game-changing research results from multi-disciplinary teams (Umpleby,

375

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100
90 Asia
80 Europe
70 North America
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010

Figure 1. Number of articles per year by region over time in the three journals Cybernet-
ics and Systems, Kybernetes and Systems Research and Behavioral Science (adapted from
Umpleby, Wu & Hughes 2017).

Anbari & Müller 2007), even though universities continue to operate with reward systems
that favor narrow specialization.
7. Although there are currently no courses or academic positions in the theoretical and
philosophical aspects of cybernetics, we feel the future of the field is bright for several rea-
sons: Cybernetics is a transdisciplinary field that has influenced and has been influenced by
many fields, including neurophysiology (Maturana 1975), psychology (Watzlawick 1983),
engineering (Sage 1992), management (Beer 1972; Ackoff 1981; Schwaninger 2008),
mathematics (Wiener 1948; Kauffman 2016), political science (Deutsch 1966), sociol-
ogy (Buckley 1968), economics (Soros 1987), anthropology (Bateson 1972; Mead 1964),
philosophy (Abraham 2016) and design (Glanville 2015). Cybernetics conferences attract
people from all of these fields and the conference participants communicate easily with one
another because of shared assumptions, principles, and models.
8. Cybernetics and its sister field of systems science provide transdisciplinary ideas
that make it easier for people from diverse fields to work together. The problems of the
future will increasingly require the efforts of people from several disciplines. Although
Americans, with their focus on practical problem-solving, tend to neglect theory and phi-
losophy, other countries, such as Russia and China, in addition to Europe, are taking an
interest in cybernetics.
9. Today professional people are spending several hours a day in cyberspace, cyber-
security is a major concern domestically and internationally, and cyber infrastructure is
spreading around the world, but most people, including academics, have not known that a
science of cybernetics exists. Some people have thought that the field of cybernetics ended
in the mid-1970s, at about the same time that SOC was invented (Pickering 2010; Kline
2015).
10. In its contemporary form SOC continues to focus on circularities and their inher-
ent paradoxes as well as on solutions to operate in and with these circularities. SOC is tied
to circularities like Prometheus to the stone. In Greek mythology Prometheus is a great
benefactor who steals fire from Mount Olympus and presents it to mankind. Similarly,

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12

10 Europe
8 North America

0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 2. Number of recent books about cybernetics (adapted from Umpleby, Wu &
Hughes 2017).

SOC steals circularities from their paradoxical and self-destructive past and offers them as
a great gift to science.
11. SOC is to cybernetics what quantum mechanics is to physics – new ideas and a new
direction. SOC has fundamentally reinterpreted the field of cybernetics. Assuming that cy-
bernetics is another term for computer technology fundamentally misunderstands the field
because it misses completely the theoretical and philosophical implications of cybernetics
for our understanding of cognition, society and ethics.
12. SOC starts with circular configurations and their paradoxes and transforms them
into new horizons for scientific research or reflective practices in applied or artistic fields.
This cybernetic core function can be classified as the cybernetic attractor or as the eigen-
form for cybernetics itself. Eigenforms, following Heinz von Foerster (1976), reproduce
themselves through circular configurations regardless of their starting points.
13. One of these circular configurations was presented at the first  conference of
the American Society for Cybernetics when Margaret Mead gave a lecture with the title
“Cybernetics of Cybernetics” and spoke of the challenging task of exploring cybernetics
with the methods and tools of cybernetics itself (Mead 1968). The circularities inherent
in Mead’s lecture have been expanded and generalized to a circular configuration within
science where first-order science is the science of exploring the world and second-order
science becomes the science of reflecting on these explorations. In this configuration SOC
offers new perspectives for science and motivates a second-order science (Riegler & Mül-
ler 2014) as a vast and largely unexplored science frontier with a high innovation potential
and multiple methods for quality improvements in science.
14. Another circular configuration deals with observers and their domains of research.
It can be classified as an observer-circularity following von Foerster’s distinction between
first-order cybernetics as the cybernetics of observed systems and second-order cybernet-
ics as the cybernetics of observing systems (Foerster 1974).
15. The fifty-six contributions in this book deal with the observer-circularity and gen-
eralize and transform it to different epistemic modes of science, i.e., explorations from

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without (exo-mode) and explorations from within (endo-mode). They present the current
state of the art with respect to new horizons for science in the endo-mode.
16. As can be seen in the present volume, the agenda for innovative explorations in
the endo-mode is highly complex, diversified, challenging and transdisciplinary. It can be
separated into several broad areas focusing on building a new general methodology of sci-
ence, constructing endo-methodologies for scientific fields and disciplines, reframing and
contextualizing research problems, searching circular practices within applied disciplines
or establishing circular reflexive approaches in artistic domains.
17. Circular configurations abound in biological and social systems and include also
a variety of other self-referential or reflexive circularities, such as therapy, negotiation,
planning, and design. Cybernetics calls attention to and illuminates such circularities in a
way new to science.  In all these instances SOC performs a crucial midwife function and
converts circular configurations and their inherent paradoxes into new scientific challenges
and innovative perspectives for the respective state of the scientific art. This function has
remained the stable core of SOC since its early days and will continue as such in the future
even if SOC disappears from the map of scientific landscapes. 
18. The present book shows that cybernetics and second-order cybernetics are again
enjoying a widespread interest that is maintained by a vital and living organization and
shared by a large community of researchers, designers or artists in a variety of academic
disciplines, applied domains or artistic niches around the world.

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