G.R. No.

72005 May 29, 1987

PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT; SYCWIN COATING & WIRES, INC., and
DOMINADOR CACPAL, CHIEF DEPUTY SHERRIF OF MANILA, respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Resolution dated September 12, 1985 of the
Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. CR-05409 1 granting private respondent's motion for execution pending
appeal and ordering the issuance of the corresponding writ of execution on the counterbond to lift attachment filed by petitioner. The focal
issue that emerges is whether an order of execution pending appeal of a judgment maybe enforced on the said bond . In the Resolution of
September 25, 1985 2 this Court as prayed for, without necessarily giving due course to the petition, issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the respondents from enforcing the order complaint of.

The records disclose that private respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a complaint for
collection of a sum of money against Varian Industrial Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. During the pendency of the suit, private respondent succeeded in attaching some of
the properties of Varian Industrial Corporation upon the posting of a supersedeas bond.   The latter 3

in turn posted a counterbond in the sum of P1,400, 000.00   thru petitioner Philippine British 4

Assurance Co., Inc., so the attached properties were released.

On December 28, 1984, the trial court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED, and judgment is
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Varian Industrial Corporation, and
the latter is hereby ordered:

1. To pay plaintiff the amount of P1,401,468.00, the principal obligation with 12% interest per
annum from the date of default until fully paid;
2. To pay plaintiff 5% of the principal obligation as liquidated damages;
3. To pay plaintiff P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. To pay plaintiff 15% of P1,401,468.00, the principal obligation, as and for attorney's fees; and
5. To pay the costs of suit.
Accordingly, the counterclaim of the defendant is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.  5

Varian Industrial Corporation appealed the decision to the respondent Court. Sycwin then filed a
petition for execution pending appeal against the properties of Varian in respondent Court. Varian
was required to file its comment but none was filed. In the Resolution of July 5, 1985, respondent
Court ordered the execution pending appeal as prayed for.   However, the writ of execution was
6

returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the previously attached personal properties upon
demand. In a Petition dated August 13, 1985 filed with respondent Court Sycwin prayed that the
surety (herein petitioner) be ordered to pay the value of its bond.   In compliance with the Resolution
7

of August 23, 1985 of the respondent Court herein petitioner filed its comment.    In the Resolution of 8

September 12, 1985,   the respondent Court granted the petition. Hence this action.
9

It is the submission of private respondent Sycwin that without a previous motion for reconsideration
of the questioned resolution, certiorari would not lie. While as a general rule a motion for
reconsideration has been considered a condition sine qua non for the granting of a writ of certiorari,
this rule does not apply when special circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action. 10 It
has been held further that a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with in cases like this where execution had
been ordered and the need for relief was extremely urgent. 11
The counterbond provides:

WHEREAS, in the above-entitled case pending in the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch LXXXV, Quezon City, an order of Attachment was issued against
abovenamed Defendant;

WHEREAS, the Defendant, for the purpose of lifting and/or dissolving the order of attachment
issued against them in the above-en-titled case, have offered to file a counterbond in the sum of
PESOS ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND ONLY (P1,400,000.00), Philippine
Currency, as provided for in Section 5, Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court.

NOW, THEREFORE, we, VARIAN INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, as Principal and the

PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC., a corporation duly organized and
existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, as Surety, in consideration of the
above and of the lifting or dissolution of the order of attachment, hereby jointly and severally,
bind ourselves in favor of the above Plaintiff in the sum of PESOS ONE MILLION FOUR
HUNDRED THOUSAND ONLY (P1,400,000.00), Philippine Currency, under the condition that
in case the Plaintiff recovers judgment in the action, and Defendant will, on demand, re-deliver
the attached property so released to the Officer of the Court and the same shall be applied to
the payment of the judgment, or in default thereof, the defendant and Surety will, on demand,
pay to the Plaintiff the full value of the property released.

EXECUTED at Manila, Philippines, this 28th day of June, 1984. 12

Sections 5, 12, and 17 of Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court also provide:

SEC. 5. Manner of attaching property. — The officer executing the order shall without delay
attach, to await judgment and execution in the action, all the properties of the party against
whom the order is issued in the province, not exempt from execution, or so much thereof as
may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand, unless the former makes a deposit with the
clerk or judge of the court from which the order issued, or gives a counter-bond executed to the
applicant, in an amount sufficient to satisfy such demand besides costs, or in an amount equal
to the value of the property which is about to be attached, to secure payment to the applicant of
any judgement which he may recover in the action. The officer shall also forthwith serve a copy
of the applicant's affidavit and bond, and of the order of attachment, on the adverse party, if he
be found within the province.

SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counterbond. — At any time after an order of
attachment has been granted, the party whose property has been attached, or the person
appearing on his behalf, may, upon reasonable notice to the applicant, apply to the judge who
granted the order, or to the judge of the court in which the action is pending, for an order
discharging the attachment wholly or in part on the security given. The judge shall, after
hearing, order the discharge of the attachment if a cash deposit is made, or a counter-bond
executed to the attaching creditor is filed, on behalf of the adverse party, with the clerk or judge
of the court where the application is made, in an amount equal to the value of the property
attached as determined by the judge, to secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching
creditor may recover in the action. Upon the filing of such counter-bond, copy thereof shall
forthwith be served on the attaching creditor or his lawyer. Upon the discharge of an attachment
in accordance with the provisions of this section the property attached, or the proceeds of any
sale thereof, shall be delivered to the party making the deposit or giving the counterbond
aforesaid standing in place of the property so released. Should such counterbond for any
reason be found to be, or become, insufficient, and the party furnishing the same fail to file an
additional counterbond, the attaching creditor may apply for a new order of attachment.
 SEC. 17. When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had upon bond. — If the execution be
returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, the surety or sureties on any counter-bond given
pursuant to the provisions of this rule to secure the payment of the judgment shall become
charged on such counter- bond, and bound to pay to the judgement creditor upon demand, the
amount due under the judgment, which amount may be recovered from such surety or sureties
after notice and summary hearing in the same action. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under Sections 5 and 12, Rule 57 above reproduced it is provided that the counterbond is intended
to secure the payment of "any judgment" that the attaching creditor may recover in the action. Under
Section 17 of same rule it provides that when "the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in
part" it is only then that "payment of the judgment shall become charged on such counterbond."

The counterbond was issued in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57 of the Rules of
Court as provided in the second paragraph aforecited which is deemed reproduced as part of the
counterbond. In the third paragraph it is also stipulated that the counterbond is to be "applied for the
payment of the judgment." Neither the rules nor the provisions of the counterbond limited its
application to a final and executory judgment. Indeed, it is specified that it applies to the payment
of any judgment that maybe recovered by plaintiff. Thus, the only logical conclusion is that an
execution of any judgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied maybe charged
against such a counterbond.

It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.  Ubi
lex non distinguish nec nos distinguere debemos.  13 "The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that
general words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance.  14 The rule requires that a
general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the
operation of the law. 15 In other words, there should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated. 16 For courts are
not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but
as they find it and without regard to consequences. 17

A corollary of the principle is the rule that where the law does not make any exception, courts may
not except something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify
it.18 Thus where a statute grants a person against whom possession of "any land" is unlawfully withheld the right to bring an action for
unlawful detainer, this Court held that the phrase "any land" includes all kinds of land, whether agricultural, residential, or mineral.19 Since
the law in this case does not make any distinction nor intended to make any exception, when it speaks of "any judgment" which maybe
charged against the counterbond, it should be interpreted to refer not only to a final and executory judgment in the case but also a judgment
pending appeal.

All that is required is that the conditions provided for by law are complied with, as outlined in the
case of Towers Assurance Corporation v. Ororama Supermart,  20

Under Section 17, in order that the judgment creditor might recover from the surety on the
counterbond, it is necessary (1) that the execution be first issued against the principal debtor
and that such execution was returned unsatisfied in whole or in part; (2) that the creditor
make a demand upon the surety for the satisfaction of the judgment, and (3) that the surety
be given notice and a summary hearing on the same action as to his liability for the judgment
under his counterbond.

The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in accordance with the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be charged with the payment of any
judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and executory judgement but also the
execution of a judgment pending appeal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the restraining order issued
on September 25, 1985 is hereby dissolved with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 131909 February 18, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ALFREDO CABRAL, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 30, Camarines Sur and RODERICK
ODIAMAR, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

Assailed before this Court is the August 1, 1997 decision   of the Court of Appeals in CA GR. No.
1

42318 which affirmed the March 24, 1995 and June 14, 1996 orders   of the lower court granting
2

accused-respondent's Motion for Bail and denying petitioner People's Motions "to Recall and
Invalidate Order of March 24, 1995" and "to Recall and/or Reconsider the Order of May 5, 1995"
confirming the hospitalization of accused-respondent.

Accused-respondent Roderick Odiamar was charged with rape upon the complaint of Cecille
Buenafe. In a bid to secure temporary liberty, accused- respondent filed a motion praying that he be
released on bail which petitioner opposed by presenting real, documentary and testimonial evidence.
The lower court, however, granted the motion for bail in an order, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, the evidence not being strong at the (sic) stage of the trial, this court is
constrained to grant bail for the provisional liberty of the accused Roderick Odiamar in the
amount of P30,000.00. (Emphasis supplied)

Believing that accused-respondent was not entitled to bail as the evidence against him was strong,
the prosecution filed the two abovementioned motions which the lower court disposed of, thus:

WHEREFORE, the motions dated 10 May 1995 and 15 May 1995 both filed by Atty. Romulo
Tolentino, State Prosecutor, are hereby denied, for lack of merit.

The above-cited orders prompted petitioner to file a petition before the Court of Appeals with prayer
for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals denied the petition
reasoning thus:

We have examined in close and painstaking detail the records of this case, and find that the
claim of the People that the respondent judge had over-stepped the exercise of his
jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders, is unimpressed with merit. We are not inclined
to declare that there was grave abuse in respondent court's exercise of its discretion in
allowing accused to obtain bail. There is grave abuse of discretion where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. We do not find this to be so in this case. Our
ruling is based not only on the respect to be accorded the findings of facts of the trial court,
which had the advantage (not available to Us) of having observed first-hand the quality of the
autoptic preference and the documentary exhibits of the parties, as well as the demeanor of
the witnesses on the stand, but is grounded on the liberal slant given by the law in favor of
the accused. Differently stated, in the absence of clear, potent and compelling reasons, We
are not prepared to supplant the exercise of the respondent court's discretion with that of Our
own.
Still convinced by the merit of its case, petitioner filed the instant petition submitting the following
sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION
AND RESOLUTION DESPITE A SHOWING BY THE PROSECUTION THAT THERE IS STRONG
EVIDENCE PROVING RESPONDENT'S GUILT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.

The above-submitted issue pertains to the orders of the lower court granting used-respondent's
application for bail which it justified through its summary of the evidence presented during the
hearing. Said order states, thus:

Now going over the evidence adduced in conjunction with the petition for bail filed by the
accused through counsel, the court believes that the evidence so far presented by the
prosecution is not strong. This is so because the crime of rape is not to be presumed;
consent and not physical force is the common origin of acts between man and woman.
Strong evidence and indication of great weight alone support such presumption. It is the
teaching of applicable doctrines that form the defense in rape prosecution. In the final
analysis, it is entitled to prevail, not necessarily because the untarnished truth is on its side
but merely because it can raise reasonable, not fanciful doubts. It has the right to require the
complainant (sic) strong evidence and an indication of great weight (People v. Godoy, G.R.
No. L-31177, July 15, 1976), and in the instant case, the reasonable doubt is on the
evidence of the prosecution, more so, because the intrinsic nature of the crime, the
conviction or the acquittal of the accused depends almost entirely on the credibility of the
complainant (People v. Oliquino, G.R. No. 94703, May 31, 1993). Rightly so, because in the
commission of the offense of rape the facts and circumstances occuring either prior, during
and subsequent thereto may provide conclusion whether they may negate the commission
thereof by the accused (People v. Flores, L-6065, October 26, 1986). If they negate, they do
presuppose that the evidence for the prosecution is not strong. More so, because in the
instant case, the facts and circumstances showing that they do seem to negate the
commission thereof were mostly brought out during the cross-examination. As such, they
deserve full faith and credence because the purpose thereof is to test accuracy and
truthfulness and freedom from interest and bias or the reverse (Rule 132, Sec. 6, Revised
Rules of Evidence). The facts and circumstances brought up are as follow, to wit:

a) That, when the offended party Cecille Buenafe rode in the jeepney then driven by
the accused Roderick Odiamar in that evening of July 20, 1994 at about 8:00 o'clock
from the Poblacion, Lagonoy, Camarines Sur the former knew that it was for a joy
ride. In fact, she did not even offer any protest when the said jeepney proceeded to
the Pilapil Beach resort at Telegrafo, San Jose, Camarines Sur instead of Sabang,
same municipality, where she and Stephen Florece intended to go. And when the said
jeepney was already inside that resort, Cecille even followed the accused in going
down from the jeepney also without protest on her part, a fact which shows
voluntariness on the part of the offended party and, therefore, to the mind of the court
her claim of rape should not be received with precipitate credulity. On the contrary, an
insight into the human nature is necessary (People v. Barbo, 56 SCRA 495). And it is
only when the testimony is impeccable and rings true throughout where it shall be
believed (People v. Tapao, G.R. No. L-41704, October 23, 1981). Rightly so, because
the aphorism that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but it must be credible in itself in conformity with the common
experience and observation of mankind is nowhere of moral relevance than in cases
involving prosecution of rape (People v. Macatangay, 107 Phil. 188);

b) That, in that resort, when the accused Roderick Odiamar and companions allegedly
forced the offended party Cecille Buenafe to drink gin, the latter, at first, refused and
even did not swallow it but later on voluntarily took four (4) shots there shows that
there (was) no force. And as regards the claim that the accused Roderick Odiamar
and companions allegedly forced the said offended party to inhale smoke, out of a
small cigarette, presumably a marijuana, it becomes doubtful because the
prosecution, however, failed to present any portion of that so-called small cigarette
much less did it present an expert witness to show that inhaling of smoke from the
said cigarette would cause dizziness. Rightly so, because administration of narcotics
is covered by Art. 335, par. 2 Revised Penal Code (People v. Giduces C.A. 38 O.C.
1434 cited in the Revised Penal Code, Aquino, Vol.III, pp. 392). As such, the burden
of proof rests with the prosecution but it failed to do so;

c) That, in that cottage where the accused, Roderick Odiamar allegedly brought the
offended party, Cecille Buenafe, the former was able to consummate the alleged
offense of rape by removing the two (2) hands of the offended party, placed them on
her knee, separating them thereby freeing the said hand and consequently pushed
the head of the accused but the latter was able to insert his penis when the said
offended party was no longer moving and the latter became tired. Neither evidence
has been presented to show that the offended party suffered an injury much less any
part of her pants or blouse was torn nor evidence to show that there was an
overpowering and overbearing moral influence of the accused towards the offended
party (People v. Mabunga, G.R. No. 96441d, March 13, 1992) more so, because force
and violence in the offense of rape are relative terms, depending on the age, size and
strength of the parties and their relation to each other (People v. Erogo, 102077
January 4, 1994);

d) That, after the alleged commission of rape at about 3:00 o'clock in the early
morning of July 21, 1994, the offended party, Cecille, Stephen Florece and the latter's
companions all boarded the same jeepney going back to the Poblacion of Lagonoy,
without the said offended party, protesting, crying or in any way showing sign of grief
regarding the alleged commission of the offense of rape until the jeepney reached the
house of Roderick Odiamar where the latter parked it. As in other cases, the
testimony of the offended party shall not be accepted unless her sincerity and candor
are free from suspicion, because the nature of the offense of rape is an accusation
easy to be made, hard to be proved but harder to be defended by the party accused
though innocent (People v. Francisco G.R. No. L-43789, July 15, 1981). It becomes
necessary, therefore, for the courts to exercise the most painstaking care in
scrutinizing the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution (People v. Dayag, L-
30619, March 29, 1974);

e) That the offended party, Cecille Buenafe had herself physically examined by Dr.
Josephine Decena for medical certificate dated July 27, 1994 and it states, among
others, that there was a healed laceration on the hymen, her laceration might have
been sustained by the said offended party, a month, six (6) months, and even a year,
prior to the said examination and that the said laceration might have been caused by
repeated penetration of a male sex organ probably showing that the offended party
might have experienced sexual intercourse. This piece of testimony coming from an
expert, such finding is binding to court (Rules of Court, Moran, op.cit,vol 5, 1963, ed.
pp. 413).

f) That the offended party, Cecille Buenafe accompanied by the Station Commander
of Lagonoy, Camarines Sur, proceeded to Naga City and upon the suggestion of Gov.
Bulaong, the said offended party submitted for medical treatment before the same
physician per medical certificate dated August 1, 1994 but according to the said
physician the lesions near the umbilicus were due to skin diseases but the said
offended party claim they were made by the accused after the sexual acts. As such,
 there were contradictions on material points, it becomes of doubtful veracity (People
v. Palicte 83 Phil.) and it also destroys the testimony (People v. Garcia, G.R. No.
13086, March 27, 1961). As to the fact that the said lesion was made by the accused
subsequent to the commission of the act, it is immaterial. As such, it has no probative
value.

The lower court concluded that the evidence of guilt was not strong.

The office of the Solicitor General disagreed with the lower court. It opined that aside from failing to
include some pieces of evidence in the summary, the trial also misapplied some well-established
doctrines of criminal law. The Office of the Solicitor General pointed out the following circumstances
duly presented in the hearing for bail:

First. There was no ill motive on the part of Cecille to impute the heinous crime of rape
against respondent (People v. Paragsa, 83 SCRA 105 [1978]; People v. Delovino, 247
SCRA 637 [1995]).

Second. Dr. Belmonte, the psychiatrist who attended to Cecille testified that based on her
psychiatric examination of the latter, Cecille manifested psychotic signs and symptoms such
as unusual fear, sleeplessness, suicidal thoughts, psychomotor retardation, poverty of
thought content as well as depressive signs and symptoms. These abnormal psychological
manifestations, according to Dr. Belmonte, are traceable to the rape incident (Pages 5-7,
TSN, November 22, 1994.)

Third. The unrebutted offer of compromise by respondent is an implied admission of guilt

(People v. Flore, 239 SCRA 83 [1994]).

Fourth. Cecille was threatened by a deadly weapon and rendered unconscious by

intoxication and inhalation of marijuana smoke.

Fifth. The fact that after the conduct of two (2) preliminary investigations, "no bail was
recommended in the information" constitutes "clear and strong evidence of the guilt of (all)
the accused" (Baylon v. Sison, 243 SCRA 284 [1995].

Sixth. Cecille categorically testified on re-cross examination (pages 5-7, Order) that

respondent succeeded in forcibly deflowering her because she was already weak and dizzy
due to the effect of the smoke and the gin. Her declarations remain unrebutted.

Seventh. Cecille categorically testified that she performed acts manifesting her lament,
torment and suffering due to the rape. She went to Stephen Florece, cried and complained
about the incident. Instead of helping her, Florece threatened to harm her and her family.
(Pages 9-13, November 17, 1994). The statements of Cecille are positive statements which,
under existing jurisprudence, are stronger than the denials put forth by respondent (Batiquin
v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 334 [1996]).

Eight. The reliance by trial court on the testimony of Dr. Decena to the effect that the
lacerations suffered by Cecille "might have been sustained by the latter a month, six (6)
months or even a year prior to the examination" (Page 12 (e), Order, March 24, 1995) thus
implying that respondent could not have committed the crime is highly misplaced.

Dr. Decena herself testified that she cannot tell "how old is an old hymenal laceration"
because she cannot indicate when an old laceration was inflicted and that from the size of
the vagina she "could not point the exact cause" (Pages 7-10, TSN, December 9, 1994).
Nevertheless, proof of hymenal laceration is not indispensable in indictments for rape as a
 broken hymen is not an essential element of the crime (People v. Echegaray, 257 SCRA 561
[1996]). Further, in crimes against chastity, the medical examination of the victim's genitalia
is not an indispensable element for the successful prosecution of the crime. The examination
is merely corroborative in nature. (People v. Arce, 227 SCRA 406 [1993]).

Ninth. With respect to the cigarette wounds, Dr, Decena positively testified that the wounds
could have been '"aused by cigarette butts as alleged by the victim" (Page 6, TSN,
December 9, 1994) which confirms Cecile's testimony (quoted in the Order at page 9) that
respondent burned her "right side of the stomach" thrice.

The above points are well taken and have impressed upon this Court the merits of the instant
petition.

The 1987 Constitution in Article III, Section 13 of the Bill of Rights provides:

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required. (Emphasis supplied)

In view of the above exception to the constitutional guarantee on bail and in accordance with its rule-
making powers,   the Supreme Court, in promulgating the Rules of Court, adopted the following
3

provision:

Sec. 7. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by  reclusion

perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.   (Emphasis suppplied)
4

In this case, accused-respondent was being charged with rape qualified by the use of a deadly
weapon punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.   As such, bail is discreationary and not a matter
5

of right. The grant or denial of an application for is, therefore, dependent on whether the evidence of
guilt is strong which the lower should determine in a hearing called for the purpose. The
determination of the evidence of guilt is strong, in this regard, is a matter of judicial discretion. While
the lower court would never be deprived of its mandated prerogative to exercise judicial discretion,
this Court would unhesitatingly reverse the trial court's findings if found to be laced with grave abuse
of discretion.

By judicial discretion, the law mandates the determination of whether proof is evident or the
presumption of guilt is strong.   "Proof evident" or "Evident proof" in this connection has been held to
6

mean clear, strong evidence which leads a well-guarded disspositionate judgment to the conclusion
that the offense has been committed as charged, that accused is the guilty agent, and that he will
probably be punished capitally if the law is administered.   "Presumption great" exists when the
7

circumstances testified to are such that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is
strong, clear, and convinsing to an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of any
other conlusion.   Even though there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused, if on an
8

examination of the entire record the presumption is great that accused is guilty of a capital offense,
bail should be refused.   (Emphasis and supplied)
9

In other words, the test is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt but
rather whether it shows evident guilt or a great presumption of guilt. As such, the court is
ministerially bound to decide which circumstances and factors are present which would show evident
guilt or presumption of guilt as defined above.  10
This Court has observed that the lower court's order failed to mention and include some significant
factors and circumstances which, to the mind of this Court are strong, clear and convincing. First, it
excluded the testimony of Dr. Belmonte about her psychiatric examination of the victim as well as
her findings that the latter manifested "psychotic signs and symptoms such as unusual fear,
sleeplessness, suicidal thoughts, psychomotor retardation, poverty of thought content as well as
depressive signs and symptom."   This particular testimony should have been considered and
11

included in the summary as it was given by an expert witness. Second, the unrebutted offer of
compromise by accused-respondent is an implied admission of guilt which should have been noted
as an offer of a compromise is generally considered as admissible evidence against the party
making it. 
12

Aside from failing to mention those important pieces of evidence and testimonies, this Court has
likewise observed that the lower court misappplied some doctrines in criminal law. First, the lower
court, in its order, intoned the following doctrine that "evidence to be believed must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself in conformity with common
experience and observation of mankind."

According to the lower court, the credibility of the complainant is suspect because she willingly went
with accused-respondent to the resort where she was allegedly raped. In the scene of the crime,
complainant allegedly voluntarily drank four shots of gin. The complainant, likewise, never protested
nor cried while they on their way to accused-respondent's house. Because of those findings, the
court doubted the credibility of complainant and stated that the crime of rape is not to be presumed
and that sexual acts between a man and a woman are presumed to be consensual. In overcoming
such presumption, much depends on the credibility of the complainant.

This Court cannot agree. First, there was no finding of any ill-motive on the part of complainant in
filing the rape charge against accused-respondent. This should have been taken into consideration.
The following rebuttal of petitioner to the findings of the lower court is more credible:

It must also be stressed that Cecille testified that she was forced by respondent to drink gin
with the help of his friends by holding her hair and putting the glass on her mouth (Pages 5-
7, TSN, November 17, 1994). More, respondent and his friends blew smoke into her face
forcing her to inhale the intoxicating smoke. Whenever she attempted to leave the place, she
was forced to sit down by Odiamar and his friends (Pages 6-7, TSN, November 17, 1994).

Similarly, Cecille categorically declared that she was threatened by Florece with a gun (Page
17, TSN, November 17, 1994).

The requirement of force and intimidation in the crime of rape are relative and must be
viewed in light of the victim's perspective and the offender's physical condition (People v.
Plaza, 242 SCRA 724 [1995]). Further, physical resistance need not be established in rape
when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself against her will
because of fear for life and personal safety. (People v. Ramos, 245 SCRA 405 [19951)

In this case, Cecille was only fifteen (l5) years old at the time of the incident in question. At
her age, it is reasonable to assume that a shot of gin rendered her tipsy. Thus, four (4) shots
of gin must have rendered her dizzy, intoxicated and deprived of will or reason. The resulting
weakness and dizziness which deprived Cecille of reason, will and freedom must be viewed
in light of her perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime, and not by
any hard and fast rule because in "rape cases, submission does not necessarily imply
volition." (Querido, 229 SCRA 745 [1994])

It must likewise be taken into consideration that when Cecille went with the group of accused-
respondent, she was of the impression that it was just for a joy ride. The conclusion made by the trial
court that Cecille must have consented to the sexual act because she acquiesced to go with them in
the first place is, therefore, bereft of any legal or factual support, if not non sequitur. That she agreed
to accompany them for a joy ride does not mean that she also agreed to the bestial acts later
committed against her person.

Second, the lower court stated that "force and violence in the offense of rape relative terms,
depending on the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to each other." The lower
court enunciated this doctrine in finding that the alleged rape was actually a consensual act since the
prosecution was unable to show the complainant suffered any injury nor show any evidence that her
pants or blouse was torn. Neither was there any evidence that accused-respondent exerted
overpowering and overbearing moral influence over the offended party.

This Court is of the impression that when the lower court invoked the above doctrine, it readily
concluded that complainant agreed to the sexual act disregarding testimonies lending credence to
complainant's allegation that she was threatened and intimidated as well as rendered weak and
dizzy, not only by the smoke of the marijuana cigarette but also by intoxication, thereby facilitating
the commission of the crime. It was not imperative for the prosecution, in order to prove the
elements of force or intimidation to show that Cecille had broken limbs or that her blouse or pants
were torn. Her testimony to that effect would have sufficed. Nevertheless, the prosecution still
exerted efforts to corroborate Cecille's claim by presenting the physician who testified that Cecille
suffered hymenal lacerations and lesions near the umbilicus area. Unfortunately, however, the lower
court chose to ignore these telling pieces of evidence.

In addition, the lower court doubted complainant's allegation that she was to smoke a small
cigarette, presumably marijuana, due to the fact that "the prosecution failed to present any portion of
that so-called small cigarette much less did it present an expert witness to show that inhaling of
smoke from the said cigarette would cause the said offended party to suffer weakness and
dizziness." Said ratiocination is trifling and unpersuasive. In fact, it is even misleading as
complainant categorically asserted that what made her weak and dizzy were the smoke of the
cigarette and the intoxicating effect of four shots of gin, not the inhalation of the smoke alone. In any
case, complainant could not be expected to produce that "portion of that so-called small cigarette."
Moreover, one does not need an expert witness to testify on what is common knowledge - that four
shots of gin have a "weakening and dizzying" effect on the drinker, especially one as young as the
fifteen-year old complainant.

More disturbing than the above misapplication of criminal law doctrines is the lower court's
misinterpretation of the medical findings and deliberate withholding of some testimonies which would
have shown a very strong likelihood that complainant could indeed have been raped. The following
pieces of evidence cited in the summary of the assailed order are indications of misleading findings:

First, the lower court did not lend any credence to the medical certificate issued after complainant's
physical examination. On the contrary, it interpreted it to mean that the offended party is already
experienced in sexual intercourse, after the examining physician had testified that the hymenal
lacerations might have been sustained a month, six months or even a year prior to the examination.
Interestingly, the lower court failed to mention that Dr. Decena also testified that she cannot tell "how
old is an hymenal laceration" because she cannot indicate when an old laceration was inflicted and
that from the size of the vagina she "could not point the exact cause."

This Court views this apparent lapse on the part of the lower court with and agrees with petitioner, in
accordance with well established jurisprudence, that proof of hymenal laceration is not indispensable
in indictments for rape as a broken hymen is not an essential element of the crime. Further, in
against chastity, the medical examination of the victim's genitalia is not an indispensable element for
the successful prosecution of the crime. The examination is merely corroborative in nature.  And 13

contrary to the theory espoused by the lower court, a hymenal laceration is not conclusive proof that
one is experienced in sexual intercourse.
Second, the lower court highlighted the testimony of Dr. Decena to the effect the cigarette burns
indicated that the lesions near complainant's umbilicus were due to skin diseases. Notably, however,
the lower court again failed to mention that Dr. Decena likewise positively testified that the wounds
could have been "caused by cigarette butts as alleged by the victim" which corroborates Cecille's
testimony that respondent burned her "right side of the stomach" thrice.

It is thus indicative from the above observations that the lower court abuse its discretion and showed
manifest bias in favor of accused-respondent in determining which circumstances are to be
considered in supporting its decision as to the guilt of accused-respondent. In this regard, it must be
remembered that the discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail, according to Basco v.
Rapatalo   "is not absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound, and exercised reasonable bounds.
14

Judicial discretion, by its very nature, involves the exercise of the judge's individual opinion. It is
because of its very nature that the law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-know
rules which, while allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views,
prevent them from getting out of control. An uncontrolled or uncontrollable discretion on the part of a
judge is a misnomer. It is a fallacy. Lord Mansfield, of the discretion to be exercised in granting or
denying bail said: "But discretion when applied to a court of justice, means sound discretion guided
by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and; but legal and
regular."

The fact that vital prosecution evidence and testimonies have been irregularly disregarded indicate
that they have not been considered at all in arriving at the decision to grant bail. This irregularity is
even more pronounced with the misapplication of the two criminal law doctrines cited to support the
grant of the bail application. This Court cannot help but observe that the lower court exerted
painstaking efforts to show that the evidence of guilt of accused-respondent is not strong by its  non
sequitur justifications, misleading or unsupported conclusions, irregular disregard of vital prosecution
evidence and strained interpretation, if not misinterpretation, of criminal law doctrines.

It is the view of this Court that: (1) the testimony of Dr. Decena confirming complainant's allegation
that accused-respondent burned the right side of her stomach with cigarette butts, (2) the testimony
of Dr. Belmonte stating that complainant exhibited psychological manifestations which are "traceable
to the rape incident'', and (3) the unrebutted offer of compromise, are indications of the strength of
the evidence of guilt of accused-respondent.

Lending credence to petitioner's case is the fact that after the conduct of two (2) preliminary
investigations, "no bail" was recommended in the information. According to Baylon v. Sison,    such
15

recommendation constitutes clear and strong evidence of guilt of the accused.

Aside from the apparent abuse of discretion in determining which circumstances and pieces of
evidence are to be considered, the lower court also did not strictly comply with jurisprudential
guidelines in the exercise of discretion. As reiterated in Carpio v. Maglalng,   discretion is guided
16

by: first, the applicable provisions of the Constitution and the statutes; second, by the rules which
this Court may promulgate; and third, by those principles of equity and justice that are deemed to be
part of the laws of the land.

The present Constitution, as previously adverted to, provides that in crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, bail is not matter of right. This Court has reiterated this
mandate in Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Recently, this Court laid down the following
rules in Basco v. Judge Rapatalo   which outlined the duties of a judge in case an application for bail
17

is filed:

(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation;
 (2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its discretion;

(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution; (Emphasis supplied)

(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond. Otherwise, petition should be denied.

Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after the hearing, the court's order granting
or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for prosecutions.   A summary is defined as
18

"a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a text or statement."  19

There are two corollary reasons for the summary: First, the summary of the evidence in the order is
an extension of the hearing proper, thus, a part of procedural due process wherein the evidence
presented during the prior hearing is formally recognized as having been presented and most
importantly, considered. The failure to include every piece of evidence in the summary presented by
the prosecution in their favor during the prior hearing would be tantamount to not giving them the
opportunity to be heard in said hearing, for the inference would be that they were not considered at
all in weighing the evidence of guilt. Such would be a denial of due process, for due process means
not only giving every contending party the opportunity to be heard but also for the Court to
consider every piece of evidence presented in their favor.   Second, the summary of the evidence in
20

the order is the for the basis for the judge's exercising his judicial discretion. Only after weighing the
pieces of evidence as contained in the summary will the judge formulate his own conclusion as to
whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong based on his discretion.   (Emphasis
21

supplied)

Based on the above-stated reasons, the summary should necessarily be a complete compilation or
restatement of all the pieces of evidence presented during the hearing proper. The lower court
cannot exercise judicial discretion as to what pieces of evidence should be included in the summary .
While conceding that some prosecution evidence were enumerated, said enumeration was
incomplete. An incomplete enumeration or selective inclusion of pieces of evidence for the
prosecution in the order cannot be considered a summary, for a summary is necessarily a
reasonable recital of any evidence presented by the prosecution. A "summary" that is incomplete is
not a summary at all. According to Borinaga v. Tamin,   the absence of a summary in the order
22

would make said order defective in form and substance. Corollarily, an order containing an
incomplete "summary" would likewise be defective in form and substance which cannot be sustained
or be a semblance of validity. In Carpio v. Maglalang,   said order was considered defective and
23

voidable. As such, the order granting or denying the application for bail may be invalidated.  24

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision dated August 1, 1997 and the resolution dated
December 22, 1997 in CA G.R. No. 42318 are REVERSED and the order dated March 24, 1995 in
Criminal Case No. T-1417 is declared void for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The
court a quo shall immediately issue a warrant for the rearrest of Roderick Odiamar if his bail bond
has been approved and thereafter, proceed with dispatch in the disposition of said case. This
resolution is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-69564 January 29, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE, MACARIO PUNZALAN, JR., y GUEVARRA, RICHARD DOE,
PETER DOE AND JUAN DOE, accused. JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE and MACARIO
PUNZALAN, JR., y GUEVARRA, accused-appellants.

G.R. No. L-69658 January 29, 1988

JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. OSCAR LEVISTE, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XCVII,
QUEZON CITY and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FERNAN, J.:

These consolidated cases originated from the decision rendered by Judge Oscar Leviste in Criminal Case No. Q-22896 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch XCVII, finding the accused-appellants Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH and to pay jointly
and severally the heirs of the victims compensatory damages of P12,000.00 for each of the victims and moral damages of P200,000.00 G.R.
No. 69564 is the automatic review of the death sentence while G.R. No. 69658 is a petition for review on certiorari of said decision, the
recourse taken by accused-appellant Juan Escober 'to cut short that long period of wait for a final resolution of his fate." 1

Juan Escober, together with four unidentified persons designated as John Doe, Peter Doe, Richard
Doe and Juan Doe, were charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City in an Information dated December 9, 1982. He entered a plea of "Not Guilty"
with the assistance of counsel Atty. Hipolito de Peralta upon arraignment on March 2, 1983.

On March 29, 1983, the Information was amended to include accused-appellant Macario Punzalan,
Jr. as one of the accused therein. He, too, pleaded "Not Guilty" during the arraignment on April 22,
1983, assisted by court-appointed counsel, Atty. Benigno Mariano, who at that time had replaced
Atty. Hipolito de Peralta as counsel de parte for Juan Escober.

A joint trial of the accused ensued. The prosecution presented its evidence, summarized by the
Solicitor General in his Consolidated Brief, as follows:

One of the alleged co-conspirator (sic), Amadeo Abuyen alias Roberto Alorte, * was formerly a co-
security guard of appellant Juan Escober at the Bee Seng Electrical Supply, Inc., a family corporation owned by the couple Vicente
Chua and Lina Chua. It is located inside a walled compound about 50 meters away from the residence of its owner, at 24 Joy Street,
Grace Village, Balintawak, Quezon City. About 4 months prior to the incident, Abuyen was relieved by Domingo Rocero for being
always absent and found sleeping while on duty. [pp. 5-8, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983; pp. 2-10, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983; pp. 6-8, tsn, April 22,
1983).

At the time of the incident on December 3, 1982, Rocero's tour of duty was from 7:00 in the
morning to 7:00 in the evening. He left his post at about 7:30 P.M. that evening after he was
relieved by appellant Juan Escober. On his way home, he passed by Barangay Balingasa in
Balintawak, where he saw Amadeo Abuyen in the store of Colonel Samson drinking beer with
three companions, one of whom he later Identified as the appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. [pp.
4-11, tsn, April 22, 19831.

After Rocero had left his point, (sic) Vicente Chua went to his office at the Bee Seng Electrical
Supply as he usually does after office hours, accompanied by his 13-year old son Irvin and 6-
year old daughter Tiffany On their way, he saw appellant Escober at his post. At the office, the
two children watched a television program, as their father proceeded to the bathroom to take a
bath [pp. 10-17, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].

Meanwhile, Abuyen and his three companions rode a tricycle and proceeded to the Bee Seng
Electrical Supply. Upon alighting thereat, Abuyen knocked at the little door of the gate.
Appellant Escober, peeped thru the hole and opened the door. Then after Abuyen had talked
with Escober, the former asked Punzalan to wait outside, while he (Abuyen) and his two other
companions went inside [pp. 4-5, tsn, Nov. 9, 1983].

At this juncture, the victims' mother, Mrs. Lina B. Chua, left their residence to join her husband
and two children. On her way, she noticed that the pedestrian gate was wide open with the
appellant Punzalan standing there. She shouted why the gate was opened, but nobody
answered. Suddenly, she heard of shot coming from the direction of the garage; and when she
looked thereat, she saw Abuyen and the appellant Escober walking towards the gate. So, she
rushed back inside the house to contact her husband through the intercom. But since the
intercom was out of order, she hurriedly went outside and met appellant Escober who
volunteered the information "that he was not hit." [pp. 9-20, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983].

Upon the other hand, Vicente Chua was inside the bathroom, when he heard the gunshot. He
hurriedly went out and saw her (sic) son Irvin lying on the sofa while her (sic) daughter Tiffany
was lying on the floor, both mortally wounded. Beside her (sic) daughter, he saw a scissor blade
[Exhibit 'E' fun of blood. He also observed that everything was scattered in his office, with all Ms
drawers opened. Later, he found out that the P5,000.00 cash he kept in one of the drawers was
lost [pp. 1314, 31-36, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].

Immediately, he went out and shouted for help from his wife to bring out the car as their children
was (sic) stabbed and bleeding. Forthwith, she got one car, while her eldest son drove a second
one. After Vicente Chua had brought the two wounded children inside the two cars, they were
brought to the Chinese General Hospital where they were pronounced dead upon arrival. [pp.
22-26, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983; pp. 13-14, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].

It was about 8:45 in the evening of December 3, 1982 when Police Investigator Oscar Francisco
was dispatched to investigate the incident. And, since the victims were already brought to the
Chinese General Hospital, he was instructed to proceed thereto. When he arrived at the
hospital at past 9.00 o'clock P.M., he found the victims already dead. Whereupon, he conducted
a cursory examination of the victim and indicated on two separate sketches (Exhibits "C" and
"D"), the 12 and 11 stab wounds sustained by Irvin Chua and Tiffany Chua, respectively. From
there, he proceeded to the scene of the crime, where he met Corporal Ibuan Pat. Robanera and
a police photographer, who arrived to assist him in the investigation [pp. 3-9, tsn, July 5, 1983].

Corporal Ibuan handed to Francisco a blood-stained blade of a scissor (Exhibit "E") which the
former said was found beside the pool of blood inside the room where the incident happened. In
the course of his investigation, Francisco noticed that the drawers inside the office of Vicente
Chua were forcibly opened with its (sic) contents scattered. Upon subsequent interview with
Vicente, he likewise learned that cash amounting to P5,000.00 was taken by the culprits in one
of said drawers [pp. 9-13, Ibid].

Thereafter, Francisco invited for questioning at the Police Headquarters appellant Escober, the
security guard on duty then at the Bee Seng Electrical Supply, who voluntarily gave his version
of the incident (Exhibit "F"). Aside from that of Escober, the written statements of the victims'
parents, Vicente Chua and Lina B. Chua, were also taken (Exhibits "G" & "H", respectively).
Thereafter, Francisco referred on December 8, 1983 [sic] (Exhibit "I") the result of his
investigation to the City Fiscal who wrote at the left hand margin thereon the following notations:
"Detained the accused all prima facie case exist(s) and that accused is probably guilty thereof.
No bail recommended. [pp. 13-23, Ibid].
 Subsequently, on the morning of December 10, 1982, the police apprehended the appellant
Punzalan, who in a police line-up was readily Identified by the victims' mother, Una Chua, as
one of those she saw standing at the open gate of their compound during the night of the
incident on December 2 (sic), 1982. Another statement (Exhibit "F") was, therefore, taken on
December 10, 1982 from the victims' mother to supplement the previous statement she gave on
December 8, 1982. Also taken on even date were the statements of Security Guard Jesus
Zaragosa (Exhibit "K") and that of Virginia Alorte Abuyen, the mother of one of the suspects
who claimed that her son, Amadeo Abuyen, mentioned to her his four [4] companions, including
the herein two appellants, in the commission of the crime. Even appellant Punzalan waived his
constitutional rights under custodial investigation and voluntarily and willingly gave his
statement (Exhibit "M") wherein he did not only admit his participation in the commission of the
crime, but also implicated appellant Juan Escober [pp. 25-26, Ibid; pp. 2-12, tsn, July 6, 1983].

Thus, in his second referral dated December 13, 1983 [sic] (Exhibit "J") to the Fiscal, Police
Investigator Francisco named the five [5] accused as: Juan Escober y Geralde, Macario
Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra, Amadeo Abuyen y Alorte, alias Florante Bato, alias Dodong and a
certain Peter Doe, albeit, only the herein two appellants were apprehended. [pp. 7-8, tsn, July 6,
1983]. 2

Thereafter, accused-appellant Juan Escober took the witness stand to testify in his defense. His
testimony is deed in his Brief, thus:

Escober was then a Security guard and belonged to the Western Private Detective Security
since January 1, 1982 and was assigned at Vising Electrical Supply at Joyce St. Grace Village,
Balintawak, Quezon City,owned by Vicente Chua and Lina Saw Chua. On December 3, 1982,
at 7 p.m. he reported for work. When his companion left and he arrived (to take over) he
cleaned the guardhouse, a routinary work because Mr. and Mrs. Chua did not like to see the
guardhouse dirty and also because after the security guard leaves, the security guard on duty
must clean it. There was a janitor but the security guards used to clean the guardhouse. As
security guard, he had a gun but on this occasion he left it in the locker because he was
cleaning the guardhouse. Then when he was to throw the garbage, Alorte arrived and talked to
him because he, Alorte alias Abuyen, wanted to, and two men [also accused named Does as
they are also still at large] entered and one man [co-accused Punzalan] was left at the gate.
Escober was not able to talk to Alorte alias Abuyen because when Alorte came, one of his
companions aimed a gun at Escober and also a knife and they said they would kill him. He
does not know the man who aimed a gun at him. He only knows Alorte because he Alorte used
to be his co-guard at Vising Electrical Supply. They then asked Escober to get into (climbed)
the pick- up car inside the garage and the other man was pointing a gun at Escober. Alorte and
his companion went up the Vising Electrical Supply. Escober does not know the real name of
Alorte; all the (sic) knows is Roberto Alorte. Escober does not know the man who was left near
the gate but he knows him by face and he was then in the courtroom and he pointed to the
person who answered by the name of Macario Punzalan, Jr., his co- accused. Escober did not
see what Punzalan was doing because he, Escober, was made to climb the vehicle (pick-up).
At this point, his gun was in the locker. He was not able to get that gun when these four men
entered because a gun was already pointed at him. Alorte took Escober's gun from the locker
because he was formerly a security guard at Vising Electrical Supply for 3 or 4 months. He
does not know why Alorte did not continue his work there. After 5 minutes, after the two men
went up the office, they came down and talked to the man guarding Escober and Alorte fired at
him. He was not hit for he was able to avoid it and after that, the four men suddenly left.
Escober went down from the pickup and he heard Vicente Chua calling him and he responded.
Chua asked him to call Mrs. Chua at the house because, according to Chua, their children
were stabbed. So Escober went to the house and called Mrs. Chua. When Mr. Chua called
him, Alorte and his companions were no longer at the place for, after firing, they hurriedly left.
Escober was able to call Mrs. Chua and she and he, together, returned to Vising Electrical
Supply and upon reaching the place, Mr. Chua was shouting and he could not understand him
 because he was speaking in Chinese. Mrs. Chua went back and got the car, parked it and
returned to the office. When Mr. Chua went out of the office, he was bringing his son and
placed him at the parked car of the office. When Chua returned to the office (after he called
Escober) and came back out, Escober saw him with his son and placed him at the balcony.
The two children who were stabbed were carried in two cars because there were only two cars
at the driveway. Escober opened the gate. He does not know to what hospital they went. After
that, he called Jeffrey one of the sons of the Chuas, so he could help him (Escober) call the
police. Jeffrey was not able to call the police because when Jeffrey gave him a directory and
asked him (Escober) to look for the telephone number of the police but he told Jeffrey to look it
up himself because his eyes were blurred. After 15 minutes, the police came and after that, the
owner of the security agency arrived. Other policemen not in uniform also arrived. They
interviewed Escober and forced him to go with them to the police precinct. He refused because
the owner of the agency had not then arrived. When owner arrived, he called another security
guard to guard the Vising Electrical Supply. The police and the owner of the security brought
Escober to the precinct to get his statement and there the police was forcing him to adroit he
was the one who robbed and killed the children of the Chuas and he told them do not know
everything. The testimony of Mrs. Chua that she saw him together with Abuyen Alorte inside
the garage is not true because he was the one who told Mrs. Chua that their children were
being stabbed. When Alorte and his companions left, Mrs. Chua was finding (sic) to call him
(Escober). When he was brought to the precinct, the investigator was typing something.
Escober could recall/remember only his signature. He Identified his statement, Exhibit I for the
defense, Exh. F for the prosecution. He narrated it there exactly. The signature there are his.
He knows the police who investigated him but he does not know the person. Escober was at
the precinct when he signed his statement. He was there up (sic) October 3, 1983, the date he
testified in court (tsn, 2-13). 
3

Accused-appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. likewise testified in his defense. The gist of his testimony is
found in his Brief as follows:

PUNZALAN testified on his own behalf (his direct testimony is found in TSN, pp. 2-35, Nov. 9,
1983). PUNZALAN is a fruit vendor at "the market of Monumento." In the afternoon of 3
December 1982, according to PUNZALAN, he accepted the invitation of fugitive
ABUYEN/ALORTE for a drink, in a place near Abonce Beer House; ABUYEN/ALORTE was
with two companions whom he introduced all his relatives; after several drinks, he was
requested to join the group to proceed to another place for which reason they boarded a
tricycle; and the group stopped 'at a place with a high gate' because ABUYEN/ ALORTE
wanted 'to drop by someone' (TSN, pp. 2-11, November 9, 1983). ABUYEN/ALORTE knocked
at the little door and the security guard (PUNZALAN Identified accused Escober as the security
guard) opened the door and they greeted each other; ABUYEN/ALORTE then instructed
PUNZALAN "to wait for him outside;" and thereafter ABUYEN/ALORTE and his two
companions entered the compound (TSN, pp. 11-14, Nov. 9, 1983).

PUNZALAN further testified that he waited for half an hour for the group; that while waiting he
heard the mourn (sic) of a child that he was then about to enter the premises but he met
ABUYEN/ALORTE and his two companions and saw them with blood stains in their arms;' that
ABUYEN/ALORTE and his companions started running and he followed them; that in response
to his query AB ABUYEN/ALORTE stated that he stabbed the two [2] children'; and that they
boarded a taxi and he was brought back to our place where we are selling apples' (TSN pp.
14- 18, Nov. 9, 1983)

PUNZALAN was apprehended early dawn of 10 December 1982 at the Monuments market.
No lawyer assisted him during his custodial investigation despite the fact that he informed the
police officers that he has a lawyer by the name of Atty. Valdez nor was he informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. Nevertheless, the police investigator
proceeded to interrogate him. He disclosed that he was invited by Amadeo Abuyen for a drink;
 and that they drank beer 'in a place near Abonce Beer House. "PUNZALAN asserted that,
when Exh. M was presented for his signature he refused to sign (Exh. "M") because 'many
statements thereon are not correct that he nevertheless signed Exh. "M" because he was
already tired and was forced to sign it after they hurt me by boxing me, subjected me to water
therapy and he could not endure the pain, when they gave (him) the electric shock treatment;"
and that the portions of Exh. "M" which are incorrect are those Identified as Exhs.'11-A and 11-
B (TSN, pp. 19-32, Nov. 9, 1983 ).  4

On January 10, 1984, the decision under review was promulgated. On February 8, 1984, despite his
manifestation in open court immediately after the promulgation of the decision that he was appealing
the same to this Court, Atty. Mariano filed a motion for reconsideration. This was opposed by the
prosecution.

Pending resolution of the motion. Atty. A.E. Dacanay entered his appearance on August 7, 1984 as
counsel for accused Escober, and on August 20, 1984, he filed another motion for reconsideration
for the said accused, which was likewise opposed by the prosecution. After an exchange of
pleadings between Atty. Dacanay and the prosecution, the trial court issued an Order dated
November 21, 1984 denying the motions. Hence. the petition in G.R. No. 69658 and the automatic
review.

In G.R. No. 69658, accused-appellant Juan Escober contends that:

RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING HIS TWO-PAGE DECISION

IMPOSING DEATH SENTENCE IN CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
CONSEQUENTLY IT MUST BE REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, ACQUITTING
PETITIONER ...;

RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONER,

TOGETHER WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED PUNZALAN AND THREE OTHERS ACTED "AS
PRINCIPALS BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION" CONSIDERING THESE
CIRCUMSTANCES: FIRST: (THE) UNLIKELY GARBAGE THROWING REASON OF
ACCUSED ESCOBER (PETITIONER) IN OPENING THE GATE OF THE COMPOUND IN
QUESTION, AGAINST THE TESTIMONY OF HIS CO-ACCUSED MACARIO PUNZALAN, JR.
OF KNOCKING ON THEIR PART; SECOND THE RITUAL IN AVOIDANCE OF SUSPICION
OF FIRING A GUN JUST BEFORE THE EXIT OF THE CONSPIRATORS AND
VOLUNTEERING THAT HE WAS NOT HIT': AND THIRD: '(T)HE VERSION OF JUAN
ESCOBER 'PETITIONER) REGARDING HIS ACTUATION DURING THE HALF-HOUR
ROBBERY-HOMICIDE WAS REPLETE WITH CONTRADICTIONS.

RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED FURTHERMORE IN CONVICTING PETITIONER TO DEATH

AS SUCH PRINCIPAL UNDER THE DECISIONAL LAW ON CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY.

RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION ... OF SAID DECISION OF JANUARY 10, 1984.  5

These assigned errors were reiterated in the Brief for Accused-Appellant Juan Escober filed in G.R.
No. 69564.

On his part, Macario Punzalan, Jr. seeks reversal of his conviction on the following grounds:

PUNZALAN SHOULD BE ACQUITTED; OR AT THE VERY LEAST, HIS CONVICTION

SHOULD BE NULLIFIED ON THE GROUND THAT PUNZALAN WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS
TO RE MAIN SILENT AND TO COUNSEL IN ALL OF THE THREE OF THIS CASE:
 CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION PRELIMINARY IN- INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL ON THE
MERITS;

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT, AS A MAT TER OF LAW, PUNZALAN IS
ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE CRIME OF ROBBERY;

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRINCI PAL MOTIVE FOR THE
CRIME WAS ROBBERY;

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ROBBERY WAS IN FACT COMMITTED;

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PUNZALAN ON THE GROUND OF

REASONABLE DOUBT;

THERE BEING NO DIRECT EVIDENCE TO SHOW HOW THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED,
THE LOWER COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN RULING THAT THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME WAS ATTENDED WITH THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF CRUELTY, NIGHTTIME, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR
STRENGTH, TREACHERY AND IN BAND.  6

We shall deal first with Escober's assigned errors, particularly the objection interposed to the form
and substance of the decision under review. Accused-appellant Escober asserts that said decision is
null and void for it does not conform with the requirement of Section 9, Article X of the 1973
Constitution and that it was rendered even before all the stenographic notes of the proceedings had
been transcribed.

We find merit in this contention. The decision of January 10, 1984 consists of 1-1/2 pages, typed
single-space, with a number of handwritten notations and insertions. It reads:

The AMENDED INFORMATION charged the above-named accused of Robbery with

Homicide defined in Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. It alleged, among others, that on
or about December 3, 1982, in Quezon City, said accused conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and by means of violence and intimidation
again persons robbed Vicente Chua y Ching by entering the premises of No. 24 Joy St. Grace
Village, Quezon City and taking therein P5,000.00 and (sic) by reason or on the occasion of
said robbery employed personal violence upon minors Irvin Chua y Saw and Tiffany Chua y
Saw, stabbing them and inflicting thereby multiple serious mortal wounds directly causing
their immediate deaths, to the damage of their heirs.

Prosecution evidence consisted of the testimonies of Vicente Chua, Mrs. Lina Chua, Domingo
Rocero, Oscar Francisco, Amado V. Ramos, Teodoro Ibuan Abelardo V. Lucero and Dr.
Josefina Qua, and Exhibits "A" to "Z" with sub-exhibits; while Defense evidence consisted of
the testimonies of the two named accused above and some exhibits, contained in
Pages 1 to 454 of the Records, Volume 2, Vol. 1 and 3.

In view of the foregoing evidence, and considering the memoranda of both parties, the
arguments and authorities cited therein, this Court finds that the material allegations of the
above information are facts, and that accused Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario
Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra are guilty of the charges of Robbery with Double Homicide, as
principals by indispensable cooperation as defined in article 17, par. 3, with no mitigating
circumstances, and attended by aggravating circumstances of cruelty, nighttime to insure the
commission of the crime, taking advantage of number and superior strength, treachery, in
band, among others, and that the defenses and excuses of the accused are unnatural,
incredible, contradictory and uncorroborated. The circumstances pointing to the (sic) this fact,
 among others, are the following: The unlikely garbage throwing reason of accused Juan
Escober in opening the gate of the compound in question, against the testimony of his co-
accused Macario Punzalan, Jr. of knocking on their part; the ritual in avoidance of suspicion
of firing a gun just before the exit of the co-conspirators of Juan Escober, and volunteering the
information that he was not hit. The version of Juan Escober regarding his actuation during
the half-hour robbery homicide was replete with contradictions. Macario Punzalan admitted
being fetched by, going with and talking to, immediately prior to taking a tricycle to the said
compound, and later acting as lookout for, his co-conspirators. The Court finds further that the
group took some drinks, not to get drunk admittedly, and therefore to strengthen their resolve
better to commit the crime planned.

WHEREFORE, this Court declares Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr.
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the amended information, this
Court holding firmly that when a hired security guard opens the compound under his
protection to four men who turn out to be robbers and murderers or when a former security
guard accompanies and meets with said malefactors immediately before the commission of
the offense and stands guard at the gate and flees with said malefactors then the burden of
proof is shifted to him to exculpate and excuse himself by clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence, which the named accused failed to do, but succeeded only in insulting this Forum
of Truth with their rediculous (sic) justifications for the brutal and merciless killing of innocent
and helpless children on the occasion of that robbery in question, of being held-up at
gunpoint, of coincidentally being in the act of throwing garbage and being fired at but not
getting hit but not knowing so many vital details a truthful witness would certainly not forget,
among others, thus that this court after a total appreciation of all the evidence on record is
convinced that there being apple (sic) circumstances present that could only possibly point to
the guilt of said accused for the most heinous (sic) crime that deserves the highest penalty,
Hereby sentences the said accused Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. to the
legal punishment provided by Article 294, Paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines, which is DEATH and orders the said accused further to pay the heirs of their
victims compensatory damages of P12,000.00 each, jointly and severally, and moral
damages of P200,000.00 to the said heirs, jointly and severally.

SO ORDERED. QUEZON CITY, January 10, 1984.  7

Every decision of a court of record shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on
which it is based ...

The above-quoted decision falls short of this standard. The inadequacy stems primarily from the
respondent judge's tendency to generalize and to form conclusions without detailing the facts from
which such conclusions are deduced. Thus, he concluded that the material allegations of the
Amended Information were the facts without specifying which of the testimonies or exhibits
supported this conclusion. He rejected the testimony of accused-appellant Escober because it was
allegedly replete with contradictions without pointing out what these contradictions consist of or what
"vital details" Escober should have recalled as a credible witness. He also found the crime to have
been attended by the aggravating circumstances of cruelty, nighttime, superior strength, treachery,
in band, "among others," but did not particularly state the factual bases for such findings.

As enunciated by this Court in the case of Hernandez v. Colayco, 64 SCRA 480,

reiterating Montelibano v. Director of Lands, 21 Phil. 449; Alindogan v. Insular Government 15 Phil.
168; City of Manila v. Insular Government, 9 Phil. 71; Enriquez v. Enriquez, 3 Phil. 746; Braga v.
Millora, 3 Phil. 458:

Without the concrete relation or statement in the judgment of the facts alleged and proved at
the trial, it is not possible to pass upon and determine the issue raised in litigation, inasmuch
as when the facts held to be proved are not set forth in a judicial controversy, it is impossible
 to administer justice, to apply the law to the points argued, or to uphold the rights of the
litigant who has the law on his side.

It is not sufficient that the court or trial judge take into account the facts brought out in an
action suit, the circumstances of each question raised, and the nature and condition of the
proofs furnished by the parties. He must also set out in his decision the facts alleged by the
contending parties which he finds to have been proven. The conclusions deduced therefrom
and the opinion he has formed on the issues raised; then only can be intelligently set forth the
legal grounds and considerations proper in his opinion for the due determination of the case.

As it is written, the decision renders a review thereof extremely difficult. Without a particularization of
the evidence, testimonial or documentary, upon which the findings of facts are based, it is practically
impossible for the appellate court to determine whether or not such findings were sufficiently and
logically supported by the evidence relied upon by the trial court.

Were it not for its dire consequences, we would have appreciated the efforts shown by respondent-
judge to administer justice in this case in the most speedy and expeditious manner. He obviously
took to heart our admonition that judges do not have to wait for the transcription of stenographic
notes before rendering judgments but can rely on the notes of the proceedings personally taken by
them. For this is what respondent judge did. The records show that he took copious notes of the
testimonies of the witnesses on which he apparently based this decision, as the transcript of the
stenographic notes were not yet complete at the time of the rendition of the judgment. In fact, the
review of the case suffered some delay due to the failure of stenographer Eduardo Bober to submit
to this Court the transcript of stenographic notes of some hearings.

Speed in the administration of justice, however, is not the sole concern of courts and judges. More
than this is the essentiality of justice and fairness which is the primordial objective of the courts.
Respondent judge lamentably disregarded the latter for the former.

The decision of January 10, 1987 calls to mind the decision rendered by another trial court in the
case of People v. Banayo, 129 SCRA 725, regarding which We said:

At the onset, this Court takes a rather dim view of the apparently indifferent attitude displayed
by the trial court towards a murder case it has tried as shown by the rendition of a decision,
the body of which contains only 63 lines spread out over less than three typewritten pages,
double-spaced and wide-margined. While brevity should characterize a court's decision and
length is not necessarily determinative of its quality, the lower court in deciding this murder
case nonetheless should have outlined in greater and more satisfactory detail the evidence
presented by both prosecution and the defense, the facts as found by the trial judge based on
the evidence on record and the jurisprudence and the authorities supporting the court's
decision.

This trial judge failed to do. There is not one single citation of authority in the decision. The
issues raised by the appellant include allegations of concocted testimony, the nature of a
dying declaration, premeditation, conspiracy, treachery and superior strength. The issues
raised are quite serious and they deserved better treatment. [Emphasis supplied].

With the finding that the decision of January 10, 1984 does not conform to the requirements of
Section 9, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, the case should have been remanded to the court a
quo for the rendition of a new judgment. However, since the records of the case, including all
evidence necessary for a determination of the innocence or guilt of the accused- appellants are now
before Us, We deem it wise to render judgment in this case in order to accord the accused-
appellants their right to a speedy disposition of their cases. 8
The prosecution's theory is that Juan Escober is a principal by indispensable cooperation in the
crime of robbery with homicide. In support thereof, it tried to prove that Escober's actuations during
the incident in question were done with the knowledge of and pursuant to said nefahous plan. These
acts consist of- [1] his alleged act of opening the gate of the compound to his co-conspirators; [2] his
having been seen by Mrs. Lina Chua behind Alorte/Abuyen, the alleged mastermined, after the
gunshot; and [3] his having volunteered the information to Mrs. Chua that he was not hit. The
prosecution further attempted to show that the gun-firing was a mere ritual in avoidance of suspicion
and that Escober's version of the incident is too replete with contradictions to merit belief.

After a thorough review of the evidence, We find that the guilt of Juan Escober has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.

The act of opening a gate upon hearing a knock is by itself an innocent gesture. One who imputes
an evil motive or purpose thereto must prove his allegations convincingly. In the case at bar, even if
the version of Macario Punzalan, Jr. that Escober opened the gate at the knock of the alleged
mastermind Amadeo Abuyen/Roberto Alorte were to be believed, the same would not constitute
sufficient and convincing proof that Escober had knowledge of the nefarious plan. The worse that
could be attributed to him is lack of better judgment or laxity in the performance of his duties as a
security guard in having failed to exercise the minimum precaution dictated by his occupation to
exclude from the premises being guarded persons who have not demonstrated any legitimate
reason for getting in. For it must be remembered that having been co-employees, Escober knew
Abuyen/Alorte. It was therefore not surprising that he should open the gate for him. In fact, even
Domingo Rocero, the security guard who replaced Abuyen/Alorte and who was not as familiar with
Abuyen/Alorte admitted on his Sworn Statement having allowed Abuyen/Alorte into the compound
thus:

20.T Mula ng manungkulan ka sa Bee Seng Electrical Supply, ilang beses mo ng nakita si
Roberto Alorte sa malapit sa iyong pinagguaguardiayahan?

S Dalawang beses ko na po siyang nakita sa lugar na iyon, una noong buwan ng Septyembre
at pangalawa noong buwan November 1982.

21.T Ano ang dahilan at nakikita mo siya sa lugar na iyan?

S Una binisita niya ako at pangalawa mayroon siyang kasamang babae at hindi ko na siya
pinapasok sa loob ng Bee Seng Electrical Supply.  9

The facts of the case likewise do not support the prosecution's theory that the gun-firing incident was
a mere ritual in avoidance of suspicion. We share the keen observation of counsel for Escober that
"... it is not a common experience that a person allows himself to be shot by a gun. He would be the
stupidest person on earth if he allows that ... to avoid suspicion that he was in cahoots [sic] with
malefactors The least or perhaps the safest way for that evil purpose is to allow himself to be
rendered ineffective, i.e., by tieing [sic] him up, mauling him or wounding him so he would live if he
were a conspirator. To allow him to be shot by a gun is too risky a ritual for he might get killed. 
10

Besides, the robbery and homicide were perpetrated within a span of 5-10 minutes, not half an hour
as found by the trial court, a time too short to enable Abuyen/Alorte and Escober to contrive such a
ritual or scenario, or if it were a pre-conceived plan, for Abuyen/Aorte to have remembered it
considering the unexpected apprearance of Lina Chua at the scene and the need for immediate
escape.

Even assuming arguendo that the gun was fired in the air and not at Escober, the same could have
been done to scare Lina Chua away from the scene of the crime rather than to divert suspicion from
Escober.
That the gun-firing was not a ritual and that Escober was not a part of the criminal plan are further
bolstered by the statement made by Macario Punzalan during the preliminary investigation, and
extra-judicial statement of the alleged mastermind Abuyen /Alorte dated April 16, 1986, submitted by
the prosecution as Exhibit B during the separate trial of said Abuyen/Alorte. The pertinent portion of
Macario Punzalan's statement reads:

FISCAL: Ito ba si Abuyen at saka si Juan Escober at Abuyen ay matagal ng magkakilala?

PUNZALAN: Hindi ko po alam sir, dahil po sa guardiya po dati yung Alorte.

FISCAL: Ito ba ang kasalukuyang guardia [referring to Escober]

PUNZALAN: Oho, siya po ang naka guardia noon. [duty]

FISCAL: Noong pagkatapos ng pag-uusap nila ano pa ang ginawa? Kung mayroon pa?

PUNZALAN: Hindi ko na po nakikita sir.

FISCAL: Ito ng umakyat kayo sa bahay ay sumama ba?

PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, nasa ibaba po rin ako sir.

FISCAL: Ito [referring to Escober nakita mong umakyat?

PUNZALAN: Hind ho, kung baga sa ano ay pinapapatay ho sa akin ni Abuyen ni Alorte.

FISCAL: Bakit?

PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, hindi ko po alam ang dahilan.

FISCAL: Pero hindi mo naman pinatay.

PUNZALAN: Hindi po.

FISCAL: Bakit?

PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, dahil hindi ko po alam nga ang dahilan, sir, kasi po ay gusto kong
mahuli yung Abuyen, sapagkat iyon pong talaga ang utak eh.  11

On the other hand, Amadeo Abuyen's extrajudicial statement reads in part:

... Pagkatapos ay sumakay kami sa tricycle at nakarating kami sa bahay ni Mr. Chua ng
bandana alas 8:00 ng gabi ng petsa 3 ng Desiyembre. Pagdating namin doon ay kumatok ako
at binuksan naman ako ng guwardia dahil kakilala ko. Kinumusta ko muna siya kong paano
ang buhay-buhay niya. Habang nagkakamustahan kami ay bigla ko siyang tinutukan ng aking
baril sinabi ko sa kanya na pasensiya na siya. Pinakuha ko ngayon kay DON-DON iyong baril
na .22 kalibre sa lalagyan nito. Pagkatapos ay sabay pumasok si DON-DON at si REY sa
opisina ni Mr. Chua. Ako naman ay pumuesto sa labas ng opisina at sa gate ay si KUMANG.
Nang nakapuesto na ako sa pintuan ay pumalag itong guwardiya na si Escober na hindi an
pala ginapos nitong si KUMANG. Nang makita ko ay binaril ko siya pero hindi siya tinamaan.
Noong matapos kong barilin si ESCOBER ay niyaya ko na sila at tumakbo na kami ...  12
These exculpatory statements, although emanating from alleged co- conspirators and therefore may
ordinarily be considered "polluted," deserve credence. Punzalan's statement, it must be observed, is
not even responsive to the question being asked. The spontaneous and candid manner by which it
was given lends credence to his statement, that Abuyen/Alorte wanted Escober killed. This
statement, together with the statement of Abuyen/ Alorte that he himself fired at E scober although
the latter was not hit, unwittingly corroborates Escober's version that the gun was aimed at him. That
Escober was not thereby hit should not be taken as conclusive proof that the gun-firing was a mere
ritual because the same could be easily occasioned by a poor aim and/ or the hurried manner of its
execution.

On the other hand, We see no reason why Abuyen/Alorte should absolve Escober of any complicity
in the crime if this were not the truth. The usual practice is for a conspirator to exculpate himself and
pass on the blame to a co-conspirator, particularly in a case such as this where the crime charged is
indeed very grave and serious. However undesirable a person may seem, there may be left in him a
sense of justice and fairness. Without passing judgment on Abuyen/Alorte, We believe that it was
this sense of justice and fairness that moved him to disclose the truth in his extrajudicial confession.

Escober's unilateral offer of the information that he was not hit does not prove either that he was a
co-conspirator. It was but natural that he would want to inform and assure his superior who is
presumed to be concerned with his safety and well-being. The motivation attached to said act by the
prosecution is therefore too conjectural and far-fetched to pass the test of logic and reason.

The only evidence of the prosecution which may lead to a conclusion of Escober's complicity is the
testimony of Mrs. Lina Chua that upon hearing a shot, she looked at the garage where the shot
sounded to have come from and saw Abuyen/Alorte walking towards the gate with Escober about a
meter behind.

We have reasons to doubt the veracity and/or accuracy of this statement. We observe that Mrs. Lina
Chua was the last among the prosecution witnesses to give her statement to the police. She gave
her statement on December 8, 1983 when none of the accused had been apprehended. So, soon
after the violent incident her appreciation of what she saw may have been faulty when she attributed
the blame on Escober whose lack of better judgment and laxity in the performance of his job resulted
in the tragic event.

Taken in conjunction with the extra-judicial confession of Abuyen/Alorte quoted above, Mrs. Chua's
narration of the situation would suffer from inaccuracy, aside from being susceptible to other
interpretations. Abuyen/Alorte declared that immediately after the shooting, he called his
companions and ran away from the scene of the crime. Punzalan's testimony was of the same tenor,
i.e., that Abuyen/Alorte and his companions started running and he [Punzalan] followed them. This
was precisely the moment when the malefactors were fleeing from the scene of the crime, and at
which point Escober could have felt safe enough to emerge from the pick-up where he was held
captive. Thus, Mrs. Chua claims to have seen Escober about a meter behind Abuyen/ Alorte, who
was not walking, but running away from the scene of the crime.

Indeed, it was not unlikely for Mrs. Chua to misinterpret the situation she described having seen.
She was then in an agitated condition on seeing the pedestrian gate of the compound open, which
was Escober's duty to keep closed. Moreover, from the relative positions of Mrs. Chua,
Abuyen/Alorte and Escober, the line of vision of Mrs. Chua was such that it would be difficult for her
to determine for certain the distance between Abuyen/Alorte and Escober and whether the latter was
merely walking behind the former or in fact chasing him.

Additionally, in her testimony on August 1, 1986 in the separate trial of Abuyen/Alorte, she declared
that 'they [referring to Abuyen/Alorte and Escober] were walking towards the gate; they were
nagmamadali [in a hurry]."   This description given by Lina Chua does not jibe with the impression
13

gathered from her previous statement of seeing Escober walking behind Abuyen/Alorte. The element
of speed injected into the 'walking" by the descriptive term 'nagmamadali" corroborates Abuyen/
Alorte's declaration that after firing the gun, he ran away from the scene of the crime, and tills can be
interpreted to mean that Escober was indeed chasing Abuyen/Alorte.

The fact that the accused was at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission is not, by
itself, sufficient to establish his criminal liability. To hold the accused guilty as co-principal in
the crime charged, the existence of conspiracy between the accused and the actual killers,
must be shown, and the same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is required to
support a finding of the presence of the conspiracy, i.e., it must be shown to exist as clearly
and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself.  14

The prosecution evidence is glaringly wanting in this regard. It failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that [1] Escober had knowledge of the criminal design and [2] that his acts during the
commission of the crime, such as the opening of the gate and having been behind Abuyen after the
gunshot, were performed pursuant to said nefarious plot. This being the case, the prosecution's
reliance on the alleged inconsistencies in Escober's testimony regarding his actuations during the
incident at bar can not improve its case. To convict on this basis is repugnant to the constitutional
right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved   and its corollary rule that
15

the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the
defense. 16

Indeed, the accidents of Escober being on duty during the commission of the crime and his having
opened the gate to persons who turned out to be robbers and killers make him an easy suspect. A
less discerning mind could have been blinded by these suspicions and compassion for the two
hapless victims. But convictions can never rest on mere suspicions, however, grave and serious.

We now turn to Macario Punzalan's case. He contends having been denied his rights to remain
silent and to counsel during the custodial investigation, the preliminary investigation and the trial on
the merits.

Punzalan's extra-judicial statement   is prefaced by the for lowing:

17

PAGPAPAUNAWA NG KARAPATAN SA ILALIM NG SALIGANG BATAS NG PILIPINAS.

Ikaw ngayon ay nasa ilalim ng pagtatanong sa himpilang ito ng pulisya hinggil sa isang
usaping kinasasangkutan mo sa salang PAGNANAKAW NA MAY KASAMANG PAGPATAY.
Bago ka tanungin ng anoman, ipinauunawa ko muna sa iyo at pinagpapaalalahanan ka ng
iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas, tulad ng mga sumusunod:

1. Ikaw ay may karapatang manatiling tahimik at huwag magsalita o magbigay ng salaysay

kung hindi mo nais.

2. Ikaw ay may karapatang magkaroon ng paglilingkod ng isang abogado na iyong mapipili.

Kung hindi mo kayang kumuha ng abogado, at nais mong magkaroon ng paglilingkod nito
maglalaan ng isa para sa iyo ang hukuman na hindi mo na kailangang bayaran ang
paglilingkod nito.

3. Ikaw ay may karapatan na huwag magbigay ng anomang pahayag na maaaring gamiting

katibayan laban sa iyo.

4. Hindi ka maaaring pilitin,o gamitan ng anomang uring karahasan o pamilit para ikaw ay
magbigay ng salaysay.
 Tanong — Pagkatapos na malaman mo, maipaunawa sa iyo at mapagpaalalahanan ka ng
iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas, nahahanda ka bang magbigay
ng isang malaya at kusang loob ng salaysay?

Sagot — Opo.

Tanong — Nahahanda kang magbigay ng salaysay kahit na walang abogado na

sumusubaybay sa iyo habang ikaw ay sinisiyasat?

Sagot— Opo.

Tanog— Lubos mo bang naunawaan na ikaw ay hindi maaaring pilitin or gamitan ng anomang
uri ng karahasan upang maging saksi laban sa iyong sarili?

Sagot— Opo.

Tanong— Sa kabila ng lahat ng mga karapatang ipinaunawa sa iyo magbibigay ka pa rin ba

ng salaysay?

Sagot— Opo.

Sgd. Macario G. Punzalan, Jr.

Noteworthy is the fact that except for an additional question in Escober's extra-judicial
statement,   the latter carried the same quoted prefatory statement. This, to our mind, indicates the
18

lack of zeal and initiative on the part of the investigating officers to fully and truly inform Punzalan of
his rights to remain silent and to counsel during the custodial investigation. The Identical manner by
which the police sought to inform Escober and Punzalan of their constitutional rights shows a blatant
disregard for individual comprehensive ability arising from differences in intelligence level,
educational background and personal experiences. No effort was exerted to see to it that Punzalan
really understood what was being told, considering his low educational attainment of Grade 2
Elementary level. The so-called "informing" done by the police in the case at bar was nothing more
than a superficial and mechanical act, performed not so much to attain the objectives of the
fundamental law as to give a semblance of compliance thereto. Besides, the phraseology used by
the police respecting the appointment of counsel de oficio for Punzalan was misleading. It gives the
impression that the services of a counsel de oficio can be availed of by Punzalan only during the
court proceedings, not during the custodial investigation.

Not having been fully and truly informed of his right to counsel, the waiver appearing in Punzalan's
extrajudicial statement cannot be considered intelligently made. For this reason, aside from the fact
that it was done without the assistance of counsel, said waiver is not valid.    Needless to say, the
19

extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence.  20

With respect to Punzalan not having been represented by counsel during the preliminary
investigation, suffice it to say that such irregularity which amounts to an absence of preliminary
investigation, should have been raised before the trial court, Philippine jurisprudence is uniform and
consistent in ruling that:

The question of absence of a proper preliminary investigation is also better inquired into by the
Court below. When so raised, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee,
has held that the trial Court is called upon 'not to dismiss the information but hold the case in
abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the fiscal to hold a reinvestigation. As
stressed in People vs. Casiano, I SCRA 478 (1 961), this is the proper procedure since the
'absence of such investigation did not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render
 it defective. Much less did it affect the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. The right to a
preliminary investigation, being waivable does not argue against the validity of the
proceedings, the most that could have been done being to remand the case in order that such
investigation could be conducted.

... the proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation should be ventilated is
the Court of First Instance, not this Court. Reason is not wanting for this view. Absence of
preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity
of the proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived. These are matters
to be inquired into by the trial courts, not an appellate court. 21

While it may be conceded that it would have been more judicious for the trial court to appoint a
counsel de oficio for Punzalan other than the counsel de parte of his co-accused Escober, such
failure did not constitute prejudicial error to warrant nullification of the proceedings taken against
Punzalan. There is no evidence that Atty. Mariano was biased in favor of Escober to the prejudice of
Punzalan. The records show that Atty. Mariano defended both accused with equal zeal and vigor
and that Punzalan was able to present his defense well. In fact, it was Punzalan's version of having
knocked that the trial court believed. In the final analysis, the only prejudice Punzalan might have
suffered was the failure of Atty. Mariano to cross-examine Escober on the latter's testimony
regarding Punzalan's presence at the scene of the crime.   Escober's testimony, however, was
22

merely corroborative of the testimonies of Lina Chua and Domingo Rocero, witnesses for the
prosecution who were cross-examined by Atty. Mariano.  23

Prosecution witnesses Vicente Chua and Lina Chua had established the fact of robbery and we are
convinced beyond reasonable doubt that Punzalan knew of such plan. It is incredible that his three
companions would fetch him on the pretext of drinking beer and just bring him along to the scene of
crime, thereby risking another eyewitness to the perpetration thereof. Punzalan's flight from the
scene of the crime with his companions and his failure, if he were truly innocent, to report to the
police what he knew about the crime after reading it in the newspapers further demonstrate his
knowledge of the plan.

While it has been established that Punzalan's participation in the crime was to act as a look-out, and
as such, he did not participate in the killing of the two helpless victims, he cannot evade
responsibility therefor. Well-established is the rule in this jurisdiction that whenever a homicide has
been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as
principals in the commission of the robbery are also guilty as principals in the special complex crime
of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the homicide unless it clearly
appeared that they endeavored to prevent the homicide.  24

WHEREFORE, the decision dated January 10, 1984 in Criminal Case No. Q-22896 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Juan Escober y Geralde is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and his immediate release from
confinement is ordered, unless detained for some other crimes. Accused- appellant Macario
Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the complex
crime of Robbery with Homicide and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victims in the amount of P60,000,00,

SO ORDERED.

Yap, Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
G.R. Nos. 111962-72 December 8, 1995

MAXIMINO GAMIDO y BUENAVENTURA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed with
modification  petitioner Maximino B. Gamido's conviction by the Regional Trial Court on eleven
1

counts of having forged the signature of the Chief Executive. Specifically, petitioner was accused in
11 cases of forging the signature of the President of the Philippines in the following documents and
making it appear that the documents were genuine official documents of the Republic of the
Philippines:

1. Criminal Case No. 85-40361 — Special Appointment of Maximino Gamido as Confidential

Presidential Representative dated November 30, 1984; 2

2. Criminal Case No. 85-40362 — Memorandum/Order No. 1489 informing all Heads of Ministries,
Bureaus, Instrumentalities of the Government, and Government Controlled Corporations and others
on the existence of Presidential Regional Assistant Monitoring Services (PRAMS) dated July 29,
1985;3

3. Criminal Case No. 85-40363 — Appointment of Maximino Gamido as Presidential Regional

Executive Assistant and Executive Director of the PRAMS dated November 7, 1983; 4

4. Criminal Case No. 85-40364 — Memorandum to Land, Air and Navigation Transportation
Operators in the Philippines dated July 11, 1985;5

5. Criminal Case No. 85-40365 — Memorandum Order to all Heads of Ministries, Bureaus,
Government Corporations, Government Agencies and Instrumentalities, and Government Controlled
Corporations dated July 29, 1985; 6

6. Criminal Case No. 85-40366 — Memorandum Order No. 1480 — To: Hon. Maximino B. Gamido,
Presidential Regional Executive Assistant/Executive Director PRAMS-PREMO dated November 23,
1984;7

7. Criminal Case No. 85-40367 — Memorandum/Circular to all Operators: (1) Transportation; (2)
Shipping Transportation; (3) Air Line Transportation dated November 30, 1984; 8

8. Criminal Case No. 85-40368 — A letter addressed to President Ferdinand E. Marcos, thru the
Minister of the Budget, submitting the required STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP)
specifying the functions and duties of PRAMS personnel and their salaries allegedly approved by the
President on November 23, 1984; 9

9. Criminal Case No. 85-40369 — Executive Order No. 820 Creating the Presidential Regional
Assistant Monitoring Services (PRAMS) in all Regions of the Philippines dated October 11, 1983;  10

10. Criminal Case No. 85-40370 — Special Presidential Certification dated September 9,1985;   and11
11. Criminal Case No. 85-40371 — Presidential Permission for Free of Fare (sic) in any
Transportation in the Philippines dated February 28, 1985. 12

The prosecution was made under Art. 161 of the Revised Penal Code which provides as follows:

Art. 161. Counterfeiting the great seal of the Government of the Philippine Islands, forging
the signature or stamp of the Chief Executive. — The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be
imposed upon any person who shall forge the Great Seal of the Government of the
Philippine Islands or the signature or stamp of the Chief Executive.

It appears that on March 25, 1985, then Executive Assistant Juan C. Tuvera issued Memorandum
Circular No. 1281   which read:
13

INFORMING ALL HEADS OF MINISTRIES, AGENCIES, GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS

AND INSTRUMENTALITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING PROVINCIAL AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS OF THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL REGIONAL
ASSISTANT MONITORING SERVICES (PRAMS) WITHIN THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT.

The Presidential Regional Assistant Monitoring Services (PRAMS) is a non-existent agency

within the Office of the President. Its alleged Executive Director, Mr. Maximino B. Gamido is
likewise not connected, in any capacity, with this Office.

It is gathered that personnel from the PRAMS have been using Presidential directives,
particularly Executive Order No 819; Memorandum Order No. 811; and Memorandum
Circular No. 1278, to support its fraudulent activities. These issuances, however, refer to the
creation, designation/appointment, and operationalization of the Presidential Regional
Monitoring Officer (PREMO) System, the duly authorized regional monitoring arm of the
Office of the President, which is charged to provide the President with the information on
development in the region.

Furthermore, Mr. Gamido has not been given any authorization to sign for and on behalf of
the President of the Philippines. As such, all memorandum/directives issued by Mr. Gamido
on behalf of the Office of the President are fraudulent. All memorandum/directives issued by
alleged PRAMS personnel are likewise fraudulent.

By Authority of the President: 

JUAN C. TUVERA
Presidential Executive Assistant

Following the issuance of this memorandum, the Presidential Security Command and the Office of
the President, through the Malacañang Complaints and Investigation Office (CIO), investigated
petitioner.

On September 27, 1985, upon the invitation of Atty. Quirino Sagario, CIO Hearing Officer, petitioner
appeared and presented the 11 documents, claiming that President Ferdinand E. Marcos had signed
them in his (petitioner's) presence.

The lone witness for the prosecution, Melquiades T. de la Cruz, Presidential Staff Director of the
Malacañang Records Office (MRO), testified that there were no copies of the documents on file in
his office and that the signatures thereon did not appear to be those of the former President.
For his part, petitioner said that he was the Executive Director of the Presidential Regional Assistant
Monitoring Services, or PRAMS, having been appointed by then President Marcos and that his
appointment and the related documents, subject of the prosecution, had been signed by the former
President in petitioner's presence.

The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 3, in finding the petitioner guilty, held:

The defense put up by the accused, that all the subject documents were actually signed by
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, in his office at Malacañang, and in the presence of said
accused, is as preposterous as it is unbelievable, the said defense, besides being
completely negated and belied by the established facts (that subject documents, do not exist
in the Malacañang Records Office, and therefore, are spurious) is an imposition on human
belief and all sense of propriety. Further, the accused does not appear to the Court, and has
not shown himself, to be of such stature as to enjoy the privilege of having the former Chief
Executive sign documents in his presence. Moreover, the testimony of the accused in
support of his defense is totally untrustworthy and unreliable.

On the basis of the foregoing factual and legal considerations, the Court is convinced,
beyond any shadow of doubt, that the felony of the forging the signature of the President, as
defined and penalized under Art. 161 of the Revised Penal Code, was committed by the
accused on eleven (11) counts.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
forging the signature of the Chief Executive, and/or violation of Art. 161 of the Revised Penal
Code, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and hereby sentences him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
in each of these eleven (11) criminal cases, or a total of eighty (80) years up to one hundred
fifty-four (154) years, with costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals   affirmed with the modification already
14

noted on the margin of this opinion.

In this petition, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming his
conviction for the following reasons:

(1) The fact that the documents in question are not on file in the Malacañang Records Office does
not ipso facto prove that they are forged but only that they were lost or destroyed.

(2) The lone prosecution witness, Melquiades T. dela Cruz, is incompetent to testify that the
documents were forgeries since there is no evidence to show that he had seen then President
Marcos sign documents. Indeed, this witness could not say with certainty that the signature on each
of the 11 documents was not that of President Marcos.

(3) No handwriting expert was presented in court to give an opinion as to the genuineness of
President Marcos' signatures.

(4) The Court of Appeals and the RTC committed the fallacy of "argumentum ad elenchi" in
concluding that the signatures in the documents were forgeries from the documents' "unusual format
and atrocious grammar" when these documents were not offered to prove their appearance and
grammar.
(5) Assuming these defects in format and grammar, there is no forgery since the documents could
not have deceived any person.

(6) A writing or instrument in order to constitute a forgery must possess some apparent legal efficacy
(36 Am. Jur. 2d 690), and if PRAMS is a non-existent entity as Memorandum Circular No. 1281
declared, then the documents executed under it cannot acquire such "apparent legal efficacy."

(7) Assuming further that the signature of former President Marcos on the document creating the
PRAMS was a counterfeit (Exh. C), the criminal liability of the author thereof absorbed all acts of
forgery committed under the fictitious office, because there was only one intent, i.e. to discharge the
imagined functions of a non-existent office.

(8) Assuming that the signatures of then President Marcos in the documents were spurious,
petitioner, the possessor of the documents, must be exempted from criminal responsibility because
no person of sound mind would make it appear that the President created an office and appointed
him to that office.

The petition has no merit.

First. Melquiades T. de la Cruz, Director of the Malacañang Records Office, testified that his office
did not have a record of the documents. For his part Executive Secretary Juan C. Tuvera declared
the Presidential Regional Assistant Monitoring Services as nonexistent and its alleged Executive
Director, herein petitioner, as not in any capacity connected with the Office of the President. From
these premises it is rational to conclude that the documents in question, which purport to have been
signed by then President Marcos, are bogus documents. The trial court and Court of Appeals
correctly found petitioner to be the author of the forgery. The presumption is that the possessor and
user of a falsified document is the forger thereof . 
15

Second. Petitioner contends that Melquiades T. dela Cruz was incompetent to testify as to whether
the signatures on the documents, purporting to be those of President Marcos, were forgeries
because there is no showing that he had witnessed President Marcos signing his name.

What dela Cruz said that is that he was familiar with the signature of President Marcos and that the
signatures on the documents in question were not those of President Marcos.   This is sufficient to
16

establish the signatures as forgeries. Under Rule 132, §22 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, it is
not required that the person identifying the handwriting of another must have seen the latter write the
document or sign it. It is enough, if the witness "has seen writing purporting to be his [the subject's]
upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the
handwriting of such person." De la Cruz has been record custodian at Malacañang for so many
years; it is inconceivable he had not acquired familiarity with the signature not only of President
Marcos but of other Presidents under whom he had served.

There was thus no necessity for a handwriting expert testify on the genuineness of the challenged
signatures. As this Court has once observed, the authenticity of signatures "is not a highly technical
issue in the same sense that questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology or molecular
biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature. The opinion of a handwriting expert on
the genuineness of a questioned signature is certainly much less compelling upon a judge than an
opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue. The signatures on a questioned
document can be sighted by a judge who can and should exercise independent judgment on the
issue of authenticity of such signatures."   Here, as the trial court observed, "the forgeries were not
17

only established by the evidence, but they are also as clearly discernible to the naked eye or mere
ocular inspection, as they are conspicuously evident from their appearance. . . . "  18
Third. Nor is there merit in petitioner's claim that forgery could not be said to exist since the
documents, because of their "unusual format, atrocious grammar, and misspelled words" could not
have defrauded or deceived anyone, and that moreover they lack apparent legal efficacy." That is
not so. If the documents were fanciful or whimsical, as for example, a commission appointing
petitioner mayor of a mythical kingdom, the forgery could simply be dismissed as a spoof. But as
pointed out by the Solicitor General, the Office of the President had to issue a memorandum
denouncing the legality of PRAMS because of the possibility that the less wary would be deceived,
especially because that the documents pertaining to it bear the Great Seal and were typed on
stationary which have the appearance of official stationery of the Office of the President.

Fourth. Petitioner also argues that he should have been charged under only one information
because there was only one intent "to discharge the imagined functions of a non-existent office." The
argument has no merit. The documents in this case were forged on different dates. One act was not
done to commit another. There is therefore no basis for considering the various acts as constituting
only one crime of forgery.

Fifth. As a last-ditch effort of sorts to escape criminal liability, petitioner claims that since "no person
of sound mind would [make] it appear that the Chief Executive created an office for him and
appointed him thereto," he must be exempt from criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 1 of the Revised
Penal Code. This, again, is not necessarily so since the purpose may be to deceive others.
Moreover, this defense now invoked should have been raised below. At all events, the presumption
is in favor of sanity.   In this case there is no evidence to show that petitioner was insane at the time
19

he committed the acts for which he is being prosecuted.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's petition for review and petition for bail pending appeal are DENIED for
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.