EDGARDO A. QUILO and ADNALOY VILLAHERMOSA v.

TEODULA BAJAO
G.R. No. 186199
SEPTEMBER 7, 2016
PEREZ, J.

FACTS: Teodula Bajao filed an Ejectment Complaint against Eduardo B.

Saclag, Jr., Zoilo Fulong, Sr., Elena Bertos and Talia Saclag. The subject
property was located at Sta. Ana, Manila. The MeTC of Manila decided in favor
of Bajao. The case was elevated to the RTC-Manila which affirmed the MeTC
Decision. An Appeal and Motion for Reconsideration was made to the CA and
were also denied. The case was elevated to the SC which ruled also for Bajao.
But the SC Decision was not implemented because the court did not act on the
Motion for Execution of Bajao. Seven years after, Bajao filed another Motion
for Execution before the RTC which issued a Writ of Execution on November
28, 2007 which led to the issuance of the Notice to Pay/Vacate and Demolish
Premises dated February 12, 2008. Edgardo Quilo and Adnaloy Villahermosa,
petitioners, filed a Motion to Quash and Recall of the Notice. This action of the
petitioners brought the case again to the SC.
ISSUES: 1)WON the RTC of Manila committed serious reversible error
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the petition for
certiorari of the petitioners for allegedly failing to attach the certified true copy
of the Decision by the MeTC dated November 20, 1998 and for allegedly failing
to comply with the three-day notice rule in violation of Section 4, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court.
2)WON the MTC of Manila committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the petitioners’ motion to
quash writ of execution and recall of the notice to pay/vacate and demolish
premises.
RULING: 1) NO. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure Provides that
the petition for certiorari “shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgement, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto and a sworn certification of non-
forum shopping…”. The petitioners lately submitted the certified true copies of
the assailed Orders but failed to attach the MeTC Decision dated 20 November
1998 which led to the denial by the RTC of the petition for certiorari. The
Motion for Reconsideration was received by public respondents, Hon. Felicitas
O. Laron-Cacanandin and Sheriff Rogelio C. Jundarino only on the day of the
hearing contrary to the three-day notice rule under Section 4 of Rule 15 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
 2) NO. Section 6, of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that “ a
final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five
years from the day of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is
barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.”
The Decision became final and executory on July 28, 2000. Bajao moved for
the execution of the Decision on August 8, 2000, well within the five-year
limitation. But the court failed to implement the Decision. This compelled
Bajao to file another motion to execute. Clearly, Bajao did not avail of the
proper remedy which is to file a complaint for revival of judgment. However,
the circumstances of this case are replete with peculiarities which impel the
Court to exercise equity jurisdiction. The Court, in pursuit of equity justice
resolved to treat the second motion for execution as a complaint for the revival
of judgment to allow it to rule on merits. It was not the fault of Bajao why the
decision was not implemented despite of a timely filing of a motion to execute.
In the end, the court must promote substantial justice and get out of strict
adherence to technical rules if it will only perpetuate injustice.
The Petition is DENIED and the Writ of Execution be implemented
upon receipt of the Decision.
MICHAEL A. ONSLOTT v. UPPER TAGPOS NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION,
INC.,
G.R. No. 221047
JANUARY 11, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS: Albert Onslott, an American citizen, owned a parcel of land in Rizal

Province. That parcel of land was occupied by the members of Upper Tagpos
Neighborhood Association, Inc.. The Province of Rizal had the property
auctioned for non-payment of realty taxes and Amelita De Sena won the
auction. UTNAI redeemed the property from De Sena and was able to have the
OCT be cancelled and a new title issued in its name. Michael Onslott,
petitioner, claiming to be the legitimate son of Albert and Josefina Arrastia filed
a Petition for Relief from Judgment. He averred that he and his mother were
not impleaded in the case as indispensable parties. The RTC of Rizal denied
the Petition and later found that its decision never attained finality for not
being served upon Albert. Both parties appealed to the CA and it found out
that UTNAI’s appeal was meritorious while that of Michael’s was dismissed.
ISSUE: 1)WON the CA erred in directing the issuance of a title in favor of
UTNAI notwithstanding (a) the lack of jurisdiction over the person of Albert, the
registered owner of the subject property who has been dead prior to the
institution of UTNAI’s complaint.
2)WON the failure to implead his mother as an indispensable party,
since the subject property was allegedly conjugal in nature.
3)WON the lack of legal interest on the part of UTNAI to redeem the
subject property.
RULING: 1)The Petition is PARTLY MERITORIOUS. Albert died in the US in
2004. Michael was his compulsory heir. Although jurisdiction was not initially
acquired over the person of Albert, the defect was cured when Michael as
successor-in-interest voluntarily appeared in court. His appearance made the
court acquire jurisdiction over his person.
2)With regards to the failure of UTNAI to implead him and his
mother, Josephine, as indispensable parties, Michael was not able to prove
that the property, was acquired during the marriage of Josephine and Albert.
So the property, was acquired during the marriage of Josephine and Albert.
3)UTNAI has no legal interest to redeem the property. Mere use or
possession of the subject property does not vest it with legal interest. UTNAI’s
redemption was erroneous. As a result, all proceedings that spring from
redemption ought to be nullified and the status quo thereto should be revert.
UTNAI may recover the full amount it has paid in redeeming the property. De
Sena and the Provincial Government of Rizal, not impleaded in the case, may
commence the appropriate proceedings to assert their right.
 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. HEIRS OF THE LATE IRENEO AND
CARIDAD ENTAPA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 215072
SEPTEMBER 7, 20016
LEONEN, J.

FACTS: Caridad Entapa owned a piece of land with an area of 16.067

hectares. She and two of her children executed a Special Power of Attorney
authorizing Joseph Gonzaga to enter into legal transactions on their behalf.
Gonzaga executed a real estate mortgage over Estapa’s land to guarantee a
P30,000 loan in favor of Philippine National Bank. Gonzaga failed to pay and
the property was sold at public auction. PNB won the bid. When the other
heirs of Estapa learned of the foreclosure, they decided to re-acquire the
property. So, they requested PNB to restructure and recompute Gonzaga’s
loan. PNB approved the request. P178, 336.19 representing 20% of the
recomputed was paid initially by Rosario Orpeza and she paid also the taxes.
Later, she discovered that the property was occupied by beneficiary-farmers of
the DAR. She demanded the return of her money. PNB refused. And this led
to the filing of a complaint for Collection of Sum of Money against PNB. The
RTC-Bacolod City decided in favor of Estapa. PNB appealed to the CA arguing
that the RTC’s Decision violated the Constitution and the Rules of Civil
Procedure when it failed to state the facts and law on which the ruling was
based and the trial court erred in ordering it to return the payments. CA
nullified the RTC’s Decision and remanded the case for the rendition of
judgment under the Constitution and Rules of Court. PNB appealed to SC.

ISSUES: 1) WON the CA erred in nullifying the RTC Decision.

2) WON the CA adjudicated on the merits of the case despite ordering
its remand to the trial court.

RULING:1) NO. Article VIII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution provides, “ No decision

shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based.” Sec. 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of
Court likewise provides, “ a judgement or final order determining the merits of
the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge,
stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based signed
by him, and filed with the clerk of court.” In nullifying the decision of the trial
court, the CA stated that “it contained no reference to any legal basis in
reaching its conclusions” nor did it “cite any legal authority or principle to
support its conclusion that [the] bank is liable. Although the RTC Decision is
four pages long, the first three pages just stated the facts and dispositive
portion. The constitutional requirement that the basis of the decision of courts
should be clearly articulated and made legible to the parties does not merely
assure fairness. It is likewise crucial to enforce fairness. It is likewise crucial
to assure the public that the judiciary arrives at its conclusions on the basis of
reasonable inference from credible and admissible evidence and from the text
of law and jurisprudence.
2) NO. It is erroneous for the petitioner to argue that the CA had ruled
that it was liable to the respondents. There is nothing in the decision of the CA
that ordered the petitioner to return to respondents their down payment and
pay damages. “While it is true that (petitioner) has the right to recover the
deficiency of Gonzaga’s loan obligation under the well-entrenched rule that a
creditor is not precluded from recovering any unpaid balance on the obligation
if the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the property subject of the real estate
mortgage results in a deficiency, still, such defenses should not be
countenance because it was belatedly raised only on appeal, not during the
trial before the court a quo.” Even if it was true that the CA had adjudicated
upon the merits of the case, any discussion would have been considered obiter
dictum because the case was remanded to the court a quo.