SUMMARY OF CASES

CIVIL PROCEDURE
CASE DIGEST BY: GUNTANG, MIKKO JANE A.
2C
TOPIC: SEC. 5, RULE 18 PRE-TRIAL
RENATO S.D. DOMINGO AND ON BEHALF OF HIS CO-HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES FELICIDAD DE
DOMINGO AND MACARIO C. DOMINGO, v. SPOUSES ENGRACIA D. SINGSON et.al.

G.R. No. 203287, April 05, 2017, REYES, J.

SUMMARY

Q: Engracia filed with the MTC of Manila a complaint for ejectment/unlawful detainer, against his
co-heirs. Engracia claimed that she is the absolute owner of the subject property, having bought
the same from the Spouses Domingo as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale. The petitioners
filed a complaint with the RTC of Pasig City, which sought the nullity of the sale. The Civil Case was
initially set for pre-trial conference in Feb. 7, 2008. However, the pre-trial was reset many times
until May 26, 2011. The RTC issued an Order dismissing the petitioners' complaint due to their
and their counsel's repeated failure to appear during the scheduled pre-trial hearing dates. The
CA, in its decision, affirmed the RTC's dismissal of the petitioners' complaint. Whether or not the
dismissal of the petitioners' complaint due to failure to prosecute was proper.

A: Yes. Under the Rules of Court, the parties and their counsel are mandated to appear at the pre-
trial. Thus, the failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse consequences. If the absent
party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed, which shall be with prejudice, unless
otherwise ordered by the court. If it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is
allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof.
What transpired is a series of resetting of the hearing due to the failure of the petitioners and/or
their counsel to appear during the scheduled pre-trial dates. Clearly, the petitioners' wanton
disregard of scheduled pre-trial indeed justified the dismissal of their complaint. The petitioners
have not shown any persuasive reason, which would justify a relaxation of the rules on pre-trial.

TOPIC: KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY LAW (P.D 1508; R.A 7610 AS AMENDED); RULES ON SUMMARY
PROCEDURE.
RAFAEL C. UY (CABANGBANG STORE) v. ESTATE OF VIPA FERNANDEZ.

G.R. No. 200612, April 05, 2017,REYES, J.

SUMMARY

Q: The estate of Vipa, through Grace Joy (administrator), filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
with the MTCC of Iloilo City against Rafael for failure to pay rents. The MTCC ruled in favor of the
Estate of Vipa and against Rafael to vacate the premises. On appeal, the RTC reversed the MTCC's
decision. Thus, dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer, it then pointed out that Grace Joy
failed to bring the dispute to the barangay for conciliation prior to filing the complaint for
unlawful detainer. The CA reversed the RTC decision. The CA held that there was no necessity to
bring the dispute before the barangay for conciliation since the Estate of Vipa, being a juridical
person, cannot be impleaded to a barangay conciliation proceeding. Further, the CA held that
Rafael raised the issue of ownership of the subject property, only for the first time in his appeal
with the RTC. Should the complaint be dismissed for lack of prior barangay conciliation and for
raising the issue of ownership of the subject property, only for the first time in his appeal with the
RTC?
 A: There was no need to refer the dispute between the parties herein to the barangay for
conciliation pursuant to the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. It bears stressing that only
individuals may be parties to barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants or
respondents. Complaints by or against corporations, partnerships or other juridical entities may
not be filed with, received or acted upon by the barangay for conciliation. The Estate of Vipa,
which is the complainant below, is a juridical entity that has a personality, which is separate and
distinct from that of Grace Joy. Thus, there is no necessity to bring the dispute to the barangay for
conciliation prior to filing of the complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTCC. The issue of
ownership must be raised by the defendant on the earliest opportunity; otherwise, it is already
deemed waived. Moreover, the instant case was covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure,
which expressly provide that affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be
deemed waived, except for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Thus, the RTC erred in
resolving the issue of ownership for the first time on appeal. However, before a party may be
barred from raising an issue for the first time on appeal, it is imperative that the issue
could have been raised during the trial. What escaped the appellate court's attention is that the
sale of the one-half undivided share in the subject property to Rafael was consummated only on
December 29, 2005, more than two years after Rafael filed with the MTCC his answer to the
complaint for unlawful detainer on July 18, 2003. Obviously, Rafael could not have raised his
acquisition of Levi's share in the subject property as an affirmative defense in the answer he filed
with the MTCC. Thus, the CA should have exerted efforts to resolve the said issue instead of
dismissing the same on the flimsy ground that it was not raised during the proceedings before the
MTCC.

TOPIC: RULE 65: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

ROBERT C. MARTINEZ v. NOELS BUEN

G.R. No. 187342, April 05, 2017, JARDELEZA, J.

SUMMARY

Q: Buen filed in the MeTC an Action for Recovery of Personal Property against Martinez. The MeTC
awarded the possession of the vehicle to Buen. The MeTC treated Martinez' Comment/Opposition
as a motion for reconsideration. Buen filed a Petition for Certiorari in the RTC, pleading that the
MeTC acted in grave abuse of discretion when it treated Martinez' Comment/Opposition as a
motion for reconsideration. The RTC ruled in favor of Buen. The RTC also agreed with Buen that
the Comment/Opposition should not have been treated as a motion for reconsideration because it
did not comply with the substantive and procedural requirements for a motion, such as stating the
grounds relied upon, notice of hearing, manner of service, and proof of service. Further, the RTC
stated that Buen did not err in filing a petition for certiorari instead of an appeal because it was
apparent that the MeTC committed an error in jurisdiction. It also held that while certiorari may
not be used as a substitute for lost appeal, such rule should not be strictly enforced if the case is
genuinely meritorious. CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Is petition for certiorari the proper
remedy to be availed of?

A: Yes. A special civil action for certiorari can only be entertained when there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the RTC could have dismissed
Buen's petition outright. The rule that certiorari will not lie as a substitute for appeal, however,
admits of exceptions. Certiorari may be considered a proper remedy despite the availability of
appeal or other remedy in the ordinary course of law in the following instances: "(a) when it is
necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge
capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there may be danger of a
failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the
issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in case urgency. The
second exception is present in this case. We find that the MeTC judge capriciously and whimsically
exercised his judgment when he treated Martinez' (belated) Comment/Opposition as a motion for
reconsideration. The Comment/Opposition cannot be treated as a motion for reconsideration as it
does not comply with the formal/substantive requisites for the same.

TOPIC: SEC. 3, RULE 58 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; SEC.16, RULE 39 EXECUTION

CARMELITA T. BORLONGAN v. BANCO DE ORO
G.R. No. 217617, April 05, 2017

ELISEO C. BORLONGAN, JR. v. BDO UNIBANK, INC.

G.R. No. 218540, VELASCO JR., J.
SUMMARY

Q: Spouses Borlongan went to the Registry of Deeds to obtain a copy of the TCT in preparation for
a prospective sale of the subject property. To their surprise, the title contained an annotation that
the property covered thereby was the subject of an execution sale pending before the RTC of
Makati City. Found out that respondent BDO filed a complaint for sum of money against Tancho
Corporation, the principal debtor of loan obligations obtained from the bank. Following the
discovery of the sale of their property, Eliseo filed a Complaint for Annulment of Surety
Agreements, Notice of Levy on Attachment, Auction Sale and Other Documents with the RTC of
Pasig City. BDO filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. The Pasig RTC dismissed the case citing
lack of jurisdiction. CA affirmed the RTC decision. Also, the appellate court denied Carmelita's
prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Whether CA erred in
refusing to issue a TRO/WPI over BDO’s claimed ownership over the subject property? Does RTC has
jurisdiction to annul the levy and execution sale of the subject property filed by the non-debtor
husband?

A: (1) Yes. The issuance of a TRO is not conclusive of the outcome of the case as it requires but a
sampling of the evidence. Issuing the writ of preliminary injunction are interlocutory in nature.
Moreover, the sole object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits
of the case can be heard. Since Sec. 4 of Rule 58 gives the trial courts sufficient discretion to
evaluate the conflicting claims in an application for a provisional writ which often involves a
factual determination, the appellate courts generally will not interfere in the absence of manifest
abuse of such discretion. Indeed, the petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI was
intended to preserve the status quo ante, and not to pre-empt the appellate court's decision on the
merits of her petition for annulment. Thus, it was a grievous error on the part of the CA to deny
her of this provisional remedy.
(2) Yes. Sec. 16, Rule 39, allows third-party claimants of properties under execution to vindicate
their claims to the property in a separate action with another court. Provided, that the claim is a
third-party or a "stranger" to the case. The poser then is this: Is the husband, who was not a party
to the suit but whose conjugal property was executed on account of the other spouse's debt, a
"stranger" to the suit? We held, thus: A third-party claim must be filed by a person other than the
judgment debtor or his agent. There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature.
Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by
the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Furthermore, it is not
apparent from the records of this case that BDO had established the benefit to the conjugal
partnership flowing from the surety agreement allegedly signed by Carmelita. Thus, Eliseo's claim
over the subject property lodged with the RTC Pasig is proper.

TOPIC: RULE 65 PETITION FOR CERTIORARI; RULE 16 FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION
BUTUAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 197358,April 05, 2017, REYES, J.

SUMMARY

Q: BDC filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of real estate mortgage with the RTC against
respondents. As special and affirmative defense, respondent claimed that the complaint filed by
BDC should be dismissed outright for failing to state a cause of action since at the time of the
execution of the REM, BDC did not yet exist, hence, could not have claimed ownership of the
subject property. RTC ruled in favor of BDC. The respondents then filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA, claiming that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in brushing aside
their special and affirmative defense. CA granted the petition and dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action. The respondents maintain that BDC’s petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 is not the proper remedy to assail the CA's Decision. They aver that BDC should have filed
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court instead. Is rule 65 the proper
remedy to assail the CA’s decision? Is BDC’s complaint failed to state a cause of action?

A: (1) No. BDC's counsel received a copy of the CA's Resolution dated May 24, 2011, denying
reconsideration. Thus, BDC only had until June 15, 2011 within which to file with this Court a
petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA's Decision. However, BDC failed to file a petition
for review on certiorari within the period to do so and, instead, opted to file a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 with this Court on July 4, 2011. Evidently, this petition for certiorari is
merely being used by BDC as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal under Rule 45. A party
cannot substitute the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the
remedy of appeal. Remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or
successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one's own
negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse.

(2) No. The allegations in the complaint has sufficiently stated a cause of action for declaration of
nullity of the REM. Basically, BDC alleged in its complaint that it is the owner of the subject
property as evidenced by TCT, which was issued in its name after it purchased the subject
property from the Spouses Sering. It bears stressing that a certificate of title issued is an absolute
and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein. BDC further alleged that the subject property was mortgaged to DORI and
Libarios without their knowledge or consent and that the Arriolas were not in any way connected
with BDC.

TOPIC: RULE 65: MANDAMUS

CITY OF DAVAO v. ROBERT E. OLANOLAN

G.R. No. 181149, April 17, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

SUMMARY

Q: An election protest was filed by Tizon against the respondent. Tizon's election protest was
initially dismissed by the MTCC, but was later granted by the COMELEC, on appeal. Hence, Tizon
was declared the duly-elected Punong Barangay. The Court en banc issued a Status Quo
Ante Order in favor of respondent which was immediately implemented by the DILG. Upon his
reinstatement, respondent passed an ordinance. The Court en banc recalled its SQAO issued. The
City of Davao thus refused to recognize all acts and transactions made and entered into by
respondent as Punong Barangay after his receipt of the Recall Order. Respondent filed a Petition
for Mandamus before the RTC, seeking to compel petitioner to allow the release of funds in
payment of all obligations incurred under his administration. But the RTC dismissed respondent's
mandamus petition. CA nullified and set aside the RTC's Orders. Does CA erred in reversing the
RTC's dismissal of respondent's mandamus petition?
A: Yes. The recall of the SQAO is effectively a dissolution of the said issuance. Thus, considering
that respondent had no right to the office of Punong Barangay at the time he filed his mandamus
petition, during which the SQAO had already been recalled, he had no valid legal interest to the
reliefs prayed for. It is well-settled that mandamus only lies to enforce the performance of a
ministerial act or duty and not to control the performance of a discretionary power.

TOPIC: RULE 18: PRE-TRIAL

ULTRA MAR AQUA RESOURCE, INC. v. FERMIDA CONSTRUCTION SERVICES

G.R. No. 191353,,April 17, 2017, TIJAM, J.

SUMMARY

Q: Fermida entered into a Contract Agreement with Ultra Mar for the construction of a warehouse.
Fermida commenced the Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money with Prayer for Injunction
before the RTC. The case was then set for pre-trial conference. However, the scheduled pre-trial
conference was re-scheduled many times. Despite several resettings, counsel for Ultra Mar failed
to attend the pre-trial conference and failed to file the required pre-trial brief. As a result, the RTC
declared Ultra Mar in default. Ultra Mar filed an Omnibus Motion to Lift Order of Default, Admit
Attached Pre-Trial Brief and Set the Case for Pre-Trial Conference, however, denied. Is the
Omnibus Motion to lift the order should be granted?

A: No. Sec. 5, Rule 18- The failure of a party to appear at pre-trial has adverse consequences: if
the absent party is the plaintiff then he may be declared non-suited and his case is dismissed; if
the absent party is the defendant, then the plaintiff may be allowed to present his evidence  ex
parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall
have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial. By way of exception, the non-
appearance of a party and counsel may be excused if (1) a valid cause is shown; or (2) there is an
appearance of a representative on behalf of a party fully authorized in writing to enter into an
amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into
stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents. Clearly then, the justifications advanced by
Ultra Mar's counsel for its repeated failure to comply with the RTC's Order to appear at the Pre-
Trial Conference, to submit the Pre-Trial Brief and to present the supporting Medical Certificate do
not constitute a valid cause to excuse such non-compliance.

TOPIC: RULE 13 FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS, JUDGMENTS AND OTHER PAPERS
SPOUSES PROCESO O. PONTILLAS, JR. AND HELEN S. PONTILLAS, v.
CARMEN OLIVARES VDA. DE PONTILLAS

G.R. No. 207667, April 17, 2017, TIJAM, J.

SUMMARY

Q: A complaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by respondent against petitioners.
The MTC dismissed the complaint and ruled that the Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver
produces no effect because the signature of one of the heirs was forged. Respondent filed an
Appeal before the RTC in Naga City. The RTC reversed the ruling of the MTC and ordered
petitioners to vacate the subject property and to remove whatever structure they had introduced
therein. Petitioners filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 before the CA. However, CA
dismissed the petition outright for the following infirmities: (1) failure to append proof of service
of the petition to the adverse party; and (2) failure to provide the updated PTR number of
petitioners' counsel. Should the case be dismissed for failure to append proof of service of the
petition to adverse party?

A: No. Courts should not be unduly strict in cases involving procedural lapses that do not really
impair the proper administration of justice. Since litigation is not a game of technicalities, every
litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his
case, free from the constraints of technicalities. While petitioners failed to attach the proof of
service in their petition before the CA, petitioners submitted an Affidavit of Service when they
filed their Motion for Reconsideration. In this case, the SC deemed it proper to consider that their
belated submission of said proof of service constitutes substantial compliance.

TOPIC: FORUM SHOPPING

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOCELYN I. BOLANTE
G.R. No. 186717, April 17, 2017

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. WINLOVE M. DUMAYAS

G.R. No. 190357, SERENO, C.J.

SUMMARY

Q: The Philippine National Bank submitted to the Anti-Money Laundering Council a series of
suspicious transaction reports involving the accounts of Livelihood Corporation, Molugan
Foundation and Assembly of Gracious Samaritans, Inc. The AMLC discovered a total of 70 bank
accounts or investments found to be part of the related web of accounts involved in the fertilizer
fund scam. Hence, the Republic filed an Ex Parte Petition, seeking the issuance of a freeze order
against the 70 accounts. The CA issued a freeze order effective for 20 days and was later extended
for a period of 30 days. The CA extended the effectivity of the freeze order for another four months
but the extension covered only 31 accounts. However, the CA found that the Republic had
committed forum shopping in seeking for issuance of freeze order. Is there forum shopping
committed?

A: Yes. Forum shopping is committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action and with the same prayer, where the previous case has not yet been resolved (litis
pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer,
where the previous case has finally been resolved (res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where
the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). While it is true that a
previous freeze order was issued in CA-G.R. AMLC No. 00014 covering some of the accounts
subject of CA-G.R. AMLC No. 00024, CA-G.R. AMLC No. 00014 had already attained finality when
the second petition was filed, neither petitioner nor any of the respondents interposed an appeal
therefrom. First, there is identity of parties. Second, there is an identity of rights asserted and
relief sought based on the same facts. Third, the judgment in CA-G.R. AMLC No. 00014 barred the
proceedings in CA-G.R. AMLC No. 00024 by res judicata.
TOPIC: RULE 47 ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENTS OR FINAL ORDERS AND RESOLUTIONS
BACLARAN MARKETING CORPORATION v. FERNANDO C. NIEVA

G.R. No. 189881, April 19, 2017, JARDELEZA, J.

SUMMARY

Q: The case stemmed from a civil case arising from vehicular accident where BMC was involved.
The sheriff levied upon BMC's real property in Parañ aque City. Then, it was sold in public auction.
Respondent Nieva emerged as the highest bidder. BMC failed to redeem the property within one
year from the sale. Nieva filed a Petition for Cancellation of TCT and Issuance of New Title in the
RTC Parañ aque City. The Parañ aque Court issued a Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate
against BMC. BMC filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment before the CA. BMC prayed for the
annulment of the following orders and decisions: Writ of Execution and its implementation,
auction sale, cancellation of title and issuance of writ of possession. BMC alleged that its counsel
committed acts of gross and inexcusable negligence constituting "extrinsic fraud," which deprived
it of due process and an opportunity to present its side. The CA denied BMC's petition. It ruled that
the remedy of annulment of judgment is not available to BMC. Is the remedy of annulment of
judgment proper?

A: No. The petitioner must comply with the statutory requirements as set forth under Rule 47.
These are:
(1) The remedy is available only when the petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies through no
fault of the petitioner;
(2) The grounds for the action of annulment of judgment are limited to either extrinsic fraud or
lack of jurisdiction;
(3) The action must be filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if
based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel; and
(4) The petition must be verified, and should allege with particularity the facts and the law relied
upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioner's good and substantial cause
of action or defense, as the case may be.

BMC's petition for annulment of judgment fails to meet the first and second requisites. An auction
sale and a writ of execution are not final orders. Thus, they cannot be nullified through an action
for annulment of judgment. It applies only to a petition to annul a judgment or final order and
resolution in civil actions, on the ground of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction or due process.
Here, BMC invokes extrinsic fraud and lack of due process as grounds for its petition for
annulment of judgment due to Atty. Rizon's gross negligence in handling the case. However, it is
not the extrinsic fraud contemplated under Rule 47, Sec. 2.
TOPIC: RULE 16 MOTION TO DISMISS
BERNADETTE S. BILAG v. ESTELA AY-AY

G.R. No. 189950, April 24, 2017, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

SUMMARY

Q: The instant case stemmed from a Complaint for Quieting of Title with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction filed by respondents against petitioners before the RTC. Petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, prescription/laches/estoppel, and res judicata. The
RTC ruled in petitioners' favor and ordered the dismissal of the case. CA set aside the dismissal of
RTC. CA concluded that while these cases may involve the same properties, the nature of the
action differs; hence, res judicata is not a bar to the present suit. On the issue of laches,
prescription or estoppel, the CA pointed out that in view of respondents' allegation that they have
been in possession of the subject lands since 1976, their action to quiet title is imprescriptible.
Should the case be dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter?

A: Yes. Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case.
In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the case on the
merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject matter. Thus, when a court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action, hence, null
and void. It creates no rights and produces no effect. Since the subject lands are untitled and
unregistered public lands, then petitioners correctly argued that it is the Director of Lands who
has the authority to award their ownership. Thus, the RTC correctly recognized its lack of power
or authority to hear and resolve respondents' action for quieting of title. Having established that
the disputed property is public land, the trial court was therefore correct in dismissing the
complaint to quiet title for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court had no jurisdiction to determine who
among the parties have better right over the disputed property which is admittedly still part of the
public domain.

TOPIC: RULE 58 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

PABLO AND PABLINA MARCELO-MENDOZA v. PEROXIDE PHILS., INC.

G.R. No. 203492, April 24, 2017, REYES, J.

SUMMARY

Q: An ejectment case was filed by the petitioners against respondent. The sheriff conducted a
public auction and sold to Pablo. Aggrieved, the third-party claimants filed a complaint with the
RTC of Quezon City to declare void the sheriff's sale and Certificate of Sale with prayer for a TRO
and a writ of preliminary injunction. A WPI was issued. The deputy sheriff of the RTC of Quezon
City padlocked the gate of the subject property. Pablo, however, forcibly opened the gate and
brought out dismantled machineries of PPI. PPI filed an Omnibus Motion alleging specific acts that
were characterized as violative of the court's injunction. Pablo filed a Motion to Remove Padlock
on the Gate of the Land Owned by the petitioners. RTC granted the petitioners' motion. PPI
elevated the case before the CA. The CA granted the petition for certiorari and rendered the
adverse decision under review. Whether or not the grant of writ of preliminary injunction, as well
as the order to padlock and re-padlock the subject property are proper.

A: Yes. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior
to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a
particular act or acts. The sole purpose of which is to preserve the status quo until the merits of
the main case can be heard.
A WPI may be issued only after a clear showing that there exists a right to be protected and that
the act against which the writ is to be directed are violative of an established right. PPI was able to
sufficiently establish that it had a right over the properties which should be protected while being
litigated. Hence, the issuance by the lower courts of the WPI and the order to padlock and re-
padlock the subject property is in order to preserve and protect the rights of PPI and other
claimants during the pendency of the main case.

TOPIC: RULE 60 REPLEVIN

WILLIAM ANGHIAN SIY v. ALVIN TOMLIN

G.R. No. 205998, April 24, 2017, DEL CASTILLO, J.

SUMMARY

Q: Petitioner filed before the RTC a Complaint for Recovery of Possession with Prayer for
Replevin against respondents. Petitioner alleged that he is the owner of a car which he entrusted
to Ong. Ong failed to surrender the vehicle. Petitioner learned that the vehicle was being
transferred to respondent and that the vehicle was later impounded and taken into custody by the
PNP-Highway Patrol. Thus, prayed that a writ of replevin be issued for the return of the vehicle to
him. The trial court issued a Writ of Replevin in favor of the plaintiff subject to the posting of the
bond. Respondent filed an Omnibus Motion seeking to quash the Writ of Replevin. The trial court
denied respondent's Omnibus Motion for lack of merit. Respondent filed a Petition
for Certiorari before the CA. CA held that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
instant case for failure of petitioner to pay the correct docket fees, that petitioner failed to comply
with the requirements under Section 2, Rule 60. Is the issuance of writ of replevin proper?

A: No. Petitioner constituted and appointed Ong as his agent to sell the vehicle, surrendering to
the latter the vehicle, all documents of title pertaining thereto, and a deed of sale signed in blank,
with full understanding that Ong would offer and sell the same to his clients or to the public. In
return, Ong accepted the agency. Since Ong was able to sell the subject vehicle to Chua, petitioner
thus, ceased to be the owner thereof nor is he entitled to the possession of the vehicle. Considering
that he was no longer the owner or rightful possessor of the subject vehicle at the time he filed the
case, petitioner may not seek a return of the same through replevin. Respondent who obtained the
vehicle from Chua and registered the transfer with the LTO, is the rightful owner thereof, and as
such, he is entitled to its possession.

TOPIC: RULE 9 EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD; RULE 16 MOTION TO DISMISS

RODANTE F. GUYAMIN v. JACINTO G. FLORES
 G.R. No. 202189, April 25, 2017, DEL CASTILLO, J.

SUMMARY

Q: Respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession against petitioners before the RTC.
Summons and a copy of the Complaint were served upon petitioners through Eileen, who
nonetheless refused to sign and acknowledge receipt thereof. Respondents filed a Motion to
Declare Defendants in Default, arguing that despite service of summons petitioners failed to file
their answer. Petitioners filed their Answer with Motion to Dismiss. Respondents filed their Reply
to Answer, arguing that petitioners' Answer was belatedly filed so they prayed that the Answer be
stricken off the record. The RTC declared the defendants (Guyamin) in default for failure to file
their responsive answer within the reglementary period. The CA affirmed the ruling of RTC. (1)
Should the case be dismissed for lack of cause of action? (2) Is CA correct for declaring petitioners in
default? (3) Is CA erred when it ruled that the RTC validly rendered its decision favorable to the
respondents without the filing of the formal offer of evidence.

A: (1) No. With the clear realization that they are settling on land that they do not own, occupants
of registered private lands by mere tolerance of the owners should always expect that one day,
they would have to vacate the same. Their time is merely borrowed; they have no right to the
property whatsoever, and their presence is merely tolerated and under the good graces of the
owners. Thus, there could be no more categorical demand by respondents than the filing of a case
against petitioners before the Barangay Chairman to cause the latter's eviction from the property.

(2) Yes. Upon CA review, a copy of the summons was received on September 26, 2006 by one of
the defendants Eileen Gatarin, who received a copy for all the defendants. It was only on May 28,
2007 that the Guyamins filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss, or more than 8 months after
receiving the summons.

(3) No. The Court supports the CA's pronouncement that since respondents' exhibits were
presented and marked during the ex parte hearing, the trial judge committed no error when he
admitted and considered them in the resolution of the case notwithstanding that no formal offer of
evidence was made. The pieces of evidence were identified during the ex parte hearing and
marked as Exhibits "A" to "F" for respondents and were incorporated into the records of the case.
As a matter of fact, the RTC Judge referred to them in his October 21, 2008 Decision. If they were
not included in the record, the RTC Judge could not have referred to them in arriving at judgment.

TOPIC: RULE 63 DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

SPS. ALCANTARA v. SPS. FLORANTE BELEN AND ZENAIDA ANANIAS

G.R. No. 200204, April 25, 2017, SERENO, C.J.

SUMMARY

Q: Spouses Alcantara filed before the RTC a Complaint against Spouses Belen for the quieting of
title, reconveyance of possession, and accounting of harvest with damages. Spouses Alcantara
claimed that they were the registered owners of the parcel of land. Spouses Belen alleged that they
bought the property from its prior owners. Even though respondents did not have any certificate
of title over the property, they supported their claim of ownership with various Tax Declarations.
The RTC declared petitioners as the absolute owners of Lot No. 16932. The RTC went on to
conclude that respondents were claiming Lot No. 16931, a property different from Lot No. 16932.
Spouses Belen appealed before the CA. CA set aside the ruling of RTC. Whether or not the
petitioners have a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property to quiet title.

A: Yes. Upon review, it clearly shows that the lot claimed by petitioners is not the property
conveyed in the deed of sale presented by respondents. Aside from their difference in size, the two
properties have distinctive boundaries. Therefore, on the face of the documents, the CA incorrectly
ruled that these pertained to Lot No. 16932. Based on established jurisprudence, we rule that the
certificate of title of petitioners is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of their ownership of the
property. The irrelevant Tax Declarations of Spouses Belen cannot defeat TCT No. T-36252 of
Spouses Alcantara, as it is binding and conclusive upon the whole world. The real purpose of the
Torrens System of land registration is to quiet title to land and put stop forever to any question as
to the legality of the title.