Rule 37 Republic Vs Asuncion
Rule 37 Republic Vs Asuncion
159695, September 15, 2006 Case Digest by: Carlos, Kaira Marie
B.
Facts:
Paciencia Gonzales Asuncion and the Heirs of Felipe F. Asuncion applied for the registration of the titles
of nine (9) parcels of land, with RTC of Bulacan.
Petitioner, represented by the Solicitor General, opposed the application on the ground that the subject
lands are inalienable forest lands of the public domain, within the unclassified area of Bulacan, Bulacan.
The applicants’ motion to admit an amended application for eleven (11) parcels of land was granted by
the trial court.
The trial court also dismissed the application over two (2) other parcels, Psu-133934 & Psu-138316.
Meanwhile, on June 29, 2001, the trial court had considered the case submitted for decision16 and on July
10, 2001, rendered its decision ordering the registration of five (5) parcels of land, denominated as Psu-
115369, Psu-115615, Psu-115616, Psu118984, and Psu-121255 (amended).
Due to the applicants’ voluminous formal offer of evidence, the Solicitor General asked for additional
time, until July 30, 2001, to file his comment on the applicants’ formal offer of evidence.
The Solicitor General received his copy of the decision. Five days later, on August 2, 2001, the Solicitor
General filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision dated July 10, 2001, but it was
denied on February 26, 2002. The trial court ruled that the Solicitor General was in effect seeking a new
trial and that the motion for reconsideration was pro forma since it lacked an affidavit of merit required
by the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court.
The Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking the annulment of the
Orders dated February 26, 2002 and April 26, 2002. The appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of
merit.
The appellate court considered the Solicitor General’s motion for reconsideration as a motion for new
trial and held that the case cannot be re-opened because the motion was filed after judgment.
ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the dismissal of the Solicitor General's motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the motion was in effect one for a new trial and was pro forma?
Held:
A motion for reconsideration is equivalent to a motion for new trial if based on a ground for new trial.
Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion for new trial must be based on the
following causes: (a) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not
have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his
rights; or (b) newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result.
The Solicitor General’s motion for reconsideration did not aver grounds for new trial. The motion was not
based on fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that would need affidavits of merit, nor is the
motion based on newly discovered evidence as to require affidavits of witnesses. The two main
arguments raised by the Solicitor General in the motion for reconsideration were: (1) that the trial court
deprived petitioner of its right to present evidence; and, (2) that the decision was tainted with serious
errors of law and fact. Both are not the valid causes for new trial per Section 1, Rule 37. Hence, we are
unable to agree with the trial and appellate courts that the motion for reconsideration was actually a
motion for new trial.
Mere reiteration of issues already passed upon by the court does not automatically make a motion for
reconsideration pro forma. What is essential is compliance with the requisites of the Rules.
Since the Solicitor General filed his notice of appeal on March 20, 2002 or seven days after he
received the denial of the motion, the notice of appeal was filed within the "fresh period" of 15 days to file
the notice of appeal. Thus, the notice of appeal deserves to be given due course.
Lastly, we find now that the Solicitor General improperly appeals before this Court the trial court's
decision in LRC Case No. 3681-M. We note that he had already appealed said decision, by way of an
ordinary appeal, when he filed the notice of appeal with the trial court. In Marikina Valley Dev't. Corp. v.
Hon. Flojo, it should be pointed out, this Court directed the trial court to give due course to the
notice of appeal.