Mobile-Application-Security Testing-Landscape-Overview
Mobile-Application-Security Testing-Landscape-Overview
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Peer Reviewers:
Srinivas Naik
Giovanni Russello
CSA Analysts:
Hing-Yan Lee
Haojie Zhuang
It was only recently that whenever a new service was introduced, it would be provided via /
accompanied by websites that allow users easy access to the service, be it social media, online
banking, online grocery shopping, etc. A website was almost always mandatory. But with the
explosion of smart mobile devices ownership (approximately 3.5 billion smartphone users in 20201),
mobile applications (apps) have surpassed websites as the avenue of choice when it comes to
consuming services.
According to a study by eMarketer, approximately 90% of the time spent on smartphones is spent on
apps as opposed to websites2. ‘Do you have an app for that?’ is one of the common questions asked
by the digital native when introduced to a new service.
The following are some interesting statistics that further illustrate the prevalence and impact of
mobile apps in our everyday lives:
• Approximately 2.9 million apps are available on the Google Play Store in Dec 20193
• Approximately 1.8 million iOS apps are available on the Apple App Store in Jan 20204
• Consumers downloaded a total of 204 billion apps in 20195
• Consumers spent USD 462 billion on apps in 20196
• 60 to 90 apps are installed on the average smartphone7
Cloud computing accelerates the development and real-time use of applications, which drives
personal productivity and business agility. However, with the proliferation of mobile apps and how it
intertwines with both work and play, new security challenges arise which need to be addressed. This
in turn has led to a vibrant and growing mobile app testing market. According to Market Research
Future Analysis, the ‘global mobile application testing services market reached USD 3.2 billion in 2018
and has been estimated to be valued at USD 13.6 billion by 2026 growing at 20.32 % CAGR during the
forecast period 2019–2026’8.
1
https://www.statista.com/statistics/330695/number-of-smartphone-users-worldwide/
2
https://www.emarketer.com/content/us-time-spent-with-mobile-2019
3
https://www.statista.com/statistics/266210/number-of-available-applications-in-the-google-play-store/
4
https://www.lifewire.com/how-many-apps-in-app-store-2000252
5
https://www.statista.com/topics/1002/mobile-app-usage/
6
https://www.statista.com/topics/1002/mobile-app-usage/
7
https://buildfire.com/app-statistics/
8
https://www.marketwatch.com/press-release/mobile-application-testing-services-mar-
ket-global-segment-analysis-opportunity-assessment-competitive-intelligence-industry-out-
look-2020-2024-2020-06-19
In addition, CSA signed a Memorandum of Understanding with OWASP in 2019 with the aim to
collaborate towards improving and increasing open source security standards and testing for mobile
applications.
The next section briefly describes the key contribution from the MAST WG thus far.
The CSA believes that implementation of recommendations in the 2016 MAST whitepaper will result
in clearly articulated best practices in the security testing of mobile applications.
• Section 1: introduced the paper’s purpose and scope; normative references; and a preliminary
study
• Section 2: examined the key areas of concerns and challenges during mobile application
security vetting
• Mobile computing and app security challenges
• Third-party app-derived security challenges
• Mobile app development management challenges
• Mobile app security vetting concerns
• Section 3: discussed mobile application security management lifecycle and security
recommendations from development to completion - including usage and off-the-shelf
phases
• Development
• Testing
• Production
• Update
9
https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/artifacts/mobile-application-security-testing/
10
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-163/rev-1/final
Recreational obfuscation
Before Google Play accepts an app, it is scanned for potential security issues under Google’s App
security improvement program11. The program continues to re-scan apps on Google Play even after
they are accepted, as the threat landscape and known vulnerabilities evolve continuously.
Once an app is installed on an Android device, Google uses Play Protect12, its built-in machine-
learning-based malware protection for Android to keep the device, data, and apps safe. This is
especially useful as there remain numerous third-party Android app stores that users can use to
download and install untrusted apps that were previously blacklisted on the official Play Store, and
are likely to be dangerous13.
How Google Play specifically tests and reviews apps for security is largely proprietary information. It
is however not without flaws, as apps loaded with malware manage to sneak past Google’s defenses
from time to time. For example, the Tekya family of malware generates fraudulent clicks on ads and
banners found in 56 apps on Google Play Store in 202014.
While Apple provides a set of App Store Review Guidelines15, they are high-level and principles-based
(eg. ‘Apps should implement security measures to ensure proper handling of user information…’).
11
https://developer.android.com/google/play/asi
12
https://www.android.com/play-protect/
13
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2020/03/07/this-is-androids-most-alarming-malware-
threat-new-report-warns-of-61669-malicious-apps/#144f1bed4a36
14
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/03/found-malicious-google-play-apps-
with-1-7-million-downloads-many-by-children/
15
https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/
As secure as the iOS is touted, malicious apps do still slip through the review process, such as the
‘clicker trojan’ module found in 17 approved apps that were approved16. They were subsequently
discovered and removed from the App Store.
Microsoft Store
The Microsoft Store puts submitted apps through its App Certification Process17. However, it similarly
does not disclose the specific tests and only mentions that the test “checks app’s packages for
viruses and malware”.
The Microsoft Store is also not spared from malicious apps. In 2019, Symantec found eight apps on the
store that secretly mined for cryptocurrency by hijacking computing resources on users’ devices18.
Amazon AppStore
The Amazon AppStore provides developers with a pre-submission checklist19. This checklist,
however, does not make much mention in terms of security testing, except for stating that ‘if your
app uses the Amazon Device Messaging API, be prepared to associate your app with a security profile
as part of the submission process,’ which is a requirement for OAuth rather than for security testing.
Amazon does provide a ‘Privacy and Security Policy’20 that explains relevant principles apps need to
adhere by, and also provide examples of app scenarios that violate these policies and will be rejected
by the AppStore. As with its peers, it does not disclose specific tests performed on apps.
Because the use of Amazon AppStore requires Android users to allow installation of apps from
unknown sources, concerns have been raised21 about weakening Android’s security posture by
potentially allowing apps rejected by Google Play Store to make their way onto users’ devices via
alternative avenues.
16
https://9to5mac.com/2019/10/25/malware-iphone-apps/
17
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/uwp/publish/the-app-certification-process
18
https://news.softpedia.com/news/malicious-windows-10-apps-found-in-the-store-possibly-down-
loaded-by-thousands-524980.shtml
19
https://developer.amazon.com/apps-and-games/app-submission
20
https://developer.amazon.com/docs/policy-center/privacy-security.html
21
https://www.zdnet.com/article/amazons-app-store-puts-millions-of-android-devices-at-risk/
Samsung’s Galaxy Store provides developers with checklists and guidelines22 for apps that are
submitted to the store. These checklists are principles-based, stating only that ‘Apps must not
include malware or viruses’, without providing further elaboration on how the Galaxy Store ensures
this is adhered to.
We were not able to find reports of malicious apps on the Galaxy Store, likely due to it being the less-
used cousin of the Google Play Store.
BlackBerry World
While app security testing and reviewing details or statistics concerning app malware incidents could
not be located, BlackBerry does provide a Secure Development Platform, that allows developers to
build secure mobile apps.
The platform includes tools such as BlackBerry Unified Endpoint Manager (UEM) - used to manage
users, groups, policies, apps, and app configurations; BlackBerry Workspaces -- where documents
can be securely stored, shared and synchronized across all enterprise platforms and devices;
BlackBerry Enterprise Identity -- an Identity-as-a-Service (IDaaS) that can also be used to federate
identities for SaaS services; BlackBerry two-factor authentication technology that leverages user
mobile devices, avoids PINs and codes; BlackBerry Spark Communications Services -- used to
develop real-time, end-to-end secure messaging capabilities; and BlackBerry Analytics -- which
includes Intelligent Security APIs that can report a user’s current risk level23.
Huawei AppGallery
Huawei, while not disclosing app security testing details, does provide AppGallery Review Guidelines
which consist of:
1. App Information
2. App Security
22
https://developer.samsung.com/galaxy-store/distribution-guide.html
23
https://developers.blackberry.com/
Also included in the package are the Developer’s guide and a Guide to Huawei Mobile Services 4.0
which incorporates security detection, dynamic tag management, fast identity online (FIDO)
authentication, location services, and user identification. Many of these security service offerings
also integrate Huawei’s collaborative chip-device-cloud technology, addressing user privacy and data
security protections24.
Huawei states, but does not provide details that the AppGallery ensures app downloads are secured
using: integrity verification, signature verification, threat detection, AI-enabled safeguards, and other
measures that prevent malicious tampering. Additionally, Huawei describes that during installation,
AppGallery protects app data from being read and avoids loss caused by user data leakage via procedures
such as sandboxing, memory protection, periodic backtesting, and customer service feedback25.
OWASP’s Mobile Security Testing Guide (MSTG) is a ‘comprehensive testing guide that covers the
processes, techniques, and tools used during a mobile app security test, as well as an exhaustive set
of test cases that enables testers to deliver consistent and complete results’27.
Specifically, the MSTG provides a guide for the security testing of apps in the development lifecycle,
covering both basic static and dynamic security testing, among others.
As an extension from the MSTG, OWASP also developed the Mobile Application Security Verification
Standard (MASVS), which ‘can be used by mobile software architects and developers seeking to
develop secure mobile apps, as well as security testers to ensure completeness and consistency of
test results’28.
24
https://developer.huawei.com/consumer/en/doc/30202
25
https://consumer.huawei.com/en/press/news/2020/how-does-huawei-appgallery-protect-us-
er-privacy-and-security/
26
https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/artifacts/mobile-application-security-testing/
27
https://owasp.org/www-project-mobile-security-testing-guide/
28
https://mobile-security.gitbook.io/masvs/
There is a multitude of mobile app security testing tools (e.g., ImmuniWeb MobileSuite, Zed Attack
Proxy) available in the market29. Many of these tools are open-source, maintained by hundreds of
volunteer security professionals, support both Android and iOS platforms, and generate reports
about potential vulnerabilities with recommendations on how to fix them. The following briefly
introduces some of the popular and open-source tools in use (descriptions referenced from the tools’
official webpages):
• Drozer30: An open-source security testing framework for Android. It searches for security
vulnerabilities in apps and devices by assuming the role of an app and interacting with
Android’s Dalvik Virtual Machine (now no longer used in newer Android versions), other apps’
inter-process communication endpoints, and the underlying operating system. The tool helps
users to use, share, and understand public Android exploits.
• MobSF31: Short for Mobile Security Framework, MobSF is an automated, all-in-one application
(Android / iOS / Windows) penetration testing, malware analysis, and security assessment
framework capable of performing static and dynamic analysis. Users can purchase self-paced
e-Learning courses & certifications to demonstrate competencies in the use of the tools at
nominal fees.
• QARK32: Short for Quick Android Review Kit, this open-source tool is designed to look
for common security-related Android app vulnerabilities in either source code or Android
Application Packages (APKs). It is also able to create proof-of-concept deployable APKs and/
or Android Debug Bridge commands to exploit any vulnerabilities that it may find. Rooting of
test devices is not required as the tool focuses on vulnerabilities that can be exploited under
more secure conditions.
• Zed Attack Proxy33: Open source security tool facilitating the automatic discovery of
application vulnerabilities. It has an API that developers through a desktop interface can
automate pentesting and security regression testing of an application in the CI/CD pipeline.
The following are some of the features provided by ZAP: Intercepting Proxy, Active and
Passive Scanners, Traditional and Ajax Spiders, Brute Force Scanner, Port Scanner, Web
Sockets. Proxy, Active and Passive Scanners, Traditional and Ajax Spiders, Brute Force
Scanner, Port Scanner, Web Sockets.
29
https://www.softwaretestinghelp.com/mobile-app-security-testing-tools/
30
https://github.com/FSecureLABS/drozer/wiki
31
https://mobsf.github.io/docs/#/
32
https://github.com/linkedin/qark
33
https://www.zaproxy.org/
4. Conclusion
CSA’s MAST WG in reviewing the current landscape for mobile app security testing found that:
• Users place a good deal of trust in app stores’ abilities to review, test, flag, and block apps that
exhibit undesirable behavior. However, even with the best expertise and resources touted by
the most popular and established app stores, along with the extensive experience gained from
testing and reviewing a large number of mobile apps, malware still manages to slip through
their defenses from time to time, making the headlines.
• These app stores are currently not transparent in the nature and types of security testing
conducted on submitted apps. Transparency could be a two-edged sword (benefiting
threat actors as well), but the WG opines that greater transparency for app developers and
collaboration between app stores can result in stronger defense against malware.
• Existing efforts by OWASP provide the industry with a detailed step-by-step guide and
checklists to enhance the security posture of mobile apps²².
• There are a healthy number of software tools available that are maintained by the community
and vendors to conduct security testing on mobile apps²³.
With no obvious and pertinent gaps in the mobile security testing landscape at the moment that
the WG can help to address, the WG will be temporarily suspended, but continue to keep a look-
out for potential security gaps that arise from the emergence of trends such as Beacon Technology,
Wearables, and 5G/6G wireless35
34
https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/sei_blog/2018/07/10-types-of-application-security-testing-tools-
when-and-how-to-use-them.html
35
https://www.mobileappdaily.com/mobile-app-development-trends