The Meaning of Necessary' in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV: The Myth of Cost-Bene T Balancing DONALD H. REGAN
The Meaning of Necessary' in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV: The Myth of Cost-Bene T Balancing DONALD H. REGAN
http://journals.cambridge.org/WTR
DONALD H. REGAN
* Email: [email protected].
Thanks to Rob Howse, Steve Charnovitz, Federico Ortino, Lorand Bartels, and an anonymous reviewer
for comments on previous drafts.
1 Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161 and 169/AB/R
(adopted 10 January 2001).
2 E.g., Marceau and Trachtman, ‘The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Map of the
World Trade Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods’, 36 Journal of World Trade (5, 2002)
811, at 826–828, 851–853; WTO, World Trade Report 2005: Exploring the Links between Trade,
Standards and the WTO, at 135, 137–139.
347
Appellate Body did not establish such a test. But I acknowledge that they made it
easy for people to think they did.3
The source of the confusion is a logical contradiction at the heart of the
Korea–Beef opinion. The Appellate Body does state the balancing test as I just
described it.4 But elsewhere in the opinion, the Appellate Body also states the
principle that a Member pursuing some legitimate domestic goal is entitled to
choose for itself the level of achievement of that goal. That is, a Member gets to
choose its ‘ own level of protection ’.5 Unfortunately, these two pronouncements of
the Appellate Body – that measures must be subjected to a balancing test and that
Members get to choose their own level of protection – are logically contradictory.
A court that is actually applying the balancing test described above must stand
ready to say of some measure that : (a) it achieves a legitimate local goal, and (b)
there is no other less trade-restrictive way to achieve the same level of that goal,
but (c) the measure is nonetheless illegal because the local benefits do not justify
the trade costs. But if the Appellate Body actually says that about some measure,
then the Member will be prevented from having the level of protection it has
chosen in adopting that measure. In case this is not obvious : any alternative
measure that achieves the same level of protection will involve equal or greater
trade cost, by (b) ; and any measure that achieves that level of protection at
equal or greater cost will fail the balancing test, by (c). So, applying a standard
cost–benefit balancing test is inconsistent with allowing the Member to choose its
own level of protection.
In the Korea–Beef opinion as a whole, the ‘ own level of protection’ idea gets
considerably more play than the balancing approach (even though the ‘balancing ’
passages have got much more attention from commentators). And if we look
specifically at the part of the opinion where the case is actually being decided, we
see that the Appellate Body relies on the principle that a Member gets to choose its
own level of protection.6 So the Appellate Body cannot actually be committed to
the cost–benefit balancing test described above, whatever they say.
There is a further source of confusion. The concrete test the Appellate Body
applies to implement the principle that Members get to choose their own level of
protection is a ‘ less-restrictive alternative test ’, which is just what is suggested
most naturally by the word ‘necessary ’. But their sophisticated version of the less-
restrictive alternative test itself involves a limited sort of balancing. For a start, the
Appellate Body considers as eligible alternatives to the actual measure only other
3 Among those who were not deceived are Howse and Tuerk, ‘ The WTO Impact on Internal
Regulations – A Case Study of the Canada–EC Asbestos Dispute’, in G. de Búrca and J. Scott (eds.), The
EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues (2001), 283, at 324–325; F. Ortino, ‘ From Non-
Discrimination to Reasonableness: A Paradigm Shift in International Economic Law? ’, Jean Monnet
Working Papers 01/2005.
4 ""162–164, discussed in detail in Section 3.
5 ""176, 178, discussed in detail in Section 3.
6 "180, discussed in detail in Section 3.
possible measures that would secure the same level of protection. (This guarantees
the Member’s right to choose its own level.) But within this class of alternatives,
the Appellate Body holds that a Member may have to adopt some alternative
measure that is less trade-restrictive than the actual measure, even though the
alternative measure involves higher administrative or enforcement costs. To decide
whether the Member must adopt the less trade-restrictive measure, the Appellate
Body balances the savings in trade cost achieved by the alternative measure
against the higher administrative/enforcement cost it entails. If the alternative
measure achieves the same level of the ultimate goal at lesser trade cost and
without unreasonable additional administrative/enforcement cost, the alternative
must be preferred, and the actual measure is not ‘ necessary’. Conversely, the
actual measure is ‘ necessary ’ if every alternative measure that achieves the same
level of the ultimate goal at lesser trade cost entails unreasonable administrative/
enforcement cost. This mode of decision obviously involves balancing of
administrative/enforcement costs against trade costs. But it is not the standard
cost–benefit analysis the Appellate Body describes in the most famous passages of
Korea–Beef, because it does not involve balancing the achievement of the under-
lying goal of the measure against the trade costs. As noted, the only alternatives
that are eligible for consideration are those that achieve the same amount of the
underlying goal.
The difference between these two sorts of balancing is enormously important.
To my mind, the most objectionable feature of Korea–Beef and the line of cases
that follow it is the suggestion that the Appellate Body is entitled to judge the
relative importance of various (non-protectionist) goals the Members might
have – human health, animal or plant health, preservation of species, avoidance of
noise pollution, restriction of luxury consumption, preventing offense to religious
sensibilities, whatever. There is no textual warrant for such judgments of import-
ance by the Appellate Body, and it is a serious intrusion on the Members’
regulatory autonomy.7 Of course, judging the importance of the local goal in this
way is unavoidable if the Appellate Body is actually going to engage in standard
cost–benefit balancing. But if the only balancing they engage in does not involve
balancing trade costs against the achievement of the underlying goal, but only
against administrative/enforcement costs, then there is never any need for the
7 The reader might object that Article XX itself implicitly ranks possible goals, by mentioning some
and not others. There is some truth in this, although the significance of the positive list in Article XX is less
than many people think, if we interpret Article III correctly – that is, as violated only by origin-specific
regulations and by origin-neutral regulations with a protectionist purpose – see Regan, ‘Regulatory
Purpose and ‘‘Like Products’’in Article III:4 of the GATT (With Additional Remarks on Article III:2) ’, 36
Journal of World Trade (3, 2002) 443, and ‘Further Thoughts on the Role of Regulatory Purpose Under
Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – A Tribute to Bob Hudec’, 37 Journal of World
Trade (4, 2003) 737. But even if Article XX does imply some ranking, it still does not authorize the
Appellate Body to do further ranking on its own, which is what the Appellate Body here proposes to do.
Appellate Body to judge the importance of the underlying goal. This is a great
advantage of the less-restrictive alternative approach.
There are three later cases in which the Appellate Body has interpreted the word
‘necessary ’ in GATT Article XX or GATS Article XIV : EC–Asbestos8 (involving
GATT XX(b)), US–Gambling9 (involving GATS XIV(a), which corresponds to
GATT XX(a)), and Dominican Republic–Cigarettes10 (involving GATT XX(d)
again, as in Korea–Beef ).11 Unfortunately, the opinions in these later cases merely
reproduce the confusion and contradiction of Korea–Beef. All three opinions
quote faithfully from Korea–Beef both the statement of a standard cost–benefit
balancing test and the statement that each Member gets to choose its own level of
protection, with no recognition of the inconsistency. Furthermore, all three
opinions do so in such a way as to give prominence to the standard cost–benefit
balancing test, reinforcing the general perception that that is ‘ the test ’. Finally, all
three follow the lead of Korea–Beef and decide the actual case before them by a
‘less-restrictive alternative ’ test that respects the principle that Members get to
choose their own level of protection. Hence none of the later opinions actually
involves standard cost–benefit balancing, and none depends on a weighing of the
underlying benefit.
There is more to praise in these four opinions (Beef, Asbestos, Gambling, and
Cigarettes) than to criticize. I think the Appellate Body is right not to engage in
cost–benefit balancing, and the specific results are all defensible, even though I
might not have reached the same result as the Appellate Body in DR–Cigarettes.
But the doctrinal state of affairs – involving repeated statements of contradictory
tests side-by-side – is unfortunate and dangerous. It is unfortunate because we
ought to expect logical consistency from the Appellate Body. It is dangerous
because as long as the Appellate Body continues to state a standard cost–benefit
balancing test in part of each opinion on ‘ necessity ’, and as long as trade lawyers
continue to believe that such balancing is the applicable test, there is always the
possibility that the Appellate Body will be taken in by its own misdescription
of what it has been doing and will start actually trying to balance the domestic
benefits of a measure against the cost in reduced trade. That would be at odds with
the whole spirit of the WTO agreements, which leave the evaluation of domestic
benefits to domestic regulators.12
2. Logical preliminaries
Can the less-restrictive alternative test and cost–benefit balancing really
be inconsistent?
I have suggested that in Korea–Beef and its progeny, the principle that Members
get to choose their own level of protection is embodied in a sophisticated version of
the less-restrictive alternative test. And I have explained why this is inconsistent
with standard cost–benefit balancing. But the reader may still wonder how there
can be any logical inconsistency. In other contexts we think of the three versions or
stages of ‘proportionality’ analysis – the mere rationality test, the less-restrictive
alternative test, and cost–benefit balancing (sometimes known as ‘ strict pro-
portionality ’) – as forming a nested sequence of successively more stringent tests.
But if the less-restrictive alternative test and cost–benefit balancing are elements in
such a nested sequence, it must be possible to apply them both. Applying the less-
restrictive alternative test cannot exclude the possibility of cost–benefit balancing.
The seeming paradox goes away if we are careful to distinguish between positing
a test as a necessary condition for the legality of a measure and positing the
same test as a necessary-and-sufficient condition for legality. When we think of the
rationality test, the less-restrictive alternative test, and cost–benefit balancing
as forming a nested sequence, we are implicitly thinking of the first two tests as
stating merely necessary conditions for the legality of a measure. In order to be
legal, a measure must pass the minimum rationality test ; assuming it passes that,
then in order to be legal it must also pass the less-restrictive alternative test ; and
assuming it passes that, then in order to be legal it must also pass the cost–benefit
balancing test. Passing the balancing test is necessary-and-sufficient for legality
(unless there is some other unrelated test we have not mentioned), but the first two
tests are merely necessary conditions.13
In contrast, if we think of each of the tests as stating a candidate necessary-
and-sufficient condition for legality, then they do not form a nested sequence. They
are incompatible. In particular, if the less-restrictive alternative test states not
only a necessary condition for legality but also a sufficient condition, then the
cost–benefit balancing test cannot state a necessary condition, since it is easy to
imagine that some measure passes the less-restrictive alternative test but fails the
cost–benefit balancing test as the relevant tribunal would apply it.
But now the crucial point: By relying on the idea that Members get to choose
their own level of protection, the Appellate Body in Korea–Beef makes its version
of the less-restrictive alternative test necessary-and-sufficient for legality. If there is
13 The claim in the text that passing the balancing test is itself sufficient for legality presupposes that
the balancing test is applicable not only to the overall benefits and costs of the measure as compared to
inaction, but also to the (marginal) benefits and costs of the measure as compared to any alternative. For a
fuller treatment of the logic of this family of tests, see Appendix 2 to Regan, ‘Judicial Review of Member-
State Regulation of Trade Within a Federal or Quasi-Federal System: Protectionism and Balancing, Da
Capo’, 99 Michigan Law Review (8, 2001) 1853, at 1899–1902.
14 With regard to whether Article XX itself imposes some ranking, see n. 7 above. Incidentally, there is
a threshold question, which arises before we even get to the ‘margin of appreciation ’ issue, whether the
claimed purpose of a measure is the Member’s true purpose. General views about the value of various
purposes, and thus the likelihood of Members’ pursuing them, are relevant here too, but with the same
caveat that they are relevant only as heuristics.
Article XX(d). But other measures, too, may fall within the ambit of this ex-
ception.
In the last two sentences just quoted, the Appellate Body says (a) that a measure
which is indispensable is (‘certainly ’) ‘ necessary ’, and (b) that a measure may be
‘necessary ’ without being indispensable. I will come back to (b) in a moment. But
notice first that by asserting (a) the Appellate Body, before it even mentions bal-
ancing, has already excluded the possibility of a generally applicable cost–benefit
balancing test. There is no guarantee that a measure which is indispensable to
secure the regulator’s goal could not still fail a balancing test. But the Appellate
Body says that a measure which is indispensable ipso facto fulfills the requirements
of Article XX(d). So, there is no room for a balancing test when the measure is
indispensable.
In fact, asserting (a) does even more. In addition to logically excluding balancing
in some cases, it makes it implausible that we should ever want to engage in
standard cost–benefit balancing in any case at all, because the cases it excludes are
the only ones where such balancing could make any sense from a logical point of
view. Consider. We know that if the measure is indispensable, it is legal, period.
That leaves cases where the measure is not indispensable, that is, where there is
some alternative way to achieve the domestic goal to the same extent. Now there
are two subcases. One possibility is that the alternative measure that achieves the
same domestic benefit has the same or higher trade cost. Obviously we are not
going to require the Member to switch to the alternative measure in such a case,
and it does not require any balancing to tell us so. The other possibility is that the
alternative measure that achieves the same domestic benefit has a lower trade cost.
Now it is clear that we do want to require the use of the alternative measure, since
it secures the same benefit at lesser cost, and once again we do not need balancing
to tell us so. So there is no case in which we need to balance.
Actually, when I say it is clear we do want to require use of an alternative
measure that achieves the same benefit at lesser trade cost, I am ignoring admin-
istrative and enforcement costs, as we frequently do in abstract discussions. The
Appellate Body rightly recognizes later in its opinion that we cannot completely
ignore administrative and enforcement costs. It implies that we should not require
the use of the alternative measure, even though it achieves the same domestic
benefit at lesser trade cost, if the administrative and enforcement costs of the
alternative are excessive (""173,179, relying on findings of the Panel that the costs
would not be excessive in this case). In fact, the Appellate Body has already an-
ticipated this point in (b) above ; this is why a measure may be ‘necessary ’ even
though it is not indispensable. At this point the comparison that is called for be-
tween the actual measure and the alternative measure requires us to balance the
extra administrative/enforcement cost of the alternative measure against the saving
in trade cost from the alternative measure, but this is still not standard cost–benefit
balancing. Specifically, it does not require any weighing of the domestic benefit
that is the underlying goal of the measure (consumer protection, health, or what-
ever). By hypothesis the two measures being compared achieve the same level of
that benefit, so we can ignore it in comparing the two. In sum, there is no case in
which we actually need to engage in the sort of balancing that involves weighing
the underlying domestic benefit of the measure.
As the preceding paragraphs indicate, both (a) and (b) are distinctly regulator-
friendly moves. The assertion of (a) excludes cost–benefit balancing when the
actual measure is the least trade-restrictive way to achieve the desired level of
protection ; this is a regulator-friendly move because balancing is a more stringent
test than a ‘ less-restrictive alternative ’ or ‘ indispensability ’ test. But as we have
seen, (b) weakens the test still further, by saying that some measures may count as
‘ necessary’ even though they are not the least trade-restrictive way to achieve the
desired level of protection, if the administrative/enforcement costs of any less
trade-restrictive alternative are too great. It is a pity that the Appellate Body does
not pause at this point to explain (as I just have) why some measure might count as
‘ necessary’ even without being indispensable. They do explain this later on, but if
they had done it here the whole opinion might have played out differently.
However, instead of developing the logic of the two sentences we have so far
focused on, they turn (still in "161) to the realm of metaphor. They opine that
the term ‘ necessary ’ in Article XX(d) refers to ‘ a range of degrees of necessity’
constituting a ‘ continuum’ with the meaning ‘ indispensable ’ at one end and the
meaning ‘making a contribution to’ at the other. They then say that a ‘necessary ’
measure is ‘ located significantly closer to the pole of ‘‘indispensable ’’ than to the
opposite pole of simply ‘‘ making a contribution to ’’’.
The Appellate Body now begins "162 by reminding us of the special features of
Article XX(d). Article XX(d) is about measures designed to ensure compliance
with other laws and regulations, and the Appellate Body points out that ‘ XX(d) is
susceptible of application in respect of a wide variety of ‘‘ laws and regulations ’’ ’.
The Appellate Body famously continues:
if the measure is actually indispensable. But as I explained already, this is the only
case where traditional cost–benefit balancing could actually make any contri-
bution to the analysis, as a logical matter. And there is a further revealing feature
of the syntax. The Appellate Body says, ‘ In sum, determination of whether a
measure, which is not ‘‘ indispensable ’’, may nevertheless be ‘‘ necessary’’ _
[involves balancing] ’ (emphasis added). The measure that is not indispens-
able is (by implication) presumptively not necessary, but it may nevertheless turn
out to be ‘ necessary’ ; it may be rescued, as it were, by a balancing inquiry. We
normally think of the balancing test as a hurdle the measure must get over, and
that is the right way to think about the standard cost–benefit balancing test, if we
apply it. But here balancing is portrayed implicitly as a life-preserver the measure
may be able to catch. This makes sense only if the balancing we are now talking
about is the sort described earlier as a kind of safety-valve on the less-restrictive
alternative test, which allows a measure to be found ‘necessary ’ even though there
is a less-trade-restrictive alternative available that achieves the same benefit, if the
alternative measure involves enough extra administrative/enforcement costs to
outweigh the savings in trade cost. This is the very test stated later in the opinion.
And as I have pointed out previously, this test requires no evaluation of the im-
portance of the underlying benefit pursued by the measure.
In "165 the Appellate Body leaves cost–benefit balancing and goes back to the
less-restrictive alternative test, although it is not immediately clear that this is what
is happening. The Appellate Body begins by quoting from the GATT Panel report
in US – Section 33715 on the meaning of ‘ necessary ’ in Article XX(d) :
[A] contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with another GATT
provision as ‘ necessary ’ in terms of Article XX(d) if an alternative measure which
it could reasonably be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with
other GATT provisions is available to it. By the same token, in cases where a
measure consistent with other GATT provisions is not reasonably available, a
contracting party is bound to use, among the measures reasonably available to it,
that which entails the least degree of inconsistency with other GATT provisions.
This sounds like a less-restrictive alternative test, not cost–benefit balancing, ex-
cept that the Appellate Body immediately says in "166 that this Section 337
standard
encapsulates the general considerations we have adverted to above. In our view
the weighing and balancing process we have outlined is comprehended in the
determination of whether a WTO-consistent alternative measure which the
Member concerned could ‘reasonably be expected to employ’ is available, or
whether a less WTO-inconsistent measure is ‘reasonably available’.
15 United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, BISD 36th Supp. 345 (adopted 7 November
1989), "5.26.
17 The Appellate Body wrestles unsatisfactorily with a similar sort of question in Australia – Measures
Affecting Importation of Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R (adopted 6 November 1998), part V.D. I am not sure
why they do not see what seems clear after the briefest reflection: that when we are applying a less-
restrictive alternative test, the ‘level of protection’ we should require from proposed alternatives is (a) the
level achieved by the actual measure, or (b) the level the Member asserts as its desired level, whichever is
lower (that is, whichever is less protective).
18 We shall see below that after deciding four cases on ‘necessity’, the Appellate Body has yet to say of
any legitimate purpose that it is not important; and in US–Gambling they seem to imply that fraud-
prevention in particular is important. Actually, the Appellate Body does seem to have a somewhat
jaundiced view of Korea’s purpose in the present case; but the best explanation is not that they see fraud-
prevention as unimportant. Rather, they suspect that Korea’s actual purpose is not origin-neutral
fraud-prevention. Remember the observation from the Section 337 Panel that the regulating Member can
EC–Asbestos
Consider first Asbestos. The Appellate Body begins by saying in "168 that
Members are entitled to choose their own level of protection: ‘ [I]t is undisputed
that WTO Members have the right to determine the level of protection of health
that they consider appropriate in a given situation. ’ A few paragraphs later, in
"172, the Appellate Body refers to Korea–Beef and its ‘ weighing and balancing
process ’:
We indicated in Korea–Beef that one aspect of the ‘weighing and balancing
process _ comprehended in the determination of whether a WTO-consistent
alternative measure’ is reasonably available is the extent to which the alternative
measure ‘contributes to the realization of the end pursued ’. In addition, we ob-
served, in that case, that ‘ [t]he more vital or important [the] common interests or
values ’ pursued, the easier it would be to accept as ‘necessary ’ measures designed
to achieve those ends. In this case, the objective pursued by the measure is the
preservation of human life and health through the elimination, or reduction, of
choose its own level of protection, but it must seek the same level of protection against harm from foreign
products and like domestic products. The Korea–Beef Appellate Body was plainly troubled by the fact that
Korea seemed to care less about domestic dairy beef being passed off as Hanwoo beef than about foreign
beef being passed off ("168). This looks like having a higher level of protection when the harm is from a
foreign product. (Related to the idea that Korea seems to want a higher level of protection against harm
from foreign beef is the Appellate Body’s complaint that the dual retail system puts ‘ all, or the great bulk’
of the costs of fraud-prevention on the foreign beef, as opposed to spreading the costs between domestic
and foreign beef ("181).)
the well-known, and life-threatening, health risks posed by asbestos fibres. The
value pursued is both vital and important in the highest degree. The remaining
question, then, is whether there is an alternative measure that would achieve the
same end and that is less restrictive of trade than a prohibition. [Footnotes
omitted.]
In "174, the Appellate Body tells us that Canada’s proposed alternative to France’s
measure, ‘ controlled use ’, would not allow France to achieve ‘ its chosen level of
health protection ’. And in "175 it tells us that ‘ for these reasons’, France’s
measure is ‘ necessary’ under Article XX(b) because there is no reasonably avail-
able alternative to the actual measure.
The one thing the Appellate Body does not do is show any awareness of the
logical contradiction between a balancing approach and the idea that France gets
to choose its own level of protection. So we should ask whether they have hit on
some way to make the contradiction go away. One possibility is that the Appellate
Body is saying that a WTO Member gets to choose its own level protection, pro-
vided the goal of the measure is ‘ vital ’ or ‘ important ’. So long as the goal is of this
favored sort, the Appellate Body does not balance, but with less important goals it
might. In support of this, it might be noted that whenever the Appellate Body
speaks most explicitly in Asbestos of France’s (or a Member’s) right to choose its
own level of protection, it speaks of the right to choose the level of health pro-
tection (""168,174). On the other hand, they never say explicitly that the right to
choose the level of protection is limited to cases involving health or life or other
‘important ’ values. Indeed, their first statement of the principle, in "168, although
it mentions health, otherwise closely tracks language from Korea–Beef and
US – Section 337, in which there is no such qualification. Also, US–Gambling cites
Asbestos for this idea without limitation to health.19 It seems most natural to
suppose that the Asbestos Appellate Body refers to health simply because that is
the regulatory goal the case involves, and not because they are trying to sneak in a
limitation on the Member’s fundamental right to choose its own level of protection
sub silentio.
Considering the ‘ important value ’ idea in its own right, there is reason to think
the Appellate Body does not take it all that seriously. In four cases the Appellate
Body has yet to say that any specific regulatory goal is not ‘ vital ’ or ‘ important ’. In
Asbestos, human life and health are vital and important. That’s easy. But in
DR–Cigarettes the Appellate Body apparently endorses the Panel’s view that col-
lecting tax revenue on cigarettes is vitally important.20 As I have already remarked,
people may read Korea–Beef as implying that preventing consumer fraud is not
within the Appellate Body’s charmed circle of preferred purposes, but the report
does not actually say any such thing. And in US–Gambling the Appellate Body
makes no objection to the Panel’s finding that all of the United States’ purposes,
which include the prevention of consumer fraud, are important.21 We might of
course say that with four purposes involved in Gambling, the Appellate Body
wasn’t paying careful attention to each. Or we might say that the consumer fraud
in Gambling, which would presumably involve actual loss of money, was worse
than the consumer fraud in Korea–Beef, which involved getting perfectly edible
foreign beef instead of a preferred luxury domestic version. But the more hairs of
this sort the tribunals split, the more suspect the whole process would become. In
sum, the Appellate Body has yet to say that any specific legitimate regulatory
purpose is less valuable than any other. So far so good.
US–Gambling
In US–Gambling we see once again all the inconsistent elements of Korea–Beef.
First we read in "305, ‘ In Korea–Various Measures on Beef, the Appellate Body
stated, in the context of Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994, that whether a measure
is ‘‘ necessary’’ should be determined through ‘‘ a process of weighing and bal-
ancing a series of factors’’. ’ In "306, ‘ The process begins with an assessment of
the ‘‘relative importance ’’ of the interests or values furthered by the challenged
measures. ’ And so on through the Korea–Beef ‘ factors ’. The first two sentences of
"308 remind us that even if a less-restrictive measure is available, the Members
may not be required to use it if its administrative/enforcement costs are excessive.
Then the last sentence of "308: ‘ Moreover, a ‘‘ reasonably available ’’ alternative
measure must be a measure that would preserve for the responding Member its
right to achieve its desired level of protection with respect to the objective pursued
under paragraph (a) of Article XIV [of GATS] ’ (emphasis added). By this point,
the Appellate Body has transformed the cost–benefit balancing test into its logical
contrary – all unaware of the contradiction.
There is no single sentence in the Gambling report that encapsulates the decisive
rationale quite as neatly as in Korea–Beef or Asbestos, but the closest thing to such
a sentence is in "317 : ‘ In our view, the Panel’s ‘‘necessity’’ analysis was flawed
because it did not focus on an alternative measure that was reasonably available to
the United States to achieve the stated objectives regarding the protection of public
morals or the maintenance of public order’ (emphasis added). There are ten more
paragraphs in the ‘necessity ’ analysis, devoted to explaining why consultation
with Antigua was not, as the Panel thought, a relevant alternative, and why the
Appellate Body could then complete the analysis and find for the United States,
since no other alternative had even been suggested. These last ten paragraphs
talk about ‘ alternatives’ or ‘ reasonably available alternatives ’ without explicitly
addressing the ambiguity mentioned earlier about whether an ‘alternative ’ must
achieve the Member’s desired level of protection. But there is no reason to doubt
21 US–Gambling, "323.
DR–Cigarettes
Dominican Republic–Cigarettes adds nothing of interest with regard to the
necessity defense. Like the other cases, it restates the Korea–Beef balancing test,
citing also both Asbestos and Gambling (""66,68,69–70). It also states the in-
compatible principle that Members get to choose their own level of protection,
quoting from Gambling a sentence we have already noted : ‘ Moreover, a
‘‘ reasonably available ’’ alternative measure must be a measure that would pre-
serve for the responding Member its right to achieve its desired level of protection
with respect to the objective pursued’ ("70, quoting Gambling "308). The
Appellate Body then explains its ultimate resolution of the case in terms of the
latter principle. In "72 the Appellate Body summarizes thus the Panel’s reasoning
(which it then endorses in "73) :
[T]he alternative of providing secure tax stamps to foreign exporters, so that
those tax stamps could be affixed on cigarette packets in the course of their own
production process, prior to importation, would be equivalent to the tax stamp
requirement in terms of allowing the Dominican Republic to secure the high level
of enforcement it pursues with regard to tax collection and the prevention of
cigarette smuggling. [Emphasis added.]
Taking stock
The lesson of all four cases – Beef, Asbestos, Gambling, and Cigarettes – is that,
despite what the Appellate Body says in some parts of these opinions, it is not
engaged in cost–benefit balancing. Beef and Cigarettes may seem inconclusive on
their own ; in both cases the challenged measure fails the less-restrictive alternative
test, so we do not know for certain that the Appellate Body would not have gone
on to cost–benefit balancing if the measure had passed the less-restrictive alterna-
tive test. But in both Asbestos and Gambling, the measure passes the less-restric-
tive alternative test, and that is the end of the matter. Someone might claim that in
Asbestos the Appellate Body does balance, but there is no need to go through the
steps explicitly because the result is so obvious. In Gambling too, the hard-core
defender of balancing could insist that cost–benefit balancing is going on un-
consciously, or sub rosa. But despite the confusion the Appellate Body itself has
sown, the full opinions in all four cases strongly suggest that the determinative
principle is the principle that Members get to choose their own level of protection,
which excludes cost–benefit balancing. The claim that the Appellate Body is
‘ really ’ balancing, whatever it says, is the sort of claim it is impossible to disprove.
But if we are trying to account for a data set, we should accept the simplest ad-
equate explanation. The simplest adequate explanation for the results in these
cases is that the Appellate Body is deciding the cases by a less-restrictive alternative
proposes a minimally plausible alternative measure, the burden is still on the respondent Member to show
that the alternative does not achieve the desired level of protection, or is not less trade-restrictive, or
involves excessive administrative/enforcement costs.
test, just as it says it is in the parts of the reports where the results are finally
announced and justified.
5. Why the Appellate Body is right not to balance: treaty text and
economic theory
I have argued that the Appellate Body does not engage in cost–benefit balancing. In
this section I shall explain briefly why they are right not to. First, they are right as a
matter of interpretation of the WTO texts. If we think about ordinary meaning in
context, the word ‘necessary ’ in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV suggests
a less-restrictive alternative approach much more naturally than it suggests a
cost–benefit balancing approach. Furthermore, we have seen that cost–benefit
balancing is incompatible with the principle that Members get to choose their own
level of protection. The right to set one’s own level of protection was recognized
under GATT before the WTO came into existence ;24 and the right is mentioned
specifically in the SPS and TBT Agreements.25 Starting from the other direction, if
we consider what sorts of limitations the WTO clearly imposes on Members’
regulatory autonomy, they are, roughly speaking : (a) the specific commitments
made in Members’ schedules under various agreements, (b) provisions in a number
of agreements designed to limit non-tariff protectionism (including subsidies),26
and (c) a ban on sanitary, phytosanitary, and technical measures that are more
trade-restrictive than necessary to achieve the regulating Member’s goals.27 None
of these limitations requires cost–benefit balancing, and there is nothing else in the
texts to suggest that the dispute system is authorized to subject measures to
cost–benefit balancing. Judicial review by cost–benefit balancing is not in the spirit
of the WTO.
Rejecting balancing is also right as a matter of economic theory. The proponent
of balancing may argue that, whatever the WTO texts say, we need balancing to
ensure global economic efficiency. Even a regulatory measure that is not protec-
tionist and not unnecessarily trade-restrictive may have greater costs abroad than
benefits at home (so the argument goes). Since the domestic regulator has no pol-
itical incentive to consider the costs abroad, the dispute settlement system must
balance the foreign costs against the domestic benefits to avoid inefficient results.
But this argument is fallacious. We do not actually need to balance the foreign
costs against the domestic benefits, not even to secure global efficiency. The reason
is that in the trade context (and given a general fact about countries’ policy-
making that I shall explain in the next paragraph), regulation by a Member that
maximizes that Member’s national social welfare is also globally efficient. I shall
summarize this in the motto that ‘ domestically rational regulation is globally ef-
ficient ’. This means that even if a tribunal reviewing some regulation is ultimately
concerned with global efficiency, all it needs to investigate is whether the regu-
lation is domestically rational. This does not trivialize the project of reviewing
regulation. Countries often adopt regulation that is domestically irrational – for
example, most protectionism, or well-motivated regulation that is unnecessarily
trade-restrictive (which is domestically irrational because it harms domestic con-
sumers unnecessarily, over and above harming foreign producers). There are
serious questions about how tribunals should go about identifying domestic
irrationality, and what sorts of domestic irrationality they can identify reliably
enough so that they should be charged to try. But still, if the issue is domestic
rationality, foreign costs are irrelevant. I cannot give an exhaustive demonstration
here of the claim that domestically rational regulation is globally efficient. I have
done so elsewhere.28 In a moment, I will offer an intuitive explanation. But first, let
me comment on some assumptions.
First, the claim that domestically rational regulation is globally efficient is lim-
ited to the trade context. It is obviously not true in general. If a Member allows, or
perhaps even requires, some local industry to dump noxious effluent into a river
that flows into a neighboring country, that may very well be domestically rational
but globally inefficient. But this is different from a trade law case, because the local
environmental law (or lack of it), creates a physical cross-border externality –
what an economist would call a ‘ non-pecuniary ’ externality. In contrast, trade
regulation creates only pecuniary externalities ; the harm done to foreign interests
is mediated through effects on market opportunities. This is a crucial difference.
Second, the claim that domestically rational regulation is globally efficient depends
on the assumption that countries do not choose trade-affecting regulation for the
purpose of improving their terms-of-trade. Notice I am not denying that trade-
affecting policies affect the terms of trade; I am only denying that they are chosen
on this ground. This is a controversial assumption in some quarters, but I have
argued for it in detail elsewhere.29 There are further assumptions we must make
before we can prove the claim in a mathematical model, but these two are the most
salient.30
28 Regan, ‘ What Are Trade Agreements For? – Two Conflicting Stories Told by Economists, With a
Lesson for Lawyers’, Journal of International Economic Law, 9(4), 951–988 (2006).
29 Ibid.
30 Other assumptions, aside from purely mathematical ones about convexity and the like, are (a)
competitive domestic markets, (b) constant returns to scale, and (c) domestically rational behavior by all
Even with these assumptions, why is it true that domestically rational regulation
is globally efficient ? Why do we not have to worry at some point about the foreign
costs ? Those costs are real even if they are only ‘‘pecuniary ’’. Over the years I have
experimented with a variety of metaphors and stories as intuitive explanations.
Here are two. First, suppose that Home imports widgets from Foreign. Although it
is individual consumers in Home who buy widgets, think of Home as a collective
consumer of widgets. The collective interest is just the aggregate of all private
interests in Home that are affected in any way by widget consumption in Home. If
there is some market failure in the domestic market – a consumption externality,
or consumer ignorance or irrationality, for example – then the demand curve for
imported widgets that results from the unregulated market behavior of Home’s
individual widget consumers will not embody the true interests of the collective
consumer Home. If Home now regulates rationally to correct the market failure, it
will alter the incentives of individual consumers so that their aggregated behavior
does reflect the true interests of the collective consumer. If we assume similarly that
Foreign puts in place any regulation that may be necessary to make the supply
curve for exports that results from the aggregated behavior of its producers reflect
the true overall interests of the collective producer Foreign, then the intersection
of Home’s demand curve for imports and Foreign’s supply curve for exports
will identify an efficient result, in the standard way. The one danger posed by
these ‘ collective ’ actors is that they will exploit their market power to manipulate
their terms of trade (that is, they will behave as monopsonist or monopolist
in the international market). But we have excluded that by hypothesis. So, if
each country regulates rationally for its domestic interests, the market produces
an efficient result. Domestically rational regulation is globally efficient.
The story we have just told emphasizes that separate self-interested regulations
by Home and by Foreign combine to produce an efficient result, via the mechanism
of the market. A different story (in which Home still imports widgets from
Foreign) emphasizes that Home’s widget consumers and Foreign’s widget pro-
ducers have a joint interest in being allowed to transact with each other on efficient
terms. Hence Home’s widget consumers can in a sense ‘ represent ’ Foreign’s widget
producers in Home’s political process, and vice-versa. Let us assume specifically
that consumption of widgets in Home creates a (domestic) consumption exter-
nality. (This is just one example to illustrate a general point.) To correct this
externality, Home imposes a Pigovian tax. But they overestimate the externality,
and they set the tax too high.31 Now, the too-high tax will create a deadweight
loss,32 and this loss will be divided between consumers in Home and producers
other countries. Again, I have explained elsewhere why these are appropriate assumptions for the dispute
settlement system to rely on, even though they are obviously idealizations. Ibid. at 982–983.
31 This is just a miscalculation by Home; by hypothesis, Home is not setting the tax above the efficient
level as a means of purposeful terms-of-trade manipulation.
32 This assumes there is efficient regulation in Foreign, so that Home’s too-high tax does not merely
compensate for, say, an export subsidy in Foreign.
in Foreign.33 That simple point is crucial : when the harm is market-mediated, any
loss is shared. The fact that the loss is shared means that if Home now revises its
policy so that it eliminates the deadweight loss on its own consumers, it will
necessarily eliminate the deadweight loss on Foreign’s producers as well. It’s not
that the loss of the consumers is the same as the loss of the producers; these losses
are different ; but they are linked. Because any deadweight loss is shared, reducing
the deadweight loss felt by Home’s consumers to zero means the deadweight loss
felt by Foreign’s producers must go to zero as well. In other words (and once
again), regulation that is domestically rational will also be globally efficient.
In eschewing cost–benefit balancing and allowing Members to choose their own
level of protection, the Appellate Body follows both treaty text and sound econ-
omic theory.
33 This assumes Home has market power as a buyer in the world market for widgets; if they do not,
their policy cannot hurt Foreign in any event.