Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC
Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC
COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 199149, 201350, January 22, 2013
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Facts:
Liwayway Vinzons-Chato (Chato) renewed her bid in the May 10, 2010 elections as representative
of the Second Legislative District of Camarines Norte, composed of the seven (7) Municipalities of Daet,
Vinzons, Basud, Mercedes, Talisay, San Vicente, and San Lorenzo, with a total of 205 clustered precincts.
She lost to Elmer E. Panotes (Panotes) who was proclaimed the winner on May 12, 2010 having
garnered a total of 51,707 votes as against Chato's 47,822 votes, or a plurality of 3,885 votes.
Chato filed an electoral protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
assailing the results in four (4) municipalities, namely: Daet, Vinzons, Basud and Mercedes. Panotes
moved for the suspension of the proceedings and prayed that a preliminary hearing be set in order to
determine the integrity of the ballots and the ballot boxes used in the elections. In its resolution, the
HRET directed the copying of the picture image files of ballots relative to the protest. Chato then filed an
Urgent Motion to Prohibit the Use by Protestee of the Decrypted and Copied Ballot Images reiterating
the lack of legal basis for the decryption and copying of ballot images inasmuch as no preliminary
hearing had been conducted showing that the integrity of the ballots and ballot boxes was not
preserved. The HRET denied Chatos motion. HRET declared that, although the actual ballots used in the
May 10, 2010 elections are the best evidence of the will of the voters, the picture images of the ballots
are regarded as the equivalent of the original ballots. Chato filed a motion for reconsideration but the
HRET denied the same.
Chato then moved for the revision of the ballots in all of the protested clustered precincts arguing
that the results of the revision of 25% of the precincts indicate a reasonable recovery of votes in her
favour. She filed a second motion reiterating her prayer for the continuance of the revision. The HRET
denied the motion.
However, on March 22, 2012, the HRET issued the assailed Resolution No. 12-079 directing the
continuation of the revision of ballots in the remaining seventy-five percent (75%) protested clustered
precincts, or a total of 120 precincts. Panotes moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied the same.
Hence, Panotes filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not HRET gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing Resolution No. 12-079?
Held:
No. The HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it issued Resolution No. 12-079. It is
hornbook principle that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review decisions and orders of electoral
tribunals is exercised only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the tribunal;
otherwise, the Court shall not interfere with the electoral tribunals exercise of its discretion or
jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment, or the exercise of power in an arbitrary manner, where the abuse is so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty.
To substitute our own judgment to the findings of the HRET will doubtless constitute an intrusion
into its domain and a curtailment of its power to act of its own accord on its evaluation of the
evidentiary weight of testimonies presented before it.
In the main, Panotes ascribes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the HRET in ordering the
continuation of the revision of ballots in the remaining 75% of the protested clustered precincts.
The Constitution mandates that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of its members. By employing the word sole, the Constitution is
emphatic that the jurisdiction of the HRET in the adjudication of election contests involving its members
is intended to be its own full, complete and unimpaired.
There can be no challenge, therefore, to such exclusive control absent any clear showing, as in this
case, of arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power that constitutes a denial of due
process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such
grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy therefor. The petition is dismissed.