Republic of the Philippines of depositors.

The Monetary Board approved the request on June 21, 1974

SUPREME COURT subject, however, to a verification of the bank's assets.
Manila
On June 24, 1974, the Director of petitioner's department of Commercial and
SECOND DIVISION Savings Banks, after conducting said verification, reported that Continental
Bank's assets cannot meet its liabilities, since the latter exceeded the former
G.R. No. 90365             March 18, 1991 by P 67.260 million. The report also indicated that Continental Bank was
insolvent and that its continuance in business would involve probable loss to
its depositors and creditors, which are the two grounds mandated under
VICENTE T. TAN, VICTAN & COMPANY, INC., TRANSWORLD INVESTMENT Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265, otherwise known as the Central Bank Act,
CORPORATION, FIRST INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT COMPANY, INC., FAR justifying the closure and placing under receivership of a bank.
EAST PETROLEUM & MINERALS CORPORATION, and PHILCONTRUST
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs. On the basis of the report, petitioner ordered the closure of Continental Bank
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), effective June 24, 1974 and designated the Director of its Department of
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Commercial and Savings Banks as receiver with instructions to take charge of
the bank's assets pursuant to Sec. 29 of R.A. No. 265.
Ruperto G. Martin & Associates for petitioners.
Agapito S. Fajardo, Jerry P. Rebutoc & Restituto P. Ventura for private respondent. As also required by Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, a final report was submitted to
the Monetary Board on August 12, 1974 by Feliciano A. Balajadia, the
Supervising Bank Examiner, affirming the earlier report that Continental Bank
SARMIENTO, J.: was in an insolvent position and that its continuance in business may be
detrimental to its, creditors and depositors. The same report indicated,
The petitioners ask the Court to set aside the Decision of the Court of however, that the bank may be allowed to reorganize under an entirely new
Appeals1 dismissing their complaint for reconveyance of shares of stock against the management subject to certain conditions foremost of which was the infusion
Central Bank. The fact as stated by the respondent court are accurate and we adopt the of fresh funds into the bank.
same. They are as follows:
While still under detention by the military, respondent Tan executed certain
x x x           x x x          x x x agreements on February 2, 1977, May 12, 1977 and July 5, 1977 transferring
and assigning 359,615 shares of stock in Continental Bank, as well as other
Civil Case No. 15707, entitled "Vicente T. Tan, et al. vs. Central Bank of the properties belonging to him and his affiliate firms, to Executive Consultants,
Philippines, et al.," is an action for "Reconveyance of Shares of Stock with Inc., Orobel Property Management, Inc. and Antolum International Trading
Damages and Restraining Order" wherein private respondent Vicente T. Tan Corporation in consideration of the assumption by these assignees of the
sought to recover shares of stocks owned by him and his associates in liabilities and obligations of respondents Tan and his companies.
Continental Bank which he had assigned to three corporations, namely:
Executive Consultants, Inc., Orobel Property Management, Inc., and Antolum The assignees of respondents Tan and his companies rehabilitated
International Trading Corporation, as well as damages for the illegal closure of Continental Bank and, in support thereof, respondent Tan wrote the petitioner
Continental Bank. on July 5, 1977 certifying on his own behalf and in behalf of the corporations
owned and controlled by him, that they have no objection to the reopening and
It appears from the record that on June 15, 1974, private respondent Tan was rehabilitation of Continental Bank under its new name, International Corporate
arrested by the military authorities pursuant to an Arrest, Search and Seizure Bank or Interbank.
Order (ASSO) issued by the then Secretary of National Defense on the basis
of criminal charges filed against him before the PC Criminal Investigation Interbank reopened in 1977 and since then operated as a banking institution
Service for alleged irregular transactions at Continental Bank. At the time of with controlling ownership thereof changing hands during the past decade.
his arrest, respondent Tan was neither a director nor an officer of said bank.
Subsequently, three (3) other officers of Continental Bank, all with the rank of On January 13, 1987, after the lapse of more than twelve (12) years, private
vice-presidents, were arrested. However, the bank's chairman of the board, respondents filed the present case of reconveyance of shares of stock with
Cornelio Balmaceda, and its President, Jose Moran, were not arrested, and in damages and restraining order before the respondent court. On March 3,
fact continued to run the operations of the bank. 1987, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss dated February 27, 1987 on the
grounds that the action is barred by the statute of limitations or prescription
Because of a possible bank run as a result of the arrests, the officers of and that plaintiffs therein (private respondents herein) have no cause of action
Continental Bank requested an emergency loan to meet pending withdrawals against the defendant (herein petitioner), as well as laches on the part of
 plaintiffs. On April 1, 1987, private respondents filed their Opposition to the Sec. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. — Whenever, upon examination by the
Motion to Dismiss to which petitioner filed its Reply dated April 10, 1987. head of the appropriate supervising and examining department or his
examiners or agents into the condition of any banking institution, it shall be
The respondent court (trial court) resolved the motion to dismiss in favor of disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its
private respondent(s) in an Order dated May 15, 1987, which stated among continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or
other things: creditors, it shall be the duty of the department head concerned therewith, in
writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board, upon finding
the statements of the department head to be true, shall forthwith forbid the
As to the prescription of an action based on implied or constructive institution to do business in the Philippines and shall designate an official of
trust, the Supreme Court held that it prescribes in ten years. . . . the Central Bank as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and
liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets and
As alleged in the complaint, plaintiffs were fraudulently divested of administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, and exercising all the power
their Continental Bank shares in 1977. Consequently, the ten-year necessary for these purposes including, but not limited to bringing suits and
prescription period has not yet lapsed. foreclosing mortgages in the name of the banking institution.

Plaintiffs likewise are not guilty of laches. . . . x x x           x x x          x x x

With regards (sic) to the second ground, this Court finds that the At any time within ten days after the Monetary Board has taken charge of the
allegations in the complaint, passed the test laid down in Ruiz assets of any banking institution, such institution may apply to the court of First
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 29213, Oct. 21, 1977, 79 SCRA 525, Instance for an order requiring the Monetary Board to show cause why its
534, regarding sufficiency of ultimate facts. A valid judgment can be designated official should not be enjoined from continuing such charge of its
rendered upon the facts alleged in the complaint (which are deemed assets, and the court may direct the Board to refrain from further proceedings
admitted for purposes of the Motion to Dismiss) in accordance with and to surrender charge of its assets.4
the prayer of this complaint. (p. 4, Petition)
The respondent court also held that assuming, as the petitioners maintained (and still
Not satisfied with the Order petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the maintain in this petition), that the complaint is for tort, Article 1146 of the Civil Code,
same, alleging that the grounds of prescription and laches were raised providing as follows:
principally in connection with private respondents' claim for damages, while
the ground of no cause of action was raised in connection with private Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:
respondents' claim for reconveyance. In spite of petitioner's arguments, the
Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the respondent court in its Order of
August 12, 1987. Hence, the (sic) petition for certiorari.2 (1) Upon an inquiry to the rights of the plaintiff;

The issues, as the petitioners point out, are as follows: (2) Upon a quasi-delict.5

1. Whether or not petitioners' action for damages against respondent is barred is in any case, a bar.
by prescription under Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
Its ruling is that since the petitioners' action was commenced on January 13, 1987, or
2. Assuming, arguendo, that the action is not barred by prescription under more than twelve years from June 24, 1974, the date the Central Bank ordered the
Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265, whether or not the action for damages is closure of Continental Bank, the same had prescribed, whether under Section 29 of the
barred by prescription under Article 1146 of the Civil Code. Central Bank Act or under Article 1146 of the Civil Code.

3. Whether or not the complaint states a cause of action against respondent On the issue of cause of action, the Court of Appeals is of the opinion that the complaint
for the reconveyance of petitioners' shareholdings in the former Continental states no cause of action, since the Central Bank is not one of the assignees of the
Bank under the doctrine of constructive trust.3 shares the petitioners are seeking to recover, and hence, no reconveyance is possible
against it.
On the issue of prescription, the holding of the Court of Appeals is that prescription is a
bar, under Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265, the Central Bank Act, as follows: The petitioners now argue that prescription has not set in; that the ten-day period
prescribed by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265 refers to acts of the Monetary Board
in taking over a bank's assets; that their complaint is in the nature of an action for tort
against the Central Bank arising from its alleged forcible divestment of their shares in
the Continental Bank-; that the period during which they were detained under a martial Plaintiffs likewise pray for such other reliefs and remedies as this Honorable
law government constitutes  fuerza mayor which interrupted prescription under Article Court may deem just and equitable in the premises.6
1146 of the Civil Code; and that their action for reconveyance is to enforce a
constructive trust with the Central Bank as "indirect owner" (of the shares of stock), As the petitioners in fact very vehemently maintain in the present petition, the cause of
which must allegedly account therefor. action is predicated on "reconveyance of petitioners' shareholdings in the former
Continental Bank under the doctrine of constructive trust."7
The first question refers to prescription. In this connection, we are not disposed to
accept the ruling of the Court of Appeals that under Republic Act No. 265, the action At any rate, actions on tort—assuming that the complaint is one for tort-prescribe in four
has prescribed, and that in any event, assuming that Republic Act No. 265 is years under, as aforesaid, Article 1146 of the Code. That Article 1149 — which refers to
inapplicable, Article 1146 of the Civil Code is nonetheless a bar. With respect to "periods not fixed in this Code or other laws— "is the applicable provision becomes
Republic Act No. 265, the Court notes that the statute talks of enjoining the Monetary therefore untenable because, please note, Article 1146 speaks of "injury to the rights of
Board from taking charge of a bank's assets. The Court also notes, however, that the the plaintiff " and "quasi-delict"— specific legal nomenclatures for tort—assuming,
Monetary Board has since relinquished possession of Continental Bank's assets, and again, that the action is for tort. The Court does not see how Article 1149 can therefore
the controlling ownership of the bank has passed from hand to hand in the course of the enter into the picture.
decade. It has likewise since reopened under a new name, International Corporate
Bank, and a new management. Clearly, and as a perusal of the petitioners' complaint
confirms, the petitioners are not asking for an injunction against the Monetary Board Please note also that in the case of Allied Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals8 we
and the Board has since in fact ceased from performing any act in connection with specifically held that an action against the Central Bank for "tortious interference," that
Continental Bank or its successor bank. is, in closing and liquidating a bank, prescribes in four years from the date of closure. In
that case —which is one for tort — we held that Article 1146 is the applicable law.
From a reading of the complaint, we can not either say that Article 1146 is a deterrent,
because although the same, coincidentally, avers intimidation employed by the martial Be that as it may, and assuming ex gratia argumenti that Article 1149 were applicable, it
law administration in taking over Continental Bank, an act that suggests "quasi-delict," still would not have rescued the petitioners since that meant that they had until 1982 at
the same is preeminently one for reconveyance of the shares of stock subject of that most, within which to institute a claim. Prescription would still have been a bar.
takeover, and not on account of any injury to the petitioners' rights. We quote:
The next question is whether or not any action for reconveyance has nevertheless
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully pray that judgment be rendered: prescribed, on the bases of provisions governing reconveyance.

A. Upon the filing of this Complaint, this Honorable Court issue a restraining The rule anent prescription on recovery of movables (shares of stock in this case) is
order directing defendant National Development Company, its agents, expressed in Article 1140 of the Civil Code, which we quote:
representatives or such other persons acting under its authority and direction
to desist and refrain from disposing or otherwise transferring the shares of Art. 1140. Actions to recover movables shall prescribe eight years from the
stock in question. time the possession thereof is lost, unless the possessor had acquired the
ownership by prescription for a less period, according to article 1132, and
B. After due hearing: without prejudice to the provisions of articles 559, 1505, and 1133.

1. Ordering the defendants to reconvey, restore and/or re-assign to plaintiffs all As it provides, Article 1140 is subject to the provisions of Articles 1132 and 1133 of the
the latter's controlling shareholdings in the former Continental Bank (now Code, governing acquisitive presciption, in relation to Articles 559 and 1505 thereof.
renamed INTERBANK) in the same proportion as it was at the time of its Under Article 1132:
fraudulent acquisition including such incremental shares of stock that should
have been acquired by the plaintiffs had they been granted the opportunity to Art. 1132. The ownership of movables prescribes through uninterruped
exercise their right to pre-emption to the new issues of shares of stock as a possession for four years in good faith.
consequence of the subsequent increases in the authorized capital stock of
said bank and all stocks dividends declared since the reopening of Continental The ownership of personal property also prescribes through uninterrupted
Bank under the name INTERBANK. possession for eight years, without need of any other condition.

2. Ordering the defendant Central Bank of the Philippines to pay the plaintiffs With regard to the right of the owner to recover personal property lost or of
moral damages including attorney's fees and litigation expenses in an amount which he has been illegally deprived, as well as with respect to movables
that may be proved during the trial. acquired in a public sale, fair, or market, or from a merchant's store the
provisions of articles 559 and 1505 of this Code shall be observed.
acquisitive prescription sets in after uninterrupted possession of four years, provided 27, 1977 and the subsequent dismissal of the complaint for estafa thru
there is good faith, and upon the lapse of eight years, if bad faith is present. Where, falsification and violation of the Central Bank Act against said Plaintiff Tan and
however, the thing was acquired through a crime, the offender can not acquire other officers of the Bank in compliance with the instructions of deposed
ownership by prescription under Article 1133, which we quote: President Ferdinand E. Marcos;

Art. 1133. Movables possessed through a crime can never be acquired 20. Without the infusion of fresh capital and after barely three (3) months of
through prescription by the offender. operation, INTERBANK's consolidated statement of financial condition as of
December 29, 1977, which was published in Bulletin Today on January 31,
Please note that under the above Article, the benefits of prescription are denied to the 1978, showed a P22.42 million undivided profit and surplus which represented
offender; nonetheless, if the thing has meanwhile passed to a subsequent holder, about 50% of the paid-up capital. Said financial statement is hereto attached
prescription begins to run (four or eight years, depending on the existence of good as Annex "D".
faith).9
21. In the special meeting of the shareholders of INTERBANK on April 24,
For purposes of existence prescription vis-a-vis movables, we therefore understand the 1978, the recommendation/declaration by the Board of Directors during its
periods to be: special meeting on April 14, 1978 of a 25.5% stock dividend on all fully paid
shares as of April 12, 1978 was approved, subject to the approval of the
Central Bank of the Philippines; however, the Central Bank allowed
1. Four years, if the possessor is in good faith; INTERBANK to declare only 23.71% stock dividend;

2. Eight years in all other cases, except where the loss was due to a crime in 22. The new management then of INTERBANK totally ignored the existing
which case, the offender can not acquire the movable by prescription, and an rules and regulations of the Central Bank of the Philippines by milking dry the
action to recover it from him is imprescriptible. deposits with said INTERBANK through huge borrowings of the Disini Group
of companies thereby pushing said Bank to the brink of total collapse had it not
It is evident, for purposes of the complaint in question, that the petitioners had at most been for the huge infusion of funds by the Central Bank of the Philippines in
eight years within which to pursue a reconveyance, reckoned from the loss of the the form of emergency loans and advances;
shares in 1977, when the petitioner Vicente Tan executed the various agreements in
which he conveyed the same in favor of the Executive Consultants, Inc., Orobel 23. Since the Central Bank of the Philippines is prohibited to acquire shares of
Property Management, Inc., and Antolum Trading Corporation. any kind and to participate in the ownership or management of any enterprise,
either directly or indirectly, it assigned the emergency loans and advances
We are hard put to say, in this regard, that the petitioners' action is after all, extended to the INTERBANK to the National Development Company of (sic)
imprescriptible pursuant to the provisions of Article 1133 of the Civil Code, governing which the latter executed the corresponding promissory note payable in 25
actions to recover loss by means of a crime. For one thing, the complaint was not years, without interest, in favor of said Central Bank, and which loans and
brought upon this theory. For another, there is nothing there that suggests that the loss advances were converted into equity thereby enabling the National
of the shares was indeed made possible by a criminal act, other than simple bad faith Development Corporation to acquire 99% of INTERBANK's outstanding
and probably abuse of right: shares of stock from the Disini Group, including the 359,615 shares mentioned
in Paragraph 5 hereof, and the corresponding stock/cash dividends earned;
18. By reason of the fraudulent acquisition by the Disini corporations
(Executive Consultants, Inc., Orobel Property Management, Inc. and Antolum 24. The defendant American Express Bank, Ltd. (AMEX) acquired from
International Trading Corporation) of the 359, 615 shares mentioned in defendant National Development Company 40% of the outstanding shares of
Paragraph 5 hereof, a constructive trust has been constituted on said shares stock of INTERBANK but before AMEX (sic) acquisition of said interest, it was
in favor of plaintiffs, a "remedy to whatever knavery human ingenuity can placed on notice of the infirmities of the transfer of the shares of plaintiffs in
invent"; Continental Bank to the former owners of INTERBANK;

19. The execution of the aforementioned Agreement and Supplemental 25. That despite said notice, AMEX proceeded to convert, with the approval of
Agreements paved the way for the re-opening of the Continental Bank on Central Bank of the Philippines, its exposures to the Philippine government
September 19, 1977 under a new name, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE into equity in INTERBANK;
BANK (INTERBANK, for short) and under the new management of the Herdis
Group, which became the owner of the controlling stocks by virtue of their 26. Defendant Central Bank of the Philippines, which may be considered
fraudulent acquisition of the 359,615 shares mentioned in Paragraph 5 hereof; indirect owner of INTERBANK under the foregoing arrangement, and
and it also paved the way for the release of Plaintiff Vicente T. Tan, his spouse defendants National Development Company and AMEX having actual or
and other officers of the Continental Bank from military custody on December constructive notice of the fraudulent acquisition by the aforementioned three
 corporations acting as fronts of Herminio Disini of the 359,615 shares of stock and estafa, that while in detention, he was made to execute various agreements in
of plaintiffs, are obligated under the principle of constructive trust to reconvey which he conveyed the shares of stock in question; and that "[u]nder the foregoing
to plaintiffs their original controlling shareholdings in the then Continental Bank factual setting . . . it would be foolhardy on the part of petitioners to institute . . . [any]
including the corresponding stock/cash dividends earned; action for reconveyance . . ."12

27. Were it not for the acts complained of in this case, plaintiffs would have The records show, however, that although under detention, Vicente Tan:
retained the right to said shareholdings and they could have exercised their
pre-emption rights to new issues of stock as a consequence of the increases 1. Commenced, in July, 1976, Civil Case No. 103359 of the defunct Court of
of capitalization of INTERBANK; First Instance of Manila, "to mandatorily enjoin the Central Bank as receiver of
Continental Bank, to takeover from 'NISA' the control and management and
28. In view of the evident arbitrariness and bad faith of the Central Bank as assets of Vicente Tan and his affiliate corporations;"13
adverted to above, which caused Plaintiffs Vicente T. Tan being divested of his
huge investment and virtually all his assets, said Plaintiff Tan has been 2. Was ably represented by competent counsel, Atty. Norberto Quisumbing,
subjected to physical suffering, mental anguish, besmirched reputation and throughout;14
social humiliation; hence, defendant Central Bank is liable for moral
damages.10
3. Filed with this Court a petition to stop the trial of the criminal cases pending
against him with the Military Commission No. 5 and succeeded in obtaining a
x x x           x x x          x x x temporary restraining order.

Since the complaint was filed on January 13, 1987, ten years more or less after the On top of those facts abovementioned, he:
petitioners transferred the shares in question, it is clear that the petitioners have come
to court too late.
1. Asked the Court of First Instance to order the Central Bank "to proceed to
rehabilitate Continental Bank by extending to it such emergency loans and
We can not accept the petitioners' contention that the period during which authoritarian advances as may be needed for its rehabilitation. . ."15
rule was in force had interrupted prescription and that the same began to run only on
February 25, 1986, when the Aquino government took power. It is true that under Article
1154: 2. Wrote, on July 15, 1977, the Central Bank expressing his approval in the
reopening and rehabilitation of Continental Bank.16
Art. 1154. The period during which the obligee was prevented by a fortuitous
event from enforcing s right is not reckoned against him.11 We are, therefore, convinced, from Vicente Tan's very behavior, that detention was not
an impediment to a judicial challenge, and the fact of the matter was that he was
successful in obtaining judicial assistance. Under these circumstances, we can not
fortuitous events have the effect of tolling the period of prescription. However, we can declare detention, or authoritarian rule for that matter, as a fortuitous event insofar as
not say, as a universal rule, that the period from September 21, 1972 through February he was concerned, that interrupted prescription.
25, 1986 involves a force majeure. Plainly, we can not box in the "dictatorial" period
within the term without distinction, and without, by necessity, suspending all liabilities,
however demandable, incurred during that period, including perhaps those ordered by To be sure, there is nothing in the petition which would remotely suggest, assuming that
this Court to be paid. While this Court is cognizant of acts of the last regime, especially Vicente Tan could not have freely and intelligently acted during the period of martial
political acts, that might have indeed precluded the enforcement of liability against that rule, that his co-petitioners Victan & Company, Inc., Transworld Investment
regime and/or it's minions the Court is not inclined to make quite a sweeping Corporation, First International Investment Company, Inc., Far East Petroleum &
pronouncement, considering especially the unsettling effects such a pronouncement is Minerals Corporation, and Philcontrust International Corporation, could not have
likely to bring about. It is our opinion that claims should be taken on a case-to-case similarly acted during the martial law regime and shortly thereafter. As far as they are
basis. This selective rule is compelled, among others, by the fact that not all those therefore concerned, the Court has even better reason to invoke prescription because
imprisoned or detained by the past dictatorship were true political oppositionists, or, for none of them acted and none now claims that it could not have acted.
that matter, innocent of any crime or wrongdoing. Indeed, not a few of them were
manipulators and scoundrels. On the question of cause of action, the Court notes that as the complaint itself avers,
the petitioners' shares in the Continental Bank were assigned to the firms already
The petitioner Vicente Tan claims that from June, 1974 through December, 1977, he above specified (which Herminio Disini allegedly controlled), and not to the Central
was under detention; that sometime in August, 1977, the Central Bank lodged six Bank. It is therefore fairly obvious that if any claim for reconveyance may be
criminal cases against him, along with several others, with Military Commission No. 5 in prosecuted, it should be prosecuted against the Disini companies.
connection with alleged violation of the Central Bank Act, falsification of documents,
It is true that the Central Bank is alleged to be the "indirect owner," 17 arising from certain WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Complaint in Civil Case No. 15707 of the
loans supposedly facilitated by the Bank that enabled yet two other companies, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 134, Makati, Metro Manila, is hereby DISMISSED.
National Development Company and the American Express Bank, to acquire about
ninety-nine percent of International Corporate Bank, subject to the conditionality that Costs against the petitioners.
any transfer of shares shall be approved by the Central Bank. Clearly, however, if the
Central Bank were "owner" — which as we shall see, it is not—it is "owner" only
because it is preserving its money exposure to the National Development Corporation IT IS SO ORDERED.
and the American Express Bank. It is not "owner" for reconveyance purposes, that is,
as the trustee holding shares acquired by fraud or mistake. To say now that it is holding Melencio-Herrera and Regalado, JJ., concur.
those shares as such a trustee, that is, as a result of the takeover of Continental Bank Padilla, J., took no part.
by the Disini companies, in spite of the fact that based on the records the bank now
pertains to the NDC and American Express, is a mere conclusion of fact of the Separate Opinions
petitioners, the plaintiffs in the trial court.

PARAS, J.,  dissenting:
We have held that:

I dissent.
x x x           x x x          x x x

The facts in this case are simple enough: Vicente T. Tan, one of the petitioners herein,
The subject Amended and Supplemental Complaint fail to meet the test. It was one of the principal stockholders of the former Continental Bank, located in Manila.
should be noted that it charges PNB and NIDC with having assisted in the At the time the Central Bank closed the Continental Bank for alleged bankruptcy, he
illegal creation and operation of defendant sugar mill. Granting, for the sake of was a stockholder of said Continental Bank. Because of the closure and incidents
argument, that, indeed, assistance in the "illegal" act was rendered, the same, attendant thereto, he, among others, filed on January 13, 1987 an action in the
however, is not supported by well-pleaded averments of facts. Nowhere is it Regional Trial Court of Makati asking a) for damages from the Central Bank; and b) for
alleged that defendants-appellees had notice, information or knowledge of any reconveyance of certain deeds of assignment which he had executed in favor of the
flaw, much less any illegality, in their co-defendants' actuations, assuming that private respondent. Respondent Central Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss because of a)
there was such a flaw or illegality. This absence is fatal and buoys up instead alleged prescription and laches—regarding the claim for damages and b) the alleged
the PNB NIDC's position of lack of cause of action. failure of the complaint to state a cause of action against the Central Bank—regarding
the action for reconveyance. The Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, (Branch
Although it is averred that the defendants' acts were done in bad faith, the 134) denied the motion to dismiss in a resolution penned by Judge Ignacio M.
Complaint does not contain any averment of facts showing that the acts were Capulong. However, on appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals reversed the Regional
done in the manner alleged. Such a bare statement neither establishes any Trial Court in a decision dated April 5, 1989. Hence this petition for review filed by
right or cause of action on the part of the plaintiff-appellant. It is a mere Vicente T. Tan, et al. (who felt aggrieved) before Us purely on two (2) questions of law:
conclusion of law not sustained by declarations of facts, much less admitted by a) what is the period for prescription in an action for damages filed against the Central
defendants-appellees. It does not, therefore, aid in any wise the complaint in Bank for alleged illegal closure of Continental Bank?; and b) does the complaint in the
setting forth a cause of action. Defendants-appellees are not fairly apprised of Regional Trial Court for reconveyance state a cause of action against the Central
the act or acts complained of.18 Bank?

x x x           x x x          x x x We believe that the petition is meritorious on both counts, that is, a) the complaint filed
before the Regional Trial Court had not prescribed, nor was there any laches on the
As we indicated, the fact that the parties had stipulated that any transfer of the part of petitioner Vicente T. Tan; and b) said complaint actually stated a cause of action
Interbank shares by the National Development Company shall be "subject to prior CB against the Central Bank for reconveyance of the deeds of assignment involved in this
approval" does not make the Central Bank the owner. We said, it is a simple case.
conditionality prescribed by the Central Bank in order to protect its money, a
conditionality that is prescribed in many loans. It is not as if the arrangement had With reference to prescription, We state that the 10-day period in Sec. 29 of Republic
allowed the Central Bank to hold the Interbank shares in question and had left the Act 265 is not applicable because to Our mind, said period applies only when the
National Development Company to act as a front. purpose of the action is for the  reopening (or for prevention of further closure) of the
bank, not in an action for damages for the closure and subsequent actuations of the
In fine, the respondent court did not commit any reversible error. Central Bank incidental to said closure. The correct period is five (5) years under Art.
1149 of the Civil Code and not four years under Art. 1146 of the same Code. And from
this period of five (5) years must be excluded the period during which the action could
not be brought because of a  force majeure (Art. 1154 of the Civil Code), as exemplified
by the dictatorial regime which ruled the Philippines during the past administration. The
period of prescription therefore should be counted from February 25, 1986 when the
present administration of President Corazon C. Aquino took over the control of the
government. The action having been brought on January 13, 1987, it is clear that
counted from February 25, 1986, less than a year had elapsed, and therefore the action
has not yet prescribed. Moreover, considering the additional fact that petitioner Vicente
T. Tan was a detention prisoner up to the end of the former regime, it is likewise clear
that he is not guilty of laches. While it may be said cavalier-like, that despite being a
detention prisoner, Tan could have filed the action thru his lawyers, this is easier said
than done. Tan knew he had little chance of indication when the highest official of the
land seemed to be his mortal enemy.

Anent the claim for reconveyance, it is evident from a reading of the complaint filed in
the Regional Trial Court that the execution of the deeds of assignment was precipitated
by the alleged illegal closure of the Continental Bank. Whether or not the closure of said
bank was really illegal, and whether or not it was the Central Bank's fault that the
execution of the deeds had been made is completely beside the point for it should be
noted that this entire case was begun by a mere motion to dismiss, hence, there has
been no hearing on the merits as yet. And herein lies one of the principal faults of the
questioned decision, the resolution of the Court of Appeals, and the majority decision
herein, namely, that it dwelt somehow on the merits of the case, particularly on whether
or not the Central Bank was actually responsible for the execution of the deeds of
assignment. The majority says they cannot understand how the Central Bank
"precipitated" the fraudulent transfer to the assignees. This is completely irrelevant.
Whether or not there was such a "precipitating," and how this was done, is beside the
point. The fact is there is such a charge, such an allegation. Clearly, the complaint by
itself states a cause of action. Be it remembered that there is a big difference between
failure to state a cause of action and failure  to prove lack of a valid cause of action.
After all, this case will still be examined thoroughly on the merits after it is brought back
to the Regional Trial Court.

I therefore vote for the reversal and setting aside of the appealed decision dated April 5,
1989 and the resolution dated September 20, 1989 both of the Court of Appeals as well
as for the remanding of the case to the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila,
Branch 134 for further proceedings.
 On September 16, 1948, or about a month before Genaro's death a "partition of real
property" was executed in English. It was duly notarized. It was signed by Genaro,
Manuel Filomeno and Pacita and thumbmarked by Emerenciana, in representation of
her minor children Adelaide, Remedios, Socorro and Nelia (Exh. A), though
Emerenciana had not been appointed judicial guardian of their property.

The document states the ages of the children as Pacita, 22, Filomeno, 19, Adelaide, 17,
Republic of the Philippines Remedios, 15, Socorro, 13, and Nelia, 4. But their birth certificates show that they were
SUPREME COURT all minors. Filomeno and Pacita were twins born on December 25, 1929; Remedios and
Manila Adelaida were also twins born on January 2, 1932; Socorro was born in 1938 and Nelia,
as already noted, in 1944 (Exh. 4 to 9).
SECOND DIVISION
In that partition, which the petitioners also regard as a donation, Genaro treated the
G.R. No. L-48433 April 30, 1984 homestead as his sole property and not conjugal which it actually was (Pisalbon vs.
Bejec, 74 Phil. 288; Tabunan vs. Marigmen, 101 Phil 288). Manuel was given as share
PACITA, FILOMENO, REMEDIOS, ADELAIDA and NELIA, all surnamed, five and one-half hectares of the homestead (southern portion adjoining Emerenciana's
DIMAYUGA, and HEIRS OF SOCORRO DIMAYUGA-LASALA; SERGIO LASALA, separatehomestead).  The six illegitimate children were given seven and seven-tenth
MARCELINO; SATURNINO and Minors AIDA, DANTE, BELEN, LITO, JOHN, hectares (northern portion also adjoining Emerenciana's separate homestead). The
ESTER and EDWIN, all surnamed LASALA, represented by guardian ad partition was not registered.
litem Sergio Lasala, petitioners,
vs. The partition was amended in 1951 by means of an affidavit in Tagalog signed by the
COURT OF APPEALS and MANUEL DIMAYUGA, respondents. same parties except Genaro who died intestate on October 8, 1948. An additional one
hectare was given to Manuel, making his total share six and five-tenth hectares. The
Teresita Infantado-Gines for petitioners. 1948 partition prejudiced him because "ang ginawang paghahati ni Genaro Dimayuga
ay hindi tumpak sapagkat naapi si Manuel Dimayuga"  (Exh. B).

Renato Leviste for respondents.

Nineteen years later, or on May 28, 1970, Manuel having been advised that the entire
homestead was inherited by him from his parents and freed from his father's moral
ascendancy, executed an affidavit of adjudication which he registered. He obtained a
Torrens title for the thirteen-hectare homestead (Exh. 1).
AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
About two months later, the six illegitimate children filed a complaint for the annulment
This case is about the effect of a partition inter vivos on the successional rights to a of Manuel's title and for the division of the homestead equally among Genaro's seven
thirteen-hectare homestead located at Pola, Oriental Mindoro. children including Manuel. The parties submitted a partial stipulation of facts. The
plaintiffs offered the partition and the amendatory affidavit as their documentary
evidence (Exh. A and B). On the other hand, Manuel's documentary evidence consisted
The spouses Genaro Dimayuga and Segunda Gayapanao, who were married in 1915
of his title, the marriage contracts of his parents and of Genaro and Emerenciana and
(Exh. 2), acquired a Torrens title for that homestead in 1928 (Exh. 1). Segunda died
the birth certificates of the illegitimate children (E xh. 1 to 9).
intestate in 1940, survived by her son, Manuel, and her husband, Genaro.

There was no oral evidence. The parties submitted "the case on pure questions of law"
During their marriage, Genaro had a mistress named Emerenciana Panganiban by
(p. 15, Record on Appeal). The trial court annulled Manuel's title, decreed that about
whom he begot five children, named Filomeno, Pacita, Adelaide, Remedios and
one-half of the homestead should be divided equally among the six illegitimate children
Socorro. A sixth child, Nelia Dimayuga, was born in 1944 or after Segunda's death.
and ordered Manuel to pay them P2,500 as moral and exemplary damages and
Emerenciana cultivated a homestead adjoining the thirteen-hectare homestead in
attorney's fees.
question. So, it was not surprising that she became the paramour of Genaro.

Manuel appealed to the Court of Appeals which adjudicated to him three-fourth of the
Genaro, 56, married Emerenciana, 37, on February 26, 1947 (Exh- 3). That marriage
homestead and the other one-fourth to Nelia. The six illegitimate children appealed to
legitimated Nelia, who had been a duly acknowledged natural child, but it did not
this Court. We gave due course to the appeal because of their contention that since the
improve the status of her brother and four sisters who were adulterous or spurious
case involved only legal questions the Appellat Court had no jurisdiction over it. We
children.
treated the case as if it had been directly appealed from the trial court to this Court.
The petitioners or the six illegitimate children admit that the Appellate Court correctly mujer casada, cualquiera que sea el estado del hombre, porque la
applied the law by adjudicating three-fourth of the homestead to Manuel and one- madre, en algunos casos, incurria en la pena de muerte. (17
fourth to Nelia (p. 10, Brier. However, they contend that their possession of about one- Enciclopedia Juridica Espanola, p. 780-1).
half of the homestead since the 1948 partition made them owners by prescription and
that Manuel is estopped to deny that fact because he adjudicated the homestead to As such, they are not entitled to successional rights but only to support (Art. 139, old
himself only twenty-two years later. Civil Code; Reyes vs. Zuzuarregui, 102 Phil. 346; Olivete vs. Mata, 100 Phil. 563;
Javelona vs. Monteclaro, 74 Phil. 393; Lagrimas vs. Lagrimas, 95 Phil. 113; Ramirez
That contention isdevoid of merit. It may be morally plausible but it is legally vs. Gmur, 42 Phil, 855).
indefensible. No portion of the homestead, a registered land, may be acquired by
prescription. "No title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner Manuel and Nelia, as Genaro's legal and forced heirs, are entitled to inherit Genaro's
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession." (Se-,. 46, Act No. 496; Sec. - one-half portion. It cannot be said that the five adulterous children have no resources
47, Property Registration Decree, P.D. No. 1529; Art. 11 26, Civil Code.) whatsoever. Their mother, Emerenciana, has a homestead adjoining Genaro's
homestead in question.
The petitioners cite Parcotilo vs. Parcotilo, 120 Phil. 1231. That case
involves unregistered land which was held by the claimant and his predecessors for WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is reversed and set aside. Three-fourth of the
over thirty years, an extraordinary prescription. It was immaterial that the testament in said homestead is hereby adjudicated to Manuel Dimayuga and one-fourth to Nelia
that case was void. Dimayuga. The register of deeds should cancel Manuel's title and issue the
corresponding titles in accordance with this decision. No costs.
Article 1056 of the old Civil Code provides that "if the testator should make a partition of
his property by an act inter vivos,  or by will, such partition shall stand insofar, as it does SO ORDERED
not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs." Article 1056 was construed to mean that
a person who makes an inter vivos  partition must first execute a win. If the will is void,
the partition is void (Legasto vs. Verzosa, 54 Phil. 766; Fajardo vs. Fajardo, 54 Phil.
842; Romero v. Villamor, 102 Phil. 641). With more reason would the partition be void if
there was no win.

The 1948 partition was not in conformity with law. It assumed that Genaro was the
owner of the entire homestead. That is wrong. One-half of the homestead, subject to
the husband's usufructuary legitime, was inherited in 1940  by Manuel upon the death of
his mother who was married to Genaro for twenty-five years. Genaro could dispose by
an act inter vivos only one-half of the homestead In that one-half portion, Manuel and
Nelia, as Genaro's legal and forced heirs, had a two-third legitime.

In "donating" the said one-half portion to his six illegitimate children, Genaro deprived
Manuel of his legitime in his estate or, in effect, made him renounce his future
inheritance. The 1951 affidavit cannot be construed as a repudiation of his inheritance
in his father's estate because the document does not have that tenor. For this reason,
Manuel is not estopped to ignore that partition. The rule in Alforque vs. Veloso, 65 Phil.
272, cited by the petitioners, does not apply to Manuel. The facts in the Alforque case
are radically different from the facts of the instant homestead case.

The five illegitimate children (the sixth child Nelia was legitimated) have no rights
whatsoever to the said homestead. As already said, they were adulterous or spurious
children.têñ.£îhqwâ£

Desde de las leyes de Partida, la ciencia y la ley suponen, en todas

sus determinaciones, la existencia bien caracterizada de los dos
grupos de hijos adulterinos: unos, los simplemente adulterinos, ex
damnato coitu  6 de danado ayuntamiento, los nacidos de mujer
soltera 6 viuda y de hombre casado-. y otros notos, ex damnato et
punibili coitu  6 de danado y punible ayuntamiento, los nacidos de
 Similarly, private respondent Paula Palmenco denied having ever executed said Deed.
According to private respondents, subject Deed was fraudulently prepared by petitioner
and that their signatures thereon were forged. They also assert the one Atty. Jose
Villena, the Notary Public who notarized the said Deed was not even registered in the
list of accredited Notaries Public of Pasay City.
 
Thereafter, petitioner executed a Deed of Absolute Sale selling 240 square meters of
G.R. No. 110207 July 11, 1996 the land to his children while retaining 93 square meters for himself. The 50 square
meter portion given to Paula Palmenco as originally provided in the Deed remained in
FLORENTINO REYES, SPOUSES EDUARDO REYES AND ANITA her name.
MABABANGLOOB, ENGRACIA REYES, SPOUSES ZACARIAS AND NORMA R.
MADRID, SPOUSES ALBERTO AND NORMA N. REYES, SPOUSES, TEODORO After the property was partitioned, petitioner, his children and private respondent Paula
AND DOLORES S. REYES, petitioners, Palmenco allegedly executed a Deed of Co-owners' Partition dividing the property
vs. among themselves. Each of the alleged co-owners, namely, petitioner, his children
COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION) AND JACINTA REYES, PAULA REYES, Eduardo, Teodoro, Engracia, Norma and Alberto, as well as Paula Palmenco, allocated
AND PETRA REYES, respondents. for themselves a specific portion of one-seventh (1/7) each.

ROMERO, J.:p On May 27, 1985, private respondents filed a Complaint for "Annulment of Sale and
Damages With Prayer for Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order" before the Makati
This is a petition for review on certiorari  seeking the reversal of the decision of the Regional Trial Court against petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Makati. Private
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 33028 entitled "Jacinta Reyes, et al. vs. Florentino respondents Petra Reyes and Paula Palmenco who died on May 23, 1988 and October
Reyes, et al"1 which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 20, 1987, respectively, were duly substituted by their respective children. Private
58 rendered in favor of private respondents. respondent Jacinta Reyes and the children of Petra and Paula then filed an amended
complaint praying for the annulment of the following: (1) Deed of Extrajudicial Partition
The antecedent facts as found by the lower court and adopted by the Court of Appeal and Settlement dated July 29, 1970 and TCT No. 318944 of the Registry of Deeds of
are as follows: Makati, Metro Manila; (2) Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 15, 1979; (3) Deed of Co-
owners' Partition dated August 24, 1984 and (4) the seven (7) Transfer Certificates of
Titles Nos. 135257, 135258, 135259, 135260, 132561, 135262, and 135263 of the
On July 29, 1970, a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement was allegedly Registry of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila as null and void.
entered into between petitioner Florentino and his sisters (private respondents herein)
Jacinta, Paula and Petra, all surnamed Reyes. The subject of the alleged partition was
a parcel of land located in Bangkal, Makati measuring Three Hundred Eighty Three On June 1, 1985, the lower court issued an order enjoining the Register of Deeds of
(383) Square Meters. Said parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. Makati from issuing and delivering the Transfer Certificates of Title in question to the
22801 was registered in the name of Bernardino Reyes, the father of petitioner and petitioners and from collecting the monthly rentals due on the subject parcel of land.
private respondents. After trial on the merits, the lower court ruled that the private respondents' signatures on
the questioned Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement were indeed forged and
simulated. As a result of such finding, the lower court permanently enjoined the Registry
The Deed which allegedly partitioned the subject parcel of land extrajudicially among of Deeds of Makati from issuing and delivering TCT Nos. 135257, 135258, 135259,
petitioner and private respondents stated that the latter waived their rights, interest and 135260, 135261, 135262, and 135263 to petitioner Florentino and his children, and
participation therein in favor of the former. Thereunder, one of the private respondents, petitioners from collecting the monthly rentals due on the properties. The lower court
Paula Reyes Palmenco was given a share of fifty (50) square meters. also declared the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 318944 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati, Deed of Absolute Sale, Deed of
On March 16, 1971, petitioner caused the registration of the alleged Deed of Co-owner's Partition, and the seven (7) TCT Nos. 135257 to 135263 of the Registry of
Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement with the Register of Deeds of Rizal. Subsequently, Deeds of Makati as null and void.2
he managed to obtain Transfer Certificate of Title No. 318944 with 333 square meters
in his name and 50 square meters in the name of Paula Palmenco. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence, this
petition. Petitioners assign the following errors:
Sometime in May 1985, private respondents, having discovered the registration of the
said Deed denied having knowledge of its execution and disclaimed having signed the I
same; nor did they ever waive their rights, shares and interest in the subject parcel of
land.
 THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DEED OF by the Affidavit of Publication. More importantly, petitioners did not dispute the fact that
EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION AND SETTLEMENT WAS A the alleged residence certificates of private respondents shown to the trial court were in
FORGERY; the possession of petitioner Florentino which the Court of Appeals found to be unnatural
since residence certificates are supposed to be in the physical possession of their
II owners as ready proofs of their identities and for purposes of dealing with the
government and other agencies. It added that it cannot be inferred that the Deed was
indeed executed by petitioners by facilely presenting a group picture purportedly
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THE AFORESAID FORGERY, THE showing the parties before the signing of the questioned document when said group
COURT A QUO ERRED NONETHELESS IN NOT FINDING THAT picture may have been taken on another occasion.4
PETITIONER HAS BECOME AN ABSOLUTE OWNER OF THE
LAND IN DISPUTE BY VIRTUE OF ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION;
Clearly, the main issue to be resolved is the authenticity of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition and Settlement which is a question of fact rather than of law. In the case
III of Manila Bay Club Corporation v.  Court of Appeals,5 this Court held that for a question
to be one of law, it must involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence
IN LIGHT OF AFORESAID ERRORS, THE COURT A QUO ERRED presented by the litigants or any of them. To reiterate the distinction between the two
IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND AWARDING THE types of questions: there is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or
RELIEFS PRAYED FOR BY PETITIONERS IN THEIR difference arises as to what the law is pertaining to a certain state of facts, and there is
COUNTERCLAIMS. a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts.

The Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the lower court, declared that In the case at bar, petitioners cast doubt on the findings of the lower court as affirmed
petitioners failed to convincingly overturn the factual findings of the trial court which by the Court of Appeals regarding the existence of forgery.
ruled on the fake and forged character of the document on the following points:
In the case of Chua Tiong Tay v.  CA,6 this Court held that the factual findings of the trial
1. The signatures at the bottom page of the Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement court, adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may
appear to have been written by one and the same hand and not by individual not be reviewed on appeal. The exceptions to this rule are laid down in the case
signatories thereto except the signature of Rustico Reyes. of Floro v. Llenado7 citing Remalante v.  Tibe,8 as follows: (1) when the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of
2. The acknowledgment in the Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement appears to have discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
been signed by one Jose D. Villena who was never commissioned as Notary Public for conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on
and in the province of Rizal on July 31, 1970 in Pasay City. misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the
3. The word "Pasay, Rizal" in handwriting was superimposed on the word "Makati", findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
supposedly the place where the document was notarized. findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
4. The residence certificates of the parties who allegedly executed the Extrajudicial disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
Partition and Settlement were all issued on July 30, 1970 in Pasay City except that of conclusion and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on
Encarnacion Reyes and Rustico Reyes when it fact they were residents of Makati, the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
Metro Manila, specifically, at Evangelista Street in Bangkal, less than a kilometer away
from the Municipal Hall of Makati, while Pasay City is 10 kilometers away from Bangkal, Petitioners failed to show that any of the above-cited exceptions exists in instant case
Makati.3 as to warrant a review of the findings of fact made by the lower court and upheld by the
Court of Appeals. Contrary to the assertion of petitioners, the findings of the lower court,
Aside from the above factual findings of the lower court which the Court of Appeals as well as those of the Court of Appeals, are substantially supported by the evidence
agreed with, the latter also noted that under the certification of one Pedro P. Rollon, presented by the parties.
OIC, Record and Notarial Reports of Pasay City, no such Extrajudicial Partition and
Settlement subject of this case notarized by a certain Atty. Jose Villena was ever This being a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, this
recorded. Nor was Atty. Villena officially appointed as Notary Public for and in Pasay Court is empowered to review errors of law committed by the Court of Appeals. It is not
City on the aforesaid date. the function of this court, however, to re-examine the evidence submitted by the parties
unless the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are not supported by the evidence on
Instead, it appears that the original copy of the Deed, as published in the Daily Mirror, record or the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.9
was notarized by one Atty. Primo M. Beltran in Pasay City and not in Makati, as shown
The conclusion arrived at by the lower court is consistent with its findings that the Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property
signatures of private respondents were indeed simulated. This conclusion is even are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten
buttressed by the Court of Appeals, which, aside from agreeing with the findings of the years.
lower court, arrived at conclusions which support said findings.
By virtue of said articles, they claim that they have been possessors of the contested
Petitioners, on the other hand, assail the findings of both courts that the subject Deed of parcel of land in good faith, for ten years and with a just title for the period required by
Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement was a "fakery and a forgery." They claim that law.
private respondents' signatures thereon, as well as their alleged signatures in the
residence certificates and in the verification of the complaint, were obviously similar. This Court is not impressed with this argument. Petitioners cannot justify their
However, they failed to rebut the observation made by the lower court that the ownership and possession of the subject parcel of land since they could not meet the
signatures on the Deed appear to have been written by one and the same hand and not requisites provided by the provisions they have cited. Regarding the requirement of
by the individual signatories thereto, except the signature of Rustico Reyes.10 good faith, the first paragraph of Article 526 states, thus:

Petitioners' assertion that the steps taken leading to the transfer of the subject property He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there
to them were duly evidence by public documents do not disprove the finding that the exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
subject Deed was indeed a fake and the signatures of private respondents, simulated.
Neither does the requisite publication in a newspaper of general circulation refute said
finding.11 From the above-cited provision, petitioners could not have been possessors in good
faith of the subject parcel of land considering the finding that at the very inception they
forged the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement which they claim to be the
This Court agrees with private respondents that while Rustico Reyes, Jr., son of basis for their just title.
petitioner Florentino and private respondents' only other brother did not join the
complaint, neither did he sign the subject Deed considering that he should have been a
signatory thereto, being the heir of the brother of the Having forged the Deed and simulated the signatures of private respondents,
parties.12 petitioners, in fact, are in bad faith. The forged Deed containing private respondents'
simulated signatures is a nullity and cannot serve as a just title.
Petitioners' ludicrous claim that private respondents imputed no deception on his part
but only forgery of the subject Deed and the simulation of their signatures is nothing Moreover, this Court agrees with the private respondents that there can be no
short of being oxymoronic. For what is forgery and simulation of signatures if not arrant acquisitive prescription considering that the parcel of land in dispute is titled
deception! property, i.e., titled in the name of the late Bernardino Reyes, the father of both
petitioner Florentino and the private respondents.14 This fact, petitioners do not
deny.15 Hence, even if they allege adverse possession that should ripen into ownership
The allegation made by petitioner that the execution of a public document ratified before due to acquisitive prescription, their title cannot defeat the real rights of private
a notary public cannot be impugned by the mere denial of the signatory is baseless. It respondents who stepped into the shoes, as it were, of their father as successors-in-
should be noted that there was a finding that the subject Deed was notarized by one interest. As it is, petitioners cannot even claim adverse possession as they admit that
Atty. Villena who at that time was not commissioned as a notary in Pasay City. Neither the private respondents likewise resided and continue to reside on the subject
was the alleged Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement recorded in the Record property.16
and Notarial Reports of Pasay City as certified by the OIC of such office. This finding
was never satisfactorily disputed by petitioner.13
Having found the subject Deed to be a nullity, this Court sees no need to discuss the
third assignment of error.
With respect to the second assignment of error, petitioners contend that even assuming
that there was forgery, they had become absolute owners of the subject property by
virtue of acquisitive prescription citing Articles 1117 and 1134 of the Civil Code as WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the petition is DISMISSED.
follows:
SO ORDERED.
Art. 117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights
may be ordinary or extraordinary.

Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in

good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.

xxx xxx xxx

 the public auction did, in fact, take place; that the defendant was the highest bidder for
the property sold and was declared to be the purchaser and that he took possession of
Republic of the Philippines the land in question under and by virtue of said sale.
SUPREME COURT
Manila This evidence, we think, was sufficient to establish the fact that the defendant was in
possession con justo titulo — of the Civil Code — because, granting that the debtor was
EN BANC the owner of the property at the time of the sale, this sale of land at public auction by a
commissioner appointed for the making of such sales and the payment of the purchase
price and occupation of the land purchased were sufficient to transfer the ownership to
G.R. No. L-2765 December 27, 1906 the purchaser provided these proceedings where had in accordance with law; and since
there was no evidence which tended to show that the defendant occupied the land in
JOSE DOLIENDO, plaintiff-appellee, bad faith, or that he had any reason to believe that the commissioner selling it had no
vs. authority to sell, or that he could not lawfully purchase at the sale, he must be deemed
DOMINGO BIARNESA, defendant-appellant. to have purchased in buena fe (good faith) in accordance with the provisions of articles
436 and 1950 of the Civil Code.
Ledesma, Sumulong & Quintos for appellant.
Counsel for the plaintiff contends that since the plaintiff had purchased the land in
Rothrock & Foss and Smith & Hargis for appellee. question prior to the alleged sale at public auction, the commission had no lawful
authority to include it in the list of property of the vendor which could be subjected to the
payment of his debts, and that the sale, therefore, was invalid and of no effect; and he
CARSON, J.: insists that a prescription title can not be based on such a transaction because "el titulo
para la precripcion ha de ser verdadero y valido." (Art. 1953 of the Civil
This is an action for the possession of a certain parcel of land situated in the Province Code.)lawphil.net
of Iloilo and specifically described in the complaint. It appears from the evidence that
the plaintiff bought the land in question from one Ventura Belarmino on the 30th of We think that this contention is based on a misconception of the scope and effect of the
November, 1888, on which day he paid the purchase price and took possession; that provisions of this article of the code in its application to "ordinary prescription." It is
the vendor, Ventura Belarmino, died on the 20th of July, 1889; that thereafter evident that by a "titulo verdadero y valido" in this connection we are not to understand
proceedings were instituted against the estate of the said Ventura Belarmino, a "titulo que por si solo tiene fuerza de transferir el dominio sin necesidad de la
deceased, on account of certain alleged shortages in his official accounts as cabeza de prescripcion" (a title which of itself is sufficient to transfer the ownership without the
barangay, which resulted in a sale at public auction of certain real and personal necessity of the lapse of the prescription period); and we accept the opinion of a
property (which it was alleged, was bound for the payment of said shortages) by the learned Spanish law writer who holds that the "titulo verdadero y valido" as used in this
commissioner appointed for the purpose of making such sales; that the parcel of land in article of the code prescribes a "titulo colorado" and not merely "  putativo," a "titulo
question in this action was included in the property thus sold; that the defendant was colorado" being one of which a person has when he buys a thing, in good faith, from
the purchaser of this land at the public sale and that some time thereafter, and not later one whom he believes to be the owner," and a "titulo putativo" "being one which is
than the 31st of December, 1892, he took possession by virtue of his purchase at said supposed to have preceded the acquisition of a thing, although in fact it did not, as
public auction and continued in possession until the 18th day of February, 1903, when might happen when one is in possession of a thing in the belief that it had been
this action was instituted. bequeathed to him." (Viso Derecho Civil Parte Segunda, p. 541.)

The plaintiff alleges that the description of the land actually sold at the public sale does Hence, even should it prove to be true upon investigation that the land in question was
not conform to the description of the land in question, but we think that the evidence not lawfully included in the list of property subject to the payment of the debts of the
introduced by the plaintiff himself leaves little doubt as to the point. At the time of the said Ventura Belarmino, deceased, or that the documentary evidence of title introduced
public sale, and immediately prior thereto, the plaintiff vigorously protested on the at the trial was deficient in form and lacks the formalities prescribed by law, the
ground that the land which was about to be sold was his property and had been defendant's title by prescription must still be sustained, since it is clear that the sale at
purchased by him from the said Ventura Belarmino, and in the light of this protest and in public auction did in fact take place, that the transaction was in good faith, and that the
consideration of all the evidence of record we are satisfied that the land in question in defendant bought the land from one whom he believed to have the right to sell.
the complaint must be taken to be included in the description of the land originally sold
to the plaintiff at private sale and later sold to the defendant at public auction.
The trial judge gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff, but the reasons on which he
based his conclusions are not fully set out in his opinion as it appears in the record. The
It is admitted that the defendant had been in possession more than ten years prior to language in which it is couched seems to suggest that the opinion in full as filed in the
the institution of this action and he must, therefore, be held to have acquired a title by trial court has not been brought here on appeal, but since the bill of exceptions bears
prescription under the provisions of article 1957 of the Civil Code if it appear that this the certificate of the judge who signed the opinion, and there is no suggestion of
possession was con buena fe y justo titulo. The evidence conclusively establishes that
mistake or oversight by either party, we have had no occasion to verify the record in this
regard. lawphil.net

The judgment of the trial court is reversed without special condemnation of costs in this
instance, and judgment will be entered in favor of the defendant, with the costs of first
instance against the plaintiff. After expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in
accordance herewith and ten days thereafter the case remanded to the court from
whence it came for proper action. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines their agents be enjoined from commencing and continuing the construction of a
SUPREME COURT residential house on the land in question. The motion was granted in an order dated
Manila December 11, 1968.

FIRST DIVISION On February 17, 1969, plaintiffs and defendants, thru their respective counsel, filed the
following partial stipulation of facts:
G.R. No. L-46753-54 August 25, 1989
COMES NOW the plaintiffs thru their undersigned counsel, and the defendants thru
ANTONIO SOLIS and ANGELA SOLIS CALIMLIM, petitioners, their counsel, respectfully submit the following partial stipulation of facts;
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE SOLIS and FLORENCIA 1. Parties know the Identity of the land in litigation as described under
DIOQUINO respondents. paragraph 11 of the complaint;

Benigno P. Pulmano for petitioners. 2. That the subject matter of the litigation refers to the eastern side of
the property described in par. 11 of the complaint consisting of about
Teodoro P. Regino for private respondents. 526 square meters;

3. That the defendants has (sic) a house in the said eastern portion of
the said property;
MEDIALDEA, J.:
4. That the whole property was previously owned by Simeon Solis;
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners
Antonio Solis and Angela Solis Calimlim seek the review of the decision (pp 81- 5. That there exist an alleged donation proper nuptias executed by
88, Rollo) of the Honorable Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 45505-R and 45506R deceased Tomas Solis in favor of Jose Solis, the defendant over the
dated May 12, 1977 which set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of eastern half of the said property described in par. 11 of the complaint;
Pangasinan in Civil Case No. D-2039 declaring petitioner Antonio Solis the exclusive
owner of an unregistered parcel of land consisting of an area of five hundred thirty-six 6. That Tomas Solis, father of defendant Jose Solis was the nephew
(536) square meters. of Simeon Solis; that Tomas Solis was the son of Domingo Solis;
brother of Simeon Solis;
In a complaint (pp. 1-8, Record on Appeal) dated May 30, 1967, plaintiffs Antonio Solis
and Angela Solis Calimlim alleged that they are co-owners of a parcel of residential 7. That the land in question has been declared for taxation purposes
land situated at Barrio Bued, Calasiao, Pangasinan, with an area of 1,073 square as follows:
meters more or less; that this parcel of land was inherited from their parents, Simeon
Solis and Petronila Bauzon; that in 1939, they allowed defendants Jose Solis and his a. Before 1918-T.D. 7659 in the name of Simeon
wife Florencia Dioquino to construct a house on the eastern portion of plaintiffs' parcel Solis.
of land (consisting of 536 square meters) with the understanding that they (defendants)
should vacate the premises as soon as their financial conditions would permit them. In
1965, plaintiffs demanded that the defendants vacate the premises but the latter b. 1918-T.D. 21465 revised T.D. 7659 also in the
refused. name of Simeon Solis.

The answer (pp. 8-10, Record on Appeal) of defendants raised as affirmative defense c. 1920-T.D. 37709 revised T.D. 21465 also in the
the fact of their ownership of the property in question having acquired the same by way name of Simeon Solis.
of donacion proper nuptias from spouses Tomas Solis and Hermenegilda Jimenez, way
back in 1931. They also alleged that since 1931, they were in possession of said d. 1951-T.D. 11144 revised T.D. 37709 also in the
property openly, continuously and adversely, to the exclusion of all others, and in the name of Simeon Solis.
concept of owners and that since 1931 they have paid the taxes due on the property.
e. 1965-T.D. 27385 revised T.D. 11144 now in the
On November 21, 1968, plaintiffs filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary name of Antonio Solis.
Mandatory Injunction (pp. 11 -12, Record on Appeal) praying that the defendants or
 f. 1966-T.D. 16147 revised T.D. 27385 also in the Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, spouses Jose Solis and Florencia
name of Antonio Solis. Dioquino appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a decision (pp. 81-88, Rollo) dated May
12, 1977, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the
g. 1967-T.D. 20097 cancels T.D. 16147 in the appellants the lawful owners of the eastern half of the parcel of land described in the
name of Jose Solis. complaint.

... (pp. 15-17, Record on Appeal). The pertinent portion of the decision reads:

The healing of the case was conducted on a single setting on June 25, 1969 where In the present case, there is no question that the actual possession
both parties were allowed to present their evidence. by the appellants of the disputed portion of the land dates back to
1933 and since then appellants have been in the adverse,
continuous, open, public, peaceful and interrupted possession of the
After presentation of evidence, oral and documentary, the trial court found that indeed, disputed property in the concept of an owner until this case was filed
herein private respondents spouses Jose Solis and Florencia Dioquino were in in court on May 30, 1967.
possession of the eastern half portion of the property described in the complaint for
more than thirty years. However, it ruled that such possession cannot be held adversely
against the plaintiffs who had shown a better title thereto. The pertinent portion of the x x x.
decision of the trial court dated July 17, 1969 reads:
.....If we have said it before, we repeat it here for emphasis that the
The court rules that while the defendants had possessed the eastern appellants took possession of the disputed eastern portion of the land
portion of the land in question for more than 30 years, such as owners by virtue of a donation executed in their favor in 1933.
possession cannot be held adversely against the plaintiffs who had Since then, they have exercised various acts of dominion over the
shown a better title thereof. Hence, prescription does not lie in this disputed property such as constructing their house thereon enjoying
case. its fruits to the exclusion of all others and paying realty taxes
corresponding to the disputed one-half portion of the land. Even the
plaintiffs acknowledge this fact by their own evidence that they, for
From the partial stipulation submitted by the parties, it was shown their own part, also paid half of the realty taxes for the western
that the whole property was previously owned by Simeon Solis, father portion of the land (Exhibits C, C-1 to C-6; tsn., June 25, 1969, p.
of herein plaintiffs, and that the same land had been declared for 39).lâwphî1.ñèt
taxation purposes in the name of Simeon Solis from 1918 to 1951.
x x x.
While the defendants exhibited the deed donation proper nuptias
(Exh. 1) executed in their favor by Tomas Solis and Hermenegilda
Jimenez, they have however, failed to present proof that Simeon ... By the plaintiffs' own evidence, they paid realty taxes only for the
Solis who previously owned the whole land in question had conveyed other half of the property (Exhibits C, C-1 to C-6; tsn., June 25, 1969,
the eastern portion thereof consisting of 536 square meters to his p. 39). This is strongly indicative of the fact that the defendants are
brother Tomas Solis. The situation shows in effect, that Tomas Solis the owners of the eastern half of the land over which they, in turn,
had no title to the property he donated to his children, the defendants, paid the corresponding half of the realty taxes from 1934 (Exhibits 2,
and therefore the latter acquired no right over the subject property. 2-A to 2-S). Further, the circumstance that neither the appellants nor
their donors have declared the disputed portion in their names prior to
1967 is not sufficient to overcome the undisputed possession for
There is evidence of the plaintiffs to the effect that Angela Solis more than 30 years of the property in question by the appellants.
Calimlim had already renounced her right and interest over the land (See Vigor vs. Director of Lands, CA 57 O.G. 5888).
in question in favor of Antonio Solis.
WHEREFORE, finding the Appeal to be meritorious, the judgment
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the court appealed from is hereby set aside, and another one entered
hereby renders judgment 1) declaring the plaintiff Antonio Solis the dismissing the complaint and declaring the appellants as the lawful
exclusive owner of the land in question; 2) ordering the defendants to owners of the eastern half of the parcel of land described in the
vacate the eastern portion of the land in question; 3) ordering the complaint without costs.
defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P800.00 for attorney's fees;
and 4) to pay the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 84-88, Rollo)
SO ORDERED. (pp. 27-29, Record on Appeal)
The Motion for Reconsideration filed thereat was denied on August 3, 1977. continuous, open, public, peaceful and uninterrupted in the concept of an owner until
tills case was filed on May 30, 1967. It pointed out that private respondents exercised
Aggrieved, Antonio Solis and Angela Solis Calimlim filed the instant petition for review various acts of dominion over the disputed property, such as constructing their house
on certiorari on September 19, 1977. The herein petitioners manifested in their petition thereon, enjoying its fruits to the exclusion of all others, and paying realty taxes
that they admit the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals as embodied in its decision, corresponding to the disputed one-half portion of the land. It likewise gave due
but they take exception to the conclusions drawn by the appellate court from the significance to the fact that petitioners acknowledged the ownership of the private
undisputed findings (p. 17, Rollo). The following arguments (pp. 23-24, Rollo) were respondents of one-half portion of the land when they also paid half of the realty taxes
presented in support of their petition: for the western portion of the land.

1. The Court of Appeals was not justified in concluding that the It is firmly settled that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and binding upon
possession by private respondents over the disputed property was this Court, if borne out by the evidence on record. There are of course certain
adverse and in the concept of owner, because such possession was recognized exceptions none of which, however, find any application here (Tan v. CA, et
merely tolerated by the petitioners. al., L-48619, June 20, 1988).lâwphî1.ñèt  In fact, in the preliminary statement of their
petition (p. 17, Rollo), petitioners manifested their admission of the findings of facts of
the Court of Appeals.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in recognizing the validity and effect of
the donation proper nuptias as sufficient to create or establish the
just title of private respondents, as donees in said donation, although Petitioners also contend that since no competent proof was adduced by private
the alleged donor or grantor Tomas Solis, had no right or title respondents to show how Simeon Solis, the previous owner, transferred ownership of
whatsoever over the property in question. the disputed premises to Tomas Solis, father of Jose Solis, the donacion proper
nuptias executed by Tomas is not sufficient to create or establish the just title of private
respondents as donees.
3. The Court of Appeals, in deciding that petitioner's cause of action
had prescribed, overlooked the importance of determining when such
cause of action accrued. This contention of petitioners is not meritorious. Suffice it to state that even a void
donation may be the basis of claim of ownership which may ripen into title by
prescription (Pensador vs. Pensador 47 Phil. 959, 961). It is the essence of the statute
On November 3, 1977, We required the respondents to comment on the petition (p. of limitations that, whether the party had a right to the possession or not, if he entered
106, Rollo). After private respondents' comment and petitioners' reply were submitted, under the claim of such right and remained in possession for the period (ten years)
We gave due course to the petition on November 27, 1978 (p. 152, Rollo). Petitioners named in the statute of limitations, the right of action of the plaintiff who had the better
filed their brief on November 21, 1979 (p. 164, Rollo). Private respondents failed to file title is barred by that adverse possession. The right given by the statute of limitations
their brief within the required period. On March 12, 1980, We resolved to consider the does not depend upon, and has no necessary connection, (with) the validity of the claim
petition submitted for decision without respondents' brief (p. 169, Rollo). under which the possession is held. ..." (Vda. de Lima vs. Tio, L-27181, April 30, 1970,
citing Conspecto v. Fruto, 129 US 182 [1889]). The "just title" required for acquisitive
The land in question is not registered under the Torrens System. It consists of an area prescription to set in is not "titulo verdadero y valid"-or such title which by itself is
of 536 square meters and is located at the eastern portion of the land described under sufficient to transfer ownership Without necessity of letting the prescriptive period
paragraph 11 of the complaint. It is admitted that the land described in paragraph 11 elapse but only "titulo colorador" —  such title where, although there was a mode of
was originally owned by Simeon Solis, father of petitioner Antonio Solis. transferring ownership, still something is wrong because the grantor is not the owner
(See Doliendo vs. Biamesa, 7 Phil. 132).
It is the contention of petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that private
respondents' possession of the land was adverse and in the concept of an owner The donacion was made in 1931 and spouses Jose Solis and Florencia Dioquino took
because such possession was merely tolerated by petitioners. possession of the land in 1933 by virtue of the donacion. It was the Code of Civil
Procedure which was then in force. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, ten years of
The trial court found that indeed, private respondents were in possession of the adverse possession by a person claiming to be the owner, in whatever way such
property for more than thirty (30) years. Noteworthy, however, is the fact that it did not occupancy may have commenced shall vest in every actual possessor of such land a
state that such possession was merely tolerated by petitioners. It only held that such full complete title. In Ongsiaco vs. Dallo (27 SCRA 161) the Supreme Court said: 'Under
possession cannot be held adversely against petitioners who had shown a better title the Code of Civil Procedure formerly in force, good or bad faith was immaterial for
thereto, in view of private respondent's failure to present any evidence showing how purposes of acquisitive prescription. Adverse possession in either character ripened
title passed from Simeon Solis, petitioners' father, to Tomas Solis, private respondents' into ownership after the lapse of ten years (Miraflor vs. CA, L-40151-52, April 8, 1986,
father. 142 SCRA 18, 29).

On the other hand, the appellate court, on the basis of the records of this case found Finally, petitioners assail respondent appellate court's holding that their cause of action
that private respondents' possession of the premises way back in 1933 was adverse, had prescribed, overlooking the importance of determining when such cause of action
accrued. In its findings of fact, the appellate court said that the record shows that
Tomas Solis (private respondent's predecessor) was already in possession of the
eastern portion in question before 1927 (t.s.n., June 25, 1969, pp. 41, 42, 47; p. 2, CA
decision).lâwphî1.ñèt However, no evidence was presented to show that Tomas Solis'
possession thereof was adverse, exclusive or in the concept of an owner. Thus, the
appellate court concluded that private respondents possession have been actual,
adverse, continuous, open, public, notorious, peaceful and uninterrupted only in 1933,
when they took possession of the property by virtue of the donacion proper nuptias. The
respondent court, therefore, found and We agree that it was in 1933 when petitioner's
cause of action accrued.

Even if we were to admit, as contended by petitioners, that their cause of action

accrued only in 1941 (p. 3 of Reply; p. 148, Rollo), the first time that private
respondents can be considered as having repudiated petitioners' ownership of the
premises by paying the tax on the property in the name of respondent Jose Solis, the
same conclusion would be obtained. The lapse of more than twenty (20) years of
adverse possession by private respondents is sufficient to confer ownership on them of
the disputed portion under the Old Civil Code which requires only ten (10) years of
adverse possession. Article 41 of the Old Civil Code provides:

Sec. 41. Title to land by prescription. — Ten years of adverse

possession by any person claiming to be the owner for that time of
any land or interest in land, uninterruptedly, continuously for ten years
by occupancy, descent, grants or otherwise, in whatever way such
occupancy may have commenced or continued, shall vest in every
actual possessor of such land a full complete title, saving to the
person under disabilities the rights, secured by the next Section.

Although petitioners' action for quieting of title was filed in May 30, 1967 when the New
Civil Code was already in effect, Article 1116 of the New Civil Code provides that
"prescription already running before the effectivity of this Code (August 30, 1950) shall
be governed by laws previously in force; ..." which in this case is the aforequoted
Section 41 of the Old Civil Code.

Therefore, whatever claim petitioners had over the disputed property had prescribed in
view of private 'respondents' open, actual, peaceful, continuous and adverse
possession of the same property for more than thirty years or at the least, for more than
twenty (20) years.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated May 12,1977 of the Court
of Appeals dismissing the complaint and declaring private respondents Jose Solis and
Florencia Dioquino Solis the lawful owners of the eastern portion of the lot described
under paragraph 11 of the complaint is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines covering the two parcels of land which were in the name of Pablo Parcotilo. The
SUPREME COURT plaintiffs also alleged that in 1936 the defendant Demetrio Parcotilo, sold to the
Manila defendant Crispin Prieto a portion of one of the parcels of land that were left by Pablo
Parcotilo. It was further alleged by the plaintiffs that defendant Victor Parcotilo, in
EN BANC collusion with his father, the defendant Demetrio Parcotilo, procured the transfer to his
name of the tax declarations which were in the name of his father.
G.R. No. L-17249           November 28, 1964
The defendant Vicenta Parcotilo Baji in her answer, manifested that she had no interest
whatsover in the property under litigation and that she was not interested in whatever
LICOTEDRA PARCOTILO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, would be the outcome of the case.
vs.
FILOMENA PARCOTILO, CRISPIN PRIETO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
The defendant Crispin Prieto, in his answer, alleged that in 1936 he purchased an area,
of about .4312 hectares of riceland from his co-defendant Demetrio Parcotilo, which
Nicasio S. Macoy for plaintiffs-appellants. was a portion of one of the two parcels of land that were then in the possession of
Pauline A. Conol for defendants-appellees. Demetrio Parcotilo. Crispin Prieto claimed that he bought that portion in the belief that
Demetrio Parcotilo was the true and absolute owner of the land, the transaction being
ZALDIVAR, J.: evidenced by a public instrument; and that since 1936 he had been in possession of the
portion that he had bought, actually, openly, and continuously up to the time when the
An appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Misamis in its complaint in this case was filed on January 23, 1956.
Civil Case No. 1858, which was an action for partition.
The defendant Demetrio Parcotilo, in his answer, alleged that he acquired the lands in
The plaintiffs, Licotedra Parcotilo, Maria Parcotilo, Epifania Parcotilo, Raymundo question by virtue of a donation mortis causa, executed by the late Pablo Parcotilo and
Parcotilo, Corazon Parcotilo, Perpetua Parcotilo, Aladino Parcotilo and Francisco Filomena Dipolog on July 20, 1917, and that after the death of these espouses in 1918
Parcotilo, are nephews and/or nieces of one Pablo Parcotilo. The defendant Filomena he immediately took possession of those two parcels of land in good faith, he had
Parcotilo is the sister of Pablo Parcotilo; the defendant Demetrio Parcotilo, is the son of introduced improvements thereon, and had since then been in possession of said lands
defendant Filomena Parcotilo, and, therefore, is another nephew of Pablo Parcotilo; the actually, publicly, and uninterruptedly, under a claim of ownership adverse to all other
defendant Victor Parcotilo is the son of the defendant Demetrio Parcotilo; and the rights up to the time when the complaint in this case was filed on January 23, 1956.
defendant Vicente Parcotilo Baji is another niece of Pablo Parcotilo. The defendant
Crispin Prieto is made a party in the present case because it is alleged that he had The other defendants, Filomena Parcotilo and Victor Parcotilo, who are mother and son
bought from the defendant Demetrio Parcotilo a portion of one of the two parcels of land respectively of defendant Demetrio Parcotilo, join in the claim that said Demetrio
that are in question. Parcotilo had acquired the two parcels of land in question from the late espouses Pablo
Parcotilo and Filomena Dipolog and had become the absolute owner thereof, with right
The defendant Vicenta Parcotilo Baji is included as defendant because she was not to convey some to other persons.
willing to join as a party plaintiff.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. The pertinent
The plaintiffs alleged that Pablo Parcotilo, during his lifetime, owned and possessed two portion of said decision, which embodies the findings of facts and conclusions of the
parcels of land located at Sitio Tuburan, Barrio Villaflor, Municipality of Oroquieta, in the lower court, reads as follows:
province of Misamis Occidental; that Pablo Parcotilo was married to Filomena Dipolog,
that both died during the cholera epidemic of the year 1918, and that they were not That the two parcels of land described in the complaint were conjugal
survived by any descendant or ascendant. It was therefore claimed by the plaintiffs, properties of the late spouses Pablo Parcotilo and Filomena Dipolog,
who are the children of the brothers and/or sisters of Pablo Parcotilo, that they are the otherwise called and known as Filomena Botanog; that on July 20, 1917,
co-owners, together with the defendant Filomena Parcotilo who was the surviving sister Filomena Botanog, alias Dipolog executed a statement without the requisite of
of Pablo Parcotilo and Vicente Parcotilo Baji who was also a niece of Pablo Parcotilo, of law, conveying the conjugal property in question to Demetrio Parcotilo,
the two parcels of land left by said Pablo Parcotilo. nephew of her husband Pablo Parcotilo. Pablo Parcotilo, however, also signed
the said testament Exh. "1", with translation Exh. "1-a". Upon the death of the
The complaint which was filed on January 23, 1956, seeks to partition among the spouses in 1918, Demetrio Parcotilo asserted ownership of the land in
plaintiffs and the defendants Filomena Parcotilo and Vicente Parcotilo Baji the two question without anybody raising any protest, and only recently the plaintiffs
parcels of land in question. The plaintiffs claimed that sometime on July 30, 1936, the claim to be entitled to share with the land in question as co-heirs in the estate
defendant Demetrio Parcotilo subscribed and swore to an affidavit before the Deputy of the late Pablo Parcotilo.
Provincial Assessor declaring that he was the only son and heir of the late Pablo
Parcotilo, and in so doing he procured the transfer to his name of the tax declarations
 The plaintiffs tried to prove that Luis Parcotilo youngest brother of Pablo land in question to his co-defendant Crispin Prieto. Incidentally, the trial court found that
Parcotilo was the one who lately possessed and enjoyed the land in question, Luis Parcotilo, one of the brothers of the late Pablo Parcotilo, was a witness to the deed
but it is an uncontradicted fact that in the document of sale whereby Demetrio of sale executed by Demetrio Parcotilo in favor of Crispin Prieto; and this indicated that
Parcotilo conveyed thru sale a portion of the land in question in favor of Crispin Luis Parcotilo, as a brother of Pablo Parcotilo, had recognized the ownership of
Prieto, said Luis Parcotilo signed only as a witness implying that he never Demetrio Parcotilo of the land that was sold to Crispin Prieto. It is further alleged in the
asserted ownership of said land. complaint that in 1952 the defendant Demetrio Parcotilo caused the tax declarations of
these lands in questions to be transferred to the name of his son Victor Parcotilo. All
In short, the Court finds that altho the testament Exh. "1" is null and void for these circumstances, as brought forth by the plaintiffs-appellants in their pleadings,
lack of legal requisites, it is nevertheless a good ground of which to base were indications of the claim of ownership of Demetrio Parcotilo over the two parcels of
acquisitive prescription. There is no doubt that the plaintiffs would have the land in question, exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants; and this
right to demand shares to the land in question if they acted promptly before the adverse claim of Demetrio Parcotilo bolstered by his actual, open and continuous
period of prescription had elapsed. possession for a period of over thirty years had ripened into a title. The adverse
possession of defendant Demetrio Parcotilo from 1918 to 1936 had redounded to the
benefit of the defendant Crispin Prieto as far as the portion that the latter had bought
It is regrettable that the filing of this case has been too late, when they had from Demetrio Parcotilo was concerned; and the defendant Crispin Prieto also had
already lost their right thereto. adverse possession of the portion of which he had bought from Demetrio Parcotilo for a
period of about twenty years before the filing of the complaint in the present case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing
the complaint with costs against the plaintiffs. The lands in question being unregistered lands, and the rights of the defendants
Demetrio Parcotilo and Crispin Prieto having accrued before the New Civil Code went
The plaintiffs appealed from the decision of the trial court. into effect, the law applicable is Sec. 41 of Act 190, the old Code of Civil Procedure,
which provides as follows:
The findings of the lower court that the defendant Demetrio Parcotilo had acquired
ownership of the two parcels of land in question through adverse possession are amply SEC. 41. Title to land by prescription. — Ten years actual adverse possession
supported by the record. The document which was executed jointly by the spouses by any person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land or interest in
Pablo Parcotilo and Filomena Botanog on July 20, 1917 (Exh. 1-A) contains the land, uninterruptedly continued for ten years by occupancy, descent, grants, or
following provisions, among others: otherwise, in whatever may such occupancy may have commenced or
continued, shall vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full
3 TESTAMENT — The said land and the house that we bequeath to no other and complete title, saving to the persons under disabilities the rights secured
person but to my nephew already mentioned above because he is the only by the next section. In order to constitute such title by prescription or adverse
one who served us throughout, that is why we love him and favor him because possession, the possession by the claimant or by the person under or through
of his services to us spouses; that our immovable properties, to make known whom he claim must have been actual, open, public, continuous, under a
to all residents in this District No. 7, Tuburan and in order to make perfect the claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants ... .
truth of this written present testament, my nephews, as well as the nephews of (Emphasis supplied).
my wife are excluded, likewise my relatives on both sides including the
relatives of my wife on both sides, no one of them can question the properties Even the provisions of Article 1137 of the New Civil Code on extraordinary prescription
above mentioned because they have no right of ownership except the one who through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years, regardless of whether there
served us as we consider him our faithful son. was title or good faith, uphold the right of the defendant Pablo Parcotilo as owner
through adverse possession in this present case.
We agree with the trial court that even if the document Exh. "1-a" was not executed with
all the requisites of a valid will or of a valid donation mortis causa  the said document The decision of the lower court is in accordance with law and finds support in a long line
supplied the basis for the claim of ownership by the defendant Demetrio Parcotilo of the of decisions of this Court (Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857; Pensader v. Pensader,
two parcels of land in question after the death of the spouses Pablo Parcotilo and 47 Phil. 959; Dimanlig v. Cusi, 48 Phil. 394; Dadivas v. Bunayon, 54 Phil. 632).
Filomena Botanog. This claim of ownership by Demetrio Parcotilo, coupled with his
open, continuous and adverse possession for a period of thirty-eight years had ripened WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the plaintiffs-
into a title by prescription (Pensader, v. Pensader, 47 Phil. 959, 961). appellants.

In their complaint the plaintiffs-appellants had alleged that in 1936 Demetrio Parcotilo
caused the tax declarations of these two parcels of land, which were formerly in the
name of Pablo Parcotilo, to be transferred to his name. It is also alleged in the
complaint that in 1936 Demetrio Parcotilo sold a portion of one of the two parcels of
 Republic of the Philippines sometime in 1953 when respondent Gregorio Bolo, a common law husband of one of
SUPREME COURT the granddaughters of Felix Malonis, caused the survey of Lots 1236 and 1237 in June
Manila 1984, and proceeded to occupy Lot 1236 claiming to have purchased the same on 11
April 1948 from respondent heirs of Felix Malonis. Petitioners constested the claim of
THIRD DIVISION respondent Bolo and asserted that what had been sold to him was only Lot 1237 (area:
5 hectares) and that Lot 1236 (area: 20 hectares) was surreptitiously declared by
respondent Bolo in the aforementioned survey as property owned exclusively by Felix
G.R. No. 76386 October 26, 1987 Malonis. Petitioners also contended that respondent Bolo, in his desire to consolidate
possession and ownership of Lot 1236 in his name, harassed petitioners by instituting a
CELSO AMARANTE HEIRS, NAMELY: FELOMINA, FERNANDA, GENARO, criminal case for qualified theft on 7 October 1953 against Eleuterio Amarante and
CARMELITA, CRISPIN, CORAZON, ISIDRA, LYDIA, ANTONIO, BIENVENIDO, petitioner Celso Amarante, 2 and by threatening to liquidate the other petitioners if they
NATHALIA, DEGUILO, DOMINADOR, ZOSIMA, HUGO and LORNA, all surnamed persisted in their refusal to abandon the disputed property.
AMARANTE, BOHEMIA INFIEL, FAUSTA AMARANTE, PETRA AMARANTE,
MARCELA VAILOCES LUCIANO FERRAREN, BIYORA INFIEL and VICENTE For their part, respondents (defendants below), the grandchildren and surviving heirs of
MANGABIS, petitioners, Felix Malonis, contended that it was not improper for them to sell Lot 1236 to
vs. respondent Bolo on the ground that said property had always been owned exclusively
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, GREGORIO BOLO, EPIFANIO by Felix Malonis, contrary to the claim by petitioners that Lot 1236 was owned in
VILLANUEVA @ PANIYO, MATEA FELIX @ ESTRELLA, SUAREZ FELIX, common by the six children of Malonis Infiel by his two wives. Respondents presented
BUENAVENTURA @ TURA, ANDA FELIX, DIOSDADO FELIX, DIRO FELIX, Tax Declaration No. 123 issued on 7 August 1948 in the name of "Herederos de Felix
ANTONIA FELIX, EVANGELISTA FELIX and VICTORIA FELIX, respondents. Malonis" in support of their claim of ownership over Lot 1236, and in rebuttal of Tax
Declaration No. 6051 issued in 1953 in the name of Malonis Infiel which was presented
in evidence by petitioners.

FELICIANO, J.: On 17 September 1984, Branch 42 of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City
(Seventh Judicial District) rendered a Decision, 3 the dispositive portion of which reads:
On 20 August 1954, petitioners filed a complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 2967)
against respondents for the recovery of a twenty-hectare parcel of unregistered WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiffs' complaint is hereby
agricultural land (Lot 1236, Pls-667) situated in Sitio Campulay, Barrio Atotes, Bindoy, a dismissed and declaring the sale between the heirs of Felix Malonis
remote, mountainous region of Negros Oriental. The complaint was dismissed by the and Gregorio Bolo over the property in question valid, and finally
trial court on 31 January 1962 due to the failure of counsel for the petitioners to appear declaring Gregorio Bolo owner of the parcel of land declared under
at the scheduled hearing of the case; the dismissal, however, was ordered without Tax Declaration No. 123 in the name of the Heirs of Felix Malonis and
prejudice to the refiling of the same complaint. now declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. 4393.

On 20 December 1962, petitioners refiled their complaint (docketed this time as Civil The Court refrains from granting defendants' counterclaim for
Case No. 4100) with the then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental (12th Judicial damages, the same not being proved by convincing evidence.
District).
SO ORDERED.
The evidence for the petitioners (plaintiff below) indicates that Lot 1236 was one of two
pieces of real property originally owned and cultivated by the late Malonis Infiel, a native On appeal to the Court of Appeals, this case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 05697.
negrito or Aeta (Ate in the Ilongo dialect). 1 Upon his death (the date is not specified), In a Decision dated 3 April 1986, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by
Lot 1236 was inherited by: (1) Silverio Amarante, Bohemia Infiel, Belta Infiel, Apolonia the Court of Appeals (First Civil Cases Division). 4
Infiel, and Inojaria Infiel, the children of of Malonis Infiel with Elena Infiel; and (2) Felix
Malonis, the son of Malonis Infiel with Lucia Infiel. The other, five-hectare, property
situated in Sitio Aswang, Barrio Atotes, Bindoy, Negros Oriental (Lot 1237, Pls-667), on The Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), 5 in a Resolution dated 17 September 1986,
the other hand, was solely by Felix Malonis. denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration not on its merits but rather for having
been filed late, and ordered that entry of judgment of the decision dated 3 April 1986 of
the First Civil Cases Division be made.
Petitioners, the grandchildren and descendants of Malonis Infiel out of his union with
Elena Infiel, contended that Malonis Infiel began occupying Lot 1236 long before the
advent of World War II and had cultivated the land by plaintiff no less than 300 coconut In a resolution dated 14 January 1987, 6 this Court set aside the resolution dated 17
trees, 19 mongo trees, and 33 bamboo groves thereon. The occupation and possession September 1986 of the Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), as well as the entry of
by Malonis Infiel, his children, and petitioners of Lot 1236 remained undisturbed until judgment ordered by the Sixth Division in said resolution of the decision dated 3 April
1986 of the First Civil Cases Division. Respondents have since then filed their Both the trial judge and the appellate court had apparently forgotten all about Civil Case
Comment to the petition while petitioners, in response, have filed their Reply to No. 2967, instituted by petitioners on 20 August 1954 against respondents for recovery
respondents' comment. of the possession of Lot 1236. The dismissal of this case without prejudice on 31
January 1962, in fact, occasioned the filing on 20 December 1962 of Civil Case No.
The present Petition for review was filed with the Court on 11 November 1986. 4100 which, in effect, was merely a revival of Civil Case No. 2967 and not a new action
altogether. We are, consequently, unable to understand how the doctrine of laches
could be regarded as applicable in the present case.
We are of course aware of the familiar rule that, as a matter of general principle, the
conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal
on account of said court's having been in a better position to examine real evidence, as 2. The trial judge, in substantiation of the position taken by him in Civil Case No. 4100,
well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case. 7 This enumerated in his decision several "facts" (which are really conclusions), which were
rule, however, admits of exceptions, as where the evidence of record fails to support or simply adopted in their entirety by the appellate court. Conspicuously missing, however,
substantiate the lower court's findings of fact and conclusions; 8 or where the lower in the decisions of both courts is an exposition and evaluation of the specific factual
court overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, would affect circumstances and the supporting evidence which led to such conclusions.
the outcome of the case,  9 or where the disputed decision is based on a
misapprehension of facts. 10 After summarizing the respective contentions of the petitioners (plaintiffs below) and the
private respondents (defendants below), the trial Judge went on to state in his decision:
We are similarly not unmindful of the well-established rule that the Court of Appeals is
the final arbiter of questions of fact and, hence, the jurisdiction of this Court in cases In the assessment of the evidence spread on the records of the case,
brought before it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising only this court believes and so holds that defendants have proven their
errors of law. 11 Exceptions to this rule, however, likewise exist, such as when: "(1) the case by preponderance of evidence as shown by the following facts:
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2)
the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; 1. Plaintiffs are guilty of laches for allowing
(4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went Gregorio Bolo to possess, cultivate and own the
beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admission of both disputs Property for fourteen (14) long years before
appellant and appellees: (6) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to instituting the present action. This inaction negates
those of the trial court; (7) the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific whatever pretensions there are that plaintiffs own
evidence on which they are based; (8) the facts set forth in the petition as well as the the property in question;
petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (9) when the
finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and is
contradicted by evidence on record." 12 2. Tax Declaration No. 6051 shows that it was a
concoction to make it appear that the land was
declared by plaintiffs' predecessor in interest
The record here discloses several rather unsettling and unexplained circumestances Malonis Infiel; its preparation and issuance was
which compel us to order a re-trial of the case at bar. motivated by the desire to provide basis in filing the
case and to offset the effect of defendants' tax
1. The ground of laches was relied upon very heavily in deciding this case against declaration which is older than that of the plaintiffs;
petitioners. Said the trial judge in this respect:
3. While asserting fraud in the pleadings, fraud was
Plaintiffs (petitioners) are guilty of laches for snowing Gregorio Bolo never proved, a fatal evidentiary shortcoming;
to possess, cultivate and own the disputed property for fourteen (14) falling short of the jurisprudential requirement that it
long years before instituting the present action (Civil Case No. should be proved by convincing and sufficiently
4100). This inaction negates whatever pretensions there are that (sic) rather than presume the same;
plaintiffs own the property in question. 13
4. The testimonies of plaintiffs' witnesses hardly
The respondent appellate court similarly held: proved a case at (sic). Several loose ends and lack
of proofs of ownership of the disputed property
... For a period of nine (9) years from 1953 . . . . they (petitioners) characterized their testimonies;
neglected to take positive steps to assert their dominical claim over
the property. They commenced the instant case (Civil Case G.R. No. 5. No competent and sufficient evidence has been
4100) only on December 10, 1962.  As correctly concluded by the adduced to prove that the property in question was
lower court, laches have set in. ... 14 plaintiffs' and defendants' common property and
 neither was there evidence to show defendants' SCRA 205). In this Court, the evidence and sufficiently their averment
betrayal of trust reposed on them by plaintiffs as of fraud in the execution of the deed of sale in favor of Gregorio Bolo.
co-owners of the property in question;
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED in
6. Finally, the plaintiffs themselves except Gregorio toto.  Costs against plaintiff-appellants.
Bolo took the witness stand as witnesses for the
defendants declaring that the property in question (a) In respect of petitioners' and respondents' conflicting tax declarations covering Lot
was the exclusive property of Felix Malonis and not No. 1236, no explanation or documentation was offered by either the trial Judge or the
their common inheritance from their deceased appellate court to explain how the conclusion that petitioners' tax declaration was a
alleged original owner, Malonies Infiel; mere "concoction" devised only "to offset the effects of defendants' tax declaration" was
arrived at. It should be readily evident that the mere fact that petitioners' tax declaration
WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiffs' complaint is hereby was later in time than defendants' tax declaration does not rationally justify such a
dismissed and declaring the sale between the heirs of Felix Malonis conclusion. The conclusion of the two (2) courts, thus, appears based only on
and finally declaring Gregorio Bolo owner of the parcel of land conjecture or supposition.
declared under Tax Declaration No. 123 in the name of the Heirs of
Felix Malonis and now declared in his name under Tax Declaration (b) The trial Judge, referring to the testimonies of the petitioners' witnesses, summarily
No. 4393. declared that the testimonies of plaintiffs "hardly proved [their] case" and that "several
loose ends and lack of proof of ownership of the disputed property characterized their
The Court refrains from granting defendants' counterclaim for testimonies". The trial Judge, however, refrained from Identifying the witnesses
damages, the same not being proved by convincing evidence. adverted to and the portions of their testimonies found to have "loose ends".

SO ORDERED. (c) The trial Judge held that the petitioners failed to prove their allegations of fraud, a
conclusion that the respondent appellate court upheld not by independent inquiry but by
The respondent appellate court, for its part, quoted the same above "facts" found by the saying that "the finding of the lower court as to the existence [or] the non-existence of
trial court and then went on to state as follows: fraud is final and cannot be reviewed here unless clearly shown to be erroneous." Once
again, both decisions failed to document the position taken on this crucial point. Neither
decision contained even a summary discussion of or reference to the evidence of
The record supports the findings of the lower court. Plaintiffs declared record, whether in substantiation or in rebuttal of these allegations of fraud. Neither
the land for assessment purposes in 1953 after it was alredy declared Court disclosed, in other words, the basis of the finding of fact they purported to have
for the same purpose by defendants in 1948 and sold by them to Bolo made.
in 1949. Plaintiffs' Tax Dec. No. 6051 for the year 1953 is indicated
as "NEW" at the bottom of the reverse side thereof. Some of the
plaintiffs, such as Luciano Ferraren, Fausto Papa (Amarante) and (d) On the critical question of possession of the disputed land, the Court of Appeals said
Ines Papa (Infiel), testified for the defendants and named Felix in its decision: "Exhs. C and C-1 indicate that defendants are in possession of the land.
Malonis as the owner of the land in question. Exhs. C and C-1 Plaintiffs also admit that Bolo had caused the land to be surveyed, showing his
indicate that defendants are in possession of the land. Plaintiffs also possession thereof." It is important to point out that Exh. C of the petitioners consisted
admit that Bolo had caused the land to be surveyed, showing his of a criminal complaint dated 7 October 1953, against Eleuterio Amarante and petitioner
possession thereof. Pursuant to Art. 541 of the Civil Code, defendant Celso Amarante charging them with the crime of qualified theft — theft of twenty (20)
Gregorio Bolo should now be deemed the owner of the disputed pieces of coconuts allegedly belonging to Gregorio Bolo having the total value of P1.00
property (Samonte vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44841, Jan. 27, This complaint was docketed as Criminal Case No. 257 of the Justice of the Peace
1986). For a period of nine (9) years from 1953, when plaintiffs Celso Court, Negros Oriental. Exh. C-1 was the order dated 23 September 1954 of the Justice
Amarante and Eleuterio Amarante were charged with qualified theft of the Peace Roque B. Amante dismissing "temporarily" the complaint, "it appearing
(Exh. C), and they claimed ownership of the land (Exh. C-1), they that the question of ownership over the subject matter of this action [20 coconuts] had
neglected to take positive steps to assert their dominical claim over been raised by the defense in this case and which question is presently pending
the property. They commenced the instant case only on December determination in the Court of First Instance of this province [Civil Case No. 2967]." We
10, 1962. As correctly concluded by the lower court, laches have set are unable to understand how the respondent appellate court could regard Exhs. C and
in. Fraud is a question of fact and the circumstances constituting C-1 as evidence showing that defendants (respondents herein) were in Possession of
fraud must be alleged and proved in the court below. The finding of the land. We are similarly unable to understand how the circumstance that respondent
the lower court as to the existence or non-existence of fraud is final Bolo had caused the land to be surveyed could be regarded as evidence that he (,Bolo)
and cannot be reviewed here unless clearly shown to be erroneous was in possession thereof; this appears a simple non sequitar.
(Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Ayala Securities Corp., 70
3. Civil Case No. 4100, so the record discloses, apart from having taken all of twenty- Department by a non-christian inhabitant thereof unless, among other requirements, the
two years to resolve, was heard and decided by six different judges, the participation of deed is approved by the Provincial Governor or his authorized representative. Section
the sixth and first judge being limited solely to the writing of the decision therein. The 120 of the Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended, has extended the
judge who wrote the decision, in other words, had not personally heard any part of the same kind of protection to all "non-christian Filipinos" or "national cultural minorities",
case. This unusual circumstance must affect the weight that a reviewing tribunal whether in Mindanao and Sulu or elsewhere; conveyances and encumbrances made by
normally accords to the findings of fact of the trial judge who is assumed to have illiterate non-christians (or by literate non-christians if the deed is in a language not
observed the detailed demeanor of ,witnesses in the course of their testimony before understood by them) need the approve of the Chairman of the Commission of National
the court. Integration [now, the Presidential Assistant for Cultural Minorities] to be valid.
In Mangayao, et al. v. Lasud et al., 25 Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes referred, in his
4. In both their Memorandum 15 filed with the trial court in civil Case No. 4100 and their characteristic, trenchant language, to "the obvious intent of [these] statutes to guard the
appellants' Brief 16 filed in the Court of Appeals, petitioners, among other things patrimony of illiterate non-christians from those who are inclined to prey upon their
painstakingly outlined and cited the portions of the testimonies of their witnesses ignorance or ductility(  Porkan v. Yatco,  70 Phil. 161, Porkan v. Navarro, 73 Phil.
showing that Lot 1236 was originally owned by Malonis Infiel, a native negrito, who lived 689, Madale v. Sa Raya, 92 Phil. 558)", 26 We must give meaning to this public policy in
and died on said property; 17 that Malonis Infiel, upon his death, was succeeded his six this case.
children by his two wives; 18 that petitioner Celso Amarante ante, together with his
aunts and their children, were the actual occupants of Lot 1236 until 1954 when All the above factors lead us to the conviction that the interests of substantial justice will
respondent Bolo unlawfully divested them of their possession; 19 that what was sold by best be served by remanding this case to the trial court. Ordinarily, we would remand
respondent heirs of Felix Malonis to respondent Bolo was Lot 1237 and, if ever, at most this case for trial de novo. This controversy has, however, been in our courts since
only their 1/6 share in Lot 1236 : 20 that respondent Bolo threatened and harassed 1954, we cannot allow this situation to persist a days longer than is absolutely,
petitioners petitioners in order to lay claim to Lot 1236; 21 and that due to the fraud essential.
allegedly perpetrated upon them, and for the "measly sum of P1,146.00," all the real
property — comprising no less than twenty-five hectares — once owned and cultivated WHEREFORE the Decision of Branch 42 of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City
by Malonis Infiel and the members of his family, and all the improvements thereon, dated 17 September 1984 in Civil Case No. 4100 is SET ASIDE. This case is
suddenly wound up in the singular possession of respondent Bolo, who has since REMANDED to that Regional Trial court which is hereby DIRECTED to proceed as
benefitted from the produce thereof. 22 Petitioners likewise pointed to several material follows:
inconsistencies in the testimonies of respondents' four witnesses 23 which, had they
been evaluated more carefully, might have altered the result of this case altogether.
Finally, there is also the argument by petitioners that those who purportedly affixed their 1. It shall consider carefully all the evidence previously submitted to it by petitioners.
thumbmarks to the Absolute Deed of Sale covering Lot 1236 in favor of respondent
Bolo could not have possibly been aware of the consequences of their individual acts 2. It shall hold hearings for the purpose of receiving such additional evidence as
because they were all illiterate mountain people lacking in any formal education, 24 in petitioners may wish to submit in support of their principal allegations and arguments, to
stark contrast with respondent Bolo who, apart from being a local political official in wit:
those days (he was a municipal councilor), was a schooled individual — apparently the
only one among the contracting parties. The detailed discussion of the evidence by the (a) that Lot No. 1236 was originally owned by Malonis Infiel who
petitioners was not dealt with at all was in fact ignored, by the two courts in their cultivated and lived and died on that property;
decisions. The obvious inequality, in level of understanding of formal transactions,
between the parties did not move either court to substantial efforts to make sure that
the rights of illiterate negritos were protected. (b) that Malonis Infiel, upon his death, was succeeded, insofar as Lot
No. 1236 was concerned, by his six (6) children by his two (2) wives;
The curious silence of the two courts on the foregoing matters, coupled with the
strikingly inadequate, practically nonexistent discussion of the facts and evidence in this (c) that petitioner Celso Amarante, his aunts and their children were
case, must be viewed in the light of an important public policy which bears upon this in actual possession of lot No. 1236 until 1954 when respondent Bolo
case. That public policy is embodied, inter alia, in Article 24 of the Civil Code which, "in by fraud, breach of trust. threats, intimidation, harassment,
all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage misrepresentation and other unlawful means divested them of their
on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender possession;
age or other handicap", enjoins courts to be "vigilant for [the] protection [of such party]."
This same public policy is manifested in the recognition i in our statute law and case law (d) that what was sold by respondent heirs of Felix Malonis to
that members of our cultural or ethnic minority groups, such as Aetas, are commonly respondent Bolo was lot No. 1237 and, if at all and at most, a 1/6
handicapped and vulnerable in dealing with other members of the community and, share in lot No. 1236; and
therefore, need and deserve particular protection. Section 145 (b) of the Revised
Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu, for instance, prescribes that no conveyance
(e) that the Absolute Deed of Sale covering Lot No. 12:36 in favor or
or encumbrance of real property shall be made in the territorial jurisdiction of that
of respondent Bolo is invalid or unenforceable.
3. If additional evidence is submitted by petitioners, respondents shall be entitled to
cross-examine petitioners additional witnesses and to submit rebuttal evidence.

4. This Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Dumaguete City shall, with all deliberate
dispatch, and in any case within ninety (90) days from receipt hereof, submit a report
fact the evidence of record and on its findings of Fact to this court. Such findings of fact
shall be fully documented by reference to the evidence of record; the basis of each
finding of fact shall be clearly Identified. The Regional Trial Court shall furnish
petitioners and private respondents with a copy of its report to this Court. The entire
record of this case shall be elevated to this Court.

After receipt and consideration of the report of the Regional Trial Court, this Court will
resolve the Petition for Review and he underlying case on the merits. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines It is the position of the petitioner that Lot No. 5005 should be registered in its name for
SUPREME COURT either of two reasons. The first is that the disputed strip of land really formed part of
Manila Lots 2381 and 2386-A but was omitted therefrom only because of the inaccuracies of
the old system of cadastral surveys. The second is that it had acquired the property by
FIRST DIVISION prescription through uninterrupted possession thereof in concept of owner, by itself and
its predecessors-in-interest, for more than forty years.

For its part, the Republic of the Philippines argues that the elongated piece of land
between the two lots now owned by the petitioner used to be a canal which could not
G.R. No. 76564 May 25, 1990 have been appropriated by the purchasers of the adjacent lots or their successors-in-
interest. Neither could it be deemed included in the lots now owned by the petitioner
SOUTH CITY HOMES, INC., petitioner, because their respective technical descriptions indicate otherwise. Prescription is also
vs. not applicable because the petitioner has not established the requisite possession of
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. the lot, as to manner and length, to justify judicial confirmation of title in its name.

Jose S. Santos, Jr. for petitioner. The parties also differ on the nature of the disputed lot. The petitioner insists it is
patrimonial property of the State, being part of the so-called Friar Lands, while the
Republic maintains it is part of the public domain and cannot therefore be acquired by a
private corporation. But this disagreement is irrelevant, as will appear later.

CRUZ, J.:
The Court has considered the issues and the arguments of the parties and finds that
the petition has no merit .
The subject of this dispute is a strip of land between two lots owned by the petitioner. It
has an area of 613 square meters and is situated in Calabuso, Biñan, Laguna. It was
discovered only in 1983 after a survey conducted by the Bureau of Lands and is now To argue that Lot No. 5005 is really a part of the other two lots owned by the petitioner
identified as Lot No. 5005 of the Binan Estate.1 Registration thereof in the name of the is to oppose the obvious. What is obvious is the technical descriptions of the two lots
petitioner was decreed in 1984 by the trial court pursuant to the Property Registration whose areas do not include the strip of land between them. The petitioner points to the
Law. 2 On appeal, the order was reversed by a special division of the respondent court, original survey of the lands in 1906 which states that the two lots adjoin each other,
with two members dissenting.3 The petitioner is now before us, claiming that the without mention of what is now Lot No. 5005. But it forgets that it has itself suggested
reversal was erroneous. that the old surveys were inaccurate, which could explain the omission.

The two lots bordering the subject property are Lot No. 2381, containing an area of If it is true that there was no canal between the two lots at the time of their survey, then
36,672 square meters, and Lot No. 2386- A, containing an area of 32,011 square the disputed strip of land should have been included as part of either of the two
meters. Both are now registered in the name of the petitioner. The history of these lots adjoining lots. It was not. The petitioner itself insists that the canal, if there ever was
is described by the trial court as follows: one, had disappeared after it had been filled with silt and dirt. The result was the
segregation of a third and separate lot, now known as Lot No. 5005. Notably, the area
of that dried-up canal is not negligible as to come under what the petitioner calls the
The record shows that Lot 2381 was purchased on installment basis by Basilia allowable margin of error in the original survey.
Dimaranan, and Lot 2386 was acquired under similar condition by Fernando Guico,
both from the Friar Lands Division of the Bureau of Lands (Exhs. "S" and "R") in the
year 1910. Eight (8) years thereafter, installment-payment for Lot 2386 was completed The Republic submits that the petitioner and its predecessors-in-interest could not have
in favor of Basilia Dimaranan. On the other hand, Lot 2381 was on September 12, 1911 appropriated the strip of land because it used to be a canal over which they could not
assigned to Bartolome Peña who continued and completed the installment payments have acquired any exclusive right. The applicable law is Act No. 1120, otherwise known
culminating into the issuance in his name of Patent No. 19138 on September 26,1919. as the Friar Lands Act, providing in its Section 19 as follows:
From Bartolome Pena, Lot 2381 was acquired by Fidel M. Cabrera, Sr. and the title was
transferred to his name (Exh. "F") while Lot 2386 was acquired by the Garcias (Exh. "J- No purchaser or lessee under this Act shall acquire any exclusive rights to any canal,
2") On August 27,1981, Lot 2386-A was sold by the Garcias to the applicant South City ditch, reservoir, or other irrigation works, or to any water supply upon which such
Homes, Inc. (Exh. "J"). Lot 2381 was on February 25,1977 sold by Fidel M. Cabrera, Sr. irrigation works are or may be dependent, but all of such irrigation works and water
to Koo Jun Eng (Exh. "G") who in turn assigned the property to the applicant in supplies shall remain under the exclusive control of the Government of the Philippine
February of 1981 (Exh. "H"). 4 Islands and be administered under the direction of the Chief of the Bureau of Public
Lands for the common benefit of those interest dependent upon them. And the
Government reserves as a part of the contract of sale in each instance the right to levy
an equitable contribution or tax for the maintenance of such irrigation works, the
assessment of which shall be based upon the amount of benefits received, and each not included in the title to the two parcels of
purchaser under this Act, by accepting the certificate of sale or deed herein provided to riceland?
be given, shall be held to assent thereto. And it is further provided that all lands leased
or conveyed under this Act shall remain subject to the right of such irrigation canals, A Yes, sir, I came to know that. As a matter of fact,
ditches, and reservoirs as now exist or as the Government may hereafter see fit to when I became tenant, my predecessor used to tell
construct. me that there is a strip in between the two parcels
of riceland which I was working on. They even told
According to the respondent court, the fact that the canal had been filled up did not me that the owners of the adjoining Lots 2381 and
change its nature as a canal; it was still a canal although it had dried up. We do not 2386 were lucky because there was added to their
think so. A canal without water is not a canal. The status of a canal is not perpetual. property a strip of land which they produced also
Consequently, the above provision is not applicable and cannot defeat the petitioner's rice but which is not included in their title.
claim to the disputed property either as part of two other lots or as a separate lot.
According to them, it happened this way that from time immemorial, there was an
As we have already rejected the contention that the third lot was part of the other two irrigation canal constructed on this strip of land. After the cadastral survey of the lots in
lots, the petitioner must fall back on its claim of acquisitive prescription over it as a Biñan, this canal gradually disappeared by the filing up of dirt and silt until such time
separate lot. Its submission is that its possession of the lot dates back to "time that no one could notice anymore a canal on this strip of land, such that the same was
immemorial," by which tired phrase it is intended to convey the idea that the start of taken possession of by both the owners of Lot 2381 and Lot 2386 and had it planted
such possession can no longer be recollected. Indeed, it can be. The petitioner's with rice in the same way that the two parcels of riceland were planted at that time. And
possession does not in fact go back to "time immemorial," but only to the recent I was likewise informed by my predecessor  that I have also to till the strip of land, the
remembered past. same having been considered as properly owned and forming part and parcel of Lots
2381 and 2386 and owned by the respective owners. 6
The petitioner presented only two witnesses whose testimony regarding its supposed
possession of Lot No. 5005 is essentially hearsay and inherently inadequate. Thus, The underscored portions stress the unreliableness of these declarations, which, in the
Rogelio Constantino, an employee of the petitioner, declared on the stand: case of Constantino, is also suspect as self-serving.

A. Yes sir, as a matter of fact we were duly informed  that since the The testimony falls short of establishing the manner and length of possession required
beginning even from the time of their predecessors-in-interest, such by law to vest prescriptive title in the petitioner to Lot No. 5005. For one thing, as the
strip of land was believed to be forming part of the two parcels of land Solicitor General points out in his Comment, the claim of adverse ownership to the strip
and since the beginning they have been cultivating the same and of land between their respective lots was not exclusive but shared by the predecessors-
treating the said strip of land as their own, publicly, notoriously and in in-interest of the petitioner. For another, and more importantly, the length of possession
the concept of owner. 5 claimed by the petitioner is not sufficient to vest prescriptive title in it.

The other witness, Meliton Casunuran, was more explicit but his testimony is largely Casunurans allegation that the claim of the petitioner's predecessors-in- interest to the
hearsay also, let alone the fact that the possession he sought to establish is likewise disputed strip of land was "in the concept of owner, open, public and adversely against
insufficient. According to him, he worked as a tenant on the land for the previous the whole world" was fed to him with a leading question during the ex parte  hearing,
owners of the other two lots before these were acquired by the petitioner and that the thus:
subject property was regarded as part of their lots by their respective owners. Thus he
declared: MENDOZA

Q Now, since you testified that you worked both on Q So you mean to convey to this Honorable Court that from the time
Lot 2381 and Lot 2386-A as tenant thereof, did you of your predecessor up to your time as tenant, the owners of Lots
as a tenant recall that you cultivated these two 2381 and 2386-A have been in possession of this strip of land
particular parcels of land in its entirety? containing an area of 613 square meters more or less in the concept
of owner, open, public and adversely against the whole world?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.7
Q Do you know that between these two parcels of
land that you were working then, there is a strip of The witness was a farmer and could hardly be expected to understand the legal
land included in the area you were working which is significance of the question, to which he could have give only the short and simple
answer "Yes." He did not and was not asked to elaborate. The statement was also not
corroborated by other witnesses or supported by documents showing that, indeed, the if A acquires by deed a 40 acres and obtains an adjoining strip 2 rods wide or some
former owners of the two lots also asserted claims of ownership over the land in interest in it, his conveyance of the 40 acquired by deed does not carry with it his
question. In fact, the only other evidence of such claim is the tax declaration on the said interest in the adjoining strip. If the sole defense here was that of adverse possession,
lot, which was made only in 1980. 8 we would be obliged to hold that it had not been made out.11

But the more telling consideration, as the Court sees it, is this. By the testimony of the It should also be noted that, according to Article 1135 of the Civil Code:
two witnesses, the petitioner obviously meant to tack the possession of the two lots by
the previous owners to its own possession. There was no need for this because the In case the adverse claimant possesses by mistake an area greater, or less, than that
petitioner acquired ownership of Lot No. 2381 by assignment and Lot No. 2386-A by expressed in his title, prescription shall be based on the possession.
purchase; and such ownership includes the right of possession. The petitioner is not
claiming prescriptive rights to these two lots, which had previously been registered in
the name of the transferors The lot it is claiming by prescription is Lot No. 5005, which it This possession, following the above quoted rulings, should be limited only to that of the
did not acquire from the owner of the other two lots, or from any previous private successor-in-interest; and in the case of the herein petitioner, it should begin from 1981
registered owner of the lot, as there was none. when it acquired the two adjacent lots and occupied as well the lot in question thinking it
to be part of the other two.
Neither of the owners of Lots Nos. 2381 or 2386-A, in their respective deeds,
transferred Lot No. 5005 to the petitioner; as already explained, Lot No. 5005 was not It follows that when the application for registration of the lot in the name of the petitioner
part of either of the two lots. The petitioner merely occupied the disputed strip of land was filed in 1983, the applicant had been in possession of the property for less than
believing it to be included in the two lots it had acquired from Koo Jun Eng and the three years. This was far too short of the prescriptive period required for acquisition of
Garcia spouses. However, even if it be conceded that the previous owners of the other immovable property, which is ten years if the possession is in good faith and thirty years
two lots possessed the disputed lot, their possession cannot be tacked to the if in bad faith, or if the land is public.
possession of the petitioner. The simple reason is that the possession of the said lot
was not and could not have been transferred to the petitioner when it acquired Lots The weakness of the petitioner's position prevents this Court from affirming the claim to
Nos. 2381 and 2386-A because these two lots did not include the third lot. Article 1138 the lot in question either as part of the two other lots or by virtue of acquisitive
of the Civil Code provides that — prescription. And having made this ruling, we find it unnecessary to determine whether
the land is patrimonial in nature or part of the public domain.
(1) The present possessor may complete the period necessary for prescription by
tacking his possession to that of his grantor or predecessor- in interest. The case of Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 12 on which the petitioner
relied so strongly (to the point of simply invoking it in a supplemental petition instead of
However, tacking of possession is allowed only when there is a privity of contract or filing its memorandum), is not applicable. That decision, which reversed the case of
relationship between the previous and present possessors. In the absence of such Manila Electric Co. v. Castro-Bartolome, 13 involved a situation where the public land
privity, the possession of the new occupant should be counted only from the time it automatically became private as a result of prescription clearly and indubitably
actually began and cannot be lengthened by connecting it with the possession of the established by the claimant. In the case at bar, the petitioner's claim is rejected not
former possessors. Thus it has been held: because it is a private corporation barred from acquiring public land but because it has
failed to establish its title to the disputed lot, whatever its nature.
A deed, in itself, creates no privity as to land outside its calls. Nor is privity created by
the bare taking of possession of land previously occupied by the grantor. It is therefore WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
the rule, although sharply limited, that a deed does not of itself create privity between
the grantor and the grantee as to land not described in the deed but occupied by the SO ORDERED.
grantor in connection therewith, although the grantee enters into possession of the land
not described and uses it in connection with that conveyed.  9 Narvasa (Chairman) and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Where a grantor conveys a specific piece of property, the grantee may not tack onto the Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.
period of his holding of an additional piece of property the period of his grantor's
occupancy thereof to make up the statutory period. His grantor has not conveyed such
property or his interest therein, and there is no privity. 10  LEONIDA CORONADO, FELIX BUENO, MELANIA RETIZOS,
BERNARDINO BUENASEDA and JOVITA MONTEFALCON, petitioners,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and JUANA BUENO ALBOVIAS,
It is said, in Hanlon v. Ten Hove supra, that this rule is not harsh, the court using the respondents.
following language: "If A purchases and by adverse possession obtains title to an Rogelio V. Fernandez for petitioners.
adjoining 40 acres, it would hardly be contended that a conveyance by him of the 40 Siruelo, Muyco & Associates for B. Buenaseda.
acquired by deed would carry with it title to the 40 acquired by adverse possession. So
Eduardo A. Cagandahan for private respondent. Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at the time said document
SYLLABUS was
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER COURT CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
OF executed by Melecio Artiaga in 1918. The said article read as follows: "Article 1056. If
APPEALS CASES; RULE. — Time and again, it has been ruled that the jurisdiction of the
the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act inter vivos, or by will, such
Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heir."
and (Mang-Oy v. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 33 [1986]). In this case, nowhere was it
revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. It is not the alleged
function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its nor shown that Leonida Coronado is entitled to legitime from Melecio Artiaga. The truth
jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed. of
Absent, therefore, a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of the matter is that the record is bereft of any showing that Leonida Coronado and the
support late
in the record, so that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of Melecio Artiaga were related to each other.
discretion, such findings must stand, for the Supreme Court is not expected or required 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT LOOK UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY; CASE AT BAR.
to —
examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties Normally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity. The authentication
(Andres of
v. Manufacturing Hanover & Trust Corporation, G.R. 82670, September 15, 1989). a will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator
There and
are no convincing reasons in the instant case to depart from this rule. the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the
2. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; POSSESSION; WHEN THE CONTINUED POSSESSION validity of the wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or
OF efficiency of the provisions of the will, thus may be impugned as being vicious or null,
THE PROPERTY SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING notwithstanding its authentication. The question relating to these points remain entirely
PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT. unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated (Maninang, et
— Even assuming arguendo that Monterola was indeed in continued possession of the al.
said property for over ten years since 1934, said possession is insufficient to constitute v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 473 [1982]). Consequently, JUANA is not estopped
the fundamental basis of the prescription. Possession, under the Civil Code, to from
constitute questioning the ownership of the property in question, notwithstanding her having
the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under claim of title (en objected to the probate of the will executed by Monterola under which Leonida
concepto de dueno), or to use the common law equivalent of the term, it must be Coronado
adverse. is claiming title to the said property.
Acts of possessory character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the 5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE LOWER COURT;
owner CONCLUSIVE UPON THE APPELLATE COURT. — The fact that JUANA failed to
are clearly not en concepto de dueno, and such possessory acts, no matter how long identify the
so property in question and to explain the discrepancy in the boundary of said property,
continued, do not start the running of the period of prescription (Manila Electric assuming they are true, is immaterial, in view of the findings of the lower court as to the
Company identity of the property in question. Moreover, the lower court found sufficient evidence
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. 71393, June 28, 1989). In this case, Monterola, to
as support the conclusion that the property in question is the same property adjudicated to
found by the respondent appellate court and the lower court, never categorically JUANA under the will of Melecio Artiaga, and that CORONADO has no right
claimed whatsoever to
ownership over the property in question, much less his possession thereof en concepto said property. Such findings are conclusive upon this Court (Reynolds Philippine
de Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 220 [1989]).
dueno. Accordingly, he could not have acquired said property by acquisitive DECISION
prescription. PARAS, J p:
3. ID.; SUCCESSION; PROBATE OF WILL; NECESSARY FOR THE TRANSFER OF This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the decision * of the
PROPERTY BY SUCCESSION; EXCEPTION IN CASE AT BAR. — While it is true that respondent appellate court dated March 3, 1987 CA-G.R. CV No. 06911 entitled "Juana
no will (Bueno) Albovias et al., v. Leonida Coronado, et al.," affirming the decision of the lower
shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court, the decretal portion of which reads: LLphil
court (Art. 838, Civil Code), the questioned will, however, may be sustained on the "WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
basis of 1. Declaring Leonida Coronado to have no title or interest over the property in
question, hence, has no authority to dispose of the same in favor of her codefendants;
2. Declaring the sales executed by Coronado and subsequent transactions land owned by Dalmacio Monterola, which were sold by Monterola's successor-in-
involving the same property null and void ab initio; interest
3. Declaring the plaintiff to be the true and legal owner of the subject parcel Leonida Coronado (now married to Felix Bueno) to Melania Retizos on April 18, 1970.
of land; Melania Retizos in turn sold the lots, including that one being claimed by JUANA, to the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com spouse Bernardino Buenaseda and Jovita Montefalcon, now the present possessors
4. Ordering the defendants to vacate the subject premises and to surrender thereof, sometime in 1974 (Ibid., pp. 16-17).
possession thereof unto the plaintiff; On the other hand, Leonida Coronado and her co-petitioners (CORONADO, for brevity)
5. Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay unto the plaintiff the CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and P10,000.00 as moral and exemplary claim that the property in question was bequeathed to Leonida Coronado under a Will
damages. executed by Dr. Dalmacio Monterola, who was allegedly in possession thereof even
Costs against the defendants." (Rollo, p. 17) before
As found by the respondent appellate court, the property subject of this case is a parcel the outbreak of World War II (Ibid., p. 107).
of Parenthetically, said will was probated under Sp. Proc. No. SC-283, entitled "Testate
land situated in Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing 277 square meters, more particularly Estate
described as follows: prcd of the Deceased Monterola Leonida F. Coronado, petitioner (Ibid., p. 105). JUANA,
"A parcel of land situated in the Poblacion, Municipality of Nagcarlan, province of together
Laguna. Bounded on the North, by property of Epifania Irlandez (formerly with her husband, opposed the said probate. Despite their opposition, however, the Will
Bonifacio Formentera); on the East, by that of Julio Lopez; on the South, by that was allowed by the then Court of First Instance of Laguna, Sta. Cruz Branch (Ibid., p.
of Dalmacio Monterola (formerly Domingo Bueno); and on the West, by C. Lirio 106).
Street. Containing an area of two hundred seventy seven (277) square meters, On appeal, said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 40353,
more or less. Assessed at P3,320.00 under tax declaration No. 241." (Ibid., p. 15) entitled "Leonida F. Coronado, petitioner-appellee v. Heirs of Dr. Dalmacio Monterola,
Said parcel of land is being contested by Juana Albovias, herein private respondent, on oppositors-appellants" (Ibid.). It is not apparent, however, from the record whether or
the not
one hand, and Leonida Coronado, Felix Bueno, Melania Retizos, Bernardino Buenseda said decision has already become final and executory.
and As a result of the conflicting claims over the property in question, JUANA filed an action
Jovita Montefalcon, herein petitioners, on the other hand. for
Juana Albovias (JUANA, for brevity) claims that the property in question is a portion of a quieting of title, declaratory relief and damages against CORONADO in the Regional
bigger lot referred to as Parcel G in the last will and testament executed in 1918 by Trial
Melecio Artiaga, grandfather of JUANA. This bigger lot was inherited under that will by Court of the Fourth Judicial Region, Branch XXVI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, docketed as Civil
JUANA, her brother Domingo Bueno, and two other grandchildren, namely Bonifacio Case
and No. 7345 (Ibid., p. 4).
Herminigildo, both surnamed Formentera. Parcel G is described as follows: As adverted to above (first par.), the lower court rendered judgment in favor of JUANA.
"Isang lagay na lupa na ang bahagi ay walang tanim na halaman at ang bahagi Not satisfied with the decision of the lower court, CORONADO elevated the case to the
naman ay may tanim na saguing, tumatayo sa gawin Canloran ng Calle Avenida Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision appealed from (Ibid., p. 20). Hence, this
Rizal nitong Nagcarlan, at humahangan sa Ibaba; sa ari cong Testador; sa petition. prLL
Silangan, sa cay Enrique Jovellano; sa Ilaya, sa namatay na Perfecto Nanagas, at CORONADO raised the following assigned errors:
sa Canloran, tubig na pinamamagatang San Cido." (Ibid., p. 16) I
JUANA further claims that sometime in 1925 or 1926, C. Lirio Street was created by the THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ARRIVING AT A
Municipality of Nagcarla traversing said Parcel G and thus dividing it into two portions, CONCLUSION WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF
one THE CASE AND IN NOT APPLYING THE APPLICABLE PROVISION OF LAW AND
on the west of C. Lirio St. and the other to the east of said street. Parcel G was divided JURISPRUDENCE LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT. (Ibid., p. 108)
by II
the heirs in the following manner; the land was divided into two portions, the northern THERE IS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO SHOW THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION
portion of which was adjudicated in favor of the Formenteras and the southern portion CLAIMED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS THE SAME PROPERTY ADJUDICATED
was given to JUANA and Doming Bueno. The southern portion in turn was partitioned TO JUANA BUENO UNDER THE WILL OF THE DECEASED MELECIO ARTIAGA;
between JUANA and Domingo Bueno, the former getting the northern part adjoining the NEITHER IS THERE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT SAID WILL HAD BEEN
lot PROBATED. (Ibid., p. 114)
of the Formenteras, and the latter the southern part which adjoins the lot of Perfecto III
Nanagas (not owned by Dalmacio Monterola). The part allocated to Domingo was later PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS IN ESTOPPEL FROM QUESTIONING THE OWNERSHIP
sold by him to Dalmacio Monterola, owner of the adjoining property (Ibid.). LLjur OF THE PETITIONER OVER THE LAND IN QUESTION HAVING FAILED TO RAISE
Moreover, JUANA claims that her property was included together with the two parcels THE SAME IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING IN THE TRIAL COURT AND EVEN ON
of APPEAL. (Ibid., p. 119)
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPRECIATED THE EVIDENCE continued, do not start the running of the period of prescription (Manila Electric
SUBMITTED AND FACTS ADMITTED ON RECORD. IT THEREFORE COMMITTED Company
GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR. (Ibid., p. 121) v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. 71393, June 28, 1989).
As required by this Court, CORONADO filed their memorandum on May 8, 1989 (Ibid., In this case, Monterola, as found by the respondent appellate court and the lower court,
p. never categorically claimed ownership over the property in question, much less his
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com possession thereof en concepto de dueno. Accordingly, he could not have acquired
105); while that of JUANA was filed on October 13, 1989 (Ibid., p. 139). LLpr said
The petition is devoid of merit. property by acquisitive prescription.
Under the first assigned error, CORONADO assails the respondent appellate court's Anent the contention of CORONADO that Leonida Coronado could tack her possession
finding to
that Dr. Dalmacio Monterola could not have acquired the subject land by acquisitive that of Monterola, so that claim of legal title or ownership over the subject property,
prescription. Citing Art. 1116 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 41 of the Code even
of against the petitioners, the Buenasesas, who are purchasers for value and in good
Civil Procedure, CORONADO claims that JUANA had already foreclosed whatever right faith, is
or a foregone or settled issue, the respondent appellate court aptly answered the same in
legal title she had over the property in question, the reason being that Monterola's CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
continued possession of the said property for over ten years since 1934 ripened into full this wise:
and absolute ownership (Ibid., p. 112). "It follows that Leonida Coronado could not have derived ownership of the land in
The argument has no factual basis. question from her predecessor-in-interest Dalmacio Monterola, whether by
Time and again, it has been ruled that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases prescription or by some other title. Neither can she claim acquisitive prescription
brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of in her own name. It was only in 1970 after the death of Dalmacio Monterola that
law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. It is not the function of the she asserted her claim of ownership adverse to that of plaintiff-appellee. Having
Supreme knowledge that she had no title over the land in question, she must be deemed to
Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to have claimed it in bad faith. Under Article 1137 of the Civil Code, ownership and
reviewing errors of law that might have been committed. Absent, therefore, a showing other real rights over immovables prescribe through uninterrupted adverse
that possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or good faith. And even
the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, so that they are so granting that she had no notice or defect in her title and was, therefore, in good
glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must faith, a period of ten years of possession is necessary for her to acquire the land
stand, by ordinary prescription. (Article 1134, Civil Code). But she can claim to have
for the Supreme Court is not expected or required to examine or contrast the oral and possessed the land only in 1968, the year the Monterola lots were donated to her.
documentary evidence submitted by the parties (Andres v. Manufacturers Hanover & The period, however, was interrupted in 1975, or 7 years after, when the complaint
Trust below was filed." (Rollo, pp. 18-19)
Corporation, G.R. 82670, September 15, 1989). There are no convincing reasons in the Under the second assigned error, CORONADO claims that the will under which JUANA
instant case to depart from this rule. inherited the property in question from her grandfather, Melecio Artiaga, was never
As found by the respondent appellate court, Monterola never claimed ownership over probated; hence, said transfer for ownership was ineffectual considering that under
the Rule
property in question. As a matter of fact, one of the deeds of donation executed by 75, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court (formerly Sec. 125 of Act No. 190), no will shall pass
Monterola in favor of Leonida Coronado acknowledged that the boundary owner on the either
property conveyed to her is JUANA. This is precisely the reason why during the lifetime real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court (Ibid., p.
of 115).
the late Dalmacio Monterola, JUANA had always been allowed to enter and reap the The contention is without merit. LibLex
benefits or produce of the said property. It was only after the death of said Monterola in While it is true that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved
1970 that Leonida Coronado prohibited JUANA from entering it (Ibid., p. 18). LexLib and
Even assuming arguendo that Monterola was indeed in continued possession of the allowed in the proper court (Art. 838, Civil Code), the questioned will, however, may be
said sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at
property for over ten years since 1934, said possession is insufficient to constitute the the
fundamental basis of the prescription. Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute time said document was executed by Melecio Artiaga in 1918. The said article read as
the follows:
foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under claim of title (en concepto "Article 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an
de act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not
dueno), or to use the common law equivalent of the term, it must be adverse. Acts of prejudice the legitime of the forced heir." (Mang-Oy v. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA
possessory character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are 33 [1986])
clearly not en concepto de dueno, and such possessory acts, no matter how long so In this case, nowhere was it alleged nor shown that Leonida Coronado is entitled to
legitime from Melecio Artiaga. The truth of the matter is that the record is bereft of any
showing that Leonida Coronado and the late Melecio Artiaga were related to each
other.
Under the third assigned error, CORONADO claims that JUANA is estopped from
questioning the ownership of Leonida Coronado over the land in question having failed
to
raise the same in the estate proceedings in the trial court and even on appeal (Rollo, p.
119).
The contention is likewise without merit.
Normally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity. The authentication
of
a will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator
and
the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the
validity of the wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or
efficiency of the provisions of the will, thus may be impugned as being vicious or null,
notwithstanding its authentication. The question relating to these points remain entirely
unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated (Maninang, et
al.,
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 473 [1982]). Consequently, JUANA is not estopped
from
questioning the ownership of the property in question, notwithstanding her having
objected to the probate of the will executed by Monterola under which Leonida
Coronado
is claiming title to the said property. Cdpr
Under the fourth assigned error, it is alleged by CORONADO that JUANA's petition is
weak
for want of factual and legal support; the weakness of JUANA's position lies in the fact
that she did not only fail to identify the subject land, but also failed to explain the
discrepancy in the boundary of the property she is claiming to be hers (Rollo, p. 125).
The contention is unavailing.
The fact that JUANA failed to identify the property in question and to explain the
discrepancy in the boundary of said property, assuming they are true, is immaterial, in
view
of the findings of the lower court as to the identity of the property in question. Moreover,
the lower court found sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the property in
question is the same property adjudicated to JUANA under the will of Melecio Artiaga,
and
that CORONADO has no right whatsoever to said property (Ibid., p. 20). Such findings
are
conclusive upon this Court (Reynolds Philippine Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 169
SCRA
220 [1989]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines (Exh. 4). In 1929, Corpuz, Sr. caused the said lot and other parcels of land, to be
SUPREME COURT surveyed for him (Exh. L). He cultivated the northern portion thereof prior to 1934 thru a
Manila tenant, father of Hilario Fulgar, and when said tenant was too weak to till the land,
Hilario Fulgar himself continued its cultivation for Corpuz, Sr. The southern portion of
EN BANC Lot 4 was cultivated by Pedro Domingo. On April 15, 1937, Pedro Domingo and
Corpuz, Sr. executed a deed of sale (Exh. 1), pertinent portions of which provide: —
G.R. Nos. L-18099 and L-18136             July 31, 1962
Na akong si Mariano Corpuz ay may isang lagay na lupa sa lugar ng Panaulo
Sagana Laur, na may titulo Torens No. 18139 (lote 2) na galing sa Registro de
MARIANO CORPUZ, petitioner, Titulos para sa Provincia ng Nueva Ecija;
vs.
BENJAMIN PADILLA, respondent.
Na sa nasabing lupa ay may nasakop ako na lupa na hinahabol ni Pedro
Domingo na mayroong dalawang hectares, mas o menos na nasakop ng
Salonga, Ordoñez & Associates for petitioner. nasabing titulo at Lote 4 sa plano na akin namang kinikilala na kanya;
Pedro D. Maldia for respondent.
Na alang alang sa halagang Isang Daang Piso (P100.00) Moneda Filipino, na
PAREDES, J.: aking tinanggap kay G. Mariano Corpuz, akong si Pedro Domingo, sa
pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay ipinagbibili at inililipat na sa nasabing
On December 7, 1956, Mariano Corpuz filed with the justice of the Peace Court of Laur, Mariano Corpuz ang aking pagmanayari at lahat ng aking karapatan sa
Nueva Ecija, a complaint for Forcible Entry against Benjamin Padilla, over a parcel of nasabing lupa na nasasakop ng kanyang titulo na nabangit sa itaas at kailan
land situated at Laur, Nueva Ecija, who in his Answer claimed that he is the owner of man ay wala na akong paghahabol sa nasabing lupa na sa ngayon ay
the land. After trial, the JP Court rendered judgment, . . . "in favor of the plaintiff and ipinagkakaloob ko sa kanya sa pamamagitan ng pagbibiling ito ng tuluyan, sa
against the defendant and hereby orders the latter to vacate the premises in kanya at sa kanyang mga herederos at tagapagmana.
controversy; to pay the plaintiff, Mariano Corpuz, in the amount of P250.00 as the
reasonable rental value of the land; and to pay the costs of this suit." Before this xxx     xxx     xxx
judgment could be executed, an appeal to the CFI was perfected, and the complaint
and Answer were reproduced.
(Sgd.) MARIANO CORPUZ (Sgd.) PEDRO DOMINGO.
Pending determination of the Forcible Entry case, Benjamin Padilla, on May 7, 1959,
presented an application for registration of the land, subject matter of the forcible entry The land remained uncultivated from 1946, because of dissident activities in the area.
case, under the Torrens System (Land Reg. Case No. 397). On October 17, 1957, In 1953, Fabian Corpuz, brother of the oppositor, administered the property, when
Mariano Corpuz presented his opposition thereto. It appearing that the ejectment case Jorge Padilla, father of applicant and then Mayor of Laur, borrowed the lands belonging
and the registration application involved the same parcel of land and the same parties, to oppositor, including Lot 4, having tilled the same until 1956. Thereafter, Mariano
the CFI ordered a consolidated bearing. At the hearing, applicant Padilla established Corpuz, Sr. caused the cultivation of lot 4 thru a tenant named Fruto Saad, from whom
the following facts: — Benjamin Padilla had wrested possession of the land (lot 4). Fabian Corpuz, who was
then administering the lands of Mariano, demanded an explanation from Padilla, who
told him that he owned the land by virtue of a deed of sale executed by Pedro Domingo
The land in question is a rice-land the particulars of which are delineated in plan PSU- in his favor in 1956.
155161 having an area of (54,554 square meters 5.4 hectares more or less), situated in
barrio Sagana Municipality of Laur, Nueva Ecija. It is also designated as Lot 4 of plan
PSU-71598 (Exh. 3, also Exh. F), and adjoins lot 2, titled under the name Mariano Upon the basis of the above facts, the CFI of Nueva Ecija, on June 26, 1959, rendered
Corpuz, Sr. TCT No. 18139). It formerly belonged to Sixto Domingo, who had been in judgment, tile pertinent portions of which are reproduced below: —
possession thereof for about four or five years prior to the Spanish revolution. When he
died in 1918, he was succeeded by his son, Pedro Domingo, who continued possessing It is admitted by the applicant and the oppositor that the original owner of this
and cultivating the same until the outbreak of the second world war. During the land was Sixto Domingo. The applicant claimed that the land passed to Pedro
Japanese occupation, until the year 1953, the land was abandoned. In 1953, one Domingo from whom the applicant bought the land in May, 1956. While
Rufino Tawagin borrowed the land from Pedro Domingo, and cultivated the same until it evidence was presented by the oppositor-plaintiff that the land belonged to
was sold to Benjamin Padilla on May 11, 1956 (Exh. H). After the purchase, the land Mariano Corpuz who had declared it for taxation as early as 1925, it is also
was declared for taxation purposes by Padilla (Exh. I). contended that this land was bought by Mariano Corpuz from Pedro Domingo
by virtue of the document Exhibit 1. In Exhibit 1, also marked Exhibit k, which
The evidence for oppositor Corpuz, disclosed that in 1925, the land in question (Lot 4) has been quoted verbatim, Mariano Corpuz stated that there was included in
had been declared for taxation purposes by his father, the late Mariano Corpuz, Sr. his title No. 18139 about two hectares of land which was being claimed by
 Pedro Domingo and he recognized lot 4 of his plan belongs to Pedro Domingo. 2. In holding that petitioner did not acquire title to lot 4 by virtue of the
And in the 4th paragraph, Pedro Domingo, in consideration of P100.00 and by execution of the deed of sale, Exhibit 1, and/or by acquisitive prescription.
virtue of the said document, sold and transferred to Mariano Corpuz all his
ownership and right in the property which was included in the title of Mariano The Court of Appeals in finding that Mariano Corpuz, Sr. acknowledged the title of
Corpuz. By virtue, therefore of Exhibit 1, Mariano Corpuz recognized that lot 4 Pedro Domingo in Lot 4, said:
of his plan belonged to Pedro Domingo. His heirs, therefore, cannot now claim
that lot 4 had belonged to his father Mariano Corpuz as early a 1925. It is
contended, however, by the oppositor and plaintiff that Mariano Corpuz had A careful consideration of the instrument in question reveals that the
also bought Lot No. 4 from Pedro Domingo by virtue of the document Exhibit interpretation given by the trial court thereto must be sustained. By paragraph
1. But in Exhibit 1, what was sold to Mariano Corpuz was only the land which 2 of the deed, it was conceded by the parties that at the time of the execution
was included in the title of Mariano Corpuz. That is expressly stated in of the instrument in 1937 Mariano Corpuz had title, No. 18139, over lot 2. In
paragraph 4 of the document, Exhibit 1. Since the oppositor and plaintiff now the second paragraph, the parties stated that Pedro Domingo was claiming
claims ownership of lot 4 by purchase from Pedro Domingo, it is incumbent two hectares of land, more or less, embraced within said lot, covered by the
upon him to show clearly that there had been transfer of ownership of lot 4 said title, and lot 4 in the plan which Mariano Corpuz recognized as belonging
from Pedro Domingo to Mariano Corpuz. This, he has not shown, as there was to Pedro Domingo. And in the penultimate paragraph, Pedro Domingo stated
no such transfer of lot 4 from Pedro Domingo to Mariano Corpuz in the that for and in consideration of P100.00, received by him from Mariano
document Exhibit 1. Corpuz, he was selling and transferring all, his rights and interests over the
said land that was included in his (Mariano Corpuz) title as above mentioned.
The land, object of the sale, is seemingly rendered doubtful by the clause "at
As regards the action of forcible entry, it is admitted by the plaintiff that from lote 4 isa plano na akin namang kinikilala na kanya" in paragraph 3 of the
1946 to 1953 he was not in possession as the land was abandoned because it deed. It is clarified by the penultimate paragraph, however, which states that
was infested by huks. It was only in April, 1956, according to the plaintiff, that Pedro Domingo sold and transferred to Mariano Corpuz the two-hectare
Fruto Saad became his tenant and was placed in possession. On the other portion covered by the latter's title. Said two-hectare portion must, perforce, be
hand the evidence for the applicant-defendant is that as early as 1953 Rufino within lot 2, for Mariano Corpuz did not have any title to lot 4. From all the
Tawagin was in possession of the land by permission from Pedro Domingo. foregoing considerations, appellant cannot claim that he acquired the two-
Rufino Tawagin possessed the land until 1956 as representative of Pedro hectare portion of lot 4 by purchase.
Domingo, and thereafter as tenant of Benjamin Padilla. When Fruto Saad
entered the land in 1956, the property was in the actual and physical
possession of Rufino Tawagin who had borrowed the land from Pedro Little need be added to the observations and conclusions made by the registration court
Domingo. Benjamin Padilla, as successor of Pedro Domingo, had a perfect and the Court of Appeals, regarding the meaning and import of the deed of sale (Exhibit
right to take possession of the land and to exclude Fruto Saad and the plaintiff- 1), executed between Mariano Corpuz, Sr. and Pedro Domingo. No other reasonable
oppositor. The exclusion of Fruto Saad and the plaintiff-oppositor cannot give interpretation could be given. It is clear that when the deed of sale was executed in
rise to an action of forcible entry on the part of the plaintiff for he did not have 1937, the portion of two hectares mentioned therein already formed part of the property
the prior possession. . . . . of Mariano Corpuz, Sr. and included in his title to lot No. 2, which portion Pedro
Domingo was claiming. By so providing in the deed of sale, that the land of two
hectares was the property of Pedro Domingo, Corpuz expressly admitted the title to lot
WHEREFORE, the title of the applicant to the parcel of land described in the 4 or whatever remained of it, of Pedro Domingo.
plan PSU-155161, Exhibit A, and more particularly described in the technical
descriptions Exhibit B, is hereby confirmed and it is hereby ordered to be
registered as the conjugal property of the spouses Benjamin Padilla and The pretension of oppositor-appellant that he has acquired the whole of lot 4 by
Gumerainda Alivia citizens of the Philippines and with residence at Sagana, prescription is contradicted by his own evidence. He claims that said lot 4 had been
Laur, Nueva Ecija, free from all liens and encumbrances. When this decision declared by his predecessor-in- interest for tax purposes since 1925. This could not be
becomes final let decree and title issue therefor. true, otherwise there would have been no reason or necessity at all for Corpuz, Sr. to
buy the two-hectare portion of lot 2 in 1937. Again, he contends that after the sale of the
two hectares, Pedro Domingo abandoned the same and his predecessor-in-interest
The above judgment was appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered an cultivated it, thru a tenant. This does not also reflect the truth, because the two hectares
affirmatory decision on January 25, 1961. The cases are now before Us on an appeal which he claims to have been abandoned, were already included in his property lot 2,
by Certiorari, appellant Mariano Corpuz assigning two errors allegedly committed by the for which he had a title. It could not have referred to another two hectares which formed
Court of Appeals, to wit — part of the remaining portion of lot 4. The oppositor's claim that the three-hectare
portion of Lot 4, was acquired by him, by prescription, thru continuous possession since
1. In holding that in the deed of sale, Exhibit 1, petitioner's predecessor-in- 1934, is negated by the very admission of Corpus, Sr., that Lot 4 belonged to Pedro
interest, Mariano Corpuz, Sr. acknowledged adverse title to lot 4 in Pedro Domingo. One cannot recognize the right of another and at the same time claim
Domingo, predecessor-in-interest of respondent Benjamin R. Padilla; adverse possession which can ripen to ownership, thru acquisitive prescription. For
prescription to set in, the possession must be adverse, continuous, public and to the
exclusion of all. These circumstances do not obtain in the case under consideration.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find that the errors assigned are not well taken
and the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed. Costs taxed against
the oppositor-appellant in both instances.
 Republic of the Philippines This finding of non-identity is conclusive, and, as a matter of fact, appellant does not
SUPREME COURT question it. His assignment of error center on the ruling of the appeals court disallowing
Manila his claim of title by adverse possession.

EN BANC Admittedly, there is nothing in the answer which alleges, directly or indirectly, that
petitioner acquired by prescription the land subject-matter of the complaint. On the
G.R. No. L-17738             April 22, 1963 contrary, petitioner expressly asserted that he bought it from the same vendor in a deed
of sale with right of repurchase (Exhibit 9). For this reason, the Court of Appeals
refused to consider the defense of adverse possession.
LUPO L. DIÑOSO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO P. FONTILLAS, respondents. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
Cesar B. Villanueva and Luperio F. Villanueva for petitioner. facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Nicolas C. Adolfo for respondents.
Petitioner Diñoso complains that the Court of Appeals erred in so holding, and invokes
REYES, J.B.L., J.: in his behalf Recolectos vs. Crisostomo, 32 Phil. 248, wherein it was held that adverse
possession can be set up by a defendant under a general denial.
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 23886-R, 30
June 1960) affirming a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Zambales. This argument does not take into account that general denials have been abolished by
As found by respondent court the facts are: the present Rules of Court, and a defendant is now required to allege all his defenses,
both negative and positive, by specific denials and pleas in avoidance (Rule 9, secs. 6,
On December 18, 1944 appellee (Antonio D. Fontillas) bought from Modesta 7, and 8), disclosing the true facts in order to prevent surprise and unfair advantage.
Feria four parcels of land, three of which were located in San Narciso, Explains Moran (Rules of Court, 1957, Vol. 1, p. 158):
Zambales, and the fourth — the lot in question — in sitio Cawatan Kiling,
Cabangan, Zambales (Exhibit A.) The vendor was given the right repurchase The purpose of requiring the defendant to make a specific denial is to make
the properties on or before December 1, 1945. As she failed to exercise her him disclose the matters alleged in the complaint which he sincerely intends to
right, the vendee consolidated his ownership and registered the deed of sale disprove at the trial, together with the matters which he relies upon to support
of option to repurchase in accordance with Act 3344 on January 10, 1946. the denial. Under the old procedure, the defendant was allowed to conceal,
However, he failed to take possession thereof when the present action was under a general denial, the true facts of his case, and at the same time compel
commenced on September 4, 1952. the proving of facts alleged in the complaint which he, at the trial, does not
even attempt to dispute. He was thus given the advantage, doubly unfair, of
It also appears that on April 6, 1940, Modesta Feria executed in favor of presenting his true facts only at the trial as a surprise to the plaintiff and of
appellant the pacto de retro sale Exhibit 1 which was registered only on May compelling the latter to incur unnecessary expenses for proving facts not really
25, 1948. After the sale appellant took possession of the land in question and disputed by him. The new system of specific denial removes this unfair
was still in possession thereof when the present action was commenced on advantage, unnecessary expenses and waste of time, by compelling both
September 4, 1952. parties to lay their cards on the table, thus reducing the controversy to its
terms ....
Notwithstanding the numerous questions raised by appellant in the eight
assignments of error submitted in his brief, we believe that only two questions In his answer filed in the court or origin, petitioner-appellant Diñoso specifically denied
are decisive of this case. The first is whether or not the land sold by Modesta respondent Fontillas' claim of ownership, and alleged that he was the true owner in fee
Feria to appellee is the same parcel of land sold to appellant; and the second simple of the land in question by virtue of the consolidation of the title conveyed to him
is whether, assuming that the properties sold by Modesta Feria to appellant under pacto de retro by Modesta Feria:
and appellee were different from each other, appellant acquired title by
prescription to the land conveyed to appellee.. 2. That he denies specifically paragraph 2 of the complaint, for the fact is: it is
the defendant who is the owner in fee simple, the ownership having been
A comparison between the boundaries of the parcel of land sold under pacto consolidated in said defendant by virtue of a Deed of Sale with right to
de retro by Modesta Feria to appellee, on one hand, and the boundaries of the repurchase executed by and between the defendant and the former owner
land which the same vendor has claimed to have sold to appellant on April 6, thereof, Modesta Feria, on April 6, 1940; which date is much earlier than the
1940, on the other, shows conclusively that they are different ...."(Emphasis supposed date of the instrument alleged by the plaintiff to have been
supplied) executed. The right to repurchase under the instrument executed by and
 between the defendant and Modesta Feria had not been exercised by the
Vendor a Retro within the time stipulated, thus making the defendant the
absolute owner of the propertyin question, rather than the plaintiff whose right,
if any is based on a later instrument the genuineness and due execution of
which is, by the way, not admitted by the supposed Vendor a Retro, Modesta
Feria;

Diñoso never pleaded that irrespective of that conveyance, and regardless of whether
his deed covered the disputed land or not, he had held it adverselyfor more than ten
years, as required by the applicable law (Act 190, sec. 41).

The express pleading of the sole defense of conveyance from the former owner would
make it unfair to admit the inconsistent claim of adverse possession that Diñoso had not
interposed below, as it would deprive respondent Fontillas of the opportunity to counter
said defense by proving that the petitioner's occupancy did not comply with all the
requirement of law, for example, that it lacked hostility, openness, or continuity. In other
words, the failure to plead adverse possession has misled the respondent (plaintiff
below) into assuming that petitioner relied exclusively on the sale to him by Modesta
Feria (which the Court of Appeals found to have referred to another piece of land,) and
appellant should be barred from asserting adverse possession, involving as it does a
complete change of theory from that upon which the case was tried.

We further agree with the appeals court that the possession of petitioner Diñoso under
the sale a Retro, Exhibit "1", did not actually become hostile or advance until the
expiration of the redemption period, since until then he recognized the superior right of
the vendor to oust him, and his claim of ownership was not absolute. Authorities are to
the effect that —

Where the sale is subject to the owner's right of redemption, the purchaser's
possession has been held in subordination to the title of the owner prior to the
expiration of the redemption period, although it may become hostile thereafter.
(2 C.J.S., p. 664, sec. 113; Morse vs. Seibold, 35 N.W. 471)

It was incumbent upon the petitioner to show when his vendor's right of redemption
expired, and that he had held adversely for ten years thereafter. In truth, his own deed
(Exhibit "1") recites that Feria's right of repurchase would expire only on 6 April 1950, so
that the present suit for recovery hasbegun, in 1952, well within the prescription period..

As to the amount of damages suffered, the same is a question of fact not reviewable by
this Court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs
against petitioner Lupo Diñoso.