125804-1996-Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals PDF
125804-1996-Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals PDF
Monsod Tamargo Valencia & Associates for private respondent Capitol City
Development Bank.
Siguion Reyna Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent Philippine Bank of
Communications.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
KAPUNAN , J : p
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the decision dated April 29, 1992 of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24776
and its resolution dated September 16, 1992, denying petitioner Philippine National Bank's
motion for reconsideration of said decision.
The facts of the cases are as follows:
A check with serial number 7-3666-223-3, dated August 7, 1981 in the amount of
P97,650.00 was issued by the Ministry of Education and Culture (now Department of
Education, Culture and Sports [DECS]) payable to F. Abante Marketing. This check was
drawn against Philippine National Bank (herein petitioner).
On August 11, 1981, F. Abante Marketing, a client of Capitol City Development Bank
(Capitol), deposited the questioned check in its savings account with said bank. In turn,
Capitol deposited the same in its account with the Philippine Bank of Communications
(PBCom) which, in turn, sent the check to petitioner for clearing.
Petitioner cleared the check as good and, thereafter, PBCom credited Capitol's
account for the amount stated in the check. However, on October 19, 1981, petitioner
returned the check to PBCom and debited PBCom's account for the amount covered by
the check, the reason being that there was a "material alteration" of the check number.
PBCom, as collecting agent of Capitol, then proceeded to debit the latter's account
for the same amount, and subsequently, sent the check back to petitioner. Petitioner,
however, returned the check to PBCom.
On the other hand, Capitol could not, in turn, debit F. Abante Marketing's account
since the latter had already withdrawn the amount of the check as of October 15, 1981.
Capitol sought clari cation from PBCom and demanded the re-crediting of the amount.
PBCom followed suit by requesting an explanation and re-crediting from petitioner.
Since the demands of Capitol were not heeded, it led a civil suit with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila against PBCom which, in turn, led a third-party complaint against
petitioner for reimbursement/indemnity with respect to the claims of Capitol. Petitioner,
on its part, filed a fourth-party complaint against F. Abante Marketing.
On October 3, 1989; the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
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1.) On plaintiff's complaint, defendant Philippine Bank of
Communications is ordered to re-credit or reimburse plaintiff Capitol City
Development Bank the amount of P97,650.00, plus interest of 12 percent thereto
from October 19, 1981 until the amount is fully paid;
2.) On Philippine Bank of Communications third-party complaint, third-
party defendant PNB is ordered to reimburse and indemnify Philippine Bank of
Communications for whatever amount PBCom pays to plaintiff;
3.) On Philippine National Bank's fourth-party complaint, F. Abante
Marketing is ordered to reimburse and indemnify PNB for whatever amount PNB
pays to PBCom;
4.) On attorney's fees, Philippine Bank of Communications is ordered
to pay Capitol City Development Bank attorney's fees in the amount of Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos; but PBCom is entitled to
reimbursement/indemnity from PNB; and Philippine National Bank to be, in turn,
reimbursed or indemnified by F. Abante Marketing for the same amount;
5.) The Counterclaims of PBCom and PNB are hereby dismissed;
6.) No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 1
An appeal was interposed before the respondent Court of Appeals which rendered
its decision on April 29, 1992, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modi ed by exempting
PBCom from liability to plaintiff-appellee for attorney's fees and ordering PNB to
honor the check for P97,650.00, with interest as declared by the trial court, and
pay plaintiff-appellee attorney's fees of P10,000.00. After the check shall have
been honored by PNB, PBCom shall re-credit plaintiff-appellee's account with it
with the amount. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 2
A motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the respondent Court in
its resolution dated September 16, 1992 for lack of merit. 3
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition which raises the following issues:
I
III
WHETHER OR NOT A DRAWEE BANK WHO FAILED TO RETURN A CHECK WITHIN
THE TWENTY FOUR (24) HOUR CLEARING PERIOD MAY RECOVER THE VALUE
OF THE CHECK FROM THE COLLECTING BANK.
IV
Petitioner alleges that there is no hard and fast rule in the interpretation of the
aforequoted provision of the Negotiable Instruments Law. It maintains that under Section
125(f), any change that alters the effect of the instrument is a material alteration. 6
We do not agree.
An alteration is said to be material if it alters the effect of the instrument. 7 It means
an unauthorized change in an instrument that purports to modify in any respect the
obligation of a party or an unauthorized addition of words or numbers or other changes to
an incomplete instrument relating to the obligation of a party. 8 In other words, a material
alteration is one which changes the items which are required to be stated under Section 1
of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
Section 1 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides:
In his book entitled "Pandect of Commercial Law and Jurisprudence," Justice Jose
C. Vitug opines that "an innocent alteration (generally, changes on items other than those
required to be stated under Sec. 1, N.I.L.) and spoliation (alterations done by a stranger)
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will not avoid the instrument, but the holder may enforce it only according to its original
tenor." 9
Reproduced hereunder are some examples of material and immaterial alterations:
A. Material Alterations:
(1) Substituting the words "or bearer" for "order."
B. Immaterial Alterations:
(1) Changing "I promise to pay" to "We promise to pay", where there are
two makers.
(2) Adding the word "annual" after the interest clause.
(3) Adding the date of maturity as a marginal notation.
(4) Filling in the date of the actual delivery where the makers of a note
gave it with the date in blank, "July . . ."
(5) An alteration of the marginal gures of a note where the sum
stated in words in the body remained unchanged.
(6) The insertion of the legal rate of interest where the note had a
provision for "interest at . . . per cent."
(7) A printed form of promissory note had on the margin the printed
words, "Extended to . . ." The holder on or after maturity wrote in the blank space
the words "May 1, 1913," as a reference memorandum of a promise made by him
to the principal maker at the time the words were written to extend the time of
payment.
(8) Where there was a blank for the place of payment, lling in the
blank with the place desired.
The case at the bench is unique in the sense that what was altered is the serial
number of the check in question, an item which, it can readily be observed, is not an
essential requisite for negotiability under Section 1 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
The aforementioned alteration did not change the relations between the parties. The name
of the drawer and the drawee were not altered. The intended payee was the same. The
sum of money due to the payee remained the same. Despite these ndings, however,
petitioner insists, that:
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner's arguments fail to convince. The check's serial number is not the sole
indication of its origin. As succinctly found by the Court of Appeals, the name of the
government agency which issued the subject check was prominently printed therein. The
check's issuer was therefore insu ciently identi ed, rendering the referral to the serial
number redundant and inconsequential. Thus, we quote with favor the ndings of the
respondent court:
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner, thus cannot refuse to accept the check in question on the ground that the
serial number was altered, the same being an immaterial or innocent one.
We now go to the second issue. It is petitioner's submission that the certi cation
issued by Minrado C. Batonghinog, Cashier III of the MEC clearly shows that the check was
altered. Said certification reads:
July 22, 1985
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that according to the records of this O ce, TCAA PNB
Check No. SN7-3666223-3 dated August 7, 1981 drawn in favor of F. Abante
Marketing in the amount of NINETY (S)EVEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY
PESOS ONLY (P97,650.00) was not issued by this O ce nor released to the
payee concerned. The series number of said check was not included among those
requisition by this Office from the Bureau of Treasury.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MINRADO C. BATONGHINOG
Cashier III. 1 4
Petitioner claims that even if the author of the certi cation issued by the Ministry of
Education and Culture (MEC) was not presented, still the best evidence of the material
alteration would be the disputed check itself and the serial number thereon. Petitioner thus
assails the refusal of respondent court to give weight to the certi cation because the
author thereof was not presented to identify it and to be cross-examined thereon. 1 5
We agree with the respondent court.
The one who signed the certi cation was not presented before the trial court to
prove that the said document was really the document he prepared and that the signature
below the said document is his own signature. Neither did petitioner present an
eyewitness to the execution of the questioned document who could possibly identify it. 1 6
Absent this proof, we cannot rule on the authenticity of the contents of the certi cation.
Moreover, as we previously emphasized, there was no material alteration on the check, the
change of its serial number not being substantial to its negotiability.
Anent the third issue — whether or not the drawee bank may still recover the value of
the check from the collecting bank even if it failed to return the check within the twenty-
four (24) hour clearing period because the check was tampered — su ce it to state that
since there is no material alteration in the check, petitioner has no right to dishonor it and
return it to PBCom, the same being in all respects negotiable.
However, the amount of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees is hereby deleted. In their
respective decisions, the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to explicitly state the
rationale for the said award. The trial court merely ruled as follows:
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With respect to Capitol's claim for damages consisting of alleged loss of
opportunity, this Court nds that Capitol failed to adequately substantiate its
claim. What Capitol had presented was a self-serving, unsubstantiated and
speculative computation of what it allegedly could have earned or realized were it
not for the debit made by PBCom which was triggered by the return and debit
made by PNB. However, this Court nds that it would be fair and reasonable to
impose interest at 12% per annum on the principal amount of the check
computed from October 19, 1981 (the date PBCom debited Capitol's account)
until the amount is fully paid and reasonable attorney's fees. 1 7 (Emphasis ours.)
Footnotes
1.CA Rollo, p. 28.
2.Rollo, pp. 21-28.
3.Id., at 30-31.
4.Id., at 10-11.
5.The Negotiable Instruments Law of the Philippines was patterned after the draft approved by
the Commissioner on Uniform State Laws in the United States. (Agbayani Commentaries
and Jurisprudence on the COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES , Vol. 1, p. 99-100).
6.Rollo, p. 11.
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7.Agbayani, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE
PHILIPPINES , Vol. 1, 1992 ed., p. 403.
8.Nickles, Negotiable Instruments and other related Commercial Paper, 1993 2nd ed., p. 168.
9.Vitug, Pandect of Commercial Law and Jurisprudence, 1990 ed., p. 55.
10.Agbayani, Commentaries & Jurisprudence on the COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE
PHILIPPINES , Vol. 1, 1992 ed., pp. 403-404.
11.Id., at 404-405.
12.Rollo, p. 78.
The due execution of a document could be proved through the testimony of (1) the person who
executed it; (2) the person before whom its execution was acknowledged; or (3) any
person who was present and saw it executed and delivered, or who, after its execution
and delivery, saw it and recognized the signatures, or by a person to whom the parties to
the instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof . . .