Sabatair: Task4: Lithium Ion Cell Exposure To An On-Board External Fire: Test Program
Sabatair: Task4: Lithium Ion Cell Exposure To An On-Board External Fire: Test Program
SABATAIR
Task4:
Lithium ion cell exposure to an on-board external fire:
Test Program
Characterisation of on-board fire-protection facilities; assessment of
Task 4 their contribution to the effectiveness of the proposed packaging
solutions
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D4a: Lithium ion cell exposure to an on-board external fire: Test results V0.2
Table of Contents
List of Figures 3
Summary 4
I. Introduction 5
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List of Figures
Figure 1: On the left a sketch of the fire test chamber and on the right a photograph of the fire
test chamber ....................................................................................................................................6
Figure 2. In-flight Leakage Simulation ..............................................................................................6
Figure 3. Thermocouple Position ......................................................................................................7
Figure 4. Position of Pressure Sensor and Gas Sample Points .........................................................8
Figure 5: Halon Sensor location .......................................................................................................9
Figure 6: Schematic of the Halon Discharge system of the test chamber .......................................9
Figure 7: Position of Discharge Nozzles, Leakage Port, and Pressure Equalization Valve ............ 10
Figure 8: Video Camera instrumentation including field of view ................................................. 10
Figure 9: Cardboard Box filled with shredded paper .................................................................... 11
Figure 10: Ignition Box .................................................................................................................. 11
Figure 11: Arrangement of Cardboard Boxes as fire load for the Bulk load fire test of the
Minimum Performance Standard for Aircraft Cargo Compartment Halon Replacement Fire
Suppression Systems [2] ............................................................................................................... 12
Figure 12: Manufacturer 1 cells packaging (the missing cells were taken to do some voltage
checks) ........................................................................................................................................... 13
Figure 13: Manufacturer 2 cells packaging. .................................................................................. 14
Figure 14: FCC mounted on PMC pallet ........................................................................................ 14
Figure 15: Test sequence for the Full scale test campaign. .......................................................... 15
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Summary
This document describes the test program for the full-scale Lithium battery external fire tests
which took place in the context of Task 4 of the Sabatair research project, which is funded by the
European Commission DG MOVE.
Two main conclusions are derived from the test results:
The Aircraft built-in fire suppression system inhibits propagation of thermal runaways for
the tested cell configuration and SoC conditions
For the tested scenario, a Fire Containment Cover provides appreciable protection
against the threats of an external fire event.
One of the objectives of the Sabatair project is to identify mitigating measures that could be put
in place to ensure that the severity of lithium battery fire could be reduced to a level that could
be within the capability of the aircraft’s onboard fire suppression system. This involves the
evaluation of the following battery fire scenarios:
a thermal runaway initiated from inside this package (internal fire)
a lithium battery fire which does not originate but eventually involves transported
cells/batteries (external fire)
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I. Introduction
One of the objectives of the Sabatair project is to identify mitigating measures that could be put
in place to ensure that the severity of lithium battery fire could be reduced to a level that could
be within the capability of the aircraft’s onboard fire suppression system. This involves the
evaluation of the following battery fire scenarios:
a thermal runaway initiated from inside this package (internal fire)
a lithium battery fire which does not originate but eventually involves transported
cells/batteries (external fire)
The objective of Task 4 of the Sabatair project is to study the external fire threat considering
different level of protection for the packaging of lithium batteries at different state of change,
taking also into account the expected typical performance of cargo compartment fire protection
systems installed on large aeroplanes.
The detailed description of the test plan is included in deliverable D4a.
The tests were performed in an 1:1 aircraft cargo compartment mock-up made of steel with an
operable aircraft fire suppression system. In a 3-step approach, the external fire scenario was
assessed:
Without the aircraft fire protection system operating
With the aircraft fire protection system operating
With the aircraft fire protection system operating and a fire containment cover (FCC)
for additional fire protection
I.1. Aircraft Fire Protection: Detection and Suppression
Fire detection systems are designed to alert flight crew on the cockpit within 1 minute of a fire
starting. Based on the information provided by the detection warnings, flight crew initiate the
suppression of any fire by discharge of Halon gas into the affected cargo compartments.
Halon is a very effective suppression agent which operates by chemically reacting with the radicals
generated by a fire, to inhibit the reaction. To achieve the extinguishing effect, sufficient Halon
needs to be released to achieve a volumetric concentration of 5% of the compartment air as a
first shot, for a fire knock-down effect. Following this, a concentration of 3% must be continuously
maintained for the rest of flight.
With this approach, lower deck cargo compartment fires can be suppressed for up to 360 minutes
on wide-body aircraft. Nevertheless, maintaining the concentration of Halon is crucial to the
effectiveness of the system, and therefore it is essential that the cargo compartment remains air-
tight
The phenomenon of thermal runaway of lithium batteries in an aircraft environment can be
catastrophic [1]. At the least it can range from limited degradation of personal equipment, or
minor damage to the overhead storage compartment. In the case worst situation, thermal
runaway in high density package of Lithium batteries can result - and has been implicated - in hull
losses.
FAA tests show that even a small number of overheating batteries emit gases that can cause
explosions and fires that cannot be prevented by traditional fire suppression systems. In view of
the possible consequences, Lithium batteries are classified as hazardous materials, therefore
particular care and consideration must be taken to ensure safe operations in relation to use and
transport of Lithium batteries (or devices containing Lithium batteries) when in an aircraft
environment.
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Figure 1: On the left a sketch of the fire test chamber and on the right a photograph of the fire test
chamber
The inner structure (compartment walls and floor) were made from mild steel sheeting in order
to preserve the article for multiple testing.
The compartment was equipped with multiple sensors to record temperature, oxygen
concentrations, and pressure.
The compartment was configured to have a leakage rate representative for an in-flight leakage
rate of an average Airbus aircraft.
The leakage from the compartment was configured to simulate the U-shape of the cargo door
seals that are on a real aircraft. Perforated ducts were installed inside the compartment in the
shape of the perimeter of a cargo door. The ducts were vented to the outside of the test article
using a single connection to the constant speed pump (see Figure 2).
A constant speed pump was installed in the exit of the duct for drawing air out of the
compartment to simulate an in-flight leakage rate.
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The test article was outfitted with a pressure equalization valve that is used onboard Airbus
aircraft to compensate pressure differentials between the cargo hold and adjacent areas. The
valve was installed in the end wall of the test compartment. This installation position is
representative to the installation position of the valve onboard Airbus aircraft.
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protrude into the test compartment. The discharge nozzles were not evenly distributed in the
compartment ceiling as the construction of the test article did not allow an even spacing of the
nozzles.
Figure 7 also shows the location of the pressure equalization valve and the location of the vent
port for the in-flight leakage simulation.
Figure 7: Position of Discharge Nozzles, Leakage Port, and Pressure Equalization Valve
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center of a box on the bottom outside row of the stacked boxes. Several ventilation holes are
placed in the side of the box to ensure that the fire does not self-extinguish.
The configuration of the cardboard boxes and the position of the ignition box shall be adopted to
the needs of this test.
III.3. Cardboard Box arrangement
The boxes are stacked in two layers in the cargo compartment in a quantity representing 30% of
the cargo compartment empty volume. For a 56.6m3 compartment, this requires 178 boxes (see
Figure 11). The boxes touch each other to prevent any significant air gaps between them.
Figure 11: Arrangement of Cardboard Boxes as fire load for the Bulk load fire test of the Minimum
Performance Standard for Aircraft Cargo Compartment Halon Replacement Fire Suppression Systems [2]
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Figure 12: Manufacturer 1 cells packaging (the missing cells were taken to do some voltage checks)
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Figure 15: Test sequence for the Full scale test campaign.
Before starting the actual full scale test campaign, 2 pre-tests were performed. A cold test
(without initiating fire) was performed to verify that the Halon concentration at every discharge
point was higher than 3% which is the required concentration for Halon effectiveness in the
aircraft.
The objective of the commissioning test which followed the cold test is to determine the
minimum duration of the flame exposure to initiate some heat generation inside the box filled
with cells. The commissioning test was performed with a reduced number of cardboard boxes
and cells to identify the optimum test setup.
The objective of the baseline test is to assess the effectiveness of the Halon suppression system
to suppress a battery cell fire initiated with an external flame. A further objective is to investigate
the thermal behaviour of the cells after the fire suppression.
The objective of the final full scale test is to assess the effectiveness of both the Halon suppression
system and the Fire Containment Cover. A further objective is to investigate the thermal
behaviour of the cells inside the boxes.
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