G.R. No.

168081              October 17, 2008 After meeting the required weight, petitioner was allowed to return to work. But
petitioner’s weight problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from
ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners, October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents. On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds over his ideal weight.
In line with company policy, he was removed from flight duty effective May 6, 1989
DECISION to July 3, 1989. He was formally requested to trim down to his ideal weight and
report for weight checks on several dates. He was also told that he may avail of the
REYES, R.T., J.: services of the company physician should he wish to do so. He was advised that his
case will be evaluated on July 3, 1989.2
THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was
dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline On February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight check. It was discovered that he
company. gained, instead of losing, weight. He was overweight at 215 pounds, which is 49
pounds beyond the limit. Consequently, his off-duty status was retained.
He is now before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari claiming that he
was illegally dismissed. To buttress his stance, he argues that (1) his dismissal does On October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator Gloria Dizon personally visited
not fall under 282(e) of the Labor Code; (2) continuing adherence to the weight petitioner at his residence to check on the progress of his effort to lose weight.
standards of the company is not a bona fide occupational qualification; and (3) he Petitioner weighed 217 pounds, gaining 2 pounds from his previous weight. After the
was discriminated against because other overweight employees were promoted visit, petitioner made a commitment3 to reduce weight in a letter addressed to Cabin
instead of being disciplined. Crew Group Manager Augusto Barrios. The letter, in full, reads:

After a meticulous consideration of all arguments pro and con, We uphold the Dear Sir:
legality of dismissal. Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the
employee as an act of social justice or based on equity. This is so because his I would like to guaranty my commitment towards a weight loss from 217 pounds to
dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character. 200 pounds from today until 31 Dec. 1989.

The Facts From thereon, I promise to continue reducing at a reasonable percentage until such
time that my ideal weight is achieved.
Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of
Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL). He stands five feet and eight inches (5’8") with a Likewise, I promise to personally report to your office at the designated time
large body frame. The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is schedule you will set for my weight check.
from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the
Cabin and Crew Administration Manual1 of PAL. Respectfully Yours,

The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised him to F/S Armando Yrasuegui4
go on an extended vacation leave from December 29, 1984 to March 4, 1985 to
address his weight concerns. Apparently, petitioner failed to meet the company’s Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight,
weight standards, prompting another leave without pay from March 5, 1985 to petitioner remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL
November 1985. decision for him to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies
with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for
weight checks.

1
Petitioner failed to report for weight checks. Despite that, he was given one more His motion for reconsideration having been denied,12 petitioner filed a complaint for
month to comply with the weight requirement. As usual, he was asked to report for illegal dismissal against PAL.
weight check on different dates. He was reminded that his grounding would continue
pending satisfactory compliance with the weight standards.5 Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA Dispositions

Again, petitioner failed to report for weight checks, although he was seen submitting On November 18, 1998, Labor Arbiter Valentin C. Reyes ruled 13 that petitioner was
his passport for processing at the PAL Staff Service Division. illegally dismissed. The dispositive part of the Arbiter ruling runs as follows:

On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the
for weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of complainant’s dismissal illegal, and ordering the respondent to reinstate him to his
weight check dates.6 Again, petitioner ignored the directive and did not report for former position or substantially equivalent one, and to pay him:
weight checks. On June 26, 1990, petitioner was required to explain his refusal to
undergo weight checks.7 a. Backwages of Php10,500.00 per month from his dismissal on June 15, 1993 until
reinstated, which for purposes of appeal is hereby set from June 15, 1993 up to
When petitioner tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he weighed at 212 pounds. August 15, 1998 at ₱651,000.00;
Clearly, he was still way over his ideal weight of 166 pounds.
b. Attorney’s fees of five percent (5%) of the total award.
From then on, nothing was heard from petitioner until he followed up his case
requesting for leniency on the latter part of 1992. He weighed at 219 pounds on SO ORDERED.14
August 20, 1992 and 205 pounds on November 5, 1992.
The Labor Arbiter held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative the nature of the job of petitioner. 15 However, the weight standards need not be
Charge for violation of company standards on weight requirements. He was given complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not hamper the
ten (10) days from receipt of the charge within which to file his answer and submit performance of his duties.16 Assuming that it did, petitioner could be transferred to
controverting evidence.8 other positions where his weight would not be a negative factor. 17 Notably, other
overweight employees, i.e., Mr. Palacios, Mr. Cui, and Mr. Barrios, were promoted
On December 7, 1992, petitioner submitted his Answer. 9 Notably, he did not deny instead of being disciplined.18
being overweight. What he claimed, instead, is that his violation, if any, had already
been condoned by PAL since "no action has been taken by the company" regarding Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).19
his case "since 1988." He also claimed that PAL discriminated against him because
"the company has not been fair in treating the cabin crew members who are similarly
situated." On October 8, 1999, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution directing the
reinstatement of petitioner without loss of seniority rights and other benefits. 20
On December 8, 1992, a clarificatory hearing was held where petitioner manifested
that he was undergoing a weight reduction program to lose at least two (2) pounds On February 1, 2000, the Labor Arbiter denied 21 the Motion to Quash Writ of
per week so as to attain his ideal weight.10 Execution22 of PAL.

On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability On March 6, 2000, PAL appealed the denial of its motion to quash to the NLRC.23
to attain his ideal weight, "and considering the utmost leniency" extended to him
"which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years," his services were On June 23, 2000, the NLRC rendered judgment24 in the following tenor:
considered terminated "effective immediately."11

2
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the Decision of the Arbiter dated 18 employee under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code in relation to Article 282(a). It is
November 1998 as modified by our findings herein, is hereby AFFIRMED and that not willful disobedience as the NLRC seemed to suggest. 35 Said the CA, "the element
part of the dispositive portion of said decision concerning complainant’s entitlement of willfulness that the NLRC decision cites is an irrelevant consideration in arriving
to backwages shall be deemed to refer to complainant’s entitlement to his full at a conclusion on whether the dismissal is legally proper." 36 In other words, "the
backwages, inclusive of allowances and to his other benefits or their monetary relevant question to ask is not one of willfulness but one of reasonableness of the
equivalent instead of simply backwages, from date of dismissal until his actual standard and whether or not the employee qualifies or continues to qualify under this
reinstatement or finality hereof. Respondent is enjoined to manifests (sic) its choice standard."37
of the form of the reinstatement of complainant, whether physical or through payroll
within ten (10) days from notice failing which, the same shall be deemed as Just like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA held that the weight standards of
complainant’s reinstatement through payroll and execution in case of non-payment PAL are reasonable.38 Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed because he repeatedly
shall accordingly be issued by the Arbiter. Both appeals of respondent thus, are failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. 39 It is obvious that the issue of
DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.25 discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of
his dismissal for being overweight.40
According to the NLRC, "obesity, or the tendency to gain weight uncontrollably
regardless of the amount of food intake, is a disease in itself." 26 As a consequence, On May 10, 2005, the CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. 41
there can be no intentional defiance or serious misconduct by petitioner to the lawful Elaborating on its earlier ruling, the CA held that the weight standards of PAL are a
order of PAL for him to lose weight.27 bona fide occupational qualification which, in case of violation, "justifies an
employee’s separation from the service."42
Like the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC found the weight standards of PAL to be
reasonable. However, it found as unnecessary the Labor Arbiter holding that
petitioner was not remiss in the performance of his duties as flight steward despite
being overweight. According to the NLRC, the Labor Arbiter should have limited Issues
himself to the issue of whether the failure of petitioner to attain his ideal weight
constituted willful defiance of the weight standards of PAL.28
In this Rule 45 petition for review, the following issues are posed for resolution:
PAL moved for reconsideration to no avail.29 Thus, PAL elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules I.
of Civil Procedure.30
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
31
By Decision dated August 31, 2004, the CA reversed the NLRC: HOLDING THAT PETITIONER’S OBESITY CAN BE A GROUND FOR
DISMISSAL UNDER PARAGRAPH (e) OF ARTICLE 282 OF THE LABOR
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES;
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition. The assailed
NLRC decision is declared NULL and VOID and is hereby SET ASIDE. The private
respondent’s complaint is hereby DISMISSED. No costs. II.

SO ORDERED.32 WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

HOLDING THAT PETITIONER’S DISMISSAL FOR OBESITY CAN BE
PREDICATED ON THE "BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION
The CA opined that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC (BFOQ) DEFENSE";
because it "looked at wrong and irrelevant considerations"33 in evaluating the
evidence of the parties. Contrary to the NLRC ruling, the weight standards of PAL
are meant to be a continuing qualification for an employee’s position.34 The failure to III.
adhere to the weight standards is an analogous cause for the dismissal of an

3
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN employee can be dismissed simply because he no longer "qualifies" for his job
HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT UNDULY DISCRIMINATED irrespective of whether or not the failure to qualify was willful or intentional. x x x45
AGAINST WHEN HE WAS DISMISSED WHILE OTHER OVERWEIGHT
CABIN ATTENDANTS WERE EITHER GIVEN FLYING DUTIES OR Petitioner, though, advances a very interesting argument. He claims that obesity is a
PROMOTED; "physical abnormality and/or illness."46 Relying on Nadura v. Benguet Consolidated,
Inc.,47 he says his dismissal is illegal:
IV.
Conscious of the fact that Nadura’s case cannot be made to fall squarely within the
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT specific causes enumerated in subparagraphs 1(a) to (e), Benguet invokes the
BRUSHED ASIDE PETITIONER’S CLAIMS FOR REINSTATEMENT [AND] provisions of subparagraph 1(f) and says that Nadura’s illness – occasional attacks of
WAGES ALLEGEDLY FOR BEING MOOT AND ACADEMIC.43 (Underscoring asthma – is a cause analogous to them.
supplied)
Even a cursory reading of the legal provision under consideration is sufficient to
Our Ruling convince anyone that, as the trial court said, "illness cannot be included as an
analogous cause by any stretch of imagination."
44
I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e) of
the Labor Code. It is clear that, except the just cause mentioned in sub-paragraph 1(a), all the others
expressly enumerated in the law are due to the voluntary and/or willful act of the
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than employee. How Nadura’s illness could be considered as "analogous" to any of them
that they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the is beyond our understanding, there being no claim or pretense that the same was
job. Tersely put, an employee may be dismissed the moment he is unable to comply contracted through his own voluntary act.48
with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards. The dismissal of the
employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. As explained by The reliance on Nadura is off-tangent. The factual milieu in Nadura is substantially
the CA: different from the case at bar. First, Nadura was not decided under the Labor Code.
The law applied in that case was Republic Act (RA) No. 1787. Second, the issue of
x x x [T]he standards violated in this case were not mere "orders" of the employer; flight safety is absent in Nadura, thus, the rationale there cannot apply here. Third, in
they were the "prescribed weights" that a cabin crew must maintain in order to Nadura, the employee who was a miner, was laid off from work because of illness,
qualify for and keep his or her position in the company. In other words, they were i.e., asthma. Here, petitioner was dismissed for his failure to meet the weight
standards that establish continuing qualifications for an employee’s position. In this standards of PAL. He was not dismissed due to illness. Fourth, the issue in Nadura is
sense, the failure to maintain these standards does not fall under Article 282(a) whether or not the dismissed employee is entitled to separation pay and damages.
whose express terms require the element of willfulness in order to be a ground for Here, the issue centers on the propriety of the dismissal of petitioner for his failure to
dismissal. The failure to meet the employer’s qualifying standards is in fact a meet the weight standards of PAL. Fifth, in Nadura, the employee was not accorded
ground that does not squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and is therefore one that due process. Here, petitioner was accorded utmost leniency. He was given more than
falls under Article 282(e) – the "other causes analogous to the foregoing." four (4) years to comply with the weight standards of PAL.

By its nature, these "qualifying standards" are norms that apply prior to and after an In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner’s claims that
employee is hired. They apply prior to employment because these are the standards a obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly
job applicant must initially meet in order to be hired. They apply after hiring shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude,
because an employee must continue to meet these standards while on the job in order determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on
to keep his job. Under this perspective, a violation is not one of the faults for which December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that "[t]he issue is could I bring my
an employee can be dismissed pursuant to pars. (a) to (d) of Article 282; the weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now."49

4
True, petitioner claims that reducing weight is costing him "a lot of expenses." 50 In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work
However, petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor
assistance of the company physician, per the advice of PAL. 51 He chose to ignore the Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended,
suggestion. In fact, he repeatedly failed to report when required to undergo weight but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, "[v]oluntariness basically
checks, without offering a valid explanation. Thus, his fluctuating weight indicates means that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external
absence of willpower rather than an illness. force influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes
under Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission.
Petitioner cites Bonnie Cook v. State of Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although
Retardation and Hospitals,52 decided by the United States Court of Appeals (First it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d)."54
Circuit). In that case, Cook worked from 1978 to 1980 and from 1981 to 1986 as an
institutional attendant for the mentally retarded at the Ladd Center that was being II. The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational
operated by respondent. She twice resigned voluntarily with an unblemished record. qualification defense.
Even respondent admitted that her performance met the Center’s legitimate
expectations. In 1988, Cook re-applied for a similar position. At that time, "she stood Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex,
5’2" tall and weighed over 320 pounds." Respondent claimed that the morbid obesity religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or
of plaintiff compromised her ability to evacuate patients in case of emergency and it national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The qualification is
also put her at greater risk of serious diseases. called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). 55 In the United States, there
are a few federal and many state job discrimination laws that contain an exception
Cook contended that the action of respondent amounted to discrimination on the allowing an employer to engage in an otherwise unlawful form of prohibited
basis of a handicap. This was in direct violation of Section 504(a) of the discrimination when the action is based on a BFOQ necessary to the normal
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,53 which incorporates the remedies contained in Title VI operation of a business or enterprise.56
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Respondent claimed, however, that morbid obesity
could never constitute a handicap within the purview of the Rehabilitation Act. Petitioner contends that BFOQ is a statutory defense. It does not exist if there is no
Among others, obesity is a mutable condition, thus plaintiff could simply lose weight statute providing for it.57 Further, there is no existing BFOQ statute that could justify
and rid herself of concomitant disability. his dismissal.58

The appellate Court disagreed and held that morbid obesity is a disability under the Both arguments must fail.
Rehabilitation Act and that respondent discriminated against Cook based on
"perceived" disability. The evidence included expert testimony that morbid obesity is First, the Constitution,59 the Labor Code,60 and RA No. 727761 or the Magna Carta for
a physiological disorder. It involves a dysfunction of both the metabolic system and Disabled Persons62 contain provisions similar to BFOQ.
the neurological appetite – suppressing signal system, which is capable of causing
adverse effects within the musculoskeletal, respiratory, and cardiovascular systems.
Notably, the Court stated that "mutability is relevant only in determining the Second, in British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission (BSPSERC) v.
substantiality of the limitation flowing from a given impairment," thus "mutability The British Columbia Government and Service Employee’s Union (BCGSEU), 63 the
only precludes those conditions that an individual can easily and quickly reverse by Supreme Court of Canada adopted the so-called "Meiorin Test" in determining
behavioral alteration." whether an employment policy is justified. Under this test, (1) the employer must
show that it adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the
performance of the job;64 (2) the employer must establish that the standard is
Unlike Cook, however, petitioner is not morbidly obese. In the words of the District reasonably necessary65 to the accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and (3)
Court for the District of Rhode Island, Cook was sometime before 1978 "at least one the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary in order to
hundred pounds more than what is considered appropriate of her height." According accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose. Similarly, in Star Paper
to the Circuit Judge, Cook weighed "over 320 pounds" in 1988. Clearly, that is not Corporation v. Simbol,66 this Court held that in order to justify a BFOQ, the
the case here. At his heaviest, petitioner was only less than 50 pounds over his ideal employer must prove that (1) the employment qualification is reasonably related to
weight. the essential operation of the job involved; and (2) that there is factual basis for
5
believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be The task of a cabin crew or flight attendant is not limited to serving meals or
unable to properly perform the duties of the job.67 attending to the whims and caprices of the passengers. The most important activity of
the cabin crew is to care for the safety of passengers and the evacuation of the
In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is aircraft when an emergency occurs. Passenger safety goes to the core of the job of a
parallel to BFOQ.68 BFOQ is valid "provided it reflects an inherent quality cabin attendant. Truly, airlines need cabin attendants who have the necessary
reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance."69 strength to open emergency doors, the agility to attend to passengers in cramped
working conditions, and the stamina to withstand grueling flight schedules.
In Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWTO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines,
Inc.,70 the Court did not hesitate to pass upon the validity of a company policy which On board an aircraft, the body weight and size of a cabin attendant are important
prohibits its employees from marrying employees of a rival company. It was held factors to consider in case of emergency. Aircrafts have constricted cabin space, and
that the company policy is reasonable considering that its purpose is the protection of narrow aisles and exit doors. Thus, the arguments of respondent that "[w]hether the
the interests of the company against possible competitor infiltration on its trade airline’s flight attendants are overweight or not has no direct relation to its mission of
secrets and procedures. transporting passengers to their destination"; and that the weight standards "has
nothing to do with airworthiness of respondent’s airlines," must fail.
Verily, there is no merit to the argument that BFOQ cannot be applied if it has no
supporting statute. Too, the Labor Arbiter,71 NLRC,72 and CA73 are one in holding The rationale in Western Air Lines v. Criswell76 relied upon by petitioner cannot
that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. A common carrier, from the nature apply to his case. What was involved there were two (2) airline pilots who were
of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to observe extraordinary denied reassignment as flight engineers upon reaching the age of 60, and a flight
diligence for the safety of the passengers it transports. 74 It is bound to carry its engineer who was forced to retire at age 60. They sued the airline company, alleging
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost that the age-60 retirement for flight engineers violated the Age Discrimination in
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. 75 Employment Act of 1967. Age-based BFOQ and being overweight are not the same.
The case of overweight cabin attendants is another matter. Given the cramped cabin
The law leaves no room for mistake or oversight on the part of a common carrier. space and narrow aisles and emergency exit doors of the airplane, any overweight
Thus, it is only logical to hold that the weight standards of PAL show its effort to cabin attendant would certainly have difficulty navigating the cramped cabin area.
comply with the exacting obligations imposed upon it by law by virtue of being a
common carrier. In short, there is no need to individually evaluate their ability to perform their task.
That an obese cabin attendant occupies more space than a slim one is an
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely unquestionable fact which courts can judicially recognize without introduction of
transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its evidence.77 It would also be absurd to require airline companies to reconfigure the
employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft in order to widen the aisles and exit doors just to accommodate overweight
aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of cabin attendants like petitioner.
discipline upon its employees.
The biggest problem with an overweight cabin attendant is the possibility of
In other words, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight impeding passengers from evacuating the aircraft, should the occasion call for it. The
standards for cabin crew is flight safety. It cannot be gainsaid that cabin attendants job of a cabin attendant during emergencies is to speedily get the passengers out of
must maintain agility at all times in order to inspire passenger confidence on their the aircraft safely. Being overweight necessarily impedes mobility. Indeed, in an
ability to care for the passengers when something goes wrong. It is not farfetched to emergency situation, seconds are what cabin attendants are dealing with, not
say that airline companies, just like all common carriers, thrive due to public minutes. Three lost seconds can translate into three lost lives. Evacuation might slow
confidence on their safety records. People, especially the riding public, expect no down just because a wide-bodied cabin attendant is blocking the narrow aisles. These
less than that airline companies transport their passengers to their respective possibilities are not remote.
destinations safely and soundly. A lesser performance is unacceptable.
Petitioner is also in estoppel. He does not dispute that the weight standards of PAL
were made known to him prior to his employment. He is presumed to know the
6
weight limit that he must maintain at all times. 78 In fact, never did he question the findings of facts are duly supported by substantial evidence. If it can be shown that
authority of PAL when he was repeatedly asked to trim down his weight. Bona fides administrative bodies grossly misappreciated evidence of such nature so as to compel
exigit ut quod convenit fiat. Good faith demands that what is agreed upon shall be a conclusion to the contrary, their findings of facts must necessarily be reversed.
done. Kung ang tao ay tapat kanyang tutuparin ang napagkasunduan. Factual findings of administrative agencies do not have infallibility and must be set
aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness. 85
Too, the weight standards of PAL provide for separate weight limitations based on
height and body frame for both male and female cabin attendants. A progressive Here, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC inexplicably misappreciated evidence. We
discipline is imposed to allow non-compliant cabin attendants sufficient opportunity thus annul their findings.
to meet the weight standards. Thus, the clear-cut rules obviate any possibility for the
commission of abuse or arbitrary action on the part of PAL. To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal protection clause
guaranty86 of the Constitution. However, in the absence of governmental
III. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was discriminated against interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked. 87 Put
by PAL. differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals.88 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the Fourteenth
Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a convenient excuse to Amendment,89 which is the source of our equal protection guarantee, is consistent in
discriminate against him.79 We are constrained, however, to hold otherwise. We saying that the equal protection erects no shield against private conduct, however
agree with the CA that "[t]he element of discrimination came into play in this case as discriminatory or wrongful.90 Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot
a secondary position for the private respondent in order to escape the consequence of violate the equal protection guarantee.91
dismissal that being overweight entailed. It is a confession-and-avoidance position
that impliedly admitted the cause of dismissal, including the reasonableness of the IV. The claims of petitioner for reinstatement and wages are moot.
applicable standard and the private respondent’s failure to comply." 80 It is a basic
rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation.81 As his last contention, petitioner avers that his claims for reinstatement and wages
have not been mooted. He is entitled to reinstatement and his full backwages, "from
Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an affirmative the time he was illegally dismissed" up to the time that the NLRC was reversed by
allegation, petitioner has to prove his allegation with particularity. There is nothing the CA.92
on the records which could support the finding of discriminatory treatment.
Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by simply naming the supposed cabin At this point, Article 223 of the Labor Code finds relevance:
attendants who are allegedly similarly situated with him. Substantial proof must be
shown as to how and why they are similarly situated and the differential treatment In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated
petitioner got from PAL despite the similarity of his situation with other employees. employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be
executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work
Indeed, except for pointing out the names of the supposed overweight cabin under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation
attendants, petitioner miserably failed to indicate their respective ideal weights; or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a
weights over their ideal weights; the periods they were allowed to fly despite their bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.
being overweight; the particular flights assigned to them; the discriminating
treatment they got from PAL; and other relevant data that could have adequately The law is very clear. Although an award or order of reinstatement is self-executory
established a case of discriminatory treatment by PAL. In the words of the CA, "PAL and does not require a writ of execution, 93 the option to exercise actual reinstatement
really had no substantial case of discrimination to meet."82 or payroll reinstatement belongs to the employer. It does not belong to the employee,
to the labor tribunals, or even to the courts.
We are not unmindful that findings of facts of administrative agencies, like the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC, are accorded respect, even finality. 83 The reason is simple: Contrary to the allegation of petitioner that PAL "did everything under the sun" to
administrative agencies are experts in matters within their specific and specialized frustrate his "immediate return to his previous position," 94 there is evidence that PAL
jurisdiction.84 But the principle is not a hard and fast rule. It only applies if the
7
opted to physically reinstate him to a substantially equivalent position in accordance WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED but
with the order of the Labor Arbiter.95 In fact, petitioner duly received the return to MODIFIED in that petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui is entitled to separation pay in
work notice on February 23, 2001, as shown by his signature.96 an amount equivalent to one-half (1/2) month’s pay for every year of service, which
should include his regular allowances.
Petitioner cannot take refuge in the pronouncements of the Court in a case 97 that
"[t]he unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate the dismissed employee entitles SO ORDERED.
him to payment of his salaries effective from the time the employer failed to reinstate
him despite the issuance of a writ of execution" 98 and ""even if the order of
reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part
of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the employee during the period of
appeal until reversal by the higher court." 99 He failed to prove that he complied with
the return to work order of PAL. Neither does it appear on record that he actually
rendered services for PAL from the moment he was dismissed, in order to insist on
the payment of his full backwages.

In insisting that he be reinstated to his actual position despite being overweight,

petitioner in effect wants to render the issues in the present case moot. He asks PAL
to comply with the impossible. Time and again, the Court ruled that the law does not
exact compliance with the impossible.100

V. Petitioner is entitled to separation pay.

Be that as it may, all is not lost for petitioner.

Normally, a legally dismissed employee is not entitled to separation pay. This may G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008
be deduced from the language of Article 279 of the Labor Code that "[a]n employee ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,
who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss vs.
of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the
time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual FACTS: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who
reinstatement." Luckily for petitioner, this is not an ironclad rule. was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline
company.
Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed employee as an act
"social justice,"101 or based on "equity."102 In both instances, it is required that the The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166
dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) does not reflect on the moral pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew
character of the employee.103 Administration Manual of PAL.

Here, We grant petitioner separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month’s pay for In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him to an
every year of service.104 It should include regular allowances which he might have extended vacation until November 1985. He was allowed to return to work once he
been receiving.105 We are not blind to the fact that he was not dismissed for any lost all the excess weight. But the problem recurred. He again went on leave without
serious misconduct or to any act which would reflect on his moral character. We also pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
recognize that his employment with PAL lasted for more or less a decade.

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Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on
petitioner remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that “[t]he issue is could I bring my
decision for him to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now.”
with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for
weight checks, which he failed to comply with. Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of
the company physician, per the advice of PAL.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report
for weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work
weight check dates, which he did not report to. as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended,
Charge for violation of company standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, “[v]oluntariness basically
that he is being discriminated as those similarly situated were not treated the same. means that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external
force influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability under Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission.
to attain his ideal weight, “and considering the utmost leniency” extended to him Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although
“which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years,” his services were it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).”
considered terminated “effective immediately.”
NOTES:
LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of
the nature of the job of petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational
complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not hamper the qualification defense. Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons
performance of his duties. of a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex,
religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The
NLRC affirmed. qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). In short, the
test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ.
CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally BFOQ is valid “provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for
dismissed because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. It is satisfactory job performance.”
obvious that the issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes
of escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight. The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely
transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its
ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed. employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the
aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of
HELD: YES discipline upon its employees.

A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin
that they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the crew is flight safety.
job. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of
Code. social justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious
misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner’s claims that
obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly
shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude,
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