OPINION OF THE COURT them”); Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 541 U. S.

125, 132
SMALL V. UNITED STATES (2004) (“ ‘any’ ” means “different things depending upon the
544 U. S. ____ (2005) setting”); United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U. S. 350, 357
(1994) (“[R]espondent errs in placing dispositive weight on the
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES broad statutory reference to ‘any’ law enforcement officer or
NO. 03-750 agency without considering the rest of the statute”); Middlesex
County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn.,
GARY SHERWOOD SMALL, PETITIONER v. UNITED 453 U. S. 1, 15–16 (1981) (it is doubtful that the phrase “ ‘any
STATES statute’ ” includes the very statute in which the words appear);
Flora v. United States, 362 U. S. 145, 149 (1960) (“[A]ny sum,”
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for while a “catchall” phase, does not “define what it catches”).
the third circuit Thus, even though the word “any” demands a broad
interpretation, see, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1,
[April 26, 2005] 5 (1997), we must look beyond that word itself.

Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. In determining the scope of the statutory phrase we find help
in the “commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates
The United States Criminal Code makes it with domestic concerns in mind.” Smith v. United States, 507 U.
S. 197, 204, n. 5 (1993). This notion has led the Court to adopt
“unlawful for any person … who has been convicted in any court, the legal presumption that Congress ordinarily intends its
of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one statutes to have domestic, not extraterritorial, application. See
year … to … possess … any firearm.” 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(1) Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U. S. 281, 285 (1949); see also
(emphasis added). Palmer, supra, at 631 (“The words ‘any person or persons,’ are
broad enough to comprehend every human being” but are
The question before us focuses upon the words “convicted in “limited to cases within the jurisdiction of the state”); EEOC v.
any court.” Does this phrase apply only to convictions entered in Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 249–251 (1991). That
any domestic court or to foreign convictions as well? We hold presumption would apply, for example, were we to consider
that the phrase encompasses only domestic, not foreign, whether this statute prohibits unlawful gun possession abroad
convictions. as well as domestically. And, although the presumption against
extraterritorial application does not apply directly to this case, we
I believe a similar assumption is appropriate when we consider
the scope of the phrase “convicted in any court” here.
In 1994 petitioner, Gary Small, was convicted in a Japanese
court of having tried to smuggle several pistols, a rifle, and For one thing, the phrase describes one necessary portion of
ammunition into Japan. Small was sentenced to five years’ the “gun possession” activity that is prohibited as a matter of
imprisonment. 183 F. Supp. 2d 755, 757, n. 3 (WD Pa. 2002). domestic law. For another, considered as a group, foreign
After his release, Small returned to the United States, where he convictions differ from domestic convictions in important ways.
bought a gun from a Pennsylvania gun dealer. Federal Past foreign convictions for crimes punishable by more than one
authorities subsequently charged Small under the “unlawful gun year’s imprisonment may include a conviction for conduct that
possession” statute here at issue. 333 F. 3d 425, 426 (CA3 domestic laws would permit, for example, for engaging in
2003). Small pleaded guilty while reserving the right to challenge economic conduct that our society might encourage. See, e.g.,
his conviction on the ground that his earlier conviction, being a Art. 153 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet Federated
foreign conviction, fell outside the scope of the illegal gun Socialist Republic, in Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure 171
possession statute. The Federal District Court rejected Small’s (H. Berman & J. Spindler transls. 2d ed. 1972) (criminalizing
argument, as did the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 183 “Private Entrepreneurial Activity”); Art. 153, id., at 172
F. Supp. 2d, at 759; 333 F. 3d, at 427, n. 2. Because the Circuits (criminalizing “Speculation,” which is defined as “the buying up
disagree about the matter, we granted certiorari. Compare and reselling of goods or any other articles for the purpose of
United States v. Atkins, 872 F. 2d 94, 96 (CA4 1989) (“convicted making a profit”); cf. e.g., Gaceta Oficial de la Republica de
in any court” includes foreign convictions); United States v. Cuba, ch. II, Art. 103, p. 68 (Dec. 30, 1987) (forbidding
Winson, 793 F. 2d 754, 757–759 (CA6 1986) (same), with propaganda that incites against the social order, international
United States v. Gayle, 342 F. 3d 89, 95 (CA2 2003) (“convicted solidarity, or the Communist State). They would include a
in any court” does not include foreign convictions); United States conviction from a legal system that is inconsistent with an
v. Concha, 233 F. 3d 1249, 1256 (CA10 2000) (same). American understanding of fairness. See, e.g., U. S. Dept. of
State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2003,
II Submitted to the House Committee on International Relations
and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong.,
A 2d Sess., 702–705, 1853, 2023 (Joint Comm. Print 2004)
(describing failures of “due process” and citing examples in
The question before us is whether the statutory reference which “the testimony of one man equals that of two women”).
“convicted in any court” includes a conviction entered in a And they would include a conviction for conduct that domestic
foreign court. The word “any” considered alone cannot answer law punishes far less severely. See, e.g., Singapore Vandalism
this question. In ordinary life, a speaker who says, “I’ll see any Act, ch. 108, §§2, 3, III Statutes of Republic of Singapore p. 258
film,” may or may not mean to include films shown in another (imprisonment for up to three years for an act of vandalism).
city. In law, a legislature that uses the statutory phrase “ ‘any Thus, the key statutory phrase “convicted in any court of, a crime
person’ ” may or may not mean to include “ ‘persons’ ” outside punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”
“the jurisdiction of the state.” See, e.g., United States v. Palmer, somewhat less reliably identifies dangerous individuals for the
3 Wheat. 610, 631 (1818) (Marshall, C. J.) (“[G]eneral words,” purposes of U. S. law where foreign convictions, rather than
such as the word “ ‘any,’ ” must “be limited” in their application domestic convictions, are at issue.
“to those objects to which the legislature intended to apply
 In addition, it is difficult to read the statute as asking judges or under State law.” §§924(e)(2)(A)(i), (ii) (2000). If “convicted in
prosecutors to refine its definitional distinctions where foreign any court” refers only to domestic convictions, this language
convictions are at issue. To somehow weed out inappropriate creates no problem. But if the phrase also refers to foreign
foreign convictions that meet the statutory definition is not convictions, the language creates an apparently senseless
consistent with the statute’s language; it is not easy for those not distinction between drug offenses committed within the United
versed in foreign laws to accomplish; and it would leave those States (potentially producing enhanced punishments) and
previously convicted in a foreign court (say of economic crimes) similar offenses committed abroad (not producing enhanced
uncertain about their legal obligations. Cf. 1 United States punishments).
Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §4A1.2(h) (Nov.
2004) (“[S]entences resulting from foreign convictions are not For example, the statute provides that offenses that are
counted” as a “prior sentence” for criminal history purposes). punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to two years, and
characterized under state law as misdemeanors, are not
These considerations, suggesting significant differences predicate crimes. §921(20). This exception is presumably based
between foreign and domestic convictions, do not dictate our on the determination that such state crimes are not sufficiently
ultimate conclusion. Nor do they create a “clear statement” rule, serious or dangerous so as to preclude an individual from
imposing upon Congress a special burden of specificity. See possessing a firearm. If “convicted in any court” refers only to
post, at 5 (Thomas, J., dissenting). They simply convince us that domestic convictions, this language creates no problem. But if
we should apply an ordinary assumption about the reach of the phrase also refers to foreign convictions, the language
domestically oriented statutes here—an assumption that helps creates another apparently senseless distinction between less
us determine Congress’ intent where Congress likely did not serious crimes (misdemeanors punishable by more than one
consider the matter and where other indicia of intent are in year’s imprisonment) committed within the United States (not
approximate balance. Cf. ibid. We consequently assume a predicate crimes) and similar offenses committed abroad
congressional intent that the phrase “convicted in any court” (predicate crimes). These illustrative examples taken together
applies domestically, not extraterritorially. But, at the same time, suggest that Congress did not consider whether the generic
we stand ready to revise this assumption should statutory phrase “convicted in any court” applies to domestic as well as
language, context, history, or purpose show the contrary. foreign convictions.

B The statute’s lengthy legislative history confirms the fact that

Congress did not consider whether foreign convictions should or
We have found no convincing indication to the contrary here. should not serve as a predicate to liability under the provision
The statute’s language does not suggest any intent to reach here at issue. Congress did consider a Senate bill containing
beyond domestic convictions. Neither does it mention foreign language that would have restricted predicate offenses to
convictions nor is its subject matter special, say, immigration or domestic offenses. See S. Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,
terrorism, where one could argue that foreign convictions would p. 31 (1968) (defining predicate crimes in terms of “Federal”
seem especially relevant. To the contrary, if read to include crimes “punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one
foreign convictions, the statute’s language creates anomalies. year” and crimes “determined by the laws of the State to be a
felony”). And the Conference Committee ultimately rejected this
For example, the statute creates an exception that allows gun version in favor of language that speaks of those “convicted in
possession despite a prior conviction for an antitrust or business any court, of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment
regulatory crime. 18 U. S. C. §921(a)(20)(A). In doing so, the exceeding one year.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1956, 90th Cong., 2d
exception speaks of “Federal or State” antitrust or regulatory Sess., pp. 28–29 (1968). But the history does not suggest that
offenses. Ibid. If the phrase “convicted in any court” generally this language change reflected a congressional view on the
refers only to domestic convictions, this language causes no matter before us. Rather, the enacted version is simpler and it
problem. But if “convicted in any court” includes foreign avoids potential difficulties arising out of the fact that States may
convictions, the words “Federal or State” prevent the exception define the term “felony” differently. And as far as the legislative
from applying where a foreign antitrust or regulatory conviction history is concerned, these latter virtues of the new language
is at issue. An individual convicted of, say, a Canadian antitrust fully explain the change. Thus, those who use legislative history
offense could not lawfully possess a gun, Combines to help discern congressional intent will see the history here as
Investigation Act, 2 R. S. C. 1985, ch. C–34, §§61(6), (9) (1985), silent, hence a neutral factor, that simply confirms the obvious,
but a similar individual convicted of, say, a New York antitrust namely, that Congress did not consider the issue. Others will not
offense, could lawfully possess a gun. be tempted to use or to discuss the history at all. But cf. post, at
13 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
For example, the statute specifies that predicate crimes
include “a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” 18 U. S. The statute’s purpose does offer some support for a reading
C. §922(g)(9). Again, the language specifies that these of the phrase that includes foreign convictions. As the
predicate crimes include only crimes that are “misdemeanor[s] Government points out, Congress sought to “ ‘keep guns out of
under Federal or State law.” §921(a)(33)(A). If “convicted in any the hands of those who have demonstrated that they may not be
court” refers only to domestic convictions, this language creates trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a threat to
no problem. If the phrase also refers to foreign convictions, the society.’ ” Brief for United States 16 (quoting Dickerson v. New
language creates an apparently senseless distinction between Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U. S. 103, 112 (1983)); see also Lewis
(covered) domestic relations misdemeanors committed within v. United States, 445 U. S. 55, 60–62, 66 (1980); Huddleston v.
the United States and (uncovered) domestic relations United States, 415 U. S. 814, 824 (1974). And, as the dissent
misdemeanors committed abroad. properly notes, post, at 12, one convicted of a serious crime
abroad may well be as dangerous as one convicted of a similar
For example, the statute provides an enhanced penalty where crime in the United States.
unlawful gun possession rests upon three predicate convictions
for a “serious drug offense.” §924(e)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. II). The force of this argument is weakened significantly, however,
Again the statute defines the relevant drug crimes through by the empirical fact that, according to the Government, since
reference to specific federal crimes and with the words “offense 1968, there have probably been no more than “10 to a dozen”
instances in which such a foreign conviction has served as a
predicate for a felon-in-possession prosecution. Tr. of Oral Arg.
32. This empirical fact reinforces the likelihood that Congress, at
best, paid no attention to the matter.

In sum, we have no reason to believe that Congress

considered the added enforcement advantages flowing from
inclusion of foreign crimes, weighing them against, say, the
potential unfairness of preventing those with inapt foreign
convictions from possessing guns. See supra, at 4. The statute
itself and its history offer only congressional silence. Given the
reasons for disfavoring an inference of extraterritorial coverage
from a statute’s total silence and our initial assumption against
such coverage, see supra, at 5, we conclude that the phrase
“convicted in any court” refers only to domestic courts, not to
foreign courts. Congress, of course, remains free to change this
conclusion through statutory amendment.

For these reasons, the judgment of the Third Circuit is

reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

The Chief Justice took no part in the decision of this case.