State Prosecutors v.

Judge Muro
FACTS:

Judge Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was charged by State
Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno V. Tac-an with ignorance of the law, grave
misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation of the
Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960. The respondent judge
dismissed all 11 cases solely on the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers, which the
judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the President of the Philippines lifted all
foreign exchange restrictions.

The respondent’s decision was founded on his belief that the reported announcement of the
Executive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the court
of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case.

The petitioners stressed that this is not just a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous
interpretation of the law. The very act of respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte the
eleven criminal cases without even a motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and without
at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written
comment or on oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the
Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.

Moreover, Petitioner’s alleged that the judge also exercised grave abuse of discretion by taking
judicial notice on the published statement of the President in the newspaper (Philippine Daily Inquirer
and the Daily Globe)which is a matter that has not yet been officially in force and effect of the law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial notice on
the statement of the president lifting the foreign exchange restriction published in the newspaper as
basis for dismissing the case?

HELD:

YES. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common knowledge
capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the requirements before a court
can take judicial notice of a fact. Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was
definitely not proper for him, to have taken cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when the same was
not yet in force at the time the improvident order of dismissal was issued.

When the President’s statement was published in the newspaper, the respondent judge admitted of
not having seen the official text of CB circular 1353 thus it was premature for him to take judicial
notice on this matter which is merely based on his personal knowledge and is not based on the public
knowledge that the law requires for the court to take judicial notice of.

For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be present:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.
The fact that should be assumed as judicially known must be on such notoriety that such fact cannot
be disputed. Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge where the personal knowledge of the judge does
not amount to the judicial notice of the court. The common knowledge contemplated by the law where
the court can take judicial notice must come from the knowledge of men generally in the course of
ordinary experiences that are accepted as true and one that involves unquestioned demonstration.

This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act of
respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a
motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the
basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument, is not
only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad
faith and partiality.

The Court strongly feels that it has every right to assume and expect that respondent judge is
possessed with more than ordinary credentials and qualifications to merit his appointment as a
presiding judge in the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, stationed in the
City of Manila itself. It is, accordingly, disheartening and regrettable to note the nature of the
arguments and the kind of logic that respondent judge would want to impose on this Court
notwithstanding the manifest lack of cogency thereof.

The SC cited several cases where judges were ordered dismissed from the government service for
gross incompetence and ignorance of the law and the Court after considering such premises, it
thus, finds respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, such dismissal to carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification from reemployment in the government
service.
Siena Realty v. Gal-Lang
DOCTRINE
Even if the amendment to the rules was not raised or alleged, the Court should take
mandatory judicial notice of such. 

FACTS 
- Siena Realty filed a petition for certiorari before the CA on June 7, 2000 (60th day
from their receipt of the March 23, 2000 Order of RTC denying their motion for
Reconsideration).
- CA by Resolution on June 20, 2000, dismissed the petition for being filed out of time.
Per records, Siena Realty had only until May 29, 2000 to file the petition or 9 days
late.
- Siena Realty then filed on July 10, 2000 an MR
- In the meantime, SC issued A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC on July 20, 2000 approving the
amendment to Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
- CA denied the MR:
- Siena Realty's counsel espoused that he overlooked the provision of the second
paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended per
Supreme Court Circular dated July 21, 1998. That the 60 day period within which to
file a Petition for Certiorari is not counted from the date of the receipt of the denial of
Motion for Reconsideration, but from the date of the receipt of the questioned order
or decision, except that such 60-day period is interrupted upon the filing of a Motion
for Reconsideration.
Hence, the petition at bar, challenging the CA resolution

ISSUE/S
1. W/N CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it issued its resolution without taking
prior judicial notice of Supreme Court A.M. no. 00-2 - 03.
PROVISIONS 
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence:

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political
history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty
and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

RULING & RATIO 

1. Yes
- Given the stated provision, even if petitioner did not raise or allege the amendment in
their motion for reconsideration, the Court of
 Appeals should have taken mandatory judicial notice of thesaid A.M. by the Court.
- The resolution did not have to specify that it had retroactive effect as it pertains to a
procedural matter.
- Contrary to the allegation that the matter was no longer pending and undetermined,
the issue of whether the petition for certiorari was timely filed was still pending
reconsideration when the amendment took effect.
- However, the amendatory rule notwithstanding, Siena Realty's petition fails as stated
early on.
 The order of the trial court granting the Motion to Dismiss was a final, not interlocutory,
order and as such, it was subject to appeal, not a petition for certiorari.

DISPOSITION 
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, hereby DENIED.
Herrera v. Bollos
The Facts:
On August 5, 1993, Teodora Bollos commenced before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bayawan-
Basay Civil Case No. 993, for forcible entry, solely against Eddie Herrera alleging that the latter,
sometime in the second week of 1993, through stealth and strategy and taking advantage of the
absence of Teodora, entered and occupied her Sugarland known as Lot No. 20, GSS-615, located at
Camandagan, Maninyon, Bayawan, Negros Oriental. Teodora claims to have inherited said parcel.
Defendant, Eddie Herrera, denied the allegations against him maintaining that he entered and
occupied not Lot No. 20, as claimed by Teodora, but Lot No. 21, GSS¬615, which is owned by
Conrado Bollos, a brother of Teodora's father, Alfonso. Further, Herrera said that his occupation of
the property was not through stealth or strategy but by virtue of a contract of lease executed between
Conrado Bollos, as lessor, and Ernesto Tijing, as lessee. Herrera is Tijing's overseer on the land. As
a consequence, the complaint was twice amended, first, on March 23, 1994 to include Ernesto T.
Tijing as a party-defendant and much later on October 4, 1995, this time to implead Conrado Bollos
as an additional defendant. After due proceedings, the first level court dismissed the case for failure
to make-out a forcible entry case because of lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs' remedy should be
reivendicatory (sic) action before the proper forum.
On Appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, docketed as Civil Case No. 12014, the
challenged verdict was reversed restoring Lot No. 20, GSS-615 to the plaintiffs and ejecting the
defendants from the said parcel of land and pay damages. Petitioners filed with the CA a petition for
review. the CA affirmed. Hence, this appeal.
The Issues
(a) Is the municipal trial court vested with jurisdiction over a second amended complaint impleading a
new defendant filed beyond one year from dispossession alleging a case of forcible entry in the
original action?
(b) May the regional trial court award moral and exemplary damages against defendants in an appeal
from a dismissal of the case for forcible entry by the lower court?
The Court's Ruling: Petition Denied
On the 1st issue: we emphasize the basic rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of
the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint at the time of its filing, irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein."What
determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the
ones to be consulted."
On the 2nd issue: the concept of damages in an action for forcible entry and detainer cases is well
defined in several cases. These damages mean "rents" or "the reasonable compensation for the use
and occupation of the premises," or "fair rental value of the property." Temperate, actual, moral and
exemplary are neither rents nor reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
premises, nor fair rental value, and are not recoverable in such cases.
Court DENIES the petition. However, the Court SETS ASIDE the decisions of the Court of Appea ls18
and the Regional Trial Court.19 The Court remands the case to the municipal trial court for further
proceedings.
In the case at bar, the municipal trial court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, and the regional
trial court reversed the dismissal but rendered judgment ejecting the defendants from the parcel of
land involved, and condemning them to pay damages and attorney's fees. This is not correct. In case
of reversal, the case shall be remanded to the municipal trial court for further proceedings.15 The
regional trial court in reversing an appealed case dismissing the action cannot decree the eviction of
the defendants and award damages. A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in
controversy. The court may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, or which are capable
of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
16 Before taking such judicial notice, the court must "allow the parties to be heard thereon." Hence,
there can be no judicial notice on the rental value of the premises in question without supporting
evidence.
Equitable Card Network v. Capistrano
Equitable Card Network vs Capistrano
Doctrine: An answer to the complaint may raise a negative defense which consists in
defendant’s specific denial of the material fact that plaintiff alleges in his complaint, which
fact is essential to the latter’s cause of action. Specific denial has three modes.
1) The defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does
not admit and whenever practicable set forth the substance of the matters on which he
will rely to support his denial.
2) When the defendant wants to deny only a part or a qualification of an averment in the
complaint, he must specify so much of the averment as is true and material and deny the
remainder
3) When the defendant is without knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint, he shall so state and this shall
have the effect of a denial.

Facts: Petitioner alleged that respondent applied for at the Manila Yacht Club (MYC) under
the latter’s widow membership program. Since the MYC and ECI had a credit card
sponsorship agreement in which the Club would solicit for ECI credit card enrollment among
its members and dependents, respondent allegedly applied for and was granted a Visa
Credit Card by ECI.
Petitioner further alleged that respondent authorized her daughter (Redulla) to claim from
ECI her credit card and ATM application form and signed the acknowledgement receipt on behalf
of the respondent. After the respondent got hold of the card, she supposedly started using it. On
November 24, 1997 Mrs. Redulla personally issued a P45,000.00 check as partial payment
of Mrs. Capistrano’s account with ECI. But Mrs. Redulla’s check bounced upon
deposit. Because respondent was unable to settle
her P217,235.36 bill, Petitioner demanded payment from her. But she refused to pay,
prompting petitioner to file ac collection suit before RTC Cebu.
Answering the complaint, respondent denied ever applying for MYC membership and ECI
credit card; that Redulla was not her daughter; and that she never authorized her or anyone
to claim a credit card for her. Assuming she applied for such a card, she never used it.
Redulla posed as respondent and fooled ECI into issuing the card to her.

RTC: Having failed to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of ECI’s
actionable documents that were attached to the complaint, Mrs. Capistrano impliedly
admitted the genuineness and due execution of those documents.
CA: Although respondent’s answer was somewhat infirm, still she raised the issue of the
genuineness and due execution of ECI’s documents during trial by presenting evidence that
she never signed any of them. Since petitioner failed to make a timely objection to its
admission, such evidence cured the vagueness in her answer. That respondent sufficiently
proved by evidence that her signatures had been forged.

Issue: WON although the respondent failed to make specific denial of the actionable
documents attached to the complaint, she overcame this omission by presenting parol
evidence to which petitioner failed to object

Held: (See doctrine)

But the rule that applies when the defendant wants to contest the documents attached to the
claimant’s complaint which are essential to his cause of action is found in Section 8, Rule 8
of the Rules of Court.
The Court holds that the CA correctly ordered the dismissal of petitioner’s action since,
contrary to the RTC’s finding, respondent effectively denied the genuineness and due
execution of petitioner’s actionable documents. True, respondent denied ECI’s actionable
documents merely “for lack of knowledge” which denial, is inadequate since by their nature
she ought to know the truth of the allegations regarding those documents. But this
inadequacy was cured by her quick assertion that she was also denying the allegations
regarding those actionable documents “for the reasons as stated in her special and
affirmative defenses.” 

Special affirmative defense of the respondent:

11. Defendant denies having applied for membership with the Equitable Card Network, Inc.
as a widow of a deceased member of the Manila Yacht Club.

12. She has never authorized anyone to get her alleged card for the preceding reason.
Therefore, being not a member, she has no obligation – monetary or otherwise to herein
plaintiff.

Since respondent in fact verified her claim that she had no part in those transactions, she in
effect denied under oath the genuineness and due execution of the documents supporting
them. For this reason, she is not barred from introducing evidence that those documents
were forged.
Canada v. All Commodities Marketing Corp
Ernesto Canada is engaged in business of providing trucking and hauling services under the name
Hi-Ball Freight Services. Respondent All Comodities Marketing Corp. has been a valued client of
petitioner for several years.
On October 27, 1986, respondent contracted petitioners service to haul and deliver one thousand
(1,0000 sacks of sugar from Pier 18, North Harbor in Tondo, Manila to the Pepsi Cola Plant at
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. The transaction was covered by waybills/ delivery receipts no. 5340 and
5341 of All Star Transport, Inc. (All Star) but duly signed by petitioner’s driver. As agreed, petitioner
loaded respondents 1,000 sacks of sugar into his two (2) trucks; however the same were never
delivered to the Pepsi Cola Plant. The drivers of the trucks, along with the helpers, had since
vanished into thin air.
Respondent demanded payment of the value of the sugar, but the demand was not heeded.
Consequently, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner.
In his answer, petitioner admitted that respondent contracted him to haul and deliver 1,000 sacks of
sugar but denied that the cargo did not reach their destination. He averred that the cargo was
delivered to the Pepsi Cola Plant on the Oct. 27, 1986. He rejected responsibility for the claim arguing
that the loss of the goods was either due to respondent’s negligence or due to fortuitous events. By
way of counterclaim, petitioner asserted his right to payment of P 350,000 representing the value of
the truck that was allegedly seized by respondent.
Ruling:
Petitioner attempted to exculpate himself from liability by insisting that the incident was a caso
fortuito. We disagree.
The exempting circumstance of caso fortuito may be availed of only when: (a) the cause of the
unseen and unexpected occurrence was independent of the human will; (b) it was impossible to
foresee the event which constituted the caso fortuito or, if it could be foreseen, it was impossible to
avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible to perform an obligation in a normal
manner; and (d) the person tasked to perform the obligation must not have participated in any course
of conduct that aggravated the accident.
None of these elements is present in this case. Other than petitioners bare-faced assertion that the
cargo was lost due to fortuitous event, no evidence was offered to substantiate it. On the contrary, we
find supported by evidence on record the conclusions of the trial court and the CA that the loss of the
sugar was due to the negligence of petitioner. The CA, committed no reversible error in sustaining the
finding of liability against petitioner
Citibank v. Teodoro
Facts: Efren Teodoro is a Citibank Card credit card holder. Bt 1995 his outstanding obligation
ballooned to 191,693.25 inclusive of interest and service charges. During the trial, Citibank presented
several sales invoices or charge slips, which added up to only P24,388.36. Although mere
photocopies of the originals, the invoices were marked in evidence as Exhibits F to F-4.  Because all
these copies appeared to bear the signatures of respondent, the trial court deemed them sufficient
proof of his purchases with the use of the credit card. MTC decided in favour of Citibank. Teodoro
appealed to RTC and affirmed MTC decision. CA reversed.
Issue: WON CA erred in holding that petitioner failed to prove the due execution and the cause of the
unavailability and non-production of the charge slips marked in evidence as Exhibits F to F-4
Decision: SC affirmed CA decision.
The original copies of the sales invoices are the best evidence to prove the alleged
obligation. Photocopies thereof are mere secondary evidence.

Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original sales
invoices, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2)
the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its nonproduction in court; and (3) on the part
of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The
correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.

The loss of the originals and reasonable diligence in the search for them were conditions that were
not met, because the sales invoices might have been found by Equitable. Hernandez, testifying that
he had requested the originals from Equitable, failed to show that he had subsequently followed up
the request.

When more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all of them have been lost, destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court before secondary evidence can be given of any one. A photocopy may
not be used without accounting for the other originals.
Triplicates were produced, although the cardholder signed the sales invoice only once. During the
trial, Hernandez explained that an original copy had gone to respondent, another to the merchant,
and still another to petitioner.

Each of these three copies is regarded as an original in accordance with Section 4 (b) of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court. Petitioner failed to show that all three original copies were unavailable, and that
due diligence had been exercised in the search for them.