G.R. No.

L-54645-76 December 18, 1986

REYNALDO R. BAYOT, petitioner, 
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts: Bayot was accused in more than 100 counts of estafa by falsifying public documents before the
Sandiganbayan. He was allegedly involved as a government auditor of the Commission on Audit assigned
to the Ministry of Education and Culture, together with other employees from the said ministry, the
Bureau of Treasury and the Teacher's Camp in Baguio City, for the preparation and encashment of
fictitious TCAA checks for the non-existent obligations of the Teacher’s Camp. Hence, this resulted to
damages of several millions to the government. The first thirty-two (32) cases were filed on July 25,
1978 and he was convicted on May 30, 1980, together with his co-accused in all but one of the thirty-
two (32) cases filed against them. However, on Mach 16, 1982 Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 was passed
amending RA 3019.

Issue: Whether or not the retroactive application of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 would violate the
Constitutional provision against enactment of ex post facto law.

Held: No. The Court finds no merit in petitioner's contention that Section 13 of Republic Act 3019, as
amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, including the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Document, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex
post facto law. Paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code clearly states that suspension from
the employment or public office during the trial or in order to institute proceedings shall not be
considered as penalty. It is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings, hence, it is not deemed a
penalty. Further, if the accused will be acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. Paragraph Nos. 1, 3 and 4 of said
Article 24 are just preventive measures before final judgment is rendered. Since it is not a penal
provision, the suspension from office and the pending trial of Bayot, charged with crimes mentioned in
the amendatory provision committed before its effectivity does not violate the constitutional provision
on ex post facto law.
 G.R. No. 174629 February 14, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC),
petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. EUGENIO, JR., AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC, MANILA, BRANCH 34, PANTALEON
ALVAREZ and LILIA CHENG, respondents.

Facts: The OSG wrote to AMLC requesting AMLC’s assistance in obtaining more evidence to completely
reveal the financial trail of corruption surrounding the NAIA 3 Project, and also noting that the Republic
was presently defending itself in two international arbitration cases. The CIS conducted an intelligence
database search regarding financial transactions of individuals involved. One of them is Alvarez,
Chairman of the Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards Technical Committee, who had already been charged
by the Ombudsman with violation of Section 3(J) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In the
investigation, it revealed that Alvarez maintained 8 bank accounts with 6 different banks.

Alvarez alleged that he accidentally learned of the bank inquiry order, which was issued following an ex
parte application, and he further argued that nothing in the Anti-Money Laundering Act (“AMLA”)
authorized the AMLC to seek the authority to inquire into his bank accounts.

As contended, the AMLA, being a substantive penal statute, has no retroactive effect and the bank
inquiry order could not apply to deposits or investments opened prior to the effectivity of the AMLA (17
October 2001). The subject bank accounts, opened in 1989 to 1990, could not be the subject of the bank
inquiry order without violating the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.

Issue: Whether or not the proscription against ex post facto laws applies to Section 11 of the AMLA (a
provision which does not provide a penal sanction BUT which merely authorizes the inspection of
suspect accounts and deposits).

Held: Yes. An individual may not be prosecuted under the penal provisions of the AMLA for acts
committed prior to the enactment of the law. With respect to the Authority to Inspect, it should be
noted that an ex post facto law is one which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal,
or a proclamation of amnesty. Likewise, prior to the AMLA:

(1) The fact that bank accounts were involved in activities later on enumerated in the law did not, by
itself, remove such accounts from the shelter of absolute confidentiality.

(2) In order that bank accounts could be examined, there was a need to secure either the written
permission of the depositor or a court order authorizing such examination, assuming that they were
involved in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in a case where the money
deposited or invested was itself the subject matter of the litigation.
 G.R. No. 133922. February 12, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DEOLITO OPTANA, accused-appellant.

Facts: Maria Rizalina Onciano filed a complaint for violation of the Special Protection of Children Against
Child Abuse, or known as four (4) Informations for Rape against herein accused-appellant Deolito
Optana.

Maria Rizalina Onciano is the daughter of Nida A. Onciano, whom she met the accused-appellant,
Deolito Optana at Doris Restaurant in Olongapo City where they are both working. The accused was
also the step-father of the appellee. He knew that Nida had a daughter but he still courted her and
promised to take care of both of them and help support in the education of Maria Rizalina. On several
occasions, whenever Nida Onciano was out of the house since she was busy selling wares in the market,
accused-appellant raped Maria Rizalina.

Issue: Whether or not Optana directly participated in the crime of rape as defined and penalized under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and for violation of Section 5(b) of Republic Act 7610

Held: Yes. The trial court correctly convicted the accused for Rape under Article 335 of the RPC in
Criminal Case No. 485-95 for it was clearly proven that the accused had carnal knowledge with the
victim through force and intimidation on that fateful day in September, 1993. This was the first time the
accused raped Maria Rizalina who was able to give a detailed account of this traumatic experience. She
was below 12 years old at that time. While Maria Rizalina also testified that she was raped several times
after September, 1993, the prosecution, however, failed to establish the material details as to the time,
place, and manner by which these offenses were committed. There is still a need for proof beyond
reasonable doubt that the offenses alleged in the informations were indeed committed. 38 Thus, the
trial court acquitted the accused under Criminal Case Nos. 482-95, 483-95, 484-95, 486-95, 488-95, 489-
95 for want of sufficient evidence.

Aside from the first incident of rape, all what Maria Rizalina could say was that she was molested by the
accused for the last time on October 28, 1995. Whether there was force and intimidation to qualify this
incident as rape was, unfortunately, not proven. Nonetheless, there is no dispute that Maria Rizalina
was sexually abused by the accused on this occasion. Hence, the trial court convicted the accused under
Criminal Case No. 487-95 for violation of Sec. 5(b) of R.A. 7610 or the Child Abuse Law.

From the above disquisition, the accused is certainly guilty for sexual abuse committed on his
stepdaughter, using his moral ascendancy in intimidating the victim to engage in sexual intercourse with
him.
 G.R. No. 142396. February 11, 2003
KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO, respondents.

Facts: Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 was filed against Minucher following a “buy-bust
operation” conducted by Philippine Police Narcotic Agents, accompanied by Scalzo in the house of
Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin was said to have been seized. Minucher was later on
acquitted by the court. Consequently, Minucher filed for damages due to trumped-up charges of drug
trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. Scalzo, on his counterclaims argued that he had acted in the discharge
of his official duties as being the agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States
Department of Justice. Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that,
he is a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, and was entitled to
diplomatic immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note of the United States Embassy
addressed to DOJ of the Philippines and a Certification of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that
the note is a true and faithful copy of its original. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.

Issue: Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.

Held: Yes. A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit as long
as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent or
imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency, however, can be gleaned from the undisputed facts in the case. First is, the official exchanges of
communication between agencies of the government of the two countries, second, the certifications
from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy and
third, participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the “buy-bust operation”
conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo. These may be inadequate to support
the diplomatic status of the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine government has
given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the
United States Drug Enforcement Agency.

The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and,
after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make
the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the
buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo
hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO GALANZA y VALDEZ @ Ed, NICANOR BAUTISTA @ Nick, HUBERTO ALIMAN y BISNA @ Bert,
REGINO BALANGUIT y CEBRON @ Budoy and LEO ROBIEGO y DULAY @ Leo, accused, LEO ROBIEGO y
DULAY @ Leo and REGINO BALANGUIT y CEBRON @ Budoy , accused-appellants

Facts: Regino Balanguit and Leo Robiego were guilty of Robbery in Band with Homicide under Article
294(1) of the Revised Penal Code.

Lourdes de los Santos have met face to face with the killers of her common-law-husband, Dominador
Limbo. This is due to the information relayed to her by Capt. Marcos Gotico, Chief of the Investigation
Section of the Marikina Police, that suspects in two robbery cases in Marikina could be the same culprits
who killed Limbo in Bacoor, Cavite. Capt. Gotico provided such information after Lamberto Bonahan had
confided to him that, the group who had been apprehended in Marikina for robbery was also involved in
the robbery with homicide in Bacoor. Since the informant did not know the name of the victim in
Bacoor, Capt. Gotico wrote a letter addressed to "Sa mga kinauukulan" in Bacoor. Consequently, on
January 28, 1985, Lourdes de los Santos went to the office of Capt. Gotico. Lourdes was able to identify
Regino Balanguit, in a police line-up as one of the killers of Limbo.

According to Lourdes, Limbo woke up between 3:00 and 4:00 A.M. of December 16, 1984, as he was
preparing to go to Batangas on business. Someone knocked at the door to buy a cigarette, but when
Limbo asked and heard no response, he opened the door and there came Balanguit and Robiego armed
with guns. They entered then shot Limbo on the chest at short range. He fell on the floor, screaming and
writhing in pain. Robiego pointed a gun at him and told him to keep quiet. Nonetheless, Limbo died on
the spot.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide

Held: Yes. The crime committed is special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide under Art. 294(l) of
the Revised Penal Code. All the elements of the crime of robbery, namely, intent to gain, unlawful taking
of personal property belonging to another and violence against or intimidation of a person (Art. 293,
Revised Penal Code) have been duly proven in this case. There is no doubt that the appellants' intention
was to rob Limbo as they even informed him that it was a hold up. In the course of the robbery,
however, they shot and killed him. As there was a direct relation and intimate connection between the
robbery and the killing, the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide was committed.

Robbery with Homicide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Article 294(l) of the Revised
Penal Code. Although there are no mitigating or aggravating circumstances proven in the commission of
the crime, the lower court correctly imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua (Article 63(2)
Revised Penal Code) in this case.
 G.R. Nos. 134777-78 July 24, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROLAND MOLINA, accused-appellant.

Facts: That on or about the 4th day of March, 1996, at about 12:00 Midnight, at Poblacion, Municipality
of Lagangilang, Province of Abra, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and while armed with a sharp-pointed instrument
(unrecovered), did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab one ANGELITO
BON-AO, thereby inflicting stab wounds on the different parts of his body, thus performing all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of MURDER as a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, by reason of the timely medical
attendance rendered to the victim which prevented his death; to the damage and prejudice of the victim
and his heirs. Further, that on or about the 4th day of March, 1996, the said accused, with intent to kill,
with treachery and while armed with a sharp-pointed instrument (unrecovered), did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab one JOSEPH BON-AO, thereby inflicting a fatal stab
wound at the back hitting the intercostal vessels, lacerating the right lung and severing the third right
posterior rib which caused his instantaneous death; to the damage and prejudice of the victim and his
heirs.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty for the crimes of murder and frustrated murder.

Held: Yes. The trial court did not err in convicting the accused-appellant for the crimes of murder and
frustrated murder. As regards the frustrated murder of Angelito Bon-ao, the penalty one degree lower
than reclusion perpetua to death, which is reclusion temporal, shall be imposed pursuant to Art. 248 of
the Revised Penal Code in relation to Art. 50 thereof. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and in
the presence of the modifying circumstance of recidivism, the maximum penalty to be imposed shall be
taken from the maximum period of the imposable penalty which is reclusion temporal maximum, the
range of which is seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, while the
minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor in any of its
periods, the range of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.

Four (4) Justices of the Court however continue to maintain the unconstitutionality of RA No. 7659
insofar as it, prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority to the
effect that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at
bar.
 G.R. No. 109660 July 1, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANNY ANGELES alias "Danny Fake" and JOHN DOE, accused,
ROMEO NELL alias "Omeng," appellant.

Facts: After an accused has openly admitted the killing, the gravamen of the prosecution's case cannot
be disbelieved anymore. Thus, the accused must prove all the elements of self-defense clearly and
convincingly. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution's. That on or about the 24th day of March 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused,
armed with a bladed instrument and with intent to kill one Reynaldo Laureano y Nuque, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery, attack, assault and
stab with the said bladed instrument they were then provided the said Reynaldo Laureano y Nuque,
hitting the latter on his body, thereby causing him serious physical injuries which directly caused his
death.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed murder.

Held: The record is bereft of proof that appellant and his companions took advantage of their collective
strength to overwhelm their victim. Superior strength is not appreciated by the mere fact of superiority
in the number of malefactors, but rather by the deliberate employment of excessive force which is out
of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. It should be noted as well the
fact that the victim was not alone.

The plea of self-defense cannot be accepted, for he failed to prove all the requisites thereof. While the
appellant failed to prove self-defense, the prosecution likewise failed to show any qualifying
circumstance. In this light, appellant should be convicted only of homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code without any generic aggravating or mitigating circumstance.

Hence, the assailed Decision was MODIFIED. Appellant is CONVICTED of homicide, not murder, and is
SENTENCED to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum and fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
 G.R. No. 88752 July 3, 1992
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANILO MANANSALA y PALISOC, accused-appellant.

Facts: On March 17, 1986, at about 9:30 o'clock in the evening, Pat. Hector Colmo and his girlfriend, Fe
Nisperos, were sitting at one end of a bench in a shed located at the Food Terminal Compound in
Bicutan, Taguig, Rizal. They were waiting for a ride home. Seated at the other end of the bench were
three men who were talking among themselves. Nisperos was looking at the approaching bus they were
to take when suddenly she heard a shot that made her scamper in fright. She realized seconds later that
she had left her boyfriend behind, and so she turned back. She froze in horror. Colmo was slumped on
the ground with a bleeding head. She rushed to aid him, but one of the three men jumped over the
bench and pointed a gun at her. She stopped short. He took the pistol from the fallen victim. She looked
at the man but he did not harm her or even speak to her. As he fled with his two companions, she
started shouting for help. Some people succoured her but it was too late. Colmo expired from "cardio-
respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of the gunshot wound in the head."

Danilo Manansala was in due time picked up and investigated for the offense. Subsequently, he was
charged with the crime of robbery with homicide committed in conspiracy with two unidentified
persons and with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery. After trial, he
was found guilty and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed robbery with homicide

Held: It was not necessary to pinpoint Manansala as the person who actually shot Colmo because it has
been established that Manansala acted in concert with his two companions in killing and robbing their
victim. The culprits evidently knew Colmo to be a policeman (although he was in civilian clothes at the
time) and killed him because of the firearm he was carrying. In a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of
all, and every co-conspirator is equally liable for the offense committed. Hence, even if it was not
Manansala but one of his co-conspirators who fired the gun that killed Colmo, Manansala would still be
subject to the penalty imposed by the Revised Penal Code for the crime they had all committed.

The killing was aggravated by treachery as the victim was shot from behind. There is alevosia when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from any defense which the offended party might make. Colmo never knew what hit him and
was totally unprepared for the attack that caused his death.

Evident premeditation is not inherent in robbery with homicide. In such an offense, the evident
premeditation must relate to the killing and not to the robbery. This aggravating circumstance should be
rejected.

Hence, the guilt of the accused-appellant has been clearly established.

 G.R. No. 114937 October 11, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE APELADO y PALMORES, GERMAN BACANI alias "ITI" and ROBERT BACANI alias "ALO", accused,
JOSE APELADO y PALMORES and GERMAN BACANI alias "ITI", accused-appellants.

Facts: That on or about the 16th day of November 1989, at 11:30 o'clock P.M. at Barangay Quirino,
Municipality of Solano, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping
one another, with intent to kill and treachery, taking advantage of superior strength and evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, hack and stab Rodolfo de
Jesus with the use of a bolo and knives, inflicting mortal wounds on the different parts of his body
causing his immediate death to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed the crime of murder.

Held: As correctly held by the trial court, conspiracy was established by the prosecution. Abuse of
superior strength also attended the commission of the crime. Neither treachery nor evident
premeditation was present in the commission of the crime. German Bacani, is entitled to the privilege
mitigating circumstance of minority under paragraph 2 of Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code. He was
seventeen years old when he committed the crime. Thus, the penalty that should be imposed upon him
should be one degree lower and in the proper period. Since there is neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance present after qualifying the offense to murder, the maximum of his sentence should be
within the medium period. Applying the indeterminate sentence law, the minimum of his penalty must
be taken from the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.

The decision of the Regional Trial Court insofar as it finds accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder is affirmed.
 G.R. No. 116600 July 3, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
M/SGT. REYNALDO LANDICHO, PAT. JOHNNY BUNYI, C1C ERIC MANLUSOC, and C2C LEOVINO CANUEL,
accused.

Facts: On 8 January 1991, at 9:30 p.m., in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, four members of the PNP gunned
down Isagani Mazon in cold blood. Mazon died instantly, having suffered twenty-one (21) gunshot
wounds, a number of which were at his back. As a result, the accused were charged with murder, but in
the interim, the trial court endowed them the privilege of being detained by their superiors, instead of
customary incarceration at the provincial jail. And if only to exacerbate matters, the accused then
escaped through the connivance or inexcusable negligence of their guardians. Of the accused, only the
appellant was subsequently arrested.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed the crime of murder.

Held: The accused were already fugitives from justice, Atty. Renato dela Cruz nevertheless was in
constant touch with them as he was able to procure their signatures for their supplemental petition
before the Court of Appeals. Yet, despite full knowledge that his clients were fugitives from justice and
that bench warrants of arrest 147 and warrants of arrest 148 had been issued against his clients, Atty.
dela Cruz made no effort to persuade them to surrender. A lawyer is absolutely prohibited from
counselling or abetting activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.Hence, lest the general public venture the thought that lawyers approve of their clients'
degeneration into outlaws, Atty. dela Cruz must explain his action, or rather, inaction which, in effect,
aided the accused in making a mockery of our judicial and penal systems.

Thus, the accused-appellant ERIC MANLUSOC is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
and sentencing him and each of his co-accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
jointly and severally the heirs of the victim Isagani Mason the sum of P50,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
 G.R. No. 125909 June 23, 2000
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HERMOGENES FLORA AND EDWIN FLORA, accused-appellants.

Facts: Days before the incident, appellant Flora alias "Bodoy," had a violent altercation with a certain
Oscar Villanueva. Oscar's uncle, Ireneo Gallarte, pacified the two. On the evening of January 9, 1993, a
dance party was held to celebrate the birthday of Jeng-jeng Malubago in Sitio Silab, Barangay Longos,
Kalayaan, Laguna. Appellant Flora, allegedly a suitor of Jeng-jeng Malubago, attended the party with his
brother and co-appellant Edwin Flora, alias "Boboy". Also in attendance were Rosalie Roma, then a high
school student; her mother, Emerita Roma, and her aunt, Flor Espinas. Ireneo Gallarte, a neighbor of the
Romas, was there too. The dancing went on past midnight but at about 1:30, violence erupted. On signal
by Edwin Flora, Hermogenes Flora fired his .38 caliber revolver twice. The first shot grazed the right
shoulder of Flor Espinas, then hit Emerita Roma, below her shoulder. The second shot hit Ireneo Gallarte
who slumped onto the floor. Rosalie, was shocked and could only utter, "si Bodoy, si Bodoy", referring to
Hermogenes Flora. Edwin Flora approached her and, poking a knife at her neck, threatened to kill her
before he and his brother, Hermogenes, fled the scene.

The victims of the gunfire were transported to the Rural Health Unit in Longos, Kalayaan, Laguna, where
Emerita and Ireneo died. Early that same morning of January 10, 1993, the police arrested Edwin Flora at
his rented house in Barangay Bagumbayan, Paete, Laguna. Hermogenes Flora, after learning of the
arrest of his brother, proceeded first to the house of his aunt, Erlinda Pangan, in Pangil, Laguna but later
that day, he fled to his hometown in Pipian, San Fernando, Camarines Sur.

Issue: Whether or not the appellants committed the crime of murder of Ireneo Gallarte and Emerita
Roma

Held: Appellants Hermogenes Flora and Edwin Flora are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
MURDER of Ireneo Gallarte and sentenced to each suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Hermogenes Flora is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the MURDER of Emerita Roma and the
ATTEMPTED MURDER of Flor Espinas. For the MURDER of EMERITA ROMA, Hermogenes Flora is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. For the ATTEMPTED MURDER of Flor Espinas,
Hermogenes Flora is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
maximum.

Laslty, Appellant Edwin Flora is ACQUITTED of the murder of Emerita Roma and the attempted murder
of Flor Espinas.
 G.R. No. 110289 October 7, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SALVADOR BALISTEROS y FLORES, NILO AVESTRO y
CARDONA and ERNESTO GALVANTE y BALISTEROS, accused.
SALVADOR BALISTEROS y FLORES and NILO AVESTRO y CARDONA, Accused-Appellants.

Facts: This case originated from the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 14, wherein the
original three accused were charged with murder, for the killing of one Romeo Abad on August 16, 1991
in Pandi, Bulacan, the information therefor alleging that said accused acted in conspiracy and committed
the felony with treachery and evident premeditation.

Upon arraignment, the three accused pleaded not guilty. During the trial of the case, the prosecution
moved for the exclusion of accused Ernesto Galvante from the information for murder so that he could
become a witness for the Government as particeps criminis. In an order dated April 22, 1992, the lower
court discharged said accused from the information to be utilized as a state witness. A year later, or on
April 6, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision finding herein accused-appellant Salvador Balisteros
and Nilo Avestro guilty as charged.

The lower court’s judgment is rendered, finding the accused Salvador Balisteros and Nilo Avestroz guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder committed with the attendant aggravating
circumstances of Abuse of Superior strength, committed in an uninhabited place, the killing augmented
by another wrong not necessary for its commission (slashing of the intestines), the court hereby
sentences each of the accused to Reclusion Perpetua.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed the crime of murder.

Held: The lower court correctly convicted appellants of murder since the killing was attended by
treachery. Aside from treachery, evident premeditation was also present since the evidence showed
how and when appellants agreed and conspired to kill the victim, followed by a sufficient interval of
time during which they could reflect on the consequences of their felonious intent but during which
period they instead armed themselves and lay in wait for their unsuspecting prey. The same is true with
respect to whether or not the locus delicti was an uninhabited place, since it is not only the distance to
the nearest occupied habitation but also the possibility of securing assistance that should be considered,
32on either of which alternative bases, again, there is no certitude. In any event, even if aggravating
circumstances could be appreciated, under the Constitutional proscription and the penalty for murder
then, the penalty could not be higher than reclusion perpetua.

On the other hand, even disregarding all the aggravating circumstances present or which could have
been considered in this case, since there is no mitigating circumstance the penalty would have to be
imposed in the medium period of that provided by law for murder, which is likewise reclusion perpetua.
The court below, therefore, did not err in the penalty it imposed.
 G. R. No. 141183. January 18, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANILO GULION and MARILYN MIONES, accused.
DANILO GULION, accused-appellant.

Facts: That on or about March 26, 1990, March 13, 1990 and March 18, 1990, in the Municipality of
Tagum, Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Danilo Gulion, conspiring, confederating and with the help of accused Marilyn Miones who owns a
checking account with Far East Bank and Trust Co., with intent to defraud, knowing that the said account
did not have sufficient funds in the bank, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously draw
and issue Far East Bank and Trust Co. Check No. 30799 in the amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P15,000.00), Philippine Currency, in exchange of cash in favor of Roselier Molina, and that upon
presentation of the said check for payment of the bank within 90 days from date of issue, the same was
dishonored for reason "Account Closed" and that inspite of notice of dishonor and repeated demands
made, the said accused failed to make the necessary deposit to cover the amount of the check or to pay
the same, to the damage and prejudice of the said Roselier Molina in the amount of P5,000.00.

Issue: There is thus an issue as to whether the prosecution has ably proved that accused-appellant
conspired with accused-at-large by signing the checks, knowing that those were checks of Miones and
that Miones had no funds in the bank to cover them when presented, with a view to cheat Molina of his
money.

Held: There is no evidence that Miones was authorized by accused-appellant to exchange, on his behalf,
the checks for cash. There is also no evidence that accused-appellant received from Miones any portion
of the proceeds of the said checks. It is principal in a case of estafa through postdated checks that the
accused must have been shown to have obtained money or property from the offended party because
of the issuance of the check.21 There is likewise no showing of past instances where Molina
"rediscounted" Gulion's checks through Miones; the lower courts simply and unquestioningly accepted
as fact that Miones was an authorized agent of Gulion in transacting with Molina.

In other words, the prosecution failed to show by the conduct of accused-appellant before, during and
after the commission of the crime that he was a participant to the defraudation of Molina. Accused-
appellant presented a fairly cohesive and logical explanation for how his signatures figured in the
questioned checks. He stated that as the proprietor of an insurance agency, he habitually signed blank
checks for agents' commissions and office bills, which his secretary then filled out with the pertinent
names of payees, dates and amounts. He signed Miones's checks while in a hurry as he had an
appointment at another town, thinking them to be the usual blank checks laid out by his secretary on his
table for his signature. The Court cannot fully agree with the reasoning of both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals that this other estafa case has no significance to the case at bench, simply because it involves a
different check. In the present case where there is no direct proof of conspiracy between the accused,
and where an implied conspiracy is sought to be proved by an evaluation of the conduct of accused-
appellant before, during, and after the commission of the crime, accused-appellant's acts of filing estafa
charges against his supposed co-conspirator, and his actively seeking her arrest and participating in the
operations that led to her arrest, cast doubt on the prosecution's theory of implied conspiracy.

Hence, accused-appellant cannot be held guilty for estafa under Article 315.
 G.R. No. 124676. May 20, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RESTITUTO MANHUYOD, JR., accused-appellant.

Facts: This is a case of a father having raped his 17-year old daughter after the effectivity of R.A. No.
7659. Accused could thus have been meted out the death penalty pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, if found guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
However, here, the trial court's imposition of capital punishment was not based on said statute, but by
reason of the aggravating circumstance of relationship under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code.

Nevertheless, repulsive and condemnable the act of a father raping his daughter, yet, the Constitution
mandates that an accused is entitled to the presumption of innocence. Thus, after a scrutiny of the
record and the evidence in this case, they were unable to affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Acquittal then is compelled by law since the presumption of innocence was not overcome, the
conviction having been based on hearsay evidence and a miscomprehension of the rule on statements
forming part of the res gestae.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed the crime of rape

Held: Strictly speaking, there is a reference to the unamended provisions of Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code. The original provisions of said Article had, even prior to R.A. No. 7659, already been
amended by R.A. No. 2632 and R.A. No. 4111. Prosecutors are thus admonished to exercise utmost care
and diligence in the preparation of complaintnst or informations to avert legal repercussions which may
prove prejudicial to the interest of the State and private offended parties.

Judgment was rendered REVERSING the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of the Ninth
Judicial Region, Branch 11, sitting in Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, and, for lack of evidence,
ACQUITTING accused-appellant RESTITUTO MANHUYOD, JR., whose immediate release from detention
was hereby ordered.
 G.R. No. 129256. November 17, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOEL PINCA y HUARDE, accused-appellant.

Facts: Appellant Joel Pinca y Huarde was charged with murder. Having said that, that on or about the
16th day of January, 1995, in the Municipality of Balilihan, Province of Bohol, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a round piece of wood, with
intent to kill, and without justifiable motive, with evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of
superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and suddenly attack, assault
and strike one Conrado Angcahan who was unarmed and unaware of the said attack, hitting the latter on
the vital parts of his body resulting [in] his death, and without giving the victim an opportunity to defend
himself; to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased in the amount to be proven during
the trial."

Upon his arraignment on August 11, 1995, the accused-appellant duly assisted by his counsel, Atty.
Alfonso Damalerio, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial ensued. On January 8, 1997, the 3-
page "Judgment" was promulgated, finding accused-appellant guilty as charged but, quite faultily,
sentencing him to the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death."

Issue: Whether or not the penalty imposed is death penalty

Held: Appellant Joel Pinca is guilty of murder. However, there being no aggravating circumstance
warranting the imposition of death, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua. Since the factual
circumstances do not merit the death penalty as prescribed under RA 7659, the Court finds it
unnecessary to tackle the constitutional question raised by appellant. In addition, actual damages to the
heirs of the victim, was granted, as it is consistent with current jurisprudence.
 G.R. No. 125812. November 28, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ABELARDO PARUNGAO, accused-appellant.

Facts: That on or about the 30th day of May, 1989 inside the Pampanga Provincial Jail at Provincial
Capitol, municipality of San Fernando, province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused who are cell-mates at Cell No. 6, with evident
premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strength, and with intent to escape from their
detention cell, by conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain, and
by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and employ personal violence upon Conrado Basa, Emilardo Valencia and Arnel Aldana
who are all Provincial Jail Guards and while engaged in the performance and discharge of their official
duties as such, by beating and striking them repeatedly with pieces of wood (bamboo stick) on the
different parts of their bodies, thereby inflicting upon Conrado Basa and Emilardo Valencia serious and
fatal injuries which cause their death thereafter, and serious physical injuries upon Arnel Aldana, and on
the same occasion thereof and thereafter, did then and there take, steal and carry away with them the
properties belonging to the armory of the Provincial Jail.

Issue: Whether or not Abelardo Parungao and 15 other prisoners committed the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and Serious Physical Injuries

Held: No. In the light of the established circumstances, the Court is not convinced that there is enough
evidence to prove accused-appellants guilt beyond the shadow of a doubt. The paucity of such evidence
only strengthens the suspicion that the prosecution witnesses fabricated their testimony against
accused-appellant because of his having reported their drug trafficking activities in the provincial jail. All
told, the criminal complicity of accused-appellant, either as a co-conspirator or a principal by
inducement in the crime charged, has not been established beyond reasonable doubt.

The decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED. Accused-appellant Abelardo Parungao is
hereby ACQUITTED.
 G.R. Nos. 102361-62 May 14, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUDY FRONDA, defendant-appellant.

Facts: Brothers Edwin & Esminio Balaan were taken by (7) seven armed men in fatigue uniforms with
long firearms, who were suspected to be NPA members, accompanied by the accused Rudy Fronda and
Roderick Padua from the house of Ferminio Balaan. The armed men tied the hands of the deceased at
their back lying down, facing downward, in front of the house of Ferminio. They all proceeded towards
Sitio Tulong passing through the rice fields. Three years later, the bodies or remains of the Balaan
brothers were exhumed. The remains were brought to the house of Freddie Arevalo, a relative of the
deceased where they were laid in state for the wake. The RTC declared Fronda guilty as a principal by
indispensable cooperation. The appellant says he was only taken by the armed men as a pointer &
argued the exempting circumstance under RPC Article 12(6) claiming that all his acts were performed
under the impulse of uncontrollable fear and only so he could save his life.

Issue: Whether or not Fronda can claim the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear under RPC
Article 12(6)

Held: No. In order to be valid, fear should be based on a “real, imminent or reasonable fear for one’s life
or limb.” In this case, the records indicate that appellant was seen being handed by and receiving from
one of the armed men a hunting knife. Further, appellant was not able to explain his failure to report the
incident to the authorities for more than three years. These circumstances establish the fact that the
appellant consciously concurred with the acts of the assailants. In order that the circumstance of
uncontrollable fear may apply, it is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity to escape or self-defense in an equal combat. Appellant had the opportunity to escape
when he was ordered by the armed men to go home after bringing the victims to the mountains, but he
did not. Instead, he joined the armed men and when he was required to bring a spade with which he
was ordered to dig the grave, he did so. Appellant also chose to remain silent for more than three years
before reporting the killing to the authorities. Thus, based on these circumstances, the concurrent and
subsequent acts of appellant cannot be regarded as having been done under the impulse of
uncontrollable fear.
 G.R. No. 128966. August 18, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA, RODERICK GARCIA y GALAMGAM, KENNETH FLORENDO and ELMER
CASTRO, accused, EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA, appellant.

Facts: That on or about the 8th day of June, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating with, and helping 2 other persons, with intent to kill, with evident
premeditation, treachery and use of superior strength, attack, assault and employ personal violence
upon the person of one FREDERICK CAPULONG y DIZON. He was shot with the use of a .22 cal. with
trade mark Paspar Armas, bearing SN-29069 with 5 pieces of caliber 22 ammo inside. Thereafter, he was
hit between his eyes and was struck with the use of a baseball bat in the mouth. As a result, inflicted
upon him were serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said Frederick Capulong y Dizon.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed the crime of murder

Held: In ruling that the crime committed was murder, the trial court found that the killing was attended
by treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. One of these was enough to qualify
the crime as murder while the two others constituted generic aggravating circumstances. The lower
court explained that the evidence established evident premeditation, for Florendos group acted with
deliberate forethought and tenacious persistence in the accomplishment of the criminal design.
Treachery was also proven, because the attack was planned and performed in such a way as to
guarantee the execution of the criminal design without risk to the group. There was also abuse of
superior strength, because the attackers took advantage of their superiority in numbers and weapons.
However, Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court a quo in appreciating two generic aggravating
circumstances, because treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength. Hence, there is only one generic
aggravating circumstance, not two. Notwithstanding the presence of a generic aggravating
circumstance, death penalty cannot be imposed, because the crime was committed before the
effectivity of the Death Penalty Law.
In the case at bar, the penalty of appellant as an accomplice is one degree lower than that of a principal,
which in murder cases is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. He is also entitled to the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Appellant De Vera is CONVICTED as an accomplice, not as a principal, in the crime of murder. He is
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 14
years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
 G.R. No. L-54414 July 9, 1984
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUSTAQUIO LORENO y MALAGA and JIMMY MARANTAL y LONDETE, accused-appellants.

Facts: That on or about the 7th of January, 1978, in the Barangay of Magsaysay, Municipality of
Libmanan, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, together with John Doe, Jose Doe, Richard Doe, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe, and
Ricky Doe, armed with firearms, conspired and confederated together and mutually helped one another,
to rob Elias Monge. They took advantage of night time to better accomplish their purpose, attack and
use violence and intimidation upon the person of Elias Monge. While his hands were tied, the accused
carry away, without the consent of said Elias Monge, owner thereof, of the properties, all in the total
amount of TEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINETEEN PESOS and FIFTY CENTAVOS (P10,619.50). That on
the occasion thereof, the abovenamed accused with lewd design, and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual intercourse with
Monica Monge, a virgin of 16 years old, and with Cristina Monge, all against their will.

Upon arraignment, both accused Eustaquio Loreno y Malaga and Jimmy Marantal y Londete entered a
plea of not guilty to the crime charged.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed the crime of robbery and rape.

Held: There was voluntary participation and conspiracy of the appellants. The foregoing acts, though
separately performed from those of their unidentified companions, clearly showed their community of
interest and concert of criminal design with their unidentified companions which constituted conspiracy
without the need of direct proof of the conspiracy itself. Conspiracy may be inferred and proven by the
6

acts of the accused themselves and when said acts point to joint purpose and concert of action and
community of interest, which unity of purpose and concert of action serve to establish the existence of
conspiracy, and the degree of actual participation petition by each of the conspirators is immaterial.
Conspiracy having been establish, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent
and character of their participation because in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all.

The foregoing crime of robbery with double rape was combat muted on January 7, 1978, by more than
three persons, all armed, 10 in conspiracy with each other, attended by the aggravating circumstances
of band, nighttime and dwelling and is, under P.D. 767, promulgated on August 15, 1975, punishable by
death. But, for lack of the required number of votes, the accused should suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
 G.R. No. 108871 November 19, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GERRY BALLABARE and EDER BALLABARE, accused-appellant.

Facts: That on or about the 16th day of September 1990, in the afternoon, at Sitio Isumbo, Barangay
Pulot II, Municipality of Brooke's Point, Province of Palawan, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspired, confederated together and mutually helped one
another to attack JUAN TACADAO and LEONARDO TACADAO, JR. There was evident premeditation and
treachery, all armed with firearms and with intent to kill, they assaulted and shot the victims, hitting
them in the vital parts of their bodies and inflicting upon them the following injuries. JUAN TACADAO
sustained gunshot wound on his head penetrating his brain and LEONARDO TACADAO, JR. suffered
gunshot wound on his chest penetrating his heart, all causing hemorrhage and shock. These were the
direct and immediate cause of the instantaneous death of LEONARDO TACADAO, JR. and JUAN
TACADAO, who just died shortly thereafter at the Brooke's Point District Hospital, Brooke's Point,
Palawan.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed the crime of murder

Held: The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in imposing in this case the penalty of life
imprisonment for accused-appellant's violation of P.D. No. 1866, §1, par. 2. The crime of illegal
possession of firearm in its aggravated form is punishable by the penalty of death. Since the offense was
committed on September 16, 1990, at a time when the imposition of the death penalty was prohibited,
the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., reclusion perpetua, should instead be imposed. This is not the
equivalent of the penalty of life imprisonment, as the cases have time and again explained.

While "life imprisonment" may appear to be the English translation of reclusion perpetua, in reality, it
goes deeper than that. First, "life imprisonment" is invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized by
special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed under The Revised Penal Code. Second, "life
imprisonment," unlike reclusion perpetua, does not carry with it any accessory penalty. Third, "life
imprisonment" does not appear to have any definite extent or duration, while reclusion perpetua entails
imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, although
the maximum period thereof shall in no case exceed forty (40) years.

Finally, the trial court erred in ordering accused-appellant to pay moral damages because no evidence,
testimonial or otherwise, was presented by the prosecution to support such a finding.

Thus, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED by finding accused-appellant guilty of (1) homicide with
one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance and sentencing him to an indeterminate
terms of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum and (2)
violation of P.D. No. 1866 and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua; and by ordering him to pay the
heirs of deceased Leonardo Tacadao, Jr. in the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity.
 G.R. No. 117407 April 15, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IRVIN TADULAN y EPAN, accused-appellant.

Facts: That on or about the 2nd day of April, 1992 in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, armed with a knife, with lewd design and by means
of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with one Maristel Cruz, a minor, nine (9) years old, without her consent and against her will.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed the crime of rape

Held: In the present case, the supposed pardon of the accused was allegedly granted only by the mother
(Estela Santos) without the concurrence of the offended minor, Maristel Cruz. Hence, even if it be
assumed for the sake of argument that the initial desistance of the said mother from taking any action
against the accused, constitutes pardon, it is clear that such pardon is ineffective without the express
concurrence of the offended minor herself.

Hence, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 157 of Pasig, Metro Manila, was
AFFIRMED, with modification as to the indemnity for the victim which is raised to P50,000.00 from
P30,000.00.
 G.R. No. 102342 July 3, 1992
LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts: The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for violations
of municipal ordinances. The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a
mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the
Province of Rizal. The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. The referral-complaint of the
police was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. The
corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. The
petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but the motion
was denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained by the respondent
judge.

Issue: Whether or not a crime or violations penalized by municipal ordinances may prescribe if filed
beyond the period indicated

Held: The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the
complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution
of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a
misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain
language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent
the problem here sought to be corrected.

The conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from
its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in
accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial
proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal
Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already
prescribed.

Hence, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated October 2, 1991 is SET ASIDE. Criminal
Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of
prescription.
 G.R. No. 139405. March 13, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondent.

Facts: Said accused is Arturo Pacificador, the Chairman of the Board of the National Shipyard and Steel
Corporation, a government-owned corporation, and Jose T. Marcelo, Jr., the President of the Philippine
Smelters Corporation, a private corporation. The accused conspired and confederated with one another
and with other individuals, to facilitate, effect and cause the sale, transfer and conveyance by the
National Shipyard and Steel Corporation of its ownership and all its titles, rights and interests over
parcels of land in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte where the Jose Panganiban Smelting Plant is
located including all the reclaimed and foreshore areas of about 50 hectares to the Philippine Smelters
Corporation by virtue of a contract. The terms and conditions of which are manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the Government as the consideration thereof is only P85,144.50 while the fair
market value thereof at that time was P862,150.00, thereby giving the Philippine Smelters Corporation
unwarranted benefits, advantages and profits and causing undue injury, damage and prejudice to the
government in the amount of P777,005.50.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed the crime of violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

Held: In the case at bar, the petitioner contends that respondent concealed his criminal acts that
effectively prevented discovery thereof. The records of this case do not specifically show how the
respondent allegedly employed acts that could prevent the discovery of any illegality in the transaction
other than the bare assertion of the petitioner. There is also no allegation that the government officials
involved in the transactions connived or conspired with respondent Pacificador. The said government
officials were not even charged in the instant Information. On the other hand, it was never disputed by
the petitioner that the subject Deed of Sale was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of the
Province of Camarines Norte and that the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13060 was
subsequently issued to the vendee, Philippine Smelters Corporation.

In view of the foregoing, there’s no need to discuss the other points raised by the respondent in his
Comment as additional grounds for the denial of the instant petition. The instant petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit
 G.R. No. 125066. July 8, 1998
ISABELITA REODICA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts: The abovementioned accused, Isabelita Velasco Reodica, being then the driver and/or person in
charge of a Tamaraw bearing plate no. NJU-306, unlawfully drive, manage and operate the same in a
reckless, careless, negligent and imprudent manner. There was no regard to traffic laws, rules and
regulations and didn’t even take necessary care and precaution to avoid damage to property and
injuries to person. Hence, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence, the said vehicle
collides with a Toyota Corolla bearing plate no. NIM-919 driven and owned by Norberto Bonsol, thereby
causing damage amounting to P8,542.00, to the damage and prejudice of its owner, in the
aforementioned amount of P8,542.00.

That as further consequence due to the strong impact, said Norberto Bonsol suffered bodily injuries
which required medical attendance for a period of less than nine (9) days and incapacitated him from
performing his customary labor for the same period of time.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case of petitioner who was charged with
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury

Held: In the instant case, the offenses involved are covered and ruled by the Revised Penal Code, Article
91. Thus, the prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the
complaint with the fiscals office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the
termination of this case. Therefore, the court cannot uphold petitioner’s defense of prescription of the
offenses charged in the information in this case.

Thus, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE as the Regional Trial Court, whose decision was affirmed therein, had no
jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 33919.

Criminal Case is ordered DISMISSED.

 G.R. No. 128055 April 18, 2001
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO,
AS PRESIDING JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION, respondents.

Facts: The accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, is a public officer, being then the Commissioner of
the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. With evident bad faith and manifesting partiality in
the exercise of her official functions, she unlawfully and criminally approve the application for
legalization for the stay of certain aliens. They arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation
of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988. This prohibits the legalization of said disqualified aliens,
and knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified, the accused still legalized their stay and gave
unwarranted benefits.

Issue: Whether or not the accused violated the Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Held: It should be noted that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided already by the First Division of
the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court, nevertheless, deems
it appropriate to render the decision for future guidance on the significant issue raised by petitioner.
Having said that, the instant petition for certiorari was DISMISSED.
 G.R. No. 108488. July 21, 1997
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODENCIO NARCA Y GAGARIN, BENJAMIN
NARCA Y GAGARIN, ROGELIO NARCA Y GAGARIN, and JAIME BALDELAMAR Y SELMO, defendants-
appellants.

Facts: On March 10, 1990, between 7:00 to 8:00 oclock in the evening, after spouses Mauro Reglos, Jr.
and Elizabeth Reglos have just come from the house of the father of Mauro Reglos, Jr. at Barangay
Cavite Plum, Guimba, Nueva Ecija. On their way home to Sta. Ana, Guimba, Nueva Ecija, accused
Benjamin Narca suddenly hacked Mauro Reglos, Jr. at the back portion of his head with a long bolo
known as panabas. When Mauro was about to fall at his back, Jaime Baldelamar, Rogelio Narca and
Rodencio Rudy Narca suddenly appeared, and they took turns in hacking Mauro with bolos. When
Mauro was being hacked, his wife Elizabeth screamed for help, and Arturo Reglos and Dante Reglos
responded and arrived at the scene of the incident. They saw Benjamin, Rodencio Rudy and Rogelio, all
surnamed Narca, and Jaime Baldelamar, all armed with bolos, guarding their brother Mauro Reglos, Jr.
who was lying face downward, soaked with blood, but still alive. Arturo Reglos and Dante Reglos and
Elizabeth Reglos cannot approach Mauro Reglos, Jr. because they were threatened by the Narca
brothers and Jaime Baldelamar. Two minutes after Arturo and Dante Reglos arrived, all the accused left,
but accused Rogelio Narca returned and hacked Mauro Reglos once more at his back.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed the crime of murder

Held: It is erroneous for the trial court to impose on appellants life imprisonment as it is nowhere in the
scheme of penalties in the Revised Penal Code nor is it a penalty similar to reclusion perpetua. The Court
had made it clear that reclusion perpetua is not the same as life imprisonment, and that no trial judge
should mistake one for the other.

Prior to the Heinous Crimes Law (R.A. 7659) the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal maximum to
death. In accordance with the graduation of penalties in Article 63, when there is neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance, as in this case, the penalty is the medium period which is reclusion perpetua.

Thus, subject to the modification that each appellant shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
not life imprisonment, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija
convicting appellants Rodencio, Benjamin, Rogelio all surnamed Narca and Jaime Baldelamar of murder
and the imposition of the monetary awards are AFFIRMED.
 G.R. No. 106531 November 18, 1999
FERNANDO GARCIA, JUANITO GARCIA, and WENCESLAO TORRES, petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. RICARDO P. GALVEZ, in his official capacity as the Presiding
Judge of Branch 29, Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, respondents.

Facts: The case before the Court is a special civil action for mandamus to compel the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 29, Iloilo, to forward the records of Criminal Case No. 20774 to the Supreme Court for
automatic review of the decision finding petitioners guilty of murder and sentencing each of them to
reclusion perpetua, to pay jointly and severally, the heirs of Jose Estrella the sum of P30,000.00 as civil
indemnity, to suffer the accessory penalties of the law and to pay the costs.

Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court must automatically review a trial court's decision convicting
an accused of a capital offense and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. In other words, is the accused
not required to interpose an appeal from a trial court's decision sentencing him to reclusion perpetua to
the Supreme Court because the latter's review of the sentence is automatic?

Held: The issue is not new. It was consistently ruled that it is only in cases where the penalty actually
imposed is death that the trial court must forward the records of the case to the Supreme Court for
automatic review of the conviction.

As the petitioners did not file a notice of appeal or otherwise indicate their desire to appeal from the
decision convicting them of murder and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua, the decision
became final and unappealable.

Consequently, mandamus will not issue to compel the trial court to elevate the records to the Supreme
Court.

The Court hereby DISMISSES the petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to elevate the records
of Criminal Case No. 20774 to the Supreme Court.
 G.R. No. 122290. April 6, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REYNALDO BAGO y MADRID, accused-appellant,
ARMANDO CAPARAS y CUENCO and RODOLFO ONGSECO y VEGO, accused.

Facts: REYNALDO BAGO y MADRID, being then employed as factory worker of the Azkcon Metal
Industries detailed with the Power Construction Supply Company has free access to the different
departments of the company. With grave abuse of confidence, in conspiracy with his co-accused
ARMANDO CAPARAS and RODOLFO ONGSECO y VEGO, they mutually helped one another, with intent to
gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner to take, steal and carry away assorted cold
rolled sheets and scraps valued in the total amount of P194,865.00. Such items belong to Power
Construction Supply Company, represented by WILLIAM HILO, to the damage and prejudice of the
owner thereof in the aforementioned amount.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed the crime of theft

Held: The appellant was correctly meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties
of death under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code.

As regards the grant of actual damages, the rule is that actual damages cannot be allowed unless
supported by evidence in the record. William Hilo testified that the value of the missing cold rolled
sheets was P192,000.00 and the incurred cutting cost was P2,448.00, for a total value of P194,448.00.
Thus, the award for actual damages must be reduced by P417.00.

Thus, decision of the Regional Trial Court was AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that the actual
damages is reduced to P194,448.00.
 G.R. Nos. 89591-96. January 24, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge of
Branch 12, Regional Trial Court of Antique, and AVELINO T. JAVELLANA, respondents.

Facts: On September 8, 1999, the People’s motion seeking reconsideration of August 13, 1990 decision
in these cases was denied. In said resolution, it was held that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda
committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of August 8, 1989 giving custody over
private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court. At that time,
sufficient reason was shown why private respondent Javellana should not be detained at the Antique
Provincial Jail. The trial courts order specifically provided for private respondents detention at the
residence of Atty. del Rosario. However, private respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam
around but was to be held as detention prisoner in said residence.

Issue: Whether or not Avelino T. Javellana and Arturo F. Pacificador shall be detained

Held: As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under
the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case
against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be
stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot practice
their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in
detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention. Consequently, all the accused in
Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 must be confined in the Provincial Jail of Antique.

Considering that the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 has dragged on for more than ten (10)
years, the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, is ordered to
continue with the trial of said criminal cases with all deliberate dispatch and to avoid further delay.

Hence, order of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE. All accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355,
including Avelino T. Javellana and Arturo F. Pacificador are ordered detained at the Provincial Jail of
Antique, San Jose, Antique, effective immediately, and shall not be allowed to go out of the jail for any
reason or guise, except upon prior written permission of the trial court for a lawful purpose.
 G.R. No. 106357 September 3, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PRISCILLA BALASA, NORMITA VISAYA, GUILLERMO FRANCISCO, NORMA FRANCISCO and ANALINA
FRANCISCO, accused, NORMA FRANCISCO, GUILLERMO FRANCISCO and ANALINA FRANCISCO,
accused-appellants.

Facts: The above-named accused being the Manager and employees of the PANATA Foundation of the
Philippines, Inc., the said accused conspiring and confederating with one another and operating as a
syndicate, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one Estrella San Gabriel y
Lacao. By means of false representation and fraud, which they made to said Estrella San Gabriel to the
effect that as an investor/subscriber to the PANATA Foundation, Inc. which is a non-stock corporation,
and by means of other similar deceit induce the said Estrella San Gabriel to give and deliver to the said
accused the amount of P5,500.00 as her investment in said foundation. Likewise, by manifestation and
misrepresentation by the said accused that the said invested amount will be doubled or tripled within a
certain period of days, said accused knows fully well that their manifestation and representations were
false and fraudulent. In fact, they obtained the amount with intent to defraud, misapply, misappropriate
and convert the said amount for their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of
said Estrella San Gabriel in the amount of P5,500.00, Philippine Currency.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed the crime of estafa

Held: Appellant ANALINA FRANCISCO is hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes charged under Criminal Case
Nos. 8428 and 8734 on ground of reasonable doubt and her immediate release from custody is ordered
unless she is being held on other legal grounds.
 G.R. No. 99865. March 28, 1994.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROLANDO CORPUS y MINA, BAYANI SANTOS y
VIDAD, PETER DOE, RICHARD DOE and JOHN DOE, Accused, ROLANDO CORPUS y MINA and BAYANI
SANTOS y VIDAD, Accused-Appellants.

Facts: The above-named accused conspiring, confederating and actually helping one another, with
intent to gain and by means of violence and intimidation, armed with firearms, entered the house of
Eustaquio P. Bautista, Sr. and once inside the house, unlawfully ] take, steal and carry away T.V. set
(Sony), Betamax machine, Sansui Stereo Component, Seiko wrist watch, assorted clothes, jewelries,
shoes, food-stuffs, other valuable personal belongings, cash money of undetermined amount and
Yamaha 100 CC motorcycle. On the occasion of such robbery, they took with them Arsenio Bautista, and
with intent to kill, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
several times Arsenio Bautista with bladed instrument/s that resulted to his immediate death, to the
prejudice of Eustaquio P. Bautista, Sr. and the heirs of his son Arsenio Bautista.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed the crime of Robbery with Homicide

Held: The trial court, after sentencing appellants to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua credited
them the entire duration of their preventive imprisonment from November 14, 1989.

Under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, "offenders who have undergone preventive imprisonment
shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time
during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment, if the detention prisoner agrees
voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners."
Otherwise, he shall only be credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during
which he has undergone preventive imprisonment (As amended by R.A. 6127 and B.P. Blg. 85).

This allowance should be made in the case where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua because it
does not make any distinction between temporal and perpetual penalties. Moreover, under Article 27 of
the Revised Penal Code, the duration of reclusion perpetua is to be computed at 30 years (I Reyes, The
Revised Penal Code, 1981 ed., p. 590; U.S. v. Ortencio, 38 Phil. 341 [1981]).

The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

 [G.R. Nos. 100382-100385. March 19, 1997]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO TABACO, accused-appellant.

Facts: In four related informations, Mario Tabaco was charged with four counts of Murder for shooting
to death on March 22, 1987 Capt. Oscar Tabulog (Criminal Case No. 10-259), Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola
(Criminal Case No. 10-270), Felicito Rigunan (Criminal Case No. 10-284) and Pat. Romeo Regunton
(Criminal Case No. 10-317). Except for the names of the victims, the informations in these four (4) cases
identically read:

That on or about March 22, 1987, in the Municipality of Aparri, Province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Mario Tabaco, armed with a gun, with intent to kill,
with evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack and shoot one [name], inflicting upon him several wounds which caused his death.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed a complex crime

Held: Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst of gunfire cannot be considered a
complex crime. They are separate crimes. The accused-appellant must therefore be held liable for each
and every death he has caused, and sentenced accordingly to four sentences of reclusion perpetua.

Hence, no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in finding accused-appellant guilty
of four (4) counts of Murder and one (1) count of Homicide with frustrated homicide, the judgment
appealed from should be, as it is, hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that four sentences of
reclusion perpetua be hereby imposed.

[G.R. No. 126114. May 11, 2000]

 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JIMMY SABREDO y GARBO, accused-appellant.

Facts: That on or about June 27, 1994, and days thereafter from sitio Caglagang, barangay Caguyong,
Burbon, Cebu the said accused with force and intimidation and against the consent of complainant
Judeliza E. Sabredo abduct the latter to sitio Cagba, barangay Tugbo, Municipality of Masbate, Province
of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this court and on the house of one auntie Nilda,
accused with a bolo did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse of
said Judeliza E. Sabredo on the night of July 4, 1994, against her will and consent.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed complex crime of abduction with rape

Held: The trial court did not award any indemnity ex delicto, which current jurisprudence has fixed at
P50,000.00. Accordingly, appellant is further sentenced to indemnify private complainant in the amount
of P50,000.00 for the rape he committed against her. As to moral damages, the trial court's award of
P50,000.00 in her favor was duly supported by evidence on record and is in order.

Therefeore, the decision of the Regional Trial Court was hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Jimmy Sabredo y
Garbo is declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape only as defined and penalized under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty imposed on him is hereby REDUCED to reclusion
perpetua. He is also ordered to indemnify the victim, Judeliza Sabredo y Espinosa, in the amount of
FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as civil indemnity, and to pay her FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00)
PESOS as moral damages.

[G.R. No. 133025. February 17, 2000]

 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RADEL GALLARDE, accused-appellant.

Facts: That on or about the 6th day of May 1997, in the evening, amidst the field located at Brgy.
Trenchera, Municipality of Tayug, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one EDITHA TALAN, a minor-
10 years of age, against her will and consent, and thereafter, with intent to kill, cover the nose and
mouth of the said minor resulting to her death and then bury her in the field, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of said EDITHA TALAN

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed the crime of murder

Held: Homicide, which the court finds to be the only crime committed by GALLARDE, is defined in Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code and is punished with reclusion temporal. In the absence of any modifying
circumstance, it shall be imposed in its medium period. GALLARDE is entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. Accordingly, he can be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from ten (10) years of the medium period of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of the medium period of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Thus, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court finding accused-appellant RADEL GALLARDE guilty
of the crime of murder is hereby modified. As modified, RADEL GALLARDE is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of Homicide, defined under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years of the
medium period of of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of the
medium period of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the victim, Editha Talan, the
sum of P70,000 as liquidated actual damages and P50,000 as indemnity for the death of Editha Talan.

G.R. No. 159208 August 18, 2006

 RENNIE DECLARADOR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. SALVADOR S. GUBATON, Presiding Judge, Branch 14, Roxas City, and FRANK BANSALES,
Respondents.

Facts: That on or about 9:45 o’clock in the morning of July 25, 2002, inside a classroom in Cabug-Cabug
National High School in President Roxas, Capiz, the accused armed with a knife and with intent to kill,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said knife his
teacher, one YVONNE DECLARADOR. She was hit and inflicted multiple fatal stab wounds in the
different parts of the body which caused her immediate death.

The crime was committed with the attendance of the qualifying aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength. The attack was made by the accused using a long knife,
which the latter carried along with him from his house to the school against his lady teacher, who was
unarmed and defenseless at that time and by inflicting upon the latter about fifteen (15) fatal knife
wounds resulting to her death.

Issue: Whether or not the sentence of respondent Frank Bansales be suspended

Held: Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the
court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juveniles
in Conflict with the Law.

The law merely amended Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended by A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, in that the
suspension of sentence shall be enjoyed by the juvenile even if he is already 18 years of age or more at
the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. The other disqualifications in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603,
as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC have not been deleted from Section 38 of Rep. Act
No. 9344. Evidently, the intention of Congress was to maintain the other disqualifications as provided in
Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. Hence, juveniles who
have been convicted of a crime the imposable penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment
or reclusion perpetua to death or death, are disqualified from having their sentences suspended.

Case law has it that statutes in pari materia should be read and construed together because enactments
of the same legislature on the same subject are supposed to form part of one uniform system; later
statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts
the legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing legislations on the subject and to have enacted
the new act with reference thereto. Statutes in pari materia should be construed together to attain the
purpose of an expressed national policy.

The petition is GRANTED. The Order of the respondent Judge suspending the sentence of respondent
Frank Bansales is NULLIFIED.

G.R. No. 88232 February 26, 1990

 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. HENEDINO P. EDUARTE, in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC, Br. 22, Cabagan,
Isabela; ELVINO AGGABAO and VILLA SURATOS, respondents.

Facts: Assailed in this petition is the order of the Regional Trial Court of Cabagan, Isabela, Branch 22,
dismissing the criminal information for concubinage filed against private respondents, on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. The antecedent facts are as follows:

Upon complaint by Alma T. Aggabao, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Cabagan, Isabela filed on July
25, 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of Cabagan, Isabela, Branch 22, an information against private
respondents Elvino Aggabao and Villa Suratos for the crime of concubinage [Annex "A" to the Petition;
Rollo, p. 17.] allegedly committed in September 1983. Upon being arraigned, private respondents
entered a plea of not guilty [Annex "B" to the Petition; Rollo, p. 19]. The complainant was represented
before the trial court by a private prosecutor. During the trial, private respondents filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They argued that concubinage, under Art. 334 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) is punishable with prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,
which is equivalent to imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2)
months, well within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court, and not of the
Regional Trial Court. The prosecution filed an opposition to the motion contending that the Regional
Trial Court has jurisdiction over the crime of concubinage because destierro, the imposable penalty on
the concubine [Art. 334, RPC] has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years [Art. 27,
RPC]. The trial court sustained private respondent's position and granted the motion to dismiss.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over crime of concubinage

Held: In fine, the Court, after a careful consideration of the pertinent laws, as well as the jurisprudence
on the matter, holds that the crime of concubinage is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
inferior courts. The Regional Trial Courts have no original jurisdiction over the said crime. Hence, the
court a quo committed no reversible error in dismissing the criminal information against private
respondents. At any rate, considering that the dismissal of the case by the court a quo on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense [Rule 117, Secs. 6 and 7,
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure] and considering further that the crime has not yet prescribed [See
Art. 90, RPC], the offended wife is not precluded from initiating the filing of another criminal information
against private respondents before the proper court.

The Court Resolved to DENY the petition for lack of merit.

[G.R. No. 117106. June 26, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JIMMY ALBERCA, accused-appellant.

Facts: The above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with several others
whose true names and real identities have not as yet been ascertained, unlawfully entered the
compound of Rebecca Saycon. With intent to kill and with the use of bladed weapons, the accused
stabbed FELIPE CLIMACO, a security guard on his body several times and JOEY RODRIGUEZ, a house boy
thereat on his chest. Respectively, inflicted upon FELIPE CLIMACO were serious and mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death and injuries to JOEY RODRIGUEZ. Thereafter
said accused with intent to gain, by means of such violence and intimidation against persons, did then
and there, wilfully, and unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away the service firearm of FELIPE
CLIMACO, 1.38 caliber revolver with Serial No. 31897 with six (6) rounds of ammunitions of still
undetermined value, belonging to Triad Security & Allied Services, Incorporated, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of Felipe Climaco, Joey Rodriguez of the injuries sustained [sic] and Triad Security
& Allied Services, Incorporated.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed the crime of Robbery with Homicide and Physical Injuries

Held: The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, so far as it finds the accused-appellant
guilty of robbery with homicide is, AFFIRMED with the modification that the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is imposed on him for lack of necessary votes to affirm the death sentence.

[G.R. No. 152044. July 3, 2003]

 DOMINGO LAGROSA and OSIAS BAGUIN, petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Facts: The Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Branch 2, rendered a decision in Criminal Case No.
8243, finding petitioners Domingo Lagrosa and Osias Baguin guilty of violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705,
as amended (The Revised Forestry Code), for having in their possession forest products without the
requisite permits. The trial court sentenced them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
years of prision mayor, as maximum. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the decision was denied
by the trial court on November 21, 1996.

Petitioners appealed their conviction to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the
conviction of the petitioners, with the modification as to the penalty imposed, which was reduced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum,
to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty one (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum. The
decision became final and executory on April 12, 2000.

On August 29, 2001, petitioners filed an Application for Probation with the trial court, which, as
mentioned at the outset, was denied. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the
trial court. Hence, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67308. On January 11, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
decision affirming the questioned resolutions of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners be granted their Application for Probation

Held: Although it has been suggested that an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for
probation if the appeal is solely to reduce the penalty to within the probationable limit may be
equitable, the court didn’t accept this proposition, specially given the factual circumstances of this case.
Had the petitioners appeal from the decision of the trial court raised the impropriety of the penalty
imposed upon them as the sole issue, perhaps this Court would have been more sympathetic to their
plight. Unfortunately, their misrepresentation has led to their own undoing.

Hence, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals denying petitioners Application for
Probation, and its Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, is AFFIRMED.

[G.R. No. 125108. August 3, 2000]

 ALEJANDRA PABLO, petitioner, vs. HON. SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO, Presiding Judge, Branch 43, Regional
Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Dagupan City and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts: At bar is an original petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court imputing grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43,
Dagupan City, for denying petitioners application for probation and the motion for reconsideration of
two Orders dated March 25, 1996 and April 29, 1996, respectively.

On January 12, 1994, petitioner Alejandra Pablo was charged with a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, in three separate Informations, for issuing three bad
checks in the total amount of P2,334.00 each to complainant Nelson Mandap.

All three Informations alleged that on or about the 25th of May, 1993, petitioner did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally draw, issue and deliver various checks to Nelson Mandap, in partial
payment of a loan she obtained from him, knowing that at the time of the issuance of such checks, she
did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the bank. Subject checks were dishonored by the drawee
bank upon presentment for payment, it appearing that the current account of petitioner had been
closed, and she failed to pay the amount or make arrangements for the payment thereof, despite notice
of dishonor.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners be granted their Application for Probation

Held: It is well-settled that the probation law is not a penal statute; and therefore, the principle of liberal
interpretation is inapplicable. And when the meaning is clearly discernible from the language of the
statute, there is no room for construction or interpretation.

The petition is hereby DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 121592 July 5, 1996

 ROLANDO P. DELA TORRE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MARCIAL VILLANUEVA, respondents.

Facts: Petitioner Rolando dela Torre was disqualified from running as mayor of Cavinti Laguna on the
ground that he was convicted of violation the Anti-Fencing Law. He argues that he should not be
disqualified because he is serving probation of his sentence and hence, the execution of his judgment
was suspended together with all its legal consequences.

Issue: Whether or not Dela Torre is disqualified to run for public office

Held: Moral turpitude is considered as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule
of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.

In this case of fencing, actual knowledge by the "fence" of the fact that property received is stolen
displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one's rightful property as that which animated the
robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. Hence Dela Torre is
disqualified from seeking public office. As regards to his argument that he is under probation, the court
ruled that the legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence. Dela Torre's
conviction subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a
judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for
probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application for probation.

G.R. No. 108395 March 7, 1997

 HEIRS OF THE LATE TEODORO GUARING, JR., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., and ANGELES CUEVAS, respondents.

Facts: This case arose from an unfortunate vehicular accident which happened on November 7, 1987,
along the North Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico, Pampanga. Involved in the accident were a
Mitsubishi Lancer car driven by Teodoro Guaring, Jr., who died as a result of the mishap, Philippine
Rabbit Bus No. 415, driven by Angeles Cuevas, and a Toyota Cressida car, driven by Eligio Enriquez. The
Mitsubishi Lancer was heading north, at the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour. Following it was the
Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, with Plate No. CVD-584. On the other hand, the Toyota Cressida was
cruising on the opposite lane, bound for Manila.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent shall pay the corresponding damages

Held: Because the Court of Appeals did not consider the evidence in the civil case, this case should be
remanded to it so that it may render another decision in accordance with the law and the evidence. The
issues raised by the petitioners are essentially factual and require the evaluation of evidence, which is
the function of the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. They cannot be
decided in this Court.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals
with instruction to render judgment with reasonable dispatch in accordance with law and the evidence
presented in the case.

[G.R. No. 135862. May 2, 2002]

 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAFAEL PRINCIPE y MOLINA, accused-
appellant.

Facts: That on or about the 9th day of August, 1998, in the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of one ARLENE IPURONG y GONZALES, who was then 6 years of age and by
reason of (or) on the occasion thereof, said ARLENE IPURONG y GONZALES was killed.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed the crime of rape

Held: The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of death. Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code
provides for the imposition of the death penalty when, by reason or on the occasion of the rape,
homicide is committed. In this case, accused-appellant knocked Arlene unconscious to facilitate his
dastardly design. The severity of the blows caused her death. Thus, the imposable penalty is death. The
fact that Arlene was below seven years old at the time of the rape cannot be taken into account against
accused-appellant as, although her age was alleged in the information, it was not proven during the trial.

The judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Cabanatuan City is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Arlene Ipurong,
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P15,000.00 as temperate damages, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

[G.R. No. 132676. April 4, 2001]

 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAIME CARPO, OSCAR IBAO, WARLITO IBAO and
ROCHE IBAO, accused-appellants.

Facts: In convicting Jaime Carpo, Warlito Ibao, Oscar Ibao and Roche Ibao of the multiple murder of
Florentino, Norwela and Nissan Dulay and the attempted murder of Noemi Dulay the trial Court gave full
credit to the testimony of Ruben. It accepted his straightforward testimony and ruled that "at no
instance throughout the twin testimonies of Meriales did the Court notice a twitch of falsehood on his
lips. Accordingly, in accordance with Sec. 6, RA 7659, and Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code the trial
court imposed upon all of the accused the supreme penalty of death and ordered them to solidarily
indemnify the heirs of the deceased as well as Noemi Dulay in the amount of P600,000.00.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed the crime of murder

Held: Four (4) members of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659, insofar as it prescribes the
death penalty, is unconstitutional. Nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the Court, by a majority
vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be accordingly imposed.

Hence, the assailed Decision of the trial court finding accused-appellants JAIME CARPO, OSCAR IBAO,
WARLITO IBAO and ROCHE IBAO GUILTY of the complex crime of multiple murder with attempted
murder and sentencing them to the supreme penalty of death is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that they are ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Florentino, Norwela and Nissan, all surnamed
Dulay, P50,000.00 as death indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages for each death or an aggregate
amount of P300,00.00. In addition, accused-appellants are ordered to pay Noemi Dulay P30,000.00 as
indemnity for her attempted murder.

[G.R. No. 112346. March 29, 1996]

EVELYN YONAHA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF HECTOR CAETE, respondents.

Facts: That on April 14, 1990, at or about 11:45 A.M., in Basak, Lapulapu City, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, while driving a Toyota Tamaraw sporting
Plate No. GCX-237 duly registered in the name of Raul Cabahug and owned by EK SEA Products, did then
and there unlawfully and feloniously maneuver and operate it in a negligent and reckless manner,
without taking the necessary precaution to avoid injuries to person and damage to property, as a result
thereof the motor vehicle he was then driving bumped and hit Hector Caete, which caused the latter’s
instantaneous death, due to the multiple severe traumatic injuries at different parts of his body.

Issue: Whether or not private respondent’s motion for the issuance of a writ of subsidiary execution be
granted

Held: The subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code requires the
existence of an employer-employee relationship; that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry;
that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the
discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits while in the discharge of such duties);
and that said employee is insolvent. The judgment of conviction of the employee, of course, concludes
the employer and the subsidiary liability may be enforced in the same criminal case, but to afford the
employer due process, the court should hear and decide that liability on the basis of the conditions
required therefor by law.

Thus, said orders are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner shall be given the right to a hearing on the motion for
the issuance of a writ of subsidiary execution filed by private respondents, and the case is REMANDED to
the trial court for further proceedings conformably with our foregoing opinion.