John Moore (Appellant) v. The Regents of University of California (Respondent) Citation-51 Cal. 3d 120 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 793 P.2d 479
John Moore (Appellant) v. The Regents of University of California (Respondent) Citation-51 Cal. 3d 120 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 793 P.2d 479
v.
The Regents of University of California (Respondent)
Citation- 51 Cal. 3d 120; 271 Cal. Rptr. 146; 793 P.2d 479
INTRODUCTION
For this situation it is to be decide if Appellant has expressed a reason for activity against his
doctor and different Respondents for utilizing his cells in possibly worthwhile therapeutic
research without his authorization. Appealing party affirms that his doctor neglected to reveal
prior scrutinization and financial engrossment in the cells before acquiring agree to the
therapeutic methodology by which they were separated. The higher court supported every
one of respondents' protests than the third changed objection, and the Court of Appeal
switched. It has been hold that the protest expresses a reason for activity for rupture of the
doctor's divulgence commitments, yet not for conversion.
CASE BACKGROUND
PARTIES- John Moore (Appellant)
v.
The Regents of University of California (Respondent)
MAJORITY JUDGES- 1. Edward A. Panelli
2. Malcom M. Lucas
3. David N. Eagleson
4. Joyce L. Kennard
MINORITY JUDGES- 1. Armand Arabian (Concurring Opinion)
2. Allen Broussard (Concurring/Dissenting Opinion)
3. Stanley Mosk (Dissenting Opinion)
SUMMARY OF FACTS
Breach- The Respondent broke his obligation by neglecting to unveil certain data,
misappropriation of body tissues, disregard of duties. The reason for activity can
appropriately be portrayed either as the rupture of a trustee obligation to uncover the realities
which matters to the patient's assent or, then again, as the exhibition of therapeutic methods
without first having acquired the patient's informed assent.
Cause-A claim for an offer in the potential benefits from items or research that had been
gotten from his cell line, without his insight or assent was organized. Moore's claim affirmed
that Golde had known about the potential for budgetary advantage when restorative assent
was gotten, yet he had covered that from Moore.
Injury-
It is important to note that no law prohibits a physician from conducting research in the same
area in which he practices. Progress in medicine often depends upon physicians, such as those
practicing at the university hospital where Moore received treatment, who conduct research
while caring for their patients.
Golde argues that the scientific use of cells that have already been removed cannot possibly
affect the patient's medical interests. The argument is correct in one instance but not in
1
Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal. 3d 279, 242 [ 104 Cal. Rptr, 505, 502 P. 2d7]
2
Cobbs v. Grant, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 242, 104 Cal.Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1.
another. If a physician has no plans to conduct research on a patient's cells at the time he
recommends the medical procedure by which they are taken, then the patient's medical
interests have not been impaired. In that instance the argument is correct. On the other hand,
a physician who does have a pre-existing research interest might, consciously or
unconsciously, take that into consideration in recommending the procedure. In that instance
the argument is incorrect: the physician's extraneous motivation may affect his judgment and
is, thus, material to the patient's consent.
A. Conversion
Moore also attempts to characterize the invasion of his rights as a conversion—a tort that
protects against interference with possessory and ownership interests in personal property.
He theorizes that he continued to own his cells following their removal from his body, at least
for the purpose of directing their use, and that he never consented to their use in potentially
lucrative medical research. Thus, to complete Moore's argument, Respondent's unauthorized
use of his cells constitutes a conversion. As a result of the alleged conversion, Moore claims a
proprietary interest in each of the products that any of the defendants might ever create from
his cells or the patented cell line.
Finally, the subject matter of the Regents' patent—the patented cell line and the products
derived from it—cannot be Moore's property. This is because the patented cell line is both
factually and legally distinct from the cells taken from Moore's body. Human cell lines are
patentable because " long haul adjustment and development of human tissues and cells in
culture is troublesome—regularly thought to be a workmanship ․," and the likelihood of
accomplishment is low. It is this innovative exertion that patent law rewards, not the
disclosure of normal crude materials. Subsequently, Moore's charges that he claims the cell
line and the items got from it are conflicting with the patent, which establishes a legitimate
assurance that the cell line is the result of development. Since such claims are simply
contentions or finishes of law, they obviously don't tie us.
The Court inspected Appellant's case under the current law and found that no legal choice
could be found to help the case, that statutory law radically restrains the proceeding with
enthusiasm of a patient in extracted tissue, lastly that the topic of the patent can't in any way,
shape or form have a place with Appellant. The Court noticed a California resolution which
requested that any materials expelled from patients be discarded in a sheltered issue. The
authoritative plan was, as indicated by the Court, to constrain the patient's responsibility for
material extracted over the span of medicinal treatment. The Court finds that the cell line is
verifiably and lawfully unmistakable from any piece of materials expelled from Appellant's
body.
The Court is worried about the privileges of the patient. Be that as it may, transformation is a
severe obligation tort which subjects guiltless outsiders to risk for acts which may not be
under their course and control. The court found that the rupture of trustee obligation
hypothesis and the absence of educated assent hypothesis were more qualified to secure the
privileges of patients. Therefore, the court declined to expand change obligation in this suit.
Holding/Rule
1. There is no property rights to the bodily fluids that have been removed from the body.
2. Moore’s complaint states a cause of action for fiduciary duty and lack of informed
consent but not for conversion. Moore's objection expresses a reason for action for
fiduciary obligation and absence of informed assent however not for conversion.
LIST OF SIMILAR JUDGEMENTS
1. Allard v. Pac. Nat'l Bank - 99 Wash. 2d 394, 663 P.2d 104 (1983).
The beneficiaries alleged that the trustee failed to comply with the ordinary standards
of trust administration when it sold the property, and that the trustee breached its
fiduciary duty in its management of the trusts by failing to inform the beneficiaries of
the impending sale when the only asset of the trusts was the property. The
beneficiaries also alleged that the trustee further breached its fiduciary duties by
failing to ensure that the sale was for the highest possible price, and that the trustee
had a duty to either obtain an independent appraisal of the property or to place the
property on the open market prior to selling it. The court held that the trustee failed to
adequately notify the
beneficiaries of the impending sale and failed to attain the highest price by failing to
adequately market the property. Further, the beneficiaries were entitled to recover all
their attorney fees expended at both the trial and on appeal because the trustee
breached its fiduciary duty.
2. Augusta Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mason, 274 Va. 199, 645 S.E.2d 290 (2007).
There is a fiduciary duty or obligation in all situations where unique certainty is rested
upon the person who in great heart will undoubtedly act with due respect for the
enthusiasm of the one resting the certainty. Consolidated in any agreement between a
trustee and its chief is a commitment to uncover anything known to him that may
influence the key's choice on whether to act or the proper behaviour. In this suit by an
insurance agency against a protection specialist, any guardian obligation purportedly
ruptured existed exclusively as a result of the legally binding connection between the
back up plan and the operator and in that capacity the guarantor has neglected to
declare a legitimate case for break of trustee obligation.
3. Patel v. Anand, L.L.C., 264 Va. 81, 564 S.E.2d 140 (2002).
On the off chance that where guardian retains data from its head, which whenever
revealed, would have made the chief reject the exchange, the proportion of harms is
the distinction between the estimation of the thing expected and the estimation of the
thing really got. Offended party for this situation neglected to present proof dependent
on that standard.