AMERICAN SECURITY PROJECT

Nuclear Arsenals of the U.S.,

Russia, and China
Fact Sheet
Jonathan Madeira & Matthew Wallin - September 2020

Introduction
For nearly half a century after the first use of nuclear weapons, the world was stuck in the middle of a nuclear arms
race between the United States and Soviet Union. During and after this period, arms control agreements played
a major role in preventing a nuclear holocaust, and continue to do so today.
o Despite the competition between the two, U.S. and Soviet leaders recognized the need to discuss,
and ultimately constrain, their respective nuclear capabilities.
• This recognition led to seminal agreements between Moscow and Washington. Notable agreements include:
o The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I;
o SALT II;
o The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I;
o START II;
o The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty);
o The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT or Moscow Treaty) and;
o New START.
• New START is the last existing nuclear arms control agreement between the U.S. and Russia.
o New START is set to expire in February 2021.
o New START’s expiration would allow unlimited nuclear weapons construction and deployment
by Russia and the United States.

Nuclear Weapons Stockpiles and Delivery Systems

The U.S., Russia, and China all possess advanced nuclear arsenals. However, a major difference in these arsenals is
the number of warheads possessed by the U.S. and Russia relative to China. Under New START, while land-based
and submarine-based warheads are counted individually, a deployed heavy bomber is counted as a single warhead,
regardless of how many it carries. In the chart on the following page, bombers are not included in the warhead
count for China, as it is not a party to New START. Additionally, these numbers may be considered approximate,
as they typically fluctuate due to maintenance, deployment, and replacement cycles.
• The U.S., Russia, and China all possess the full nuclear triad.
o The nuclear triad refers to the ability to deliver nuclear weapons in three ways: via land-based missile
(long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles being the biggest threat), aircraft, or submarine.
• Determining accurate counts and capabilities is difficult with publicly available information, as neither
Russia nor China publicly disclose these numbers. Russia’s arsenal is disclosed to the U.S. under New
START rules, but not publicly.
• The number of systems possessed by the U.S. and Russia relative to China shows the disparity in capabilities.
China has a large variety of systems, but significantly fewer weapons, especially intercontinental-range.

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Nuclear Capabilities by Country

Nuclear Warheads Based on New START Comparing Nuclear Triads
  Deployed Non- Total Arsenal   Total Deployed Ballistic Totals
Warheads Deployed Size ICBMs Heavy Missile
Warheads Bombers Subs
U.S. 1,3721 4,0502 5,415 U.S. 6608 479 1410 740
Russia 1,3263 4,8054 6,266 Russia 400*11 7612 1013 426
China 05 3206 320 China 98**14 4+***15 4****16 202
Note: China’s deployed warhead count is zero based on China’s no *Russia is estimated to have 302 ICBMs deployed, but 400 “on
first use policy – meaning China will not be the first to use a nuclear combat duty.”
weapon during war – and thus does not keep warheads mated **China also possesses 152 nuclear capable intermediate- and
to delivery systems in times of peace.7 However, the DoD’s 2020 medium-range ballistic missiles.
report on Chinese military capabilities suggests that Beijing could ***4+ nuclear aircraft include only the nuclear capable H-6N, as
be moving towards a limited ‘launch on warning’ posture.7A the current active nuclear-armed status of its roughly 100 H-6K
bombers is less clear.
****China currently has 4 operational Jin-class SSBNs. 2 more are
currently being outfitted and are expected to enter active duty soon.

Comparing Operational Nuclear Missiles by Country

Russian Nuclear Missiles21 U.S. Nuclear Missiles17 Chinese Nuclear Missiles23
Type # Range22 Type # Range18 Type # Range24
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
RS-12M Topol (SS- 36 10,500- LGM-30G 400 13,000 km DF-4 10 4500-5500 km
25 Sickle) 11,000 km Minuteman DF-5A/B 20 13,000+ km
RS-12M2 Topol-M 78 11,000 km III*
DF-31 8 8,000-11,700 km
(SS-27 Mod 1)
DF-31A 24 11,000+ km
RS-18 (SS-19 30 10,000 km
DF-31A(G) 18 8,000-11,700 km
Stiletto; mostly
Mod 3) DF-41* 18 12,000-15,000 km
RS-20 (SS-18 46 10,200-
Satan; mostly Mod 16,000 km Medium/Intermediate-Range
5) Ballistic Missiles
RS-24 Yars (SS-27 150 10,500 km DF-26 72 3,000-4,000 km
Mod 2) DF-21A/E 80 2,150 km
Air-Launched Cruise Missiles Air-Launched Ballistic Missiles
Kh-55SM Unknown 2,500 km AGM-86B 53619 2,500 km In-development N/A N/A
Kh-102 Unknown 2,500-2,800
km
Sub-Launched Ballistic Missiles
SS-N-18 Stingray Max of 6,500 km UGM-133A Up to 2,000-12,000 km JL-2 (CH- Up 8,000-9,000 km
16/SSBN Trident D-5/ 280** SS-N-14) to
SS-N-23 Skiff Max of 8,300 km D-5LE 48**
16/SSBN *Each Minuteman missile is equipped with *Entering Service
a Mk12A or Mk21 re-entry vehicle. **Each operational Jin submarine can carry
SS-N-32 Bulava Max of 8,300 km up to 12 SLBMs,25 2 more will become
16/SSBN **Each of the 14 Ohio submarines can carry
operational soon, increasing the total.
up to 20 SLBMs.20 Note: China does not appear to field any
Note: Estimates include silo-based and road
mobile where applicable air-launched cruise missiles equipped with
a nuclear payload; it is developing a nuclear
air-launched ballistic missile.
China’s Role in Nuclear Arms Control Negotiations
• China’s nuclear capability is already playing a critical role in the current status of arms control agreements,
particularly as Beijing is building up its nuclear capabilities.
• The U.S. withdrew from the INF Treaty in 2019, citing Russian violations of the treaty, but also contended
that the Chinese arsenal’s non-inclusion in the INF Treaty as a reason for the withdrawal.26
o Roughly 60 percent of China’s nuclear capable missiles are INF range (1,000-5,500 km) weapons
and would not be covered by current New START classifications.
o These missiles threaten U.S. allies and interests in East and Southeast Asia as well as Alaska.
• The U.S. has pointed to Chinese participation in New START or its replacement as being important as
Washington decides how to approach the forthcoming expiration of the treaty in February 2021.
o China has said it would “be happy to” join a trilateral arms control agreement under the condition
the U.S. reduces its nuclear arsenal to the same level as Chinas (which would require a 95% cut).27
o Should China join New START, much of Beijing’s nuclear arsenal would be covered by the limits
on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. But the current levels in comparison to Russia and the
United States would encourage China to expand its arsenal to match the limits imposed on the
other countries.
• Given the enormous disparity in numbers between the Chinese arsenal and those of the U.S. and Russia,
it is unlikely a trilateral nuclear arms control agreement will come to fruition in the near future.

Moscow’s Position
• The last remaining nuclear arms control agreement – New START – is a bilateral treaty between the U.S.
and Russia.
o Russia has called for an extension of the treaty, but the U.S. has not yet agreed to an extension
while it has advocated for Chinese inclusion in a trilateral agreement, and other changes to New
START.
• Russia does not oppose China’s participation in arms control discussions but warns that China’s participation
may be “unrealistic.”28
o Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov has said Russia would prefer arms control talks
to be multi-lateral, but “we [Russia] cannot ‘force’ or ‘persuade’ anyone to join such talks.”29
• Russia’s position on Chinese participation leaves the ball squarely in the U.S.’ court to decide how to
proceed with renewing New START.

Policy Options
There are a number of options the U.S. could take as negations with Russia over New START continue.

Option One: Insist on Chinese participation but refuse to take measures needed to bring Beijing to the table.
• In order for the U.S. to meet China’s condition of equivalent sized nuclear arsenals, the U.S. would have
to reduce its nuclear arsenal by 95%.
• Not meeting China’s request could mean New START will lapse, based on how the Trump administration
handled the INF Treaty withdrawal and China’s perceived role in that decision. This will allow Russia to
expand its deployed nuclear arsenal without limits.
Option Two: Accept China’s offer to participate and reduce the U.S. nuclear arsenal to equal China’s.
• Meeting China’s demand would leave Russia – also a strategic competitor – with a far superior nuclear
force.
 • Russia would need to be convinced to make a similar level of reductions, or be left with a severe nuclear
advantage.
• Reducing the nuclear arsenal would require a significant nuclear policy reversal as the U.S. is currently
entering a period of nuclear investment and modernization.
Option Three: Proceed with renewing the bilateral agreement with Russia.
• Renewing New START would mean the limits on strategic offensive weapons deployed & number of
delivery systems deployed/non-deployed remain intact.
• Renewing New START would retain the verification measures, which gives both the U.S. and Russia
critical information about each other’s capabilities.
• Renewing New START will allow 5 years to negotiate a future nuclear arms control agreement.
• China’s nuclear arsenal is not in the same league as the U.S. and Russia when it comes to nuclear weapons,
so allowing the more significant threat of the Russian arsenal to go unrestrained would be unwise.

Chinese Participation in a Nuclear Agreement

Although unlikely at this time, Beijing’s participation in arms control could be possible in the future. A realistic
nuclear arms control deal with China might require some or all of the following:
1. Removal of U.S. ballistic missile defense systems from East Asia;
2. Some level of asymmetry on nuclear numbers given the disparity in size of China’s arsenal vs. the U.S./
Russia’s;
3. A focus on the technological capabilities behind the weapons, not only the number of weapons themselves;
4. U.S. conventional weapons constraints;
5. Framing an agreement as one without “winners” and “losers;”
6. Consultation on current U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations.

Endnotes

1. “New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms.” United States Department of State Bureau of Arms Control,
Verification and Compliance. 1 July 2020. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/06-25-2020-FACTSHEET-Public-
Release-of-Dis-aggregate-Data.pdf, 23 July 2020.

2. “World Nuclear Forces.” SIPRI Yearbook 2020, https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2020/10 9 July 2020.

3. New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms.” United States Department of State Bureau of Arms Control,
Verification and Compliance. 1 July 2020. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/06-25-2020-FACTSHEET-Public-
Release-of-Dis-aggregate-Data.pdf 23 July 2020.

4. “World Nuclear Forces.” SIPRI Yearbook 2020, https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2020/10 9 July 2020.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Quinn, Leanne. “China’s Stance on Nuclear Arms Control and New START.” Arms Control Association. 24 August
2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2019-08-23/chinas-stance-nuclear-arms-control-new-start, 20 July 2020.
 7A. “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” United States Department of Defense, pp.
88, 1 September 2020, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-
REPORT-FINAL.PDF. 2 September 2020.

8. New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms.” United States Department of State Bureau of Arms Control,
Verification and Compliance. 1 July 2020. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/06-25-2020-FACTSHEET-Public-
Release-of-Dis-aggregate-Data.pdf 23 July 2020.

9. Ibid.

10. The Military Balance: Chapter Three, North America. International Institute of Strategic Studies. 13 February 2020. pp. 46

11. Hans M. Kristensen & Matt Korda. “Russian nuclear forces, 2020.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 76:2, pp. 105, https://www.
tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2020.1728985. 11 August 2020.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid, pp. 196.

14. The Military Balance: Chapter Six, Asia. International Institute of Strategic Studies. 13 February 2020. pp. 259.

15. Ibid, pp. 265

16. Ibid, pp. 259

17. The Military Balance: Chapter Three, North America. International Institute of Strategic Studies. 13 February 2020. pp. 46

18. “Missiles of the United States.” Center for Strategic and International Studies Missile Defense Project,. 15 June 2018. https://
missilethreat.csis.org/country/united-states/, 14 July 2020.

19. “AGM-86B/C/D Missiles.” U.S. Air Force. 24 May 2010. https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104612/agm-

86bcd-missiles/ 5 August 2020.

20. “The Military Balance: Chapter Three, North America. International Institute of Strategic Studies. 13 February 2020. pp. 46

21. The Military Balance: Chapter Five, Russia and Eurasia. International Institute of Strategic Studies. 13 February 2020. pp. 195-6

22. “Missiles of Russia.” Center for Strategic and International Studies Missile Defense Project. 15 June 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/
country/russia/, 21 July 2020.

23. The Military Balance: Chapter Six, Asia. International Institute of Strategic Studies. 13 February 2020. pp. 259 & 265.

24. “Missiles of China.” Center for Strategic and International Studies Missile Defense Project. 26 June 2020, https://missilethreat.csis.org/
country/china/ 14 July 2020.

25. The Military Balance: Chapter Six, Asia. International Institute of Strategic Studies. 13 February 2020. pp. 259.

26. Bugos, Shannon. “U.S. Completes INF Treaty Withdrawal.” Arms Control Association, September 2019, https://www.armscontrol.
org/act/2019-09/news/us-completes-inf-treaty-withdrawal 10 July 2020.

27. Tian, Yew Luan. “China challenges U.S. to cut nuclear arsenal to matching level.” Reuters. 7 July 2020, https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-china-usa-arms/china-challenges-u-s-to-cut-nuclear-arsenal-to-matching-level-idUSKBN2490C9 10 July 2020.

28. “U.S. Pushes For Broadening Of New START Treaty, Pushes For China To Join Accord.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 23 June
2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/u-s-pushes-for-broadening-of-new-start-treaty-pushes-for-china-to-join-accord/30686509.html 20
July 2020.

29. Ibid.