CATALINA BUGNAO vs. FRANCISCO UBAG, ET AL.

G.R.No. 4445, EN BANC, September 18, 1909, CARSON J.

Mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from the disease of body, or from age, will
not render a person incapable of making a will, a weak or feeble minded person may
make a valid will, provided he has understanding memory sufficient to enable him to
know what he is about, and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To
constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind should be
unbroken or unimpaired, unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has not been
understood that a testator must possess these qualities (of sound and disposing mind
and memory) in the highest degree. Few indeed would be the wills confirmed, if this is
correct. Pain, sickness, debility of body, from age or infirmity, would, according to its
violence or duration, in a greater or less degree, break in upon, weaken, or derange the
mind, but the derangement must be such as deprives him of the rational faculties
common to man and, that Sound mind does not mean a perfectly balanced mind. The
question of soundness is one of degree; on the other hand, it has been held that
testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be
insane or of an unsound mind. Weakness of intellect, whether it arises from extreme old
age from disease, or great bodily infirmities or suffering, or from all these combined,
may render the testator incapable of making a valid will, providing such weakness really
disqualifies her from knowing or appreciating the nature, effects, or consequences of
the act she is engaged in.
But for the purposes of this decision it is not necessary for us to attempt to lay down a
definition of testamentary capacity which will cover all possible cases which may
present themselves, because, as will be seen from what has already been said, the
testator was, at the time of making the instrument under consideration, endowed with all
the elements of mental capacity set out in the following definition of testamentary
capacity which has been frequently announced in courts of last resort in England and
the United States; and while is some cases testamentary capacity has been held to
exist in the absence of proof of some of these elements, there can be no question that,
in the absence of proof of very exceptional circumstances, proof of the existence of all
these elements in sufficient to establish the existence of testamentary capacity.
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the
transaction which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to
be disposed of and the person who would naturally be supposed to have claims
upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will
distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.
FACTS:
An appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros, admitting to
probate a document purporting to be the last will and testament of Domingo Ubag was
filed. The instrument was propounded by his widow, Catalina Bugnao, the sole
beneficiary thereunder, and probate was contested by the appellants, who are brothers
and sisters of the deceased, and who would be entitled to share in the distribution of his
estate, if probate were denied, as it appears that the deceased left no heirs in the direct
ascending or descending line.
Appellants contended, among others, that Ubag was not of sound mind and memory,
and was physically and mentally incapable of making a will.
Two of the subscribing witnesses, Victor J. Bingtoy and Catalino Mariño, testified in
support of the will, the latter being the justice of the peace of the municipality wherein it
was executed; and their testimony was corroborated in all important details by the
testimony of the proponent herself, who was present when the will was made. It does
not appear from the record why the third subscribing witness was not called; but since
counsel for the contestants makes no comment upon his absence, we think it may
safely be inferred that there was some good and sufficient reason therefore. In passing,
however, it may be well to observe that, when because of death, sickness, absence, or
for any other reason, it is not practicable to call to the witness stand all the subscribing
witnesses to a will offered for probate, the reason for the absence of any of these
witnesses should be made to appear of record, and this especially in cases such as the
one at bar, wherein there is a contests.
The contestants put upon the stand four witnesses for the purpose of proving that at the
time and on the occasion when the subscribing witnesses testified that the will was
executed, these witnesses were not in the house with the testator, and that the alleged
testator was at that time in such physical and mental condition that it was impossible for
him to have made a will. Two of these witnesses, upon cross-examination, admitted that
they were not in the house at or between the hours of four and six in the afternoon of
the day on which the will is alleged to have been made, this being the time at which the
witnesses in support of the will testified that it was executed. Of the other witnesses,
one is a contestant of the will, Macario Ubag, a brother of the testator, and the other,
Canuto Sinoy, his close relative. These witnesses swore that they were in the house of
the deceased, where he was lying ill, at or about the time when it is alleged that the will
was executed, and that at that time the alleged subscribing witnesses were not in the
house, and the alleged testator was so sick that he was unable to speak, to understand,
or to make himself understood, and that he was wholly incapacitated to make a will. But
the testimony of Macario Ubag is in our opinion wholly unworthy of credence. In addition
to his manifest interest in the result of the investigation, it clearly discloses a fixed and
settled purpose to overthrow the will at all costs, and to that end an utter disregard of
the truth, and readiness to swear to any fact which he imagined would aid in securing
his object.
In the course of the proceedings, an admittedly genuine signature of the deceased was
introduced in evidence, and upon a comparison of this signature with the signature
attached to the instrument in question, we are wholly of the opinion of the trial judge,
who held in this connection as follows:
No expert evidence has been adduced with regard to these two signatures, and the
presiding judge of this court does not claim to possess any special expert knowledge in
the matter of signatures; nevertheless, the court has compared these two signatures,
and does not find that any material differences exists between the same. It is true that
the signature which appears in the document offered for authentication discloses that at
the time of writing the subscriber was more deliberate in his movements, but two facts
must be acknowledge: First, that the testator was seriously ill, and the other fact, that for
some reason which is not stated the testator was unable to see, and was a person who
was not in the habit of signing his name every day.
These facts should sufficiently explain whatever difference may exist between the two
signatures, but the court finds that the principal strokes in the two signatures are
identical.
That the testator was mentally capable of making the will is in our opinion fully
established by the testimony of the subscribing witnesses who swore positively that, at
the time of its execution, he was of sound mind and memory. It is true that their
testimony discloses the fact that he was at that time extremely ill, in an advanced stage
of tuberculosis complicated with severe intermittent attacks of asthma; that he was too
sick to rise unaided from his bed; that he needed assistance even to rise himself to a
sitting position; and that during the paroxysms of asthma to which he was subject he
could not speak; but all this evidence of physical weakness in no wise establishes his
mental incapacity or a lack of testamentary capacity, and indeed the evidence of the
subscribing witnesses as to the aid furnished them by the testator in preparing the will,
and his clear recollection of the boundaries and physical description of the various
parcels of land set out therein, taken together with the fact that he was able to give to
the person who wrote the will clear and explicit instructions as to his desires touching
the disposition of his property, is strong evidence of his testamentary capacity.
ISSUE:
Whether Ubag was mentally capacitated when he executed the will. (YES)
RULING:
It has been said that "the difficulty of stating standards or tests by which to determine
the degree of mental capacity of a particular person has been everywhere recognized,
and grows out of the inherent impossibility of measuring mental capacity, or its
impairment by disease or other causes" (Greene vs. Greene, 145 III., 264, 276); and
that "it is probable that no court has ever attempted to lay down any definite rule in
respect to the exact amount of mental capacity requisite for the making of a valid will,
without appreciating the difficulty of the undertaking" (Trish vs.Newell, 62 III., 196, 203).
Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably
carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degree of mental aberration generally
known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or
incapacity, and while on one hand it has been held that "mere weakness of mind, or
partial imbecility from the disease of body, or from age, will not render a person
incapable of making a will, a weak or feeble minded person may make a valid will,
provided he has understanding memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is
about, and how or to whom he is disposing of his property"; that, "To constitute a sound
and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind should be unbroken or unimpaired,
unshattered by disease or otherwise"; that "it has not been understood that a testator
must possess these qualities (of sound and disposing mind and memory) in the highest
degree. . . . Few indeed would be the wills confirmed, if this is correct. Pain, sickness,
debility of body, from age or infirmity, would, according to its violence or duration, in a
greater or less degree, break in upon, weaken, or derange the mind, but the
derangement must be such as deprives him of the rational faculties common to man"
and, that "Sound mind does not mean a perfectly balanced mind. The question of
soundness is one of degree"; on the other hand, it has been held that "testamentary
incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of an
unsound mind. Weakness of intellect, whether it arises from extreme old age from
disease, or great bodily infirmities or suffering, or from all these combined, may render
the testator incapable of making a valid will, providing such weakness really disqualifies
her from knowing or appreciating the nature, effects, or consequences of the act she is
engaged in".
But for the purposes of this decision it is not necessary for us to attempt to lay down a
definition of testamentary capacity which will cover all possible cases which may
present themselves, because, as will be seen from what has already been said, the
testator was, at the time of making the instrument under consideration, endowed with all
the elements of mental capacity set out in the following definition of testamentary
capacity which has been frequently announced in courts of last resort in England and
the United States; and while is some cases testamentary capacity has been held to
exist in the absence of proof of some of these elements, there can be no question that,
in the absence of proof of very exceptional circumstances, proof of the existence of all
these elements in sufficient to establish the existence of testamentary capacity.
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the
transaction which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to
be disposed of and the person who would naturally be supposed to have claims
upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will
distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.
In our opinion, the evidence of record establishes in a strikingly conclusive manner the
execution of the instrument propounded as the last will and testament of the deceased;
that it was made in strict conformity with the requisites prescribed by law; and that, at
the time of its execution, the deceased was of sound mind and memory, and executed
the instrument of his own free will and accord.