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GV Absorber Shell Leak in Ammonia Plant-II at IFFCO, Aonla Unit, India

The CO2 absorber vessel in the GV CO2 removal system at IFFCO's Ammonia-II plant experienced a shell leak due to severe corrosion. On September 3, 2010 a loud noise and mist were observed coming from the bottom of the absorber vessel skirt, indicating a process gas leak from the shell. Internal inspection found lifting of the Bed #5 limiter by 8 inches, and potassium carbonate deposits near the skirt weld, pointing to a leak. The plant was shut down and repairs were made to address the cause of corrosion.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
133 views

GV Absorber Shell Leak in Ammonia Plant-II at IFFCO, Aonla Unit, India

The CO2 absorber vessel in the GV CO2 removal system at IFFCO's Ammonia-II plant experienced a shell leak due to severe corrosion. On September 3, 2010 a loud noise and mist were observed coming from the bottom of the absorber vessel skirt, indicating a process gas leak from the shell. Internal inspection found lifting of the Bed #5 limiter by 8 inches, and potassium carbonate deposits near the skirt weld, pointing to a leak. The plant was shut down and repairs were made to address the cause of corrosion.

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varatharajan g r
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© © All Rights Reserved
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GV Absorber Shell Leak in Ammonia

Plant-II at IFFCO, Aonla Unit, India


The CO2 Absorber installed in the GV CO2 removal system experienced shell leakage due to severe
corrosion at IFFCO Aonla Ammonia-II Plant. This paper describes the incident of the leakage, extent
of damage, probable cause of the leak, repair carried out and the remedial measures to avoid such
incidents.

A K Maheshwari, Rajiv Srivastava, and G K Gautam


IFFCO Aonla, Bareilly, India

% diethanol amine (DEA), and 1.0 wt. %


Introduction glycine, where DEA and glycine work as
activators. Vanadium pentoxide (0.4 wt. %) is

I ndian Farmers Fertilizer Cooperative Ltd


(IFFCO) operates two streams of Ammonia
Plant (1740 MTPD each) and four streams of
Urea Plant (1515 MTPD each) at its fertilizer
complex at Aonla in Bareilly district of Uttar
used as corrosion inhibitor, which forms a
passivation film on the surface of the vessels and
piping handling the solution. This solution is
referred to as GV solution. The process
comprises a single stage absorption and a two
Pradesh state, in India. Both the ammonia plants
stage regeneration. Figure 1 shows the flow
are based on M/s Haldor Topsøe A/S Ammonia
diagram for the GV CO2 removal system.
technology with steam reforming of Natural Gas
and/or Naphtha. The Ammonia-II plant was
The process gas at 30 kg/cm2g (441 psig), 105
commissioned in December 1996.
°C (221 °F), containing ~ 17 vol. % CO2 enters
the GV absorber near its bottom (See Figure 2).
The CO2 Removal System The GV absorber is a tower of carbon steel
The CO2 Removal Section of IFFCO Aonla construction (SA516 Gr.70) with stainless steel
Ammonia-II Plant is based on GV CO2 removal internals and consists of 5 packed beds
process technology licensed by M/s Giammarco containing stainless steel packing rings and
Vetrocoke, Italy. It consists of a close circulation structured packing (Bed # 4). The beds are
system of dual activated aqueous hot potassium numbered Bed # 1 through Bed # 4 in the
carbonate solution system called GV System. direction of upward flow of process gas. The Bed
The solution contains 27.0 wt. % K2CO3, 1.2 wt. # 5 lies above the rich solution holdup and below

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2011 [219] AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
the process gas inlet distributor. This bed solution) exiting the bottom of the GV absorber
remains partially submerged in the rich GV flows to the top of high pressure (HP)
solution under normal operation and functions as regenerator after pressure let-down through
anti-swirl (vortex breaker) and bottom level power recovery hydraulic turbines and level
fluctuations dampener to prevent level control valves (LV24-1, 2, 3). The HP
fluctuations that would be caused from the force regenerator operates at a pressure of 1.0 kg/cm2g
of process gas hitting the liquid level below. The (14.2 psig).
packed height of this bed is 1.0 m (3.3 ft).
The rich GV solution entering the top of the HP
The CO2 content in the process gas is reduced regenerator flashes initially due to pressure
successively on passing from Bed # 1 through reduction, and is further regenerated on its way
Bed # 4, thereby finally achieving 300 ppm vol. down the tower in 3 packed beds by steam from
CO2 content in the process gas at the exit of GV the GV reboilers, low pressure (LP) steam boiler
absorber. The bulk of the CO2 content in the and live LP steam. The solution from the top,
process gas is absorbed by Semi-lean GV middle and bottom of the HP Regenerator is
solution entering the mid-section of the GV shared to the top, middle and bottom respectively
absorber and falling through Bed # 2 and Bed # 1 of another tower called LP Regenerator operating
of the absorber. A relatively smaller flow of at a lower pressure of 0.10 kg/cm2g (1.42 psig).
highly regenerated Lean GV solution enters the The solution in the LP regenerator is regenerated
top of the GV absorber and falls through Bed # 4 in 2 packed beds with steam generated by
and Bed # 3, which absorbs the remaining flashing of GV solution flowing at the three
amount of CO2 in the process gas. The process levels from the HP Regenerator to the LP
gas enters the absorber at the bottom section, Regenerator.
below Bed # 1. The CO2 laden solution (rich GV

Figure 1: Schematic for CO2 Removal Section (GV Section) of Ammonia-II Plant

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2011 [220] AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
The Incident
On 3rd September 2010, at around 11:45 hrs,
loud noise suddenly started coming from near
the bottom skirt portion of the GV Absorber with
mist emanating from the nozzle holes in the
vessel skirt. The mist was analyzed with an
explosive gas detector and it was confirmed to be
process gas leakage. From the location of the
process gas leak and the fact that gas was coming
out from the opening in the vessel skirt, it was
apparent that the absorber pressure shell was
leaking from somewhere.

The plant shut down was initiated immediately.


The GV Absorber was isolated, and
depressurized at a controlled rate, with care to
keep the bottom rich solution liquid holdup level
at lower values in order to prevent GV solution
spillage through the leaky point. Thereafter the
absorber was purged, drained and cooled to
facilitate man entry for internal inspection.

Figure 2: The GV Absorber at Ammonia-II Plant


The Damage
The GV solution from the middle section of the The GV absorber was inspected externally from
LP Regenerator is called semi-lean GV solution below, through the manhole in the skirt and
and that at the bottom of the LP Regenerator is some potassium carbonate solid deposits were
called Lean GV solution, as per their degree of noticed between the skirt and pressure shell at
regeneration. The semi-lean solution is pumped the location near the skirt weld joint to the
from the mid section of LP regenerator to the absorber pressure shell, indicating a leak nearby.
mid section of absorber by semi-lean solution
pumps and the Lean GV solution from the The GV absorber man entry was permitted after
bottom of the LP Regenerator is pumped to the thorough purging and cooling of the tower. The
top of the GV absorber, and this process internal inspection through manholes M5 (above
continues in close circulation. Bed # 5 and below the process gas inlet
distributor) and M6 (below Bed # 5, in the rich
The CO2 from the overhead (OH) of the two solution holdup area) could not reveal any point
regenerators is processed further in the OH of leakage. However, the bed limiter of Bed # 5
system, consisting of a demineralized water was found lifted by 200 mm (~8”) from the bed
preheater, condensate separator, condensate limiter tray support ring (TSR) at one end and
pumps etc. The CO2 from the LP Regenerator is the bed limiter support beam bracket was found
compressed by CO2 Blower and joins the CO2 broken and badly corroded at that end. Also the
from the HP regenerator. The CO2 is finally bed packing rings were found heaved up towards
supplied to the Urea plant at ~ 0.7 kg/cm2g (10.8 this end. Some wire mesh segments of the bed
psig) and 38 °C (100 °F). limiter were also found broken. So it was
decided to unload the Bed # 5 packing

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completely in order to assess the extent of depth of 5 - 15 mm (0.2” – 0.60”) over the entire
damage and locate the leakage point on the circumference of shell between the bed limiter
vessel shell. Figure 3 shows the construction of TSR and the bed bottom grid TSR.
the bottom portion of the GV absorber shell with
the Bed # 5 and normal operating level of rich A through-hole was observed in “C” seam near
GV solution. the M5 manhole nozzle, between 105º and 110º
orientation. The shell thickness in this area is 50
On internal inspection after unloading of the Bed mm. Both tray supporting rings were found
# 5, severe corrosion was observed at the badly corroded. I-beam and brackets to support
circumferential weld seam (C- seam) and on the the bed limiter and bed bottom support (omega)
parent metal of absorber shell wall below this C- tray were also found badly corroded. Figure 4
seam in the Bed # 5 packing area. The entire area shows the corrosion damage on the absorber
throughout the circumference in the Bed # 5 was shell wall and C-seam in the Bed # 5 packing
found badly corroded and/or eroded. There were area.
many notches and vertical canals of varying

Figure 3: General Arrangement around Bed # 5 at GV Absorber Bottom

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 222 2011


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C-Seam

Bed Limiter TSR

Figure 4: Corrosion damage at C-seam in GV Figure 7: Corrosion at multibeam bed limiter


Absorber support brackets and C-seam in the Bed # 5 packing
area

C-Seam

Figure 5: Corrosion in the Bed # 5 packing area Figure 8: Corrosion at multi-beam bed limiter
support brackets and C-seam in the Bed # 5 packing
area

NDT Before Repair


The corrosion damage of the absorber pressure
shell was most prominent at C-seam weld and at
the shell parent metal below this C-seam, in the
Bed # 5 packing area, as can be seen from
Figures 4 through 8.

Dye penetrant test was carried out on this entire


C-seam circumference. The entire packing area
shell surface of the Bed # 5 was divided into
segments 15° apart and of vertical length 1.0 m
Figure 6: Corrosion in the Bed # 5 packing area (3.3 ft.), i.e. from bed limiter TSR to the bed
and C-Seam support TSR. Thickness and hardness was
measured at 3 locations vertically equi-spaced on
each of these segments (See Figure 9).

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2011 [223] AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
GV Absorber Shell Thickness Values (in mm) before Repair

345° 50 15°
330° 30°
315° 45 38°
307° 45°
40
300° 60°
35
285° 75°
30 Shell Thickness at Elev. 1
270° 82°
25 Shell Thickness at Elev. 2
262° 90° Shell Thickness at Elev. 3

255° 97°

240° 105°
225° 120°
210° 135°
195° 180° 165° 150°
Design Shell Thickness in Bed # 5 Packing Area = 50.0 mm

Figure 9: GV Absorber shell Thickness values before repair

GV Absorber Shell Hardness Values (in BHN) before Repair


220

200

180
Hardness in BHN

160

140 Shell Hardness at Elev. 1

120 Shell Hardness at Elev. 2


Shell Hardness at Elev. 3
100

80

60
0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330 360
Angle of Orientation

Figure 10: GV Absorber shell Hardness values before repair

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2011 [224] AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
The as built pressure shell thickness in this area °C. All the heating coils were removed for
is 50.0 mm (~ 1.97”). However, the shell further cooling below 150 °C.
thickness was found below 37 mm (~ 1.46”) at 9
locations. There were series of vertical canals Apart from this C-seam, all the affected areas
and notches of varying depth (5 – 15 mm) in were ground properly before starting the welding
these patches. on the inner surface of the shell. Wherever shell
thickness was found less than 43 mm, it was
The shell hardness was also measured at these built up to 43 mm by arc welding using electrode
locations which varied between 107 BHN to 141 E-7018-1.
BHN, the maximum hardness of 141 BHN was
found at 90º (See Figure 10). For welding repair of the affected areas of main
shell, a ½” natural gas pipeline was laid and
preheating was done using 5 burners over the
Repair of Pressure Shell surface area of marked patches to raise the
temperature up to 150 °C. All these repairs were
The equipment manufacturer was contacted to
post heated at 250 °C and soaked for 1 hour. All
carry out the repairs. Based on their
the sharp edges were smoothened by grinding.
recommendations for the minimum sound wall
After completion of welding, the entire area
thickness requirement of 40 mm (~1.57”) for
between the TSRs was cleaned by electrically
SA516 Gr.70 pressure shell (based on design
powered wire brush in order to remove scale.
pressure of 30.0 kg/cm2g or 441 psig), it was
decided to build up the thickness of the shell by
After the cleaning, a visual inspection and NDT
welding to a minimum of 43 mm thick, including
was carried out. All the sharp edges and the
a corrosion allowance of 3 mm.
edges of the area where there was a sudden
Since a conventional post weld heat treatment
reduction in thickness were smoothened. Weld
(PWHT) could not have been applied for this in-
spatters found during inspection, were removed
situ repair of a loaded vertical vessel, temper
by grinding. Figures 11 through 15 shows the
bead welding technique was used in order to
Bed # 5 packing area after completion of repairs.
have significantly reduced residual stresses and
lesser hardness values in heat affected zones
(HAZ) after welding. The temper bead welding
is used to refine the coarse grained HAZ in the
parent metal by the judicious positioning of weld
beads and control of heat input. This heat
treatment aims to improve the toughness and
reduce the peak hardness within the HAZ.
The entire C-seam was ground and ‘V’ was
made in the leaky area. Preheat temperature of
C-seam was raised up to 150 °C by electrical
heating pads. The affected area was repaired by
TIG welding using ER-70S filler wire. The
remaining part of C-seam was repaired by arc
welding using E-7018-1 electrode. C-seam was
post heated by raising the temperature up to 250
°C by electrical heating pads, thereafter soaking Figure 11: GV Absorber shell after repair
for 1 hr. at 250 °C and then cooling down to 150 (showing the leaky point)

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2011 [225] AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
Bed Limiter TSR

Figure 15: GV Absorber shell after repair

NDT After Repairs


Bed Support TSR Thickness and hardness measurements of the
entire affected area were carried out all around
the circumference by preparing grids 7½ º apart
Figure 12: GV Absorber shell after repair at minimum 5 locations vertically between the
(showing the leaky point) TSRs. The thickness was found between 43.2
mm (~1.58”) to 51.00 mm (~ 2.0”) at the weld
build up locations between the TSRs (see Figure
16). Hardness near leakage point was found to be
~ 139 BHN whereas hardness of the rest of the
locations was found well within the limit (see
Figure 17).

Ultrasonic testing of C-Seam was also carried


out but no defect was found.

Root Cause Analysis and Remedial


Figure 13: GV Absorber shell after repair Measures
The Bed # 5 of the GV absorber, which remains
partially submerged in rich GV solution during
normal operation, had been provided as a vortex
breaker (anti-swirl) to prevent contamination of
the product CO2 due to slippage of process gas
with the rich GV solution exiting the absorber.
The bed has an added function of liquid level
pulsation damper.

The rich GV solution at absorber bottom has the


highest CO2 loading and is the most corrosive in
this state. All packed beds have a certain empty
Figure 14: GV Absorber shell after repair

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2011 [226] AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
space between the top most layer of packing and allow for bed height expansion from stand still to
the bed limiter, the margin which is needed to normal operation.

GV Absorber Shell Thickness Values (in mm) After Repair



352.5°
345° 7.5° 15°
337.5° 50 22.5°
330° 30°
322.5° 45 37.5°
315° 45°
307.5° 52.5°
40
300° 60°
292.5° 35 67.5°
Shell Thickness at Elev. 1
285° 75°
30 Shell Thickness at Elev. 2
277.5° 82.5°
270° 25 90° Shell Thickness at Elev. 3
262.5° 97.5°
Shell Thickness at Elev. 4
255° 105°
247.5° 112.5°
Shell Thickness at Elev. 5
240° 120°
232.5° 127.5°
225° 135°
217.5° 142.5°
210° 150°
202.5° 157.5°
195°
187.5° 165°
172.5°
180° Design Shell Thickness in Bed # 5 Packing Area = 50.0 mm

Figure 16: GV Absorber shell thickness values after repair

GV Absorber Shell Hardness Values (in BHN) After Repair


220

200

180
Hardness (in BHN)

160
Shell Hardness at Elev. 1
140 Shell Hardness at Elev. 2

120 Shell Hardness at Elev. 3


Shell Hardness at Elev. 4
100
Shell Hardness at Elev. 5
80

60
0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330 360
Angle of Orientation

Figure 17: GV Absorber shell Hardness values after repair

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2011 [227] AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
Broken bed limiter segments could cause the bed enhanced corrosion and eventual leakage from
packing material to get displaced from one place pressure shell.
to another causing uneven bed height throughout
the bed cross-section and also lead to packing Figure 3 shows the general arrangement around
rings movement with liquid eddies. These the Bed # 5 at absorber bottom with the normal
movements of the packing rings near the operating level of rich GV solution marked. It
pressure shell wall could easily lead to scraping can be seen that the recommended operating
off of the protective passivation layer and thus level (this level is controlled by the level control
initiate shell corrosion. valves on the rich GV solution line at absorber
outlet) is at the middle of the bed height of the
During annual turnarounds some bed limiter Bed # 5, which as per the elevation of the level
strips and mesh segments were often found transmitter tappings means operating level of ~
broken during internal inspections of the Bed # 5 71 % on the level controller. However, since the
of GV absorber, but these were repaired at each commissioning of the Ammonia-II plant, the
opportunity. It is believed that this could have absorber bottom level controller had been
been the most likely reason of shell corrosion operated with a setpoint of ~ 50 % level; which
damage, whereby packing movement in eddies corresponds to an elevation below the bed
or otherwise led to loss of protective passivation support TSR. This means that the Bed # 5 had
film and over the years of service, this led to been kept operating without any submergence all
severe corrosion of the pressure shell. This is this time.
corroborated by the episodic peaking of total Fe
content, as has been witnessed during several It is a usual practice in process design to locate
years of operation of the GV system in level transmitter tap elevations on a vessel such
Ammonia-II plant, while the GV system towers that the normal operating level would correspond
internal inspections during annual turnaround to ~ 50 % indication on the transmitter, however,
could not find any location of corrosion to this was not the case here.
attribute the increase of Fe content in the
solution. Since the Bed # 5 had already been operating dry
till now with no observable consequence on the
This time too, the total Fe content in the GV CO2 product purity, it was decided not to
solution was running at increased values reinstall the Bed # 5, as per recommendations
(maximum up to ~85 ppm while the normal from M/s Haldor Topsøe A/S and M/s
value has been ~ 52 ppm Fe) for few weeks Giammarco-Vetrocoke. Hence, the Bed # 5 was
before the event of the absorber shell leak. The not installed.
V2O5 concentration and V5+ to total V2O5 ratio
had remained normal during this period. Such Further, as per recommendations of M/s
extensive corrosion damage in the packed bed Giammarco Vetrocoke, Italy, the normal
area could not have been caused within a short operating level setpoint was increased to 75 %.
period of few weeks, or else the total Fe content During the dynamic passivation of GV system
of the solution would have increased to much the GV absorber bottom level was maintained at
higher values. It is believed that gradual and ~ 90 % and the dynamic passivation was carried
episodic corrosion in that packed bed area would for 96 hrs. Dynamic passivation is a standard
have led to failing of the bed limiter support startup procedure in which GV solution
bracket, leading to shifting of the bed limiter and circulation at near normal flow rates is
that in turn increased the packing migration and established in the GV system for 96 hrs. without
movement and that consequently led to the introduction of process gas into the absorber and
solution is maintained at boiling point in the

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2011 [228] AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
regenerators, thereby causing a passivation film
to form inside the GV section towers and the
solution handling pipelines.

The ammonia plant was restarted and process gas


was introduced into the GV section after
completion of 96 hrs. of dynamic passivation and
ammonia production was achieved at 18:00 hrs
on September 17, 2010. Pockets for Thickness
Measurement

Seven 8” dia. holes with reinforcing rings were


made in the skirt with orientation 45º apart in Figure 18: Holes with reinforcing rings have been
order to provide access to the pressure shell provided on skirt for shell thickness monitoring
through the skirt to monitor thickness of the during running plant.
damaged area of shell during running plant (see
Figure 18). The shell thickness is regularly being
monitored at these locations (See Table 1
below).

Table 1: GV Absorber Shell Thickness Monitoring at 7 Nos. pockets in the skirt.

Conclusion as solution holdup area of a tower experiencing


frequent wetting and drying is itself very prone
The bottom rich GV solution holdup section and to corrosion. These factors make the liquid
nearby area of CO2 absorber in an ammonia holdup area of the CO2 absorber very vulnerable
plant is very prone to corrosion and erosion to corrosion. Absorber designs with a partial
damage. Further, a gas-liquid interface area such submerged bed installation at this location may

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2011 [229] AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
serve to hide the corrosion damage from being
detected early, as the corrosion inside the bed
packing area could not be known unless the bed
is unloaded for internal inspections at annual
turnarounds. Thorough thickness checks can be
carried out from the exterior, but the shell
surface located beneath the vessel skirt is still
inaccessible for thickness measurement.
It is not a usual practice in the industry to
remove trays or unload packed beds for
monitoring corrosion damage. This needs to be
reconsidered, particularly for high vulnerable
areas such as rich solution holdup and the fact
that such corrosion can often be very localized in
nature. Regular shell thickness monitoring
programs for such towers may be established in
other ammonia plants having similar absorber
design, to preclude unexpected equipment
failures due to generalized corrosion. Localized
corrosion would still be difficult to monitor with
such programs and remains highly dependent on
visual inspection during turnarounds.

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2011 [230] AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

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