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3 Reasonable Doubt

Beyond reasonable doubt is the standard of proof required for a criminal conviction. [1] It does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt, but rather that the evidence strongly points to guilt with only a remote possibility of innocence. [2] A reasonable doubt is a substantial doubt based on reason and arising from the evidence, not a mere possibility or imaginary doubt. [3] The prosecution must prove its case beyond this standard of reasonable doubt while avoiding fanciful doubts, but need not prove the case with absolute certainty.

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343 views

3 Reasonable Doubt

Beyond reasonable doubt is the standard of proof required for a criminal conviction. [1] It does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt, but rather that the evidence strongly points to guilt with only a remote possibility of innocence. [2] A reasonable doubt is a substantial doubt based on reason and arising from the evidence, not a mere possibility or imaginary doubt. [3] The prosecution must prove its case beyond this standard of reasonable doubt while avoiding fanciful doubts, but need not prove the case with absolute certainty.

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Vivek Gutam
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BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

Introduction:
The maxim that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt is a rule
of caution laid down by the Courts of Law in respect of assessing the evidence in
criminal cases1. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the
shadow of a doubt. The degree is well settled. It need not reach certainty, but it must
carry a high degree of probability. The law would fail to protect the community if it
admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so
strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour, which can be
dismissed with the sentence but not in the least probable, the case is proved beyond
reasonable doubt. All that the principle enjoins is a reasonable skepticism, not an
obdurate persistence in disbelief. It does not demand from the judge a resolute and
impenetrable incredulity. He is never required to close his mind to the truth2.

Meaning of the phrase “Reasonable doubt”:


It is this doubt which occurs to a reasonable man, has legal recognition in the field of
criminal disputes. It is something different from moral conviction and it is also
different from a suspicion. It is the result of a process of keen examination of the
entire material on record by 'a prudent man'. There is a difference between a flimsy or
fantastic plea which is to be rejected altogether. But a reasonable though incompletely
proved plea which casts a genuine doubt on the prosecution version indirectly
succeeds. The doubt which the law contemplates is certainly not that of a weak or
unduly vacillating, capricious, indolent, drowsy or confused mind. It must be the
doubt of the prudent man who assumed to possess the capacity to "separate the chaff
from the grain". It is the doubt of a reasonable, astute and alert mind arrived at after
due application of mind to every relevant circumstances of the case appearing from
the evidence. It is not a doubt which occurs to a wavering mind3.

Degree of proof in beyond reasonable doubt:


Lord Denning, J. in Miller v. Minister of Pensions 4, while examining the degree of
proof required in criminal cases stated:
"That degree is well-settled. It need not reach certainty but it must reach a
high degree of probability. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean
proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the
community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If
the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in
his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence "of course, it is possible
but not in the least probable", the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt."
"All that the principle enjoins is a reasonable scepticism, not an obdurate persistence
in disbelief. It does not demand from the Judge a resolute and impenetrable
incredulity. He is never required to close his mind to the truth5."

1
Vijayee Singh And ors v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1990 AIR 1459, 1990 SCR (2) 573
2
Miller v. Ministers of Pensions (1947) 2 All E.R. 372
3
Vijayee Singh And Ors vs State Of Uttar Pradesh 1990 AIR 1459, 1990 SCR (2) 573
4
[1947] 2 All ER 373
5
Observed in another context regarding the concept of benefit of reasonable doubt
Lord Du Paraq, cited in Vijayee Singh And Ors vs State Of Uttar Pradesh 1990 AIR 1459.

1
Presumption of innocence and beyond reasonable doubt:
The doctrine of presumption of innocence casts the burden on the prosecution to
prove its case against the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt. It is trite that
doubt to the guilt of the accused should be substantial and not flimsy or fanciful. This
is best stated in the words of the Supreme Court in, State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal 6
wherein the court had observed as follows:
A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be convicted of an offence
which is not established by the evidential standard of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Though this standard is a higher standard, there is,
however, no absolute standard. What degree of probability amounts to proof
is an exercise particular to each case. Referring to the interdependence of
evidence and the confirmation of one piece of evidence by another. The one
piece of evidence may confirm the other. Doubts would be called reasonable if
they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any
favorite other than the truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free
from an over-emotional response. Doubts must be actual and substantial
doubts as to the guilt of the accused person arising from the evidence, or from
the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is
not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt; but a fair doubt based
upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case.

Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts
or lingering suspicions and thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made
sterile on the plea that it is better to let a hundred guilty escape than punish an
innocent7. If a case is proved perfectly, it is argued that it is artificial; if a case has
some flaws, inevitable because human beings are prone to err, it is argued that it is too
imperfect. One wonders whether in the meticulous hypersensitivity to eliminate a rare
innocent from being punished, many guilty persons must be allowed to escape.

Contours of the phrase “beyond reasonable doubt”:


Generally, these terms are regularly used by us therefore this is worth to discuss the
contours of the expressions “proof beyond reasonable doubt” and “entitlement of an
accused person to benefit of doubt.” In this regard Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy, in K.
Gopal Reddy v. State of AP 8 wherein reiterating the fundamental principle of
criminal jurisprudence that the accused is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable
doubt, the court placing reliance on the afore noticed enunciation by Lord Denning
elaborated the principles thus:
To entitle an accused person to the benefit of a doubt arising from the
possibility of a duality of views, the possible view in favour of the accused
must be as nearly reasonably probable as that against him. If the
preponderance of probability is all one way, a bare possibility of another view
will not entitle the accused to claim the benefit of any doubt. It is, therefore,
essential that any view of the evidence in favour of the accused must be
reasonable even as any doubt, the benefit of which an accused person may
claim, must be reasonable. A reasonable doubt, it has been remarked, does
not mean some light, airy, insubstantial doubt that may flit through the minds
6
(1988) 4 SCC 302
7
Devender Pal Singh v. State of NCT of Delhi (2002) 5 SCC 234
8
(1979) 1 SCC 355

2
of any of us about almost anything at some time or other; it does not mean a
doubt begotten by sympathy out of reluctance to convict; it means a real
doubt, a doubt founded upon reasons [Salmon, J. in his charge to the jury in
R. v. Fantle reported in 1959 Criminal Law Review 584]...

In Inder Singh & Anr. v. State (Delhi Administration) 9, V. R. Krishna Iyer, J.


wrote that:
Credibility of testimony, oral and circumstantial, depends considerably on a
judicial evaluation of the totality, not isolated scrutiny... Proof beyond
reasonable doubt is a guideline, not a fetish and guilty man cannot get away
with it because truth suffers some infirmity when projected through human
processes. Judicial quest for perfect proof often accounts for police
presentation of fool-proof concoction. Why fake up? Because the court asks
for manufacture to make truth look? No, we must be realistic.
The concepts of probability, and the degrees of it, cannot obviously be expressed in
terms of units to be mathematically enumerated as to how many of such units
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is an unmistakable subjective
element in the evaluation of the degrees of probability and the quantum of proof.
Forensic probability must, in the last analysis, rest on a robust common sense and,
ultimately, on the trained intuitions of the Judge. While the protection given by the
criminal process to the accused persons is not to be eroded, at the same time,
uninformed legitimisation of trivialities would make a mockery of administration of
criminal justice10. Accused persons are entitled to get benefit of doubt only when the
prosecution fails to prove its case. The proof beyond reasonable doubt is a guiding
factor and not an absolute rule11.

Conclusion:
Letting the guilty escape is not doing justice according to law 12. Prosecution is not
required to meet any and every hypothesis put forward by the accused. 13 If a case is
proved perfectly, it is argued that it is artificial; if a case has some flaws, inevitable
because human beings are prone to err, it is argued that it is too imperfect. One
wonders whether in the meticulous hypersensitivity to eliminate a rare innocent from
being punished, many guilty persons must be allowed to escape. A Judge does not
preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A Judge
also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. ... Both are public duties.... 14
Vague hunches cannot take the place of judicial evaluation15. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt is a guideline, not a fetish16.

9
(1978) 4 SCC 161
10
Vishal Yadav vs State Of U.P. 2014 Delhi High Court
11
Vishal Yadav vs State Of U.P. 2014 Delhi High Court
12
Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh AIR 1990 SC 209
13
See State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava AIR 1992 SC 840
14
Per Viscount Simon in Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecution [1944 AC 315 quoted in State of
U.P. v. Anil Singh AIR 1988 SC 1998.
15
Vishal Yadav vs State Of U.P. 2014 Delhi High Court
16
Inder Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) AIR 1978 SC 1091

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